Skip to main content

David Godden

Michigan State University, Philosophy, Faculty Member

Followers

449

Following

130

Co-authors

4

Public Views

David Godden (Ph.D. McMaster University, 2004) is an associate professor of philosophy at Michigan State University, with research interests in epistemology, the theory of rationality, reasoning and argument, the theory of evidence, logic (formal and informal), the history and philosophy of logic, and the history of modern and analytic philosophy.
Phone: Office:
Address: Department of Philosophy
503 S. Kedzie Hall
Michigan State University
East Lansing MI
U.S.A. 48824-1032

less

Vanderbilt University

Jan Albert van Laar

Katarzyna Budzynska

Warsaw University of Technology

Constanza Ihnen

Universidad de Chile

Kamila Dębowska-Kozłowska

Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznań

Nankai University

Marcin Lewinski

Universidade Nova de Lisboa

Petar Bodlović

University of Windsor

North Carolina State University

InterestsView All (56)

Uploads

Papers by David Godden

Burdens of Proposing

Informal Logic, 2022

This paper considers the probative burdens of proposing action or policy options in deliberation ... more This paper considers the probative burdens of proposing action or policy options in deliberation dialogues. Do proposers bear a burden of proof? Building on pioneering work by Douglas Walton (2010), and following on a growing literature within computer science, the prevailing answer seems to be “No.” Instead, only recommenders—agents who put forward an option as the one to be taken—bear a burden of proof. Against this view, we contend that proposers have burdens of proof with respect to their proposals. Specifically, we argue that, while recommenders that Φ bear a burden of proof to show that □Φ (We should / ought to / must Φ), proposers that Φ have a burden of proof to show that ◇Φ (We may / can Φ). A burden of proposing may be defined as , which reads: Those who propose that we might Φ are obliged, if called upon, to show that Φ is possible in any of four ways which we call worldly, deontic, instrumental, and practical. So understood, burdens of proposing satisfy the standard form...

Commentary on Jan Albert van Laar and Erik C. W. Krabbe, “Splitting a Difference of Opinion”

Reasoning by grounded analogy

Synthese, 2021

Analogical reasoning projects a property taken to hold of something or things (the source) to som... more Analogical reasoning projects a property taken to hold of something or things (the source) to something else (the target) on the basis of just those similarities premised in the analogy. Standard similarity-based accounts of analogical reasoning face the question: Under what conditions does a collection of similarities sufficiently warrant analogical projection? One answer is: When a thing’s having the premised similarities somehow determines its having the projected property. Standardly, this answer has been interpreted as claiming that a formally defined determination relation exists between the variables of which the determining properties are values and the variable of which the determined property is a value. This paper supplies another answer: Analogical projection is warranted when an item’s having the projected property is grounded in its having the premised similarities. Drawing on the metaphysics of grounding, we propose a model of grounded analogy on which analogical reasoning is valid under metaphysical necessity. Our model thus provides one answer to John Stuart Mill’s question of how analogical reasoning based on limited information about a single source case can provide an indefeasible justification for analogical projection. Once a relation of total grounding is ascertained to hold between some similarities and the projected property, no other properties bear on the projectability of the projected property from the source to the target.

The role of mental states in argumentation: Two problems for rationality from the psychology of belief

This chapter recognizes the contributions made to the theory of argument by the work of Cristiano... more This chapter recognizes the contributions made to the theory of argument by the work of Cristiano Castelfranchi, together with Fabio Paglieri, by situating their work in the development of social, or process-based accounts of argumentation. It is argued that this orientation to the social requires grounding in the psychological, and thus calls for a belief-based perspective on argumentation. It is shown how Castelfranchi’s work on the ontology of belief in relation to goals and intentions, together with the Data-oriented Belief Revision model contributes to this approach by bridging the gap between the social and the psychological. The paper concludes by raising two problems for standard models of argument arising from the psychology of belief: (i) that we seem to lack adequate voluntary control over our beliefs to be rationally responsible for them, and (ii) that we seem not to be reason trackers in the way required by standard accounts of rationality employed in argumentation.

