Deep Disagreement

1. Una definizione di "disaccordi interpretativi profondi" Oggi si discute molto di disaccordi, più o meno profondi, più o meno faultless, nella filosofia contemporanea, soprattutto in quella di orientamento analitico, e in una molteplicità di ambiti disciplinari: filosofia del linguaggio, epistemologia, filosofia della religione, etica, eccetera. Il tema è uno dei più trattati, soprattutto in seguito alle posizioni innovative di filosofi del linguaggio come Kölbel2 e MacFarlane3. Nel prosieguo della mia discussione dirò qualcosa in merito. Tuttavia, il tema della mia trattazione è molto più specifico, ed è rappresentato da quelli che io da qualche tempo vado caratterizzando come "disaccordi interpretativi profondi" (da ora in poi, "DIP"). Il tema ha fatto parte delle mie lezioni ad Alessandria ed è tutt'ora oggetto dei miei studi. Le lezioni, a loro volta, erano tratte da due miei precedenti lavori4. In questo contributo, però, vi sono delle rilevanti novità rispetto ai miei studi precedenti. Possiamo considerare i DIP come una sotto-classe della più generale classe dei disaccordi profondi di natura etica ed etico-politica. Questo perché nei DIP la dimensione etica risulta assolutamente determinante, nello specifico senso che abbiamo bisogno di principi etici (e, più in generale, di concezioni etiche) per interpretare le disposizioni costituzionali sui diritti fondamentali che, come cercherò di mostrare, sono oggetto di radicali disaccordi interpretativi; e questo vale sia per il legislatore (se vuole intervenire per dare una regolamentazione legislativa alla materia in questione), che per il giudice ordinario (per tutti i casi concreti la cui soluzione dipende dall'interpretazione dei principi costituzionali rilevanti), che, infine, per il giudice costituzionale (nelle decisioni riguardanti la illegittimità costituzionale, o meno, delle norme le cui interpretazioni sono discordanti). Una parte corposa di questi casi appartiene all'ambito di quella partizione della filosofia del diritto, sempre più rilevante, che va sotto il nome di "bioetica". Quanto all'ormai vetusta questione dei "rapporti fra diritto e morale", si può dire che oggi, negli stati di diritto costituzionali, è nell'ambito dell'interpretazione (e soprattutto dell'interpretazione costituzionale) che si manifestano i rapporti fra diritto e morale, rapporti che, nell'ambito di questo specifico contesto istituzionale, assumono, ma soltanto contingentemente, la natura di una connessione necessaria. Sta di fatto che nel dibattito pubblico, nelle discussioni fra gli studiosi, sulla stampa, ci si ritrova spesso a parlare di disaccordi profondi di questo genere, soprattutto quando si verificano vicende che attirano un forte interesse, anche da parte di coloro che non sono "addetti ai lavori" (l'esempio più recente è costituito dal caso "Fabo/Cappato", di cui parlerò più in avanti). Il mio settore di indagine riguarderà, appunto, il campo dei disaccordi di carattere interpretativo che sorgono nel campo della bioetica e coinvolgono giudici, giuristi e teorici del diritto. La mia discussione si volgerà ad esaminare, in modo particolare, i casi di disaccordo interpretativo che coinvolgono la questione del "fine vita". 1* Una versione di questo saggio uscirà nel volume L'arcipelago del diritto. Dieci lezioni per i futuri naviganti. Per i dieci anni della cattedra "Galante Garrone, a cura di M. Vogliotti, Torino, Aragno, 2020. 2

The epistemic problem of deep disagreement is whether deep disagreements are subject to rational resolution. Pessimists about deep disagreement argue that such disagreements are rationally irresolvable, while optimists deny this. In this paper, I consider the Wittgensteinian account of deep disagreement, according to which deep disagreements are disagreements over hinge propositions. I argue that while several varieties of this view do provide adequate support for pessimism about deep disagreement, not all of them do.
[Please see my Synthese paper 'Deep Disagreement and Hinge Epistemology' and my Topoi SI paper 'What is Deep Disagreement?' for the successors to this draft]

This paper explores the application of hinge epistemology to deep disagreement. Hinge epistemology holds that there is a class of commitments—hinge commitments—which play a fundamental role in the structure of belief and rational evaluation: they are the most basic general presuppositions of our world views which make it possible for us to evaluate certain beliefs or doubts as rational. Deep disagreements seem to crucially involve disagreement over such fundamental commitments. In this paper, I consider pessimism about deep disagreement, the thesis that such disagreements are rationally irresolvable, and ask whether the Wittgensteinian account of deep disagreement—according to which such disagreements are disagreements over hinge commitments—provides adequate support for pessimism. I argue that while most versions of hinge epistemology support pessimism about deep disagreement, at least one variety of hinge epistemology, the entitlement theory, does not.

