Competition Law and Policy

As a result of the processes of globalisation and of technological revolution, markets now transcend countries’ physical borders. Increasingly interconnected, borderless and digitalised global markets, thus, tend to develop mass markets, increase the integration of enterprises and so produce goods and provide services that are readily accessible for consumers. Easy access improves knowledge transfer and raises economic efficiencies and expectations. However, there are
also downsides. The ever-diminishing distinction between goods and services in these markets poses a threat to the diversity of goods and services and, consequently, to small market players at both country and company level. Thus, the rise of anti-competitive cross-border economic activities such as collusion, international mergers and filling dominant positions gives reason to pause and revisit the relationship between competition and trade from the perspective of African countries, where national markets are generally small and where small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) represent the majority of market players. While economic analysis of trade on its own often assumes static models, attention to competition and especially to the interface between
trade and competition and between its laws and policies reveals possibilities of enhancing the focus on the diversification and development of productive capabilities that are crucial for the economic development of the small-scale national market players, and inclusive growth, within most African states. In this chapter we present such a perspective to economic policymaking in part by distinguishing between trade and competition at the level of economic activity (section 2) and trade and competition laws (section 3) when discussing their interrelations. We illustrate the latter by evaluating whether and to what extent the behaviour of cross-border economic operators is currently disciplined, with a specific focus on South Africa, one of Africa’s largest economies. South Africa has a well-articulated policy architecture for trade and competition; is a party to both major southern African regional agreements, the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC); and is involved in recent initiatives directed at African integration. We then conclude the chapter (section 4).

The paper analyses the incentives for media operators to opt for an exclusive distribution agreement (across platforms) of premium contents rather than a non-exclusive one: it then compares the effects of both types of dealings on the competitive process and on consumer welfare. Our specific field of inquiry is represented by sport premium rights of the Italian professional league (Serie A). Firstly, the paper surveys the exclusive distribution theory in general economic literature, recalling the main contributions on this subject; the theoretical framework is then applied to the media industry and, specifically, to content owners' incentive to sell on exclusive basis. Secondly, we focus on the downstream market (the broadcasters' one) and examine whether and under which conditions it is profitable for rights' purchasers to resell contents to their competitors. Finally, the main theoretical findings are applied to the selling procedures of audiovisual football rights, suggesting a potential overhaul of the Italian current model towards the European best practices.

Recent years have seen a notable increase in the number of leading EU Court judgments on margin squeeze, including Deutsche Telekom, TeliaSonera and Telefónica. One notable feature of the case law on margin squeeze is that for the first time, the EU Courts demanded an effects-based approach to an abusive practice under Article 102 TFEU even when the Commission was satisfied with its very existence in the absence of effects on competition. However, as the modernisation of Article 102 TFEU has shown, it was normally the Commission who was pushing for a more economics- and effects-based approach towards the interpretation of abuse of a dominant position. Mainly because the relevant case law on margin squeeze is shaped in the aftermath of the Guidance on the Commission’s enforcement priorities and at the same time puts greater emphasis on the analysis of effects and on the use of the as efficient competitor test, one may be tempted to argue that the EU Courts have ultimately endorsed the effects-based approach of the Commission as encapsulated in the Guidance. Against this background, this article deals with one of the most questioned issues in the context of Article 102 TFEU following the publication of the Guidance: whether the leading judgments on margin squeeze can be taken as an evidence of the abandonment of the formalistic approach to Article 102 TFEU in favour of the effects-based approach and of the endorsement of the Guidance by the EU Courts.

A brief presentation on algorithms and algorithmic weight on Competition Law. Technology, a tool or a weapon? A friend or a foe? This short-paper was elaborated for the final evaluation of Global Competition Law course, lectured by Professor Miguel Moura e Silva.

