Democracy and autocracy

This article takes a closer look at the internal evolution of the North Korean political system and how it has been subjugated to the personalist regime of the Kim family. The author argues that North Korea should no longer be perceived as a totalitarian regime since it is now a fully entrenched personal regime in the first place. The author investigates how this process of personalization took place in the institutional, ideological and mobilizational dimensions of the DPRK as well as the influence on its international relations (gatekeeping). Based on these insights the author provides some scenarios for endogenous transitions from this regime type and how hereditary succession and personalism affect its survival strategies..

Regarding the operational specifics of death penalty policy, Professors Johnson and Zimring have argued that it is extreme left or right wing authoritarian states’ aversion to a limitation of their own powers that determines high rates of executions in countries such as Vietnam, Singapore, China and North Korea as opposed to other, less-punitive Asian nations which share similar cultural and religious characteristics.  For a regime like Vietnam’s, the swift carrying out of a death sentence, especially when performed in public, serves to highlight the state’s power over life and death and enhance political control over the domestic constituency.  At first glance then, little scope for the exercise of the clemency power as a form of lenient reprieve from the death sentence by the executive government appears possible under a repressive regime of this nature.

However, unlike China and Singapore, a notable feature of Vietnam’s death penalty practice since the Doi Moi reforms of 1986 has been the executive’s willingness to reprieve a large minority of prisoners sentenced to death through Presidential clemency, even though executions themselves have continued unabated.  What official and unofficial justifications have been given for grants of Presidential clemency in Vietnam, and relatedly, what structural and cultural factors explain the use of clemency in a noticeable proportion of death penalty cases?  These are the under-researched questions I provide plausible explanations for in this article, incorporating an empirical study of Vietnam’s death penalty clemency grants since the mid-1980s, interpreted through the lens of the relevant academic literature on clemency and pardon grants.

This si a working paper issued from a comparative seminar on ‘’ Autocracy :Ten Years On: How Change support Continuity in Morocco and Jordan,'' co-presented and authored with  Dr. Sean Yom. The seminar took place at Stanford University-CDRRL, 7-5-2010
https://cddrl.fsi.stanford.edu/arabreform/events/autocracy_ten_years_on_how_change_supports_continuity_in_morocco_and_jordan

Проведено теоретико-методологічний та емпіричний розгляд політичних режимів сучасності, а також історії становлення та сучасного стану розвитку кількісних та якісних методів типологізації та порівняльного вимірювання політичних режимів сучасності. Окреслено і структуровано економічні та політичні свободи у контексті політичних режимів сучасності. Проаналізовано різновиди та концепти демократії (демократизації) та автократії/автократизації. Простежено параметри оцінювання ефективності та якості демократії і демократизації. Означено сутність і типологію субнаціональних політичних режимів. Розкрито параметри порівняльного аналізу трансформації/транзиту політичних режимів сучасності. Визначено економетричні атрибути різних типів політичних режимів сучасності.

The Lost Cause of modern Late Republican scholarship is the republican cause. Augustus' main problem is that he won: in a peculiar reversal, it is the loser who takes it all, and subsequent generations have attempted to explain the remarkable success of Young Caesar in spite of himself. Augustus won; autocracy won! The good people lost. One may add that the corroding of institutions by breaking norms was nothing new by the time of Young Caesar/Augustus. So far so good, but what kind of autocrat was Augustus? Taking its cue from Levitsky & Ziblatt's How Democracies Die. What History Reveals About the Future (2019), this article asks if Augustus fulfilled their four key indicators of autocratic behaviour: 1) Rejection of (or weak commitment to) democratic rules of the game, 2) Denial of the legitimacy of political opponents, 3) Toleration or encouragement of violence, 4) Readiness to curtail civil liberties of opponents, including media. These key factors focus on the breakdown of democratic rule, which seems a good starting point when accessing a man who many scholars allege (wrongly!) to have claimed to restore the Republic. In many ways this is about how we, as scholars, approach the transitional period between the Republic and the Principate. And in doing so we may ask if Augustus was what might even be described as a modern autocrat.