We frequently find ourselves in intractable disagreements about the morality of abortion, euthanasia, restrictions to freedom, or eating meat for fun. An adequate reaction to a disagreement requires knowing which type of disagreements we are confronted with. The main aim of my paper is to explain the source of moral disagreements and clarify their nature. I will argue that some moral disagreements are deep conceptual disagreements that similarly to disagreements in logic or ontology, are not resolvable, as the resolution of the disagreement requires the disputants to adopt perspectives that are conceptually unavailable to them. I will suggest four possible sources of moral disagreements: incommensurable fundamental values, different concepts of the good life, different motivating reasons and different concepts of morality.

In deep disagreements local disagreements are intertwined with more general basic disagreements about the relevant evidence, standards or argument or proper methods of inquiry in that domain. The paper provides a more specific conception of deep disagreement along these lines, and argues that while we should generally conciliate in cases of disagreement, this is not so in deep disagreements. The paper offers a general view of disagreement holding roughly, that one should moderate one's credence towards uncertainty in so far as disagreement with others provide undefeated higher order evidence that one might have made a mistake in one's appreciation of the first order evidence. When applying this view to deep disagreement we get that in cases of deep disagreement higher order evidence from disagreement is rebutted or undercut by the nature of the disagreement. So, in cases of deep disagreement one should not moderate one's credence. I finally argue that this gives a better general view of deep disagreement than views appealing to epistemic peers, personal information or independence.

My objective in this paper is to compare two philosophical problems, the problem of the criterion and the problem of deep disagreement, and note a core similarity which explains why many proposed solutions to these problems seem to fail along similar lines. From this observation, I propose a kind of skeptical solution to the problem of deep disagreement, and this skeptical program has consequences for the problem as it manifests in political epistemology and metaphilosophy.

What is the nature of deep disagreement? In this paper, I consider two similar albeit seemingly rival answers to this question: the Wittgensteinian theory, according to which deep disagreements are disagreements over hinge commitments, and the Fundamental Epistemic Principle theory, according to which deep disagreements are disagreements over fundamental epistemic principles. I assess these theories against a set of desiderata for a satisfactory theory of deep disagreement, and I argue that while the Fundamental Epistemic Principle theory does better than the Wittgensteinian theory on this score, the Fundamental Epistemic Principle theory nevertheless struggles to explain the variety of deep disagreement.

In this paper, I will argue for a complex of three theses. First, that the problem of deep disagreement is an instance of the regress problem of justification. Second, that the problem of deep disagreement, as a regress problem, depends on a dialecticality requirement for arguments. Third, that the dialecticality requirement is plausible and defensible.

An examination is offered of the nature of deep disagreements, culminating in a tripartite theoretical account of their nature. The relationship between deep disagreements and hinge epistemology is then explored. It is argued that disagreements over one’s hinge commitments would seem to be a paradigm case of deep disagreement, though it is also pointed out that the very idea of hinge disagreement may be hard to make sense of on some versions of hinge epistemology. Nonetheless, insofar as there can be hinge disagreements, it is plausible that they count as deep disagreements. It is further claimed that deep hinge disagreements may be open to resolution—i.e., that accepting the existence of deep hinge disagreements doesn’t entail a commitment to there being epistemically incommensurable epistemic systems. It is finally argued that even if all hinge disagreements are deep disagreements, it is not obvious that all deep disagreements are hinge disagreements.