Uma breve apresentação do tema referente aos algoritmos e o seu peso no Direito da Concorrência. No fundo, será a tecnologia uma ferramenta ou uma arma? Um amigo ou inimigo? Este short-paper foi elaborado no âmbito do curso de Global Competition Law, leccionado em inglês pelo Professor Doutor Miguel Moura e Silva.

La tesi ripercorre il dibattito legato al concetto di abuso di posizione dominante rispetto agli obiettivi che il diritto della concorrenza persegue e ai metodi adottati in sede amministrativa e giurisprudenziale per perseguirli.

La fattispecie delle politiche di sconto rappresenta il terreno ideale per far emergere le tensioni e incongruenze fra un approccio formalistico all'art. 102 TFUE e analisi economicamente orientata. Si dà conto in tal senso della giurisprudenza passata e si studia attentamente la vicenda Intel, considerata come dirimente nei confronti di quesiti ed interrogativi.

Eligible customers are the essence of competition in the market for retail supply of electricity which has been formed during the liberalisation and privatisation of the Turkish electricity market. They enjoy the right to switch to alternative suppliers, which enables them to purchase electricity at cheaper prices from competing suppliers instead of the authorised supplier operating in their distribution region. After the privatisation of distribution companies, the Turkish Competition Authority has received a large number of complaints with regard to the restriction of eligible customers’ right to switch and some exclusionary and/or discriminatory practices on the part of distribution companies and their affiliate retail supply companies against competing suppliers with a view to incentivising eligible customers to purchase electricity from their authorised supplier. In addressing those complaints, the Turkish Competition Authority has so far not launched a full-blown investigation and left the issue to the Energy Markets Regulatory Authority by ordering the undertakings in question to cease and desist under Article 9(3) of the Act on the Protection of Competition 1994 “all kinds of practices that raise obstacles to liberalisation”. This article examines the impact of the relevant decisions of the Turkish Competition Authority on ensuring and furthering competition in the market for retail supply of electricity.

This study aims to contribute to the cross-fertilization of the fields of competition economics and development economics. For that to happen, however, it is important to focus on the complex intellectual history that placed these different groups of scholars, and the conceptual traditions they represent, in different intellectual itineraries in order to provide an explanation to the relative isolation of each field from the inputs of the other. Our narrative will be the opposition between the dominant intellectual tradition in development economics until recently, which highlighted the role of state intervention through the establishment of protectionist barriers and monopolies to the expense of markets and free competition, and the competition economics’ belief on the superior efficiency of free competition. Our aim is not to be exhaustive, but to sketch the intellectual history of this opposition and to explain why the recent evolution of both fields to the analysis of the micro-foundations of growth, their focus on institutions and their emphasis on empirical methods, might lead to a new synthesis, favoring a useful cross-fertilization between competition economics and development economics.

The European Union adoped a new guidelines related to the assessment of vertical mergers towards end of 2007. This guidelines suggests an effect-based and economic approach in analyzing vertical mergers. The vertical merger between Tom Tom and Tele Atlas, which are undertakings operating at different stages of the portable navigation devices market, is of particular importance as being the first case decided under the new guidelines. This paper aims to discuss the strong and weak parts of the European Commission's decision for this transaction in the light of economic theories.

The present paper will examine whether the blanket prohibition of disclosure of corporate statements contained in Article 6(1) of the draft proposal on certain rules governing actions for damages under national law for infringements of the competition law provisions of the Member States and of the European Union is necessary to safeguard the attractiveness of the Commission's leniency programme or whether it represents an insurmountable burden for claimants that will in the long run severely hamper the private enforcement of EU Competition law (a most unfortunate outcome considering the main objective of the proposed Directive is precisely the opposite). On the one hand, excessive protection of leniency applicants' clemency submissions may lead to useless litigation and ultimately render the private enforcement of competition law in the EU pointless, as claimants are denied (purportedly) essential evidence for building stout damages cases. On the other hand, a more permissive approach towards the disclosure of such information may cripple the public enforcement of Competition
law by discouraging cartelists to come forward in the first place. Given the fact that follow-on claims constitute a lion's share of current actions for antitrust damages brought in the EU, such a result would almost certainly have catastrophic consequences for individuals' right to compensation for the harm caused by infringements of Article
101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union as recognised by the European Court of Justice in the Courage and Crehan and Manfredi and others judgments. We conclude that the Commission seems to be privileging immunity recipients at the cost of injured parties by imposing remedies that are too far reaching for the protection of the effectiveness of the leniency programmes, especially taking into consideration the lack of conclusive evidence proving that disclosure of corporate statements would discourage potential leniency applicants from collaborating with the competition authorities in the first place. In light of this, we contend that a case-by-case approach such as the one envisaged by the European Court of Justice in Pfleiderer is
more adequate to strike the balance between the injured parties’ right to redress and the effectiveness of the leniency programmes – at least for the time being.

