Economic Statecraft

The rising conventional wisdom has it that China has introduced a bold new era of "economic statecraft", as evidenced by the high profile introduction of new institutions like the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and new initiatives like One Belt One Road. Yet there has been little debate about how new or how transformative China’s recent foreign economic policies and initiatives really are.

Economic sanctions create adverse humanitarian outcomes on health and welfare that can be organized into the following six categories: 1) food and nutrition 2) medicine and pharmaceuticals 3) water and sanitation 4) life expectancy and mortality rates 5) chilling effect on finance for humanitarian aid groups and 6) authoritarian rule, repression, and human rights abuses. Humanitarian exemptions are currently inadequate; there need to be categorically exempt goods, uniform criteria and definitions for decision-making, monitoring procedures to allow targeted states to import dual-use items, elimination of delays that result in expired goods, and commitments binding the UN and sanctioning states to comply with the Geneva Conventions and international humanitarian law (IHL). It is uncertain whether targeted sanctions produce fewer or less severe humanitarian consequences compared to comprehensive sanctions.

In this book, Arturo Santa-Cruz advances an understanding of power as a social
relationship and applies it consistently to the economic realm in United States
relations with other countries of the Western Hemisphere. Following the academic and popular debate on the ebb and flow of US hegemony, this work
centers the analysis in a critical case for the exercise of US power through its
economic statecraft: the Americas—its historical zone of influence. The rationale for the regional focus is methodological: if it can be shown that Washington’s
sway has decreased in the area since the early 1970s, when the discussion about
this matter started, it can be safely assumed that the same has occurred in other
latitudes. The analysis focuses on three regions: North America, Central America
and South America. Since each region contains countries that have at times
maintained very different relationships with the United States, the findings contribute to a better understanding of the practice of US power in the sub-region
in question, adding greater variability to the overall results.

In this book, Arturo Santa-Cruz advances an understanding of power as a social relationship and applies it consistently to the economic realm in United States relations with other countries of the Western Hemisphere. Following the academic and popular debate on the ebb and flow of US hegemony, this work centers the analysis in a critical case for the exercise of US power through its economic statecraft: the Americas-its historical zone of influence. The rationale for the regional focus is methodological: if it can be shown that Washington's sway has decreased in the area since the early 1970s, when the discussion about this matter started, it can be safely assumed that the same has occurred in other latitudes. The analysis focuses on three regions: North America, Central America and South America. Since each region contains countries that have at times maintained very different relationships with the United States, the findings contribute to a better understanding of the practice of US power in the sub-region in question, adding greater variability to the overall results.

This book is about Japan-China power politics in the military, economic and propaganda domains. The post-2012 standoff over the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands has unveiled the antagonistic quality to Sino-Japanese relations, with an important addition: a massive information war that has cemented the two states' rivalry. Under the Xi and Abe administrations, China and Japan insisted on their moral position as benign and peaceful powers, and portrayed the neighbor as an aggressive revisionist. By highlighting great power rivalry, this study makes a theoretical contribution in favor of the power politics behind Sino-Japanese identities. The work is multidisciplinary in spirit and aims to speak both to academics and to general readers who might be curious of understanding this fascinating --if worrisome-- facet of Sino-Japanese relations. In turn, the assessment of the diplomatic, economic and identity clash between the world's second and third wealthiest states provides a window in understanding the international politics of the Asia-Pacific in the early 21st Century. This book is an invaluable resource for scholars, Area Studies and Political Science students and policymakers alike.

This paper decomposes global inequality in redistribution, using data from the World Development Indicators data set of the World Bank. It finds that per capita income has a modest, yet persistent effect on redistribution. More provocatively, the paper also demonstrates that, over and beyond the impact of per capita GDP, global inequalities in redistribution over the last generation or so strongly reflect the double legacies of colonialism (improving the likelihood of redistribution in former-colonizer societies and sharply reducing it in erstwhile-colonized, recently independent societies). In addition, it also finds that the history of recent exposure to state socialism increases the presence of redistributive institutions, partly counterbalancing the effects of lower national incomes. The data have been obtained from the World Bank's online open-access data site World Development Indicators, http://data.worldbank.org.

