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Chris Ranalli

Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, Department of Philosophy, Faculty Member

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I'm an Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam (VU Amsterdam)

I'm an epistemologist and I research conspiracy theory belief, skepticism, doubt, and suspension of judgment, and their practical significance, as well as practical applications of the ethics of belief. I'm interested in how our attitudes might be manipulated by our social environment, as well as how we protect our beliefs from influences within our social environment.

Generally, I'm interested in topics where epistemology intersects with other areas of philosophy, like philosophy of mind, ethics, value theory, and metaphysics.

Website: https://chris-ranalli.weebly.com/
Supervisors: Duncan Pritchard
Address: Department of Philosophy
Faculty of the Humanities
Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam
De Boelelaan 1105, Amsterdam NL

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Publications by Chris Ranalli

What's so bad about echo chambers?

by Chris Ranalli and Finlay Malcom

Inquiry, 2023

Echo chambers have received widespread attention in recent years, but there is no agreement over ... more Echo chambers have received widespread attention in recent years, but there is no agreement over whether they are always epistemically bad for us. Some argue they’re inherently epistemically bad, whilst others claim they can be epistemically good. This paper has three aims. First, to bring together recent studies in this debate, taxonomizing different ways of thinking about the epistemic status of echo chambers. Second, to consider and reject several accounts of what makes echo chambers epistemically harmful or not, and then offer an alternative account which builds on some features of existing accounts. In our view, echo chambers – even those that are truth-conducive – are always epistemically harmful because of their reasons-undermining features, e.g. the way that they impede the development of epistemic reasons which can answer and withstand challenges. This account captures important ideas behind several theories in the epistemology of echo chambers, but offers a richer explanation that does not suffer from their limitations.

Indoctrination: what is it to indoctrinate someone?

1000-Word Philosophy, 2022

What is indoctrination? This is a short survey of theories about what indoctrination is and why, ... more

Closed-minded Belief & Indoctrination

American Philosophical Quarterly, 2022

What is indoctrination? This paper clarifies and defends a structural epistemic account of indoct... more What is indoctrination? This paper clarifies and defends a structural epistemic account of indoctrination according to which indoctrination is the inculcation of close-minded belief caused by 'epistemically insulating content'. This is content which contains a proviso that serious critical consideration of the relevant alternatives to one's belief is sanctionable, whether morally or epistemically. As such, it doesn't demand that indoctrination be a type of unethical instruction, ideological instruction, unveridical instruction, or instruction which bypasses the agent's rational evaluation. In this way, we can account for why indoctrination can occur for liberal democratic beliefs as much as it occurs for fascist, fundamentalist, or fanatical belief: for indoctrination is a structural epistemic phenomenon.

Recent Work on Skepticism (forthcoming)

American Philosophical Quarterly

This paper critically surveys 20 years of recent work on radical skepticism. It focuses on three ... more This paper critically surveys 20 years of recent work on radical skepticism. It focuses on three key issues. First, it starts by exploring how philosophers have recently challenged our understanding of radical skeptical arguments. It then unpacks and critical evaluates some influential reactions to radical skepticism: knowledge-first epistemology, epistemological disjunctivism, and hinge epistemology. Third, it explores some novel developments of pragmatism, gauges its anti-skeptical import, and reflects on the ways in which radical skeptical epistemology and ethics might meet.

Moral Hinges and Steadfastness

Metaphilosophy, 2021

Epistemic rationality seems to permit a more steadfast response to disagreements over our fundame... more Epistemic rationality seems to permit a more steadfast response to disagreements over our fundamental convictions than it does for our ordinary beliefs. Why is this? This essay explores three answers to this question: web-of-belief conservatism, moral encroachment, and hinge theories, and argues that hinge theories do a better job than the alternatives at vindicating the intuition that there is a rationally permissible asymmetry in our responses to disagreements over ordinary beliefs and fundamental convictions. The essay also shows how hinge theorists can explain the existence of moral hinge propositions, which enables them to account for the rational permissibility of being steadfast in response to disagreements over fundamental moral convictions.