The Anti-Monopoly (Anti-Competition Law of the People's Republic of China (PRC)
is a recent development of the state following the opening up and reform of the 1980s. The Anti-
Monopoly Law of PRC learned many experiences from the western world, such as the United
States and the European Union that have experienced more than a century. But the young Anti-
Monopoly Law of PRC has a comparable status of stabling market and consumer protection with
the legal regime of the European Union in which most principles are transplanted. On the other
hand, the Chinese Anti-Monopoly Law has its own Chinese Characteristics, such as the adoption
of abuse of administrative power to eliminate or restrict competition as a manifestation of state
interference. While in areas of cartel agreement investigation and leniency programs, though
there are quite many similarities with the Anti-Trust Law of the United States, the paper argued
that being the behavior of cartel is not a criminal act and regarded as administrative misconduct,
its deterrence effect is minimal that needs some revisions. Besides, the paper argued that some
institutional arrangement warrants for Anti-monopoly acts protection and enforcement
institutions.

Issuing soft law instruments on the enforcement of abuse of a dominant position in different competition law systems has never been a global trend in the last decade than before. In the European Union (EU), the European Commission published the “Guidance on the Commission’s Enforcement Priorities in Applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to Abusive Exclusionary Conduct by Dominant Undertakings” (the Guidance) in 2009 as yet the final formal stage during the modernisation of Art.102 TFEU. As an official candidate for EU membership, Turkey is unlikely to distance itself from the developments in the EU. Within this context, “Guidelines on the Assessment of Abusive Exclusionary Conduct by Dominant Undertakings” (the Guidelines on Art.6) were published in 2014. Evident from their structure and substantive content, the Guidelines on Art.6 are closely modelled on the Guidance. Although the transposition of the Guidance into Turkish competition law seems prima facie desirable in terms of the harmonisation of Turkey’s domestic competition law with the EU acquis, the question as to whether the Guidelines on Art.6 have suited to Turkey’s own needs gains significance. Despite being the first secondary legislation on Art.6 of the Act on the Protection of Competition 1994 in Turkey, a lack of much-needed guidance on the problematic areas in the enforcement of Art.6 may well result in the Guidelines on Art.6 being a missed opportunity to establish a coherent policy on Art.6. This book explores whether there is a need for adopting Guidelines in relation to Art.6 in Turkish competition law, examines whether the Guidance can or should be used as a model, and finally gives reflections on how the legal regime and content of these Guidelines can be best tailored to the enforcement of Art.6 in Turkey.

