Justification and evidence

According to traditional epistemology, a truthful judgment needs a rational justification, at least potentially. Antonio Livi's "alethic logic" follows this principle, which is compatible with some fallibilism, since the available evidence can change in future. In this article Livi's position is discussed facing the famous Gettier's problem: a justified true belief is not equivalent to real knowledge. It is claimed that the problem can be solved in Livi's theory of truth, provided we abandon rationalistic constraints.

According to Williamson, your evidence consists of all and only what you know (E = K). According to his critics, it doesn’t. While E = K calls for revision, the revisions it calls for are minor. E = K gets this much right. Only true propositions can constitute evidence and anything you know non-inferentially is part of your evidence. In this paper, I defend these two theses about evidence and its possession from Williamson’s critics who think we should break more radically from E = K.

This is the first edition of Haack's internationally-acclaimed book, published by Blackwell in 1993.

readers may note with interest Putnam's observation, on the back cover, that Popper, Quine, Rorty, Goldman and the Churchlands, among others "will have to reply." See the second (2009) edition to see how that worked out!

Karl Popper lamented the prevalence of dogmatic argument in philosophy and commended the kind of critical argument that is found in the sciences. David Miller criticises the uncritical nature of so-called critical thinking because of its attachment to dogmatic arguments. I expound and clarify Popper’s distinction between critical and dogmatic arguments and the background to it. I criticise some errors in Miller’s discussion. I reaffirm the need for philosophers to eschew dogmatic arguments in favour of critical ones.

Reliabilism is offered as an alternative to more traditional theories of epistemological justification. After tracing its earlier history, Haack focuses on Goldman's several versions, showing that  all fail. It's time, she argues, to acknowledge that what matters is the quality of a person's evidence---as her foundherentism does.

Verbete publicado em Compêndio de Epistemologia. Editora Fi, 2022.

Há pelo menos três modos pelos quais o debate sobre a conduta doxástica se relaciona com a ética. O primeiro e menos contencioso assinala que o ato de crer, analogamente às ações morais, responde a um tipo de normatividade, não necessariamente moral. Por exemplo, as normas para o ato de crer podem ser puramente epistêmicas. Nesse caso, essas normas diriam respeito a como o agente deve visar ou buscar a verdade. O segundo modo como o debate da ética da crença se relaciona com a ética diz respeito à fundamentação das normas para crer. A ideia é que a adoção dessas normas se fundamenta com base em razões morais e sociais. Por fim, o modo mais substancial consiste em sustentar que o ato de crer, ao menos em alguns casos, é em parte um fenômeno essencialmente moral e que, portanto, razões morais incidem diretamente sobre a legitimidade da crença. Por razões morais, alguém poderia ser recriminado por sustentar uma crença ainda que tivesse evidência favorável para ela. Neste verbete, tangenciando o clássico debate entre Clifford e William James e reações mais contemporâneas ao debate, apresentaremos e discutiremos cada um desses aspectos da ética da crença.

There is a kind of objectivism in epistemology that involves the acceptance of objective epistemic norms. It is generally regarded as harmless. There is another kind of objectivism in epistemology that involves the acceptance of an objectivist account of justification, one that takes the justification of a belief to turn on its accuracy. It is generally regarded as hopeless. It is a strange and unfortunate sociological fact that these attitudes are so prevalent. Objectivism about norms and justification stand or fall together. Justification is simply a matter of conforming to norms. In this essay, I shall make the case for objectivism about justification.

This Guide is now superceded; please see instead (on this website):
'Kant's Critique of Pure Reason: A Study Guide' (under 'Research & Reference Materials'), and
'The Question Answered, What is Kant's "Critical" Philosophy?' (under 'Rational Justification & Mature Judgment' = this sub-section).
Thank you.

Di là da ciò che vedo e ciò che penso, non trovar fondo, non trovar mai posa, da spazio immenso ad altro spazio immenso; forse, giù giù, via via, sperar... che cosa? La sosta! Il fine! Il termine ultimo! Io, io te, di nebulosa in nebulosa, di cielo in cielo, in vano e sempre, Dio!

The quest to provide a fundamental understanding and explanation of reality is an ambitious one. Perhaps it is too ambitious. The possible restrictions for such an enterprise to be successful must be inquired in order to determine the issue. Section 1 explores one’s understanding in reaching (scientific) conclusions: to what extent does a successful account testify to understanding? Section 2 focuses on the other side of such an account: does it provide an explanation in a more fundamental sense than pointing out causes of phenomena, or is it restricted to such a task? A critical stance vis-à-vis the (scientific) enterprise of unearthing reality’s structure remains necessary in order not to confuse a consistent and productive theory with one that demonstrates an understanding and explanation in the sense of this article.