The influence of Wittgenstein’s work in the study of deep disagreements has been dominated by On Certainty. Since the metaphor of ‘hinges’ plays a central role in the scholarship of On Certainty, a Wittgensteinian theory of deep disagreements is assumed to be based on hinge epistemology. This means that a disagreement would be deep because it concerns parties with conflicting hinges. When we shift our attention to a different part of Wittgenstein’s oeuvre, however, another picture of deep disagreements emerges. This article proposes a new Wittgensteinian approach to disagreements through the analysis of the Lectures on Religious Belief. Some of the disagreements that Wittgenstein and his pupils discuss in these lectures are deep, but not because they are grounded in different hinges, but because they are disagreements about pictures. This article is an extension of a paper presented at the 41st International Wittgenstein Symposium. It was published in the proceedings of the symposiu...

Two common claims in philosophy are that deep disagreements cannot, in principle, be resolved by argument and that normal disagreements will be resolved by argument. In each claim it is assumed that the parties to the disagreement are rational. I argue that both claims are false. The first fails to take account of refutations. The second fails to recognise the role of conjectures in the dynamics of the growth of knowledge. There is no disagreement such that it is impossible for rational parties to reach agreement by argument; but there is also no disagreement for which parties are rationally required to reach agreement by argument. Given the same evidence, it may be rational for one person to believe a specific proposition and another to believe its negation.

This thesis will investigate the possibility of rationally unresolvable disagreements, particularly within the class of deep disagreements. Deep disagreements are those which involve disagreements about which epistemic principles or practices should be employed over a range of cases. I argue that, although not all deep disagreements are unresolvable, it is plausible that some are. To this end, I present a definition and general mechanism of rational unresolvability. I also show how the debate over rationally unresolvable deep disagreement will come to rest on sceptical concerns. The thesis closes with a consideration of how we could respond to those sceptical concerns while leaving open the possibility of rational unresolvability.

https://doi.org/10.1515/witt-2022-0011
Deep Disagreements from the Logico-Pragmatical Point of View: An Analysis of Disagreements Based on Moyal-Sharrock’s Interpretation of Wittgenstein’s On Certainty. Argumentation is central to philosophy. One of its primary functions is to resolve disagreement. Yet, there are cases of disagreement that undercut the conditions of possibility for argumentation themselves: deep disagreements. In his seminal paper, Fogelin (2005) conceived of deep disagreements in Wittgensteinian terms by highlighting their “grammatical” character. Other than normal disagreements, which are located in the space of giving and receiving reasons, deep disagreements are concerned with what enables reasoning in the first place. Hence, they cannot be rationally resolved. Drawing on an interpretation of Moyal-Sharrock’s (2007) account of Wittgensteinian certainties, my logico-grammatical account proposes that deep disagreements pertain to certainties, viz. non-proposional ways of acting in the life-world that are epistemologically basic. Furthermore, the logico-grammatical analysis entails a gradual conception of the transition from normal to deep disagreements by differentiating different types (universal, local, personal, linguistic) and origins (instinctive, acquired) of certainties and specifying which forms of certainty can and cannot be dropped. Also, it allows to identify participating in the human form of life and discursive capabilities as conditions of possibility of disagreements. Consequently, it can specify the turning-point at which disagreement transforms into mere difference. It is at this point that the focus of a dispute switches from the rationality of the discourse to that of the a​g​e​n​t​

Spanish translation of the article published by Robert J.: pp.3-11. The present translation follows the reprint text and is made with the permission of Prof. Fogelin's heirs, Florence Fogelin and Lars Fogelin, and with the consent of the editors of Informal Logic. A presentation of the paper written by the translator is also included.

In "The logic of deep disagreements" (Informal Logic, 1985), Robert Fogelin claimed that there is a kind of disagreement-deep disagreement-which is, by its very nature, impervious to rational resolution. He further claimed that these two views are attributable to Wittgenstein. Following an exposition and discussion of that claim, we review and draw some lessons from existing responses in the literature to Fogelin's claims. In the final two sections (6 and 7) we explore the role reason can, and sometimes does, play in the resolution of deep disagreements. In doing this we discuss a series of cases, mainly drawn from Wittgenstein, which we take to illustrate the resolution of deep disagreements through the use of what we call "rational persuasion." We conclude that, while the role of argumentation in "normal" versus "deep" disagreements is characteristically different, it plays a crucial role in the resolution of both.