Doğal gaz piyasaları; rekabet, arz güvenliği ve çevrenin korunması ilkeleriyle biçimlenen AB enerji politikasıyla uyumlu duruma getirilmek üzere son yirmi yıldır AB çapında bir dönüşüm sürecine konu olmuştur. AB doğal gaz piyasalarının geleceğini belki de en yakından ilgilendiren ve AB enerji politikasında dengeleri tümden değiştirebilecek bir gelişme ise AB Komisyonu’nun Rus doğal gaz devi Gazprom hakkında 2012 yılından beri devam eden soruşturmasıdır. Kimi yazarlarca “yüzyılın rekabet soruşturması”, “titanların savaşı” veya “AB’nin en büyük mücadelesi” olarak da nitelendirilen Gazprom soruşturması kapsamında Gazprom’un (i) aşırı fiyatlama ve doğal gaz fiyatını petrol fiyatına endekslemek, (ii) yeniden satış ve ihracat yasakları suretiyle üye devletlerarası sınır ötesi ticareti kısıtlamak ve (iii) bazı üye devletlere gaz akışını Gazprom’un birtakım boru hattı yatırımlarına katılma şartına bağlamak suretiyle Orta ve Doğu Avrupa’daki üye devletlerde hakim durumunu kötüye kullandığı iddiaları araştırılmaktadır. Bu makalede AB Komisyonu’nun Gazprom soruşturması gerek hukuki gerekse siyasi tüm boyutlarıyla incelenmekte ve soruşturmanın geleceği hakkında birtakım çıkarımlarda bulunulmaktadır.

Rekabet hukukunda de minimis, normal şartlar altında rekabet hukukunun yasaklayıcı normları çerçevesinde rekabeti sınırlayıcı anlaşma olarak değerlendirilebilecek bazı anlaşma türlerinin, rekabeti hissedilebilir ölçüde sınırlamaması nedeniyle rekabet otoritelerince dikkate alınmaması olarak tanımlanabilir. 4054 sayılı Rekabetin Korunması Hakkında Kanun’un ilk hâlinde düzenlenmeyen de minimis kuralı, 4054 sayılı Kanun yürürlüğe girdikten çeyrek asır sonra, 7246 sayılı Rekabetin Korunması Hakkında Kanunda Değişiklik Yapılmasına Dair Kanun ile Türk rekabet hukuku mevzuatına dâhil edilmiştir. Bu doğrultuda, ilgili pazarda belli bir pazar payına sahip teşebbüsler arası de minimis niteliğindeki, kanunun deyimiyle “rekabeti kayda değer ölçüde kısıtlamayan” anlaşma, uyumlu eylem ve teşebbüs birliği kararları, 4054 sayılı Kanun’un 4. maddesine aykırı olduğu gerekçesiyle Rekabet Kurulu tarafından soruşturma konusu yapılmayabilecektir. 7246 sayılı Kanun’da ana hatlarıyla düzenlenen de minimis kuralının usul ve esaslarına, 2021/3 sayılı Rekabeti Kayda Değer Ölçüde Kısıtlamayan Anlaşma, Uyumlu Eylem ve Teşebbüs Birliği Karar ve Eylemlerine İlişkin Tebliğ’de yer verilmiştir. Söz konusu Tebliğ hazırlanırken büyük ölçüde Avrupa Komisyonu’nun 2014 tarihli De Minimis Duyurusu’ndan yararlanılmıştır. 7246 sayılı Kanun öncesinde Rekabet Kurulu, mevzuattaki bu boşluğu 4054 sayılı Kanun’un 9/3. maddesine dayandırdığı kararlarıyla doldurmuş, uygulamada de minimis kuralının eksikliğini adeta hiç hissetmemiştir. Gerçekten, 7246 sayılı Kanun öncesinde Kurul’un “de minimis” terimini açıkça zikretmeden, ancak fiilen de minimis kuralı varmış gibi değerlendirmelerde bulunarak ilgili teşebbüslere soruşturma açmaksızın, 9/3. madde uyarınca görüş yazısı göndermek suretiyle dosyayı kapattığı sayısız kararı bulunmaktadır. Bu kararlarında Rekabet Kurulu; teşebbüslerin büyüklüğü, ilgili coğrafi pazarın boyutu, usul ekonomisi gibi de minimis’i çağrıştıracak gerekçelerle, 7246 sayılı Kanun’un “açık ve ağır ihlal” olarak nitelendirdiği ve pazar payı eşiklerine bakılmaksızın de minimis’ten yararlandırmadığı anlaşma türlerine dahi kimi zaman soruşturma açmamıştır. 7246 sayılı Kanun öncesinde istikrar kazanmış bu kararlar karşısında de minimis kuralının, 7246 sayılı Kanun’da düzenlendiği biçimiyle Türk hukukunun ihtiyaçlarına cevap verip vermediği, özellikle de pratikte uygulanabilirliği önemli bir soru hâline gelmiştir. Bu çalışmada 7246 sayılı Kanun’da düzenlendiği biçimiyle de minimis kuralının, Rekabet Kurulu’nun 7246 sayılı Kanun öncesinde verdiği kararları karşısında Türk rekabet hukukunda uygulanabilirliği tartışılmaktadır.