This article is focused on answering the question to what extent one can be a sceptic. Sextus Empiricus’s Outlines of Scepticism serves as a guide. In section 1, it is investigated whether three logical laws have a certain foundation or are subject to doubt. In section 2, Sextus’s way to deal with these laws is examined; the question arises how dogmatic his approach is. After that, a possible ‘reply’ by Sextus to the criticism receives attention. Section 3 is concentrated on a possible alternative to Sextus’s approach. Besides logical laws, some important methods are concerned.

The problem of evil presents the most prominent argument against the existence of God. The basic idea of the problem of evil is simple enough for anyone to understand, but there's still some philosophical work to be done regarding it—some general work about epistemology and some specific work about God and evil.

In recent years, pragmatism in general and John Dewey in particular have been of increasing interest to philosophers of science. Dewey's work provides an interesting alternative package of views to those which derive from the logical empiricists and their critics, on problems of both traditional and more recent vintage. Dewey's work ought to be of special interest to recent philosophers of science committed to the program of analyzing ``science in practice.'' The core of Dewey's philosophy of science is his theory of inquiry---what he called ``logic.'' There is a major lacuna in the literature on this point, however: no contemporary philosophers of science have engaged with Dewey's logical theory, and scholars of Dewey's logic have rarely made connections with philosophy of science. This paper aims to fill this gap, to correct some significant errors in the interpretation of key ideas in Dewey's logical theory, and to show how Dewey's logic provides resources for a philosophy of science.

This is the complete text of the Spanish translation of Haack's EVIDENCE AND INQUIRY.

[There are, unfortunately, problems with the translation,  starting with the title, which would better have been "Prueba e indagacion. For example, "consistency" is wrongly translated "firmeza" (it should be "consistencia"), and "grue" as "glauco" (it should be "verdul")]

Three classic distinctions specify that truths can be necessary versus contingent, analytic versus synthetic, and a priori versus a posteriori. The philosopher reading this article knows very well both how useful and ordinary such distinctions are in our conceptual work and that they have been subject to many and detailed debates, especially the last two. In the following pages, I do not wish to discuss how far they may be tenable. I shall assume that, if they are reasonable and non problematic in some ordinary cases, then they can be used in order to understand what kind of knowledge the maker's knowledge is. By this I mean the sort of knowledge that Alice enjoys when she holds the information (true content) that Bob's coffee is sweetened because she just put two spoons of sugar in it herself. The maker's knowledge tradition is quite important but it is not mainstream in modern and analytic epistemology and lacks grounding in terms of exactly what sort of knowledge one is talking about. My suggestion is that this grounding can be provided by a minimalist approach, based on an information-theoretical analysis. In the article, I argue that (a) we need to decouple a fourth distinction, namely informative versus uninformative, from the previous three and, in particular, from its implicit association with analytic versus synthetic and a priori versus a posteriori; (b) such a decoupling facilitates, and is facilitated by, moving from a monoagent to a multiagent approach: the distinctions qualify a proposition, a message, or some information not just in themselves but relationally, with respect to an informational agent; (c) the decoupling and the multiagent approach enable a re-mapping of currently available positions in epistemology (Classic, Innatist, Kant's and Kripke's) on these four dichotomies; (d) within such a re-mapping, two positions, capturing the nature of a witness' knowledge and of a maker's knowledge, can best be described as contingent, synthetic, a posteriori, and uninformative and as
contingent, synthetic, weakly a priori (ab anteriori), and uninformative respectively. In the conclusion, I indicate why the analysis of the maker’s knowledge has important consequences in all those cases in which the poietic (constructive) intervention on a system determines the truth of the model of that system.

On a standard view a subject's evidence or reasons determines what there is justification to believe and there is only justification to believe when there is strong evidential support. The standard view is wrong about the role that evidence and reasons play. While the reasons that bear on whether to believe determine what there is justification to believe, such reasons are not pieces of evidence and they do not supervene upon a subject's evidence.