وقتی در یازدهم اسفند ۱۳۵۳ (دوم مارس ۱۹۷۵میلادی) محمدرضا پهلوی در کاخ نیاوران به مخاطبان خود تولد یک حزب نوظهور را با عنوان رستاخیز نوید می‌داد، هیچ‌کس گمان نمی‌کرد که اپوزیسیون در فردای آن روز با یک تحریف کوچک اما بسیار اثرگذار و ماندگار یکی از موفق‌ترین نمونه‌های پروپاگاندای ضد پهلوی را در تخریب شخصیت شاه رقم بزند. در آن روز چه گذشت و شاه دقیقاً چه گفت؟

As I see it, humanity stands now poised to face one crisis after the other one, and has to process many catastrophes on many fronts – climate change, geopolitical, sociopolitical, etc. 
In this regard, I’m increasingly driven to make an in-depth research on major sociopolitical and geopolitical emergences, in real time as they happen – and on how these are also primarily emergences of new mindsets, systems thinking, empathy gifts and sensitiveness, and why not say it clearly: emergences and leaps in terms of new psi and spiritual capacities.
(‘spiritual’ here refers to intuitive and spirit-laden knowledge, and has nothing to do with ‘religious’ – the latter being institutionalized and more fixated, and thus generally not prone to ‘emergences’ and transformations.)

Without working life support systems life on Earth becomes impossible. This book recognises this simple condition as inescapable matter of politics and therefore political science. The continuation of life, survival, as a minimum objective for all governance, cannot be ignored. However, contemporary political thought is dominated by democracy promotion and this potentially undermines chances for sustainability. Given the current catastrophic course in regard to climate change and environmental destruction, prior assumptions need to be put under scrutiny. If democracy cannot protect nature, the definition of good governance necessarily needs to be revised. Political systems can be evaluated on their consequences and their ability to protect nature as the most fundamental common good. Here, this book clearly ventures beyond a simple dichotomisation of democracy and autocracy as good and evil. Ultimately, any form of government needs to cope with the reality of physical limits of (human) nature as they are not negotiable.

This paper takes a closer look at those authoritarian political regimes with a leader holding absolute power referred to as either ‘personalist’ or ‘neo-patrimonial regimes.’ In the literature, these regimes have been set apart since they exhibit a different behavior than their counterparts that are not under personal rule. This paper proposes another approach and aims to highlight the advantages and disadvantages of such regimes not being treated as a separate type, but analyzed with regard to their personalist element as a characteristic that can be present in various autocratic types. Firstly, this paper gives an overview of the characteristics of personalism and the dynamics by which autocrats acquire such amounts of personal power. Secondly, to provide data for the question at hand, the author links medium-N quantitative datasets of regimes in Sub-Saharan Africa (1972-2010). By linking insights from Hadenius & Teorell, Bueno de Mesquita, Geddes and many other prominent scholars who have contributed to political regime theory, the author investigates the various sources of personalist regimes in Sub-Saharan Africa in order to answer the research question.

Aggression, whose essence is the seizure of foreign lands, is always connected with oppression and murder of those living on them. But there is another kind of seizure in the Universe - a life-giving one: it is the transformation of human hearts by Love. People of the world are glad to be captured by it: God, Love is their Essence. But the aggressor, whose food is death and suffering, will never understand this.

The research field of regime theory has seen a proliferation of different approaches and typologies to explain the ever-changing reality. This paper has created a typology of these regime typologies and their respective datasets in order to describe and analyze their various merits for research. Finally this paper maps various typologies according to their most common research areas. The aim is to maximize the application potential each of specific typology, highlight their limits and aid scholars in their selection of typologies for qualitative or quantitative research in order to get a better understanding of democratization processes or regime theories.