ABİDA 102. madde: Bir veya birden fazla teşebbüsün, iç pazardaki veya iç pazarın önemli bir bölümündeki hakim durumunu kötüye kullanması, üye devletler arasındaki ticareti etkilediği ölçüde, iç pazarla bağdaşmaz ve yasaktır. Söz konusu kötüye kullanma özellikle aşağıdakileri içerir: (a) haksız alış veya satış fiyatları veya diğer haksız ticari şartların, doğrudan veya dolaylı olarak dayatılması, (b) üretimin, piyasaların veya teknik gelişmenin tüketicilerin zararına olacak şekilde sınırlandırılması, (c) eş değer işlemler için farklı koşullar uygulanmak suretiyle ticari ilişkinin diğer taraflarının rekabet edebilirlik açısından dezavantajlı duruma sokulması, (d) sözleşmelerin yapılmasının, nitelikleri gereği veya ticari teamüllere göre bu tür sözleşmelerin konusuyla ilgisi olmayan ek yükümlülüklerin taraflarca kabulü şartına bağlanması. 2 RKHK 6. madde : Bir veya birden fazla teşebbüsün ülkenin bütününde ya da bir bölümünde bir mal veya hizmet piyasasındaki hâkim durumunu tek başına yahut başkaları ile yapacağı anlaşmalar ya da birlikte davranışlar ile kötüye kullanması hukuka aykırı ve yasaktır. Kötüye kullanma halleri özellikle şunlardır: (a) Ticarî faaliyet alanına başka bir teşebbüsün girmesine doğrudan veya dolaylı olarak engel olunması ya da rakiplerin piyasadaki faaliyetlerinin zorlaştırılmasını amaçlayan eylemler, (b) Eşit durumdaki alıcılara aynı ve eşit hak, yükümlülük ve edimler için farklı şartlar ileri sürerek, doğrudan veya dolaylı olarak ayırımcılık yapılması, (c) Bir mal veya hizmetle birlikte, diğer mal veya hizmetin satın alınmasını veya aracı teşebbüsler durumundaki alıcıların talep ettiği bir malın veya hizmetin, diğer bir mal veya hizmetin de alıcı tarafından teşhiri şartına bağlanması ya da satın alınan bir malın belirli bir fiyatın altında satılmaması gibi tekrar satış halinde alım satım şartlarına ilişkin sınırlamalar getirilmesi, (d) Belirli bir piyasadaki hâkimiyetin yaratmış olduğu finansal, teknolojik ve ticarî avantajlardan yararlanarak başka bir mal veya hizmet piyasasındaki rekabet koşullarını bozmayı amaçlayan eylemler, (e) Tüketicinin zararına olarak üretimin, pazarlamanın ya da teknik gelişmenin kısıtlanması. 3