The distinction between propositional and doxastic justification is normally applied to belief. The goal of this paper is to apply the distinction to faith and hope. Before doing so, I discuss the nature of faith and hope, and how they contrast with belief—belief has no essential conative component, whereas faith and hope essentially involve the conative. I discuss implications this has for evaluating faith and hope, and apply this to the propositional/doxastic distinction. There are two key upshots. One, bringing in faith and hope makes salient additional normative categories, including the way the distinction between epistemic and practical justification interacts with the distinction between propositional and doxastic justification. Two, a paradigm example of propositional without doxastic justification is a belief that is evidentially supported but based on wishful thinking. Surprisingly, parallel cases of faith and hope may actually enjoy both propositional and doxastic justification. I conclude by exploring what it might look like for faith and hope to have propositional justification without doxastic justification.

Hume's problem of induction not only asserts that inductive reasoning is circular, but it also implies the stronger claim that it is incapable of justification. Since matters of fact can only be known through experience, any claim of matter of fact can only be justified by recourse to experience, which commits the logical fallacy of circularity each time it attempts to do so. This paper explores Hume's problem and its implications for scientific reasoning. I will first give a brief explication of Hume's problem. Next, I will explore its implications for the scientific goals of explanation, prediction, and control, and whether these goals are capable of justification. Lastly, I will conclude with a pragmatic approach. I will explicitly avoid referring to my analysis as a solution but rather, as a pragmatic approach. I happen to find Hume’s argument persuasive, and I also agree with Hume that induction is incapable of justification insofar as it is circular. Thus, to the extent that solutions are aimed to solve the problem of circularity, I will avoid framing my analysis as such as to not represent it as something that solves the problem of circularity – because it does not.

Doxastic voluntarism maintains that we have voluntary control over our beliefs. It is generally denied by contemporary philosophers. I argue that doxastic voluntarism is true: normally, and insofar as we are rational, we are able to suspend belief and, provided we have a natural inclination to believe, we are able to rescind that suspension, and thus to choose to believe. I show that the arguments that have been offered against doxastic voluntarism fail; and that, if the denial of doxastic voluntarism is part of a strategy to defeat scepticism, it is inept, because knowledge presupposes doubt.

In 1933 G ¨ odel introduced a calculus of provability (also known as modal logic S4) and left open the question of its exact intended semantics. In this paper we give a solution to this problem. We find the logic LP of propositions and proofs and show that G ¨ odel's provability calculus is nothing but the forgetful projection of LP. This also achieves G ¨ odel's objective of defining intuitionistic propositional logic Int via classical proofs and provides a Brouwer-Heyting-Kolmogorov style provability semantics for Int which resisted formalization since the early 1930s. LP may be regarded as a unified underlying structure for intuitionistic, modal logics, typed combinatory logic and-calculus.

El trabajo explora la controversia entre las concepciones atomistas y holistas del razonamiento probatorio con el objeto de evaluar críticamente sus contribuciones desde la perspectiva de una teoría normativa de la justifi cación de la decisión judicial sobre los hechos. La autora reconoce a las aproximaciones holistas el mérito de haber iluminado la relevancia semántica de la integración de las proposiciones a probar en un relato global del caso y la relevancia justifi cativa de la integración explicativa entre cada una de ellas y el conjunto de pruebas disponibles. Pero a la vez sostiene que, por razones epistémicas y jurídicas, en la arquitectura de la justifi cación probatoria cada hecho principal debe mantenerse atomísticamente diferenciado como objeto de prueba y respecto de cada elemento de prueba debe analizarse en forma individualizada su fi abilidad y la solidez de la inferencia que lo conecta con un hecho principal.

It is often assumed that there is a close connection between Quine’s criticism of the analytic/synthetic distinction, in ‘Two dogmas of empiricism’ and onwards, and his thesis of the indeterminacy of translation, in Word and Object and onwards. Often, the claim that the distinction is unsound (in some way or other) is taken to follow from the indeterminacy thesis, and sometimes the indeterminacy thesis is supported by such a claim. However, a careful scrutiny of the indeterminacy thesis as stated by Quine, and the varieties of the analytic/synthetic distinction, reveals that the two claims are mutually independent. Neither does the claim that the distinction is unsound follow from the indeterminacy thesis, nor that thesis from unsoundness claim, under any of the common interpretations of the analytic/synthetic distinction.

It is natural to suppose that a reason of the form that so-and-so said that p can be (among) one’s reason(s) for believing that p.  Let us call reasons of this kind “testimonial reasons.”  There are at least two fundamental questions we can ask about the nature of testimonial reasons.  First, what is the nature and strength of these reasons?  This is a question at the heart of the epistemology of testimony literature.  Second, what is/are the mechanism(s) by which testimonial reasons are generated?  This is a question at the intersection of philosophy of language and epistemology, as the mechanisms in question might pertain to the speaker’s testimony, the hearer’s apprehension of that testimony, or some combination of the two.  In this chapter I propose to address both of these questions.