Common Sense and Ontological Commitment

Cambridge Companion to Common-sense Philosophy, 2020

How ontologically committal is common sense? Is the common-sense philosopher beholden to a florid... more How ontologically committal is common sense? Is the common-sense philosopher beholden to a florid ontology in which all manner of objects, substances, and processes exist and are as they appear to be to common sense, or can she remain neutral on questions about the existence and nature of many things because common sense is largely non-committal? This chapter explores and tentatively evaluates three different approaches to answering these questions. The first applies standard accounts of ontological commitment to common-sense claims. This leads to the surprising and counter-intuitive result that common sense has metaphysically heavyweight commitments. The second approach emphasizes the superficiality and locality of common-sense claims. On this approach, however, common sense comes out as almost entirely non-committal. The third approach questions the seriousness of ontological commitment as such. If ontological commitment is cheap, it becomes possible both to accept the commitments of common sense at face value and to avoid the counter-intuitive consequences of heavyweight metaphysical commitments.

The Special Value of Experience

Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Mind, 2021

What is the epistemic value of conscious experience of reality? Conscious experience of reality p... more What is the epistemic value of conscious experience of reality? Conscious experience of reality provides cognitive contact with reality. I argue that this has important ramifications for how we think about its epistemic value. Epistemological orthodoxy tells us that truth is the sole fundamental epistemic value. However, I argue that cognitive contact with reality is itself a goal of inquiry which does not reduce to the goal of getting true beliefs or propositional knowledge. Experience has awareness of the truthmakers of one's true beliefs as its proper goal. As such, one reason why conscious experience is more epistemically valuable than second-hand sources like testimony is that it gives us more kinds of epistemic goods than only true belief or propositional knowledge. I defend this view from two rival accounts. First, that while conscious experience of reality has greater value than testimony, its value is eudaimonic rather than epistemic value. Second, that while it has greater epistemic value than testimony, this value is not distinctive: for it only promotes truth better than testimony.

Collective Ignorance: an Information Theoretic Account

by Chris Ranalli and Woudenberg, R. van

Synthese, 2019

We are ignorant knowers. This paper proposes an information theoretic explanation of that fact. T... more We are ignorant knowers. This paper proposes an information theoretic explanation of that fact. The explanation is a conjunction of three claims. First, that even in those dimensions where we are capable of picking up information, there is information that we don't pick up. Second, that there can be dimensions of information for which we lack the capacity to pick up any information whatsoever. Third, that we don't know whether the faculties and cognitive capacities we are endowed with process all the information that they pick up.

The Puzzle of Philosophical Testimony

European Journal of Philosophy, 2019

An epistemologist tells you that knowledge is more than justified true belief. You trust them and... more An epistemologist tells you that knowledge is more than justified true belief. You trust them and thus come to believe this on the basis of their testimony. Did you thereby come to know that this view is correct? Intuitively, there is something intellectually wrong with forming philosophical beliefs on the basis of testimony, and yet it's hard to see why philosophy should be significantly epistemically different from other areas of inquiry in a way that would fully prohibit belief by testimony. This, I argue, is the puzzle of philosophical testimony. In this paper, I explore the puzzle of philosophical testimony and its ramifications. In particular , I examine the case for pessimism about philosophical testimony-the thesis that philosophical belief on the basis of testimony is impossible or is in some way illegitimate-and I argue that it lacks adequate support. I then consider whether the source of the apparent intellectual wrongness of testimonial-based philosophical belief is grounded in non-epistemic norms and goals of philosophical practice itself and argue that such norms are implausible, don't conflict with testimonial-based philosophical belief, or else are mere disciplinary norms, lacking substantial normative force that would make it wrong to form testimonial-based philosophical belief.

Deep Disagreement and Hinge Epistemology

Synthese, 2018

This paper explores the application of hinge epistemology to deep disagreement. Hinge epistemolog... more This paper explores the application of hinge epistemology to deep disagreement. Hinge epistemology holds that there is a class of commitments—hinge commitments—which play a fundamental role in the structure of belief and rational evaluation: they are the most basic general presuppositions of our world views which make it possible for us to evaluate certain beliefs or doubts as rational. Deep disagreements seem to crucially involve disagreement over such fundamental commitments. In this paper, I consider pessimism about deep disagreement, the thesis that such disagreements are rationally irresolvable, and ask whether the Wittgensteinian account of deep disagreement—according to which such disagreements are disagreements over hinge commitments—provides adequate support for pessimism. I argue that while most versions of hinge epistemology support pessimism about deep disagreement, at least one variety of hinge epistemology, the entitlement theory, does not.