Deducttvism as an Bmterprettve Strategy : A Reply to Groarke ' S Recent Defense of Reconstructive Deducttvism

Debates concerning deductivism seem to be a hallmark of the informal logic tradition. The very fi... more Debates concerning deductivism seem to be a hallmark of the informal logic tradition. The very first issues of the Informal Logic Newsletter, published in the late 1970s, were the site of a sustained debate concerning whether inductive arguments could be distinguished categorically from deductive arguments and, if so, how (Fohr, 1980a, 1980b; Govier, 1980a; Hitchcock, 1980; Johnson, 1980; Weddle, 1979, 1980).' At the time, the prevailing view was that deductive and inductive marked kinds of arguments. This prevailing opinion was challenged by Hitchcock (1980) who, following Skyrms (1986, pp. 6-13), proposed that "we regard the distinction between deductive and inductive as a broad and exhaustive distinction between types of validity" (p. 9). This proposal that inductive and deductive are "standard[s] for appraising arguments" (Govier, 1980b, p. 4) has been adopted subsequently by many theorists. For instance, Machina (1985) has

Wittgenstein and the Logic of Deep Disagreement Wittgenstein y la lógica del desacuerdo profundo

In "The logic of deep disagreements" (Informal Logic, 1985), Robert Fogelin claimed tha... more In "The logic of deep disagreements" (Informal Logic, 1985), Robert Fogelin claimed that there is a kind of disagreement - deep disagreement - which is, by its very nature, impervious to rational resolution. He further claimed that these two views are attributable to Wittgenstein. Following an exposition and discussion of that claim, we review and draw some lessons from existing responses in the literature to Fogelin's claims. In the final two sections (6 and 7) we explore the role reason can, and some- times does, play in the resolution of deep disagreements. In doing this we discuss a series of cases, mainly drawn from Wittgenstein, which we take to illustrate the reso- lution of deep disagreements through the use of what we call "rational persuasion." We conclude that, while the role of argumentation in "normal" versus "deep" disagree- ments is characteristically different, it plays a crucial role in the resolution of both.

MILL ON LOGIC 3 2 Deduction 2 . 1 Syllogisms

Working within the broad lines of general consensus that mark out the core features of John Stuar... more Working within the broad lines of general consensus that mark out the core features of John Stuart Mill’s (1806–1873) logic, as set forth in his A System of Logic (1843–1872), this chapter provides an introduction to Mill’s logical theory by reviewing his position on the relationship between induction and deduction, and the role of general premises and principles in reasoning. Locating induction, understood as a kind of analogical reasoning from particulars to particulars, as the basic form of inference that is both freestanding and the sole load-bearing structure in Mill’s logic, the foundations of Mill’s logical system are briefly inspected. Several naturalistic features are identified, including its subject matter, human reasoning, its empiricism, which requires that only particular, experiential claims can function as basic reasons, and its ultimate foundations in ‘spontaneous’ inference. The chapter concludes by comparing Mill’s naturalized logic to Russell’s (1907) regressive ...

Denying the Antecedent as a Legitimate Argumentative Strategy 219 Denying the Antecedent as a Legitimate Argumentative Strategy : A Dialectical Model University of Windsor

The standard account of denying the antecedent (DA) is that it is a deductively invalid form of a... more The standard account of denying the antecedent (DA) is that it is a deductively invalid form of argument, and that, in a conditional argument, to argue from the falsity of the antecedent to the falsity of the consequent is always fallacious. In this paper, we argue that DA is not always a fallacious argumentative strategy. Instead, there is a legitimate usage of DA according to which it is a defeasible argument against the acceptability of a claim. The dialectical effect of denying the antecedent is to shift the burden of proof back to the original proponent of a claim. We provide a model of this non-fallacious usage which is built upon pragmatic models of argumentation. Résumé: On décrit typiquement comme non valide et toujours fallacieux tout raisonnement dans lequel on infère la négation du conséquent d’une proposition conditionnelle à partir de la négation de son antécédent (NA). J’avance dans cet article que ce raisonnement n’est pas toujours une stratégie argumentative fallaci...

The Epistemic Utility of Toulmin’s Argument Fields*

Toulmin’s DWC model recognizes a plurality of argument cultures through the thesis of field depen... more Toulmin’s DWC model recognizes a plurality of argument cultures through the thesis of field dependency: that the normative features of arguments vary from one field to the next. Yet, little consensus exists concerning the nature and foundations of argument fields. This paper explores the question of whether Toulminian fields have any useful role to play in the epistemic evaluation of arguments.