Kommunen sind Orte der erlebbaren Politik. Nirgendwo sonst stehen
Bürger, Verwaltungen, Amts- und Mandatsträger in so engem Austausch
und haben die Bürger so viele Beteiligungsmöglichkeiten. Doch wie genau sehen politische Strukturen und Gestaltungsmöglichkeiten aus? Wie stellen sich politische Kultur und Bürgerbeteiligung dar? Diesen Fragen sind die Autorinnen und Autoren für die Partnerstädte Petrosawodsk und Tübingen in Gesprächen mit Experten und mit Dokumentenanalysen nachgegangen. Dabei zeigt sich: Beide Kommunen haben ganz ähnliche Aufgaben und Strukturen, doch sie unterscheiden sich hinsichtlich der politischen Kultur und der Herrschaftspraxis deutlich.

Democracy promotion is an important and currently underappreciated counter-strategy to China’s autocracy promotion, a trend which undermines key elements of the common US and Australian vision of a free and open Indo-Pacific region. In terms of an increased emphasis on democracy promotion as an element of statecraft, Southeast Asia is the major regional battleground of high importance to the United States and Australia, given recent anti-democratic trends. Strengthening institutions which enhance accountability, good governance, civil participation and national resilience in vulnerable liberal democratic states in Southeast Asia is key. This reduces the opportunity for autocratic governments to use foreign aid and investment to exert geopolitical and strategic influence over the sovereign decisions of recipient governments in ways that compromise the long-term national interest of that country. In Southeast Asia, Australia should focus on partnering with Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand to strengthen the institutions referred to above for strategic, institutional and resourcing reasons.

The following is a response to the unvarnished bigotry and swiftly descending police state that's coming to characterize the policy, actions, and ideology of the Donald Trump administration in the United States. It is written for a general audience as a response to a letter to the editor (in a feature called "30 Seconds") of the Press Enterprise, Bloomsburg, Pennsylvania. It is also posted at my blog:

http://thewrenchphilosleft.blogspot.com/2017/02/a-short-course-in-logic-of-bigotry-and.html

Attempting to predicting the formation of particular types of governance structures has been one of the central tasks of sociologists and political scientists. John Higley and Michael Burton argued that the configuration of elite groups in a society is an important predictor of the governance structure that develops in that society. The Higley-Burton theory outlines several ways in which the configuration of elites can predict the transformation of gover-nance structures, from authoritarian regimes to liberal democracies. In the current research, this previous theoretical work is extended by articulating a route by which societies can go the other way-from democracy to an authoritarian regime. Turkey is being used as a contemporary case study to show how shifts elite configurations in a democracy can lead to authoritarian regime. A five-step process for this transformation is outlined. The steps in this model for one route of moving from an unstable democracy towards autocracy or dictatorship can be summarized as follows: 1) Political success by one group or faction. 2) Establishment of an inner circle and consolidation of power. 3) Replacement of the inner circle with weaker members who can be controlled. 4) Self-isolation of the leader. 5) Government control of opposition and suppression of dissent.

This paper suggests that the concept of populism can contribute to a renewal of historiographical debates. Often considered too imprecise to offer any analytical value, many historians discard the term or use it in a simplistic and derogatory manner. This dismissal reveals two faults. First, it exposes the lack of dialogue with theoretical contributions from different fields within the "populism studies". Second, it overlooks the particular ways in which populism engages with history. Summoning two works that seek to give populism a history (Finchelstein, 2017 and Rosanvallon, 2020), this paper argues that the term is not lacking a "manifesto" or a concise definition. The "anexactness"(Panniza, 2005) that makes it adaptable to a plurality of contexts allows for a disturbance of set interpretations and concepts, such as "democracy", "nation", or "people". Populist theory exposes the contingency of history's normative foundations, while it revitalizes some important discussions within the field.

Across first Asia and then Africa new states rose from colonial rule in the post-war era that sought to build New Westminster constitutions. The Westminster model was the transnational trend after 1945 in constitution-making for much of the world emerging from colonial rule and was promoted by the Colonial Office, Indigenous leaders and constitutional advisers such as the ubiquitous Sir Ivor Jennings. However, this flexible and ambiguous regime type caused many political and constitutional crises that questioned the wisdom of applying Westminster to these states. Jennings worked across Africa and Asia including in Ceylon, Nepal, Malaya, Singapore, the Maldives, Sudan, Ethiopia, South Africa, and the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. It is Pakistan, however, that sticks out as Jennings’s most controversial role where he effectively, legally and politically, contentiously defended a “constitutional coup” by the Governor- General against the Constituent Assembly in 1954. The case also serves to demonstrate how the manipulation and divisive interpretations of Westminster conventions and institutions in the first decade of Pakistan led to the breakdown of democracy and laid conspicuous precedents for dictatorship and military rule, which have explanatory value in understanding the country’s prevalent fragility in embedding accountability and democracy.

The paper problematizes the national soft power strategies of authoritarian states arguing that many of their features stem from those countries' political regime. In particular, the author focuses on such features as actors involved in soft power policies, the public media's international and domestic rhetoric, the presence or absence of ideological commitments, strategies' proactiveness/reactiveness as well as their long-and short-termness. The author presents his argumentation in a fashion similar to what is called theory-building process tracing: first, he shows causal links between an autocratic political regime and each of those features, and then illustrates them with relevant examples taken from case studies and media publications on the soft power strategies of contemporary Russia and China.

Importance of the changes which occurred in Chile and Yugoslavia and brought democracies will not be put under the question. However, this work will critically look upon the ways these changes were conducted. The goal of this work is that through this critique help understanding better present day situation in these societies and also to give a perspective which are the consequences, positive and negative, of this way of change of political system. After closer examination of historical background of establishment of autocracy systems and their constitutions, I shall give a detail analyze of three conditions of democracy: the separation and balance of power, independence of judiciary and A pluralist system of political parties and organizations. These conditions will be used as a way to analyze political-legal framework of the countries before they went toward democracy and how the constitutional base was used by regimes. Toward the conclusion of the work it will be presented how did the changes of the orders happen and what did that brought to new established systems. Conclusion will be that for the political-legal system which went through this transition is better, for the sake of future stability of the system, to be build from its beginning on foundation of new constitution.

Post-communist Ukraine is in the midst of implementing reforms which it missed for centuries. It gradually evolves into a unique geopolitical entity which, finally, acquires a fair chance to be consistent and self-sufficient. However, if the West takes a neutral stance today – as it frequently happened in history – a “decentralized” Ukraine will fall again under the centralized Russian assault.

Authoritarian Regionalism in the World of International Organizations uncovers a new type of regionalism-'authoritarian regionalism' and traces its historical roots as well as its implications for modern politics. The book is the first attempt to systematically investigate the functioning and the impact of authoritarian regionalism as a new phenomenon as well as its implications for democratization worldwide. The book contributes to the theory of regionalism, international organizations, studies of autocracies, foreign policy, and democratization worldwide. • Demonstrates how authoritarian regionalism has evolved since World War II and the implications for global politics • Reconceptualises the notion of regionalism, calling for attention to authoritarian regionalism as a new type of regional organization • Presents new empirical evidence of how autocracy diffusion takes place through regional organizations

As China sways further away from democracy towards a return to one-man dictatorship, Xi Jinping’s power play raises profound implications for the world. An unfettered Xi now becomes vulnerable to arbitrariness fuelled by egotism and delusions of grandeur. In absence of internal resistance, China’s lingxiu may intensify his heavy-handed rule at home and take greater risks in redrawing relationships with other powers on China’s terms.

Cultivated irrationality is a hateful thing, which easily gets out of control." John Dewey, The Cult of Irrationality (1918) 1. Einleitung John Dewey fragt in einem während des 1. Weltkriegs verfassten Text mit Bezug auf die grundsätzliche menschliche Tendenz sich in Krisensituationen irrational zu verhalten: "Is irrationality in the mass cultivated by a few in order that the attention of the many may be diverted from something which would otherwise arouse intelligent opposition?" (Dewey 1918, 108) Irrationalität allein, so Deweys Schlussfolgerung, ist nicht das eigentliche Problem, sondern die systematische Kultivierung derselben. Kollektive Anfälle von Irrationalität werden häufig durch die Mächtigen missbraucht, um andere als gemeinschaftliche oder demokratische Ziele zu erreichen (ebd. 109). Die gegenwärtige politische Situation offenbart augenscheinlich ein Wiedererstarken solcher Kräfte, die Irrationalität systematisch kultivieren um subjektive Machtziele zu erreichen. Die scheinbare Autorisierung dieser Kräfte durch das aufgebrachte Volk kann nicht über die eigentlich autoritären und undemokratischen Absichten der neuen Demagogen hinwegtäuschen. Entgegen der von Francis Fukuyama mittlerweile revidierten These vom Ende der Geschichte sind seit dem Ende des Kalten Krieges neue Gegensätze auf der Bildfläche der Geschichte erschienen. Aktuell drängen sich populistische Politik und autoritäres Herrschaftsgebaren als expliziteste Gegenbewegungen zu einer emanzipierten und intelligenten demokratischen Gesellschaft auf (vgl. Müller 2016; Mudde und Kaltwasser 2017; Arato and Cohen 2017). In diesem Zusammenhang stellt sich die Frage, wie zeitgenössische Populisten Irrationalität systematisch kultivieren und missbrauchen um ihre subjektiven Machtziele zu erreichen? Ziel aller Populisten ist politische Macht. Sie wollen Macht konsolidieren und zielen mit ihren Handlungen, Reformen und Politiken in der Regel darauf die eigene Macht aufrechtzuerhalten. Einige Populisten streben gesellschaftliche Veränderung an oder wollen politische Institutionen transformieren. Andere zielen darauf ab den Staat umzubauen, um institutionell ihre Machtprojekte langfristig verankern zu können. Die Strategien populistischer Politik unterscheiden sich nur in Nuancen. Populisten spüren gesellschaftliche Ängste auf und beuten diese aus. Sie externalisieren gesellschaftliche Probleme und weisen die Verantwortung "anderen" zu. Es sind die korrupten Eliten, die politischen Gegner, die Erscheint in: Brunkhorst, Petersen, Seeliger (Hrsg.), Pragmatistische Sozialwissenschaft

'This impressive book explores a new dimension in the relationship between political regime and international cooperation. In comprehensive empirical analysis that skilfully combines different methodological approaches and new data, the authors highlight how non-democratic regional organizations consolidate authoritarian rule through legitimation and economic benefits.' Christina L. Davis, Harvard University 'In this highly original study, Obydenkova and Libman detail how regime-type matters for international regional organizations. Through cross-national statistical analysis and detailed case studies of regional organizations in Eurasia, they show that regionalism has positive benefits for [non-democratic] regimes in terms of legitimation and leadership survival.' Mark R. Beissinger, Princeton University 'We have few systematic studies of the non-democratic organizations. This book provides a rich and innovative study which helps us understand this growing and important phenomenon. The volume is essential reading for those interested in international organizations and in authoritarian politics.' Jon C. W. Pevehouse, University of Wisconsin-Madison '[T]his groundbreaking and exhaustively researched book offers a definitive portrait of the new and potent phenomenon of authoritarian regionalism. Through quantitative analysis and revealing case studies, it shows how non-democratic regional organizations legitimate and sustain authoritarianism.. .. a vital and sobering contribution to the fields of comparative politics and international relations.' Larry Diamond, Hoover Institution, Stanford University '[S]ophisticated and insightful. .. Autocratic Regionalism explains how autocracies have avoided the once-celebrated end of history by … creating regional organizations of their own. Authors' account traces the development of regional organizations from the 19th century to our own era. .. an innovative, important, and substantive contribution to international relations and comparative politics.'

The story of the 'Arab Spring' as a revolt of young people against autocracy does not stand up to survey analysis at country level. Data from the Arab Transformations Survey show that young people were over-represented as participants, but it is necessary to stretch the concept of 'youth' into middle age in some countries to say this, there were plenty of older participants, and the protests were aimed less at political rights and more at social justice. Fundamental political changes have been expected in MENA which would sweep away autocratic rule in favour of democratisation, as the values successive younger generations became individualised, liberalised and secularised under the influence of economic and market development and the spread of education, but there is very little evidence that this is what occurred in the Arab Uprisings. Whether young or older, protestors were looking for regime change, an end to corruption and a reduction in IMF-inspired austerity, but political freedoms and democratic governance do not appear to have been at the top of their agenda.

This study empirically analyzed the relationships between emerging media as tools in fomenting anti-government protest as well as government repression of political opposition. Using a dataset of 162 democratic and autocratic countries over 18 years, potential differences between these phenomena were examined. The results of a series of analytic models suggest that higher levels of internet and mobile phones are positively associated with more instances of both political protests and political repression, which have increased dramatically in recent years. The differences between democratic and autocratic countries' emerging media and sociopolitical instability trends are explored and discussed.

Research paper submission to Hong Kong Studies and to The Tenth International Conference on Climate Change (Berkeley, 4. 20-21, 2018)

While the American and Chinese disposition to all things “Marxism” may seem radically different on the surface, Marx’s iconic recognition nonetheless offers an opportunity like no other to fortify the pursuit of capital against the encroaching implications of climate change. Indeed, it is precisely because climate change presents a potentially irrecoverable environmental crisis that the disregard of mounting evidence demands an equally potent pretext.  Marx, I’ll argue, provides just that pretext. Weaponized as the enemy of free markets or deified as the hero the worker’s state, “Marxism” provides the ideological pretext for maintaining the myth of inexhaustible resources. Whether cast as the foe of “Making America Great, Again!” job creation in the manufacturing or mining sectors of the U.S. economy, or as the champion of Jinping’s “Chinese Dream,” whether as foil or inspiration, a suitably retrofitted Marxism has been deployed by both Trump and Jinping to legitimate unsustainable economic policies. However otherwise different, Donald Trump and Xi Jinping personify what I will call the new fascism: confronted with an existential threat the magnitude of climate change, both will reach for the most effective, ideologically reliable tool at their disposal to help dispel the growing recognition that the conquest of capital is responsible for climate change: “Marx.”

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Inmersa en un panorama altamente vulnerable desde el análisis de factores ecológicos o sociales, y en medio de una pandemia sin precedentes, Centroamérica se debate entre populismo, autocracias y autoritarismo creciente. ¿Qué efectos tiene esta volatilidad concreta y simbólica en las democracias del istmo? ¿Cómo se expresa la fragilidad democrática? Y más importante, ¿hacia dónde se dirige Centroamérica desde la utopía democrática?

Der Anteil demokratisch verfasster Staaten nimmt in den letzten beiden Jahrzehnten zu. Nach den erfolgreichen Demokratisierungsprozessen der 1990er Jahre in Mittel- und Osteuropa sowie in Lateinamerika mobilisierten Regimegegner und Oppositionsbewegungen auch im Kaukasus, in Asien und zuletzt im arabischen Raum gegen autokratische Herrscher und forderten demokratische Reformen. Sie erhalten dabei zunehmend Unterstützung durch die internationale Demokratieförderung, eine kritische internationale Zivilgesellschaft und durch neue völkerrechtliche Debatten um ein „Recht auf Demokratie“. Dennoch ist Demokratisierung nach wie vor kein Selbstläufer. Der Erfolg der Demokratisierung hängt unverändert von der Bereitschaft politischer Eliten ab, das politische System intern zu liberalisieren und demokratische Regeln einzuhalten. Externe Akteure setzen zwar in immer größerem Ausmaß wichtige Anreize für die Liberalisierung politischer Systeme und den Aufbau demokratischer Institutionen. Jedoch können externe Demokratieförderer und günstige Strukturen einen Mangel an Demokratisierungswillen nach wie vor nicht kompensieren.