Luck, Propositional Perception, and the Entailment Thesis

Synthese, Aug 2013

Looking out the window, I see that it's raining outside. Do I know that it’s raining outside? Acc... more Looking out the window, I see that it's raining outside. Do I know that it’s raining outside? According to proponents of the Entailment Thesis, I do. If I see that p, I know that p. In general, the Entailment Thesis is the thesis that if S perceives that p, S knows that p. But recently, some philosophers (McDowell 2002; Turri 2010; Pritchard 2012, 2011) have argued that the Entailment Thesis is false. On their view, we can see p and not know that p. In this paper, I argue that their arguments are unsuccessful.

Are There Heavyweight Perceptual Reasons?

International Journal for the Study of Skepticism, 2020

Genia Schönbaumsfeld has recently argued that our ordinary perceptual reasons provide support for... more Genia Schönbaumsfeld has recently argued that our ordinary perceptual reasons provide support for heavyweight metaphysical and epistemological views, such as that there is a mind-independent physical world. Call this the Heavyweight Reasons Thesis. In this paper, I argue that we should reject the Heavyweight Reasons Thesis. I also argue that the rejection of the Heavyweight Reasons Thesis is compatible with the Factive Perceptual Reasons Thesis, the thesis that our perceptual reasons for our ordinary beliefs can be factive, but that factive reasons aren't necessarily better reasons than subjectively indiscriminable non-factive reasons.

Colour, Scepticism and Epistemology

by Chris Ranalli and Duncan Pritchard

What is Deep Disagreement?

Topoi (special issue on disagreement and argumentation) , 2018

What is the nature of deep disagreement? In this paper, I consider two similar albeit seemingly r... more What is the nature of deep disagreement? In this paper, I consider two similar albeit seemingly rival answers to this question: the Wittgensteinian theory, according to which deep disagreements are disagreements over hinge commitments, and the Fundamental Epistemic Principle theory, according to which deep disagreements are disagreements over fundamental epistemic principles. I assess these theories against a set of desiderata for a satisfactory theory of deep disagreement, and I argue that while the Fundamental Epistemic Principle theory does better than the Wittgensteinian theory on this score, the Fundamental Epistemic Principle theory nevertheless struggles to explain the variety of deep disagreement.

Wittgenstein and Deep Disagreement

The Philosophers' Magazine, 2017

According to the Wittgensteinian view of deep disagreement, deep disagreements are disagreements ... more According to the Wittgensteinian view of deep disagreement, deep disagreements are disagreements over hinge commitments, that is, the basic presuppositions of our world views. This article discusses, for a general audience, the extent to which the Wittgensteinian view supports the idea that deep disagreement are rationally irresolvable, and explores whether this yields a moral challenge.

Epistemological Disjunctivism and Introspective Indiscriminability

Philosophia, 2018

According to Duncan Pritchard's version of epistemological disjunctivism, in paradigm cases of pe... more According to Duncan Pritchard's version of epistemological disjunctivism, in paradigm cases of perceptual knowledge, one's knowledge that p is grounded in one's seeing that p, and one can, by reflection alone, come to know that they see that p. In this paper, I argue that the epistemic conception of introspective indiscriminability is incompatible with epistemological disjunctivism, so understood. This has the consequence that theories of the nature of sensory experience which accept the epistemic conception of introspective indiscriminability—such as phenomenal character disjunctivism and certain forms of naïve realism—are inconsistent with epistemological disjunctivism, so understood. I then argue that proponents of epistemological disjunctivism face a formidable challenge explaining in what sense, if any, one can have purely reflective knowledge of their factive rational support.

Scepticism and Disjunctivism

by Chris Ranalli and Duncan Pritchard

Scepticism and Disjunctivism

Skepticism: From Antiquity to the Present

This article examines various disjunctivist responses to the problem of radical scepticism.