Bu çalışmada dijital hizmet vergisinin, rekabet açısından doğurabileceği sonuçlar ele alınmaktadır. Rekabet perspektifinden değerlendirildiğinde dijital hizmet vergisinin, dijital hizmetler karşılığı alınan ücret ve komisyonların artmasına yol açabilecek ve uluslararası dev dijital hizmet sağlayıcıları ile yerli sağlayıcılar arasındaki adil rekabet koşullarını etkileyebilecek birtakım sonuçları bulunmaktadır. Daha önce var olmayan bir verginin, dijital hizmetlerin sunulmasının maliyetini artıracak nitelikte olması sonucu, dijital hizmetler için tüketicilerce ödenen ücretlerin ve dijital platformlarda yer alan mağazalarca bu platformlara aracılık hizmetleri için ödenen komisyonların artıp artmayacağı hususunda bazı tereddütler oluşmuştur. Her ne kadar verginin mükellefinin dijital hizmet sağlayıcıları olmasına rağmen, sağlayıcılar tarafından verginin devlete ödendikten sonra müşterilerine ve tüketicilere yansıtılma ihtimali bulunmaktadır. Öte yandan, yeni bir verginin mükellefi haline gelebilecek yerli dijital hizmet sağlayıcılarının, alanında tanınmışlığa ve belli bir pazar gücüne sahip uluslararası dijital hizmet sağlayıcıları karşısında rekabette dezavantajlı duruma düşüp düşmeyecekleri, verginin ne ölçüde adil rekabet ortamını ve yerli şirketlerin rekabet gücünü etkileyeceği hususlarının da irdelenmesi gerekmektedir.

There is general agreement on the illegality of collusive behavior around the globe. However, there is far less broad consensus on the type of sanctions that antitrust law should consider to deter price-fixing. Conventional wisdom, heavily inspired by traditional economic theory, recommends avoiding the use of imprisonment and maximizing the use of corporate and individual fines. This conservative view still influences the main antitrust authorities in several countries. For instance, Chile just re-criminalized price-fixing despite the open opposition of the principal national antitrust authorities.
While there is substantial economic evidence criticizing deterrence policies based solely on fines, those criticisms assume that people’s preferences are stable and exogenous to the legal rules. I depart my analysis from a wider theory of human behavior than the one traditional deterrence policies build upon. This wider theory considers the expressive power of the law, and how the impact of legal rules does not only depend on economic incentives, but also on social influence and morality concerns. In this sense, I designed this study to test and measure how the nature of legal sanctions affects people’s perceptions on the legitimacy of the law, social influence, the morality of collusion, authority expectations; and how those clusters affect people’s decision to offend. I also assessed the respondents’ knowledge of the law. With this aim, I surveyed managers in Chile, following vignette-based perceptual deterrence studies carried out by criminologists.
I base my results on a sample that is not representative of the Chilean population. However, random assignment allows me to draw causal conclusions when comparing my two treatment groups (i.e., subjects exposed to the threat of individual fines and those exposed to the risk of imprisonment). Regarding deterrent effects, the self-reported likelihood of colluding to earn a bonus was lower for respondents being exposed to the threat of imprisonment. Concerning the expressive effect of the law, prison sentences led respondents to find the prohibition against price-fixing more legitimate, perceive a higher risk of dismissal if detected only by the owner of the firm, as well as thinking it was less likely their peers would offend in similar circumstances. Both groups of respondents found price-fixing profoundly immoral, regardless of the applicable sanction. Remarkably, despite the media exposure of which cartel re-criminalization benefited, most respondents did not know that, according to current Chilean law, collusion was punishable with prison sentences.
The main implication of this work is simple: When once conceives of compliance not only as a function of economic rewards and punishment, but also of morality, peer pressure, and the legitimacy of the law, it is patent that the benefits of cartel criminalization are more meaningful than typically stated. In fact, the expressive power of criminal law may enhance people’s obedience by shaping their preferences. The finding concerning the respondents’ ignorance of current antitrust sanctions calls into question the effectiveness of the Chilean Antitrust Agency’s advocacy efforts. Given the deterrent and expressive power of criminal sanctions, advocacy and communicational efforts are key for maximizing compliance.