En la coyuntura de la pandemia una crisis se ha dejado sentir sobre los regímenes y las sociedades de todo el mundo. Los problemas de calidad institucional y las tendencias (anti)democráticas de los liderazgos se expanden desde los regímenes claramente despóticos hasta las repúblicas pluralistas

In this webinar (in Bangla language), panelists discussed the problems of living within the plutocratic religious extremist "living" Indian nation state. Though, there was an appeal for legalizing active euthanasia to the Indian executive, legislature and judiciary by showing the devastating ranking indexes (in happiness, poverty, undernourishment, corruption etc.) of India, the panelists questioned the problem of "right" given by the sovereign as it legitimizes the hegemony of state itself.

This paper aims at arguing that the Commander of the Faithful is the main source of the Moroccan religious policy and not the public opinion- if exists. The king is supported by many official actors such as the official religious scholars and non-officials’ actors like the Sufi brotherhood. Mohamed VI religious policy was launched after the 2003 Casablanca bombings. This new strategy is mainly concerned by security, control, the status and the role of the Commander of the Faithful in Morocco and abroad, and the promotion of one Islamic model.

Because of the severity of environmental problems, any attempt to combat them in a substantial manner, will seem utopian. Conventional approaches towards environmental protection have largely failed. Although public awareness is increasing slowly, the process is cumbersome. Only tiny voluntary changes are observable. Comfort is chosen over sustainability. Eco-friendly behaviour is practiced, if it involves low costs. Consequently, people continue to live unsustainable lifestyles, thus, risk ecocide. Restrictions on what people see as innate entitlements could achieve a meaningful remedy. Issues like car usage, overconsumption in general as well as reproduction are often considered a personal choice, however, one can even find justifications for restrictions in J. S. Mill’s liberal thought, if his harm principle is applied thoroughly. What is taken as inalienable individual liberties in democracies is threatening the common good. Meanwhile, non-democratic governments might be capable of implementing effective policies already.
The presentation seeks to encourage an open discussion about the means to fight environmental degradation. It provocatively ventures new roads by re-evaluating human rights and tensions between individual and collective interests. It takes China as a practical example, since its consequentialist approach of governance allows focusing on common goods as a priority. The presentation incorporates my personal research on political opinion in Changsha, 2012, in order to reflect upon an inclination to accept measures that are considered intrusive elsewhere. A cognitive framework, where the government is recognized as family, has vast potential. After all, the PRC has experience in coping with limited natural resources and interfering in matters such as reproduction. As global commons are at stake, rethinking current approaches becomes inevitable. Restrictions are necessary as a means to fight overexploitation of our resources. While the presentation does not make normative claims, it prompts the reader to think out-of-the-box.

The post-Cold War world has witnessed the extensive development of regional international organizations world-wide. The realtionship between their membership and democratization remains a topic of intense scholarly debate. This book opens up a new aspect of the debate by examining regional organization as set up by autocracies (e.g. Iran, Saudi Arabia, Venezuela, Russia, and China)—referring to them as “non-democratic regional organizations.” How do these newly emerged organizations counteract and confront the democratization process in their own member states and beyond their borders? How and why do the political regimes, the economic development and the cultures of their member states impac the foundation and development of these organizations? What influence do these organizations have on migration, trade, conflicts, and democratization? The book addresses these questions by developing a new theory of authoritarian regionalism. Employing quantitative analysis of authoritarian reg...