Revisionism, Scepticism, and the Non-Belief Theory of Hinge-commitments

International Journal for the Study of Skepticism, 2018

In his recent work, Duncan Pritchard defends a novel Wittgensteinian response to the problem of r... more In his recent work, Duncan Pritchard defends a novel Wittgensteinian response to the problem of radical scepticism. The response makes essential use of a form of non-epistemicism about the nature of hinge-commitments. According to non-epistemicism, hinge-commitments cannot be known or grounded in rational considerations, such as reasons and evidence. On Pritchard's version of non-epistemicism, hinge-commitments express propositions but cannot be believed. This is the non-belief theory of hinge-commitments (NBT). One of the main reasons in favour of NBT over rival anti-sceptical Wittgensteinian views is that it has less theoretical costs and revisionary consequences than its rivals. In this paper, I argue that NBT fairs at least as bad as its rivals in terms of its theoretical costs and revisionism. In particular, I argue that NBT is inconsistent with certain kinds of philosophical disagreement; that it faces worries with mental-state scepticism; and that it faces difficulties in explaining how we can represent ourselves as committed to hinge-commitments.

Putnam on BIVS and Radical Scepticism

by Chris Ranalli and Duncan Pritchard

The aim of this paper is to explore Putnam’s influential ‘BIV’ argument against radical scepticis... more The aim of this paper is to explore Putnam’s influential ‘BIV’ argument against radical scepticism, both as he presents this argument and as it has subsequently been reconstructed. §1 explores the BIV argument as Putnam presents it and the anti-sceptical morals that he extracts from this argument. §2 examines a core critique of the argument, so conceived, from Anthony Brueckner. §3 then critically evaluates an influential reconstruction of Putnam’s argument, due to Crispin Wright. §4-5 explores the idea that Putnam’s argument is best thought of as a transcendental response to radical scepticism, and accordingly applies Stroud’s challenge to transcendental arguments to this proposal. Finally, §6 examines an influential criticism of Putnam’s argument which is due to Nagel.

What's so bad about echo chambers?

by Chris Ranalli and Finlay Malcom

Inquiry, 2023

Echo chambers have received widespread attention in recent years, but there is no agreement over ... more Echo chambers have received widespread attention in recent years, but there is no agreement over whether they are always epistemically bad for us. Some argue they’re inherently epistemically bad, whilst others claim they can be epistemically good. This paper has three aims. First, to bring together recent studies in this debate, taxonomizing different ways of thinking about the epistemic status of echo chambers. Second, to consider and reject several accounts of what makes echo chambers epistemically harmful or not, and then offer an alternative account which builds on some features of existing accounts. In our view, echo chambers – even those that are truth-conducive – are always epistemically harmful because of their reasons-undermining features, e.g. the way that they impede the development of epistemic reasons which can answer and withstand challenges. This account captures important ideas behind several theories in the epistemology of echo chambers, but offers a richer explanation that does not suffer from their limitations.

Indoctrination: what is it to indoctrinate someone?

1000-Word Philosophy, 2022

What is indoctrination? This is a short survey of theories about what indoctrination is and why, ... more

Closed-minded Belief & Indoctrination

American Philosophical Quarterly, 2022

What is indoctrination? This paper clarifies and defends a structural epistemic account of indoct... more What is indoctrination? This paper clarifies and defends a structural epistemic account of indoctrination according to which indoctrination is the inculcation of close-minded belief caused by 'epistemically insulating content'. This is content which contains a proviso that serious critical consideration of the relevant alternatives to one's belief is sanctionable, whether morally or epistemically. As such, it doesn't demand that indoctrination be a type of unethical instruction, ideological instruction, unveridical instruction, or instruction which bypasses the agent's rational evaluation. In this way, we can account for why indoctrination can occur for liberal democratic beliefs as much as it occurs for fascist, fundamentalist, or fanatical belief: for indoctrination is a structural epistemic phenomenon.

Recent Work on Skepticism (forthcoming)

American Philosophical Quarterly

This paper critically surveys 20 years of recent work on radical skepticism. It focuses on three ... more This paper critically surveys 20 years of recent work on radical skepticism. It focuses on three key issues. First, it starts by exploring how philosophers have recently challenged our understanding of radical skeptical arguments. It then unpacks and critical evaluates some influential reactions to radical skepticism: knowledge-first epistemology, epistemological disjunctivism, and hinge epistemology. Third, it explores some novel developments of pragmatism, gauges its anti-skeptical import, and reflects on the ways in which radical skeptical epistemology and ethics might meet.