Commentary on Aberdein

Informal Logic and the Dialectical Approach to Argument

Undoubtedly, Ralph H. Johnson and J. Anthony Blair are two of the patriarchs of informal logic (I... more Undoubtedly, Ralph H. Johnson and J. Anthony Blair are two of the patriarchs of informal logic (IL), and they remain its most recognized exponents. The informal logic movement initially began as a rejection of the tools of formal logic as an effective means of analysing and evaluating everyday reasoning and argumentation. As it developed, IL began to adopt a dialectical conception of its subject matter, and started to utilize the theoretical and methodological tools associated with this approach. This paper explores the influence of the dialectical conception of argument on the development of informal logic. Noting that neither Blair nor Johnson has embraced a dialogic approach to the dialectical, we situate Walton’s dialog-based approach in relation to that of informal logic.

Deep disagreements: A meta-argumentation approach

This paper examines the views of Fogelin, Woods, Johnstone, etc., concerning deep disa- greements... more This paper examines the views of Fogelin, Woods, Johnstone, etc., concerning deep disa- greements, force-five standoffs, philosophical controversies, etc. My approach is to reconstruct their views and critiques of them as meta-arguments, and to elaborate the meta-argumentative aspects of radical disa- greements. It turns out that deep disagreements are resolvable to a greater degree than usually thought, but only by using special principles and practices, such as meta-argumentation, ad hominem argumentation (in Johnstone's sense), Ramsey's principle, etc.

The importance of belief in argumentation

This paper examines the adequacy of commitment change, as a measure of the successful resolution ... more This paper examines the adequacy of commitment change, as a measure of the successful resolution of a difference of opinion. I argue that differences of opinion are only effectively resolved if commitments undertaken in argumentation survive beyond its conclusion and go on to govern an arguer’s actions in everyday life, e.g., by serving as premises in her practical reasoning. Yet this occurs, I maintain, only when an arguer’s beliefs are changed, not merely her commitments.

Commentary on Krabbe

Pushing the bounds of rationality: Argumentation and extended cognition

One of the central tasks of a theory of argumentation is to supply a the ory of appraisal: a set ... more One of the central tasks of a theory of argumentation is to supply a the ory of appraisal: a set of standards and norms according to which argumentation, and the reasoning involved in it, is properly evaluated. In their most general form, these can be understo od as rational norms, where the core idea of rationality is that we rightly respond to reasons by acco rding the credence we attach to our doxastic and conversational commitments with the probative strength of the reasons we have for them. Certain kinds of rational failings are so because they are manif estly illogical—for example, maintaining overtly contradictory commitments, violating deductive closure by fusing to accept the logical consequences of one’s present commitments, or failing to track basing relations by not updating one’s commitments in view of new, defeating information. Yet, according to the internal and empirical critiques, logic and probability theory fail to supply a fit set of norms for human reasoning and...

The Compliment of Rational Opposition: Disagreement, Adversariality, and Disputation

Topoi, 2021

Introduction: Disagreement—Epistemological and Argumentation-Theoretic Perspectives

Topoi, 2021

Notice that there is significant overlap between Fogelin's approach to deep disagreements, and re... more Notice that there is significant overlap between Fogelin's approach to deep disagreements, and recent work in so-called "hinge epistemology." That is unsurprising, since Fogelin and the hinge epistemologists both draw inspiration from Wittgenstein, but hinge epistemology to date has tended to be about intrapersonal rationality, and the rational status of one's deepest commitments, rather than about the rational resolution of deep disagreements. On hinge epistemology, see e.g. Coliva (2015) and Pritchard (2016). 2 For some argumentation-theoretic work on these sorts of problems, see Godden and Brenner (2010), Campolo (2013) and Adams ( ). 3 The literature on peer disagreement is large indeed, but see Kelly (2005), Feldman (2006) and Lackey (2008) for some of the main positions and arguments.