The story of the 'Arab Spring' as a revolt of young people against autocracy does not stand up to survey analysis at country level. Data from the Arab Transformations Survey show that young people were over-represented as participants, but it is necessary to stretch the concept of 'youth' into middle age in some countries to say this, there were plenty of older participants, and the protests were aimed less at political rights and more at social justice. Fundamental political changes have been expected in MENA which would sweep away autocratic rule in favour of democratisation, as the values successive younger generations became individualised, liberalised and secularised under the influence of economic and market development and the spread of education, but there is very little evidence that this is what occurred in the Arab Uprisings. Whether young or older, protestors were looking for regime change, an end to corruption and a reduction in IMF-inspired austerity, but political freedoms and democratic governance do not appear to have been at the top of their agenda.

A kelet-európai rendszerváltásokat, a kommunizmus bukását követő általános eufória jellemző kifejezésének tekinthetjük Francis Fukuyama nagy karriert befutott könyvét, A történelem vége és az utolsó ember c. művet (1991). Fukuyama úgy gondolta – s ezzel nem volt egyedül –, hogy a jövőben mindenütt győzni fog a liberális demokrácia, és a történelem további menete egyhangú lesz és kiszámítható, nem tartogat radikális újdonságokat (erre utalt nála a „történelem végé”-nek Hegeltől kölcsönzött megfogalmazása). A szerző jóslata nem vált valóra, és Fukuyama később több ponton is felülvizsgálta kezdeti elképzelését. 2003 körül arra a következtetésre jutott, hogy egy társadalom fejlődése szempontjából kedvezőbb, ha előbb van egy erősen központosított, racionális, bürokratikus és hatékony állam, és csak azután demokrácia, (Államépítés. Kormányzás és világrend a 21. században, 2005, még inkább: A politikai rend eredete. Az ember előtti időktől a francia forradalomig, 2012, Political Order and Political Decay, 2014). Legutóbbi nyilatkozataiban pedig már rendkívül borúlátón azzal kapcsolatban, hogy a 21. században demokráciák és autokráciák versenyéből melyik kormányzati típus kerül ki győztesen.
Mivel látványos ellenpéldák voltak arra az elképzelésre, mely szerint demokrácia nélkül nincs gazdasági fejlődés, a tudósok módszeresen elkezdték vizsgálni a megfelelő országokban az intézményi háttér és a gazdasági fejlődés közti összefüggést, (Amy C. Alexander, Christian Welzel: „Measuring Effective Democracy”, 2008, később: pl. Amy C. Alexander, Ronald Inglehart, Christian Welzel: „Measuring effective democracy: A defense”, 2011). Azért, hogy a gyorsan fejlődő autokráciák jelenségét jobban érthetővé tegyék, Amy C. Alexander és Christian Welzel bevezették a „racionális autokrácia”  fogalmát, ahol a „racionalitás” bizonyos intézményi feltételekből fakad. Az autokráciák a 20. század végén, a 21. század elején, megteremtették a maguk új „társadalmi szerződését” – mely szerint a társadalom minél szélesebb tömegeinek juttatott minél nagyobb szintű jólétért „cserébe” a társadalom tagjai kevésbé várnak el demokratikus, politikai reformokat az országban, kevésbé ragaszkodnak bizonyos individuális szabadságjogokhoz.
A jelen előadás kérdése az, hogy a globális környezetváltozás (a természeti és a társadalmi környezet gyors változásai) hogyan befolyásolják demokráciák és autokráciák viszonyát, illetve versenyét. Tézisem szerint hosszú távon a környezet bonyolult változásai és sokszoros összetettsége a demokráciáknak kedvez, illetve a jelenlegi autokráciákból is ki fog kényszeríteni bizonyos demokratikus reformokat. Ezt arra alapozom, hogy a környezet komplexitása olyan kihívásokkal szembesíti az országokat, a közösségeket, hogy a megfelelő válaszok kellőképp önálló és alkalmazkodni képes egyéneket és közösségeket igényelnek. Ilyen egyénekhez és közösségekhez pedig, nézetem szerint a (Amy C. Alexander és társai értelmében vett) „hatékony demokrácia” tudja biztosítani ehhez a megfelelő kulturális és intézményes feltételeket, az autokráciák pedig nem.