La colusión entre competidores económicos se considera un problema grave en la economía chilena. Los carteles aumentan precios y así dañan a los consumidores, y limitan la innovación y el crecimiento económico. La Ley de Defensa de la Libre Competencia de Chile (Decreto de Ley N° 211, 1973) prohíbe la colusión, pero históricamente no se ha observado una implementación eficaz de esta normativa para evitar la formación y el funcionamiento de los carteles. Las modificaciones a esta ley (2003 y 2009) mejoraron y revitalizaron la política anti-carteles en el país al aumentar las multas, introducir el programa de delación compensada y otorgar facultades intrusivas de investigación a la Fiscalía Nacional Económica (FNE). La reforma de 2016 introduce sanciones más severas, incluyendo penas de cárcel e inhabilitación de los cartelistas para ocupar cargos de director o gerente de una sociedad anónima abierta, con el objetivo de disuadir la colusión y fortalecer el programa de delación compensada, para aumentar la probabilidad de detección de los carteles.

This book analyses Turkish competition law from the lens of EU competition law with a view to determining to what extent Turkey’s national competition law rules and practice reflect those of the EU. It aims to pinpoint similarities and differences between these two competition law regimes in terms of both statutory law and case law. Essentially this book is a part of research series analysing the approximation of national competition laws of the countries that have entered into an association agreement with the EU. Turkey is the fifth country in this research series following Poland (I), Hungary (II), Bulgaria (III) and Slovenia (IV). This explains why the title of the book includes the Roman letter “(V)”. The book is divided into six parts, each of which consists of two to four chapters. The first part begins by shedding light on the relations between Turkey and the EU, and the history of the evolution of Turkish competition law. The second, the third and the fourth parts discuss the three main pillars of EU and Turkish competition laws, namely anti-competitive agreements, abuse of a dominant position and merger control respectively. The fifth part deals with public and private enforcement of competition law, while the sixth part provides the concluding remarks.

This case note analyses the decision of the Turkish Competition Authority in which it has decided that consumer electronics suppliers and retailers did not restrict competition by exchanging information with regard to price increases and decreases.

Context: Since the 1990s, the EU's influence over national health care policy has been limited to European internal market law or social policy coordination mechanisms. The introduction of EU competition law into health care is more recent and underdeveloped; however, its introduction would potentially be much more far-reaching and disruptive. Methods: Three EU competition law (state-aid) cases are used and are comprised of both Court of Justice and European Commission decisions. One is from Ireland, one is from the Netherlands, and the third is from Belgium. Findings: The Belgian (Iris-H) case sees EU institutions scrutinize a clearly "social" (nonmar-ket) health care model with EU competition law for the first time. This is a highly significant development. It is clear, however, that the European Commission is more reluctant to use EU competition law to scrutinize health care systems than the European courts are. Conclusions: This intent on the part of EU institutions will have to be assessed in future cases, as considerable uncertainty about its shape and outer contours remains. However, EU competition law, and the EU's state-aid investigation apparatus, encroaching into the national healthcare systems for the first time is highly significant.

gölden" gibi içerisinde ekmek sözcüğünün geçtiği birtakım deyimlere ve atasözlerine günlük dilde sıkça rastlanmaktadır. Ekmeğin günlük dildeki bu öneminin, hukuk alanına da yansıdığını görüyoruz. Çoğu kişi farkında olmasa da ekmeğin, haksız rekabet ve rekabet hukuku açısından da önemi büyük.

Competition policy in the Western Balkan countries has recently gained in significance, in parallel with the acceleration of their EU accession process. Competition policy played a central role in the development of the EU, its institutions and in particular the EU internal market. Competition legislation aims to prevent distortions of competition that harm the economy and, at the same time, to assure freedom of choice of economic agents. A competition policy adopted by the government should include both: economic policies that enhance competition in local and national markets, and competition law designed to stop anti-competitive business practices. The goal of this paper is to analyse the recent developments in the area of competition policies in Western Balkan countries i.e. Albania, North Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro and Kosovo. In the Western Balkan countries, the progress in this policy area has been generally slower than in other areas of government. This can be explained partly by the complex environment in which competition policies and regulators are set up in any country. However, there could be also some other features at play, which are characteristic of the transition countries. In addition, in the last 20 years there were great efforts by the national governments to fully adhere with the EU competition policy principles and regulations.