No Place for Compromise: Resisting the Shift to Negotiation

Argumentation, 2020

In a series of recent papers beginning with their "Splitting a difference of opinion: The shift t... more In a series of recent papers beginning with their "Splitting a difference of opinion: The shift to negotiation" (Argumentation, 2018, 32: 329-350) Jan Albert van Laar and Erik Krabbe claim that it is sometimes reasonable (i.e., rationally permissible) to shift from a critical discussion to a negotiation in order to settle a difference of opinion. They argue that their proposal avoids the fallacies of bargaining (substituting offers for arguments) and middle ground (mistaking a compromise for a resolution). Against this permissive policy for shifting to negotiation, we argue that the motivating reasons for such shifts typically fail, and that the permissive policy avoids neither fallacy while structurally incentivizing two types of strategic maneuvering that constitute rational and argumentative hazards: argumentative overcharge and abandonment of discussion. KEYWORDS: abandonment of commitment; abandonment of discussion; argumentative overcharge; critical discussion; dialogue shift; discursive norms; fallacy of bargaining; fallacy of middle ground; negotiation dialogue; principle of retrospective evaluation; rational resolution; * Acknowledgements: We consider this joint work; our names are listed in reverse alphabetical order. Earlier versions of this paper were presented by David Godden to the 11th International Conference of the Ontario Society for the Study of Argumentation (OSSA), "Argument, Objectivity, and Bias," May 18-21, 2016 (which appears in the proceedings (Godden 2016) as a commentary on van Laar and Krabbe (2016a) and to which they replied in their (2016b)), and to the Center for Research in Reasoning, Argumentation, and Rhetoric at the University of Windsor, November 2, 2018. In addition to the audiences at those talks, we offer our thanks especially to Erik Krabbe, Jan Albert van Laar, Harvey Siegel, and Douglas Walton for their incisive and constructive comments on earlier drafts of the paper.

On the Rational Resolvability of Deep Disagreement Through Meta-argumentation: A Resource Audit

Topoi, 2019

ABTRACT: Robert Fogelin argued that the efficacy of our acts of reasons-giving depends on the nor... more ABTRACT: Robert Fogelin argued that the efficacy of our acts of reasons-giving depends on the normalcy of our discourse-to the extent that discourse is not normal disagreements occurring in it are deep; and to the extent that disagreements are deep, they are not susceptible to rational resolution. Against this, Maurice Finocchiaro argues that meta-argumentation can contribute to the rational resolution of disagreements having depth. Drawing upon a competency view of reasons-giving, this article conducts an inventory and audit of meta-argumentation's resolution resources for disagreements having depth. It concludes that, because Finocchiaro mischaracterizes the relationship between meta-argumentation and normalcy in the underlying discourse, he systematically overstates the rational resolution value of meta-argumentation. To the extent that meta-argumentation can contribute to the rational resolution of disagreements, those disagreements are normal, not deep. According to the competency view, the only way to resolve depth in disagreement is to first re-establish its normalcy.

Burdens of Proposing

Informal Logic, 2022

This paper considers the probative burdens of proposing action or policy options in deliberation ... more This paper considers the probative burdens of proposing action or policy options in deliberation dialogues. Do proposers bear a burden of proof? Building on pioneering work by Douglas Walton (2010), and following on a growing literature within computer science, the prevailing answer seems to be “No.” Instead, only recommenders—agents who put forward an option as the one to be taken—bear a burden of proof. Against this view, we contend that proposers have burdens of proof with respect to their proposals. Specifically, we argue that, while recommenders that Φ bear a burden of proof to show that □Φ (We should / ought to / must Φ), proposers that Φ have a burden of proof to show that ◇Φ (We may / can Φ). A burden of proposing may be defined as , which reads: Those who propose that we might Φ are obliged, if called upon, to show that Φ is possible in any of four ways which we call worldly, deontic, instrumental, and practical. So understood, burdens of proposing satisfy the standard form...

Commentary on Jan Albert van Laar and Erik C. W. Krabbe, “Splitting a Difference of Opinion”

Reasoning by grounded analogy

Synthese, 2021

Analogical reasoning projects a property taken to hold of something or things (the source) to som... more Analogical reasoning projects a property taken to hold of something or things (the source) to something else (the target) on the basis of just those similarities premised in the analogy. Standard similarity-based accounts of analogical reasoning face the question: Under what conditions does a collection of similarities sufficiently warrant analogical projection? One answer is: When a thing’s having the premised similarities somehow determines its having the projected property. Standardly, this answer has been interpreted as claiming that a formally defined determination relation exists between the variables of which the determining properties are values and the variable of which the determined property is a value. This paper supplies another answer: Analogical projection is warranted when an item’s having the projected property is grounded in its having the premised similarities. Drawing on the metaphysics of grounding, we propose a model of grounded analogy on which analogical reasoning is valid under metaphysical necessity. Our model thus provides one answer to John Stuart Mill’s question of how analogical reasoning based on limited information about a single source case can provide an indefeasible justification for analogical projection. Once a relation of total grounding is ascertained to hold between some similarities and the projected property, no other properties bear on the projectability of the projected property from the source to the target.