It has been more than a year and a half since the European Union and the United States have imposed an array of economic sanctions against Russia. Economic sanctions of Western countries followed the annexation of Crimean peninsula by Russia in March 2014. Prior to the annexation, Viktor Yanukovychthe President of Ukrainewas forced into resignation following massive street protests caused by his refusal to sign the Association Agreement with the European Union. In parallel, the socalled Crimean Crisis developed, leading to the Russian-backed referendum held on the peninsula asking people about joining Russia. The sanctions of the United States were based on three executive orders of President Obama issued in March 2014. Over time the scale, types and number of targets of sanctions have increased. Incomplete list of US economic sanctions against Russia included: a) Asset freezes and restrictions on financial transactions for specific entities, particularly, state-owned banks, energy companies, arm producers and certain individuals; b) export embargo on oil-related and dual-use technology; c) asset

Many states, or rather their leaders and officials, routinely violate the fundamental human rights of both their compatriots or outsiders. Faced with this depressing catalogue of abuses, the international community's response of choice consists in imposing economic sanctions on wrongdoers. The relatively scant philosophical literature on the topic tackles primary sanctions-where the sanctioning party (Sender) restricts economic relationships between, on the one hand, the sanctioned party (Target) and, on the other hand, agents of any nationality who are located on its own territory, or its own nationals wherever they are located – in other words, agents who are subject to its territorial and/or personal jurisdiction. In this paper however I focus on unilateral secondary sanctions, whereby Sender seeks to restrict the economic activities of agents who are not subject to its territorial and/or personal jurisdiction, on the grounds that they trade with or invest in Target. I provide a cosmopolitan defence of those sanctions as a means to stop ongoing grievous human rights violations. I proceed as follows. First, I outline the central tenets of cosmopolitan morality which I take for granted throughout this paper. I then mount my cosmopolitan defence of unilateral secondary sanctions. I end by rejecting the view that multilateral authorisa-tion is a necessary condition for sanctions in general and secondary sanctions in particular, though I consider cases where such authorisation is warranted.

Militære maktmidler har i lang tid dominert tenkningen omkring hvordan stater sikrer sin suverenitet,
sitt territorium og sin befolkning. Økonomiske kapasiteter og makt har i stor grad blitt holdt adskilt
fra analyser av forsvars- og sikkerhetspolitikk. I nyere tid har det imidlertid blitt større oppmerksomhet på at stater kan bruke sine økonomiske kapasiteter for å oppnå strategiske og politiske mål i
internasjonal politikk. Økonomiske virkemidler har slik potensial for å true andre staters sikkerhetsinteresser. Bekymringer knyttet til utenlandske investeringer i Norge innen strategisk viktige sektorer
som telekommunikasjon og IT har spesielt skutt fart. Investeringer er imidlertid bare ett av mange
økonomiske virkemidler en stat kan benytte seg av for å nå strategiske mål – og de økonomiske
virkemidlene kan på sin side kombineres med ikke-økonomiske virkemidler som cyber- eller påvirkningsoperasjoner. Denne rapporten er et bidrag til å gi norske myndigheter bedre forståelse for de
truslene og utfordringene vi står overfor i møtet med denne nye virkeligheten.
I rapporten studerer vi hvordan andre staters bruk av økonomiske virkemidler kan true nasjonal
sikkerhet. Vi drøfter også hvordan identifiserte utfordringskategorier for sikkerhetstruende virksomhet
kan integreres i en risiko- og sårbarhetsanalyse. Det er imidlertid utenfor denne rapportens omfang å
gjennomføre en full analyse. Rapporten har til formål å avdekke sentrale områder for videre utredning
og forskning om hvordan investeringer og andre økonomiske virkemidler kan true nasjonal sikkerhet
samt politikkutforming innen området. Vi identifiserer flere områder der kunnskapsgrunnlaget er
særlig svakt. Dersom Norge skal lykkes i å beskytte seg mot økonomiske virkemidler, må vi bedre
forstå både truslene som kan ramme oss, våre sårbarheter og hvordan disse henger sammen med
verdiene vi ønsker å beskytte i det norske samfunnet.
Det finnes bred forskningslitteratur om staters bruk av økonomiske virkemidler for å oppnå strategiske
mål, men studiene er sjelden konkrete om hvilke trusler og sårbarheter en småstat som Norge vil ha
overfor stormakter og andre staters bruk av slike midler. Vi identifiserer også flere andre sentrale
kunnskapsgap i litteraturen. Til sammen er det derfor utfordrende å avdekke truslene fra utenlandske
investeringer og andre økonomiske virkemidler mot Norge. For å kunne beskrive de ulike typene
trusler som Norge kan møte, har vi strukturert innsikten fra litteraturen i en morfologisk analyse. På
den måten får vi beskrevet handlinger hvor det er relativt få historiske eksempler, men som likevel er
aktuelle for Norge. Vi identifiserer seks utfordringskategorier hvor økonomiske virkemidler kan utgjøre
sikkerhetstruende virksomhet: tilrettelegge for skjult angrep og sabotasje, statlig påvirkningsaktivitet,
statlig etterretningsaktivitet, omgå ikke-spredningsbestemmelser, beskytte strategiske interesser og
endre styrkeforhold. Det er også mulig å kombinere disse handlingene med andre virkemidler. Slike
kombinasjoner kan gi en dypere forståelse av truslene fra økonomiske virkemidler.
Trusler er én av tre dimensjoner i en risiko- og sårbarhetsanalyse. Det er også viktig å vurdere hva
som er verdifullt for oss og som vi følgelig ønsker å beskytte. Vi diskuterer hvordan grunnleggende
nasjonale funksjoner kan representere verdier samt potensielle utfordringer ved dette. Deretter redegjør vi for relevante aspekter å ta hensyn til langs dimensjonen sårbarheter, inkludert avhengigheter
mellom sektorer og prosesser, kompleksitet, tilstedeværelsen av effektive barrierer og kontekstuelle
og landspesifikke faktorer. Innenfor hver dimensjon gir vi anbefalinger til videre studier og analyser
for å tette kunnskapshull.

The economic statecraft as the international economic tools of fallowing the strategic goals of countries is a new notion in economic studies of foreign policy. The materialist approaches ever consulted this field. These researches by linking the economic tools with politics, hard power, survival, and security have expanded the theoretical sphere of economic statecraft. By their emphasizing on the role of material elements and political goals in utilizing of economic instruments, economic statecraft has been declined to the power of politics and the analytical tool of the great powers' negative competitions and their dictating relations with developing countries. The realistic and traditional economic statecraft is in lack of applying capacity to developing countries and analysis of the role of meta-material elements in foreign policy. The article aims at to link the economic statecraft to "policy of development" and the social approach of foreign policy. What are the effective elements at the success of developing countries in utilizing the international economic tools? Invoking to the international economic tools is rooted the national necessity of development, identity, and socialization. By changing the egoistic identity to the collective identity during the process of international socialization, legitimacy and knowledge context of optimization the transnational sources will be prepared and reached. Development is the final target of international socialization and economic statecraft. In narrative of sociality and development will be dismiss the realistic declining and be applied to developing countries. The focal points of Iran's contemporary statecraft events have been the struggle on economic tools and international political norms; means the patterns of modernization and constructing of economic development and the patterns of constitution and republican of political development. The non-collective political identity and international non-socialization are the obstacles of succession of Iran's economic statecraft.

Sanctions have played a vital role in the creation of American and international policy toward North Korea. However, lax enforcement and the nature of North Korea as a hard target have minimised sanctions success. Therefore, it is time for the international community to think of implementing a new strategy. This paper will argue the need for a positive sanctions regime, leveraging the interests of China, South Korea, and the United States, which rewards Pyongyang for taking substantial steps toward denuclearisation and will show how such a regime can be implemented into our current policy on North Korean denuclearisation.

Abstract The events preceding the 2013 Maidan protests exemplified Russia's use of its economic power over Ukraine. In trying to prevent Kyiv leaving its orbit, Moscow threatened economic rupture and closed borders, used phytosanitary and technical norms to impose import bans, and demanded swift payment of Ukraine's debt to Russia. Accompanying these negative measures were incentives: Russia promised Ukraine significant concessions in the form of loans or preferential trade treatment. As a result of this pressure, President Viktor Yanukovych, against his own preferences, refused to sign the Association Agreement with the European Union. Nevertheless, Moscow's pressure did not succeed in compelling Yanukovych to join Russia's Eurasian Economic Union.

At least since Athenian trade sanctions helped to spark the Peloponnesian War, economic coercion has been a prominent tool of foreign policy. In the modern era, sovereign states and multilateral institutions have imposed economic sanctions on dictatorial regimes or would-be nuclear powers as an alternative to waging war. They have conditioned offers of aid, loans, and debt relief on recipients' willingness to implement market and governance reforms. Such methods interfere in freedom of trade and the internal affairs of sovereign states, yet are widely used as a means to advance human rights. But are they morally justifiable?Cecile Fabre's Economic Statecraft: Human Rights, Sanctions, and Conditionality provides the first sustained response to that question. For millennia, philosophers have explored the ethics of war, but rarely the ethics of economic carrots and sticks. Yet the issues raised could hardly be more urgent. On what grounds can we justify sanctions, in light of the harms they inflict on civilians? If, as some argue, there is a human right to basic assistance, should donors be allowed to condition the provision of aid on recipients' willingness to do their bidding?Drawing on human rights theories, theories of justifiable harm, and examples such as IMF lending practices and international sanctions on Russia and North Korea, Fabre offers a defense of economic statecraft in some of its guises. An empirically attuned work of philosophy, Economic Statecraft lays out a normative framework for an important tool of diplomacy.