Moral Hinges and Steadfastness

Metaphilosophy, 2021

Epistemic rationality seems to permit a more steadfast response to disagreements over our fundame... more Epistemic rationality seems to permit a more steadfast response to disagreements over our fundamental convictions than it does for our ordinary beliefs. Why is this? This essay explores three answers to this question: web-of-belief conservatism, moral encroachment, and hinge theories, and argues that hinge theories do a better job than the alternatives at vindicating the intuition that there is a rationally permissible asymmetry in our responses to disagreements over ordinary beliefs and fundamental convictions. The essay also shows how hinge theorists can explain the existence of moral hinge propositions, which enables them to account for the rational permissibility of being steadfast in response to disagreements over fundamental moral convictions.

Common Sense and Ontological Commitment

Cambridge Companion to Common-sense Philosophy, 2020

How ontologically committal is common sense? Is the common-sense philosopher beholden to a florid... more How ontologically committal is common sense? Is the common-sense philosopher beholden to a florid ontology in which all manner of objects, substances, and processes exist and are as they appear to be to common sense, or can she remain neutral on questions about the existence and nature of many things because common sense is largely non-committal? This chapter explores and tentatively evaluates three different approaches to answering these questions. The first applies standard accounts of ontological commitment to common-sense claims. This leads to the surprising and counter-intuitive result that common sense has metaphysically heavyweight commitments. The second approach emphasizes the superficiality and locality of common-sense claims. On this approach, however, common sense comes out as almost entirely non-committal. The third approach questions the seriousness of ontological commitment as such. If ontological commitment is cheap, it becomes possible both to accept the commitments of common sense at face value and to avoid the counter-intuitive consequences of heavyweight metaphysical commitments.

The Special Value of Experience

Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Mind, 2021

What is the epistemic value of conscious experience of reality? Conscious experience of reality p... more What is the epistemic value of conscious experience of reality? Conscious experience of reality provides cognitive contact with reality. I argue that this has important ramifications for how we think about its epistemic value. Epistemological orthodoxy tells us that truth is the sole fundamental epistemic value. However, I argue that cognitive contact with reality is itself a goal of inquiry which does not reduce to the goal of getting true beliefs or propositional knowledge. Experience has awareness of the truthmakers of one's true beliefs as its proper goal. As such, one reason why conscious experience is more epistemically valuable than second-hand sources like testimony is that it gives us more kinds of epistemic goods than only true belief or propositional knowledge. I defend this view from two rival accounts. First, that while conscious experience of reality has greater value than testimony, its value is eudaimonic rather than epistemic value. Second, that while it has greater epistemic value than testimony, this value is not distinctive: for it only promotes truth better than testimony.

Collective Ignorance: an Information Theoretic Account

by Chris Ranalli and Woudenberg, R. van

Synthese, 2019

We are ignorant knowers. This paper proposes an information theoretic explanation of that fact. T... more We are ignorant knowers. This paper proposes an information theoretic explanation of that fact. The explanation is a conjunction of three claims. First, that even in those dimensions where we are capable of picking up information, there is information that we don't pick up. Second, that there can be dimensions of information for which we lack the capacity to pick up any information whatsoever. Third, that we don't know whether the faculties and cognitive capacities we are endowed with process all the information that they pick up.

The Puzzle of Philosophical Testimony

European Journal of Philosophy, 2019

An epistemologist tells you that knowledge is more than justified true belief. You trust them and... more An epistemologist tells you that knowledge is more than justified true belief. You trust them and thus come to believe this on the basis of their testimony. Did you thereby come to know that this view is correct? Intuitively, there is something intellectually wrong with forming philosophical beliefs on the basis of testimony, and yet it's hard to see why philosophy should be significantly epistemically different from other areas of inquiry in a way that would fully prohibit belief by testimony. This, I argue, is the puzzle of philosophical testimony. In this paper, I explore the puzzle of philosophical testimony and its ramifications. In particular , I examine the case for pessimism about philosophical testimony-the thesis that philosophical belief on the basis of testimony is impossible or is in some way illegitimate-and I argue that it lacks adequate support. I then consider whether the source of the apparent intellectual wrongness of testimonial-based philosophical belief is grounded in non-epistemic norms and goals of philosophical practice itself and argue that such norms are implausible, don't conflict with testimonial-based philosophical belief, or else are mere disciplinary norms, lacking substantial normative force that would make it wrong to form testimonial-based philosophical belief.

Deep Disagreement and Hinge Epistemology

Synthese, 2018

This paper explores the application of hinge epistemology to deep disagreement. Hinge epistemolog... more This paper explores the application of hinge epistemology to deep disagreement. Hinge epistemology holds that there is a class of commitments—hinge commitments—which play a fundamental role in the structure of belief and rational evaluation: they are the most basic general presuppositions of our world views which make it possible for us to evaluate certain beliefs or doubts as rational. Deep disagreements seem to crucially involve disagreement over such fundamental commitments. In this paper, I consider pessimism about deep disagreement, the thesis that such disagreements are rationally irresolvable, and ask whether the Wittgensteinian account of deep disagreement—according to which such disagreements are disagreements over hinge commitments—provides adequate support for pessimism. I argue that while most versions of hinge epistemology support pessimism about deep disagreement, at least one variety of hinge epistemology, the entitlement theory, does not.

Luck, Propositional Perception, and the Entailment Thesis

Synthese, Aug 2013

Looking out the window, I see that it's raining outside. Do I know that it’s raining outside? Acc... more Looking out the window, I see that it's raining outside. Do I know that it’s raining outside? According to proponents of the Entailment Thesis, I do. If I see that p, I know that p. In general, the Entailment Thesis is the thesis that if S perceives that p, S knows that p. But recently, some philosophers (McDowell 2002; Turri 2010; Pritchard 2012, 2011) have argued that the Entailment Thesis is false. On their view, we can see p and not know that p. In this paper, I argue that their arguments are unsuccessful.

Are There Heavyweight Perceptual Reasons?

International Journal for the Study of Skepticism, 2020

Genia Schönbaumsfeld has recently argued that our ordinary perceptual reasons provide support for... more Genia Schönbaumsfeld has recently argued that our ordinary perceptual reasons provide support for heavyweight metaphysical and epistemological views, such as that there is a mind-independent physical world. Call this the Heavyweight Reasons Thesis. In this paper, I argue that we should reject the Heavyweight Reasons Thesis. I also argue that the rejection of the Heavyweight Reasons Thesis is compatible with the Factive Perceptual Reasons Thesis, the thesis that our perceptual reasons for our ordinary beliefs can be factive, but that factive reasons aren't necessarily better reasons than subjectively indiscriminable non-factive reasons.

Colour, Scepticism and Epistemology

by Chris Ranalli and Duncan Pritchard

What is Deep Disagreement?

Topoi (special issue on disagreement and argumentation) , 2018

What is the nature of deep disagreement? In this paper, I consider two similar albeit seemingly r... more What is the nature of deep disagreement? In this paper, I consider two similar albeit seemingly rival answers to this question: the Wittgensteinian theory, according to which deep disagreements are disagreements over hinge commitments, and the Fundamental Epistemic Principle theory, according to which deep disagreements are disagreements over fundamental epistemic principles. I assess these theories against a set of desiderata for a satisfactory theory of deep disagreement, and I argue that while the Fundamental Epistemic Principle theory does better than the Wittgensteinian theory on this score, the Fundamental Epistemic Principle theory nevertheless struggles to explain the variety of deep disagreement.

Wittgenstein and Deep Disagreement

The Philosophers' Magazine, 2017

According to the Wittgensteinian view of deep disagreement, deep disagreements are disagreements ... more According to the Wittgensteinian view of deep disagreement, deep disagreements are disagreements over hinge commitments, that is, the basic presuppositions of our world views. This article discusses, for a general audience, the extent to which the Wittgensteinian view supports the idea that deep disagreement are rationally irresolvable, and explores whether this yields a moral challenge.