The role of mental states in argumentation: Two problems for rationality from the psychology of belief

This chapter recognizes the contributions made to the theory of argument by the work of Cristiano... more This chapter recognizes the contributions made to the theory of argument by the work of Cristiano Castelfranchi, together with Fabio Paglieri, by situating their work in the development of social, or process-based accounts of argumentation. It is argued that this orientation to the social requires grounding in the psychological, and thus calls for a belief-based perspective on argumentation. It is shown how Castelfranchi’s work on the ontology of belief in relation to goals and intentions, together with the Data-oriented Belief Revision model contributes to this approach by bridging the gap between the social and the psychological. The paper concludes by raising two problems for standard models of argument arising from the psychology of belief: (i) that we seem to lack adequate voluntary control over our beliefs to be rationally responsible for them, and (ii) that we seem not to be reason trackers in the way required by standard accounts of rationality employed in argumentation.

Deducttvism as an Bmterprettve Strategy : A Reply to Groarke ' S Recent Defense of Reconstructive Deducttvism

Debates concerning deductivism seem to be a hallmark of the informal logic tradition. The very fi... more Debates concerning deductivism seem to be a hallmark of the informal logic tradition. The very first issues of the Informal Logic Newsletter, published in the late 1970s, were the site of a sustained debate concerning whether inductive arguments could be distinguished categorically from deductive arguments and, if so, how (Fohr, 1980a, 1980b; Govier, 1980a; Hitchcock, 1980; Johnson, 1980; Weddle, 1979, 1980).' At the time, the prevailing view was that deductive and inductive marked kinds of arguments. This prevailing opinion was challenged by Hitchcock (1980) who, following Skyrms (1986, pp. 6-13), proposed that "we regard the distinction between deductive and inductive as a broad and exhaustive distinction between types of validity" (p. 9). This proposal that inductive and deductive are "standard[s] for appraising arguments" (Govier, 1980b, p. 4) has been adopted subsequently by many theorists. For instance, Machina (1985) has

Wittgenstein and the Logic of Deep Disagreement Wittgenstein y la lógica del desacuerdo profundo

In "The logic of deep disagreements" (Informal Logic, 1985), Robert Fogelin claimed tha... more In "The logic of deep disagreements" (Informal Logic, 1985), Robert Fogelin claimed that there is a kind of disagreement - deep disagreement - which is, by its very nature, impervious to rational resolution. He further claimed that these two views are attributable to Wittgenstein. Following an exposition and discussion of that claim, we review and draw some lessons from existing responses in the literature to Fogelin's claims. In the final two sections (6 and 7) we explore the role reason can, and some- times does, play in the resolution of deep disagreements. In doing this we discuss a series of cases, mainly drawn from Wittgenstein, which we take to illustrate the reso- lution of deep disagreements through the use of what we call "rational persuasion." We conclude that, while the role of argumentation in "normal" versus "deep" disagree- ments is characteristically different, it plays a crucial role in the resolution of both.

MILL ON LOGIC 3 2 Deduction 2 . 1 Syllogisms

Working within the broad lines of general consensus that mark out the core features of John Stuar... more Working within the broad lines of general consensus that mark out the core features of John Stuart Mill’s (1806–1873) logic, as set forth in his A System of Logic (1843–1872), this chapter provides an introduction to Mill’s logical theory by reviewing his position on the relationship between induction and deduction, and the role of general premises and principles in reasoning. Locating induction, understood as a kind of analogical reasoning from particulars to particulars, as the basic form of inference that is both freestanding and the sole load-bearing structure in Mill’s logic, the foundations of Mill’s logical system are briefly inspected. Several naturalistic features are identified, including its subject matter, human reasoning, its empiricism, which requires that only particular, experiential claims can function as basic reasons, and its ultimate foundations in ‘spontaneous’ inference. The chapter concludes by comparing Mill’s naturalized logic to Russell’s (1907) regressive ...