Abstract: On the standard story about knowledge, knowledge has a normative dimension by virtue of the fact that knowledge involves justification. On the standard story, justification is necessary but insufficient for knowledge. The additional conditions that distinguish knowledge from justified belief are normatively insignificant.  In this chapter we will consider whether the concept of knowledge might be irrelevant to normative questions in epistemology. Some proponents of the standard story might think that it is, but we shall see that the concept of knowledge might play three important roles in answering normative questions in epistemology. The concept might be useful in helping us understand evidence and epistemic reasons, the kind of rational support required for justification, and in formulating epistemic norms.

TRUTH AND LEGAL ARGUMENTATION IN FYODOR DOSTOEVSKY'S THE KARAMAZOV BROTHERS 2 We examine the reasons of the judicial error in the Dmitry Karamazov case depicted by Fyodor Dostoevsky in The Karamazov Brothers and argue that the truth can and should be established in both of the process types, adversary and investigative, and that the three conceptions of truth, referential, inferential and pragmatic, play an evaluative role in that. The Dmitry Karamazov case shows that the formal view of the truth suffices for deciding a case, but it cannot prevent judicial errors when the epistemological ideal of the material truth falls into oblivion.

This essay argues that acknowledging the existence of mind-independent facts is a matter of vital importance, in that acquiescence before the layout of the world is something demanded of knowing agents from the most elementary empirical deliverance to the most abstract construct. Building on the idea that normativity requires the presence of more than one option to choose from, the essay shows how the cessation of one's life is the disjunctive alternative of any experiential episode. This much has been missed, it argues, because of a generalized failure to appreciate how even the simplest atomic contents embroil their subjects in acts of assent. Its account thus casts a new light on relativism and skepticism, revealing them to be provisional luxuries supported only by the cognitive labor of others.

This is an account of Sceptical investigation as it is presented by Sextus Empiricus. I focus attention on the motivation behind the Sceptic’s investigation, the goal of that investigation, and on the development Sextus describes from proto-Sceptical to Sceptical investigator. I suggest that recent accounts of the Sceptic’s investigative practice do not make sufficient sense of the fact that the Sceptic finds a relief from disturbance by way of suspending judgement, nor of the apparent continuity between proto-Sceptical and Sceptical investigation. I offer an alternative account which turns on the suggestion that the Sceptic accepts that justification is the norm of belief.

According to traditional epistemology, a truthful judgment needs a rational justification, at least potentially. Antonio Livi's "alethic logic" follows this principle, which is compatible with some fallibilism, since the available evidence can change in future. In this article Livi's position is discussed facing the famous Gettier's problem: a justified true belief is not equivalent to real knowledge. It is claimed that the problem can be solved in Livi's theory of truth, provided we abandon rationalistic constraints.

This Introduction to the special issue on "Skepticism and Justification" provides a background to the nine articles collected here and a detailed summary of each, which highlights their interconnections and relevance to the debate at the heart of the issue.

This study provides a critical appraisal of Duncan Pritchard’s (2012) argument to the effect that ability to preserve certain eminently plausible transmission and/or closure principles for knowledge serves as a powerful adequacy test on alternative accounts of so-called Wittgensteinian certainties or hinge commitments. I argue that Pritchard fails to establish this claim and that the transmission test does not favor his favorite conception over alternative conceptions premised on the idea that hinge commitments are not supportable via evidential-cognitive routes.

I defend the view that there are no false, justified beliefs.  This paper has been kicking around in some form or other since 2007. Most of this paper has been incorporated into Justification and the Truth-Connection (Cambridge University Press). While I think most of it's still pretty right, I think that I've improved upon this paper. See 'Justification and Action' above as well as 'The Unity of Reason'.

In a recent article Dylan Dodd has argued that anyone who holds that all knowledge is evidence must concede that we know next to nothing about the external world. The argument is intended to show that any infallibilist account of knowledge is committed to scepticism, and that anyone who identifies our evidence with the propositions we know is committed to infallibilism. I shall offer some reasons for thinking Dodd’s argument is unsound, and explain where his argument goes wrong.

