Deep Disagreement

The epistemic problem of deep disagreement is whether deep disagreements are subject to rational resolution. Pessimists about deep disagreement argue that such disagreements are rationally irresolvable, while optimists deny this. In this paper, I consider the Wittgensteinian account of deep disagreement, according to which deep disagreements are disagreements over hinge propositions. I argue that while several varieties of this view do provide adequate support for pessimism about deep disagreement, not all of them do.
[Please see my Synthese paper 'Deep Disagreement and Hinge Epistemology' and my Topoi SI paper 'What is Deep Disagreement?' for the successors to this draft]

This paper explores the application of hinge epistemology to deep disagreement. Hinge epistemology holds that there is a class of commitments—hinge commitments—which play a fundamental role in the structure of belief and rational evaluation: they are the most basic general presuppositions of our world views which make it possible for us to evaluate certain beliefs or doubts as rational. Deep disagreements seem to crucially involve disagreement over such fundamental commitments. In this paper, I consider pessimism about deep disagreement, the thesis that such disagreements are rationally irresolvable, and ask whether the Wittgensteinian account of deep disagreement—according to which such disagreements are disagreements over hinge commitments—provides adequate support for pessimism. I argue that while most versions of hinge epistemology support pessimism about deep disagreement, at least one variety of hinge epistemology, the entitlement theory, does not.

What is the nature of deep disagreement? In this paper, I consider two similar albeit seemingly rival answers to this question: the Wittgensteinian theory, according to which deep disagreements are disagreements over hinge commitments, and the Fundamental Epistemic Principle theory, according to which deep disagreements are disagreements over fundamental epistemic principles. I assess these theories against a set of desiderata for a satisfactory theory of deep disagreement, and I argue that while the Fundamental Epistemic Principle theory does better than the Wittgensteinian theory on this score, the Fundamental Epistemic Principle theory nevertheless struggles to explain the variety of deep disagreement.

In deep disagreements local disagreements are intertwined with more general basic disagreements about the relevant evidence, standards or argument or proper methods of inquiry in that domain. The paper provides a more specific conception of deep disagreement along these lines, and argues that while we should generally conciliate in cases of disagreement, this is not so in deep disagreements. The paper offers a general view of disagreement holding roughly, that one should moderate one's credence towards uncertainty in so far as disagreement with others provide undefeated higher order evidence that one might have made a mistake in one's appreciation of the first order evidence. When applying this view to deep disagreement we get that in cases of deep disagreement higher order evidence from disagreement is rebutted or undercut by the nature of the disagreement. So, in cases of deep disagreement one should not moderate one's credence. I finally argue that this gives a better general view of deep disagreement than views appealing to epistemic peers, personal information or independence.

Two common claims in philosophy are that deep disagreements cannot, in principle, be resolved by argument and that normal disagreements will be resolved by argument. In each claim it is assumed that the parties to the disagreement are rational. I argue that both claims are false. The first fails to take account of refutations. The second fails to recognise the role of conjectures in the dynamics of the growth of knowledge. There is no disagreement such that it is impossible for rational parties to reach agreement by argument; but there is also no disagreement for which parties are rationally required to reach agreement by argument. Given the same evidence, it may be rational for one person to believe a specific proposition and another to believe its negation.

According to the Wittgensteinian view of deep disagreement, deep disagreements are disagreements over hinge commitments, that is, the basic presuppositions of our world views. This article discusses, for a general audience, the extent to which the Wittgensteinian view supports the idea that deep disagreement are rationally irresolvable, and explores whether this yields a moral challenge.

My objective in this paper is to compare two philosophical problems, the problem of the criterion and the problem of deep disagreement, and note a core similarity which explains why many proposed solutions to these problems seem to fail along similar lines. From this observation, I propose a kind of skeptical solution to the problem of deep disagreement, and this skeptical program has consequences for the problem as it manifests in political epistemology and metaphilosophy.

We frequently find ourselves in intractable disagreements about the morality of abortion, euthanasia, restrictions to freedom, or eating meat for fun. An adequate reaction to a disagreement requires knowing which type of disagreements we are confronted with. The main aim of my paper is to explain the source of moral disagreements and clarify their nature. I will argue that some moral disagreements are deep conceptual disagreements that similarly to disagreements in logic or ontology, are not resolvable, as the resolution of the disagreement requires the disputants to adopt perspectives that are conceptually unavailable to them. I will suggest four possible sources of moral disagreements: incommensurable fundamental values, different concepts of the good life, different motivating reasons and different concepts of morality.

In this paper, I will argue for a complex of three theses. First, that the problem of deep disagreement is an instance of the regress problem of justification. Second, that the problem of deep disagreement, as a regress problem, depends on a dialecticality requirement for arguments. Third, that the dialecticality requirement is plausible and defensible.

This paper provides a reinterpretation of some of the most influential skeptical arguments, Agrippa's trilemma, meta-regress arguments, and Cartesian external world skepticism. These skeptical arguments are reasonably regarded as unsound arguments about the extent of our knowledge. However, reinterpretations of these arguments tell us something significant about the preconditions and limits of persuasive argumentation. These results contribute to the ongoing debates about the nature and resolvability of deep disagreement. The variety of skeptical arguments shows that we must distinguish different types of deep disagreement. Moreover, the reinterpretation of skeptical arguments elucidates that deep disagreement cannot be resolved via argumentation.

In this paper, I argue for three theses. First, that the problem of Deep Disagreement is usefully understood as an instance of the skeptical Problem of the Criterion. Second, there are structural similarities between proposed optimistic answers to deep disagreement and the problem of the criterion. Third, in light of these similarities, there are both good and bad consequences for proposed solutions to the problem of deep disagreement. Qué respuestas optimistas al desacuerdo profundo generan buenos (y malos) efectos Resumen El presente artículo presenta tres tesis. En primer lugar, plantea que el problema del desacuerdo pro-fundo se entiende, convenientemente, como un ejemplo del problema del criterio desde la óptica del escepticis-mo. En segundo lugar, existen similitudes estructurales entre las respuestas optimistas que se proponen con respecto al des-acuerdo profundo y al problema del criterio. Y, en tercer lugar, ante dichas similitudes, las soluciones que se proponen frente al problema del desacuerdo profundo generan tanto buenas como malas consecuencias. Palabras clave: Desacuerdo profundo, escepticismo, problema del criterio, argu-mentación.

In "The logic of deep disagreements" (Informal Logic, 1985), Robert Fogelin claimed that there is a kind of disagreement-deep disagreement-which is, by its very nature, impervious to rational resolution. He further claimed that these two views are attributable to Wittgenstein. Following an exposition and discussion of that claim, we review and draw some lessons from existing responses in the literature to Fogelin's claims. In the final two sections (6 and 7) we explore the role reason can, and sometimes does, play in the resolution of deep disagreements. In doing this we discuss a series of cases, mainly drawn from Wittgenstein, which we take to illustrate the resolution of deep disagreements through the use of what we call "rational persuasion." We conclude that, while the role of argumentation in "normal" versus "deep" disagreements is characteristically different, it plays a crucial role in the resolution of both.