Denying the Antecedent as a Legitimate Argumentative Strategy 219 Denying the Antecedent as a Legitimate Argumentative Strategy : A Dialectical Model University of Windsor

The standard account of denying the antecedent (DA) is that it is a deductively invalid form of a... more The standard account of denying the antecedent (DA) is that it is a deductively invalid form of argument, and that, in a conditional argument, to argue from the falsity of the antecedent to the falsity of the consequent is always fallacious. In this paper, we argue that DA is not always a fallacious argumentative strategy. Instead, there is a legitimate usage of DA according to which it is a defeasible argument against the acceptability of a claim. The dialectical effect of denying the antecedent is to shift the burden of proof back to the original proponent of a claim. We provide a model of this non-fallacious usage which is built upon pragmatic models of argumentation. Résumé: On décrit typiquement comme non valide et toujours fallacieux tout raisonnement dans lequel on infère la négation du conséquent d’une proposition conditionnelle à partir de la négation de son antécédent (NA). J’avance dans cet article que ce raisonnement n’est pas toujours une stratégie argumentative fallaci...

The Epistemic Utility of Toulmin’s Argument Fields*

Toulmin’s DWC model recognizes a plurality of argument cultures through the thesis of field depen... more Toulmin’s DWC model recognizes a plurality of argument cultures through the thesis of field dependency: that the normative features of arguments vary from one field to the next. Yet, little consensus exists concerning the nature and foundations of argument fields. This paper explores the question of whether Toulminian fields have any useful role to play in the epistemic evaluation of arguments.

Commentary on Aberdein

Informal Logic and the Dialectical Approach to Argument

Undoubtedly, Ralph H. Johnson and J. Anthony Blair are two of the patriarchs of informal logic (I... more Undoubtedly, Ralph H. Johnson and J. Anthony Blair are two of the patriarchs of informal logic (IL), and they remain its most recognized exponents. The informal logic movement initially began as a rejection of the tools of formal logic as an effective means of analysing and evaluating everyday reasoning and argumentation. As it developed, IL began to adopt a dialectical conception of its subject matter, and started to utilize the theoretical and methodological tools associated with this approach. This paper explores the influence of the dialectical conception of argument on the development of informal logic. Noting that neither Blair nor Johnson has embraced a dialogic approach to the dialectical, we situate Walton’s dialog-based approach in relation to that of informal logic.

Deep disagreements: A meta-argumentation approach

This paper examines the views of Fogelin, Woods, Johnstone, etc., concerning deep disa- greements... more This paper examines the views of Fogelin, Woods, Johnstone, etc., concerning deep disa- greements, force-five standoffs, philosophical controversies, etc. My approach is to reconstruct their views and critiques of them as meta-arguments, and to elaborate the meta-argumentative aspects of radical disa- greements. It turns out that deep disagreements are resolvable to a greater degree than usually thought, but only by using special principles and practices, such as meta-argumentation, ad hominem argumentation (in Johnstone's sense), Ramsey's principle, etc.

The importance of belief in argumentation

This paper examines the adequacy of commitment change, as a measure of the successful resolution ... more This paper examines the adequacy of commitment change, as a measure of the successful resolution of a difference of opinion. I argue that differences of opinion are only effectively resolved if commitments undertaken in argumentation survive beyond its conclusion and go on to govern an arguer’s actions in everyday life, e.g., by serving as premises in her practical reasoning. Yet this occurs, I maintain, only when an arguer’s beliefs are changed, not merely her commitments.

Commentary on Krabbe

Pushing the bounds of rationality: Argumentation and extended cognition

One of the central tasks of a theory of argumentation is to supply a the ory of appraisal: a set ... more One of the central tasks of a theory of argumentation is to supply a the ory of appraisal: a set of standards and norms according to which argumentation, and the reasoning involved in it, is properly evaluated. In their most general form, these can be understo od as rational norms, where the core idea of rationality is that we rightly respond to reasons by acco rding the credence we attach to our doxastic and conversational commitments with the probative strength of the reasons we have for them. Certain kinds of rational failings are so because they are manif estly illogical—for example, maintaining overtly contradictory commitments, violating deductive closure by fusing to accept the logical consequences of one’s present commitments, or failing to track basing relations by not updating one’s commitments in view of new, defeating information. Yet, according to the internal and empirical critiques, logic and probability theory fail to supply a fit set of norms for human reasoning and...

The Compliment of Rational Opposition: Disagreement, Adversariality, and Disputation

Topoi, 2021

Introduction: Disagreement—Epistemological and Argumentation-Theoretic Perspectives

Topoi, 2021

Notice that there is significant overlap between Fogelin's approach to deep disagreements, and re... more Notice that there is significant overlap between Fogelin's approach to deep disagreements, and recent work in so-called "hinge epistemology." That is unsurprising, since Fogelin and the hinge epistemologists both draw inspiration from Wittgenstein, but hinge epistemology to date has tended to be about intrapersonal rationality, and the rational status of one's deepest commitments, rather than about the rational resolution of deep disagreements. On hinge epistemology, see e.g. Coliva (2015) and Pritchard (2016). 2 For some argumentation-theoretic work on these sorts of problems, see Godden and Brenner (2010), Campolo (2013) and Adams ( ). 3 The literature on peer disagreement is large indeed, but see Kelly (2005), Feldman (2006) and Lackey (2008) for some of the main positions and arguments.

No Place for Compromise: Resisting the Shift to Negotiation

Argumentation, 2020

In a series of recent papers beginning with their "Splitting a difference of opinion: The shift t... more In a series of recent papers beginning with their "Splitting a difference of opinion: The shift to negotiation" (Argumentation, 2018, 32: 329-350) Jan Albert van Laar and Erik Krabbe claim that it is sometimes reasonable (i.e., rationally permissible) to shift from a critical discussion to a negotiation in order to settle a difference of opinion. They argue that their proposal avoids the fallacies of bargaining (substituting offers for arguments) and middle ground (mistaking a compromise for a resolution). Against this permissive policy for shifting to negotiation, we argue that the motivating reasons for such shifts typically fail, and that the permissive policy avoids neither fallacy while structurally incentivizing two types of strategic maneuvering that constitute rational and argumentative hazards: argumentative overcharge and abandonment of discussion. KEYWORDS: abandonment of commitment; abandonment of discussion; argumentative overcharge; critical discussion; dialogue shift; discursive norms; fallacy of bargaining; fallacy of middle ground; negotiation dialogue; principle of retrospective evaluation; rational resolution; * Acknowledgements: We consider this joint work; our names are listed in reverse alphabetical order. Earlier versions of this paper were presented by David Godden to the 11th International Conference of the Ontario Society for the Study of Argumentation (OSSA), "Argument, Objectivity, and Bias," May 18-21, 2016 (which appears in the proceedings (Godden 2016) as a commentary on van Laar and Krabbe (2016a) and to which they replied in their (2016b)), and to the Center for Research in Reasoning, Argumentation, and Rhetoric at the University of Windsor, November 2, 2018. In addition to the audiences at those talks, we offer our thanks especially to Erik Krabbe, Jan Albert van Laar, Harvey Siegel, and Douglas Walton for their incisive and constructive comments on earlier drafts of the paper.

On the Rational Resolvability of Deep Disagreement Through Meta-argumentation: A Resource Audit

Topoi, 2019

ABTRACT: Robert Fogelin argued that the efficacy of our acts of reasons-giving depends on the nor... more ABTRACT: Robert Fogelin argued that the efficacy of our acts of reasons-giving depends on the normalcy of our discourse-to the extent that discourse is not normal disagreements occurring in it are deep; and to the extent that disagreements are deep, they are not susceptible to rational resolution. Against this, Maurice Finocchiaro argues that meta-argumentation can contribute to the rational resolution of disagreements having depth. Drawing upon a competency view of reasons-giving, this article conducts an inventory and audit of meta-argumentation's resolution resources for disagreements having depth. It concludes that, because Finocchiaro mischaracterizes the relationship between meta-argumentation and normalcy in the underlying discourse, he systematically overstates the rational resolution value of meta-argumentation. To the extent that meta-argumentation can contribute to the rational resolution of disagreements, those disagreements are normal, not deep. According to the competency view, the only way to resolve depth in disagreement is to first re-establish its normalcy.