Critica della responsabilità seriale. Un contributo alla logica e alla metodologia del ragionamento probatorio Sommario: Premessa. -1. La responsabilità seriale: criterî di definizione. -2. Responsabilità seriale e ragionamento interpretativo: l'istituto del precedente giudiziario. -3. Responsabilità seriale e ragionamento probatorio: introduzione. -4. La natura del ragionamento probatorio conclusivo del giudice. -4.1. La concezione deduttiva. -4.2. La concezione induttiva. -5. Osservazioni sull'alternativa concezione deduttiva/concezione induttiva. -6. Aspetti strutturali e teleologici delle forme di ragionamento probatorio giudiziario. -7. Forme di ragionamento probatorio, soggetti e fasi processuali. -7.1. Il pubblico ministero che inizia le indagini. -7.2. Il pubblico ministero che prosegue le indagini e il giudice che istruisce il dibattimento. -7.3. Il pubblico ministero che decide se promuovere il giudizio e il giudice che valuta la prova in sede di decisione conclusiva. -8. Lineamenti di metodologia del ragionamento probatorio. -8.1. Scomponibilità dell'enunciato principale. -8.2. Requisiti fondamentali dei criterî inferenziali. -9. Critica della dottrina della congruenza narrativa. -10. Tipi di responsabilità seriale al livello della quaestio facti. -10.1. Le semplificazioni probatorie esogene. -10.2. Le semplificazioni probatorie endogene. -11. Il caso "Hotel 'Stella'". -12. Critica dell'affermazione di responsabilità da un punto di vista logico-deduttivo. -13. Critica dell'affermazione di responsabilità in quanto fondata sul solo criterio della congruenza narrativa. -14. Critica dell'affermazione di responsabilità da un punto di vista logico-induttivo. -15. Riepilogo.

It is clear that beliefs can be assessed both as to their justification and their rationality. What is not as clear, however, is how the rationality and justification of belief relate to one another. Stewart Cohen has stumped for the popular proposal that rationality and justification come to the same thing, that rational beliefs just are justified beliefs, supporting his view by arguing that 'justified belief' and 'rational belief' are synonymous. In this paper, I will give reason to think that Cohen's argument is spurious. I will show that 'rational' and 'justified' occupy two distinct semantic categories - 'rational' is an absolute gradable adjective and 'justified' is a relative gradable adjective - telling against the thought that 'rational belief' and 'justified belief' are synonymous. I will then argue that the burden of proof is on those who would equate rationality and justification, making the case that those who hold this prominent position face the difficulty of explaining how rationality and justification come to the same thing even though 'rational' and 'justified' are not synonymous.

Christian Beyer bringt in seinem kompakten Vortrag nahezu alle für Husserls transzendentale Phänomenologie relevanten Begriffe ins Spiel und beleuchtet diese im Lichte von drei prominenten zeitgenössischen Theorien der Rechtfertigung -nämlich Kohärentismus, Fundamentalismus und Kontextualismus. Als Leitfaden dient ihm dabei der wichtigste Grundbegriff der phänomenologischen Tradition, nämlich die Intentionalität des Bewusstseins. In einem kreisförmigen Argumentationsgang, der mit Husserls realistischer und anti-repräsentationalistischer Auffassung von Intentionalität beginnt und endet, wird vorgeführt, wie sich die apodiktische Evidenz der je eigenen gegenwärtigen Erlebnisse im inneren Zeitbewusstsein Schritt für Schritt ausdehnt: zunächst auf die retinierten und (nah und stetig) erinnerten Erlebnisse, dann auf die "zeitübergreifenden" Objekte der Eigenheitssphäre, sodann auf die Welt um mich herum und, schlussendlich, via Einfühlung, auf andere Egos und eine intersubjektiv geteilte objektive Lebenswelt, die gleichwohl noch das Gepräge gewisser "subjektiver Strukturen" trägt. Indem der "naive" Realismus dergestalt rehabilitiert wird, erweist er sich als gerechtfertigt, oder, wie es auch bei Husserl heißt, "gegen jeden vernünftigen Zweifel" abgesichert. Insgesamt vertritt Beyer somit die Leitthese, dass transzendentale Phänomenologie bei Husserl au fond ein erkenntnistheoretisches Projekt sei, das auf Rechtfertigung des Realismus der natürlichen Einstellung abziele. Die dabei relevante Art der Rechtfertigung sei primär kohärentistisch bzw. holistisch, während fundamentalistische Lesarten in die Irre führten. Durch folgendes kleine Argument, das bei Beyer (und Husserl) eher zwischen den Zeilen steht, lässt sich ferner begründen, dass die so verstandene Phänomenologie Erste Philosophie sein muss: