EU Procedure Law

Jako niezgodne z zasadą prawdy materialnej należy uznać działania organu podatkowego, który a priori, a więc bez przeprowadzenia postępowania dowodowego, przyjmuje np. kwalifikację danego obiektu jako budynku mieszkalno-letniskowego, zawartą w treści pozwolenia na budowę. Tak ustalona podstawa faktyczna rozstrzygnięcia podatkowego, kiedy przedmiotem sporu jest charakter budynku, jego przeznaczenie bądź cechy użytkowe, będzie z natury wadliwa i niepełna. Wyłączenie uprawnienia do odliczenia od podatku dochodowego od osób fizycznych wydatków poniesionych na budowę takiego obiektu możliwe jest jedynie, gdy organ podatkowy, niezależnie od treści pozwolenia na budowę, zbada, a następnie oceni rzeczywiste funkcje i przeznaczenie wzniesionego obiektu zgodnie z zasadą prawdy materialnej.

Użyte w art. 197 § 1 Ordynacji podatkowej słowo "może" a nie "obowiązany jest" wskazuje, iż prawna regulacja korzystania z opinii biegłego lub biegłych pozostawia organowi swobodę w zastosowaniu z tego rodzaju środka dowodowego. Mimo tego zakres tej swobody wyznaczany jest m.in. dyrektywą zawartą w art. 122 Ordynacji, a więc zobowiązującą organ podatkowy do ustalenia faktów prawotwórczych lub innych zgodnie z prawdą materialną.

Rezygnację z przeprowadzenia dowodu z opinii biegłego nie może zatem usprawiedliwiać stanowisko organu podatkowego, że powołanie biegłego lub biegłych opóźni zakończenie sprawy. Nie pomniejszając znaczenia i roli zasady szybkości i prostoty postępowania, wartością nadrzędną w postępowaniu podatkowym jest bowiem osiągnięcie prawdy materialnej i zbudowanie na niej podstawy faktycznej rozstrzygnięcia podatkowego.

Przedmiotem oceny uprzedniej dowodów musi być m.in. analiza zgromadzonego materiału dowodowego dokonana pod kątem legalności jego uzyskania. Analiza ta prowadzić musi więc do odpowiedzi na pytanie, czy zachowane zostały wymagane przez Ordynację [podatkową] formy procesowe przeprowadzenia poszczególnych dowodów, a także czy materiał dowodowy nie opiera się np. na dowodach fałszywych. W wyniku takiej oceny organ podatkowy musi odrzucić dowody sprzeczne z prawem, nawet jeśli istniałyby przesłanki pozwalające przypuszczać, iż przyczynią się one w pewien sposób do wyjaśnienia stanu faktycznego sprawy.

Zaniechanie przez organy podatkowe uzasadniania swoich decyzji w sposób przekonujący i zgodny z dyspozycją art. 122 Ordynacji powoduje wadliwość w stopniu przemawiającym za ich uchyleniem. Ustalenie stanu faktycznego niezgodne z prawdą materialną prowadzi bowiem w sposób oczywisty do naruszenia prawa.

The need for cross-border cooperation in family matters in the European Union was identified and politically expressed already in the 1990s. The first legislative act adopted in this field was the Brussels II Regulation of 2000. It unified, on the EU level, the rules on international jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and parental responsibility. In 2021, six EU regulations are in use in this field. In 2022, the second recast of the Brussels II Regulation will enter into application. Beside the mentioned cross-border procedural rules, the regulations also bring unified choice of law rules, while other EU regulations in the field of private international law enable simplified cross-border service of documents and taking of evidence.
The number of unified rules in cross-border family disputes is thus growing, which enhances legal certainty of the European families. However, the fragmented regulation and different temporal and territorial scopes of application of the “family regulations” result in a complex mosaic of rules, which is often unclear and difficult to apply. The paper aims to present a wholesome view of the legislation in force and provides information on the interplay among different regulations. Thus, it strives to enhance a rapid and correct application of this legislation, which is of crucial importance for European citizens. The paper also emphasises the importance of the broader context of the EU cooperation in family matters, namely the EU private international law in general, and of the international treaties in family law, especially the Hague conventions.

Who should prove the existence or nonexistence of some fact in a judicial proceeding? Should the Claimant help the Defendant to prove asserts of truth of particular facts or vice versa? Is there a new rule within all the rules governing the presentation of facts and proof in proceedings before courts? Those are issues of a great importance studied by scholars and courts in the last years relating to the law of evidence and this essay which provides a framework for further research gives a particularly and critic point of view influenced by a vision of the process as an instrument of freedom or as a right that point to protect freedoms.

Postępowanie podatkowe uznać należy za wadliwe, jeśli pominięto w nim, objęty żądaniem strony, dowód ze świadka wskazanego przez stronę, na tej jedynie podstawie, iż według opinii administracji podatkowej zeznanie świadka byłoby z pewnością tendencyjne. Pogląd ten nie dotyczy jednak sytuacji, w których okoliczności objęte przedmiotem postępowania stwierdzone zostały w sposób wystarczający innym dowodem.
Negatywnie z punktu widzenia realizacji zasady swobodnej oceny dowodów należy odnieść się do przypadków, w których stronę pozbawia się udziału w postępowaniu podatkowym, np. z uzasadnieniem, że jej uczestnictwo w przeprowadzeniu dowodu nie jest konieczne. Jest to niezgodne z dyspozycją art. 190 § 2 O.p. Strona musi mieć, w myśl art. 192 Ordynacji, zagwarantowaną możliwość wypowiedzenia się co do przeprowadzonych dowodów. Natomiast skutkiem procesowym niezachowania tego rodzaju wymogów jest fakt, iż żadna okoliczność faktyczna ustalona bez udziału strony nie może być uznana za udowodnioną. Dlatego naruszenie zasady wyrażonej w art. 192 może być podstawą wznowienia zakończonego ostateczną decyzją postępowania podatkowego.

This article examines how «residence» has been used as a mechanism to regulate welfare access in Italy and UK. The two countries have very different approaches to monitoring and registering local populations, but share a drive towards «differential inclusion» which has led to systemic paradoxes and has been characterised by discretionality and political frictions. This «residential bordering» of welfare rights has particularly targeted migrants and progressively extended to EU nationals and other vulnerable groups.

In common law jurisdictions litigants are free to represent themselves in person. A right to self-representation in civil proceedings has been taken for granted as an obvious expression of the right of access to court. Consequently, no attempt has been made to investigate the theoretical justification of self-representation, and mandatory legal representation has never been contemplated. This article identifies three possible reasons for the conflation of the right to litigate in person with the right of access to court: (1) the long history of self-representation, (2) the conceptual perception of procedural rights as necessarily personal, and (3) the empirical belief that litigants in person are typically poor. The article challenges the capacity of these reasons to justify vesting litigants with an unfettered power to decide whether to represent themselves in person or to instruct counsel. It argues that as a matter of principle the right of access to court does not entail a right to self-representation in all circumstances. When a litigant in person lacks the skills and expertise to conduct his or her case competently and imposes a disproportionate strain on court resources, the court should be entitled to require the litigant to obtain legal representation as a prerequisite for proceeding with the case.

Podstawa faktyczna decyzji podatkowej zawiera okoliczności, które w poszukiwaniu i rekonstrukcji podatkowego stanu faktycznego organ podatkowy uznał za udowodnione i w oparciu o nie dokonał rozstrzygnięcia, wydając stosowne orzeczenie. Jest ona więc końcowym, a zarazem głównym efektem oceny dowodów dokonanej w całym postępowaniu podatkowym.

Centralnym zagadnieniem domniemania faktycznego jest związek pomiędzy pośrednim faktem dowodowym a faktem domniemanym, który stanowi o jego istocie. Dla skutecznego przeprowadzenia domniemania faktycznego związek między pośrednimi faktami dowodowymi a faktami domniemanymi powinien odpowiadać pewnym właściwościom. Celowe zatem jest ich uchwycenie i zwrócenie uwagi na rolę, jaką odgrywają w skutecznym przeprowadzaniu domniemań faktycznych. Natomiast znajomość tej problematyki może skłaniać do
szerszego stosowania domniemań faktycznych w postępowaniu podatkowym.