Epistemological Disjunctivism and Introspective Indiscriminability

Philosophia, 2018

According to Duncan Pritchard's version of epistemological disjunctivism, in paradigm cases of pe... more According to Duncan Pritchard's version of epistemological disjunctivism, in paradigm cases of perceptual knowledge, one's knowledge that p is grounded in one's seeing that p, and one can, by reflection alone, come to know that they see that p. In this paper, I argue that the epistemic conception of introspective indiscriminability is incompatible with epistemological disjunctivism, so understood. This has the consequence that theories of the nature of sensory experience which accept the epistemic conception of introspective indiscriminability—such as phenomenal character disjunctivism and certain forms of naïve realism—are inconsistent with epistemological disjunctivism, so understood. I then argue that proponents of epistemological disjunctivism face a formidable challenge explaining in what sense, if any, one can have purely reflective knowledge of their factive rational support.

Scepticism and Disjunctivism

by Chris Ranalli and Duncan Pritchard

Scepticism and Disjunctivism

Skepticism: From Antiquity to the Present

This article examines various disjunctivist responses to the problem of radical scepticism.

Revisionism, Scepticism, and the Non-Belief Theory of Hinge-commitments

International Journal for the Study of Skepticism, 2018

In his recent work, Duncan Pritchard defends a novel Wittgensteinian response to the problem of r... more In his recent work, Duncan Pritchard defends a novel Wittgensteinian response to the problem of radical scepticism. The response makes essential use of a form of non-epistemicism about the nature of hinge-commitments. According to non-epistemicism, hinge-commitments cannot be known or grounded in rational considerations, such as reasons and evidence. On Pritchard's version of non-epistemicism, hinge-commitments express propositions but cannot be believed. This is the non-belief theory of hinge-commitments (NBT). One of the main reasons in favour of NBT over rival anti-sceptical Wittgensteinian views is that it has less theoretical costs and revisionary consequences than its rivals. In this paper, I argue that NBT fairs at least as bad as its rivals in terms of its theoretical costs and revisionism. In particular, I argue that NBT is inconsistent with certain kinds of philosophical disagreement; that it faces worries with mental-state scepticism; and that it faces difficulties in explaining how we can represent ourselves as committed to hinge-commitments.

Putnam on BIVS and Radical Scepticism

by Chris Ranalli and Duncan Pritchard

The aim of this paper is to explore Putnam’s influential ‘BIV’ argument against radical scepticis... more The aim of this paper is to explore Putnam’s influential ‘BIV’ argument against radical scepticism, both as he presents this argument and as it has subsequently been reconstructed. §1 explores the BIV argument as Putnam presents it and the anti-sceptical morals that he extracts from this argument. §2 examines a core critique of the argument, so conceived, from Anthony Brueckner. §3 then critically evaluates an influential reconstruction of Putnam’s argument, due to Crispin Wright. §4-5 explores the idea that Putnam’s argument is best thought of as a transcendental response to radical scepticism, and accordingly applies Stroud’s challenge to transcendental arguments to this proposal. Finally, §6 examines an influential criticism of Putnam’s argument which is due to Nagel.

Why Aesthetic Experience is Better than Aesthetic Testimony

Draft, 2022

Aesthetic experience seems superior to aesthetic testimony. Why? I argue that it is due to differ... more Aesthetic experience seems superior to aesthetic testimony. Why? I argue that it is due to differences in their epistemic value; in what epistemic goods each one provides. Aesthetic experience, or the experience of art or other aesthetic objects, affords multiple, distinctive epistemic goods whereas aesthetic testimony affords less. In particular, it provides aesthetic knowledge of truths, a kind of propositional knowledge, as well as aesthetic knowledge of things, a kind of non-propositional knowledge. Although aesthetic experience is superior because it has more epistemic value, this doesn’t mean that it provides weaker justification for aesthetic belief than aesthetic testimony; the difference is evaluative, not normative. In this way, we can explain a key pessimistic intuition about aesthetic testimony—that it is inferior to aesthetic experience—whilst preserving the optimistic view that aesthetic testimony makes aesthetic knowledge available to others. The superior epistemic value of first-hand aesthetic experience is compatible with a number of important observations about aesthetic testimony, including the importance of aesthetic trust.