In this paper, I argue for three theses. First, that the problem of Deep Disagreement is usefully understood as an instance of the skeptical Problem of the Criterion. Second, there are structural similarities between proposed optimistic answers to deep disagreement and the problem of the criterion. Third, in light of these similarities, there are both good and bad consequences for proposed solutions to the problem of deep disagreement. Qué respuestas optimistas al desacuerdo profundo generan buenos (y malos) efectos Resumen El presente artículo presenta tres tesis. En primer lugar, plantea que el problema del desacuerdo pro-fundo se entiende, convenientemente, como un ejemplo del problema del criterio desde la óptica del escepticis-mo. En segundo lugar, existen similitudes estructurales entre las respuestas optimistas que se proponen con respecto al des-acuerdo profundo y al problema del criterio. Y, en tercer lugar, ante dichas similitudes, las soluciones que se proponen frente al problema del desacuerdo profundo generan tanto buenas como malas consecuencias. Palabras clave: Desacuerdo profundo, escepticismo, problema del criterio, argu-mentación.

This paper provides a reinterpretation of some of the most influential skeptical arguments, Agrippa's trilemma, meta-regress arguments, and Cartesian external world skepticism. These skeptical arguments are reasonably regarded as unsound arguments about the extent of our knowledge. However, reinterpretations of these arguments tell us something significant about the preconditions and limits of persuasive argumentation. These results contribute to the ongoing debates about the nature and resolvability of deep disagreement. The variety of skeptical arguments shows that we must distinguish different types of deep disagreement. Moreover, the reinterpretation of skeptical arguments elucidates that deep disagreement cannot be resolved via argumentation.

- This is a preprint -
Considering the persisting disagreement between the common sense philosophers and the sceptics, it seems that they are faced with a deep epistemic disagreement. Taking stock from Wittgenstein's On Certainty, one generally thinks that deep epistemic disagreements cannot be rationally resolved. Hinge epistemology, inherited from Wittgenstein, is also considered as an illuminating detour to understand common sense epistemology. But is there really a deep epistemic disagreement between the common sense philosophers and the sceptics? Could it not be considered that they share a common background? If so, is the rational resolution of their disagreement logically possible? What rational means can common sense use to convince someone of the privileged status of an epistemic principle? Relying on Reid's, Alston's and Lynch's arguments , I show that common sense epistemology is a more promising approach than hinge epistemology, because it is driven by an optimism about reason in the solving of deep epistemic disagreements.
Keywords: deep epistemic disagreements, scepticism, common sense, Thomas Reid, hinge epistemology, public reasons

A set of three overlapping answers are proposed to two initial questions (about what and how do leftists and rightists disagree with each other?)
(1) Intensional rigidity: Yes, left and right are rigid designators, but provided that these are not referring to concrete objects (individuals) but, rather, to abstract objects (properties). No, they aren’t if these must refer to individuals only.
(2) Faultless disagreement: Left- and right-wing agents are in disagreement whilst being correct with respect to discretionary, perspectival, Blackburn style expressivism (Blackburn 1984, 1993).
(3) Inferential roles: Left and right are better defined in logical terms of moral inference rules (Zangwill 1994, 2021), provided that: political concepts are thick concepts (Williams 1985); their descriptive use relies on a ‘lightweight’ truth (Wright 1993); equivocations (including the Frege-Geach Problem) are avoided by moral inferentialism (Hamblin 1987, Hallich 2014).

Robert Fogelin argued that the efficacy of our acts of reasons-giving depends on the normalcy of our discourse-to the extent that discourse is not normal disagreements occurring in it are deep; and to the extent that disagreements are deep, they are not susceptible to rational resolution. Against this, Maurice Finocchiaro argues that meta-argumentation can contribute to the rational resolution of disagreements having depth. Drawing upon a competency view of reasons-giving, this article conducts an inventory and audit of meta-argumentation's resolution resources for disagreements having depth. It concludes that, because Finocchiaro mischaracterizes the relationship between meta-argumentation and normalcy in the underlying discourse, he systematically overstates the rational resolution value of meta-argumentation. To the extent that meta-argumentation can contribute to the rational resolution of disagreements, those disagreements are normal, not deep. According to the competency view, the only way to resolve depth in disagreement is to first re-establish its normalcy.

According to the Wittgensteinian view of deep disagreement, deep disagreements are disagreements over hinge commitments, that is, the basic presuppositions of our world views. This article discusses, for a general audience, the extent to which the Wittgensteinian view supports the idea that deep disagreement are rationally irresolvable, and explores whether this yields a moral challenge.