Ustalanie stanu faktycznego w drodze domniemania może więc być przedmiotem sądowoadministracyjnej kontroli przestrzegania prawa. Przydatne do tego mogą być określone wzorce postępowania, którymi powinny kierować się organy podatkowe, dokonując rekonstrukcji stanu faktycznego za pomocą domniemania faktycznego.

International treaties therefore have priority over provisions of domestic origin (domestic lex arbitri). This mainly concerns two conventions, namely the New York Convention (1958) and the European Convention on International Commercial Arbitration (1961). In the field of international arbitration, specifically the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards, these two conventions were historically preceded by two international treaty acts. If it is possible to apply both the provisions of bilateral interstate treaties (as mentioned above, primarily the legal assistance treaties) and the provisions of multilateral conventions, then the bilateral treaties are usually prioritized as a quasi lex specialis. Mainly the reflection the bilateral treaties (legal assistance treaties), but often also the reflection of the European Convention on International Commercial Arbitration (1961) will often be omitted.

This course will explore the field of international commercial arbitration, which has become the default method of dispute resolution. Students can expect to study both Philippine and foreign commentaries, statutes and case law on the subject.  Topics include (1) an introduction to the field of commercial arbitration, now the “main” – as opposed to “alternative” – mode of dispute resolution; (2) domestic arbitration in the historical perspective; (3) UNCITRAL Model Law, New York Convention, other treaty frameworks, and their international responses; (4) the arbitration process, from agreement to enforcement; (5) judicial policing of arbitration; (6) the development of the function of arbitration in foreign investment law; (7) arbitration in state contracts; (8) making use of special opportunities for clients; (9) survey of existing Philippine laws and rules on ADR; and (10) arbitration and the Rule of Law.

Article 260 TFEU (the former Article 228 EC) now provides for financial sanctions to be applied more easily, and in more situations. This paper examines the operation of the new rules, and the impact that they could have on the enforcement of EU law in practice.

this text examines art. 6, §7-B of Law 11.101/2005, dependent on Law 14.112/2020, which provides for a specific form of judicial cooperation between the judges of tax execution lawsuit and judicial reorganization lawsuit when in the first it is determined the practice of acts of constriction in the face of the company in crisis. It seeks to pre-sent criteria for the interpretation and application of the legal provision considering the exception to the rule of suspension of proceedings brought in the face of the debtor (stay period) of the tax executions.

After the entry into force of the Federal Law n. 13.146/2015, persons with intellectual disability can make use of the Supported Decision Making mechanism, in order to ensure assistance in the practice of certain acts. It is a protective institute for those persons with disabilities who, despite being legally capable, choose to build a support network with at least two people they trust. However, it is necessary to analyze the impacts of the institution of Supported Decision-Making, notably with regard to the possible limitation to the procedural capacity of the person with a supported disability. This aspect is the object of investigation of this work.

There exists no `international bar' regulating the practice of forensic advocacy before international courts and tribunals. Before arbitral tribunals such as the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes and the Iran-US Claims Tribunal, legal argumentation is almost entirely left to the discretion of parties. There has been concern amongst participants in the arbitral process regarding ethical issues that have arisen concerning the conduct of representatives. Through analysis of ICSID procedural rules and jurisprudence, with supplementary reference to other investment arbitral tribunals as well as the Iran-US Claims Tribunal, it is argued that there is a need for procedural reform in order to introduce common and strict ethical standards of conduct for counsel appearing before such tribunals. In the absence of prescribed admission requirements or deontological rules, it is further submitted that ICSID tribunals have an inherent power to protect the integrity of their own proceedings by sanctioning representatives for misconduct. It is recommended that, as part of the progressive professionalisation of the international judicial system, the principles of integrity of arbitral proceedings, fair trial and equality of arms require that all litigants' representatives be subjected to uniform standards of conduct.

1 Tesi di laurea in diritto processuale civile intitolata: "Dimensioni del giudicato civile". Relatore: Prof. Remo Caponi. Candidato: Nicola Carpentiero. Votazione: 110/110 e lode. 2 Cfr. F. Lopez de Oñate, La certezza del diritto, Milano 1968. 3 ‹‹Nella morale ciascuno deve decidere ed agire di fronte a se stesso, in una situazione di responsabilità assoluta; volere decidere agire rispondere espiare di fronte a se stesso. Sul piano morale per il contegno del soggetto non ha rilievo, in senso assoluto, il contegno morale dell"altro. Nel diritto invece questo volere decidere agire rispondere espiare sono tradotti nell"oggettività della molteplicità dei voleri che formano il mondo storico. Perché la traduzione avvenga è necessario che tutta l"azione venga salvata nel suo valore di certezza, cioè in quel valore che ogni azione porta effettivamente, realmente, con sé››. Cfr. F. Lopez de Oñate, La certezza del diritto, cit., p. 160. 4 Un entusiasta Calamandrei scriveva: ‹‹M"è accaduto qualcosa che non capita tutti i giorni: leggere un libro giuridico tutto d"un fiato, con crescente consenso ed anche con crescente gratitudine dalla prima all"ultima pagina: parlo del saggio recentemente pubblicato dal Lopez su La certezza del diritto››. Cfr. P. Calamandrei in F. Lopez de Oñate, La certezza del diritto, cit., p. 169. Più scettico appariva Carnelutti: ‹‹Per me, a cui l"esperienza del diritto nel processo ha mostrato, in tanti anni, nell"irriducibile contrasto tra la giustizia e la certezza il suo dramma, veder codesto filosofo con un gioco elegante di parole dissolvere il contrasto come se fosse una illusione e codesto giustista [il riferimento è a Calamandrei] tesser lodi del libro e della certezza senza neanche un sentore del tremendo problema, è stata tale cagione di sorpresa da costringermi intorno ad esso a rimeditare››. Cfr. F. Carnelutti in F. Lopez de Oñate, La certezza del diritto, cit., p. 193.

The article analyses the limits of res judicata in the French, Italian and Belgian legal systems, with references to the German and English systems. The changes in the case-law of these countries are conditioned by the unstable equilibrium between several fundamental principles, such as contradiction, legal certainty, party disposition, procedural economy, fairness, and the relations between civil proceedings and substantive law. The necessity to safeguard the stability of judgments (e.g. claim preclusion and issue preclusion) and to save judicial resources at all costs creates reciprocal influences between the different systems. These influences are essential not only in foreseeing the possible evolutions of these procedural models, but also from the perspective of the European Code of Civil Procedure imagined by the European Parliament, which tasked the Commission with presenting a legislative proposal regarding the shared minimum standards for civil proceedings. According to the Parliament, these standards should constitute the core of the future Code.
The abandonment of the Eventualmaxime and the introduction even in France and in Belgium of the principle of orality on the one hand and the application of the preclusion of Zeuner, although in an improper manner, in Italy, Germany and Austria on the other hand may pave the way for the construction of the said European Code starting from an indispensable unitary notion of the “subject matter of the litigation".

It is a book review of a fundamental work of civil procedure (in the field of provisional measure). It has been published in Procedural Science at the Crossroads of Different Generations, edited by L. Cadiet, B. Hess, M. Requejo Isidro, Nomos, 2015. As Marta Requejo put it: "The book is one of the outcomes of first Post-doctoral Summer School in procedural law, which was held in July 2014 at the Max Planck Institute Luxembourg under the auspices of the International Association of Procedural Law and the Max Planck Institute itself. It reflects both the philosophy of the School and the contents of its first edition. As stated in the Foreword, “modern procedural law is characterized by its opening to comparative and international perspectives”, and “the opening of procedural science also requires a new approach of research which has to be based on comparative methodology”. The common will of the IAPL and the Max Planck Institute for Procedural Law to support modern research in procedural law, backing particularly young researchers, led to the School one year ago, and achieves another goal with this volume. The book collects most of the papers which were presented by the students in July 2014, after having been reworked in the light of the discussions of last summer and the advice of the attending professors. Many different areas of procedural law, ranging from regulatory approaches to procedural law, to comparative procedural law, arbitration and ADR, as well as the Europeanisation of civil procedure, are addressed. In this way the treatise demonstrates the current trends of scientific research in procedural law and the specific approach of an incoming generation of researchers. The contributions of the professors to the School are also to be found in the book. They constitute a kind of homage to an academic work or an author considered as a milestone in the development of procedural and comparative procedural law. In this way also former generations of proceduralists joined the meeting of the different generations: thus the title of the book".
Table of Contents

PROF. DR. LOÏC CADIET, Inaugural Lecture: Towards a New Model of Judicial Cooperation in the European; Legislative Perspectives; ROBERT MAGNUS, Time for a Meeting of the Generations – Is there a Need for a Uniform Recognition and Enforcement Regulation?;  ELS VANDENSANDE, Some Initial Steps towards a European Debate on Procedural Rulemaking;  ALESSANDRO FABBI, New “Sources” of Civil Procedure Law: First Notes for a Study;  MARCO GRADI, The Right of Access to Information and Evidence and the Duty of Truthful Disclosure of Parties in Comparative Perspective; PIETRO ORTOLANI, The Recast Brussels I Regulation and Arbitration; EWELINA KAJKOWSKA, Enforceability of Multi-Step Dispute Resolution Clauses. An Overview of Selected European Jurisdictions; NATALIA ALENKINA, Interaction Between Litigation Procedures of State and Non State Courts: the Case of Aksakal Courts in Kyrgyzstan; MARTA OTERO CRESPO, The Collective Redress Phenomenon in the European Context: the Spanish case;  ZHIXUN CAO, On the Non-liquet Status of Factual Allegation in China;  STEFANOS K. KARAMEROS, Legal Presumption as a Legislative Tool in National and European Legislation; BEATRICE ARMELI, The Service of Summons in Accordance with EU Law and the Case of the Defendant not Entering an Appearance in Light of the Fundamental Right to a Fair Hearing ; GIULIA VALLAR,  Protocols as Means of Coordination of Insolvency Proceedings of Cross-Border Banking Groups; FRANÇOIS MAILHÉ, International Competence As a  Cooperation Tool: Jurisdiction, Sovereignty and Justice within the European Union

PROF. DR. REMO CAPONI, A Masterpiece at a Glance. Piero Calamandrei, Introduzione allo Studio Sistematico dei Provvedimenti Cautelari; PROF. DR. DR. H.C. PETER GOTTWALD, Rolf Stürner, Die Aufklärungspflicht der Parteien des Zivilprozesses; PROF. DR. DR. H.C. BURKHARD HESS, Der Prozess als Rechtslage – James Goldschmidt 1925 Proceedings As a Sequence of Judicial Situations – A Critique of the Procedural Doctrine;  PROF. DR. EDUARDO OTEIZA, Linn Hammergren. Envisioning Reform. Improving Judicial Performance in Latin America; PROF. DR. MARTA REQUEJO ISIDRO, Francisco Beceña González; PROF. DR. DRES. H.C. ROLF STÜRNER, Einführung in die Rechtsvergleichung – Konrad Zweigert und Hein Kötz 3. Auflage 1996. Comparative Civil Procedure and Comparative Legal Thought .

1. Obiettivi e novità della riforma francese del 2011. -SEZIONE I. LA CONVENZIONE D'ARBITRATO. -2. La nuova convenzione d'arbitrato. -2.1. Clausola compromissoria e compromesso. -2.2. La forma. -2.3. Le clauses blanches. -2.4. I requisiti del compromesso. -2.5. L'autonomia della convenzione d'arbitrato. -2.6. Effetto negativo della compétence-compétence. -2.7. Convenzione d'arbitrato e misure istruttorie e cautelari ante causam. -SEZIONE II. IL TRIBUNALE ARBITRALE. -3. La figura del juge d'appui. -4. Il tribunale arbitrale. -4.1. La costituzione: aspetti generali. -4.2. Il completamento del collegio. -4.3. L'arbitrato con pluralità di parti. -4.4. Le difficoltà nella costituzione del tribunale arbitrale. -4.5. Momento di costituzione del tribunale arbitrale e révelation. -4.6. La sostituzione degli arbitri. -4.7. Il procedimento dinanzi al juge d'appui. -4.8. L'inderogabilità della disciplina. -SEZIONE III. IL PROCEDIMENTO ARBITRALE. -5. Il procedimento arbitrale. -5.1. L'instaurazione. -5.2. La durata. -5.3. Le regole. -5.4. Effetto positivo della compétence-compétence. -5.5. Il principio dell'estoppel. -5.6. L'istruzione probatoria. -5.7. Il potere cautelare degli arbitri. -5.8. Le prove detenute da terzi. -5.9. Giudizio di verificazione e querela di falso. -5.10. L'interruzione e la sospensione. -5.11. La fine del procedimento.

Free movement of people, goods, services, and capital in Europe requires well-functioning cross-border dispute resolution mechanisms. Many initiatives have been taken over time by the EU institutions and Member States, both introducing legal instruments and developing information and e-justice technologies to support cross-border judicial litigation and cooperation. Unfortunately, the results so far achieved do not seem to be adequate to the needs of our increasingly interconnected society. Adding to this, the first wave of COVID-19 emergency measures brought court-based dispute resolution to a grinding halt. All around Europe, court buildings have been closed to the public, hearings suspended, and only emergency cases carried out. Some hope though seems to come from this bleak moment. The breakdown of existing practices, and the need to ensure the justice service provision required for our societies' functioning, resulted in many local and national initiatives to reconfigure the justice service. It provided the occasion to experiment with remote justice service provision and explore possibilities to reconfigure technologies and tools, which in many cases had been available for years, to permit remote working, hearings and legal communication. While most of the experiences have been carried out within the national boundaries, they provide the occasion for rethinking cross-border judicial procedures outside their traditional schemas. Building on this, taking stock of pre-COVID-19 EU cross border judicial services situation, this paper explores EU Member States e-justice emergency measures and attempts to stimulate the discussion on their potential for innovation in cross border judicial proceedings.

Recent case law, in particular the rulings made by the General Court and the Court of Justice in Cases Ville de Paris and Région de Bruxelles-Capitale, once again shows that the case law concerning the access of local and other devolved authorities to the action for annulment before EU Courts. While some improvements have been made thanks to limited strands of case law, e.g. concerning State aid rules, the general rule remains that they are equated to other non-privileged applicants and thus subject to stringent admissibility criteria. This state of affairs seems increasingly at odds with the substantive normative powers exercised by federated, devolved and regional authorities in particular. The Court of Justice needs to engage more explicitly with the debate related to the effectiveness of judicial protection, and to improve its own legal reasoning around its own precedents in order to increase the coherence of its case law.

RECENTLY JUDICIAL REFORMS TOOK PLACE IN POLAND THAT QUESTION THE JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AS ENSURED UNDER THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL. IN THE LM CASE THE ISSUE CONCERNS WHETHER THE SURRENDER OF A CRIMINAL FROM IRELAND TO POLAND, BASED ON A EUROPEAN ARREST WARRANT (EAW), SHOULD BE REFUSED BECAUSE OF THE RIGHT ON A FAIR TRIAL WHICH IS CONSIDERED A COMMON VALUE, IS BREACHED BY POLAND DUE TO DEFICIENCIES IN ITS RULE OF LAW AFTER JUDICIAL CHANGES TOOK PLACE. THE CJEU MUST DECIDE WHETHER AND TO WHAT EXTENT THE ARANYOSI & CĂLDĂRARU JUDGMENT MUST BE FOLLOWED.

Admettant facilement la demande de référé présentée par la Commission, la Cour de justice de l’Union européenne a ordonné à la Pologne de suspendre les opérations de gestion forestière et les abattages d’arbres en cours dans la forêt de Bialowieza. Au-delà de son intérêt pour l’une des dernières forêts primaires d’Europe, la décision rendue par le vice-Président de la Cour de justice de l’Union européenne le 27 juillet 2017 est remarquable en ce que, pour la première fois, ce type d’injonction est prononcé « eu égard au principe de précaution ».
Commentaire sur CJUE, ord. référé, 27 juillet 2017, et ord. référé, grande chambre, 20 novembre 2017, Commission européenne c. République de Pologne, C-441/17 R

Edited book on the new EU Judiciary, together with a comparative analysis and prospective developments. Authors are Marie-Pierre Granger, Albertina Albors-Llorens, Paolo Biavati, Kieran Bradley, Laure Clément-Wilz, Francesco Contini, Gerard Conway, Laurent Coutron, Henri de Waele, Mattias Derlén, Waltraud Hakenberg, Jean-Paul Jacqué, Georgia Koutsoukou, James Lee, Marie-Luce Paris, Felix Ronkes Agerbeek, Ingve Björn Stjerna, Imola Streho, Konstanze von Papp, Bertrand Wägenbaur.

The objective of this paper is to examine the foundations of the Europeanisation of Cyprus and the extent to which the Europeanisation of Cyprus will lead to the successful
integration of Cyprus into the European Union (‘EU’). It is argued that the Europeanisation of Cyprus has led to the creation of a particular model of European integration, guided by issues arising out of an unsolved conflict within the EU and
that economic governance through the rules of the Internal Market plays a central role in this model. Very few authors have looked at the accession of Cyprus to the EU as a process within the wider context of EU enlargement and European integration, envisaging the Cyprus problem2 as a component of such a process rather than as an outcome in itself. Even EU enlargement literature is seldom concerned
with Cyprus more specifically.

In order to comprehend the process of European integration of Cyprus through the Europeanisation lens, it is argued that an interpretation of the rule of law reflecting on the actual social and political context in Cyprus is necessary. This paper
places the concept of Europeanisation at the foundation of the process of European integration and envisages the Europeanisation of Cyprus from a socio-legal perspective.

This article provides the first in-depth scholarly examination of the substantive procedural reforms recently implemented in the Technology, Engineering and Construction List (‘TEC List’) of the
Supreme Court of Victoria. The authors determine whether the rules governing construction litigation in Victoria represent world’s best practice by comparing them with the rules and procedures of the United Kingdom, which are generally regarded as world leading. The conclusion reached is that while the new rules in the TEC List are a step in the right direction, there is still room for significant improvement in this area.

This paper analyses—with special attention to its common provisions, its safeguards of technology-related investigation measures and its guiding principles— the Spanish legal reform of the Criminal Procedure Code (hereinafter, LECrim) of 2015, which updated the domestic framework with a new and modern regulation of technology-related investigative measures, in order to comply with the requirements of the Cybercrime Convention, the ECHR case law and other EU legal instruments, and to help the Law Enforcement Agencies on gathering digital evidence. 1 The use of special technology-related measures in criminal investigations It is an undoubted fact that the use of information and communications technology (ICT) and, especially, of the new opportunities afforded by the internet, has led to a radical change not only in the modus operandi of traditional crimes and the process of shaping new types of crime, but also in the technological advances available to the police and law enforcement agencies for the purposes of detecting, investigating and prosecuting criminal offences. What is more important and I would like to stress, is that the use of technology enables investigating more properly any kind of crime, regardless of whether or not it constitutes a so-called " computer or cyber crime ". The opportunity to utilise drones, GPS systems, advanced cameras and high-powered

Cada vez mais, observamos movimentos no campo do
processo penal para a expansão dos consensos como forma de resolução, esteja ou não a se discutir a culpa daquele que é acusado ou imputado. Por exemplo, no Brasil, há situações que permitem que as vontades daqueles que acusam ou são perseguidos criminalmente resolvam o conflito penal sem discussão da culpa, sendo tais formas de resolução conhecidas como conciliação civil, transação penal e suspensão condicional do processo.
A utilização dos consensos como forma de resolução da persecução sem exame da culpa não causa maiores problemas, na medida em que é louvada por sua iniciativa de não estigmatizar alguém com a condenação e, ao mesmo tempo, por apresentar
uma forma de resposta à vítima e à sociedade.