Moral Risk, Conspiracy Theories, and Epistemic Norms

Draft , 2022

The epistemology of conspiracy theory belief is divided between so-called Generalists and Particu... more The epistemology of conspiracy theory belief is divided between so-called Generalists and Particularists. Generalism is roughly the view that conspiracy theories ought to be evaluated as a class; specifically, that there is a presumption of irrationality. Particularists deny this. This paper reframes the debate in terms of epistemic norms: some are norms of belief, whereas others are norms of epistemic evaluation. I then argue that one key variety of Particularism promotes skepticism about official theories. This skepticism, in turn, renders Particularism morally objectionable: for it licenses morally criticizable actions and attitudes, like disrespectful inquiry into repugnant conspiracy theories. I argue that the Particularist can avoid these challenges by adopting non-epistemic qualifications on their norms of belief and inquiry. The upshot is that there are a variety of norms regulating our attitudes towards conspiracy theory belief and inquiry, which clarifies how we ought to understand the ethics of conspiracy theory belief.

Political Hinge Epistemology

Extending Hinge Epistemology (forthcoming), 2022

This paper develops political hinge epistemology, an approach to political epistemology which tak... more This paper develops political hinge epistemology, an approach to political epistemology which takes as its starting point that every political belief system has certain fundamental moral and political presuppositions which must be in place for rational political evaluation to occur. In particular, political hinge epistemology is employed to augment ideology critique and further understand the role of political identity in polarization.

Closed-mindedness and Indoctrination

American Philosophical Quarterly (forthcoming)

What is indoctrination? This paper defends a structural epistemic account of indoctrination accor... more What is indoctrination? This paper defends a structural epistemic account of indoctrination according to which indoctrination is the inculcation of closed-minded belief caused by ‘epistemically insulating content’. This is content which contains a proviso that serious critical consideration of the relevant alternatives to one’s belief is sanctionable, whether morally or epistemically. As such, it doesn’t demand that indoctrination be a type of unethical instruction, ideological instruction, unveridical instruction, or instruction which bypasses the agent’s rational evaluation. In this way, we can account for why indoctrination can occur for liberal democratic beliefs as much as it occurs for fascist, fundamentalist, or fanatical belief: for indoctrination is a structural epistemic phenomenon.

The Wittgensteinian Theory of Deep Disagreement

The epistemic problem of deep disagreement is whether deep disagreements are subject to rational ... more The epistemic problem of deep disagreement is whether deep disagreements are subject to rational resolution. Pessimists about deep disagreement argue that such disagreements are rationally irresolvable, while optimists deny this. In this paper, I consider the Wittgensteinian account of deep disagreement, according to which deep disagreements are disagreements over hinge propositions. I argue that while several varieties of this view do provide adequate support for pessimism about deep disagreement, not all of them do.
[Please see my Synthese paper 'Deep Disagreement and Hinge Epistemology' and my Topoi SI paper 'What is Deep Disagreement?' for the successors to this draft]

Search Engines and Responsibility

Algorithm Bosses and Digital Labor Ethics

Epistemology, Algorithms, and Echo chambers

Introduces students to some key ideas in epistemology, and applies it to digital-content sharing,... more

Metaphysics of Mind: Identity Theory

Metaphysics of Mind: Functionalism

Metaphysics of Mind: Problems for Substance Dualism

Metaphysics of Mind: Substance Dualism

Naturalizing the Mind: Language of Thought

This lecture continues the serious on the philosophy of thought, and the question of how it is po... more

Naturalizing the Mind: Mental Representation as Causal Co-Variation

This lecture continues the series on the philosophy of thought. The core question of this series ... more This lecture continues the series on the philosophy of thought. The core question of this series is: "how can we naturalize mental representation?" In this lecture, we examine the view from Fred Dretske that mental representation is a type of 'causal co-variation' between the representation and what the representation is about, and Ruth Millikan's 'teleological' addition to the 'causal co-variation' view of mental representation.

Is the Mind a Computer? Representation as Computation

This lecture introduces students to the philosophy of thinking, and a one of its central question... more

Hinge Commitments, Philosophical Disagreement, and Rational Resolvability