Keywords: competition policy, Western Balkan countries, economic policies, competition law

Brexit, 23 Haziran 2016 günü Birleşik Krallık’ta yapılan, Birleşik Krallık halkının Birleşik Krallık’ın AB’den ayrılmasını oyladığı tarihi bir referandumdur. Elde edilen sonuçlara göre Birleşik Krallık halkının yaklaşık yüzde 52’si Birleşik Krallık’ın AB’den ayrılması, geri kalan yüzde 48’i ise AB üyesi olarak kalınması gerektiği yönünde oy kullanmıştır. Geniş siyasi yankı uyandıran Brexit’in ekonomik etkileri kendilerini hemen göstermeye başlamışsa da, aynı zamanda Birleşik Krallık hukuk sisteminin işleyişi ve mevzuatı üzerinde de Brexit’in birtakım etkilerinin olması kaçınılmazdır. Bu makalede Brexit sonrası İngiliz rekabet hukukunun geleceği ve karşılaşması muhtemel güçlükler incelenmektedir. Makalenin birinci bölümünde İngiliz rekabet hukukunun doğuşu, gelişimi ve güncel durumu hakkında bilgi verilmekte, ikinci bölümde ise Brexit’ten etkilenmesi muhtemel rekabet hukuku düzenlemeleri farklı başlıklar altında ele alınmaktadır.

The Turkish Competition Authority has recently published in its website two different press releases specifically addressed to driving schools and bread manufacturers. It has identified in these press releases the most common practices in the relevant markets that are prohibited under the Act on the Protection of Competition 1994 and proactively announced them to undertakings operating in those markets. With these press releases, it has taken a new step in its competition advocacy activities and redirected its strategy towards direct contact with the targets of those activities with a view to expanding their reach in the business world. These initiatives of the Turkish Competition Authority can be taken to mean that it has raised the bar in its efforts to establish a well-entrenched competition culture in Turkey. Using these press releases as an illustration, this article analyses the competition advocacy activities carried out by the Turkish Competition Authority in establishing and promoting a competition culture in Turkey.

2017 yılının hemen ilk aylarında karara bağlanan Luxottica soruşturması, ekonomi bültenlerinde Rekabet Kurulu'nun adını duyurduğu önemli kararlardan birisi olmuştur. Luxottica ismi belki bazılarımız için pek bir çağrışım yapmasa da Ray Ban güneş gözlüklerinin üreticisi dediğimiz zaman hemen hemen herkes tanıyacaktır. Rekabet Kurulu tarafından 2015 yılından itibaren Luxottica hakkında indirim sistemi ve diğer dışlayıcı uygulamaları sonucu 4054 sayılı Rekabetin Korunması Hakkında Kanun'un 6. maddesini ihlal ettiği gerekçesiyle bir rekabet soruşturması yürütülmekteydi. Şubat ayında sonuçlanan ve Ağustos ayında gerekçeli kararı açıklanan soruşturma neticesinde Kurul, markalı güneş gözlüklerinin toptan satışı pazarında hakim durumda olduğunu tespit ettiği Luxottica'nın, rakiplerinin pazardaki faaliyetlerini zorlaştırıcı uygulamalarla hakim durumunu kötüye kullandığı sonucuna ulaştı ve adı geçen teşebbüse 1.6 milyon Türk Lirası idari para cezası uyguladı.

This case note analyses the decision of the Turkish Competition Authority in which it has rejected the complaint of a rival IT company, Yandex, that agreements of a major IT company, Google, with a number of original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) on the exclusive pre-installation of its mobile apps on its mobile operating system amounted to a vertical restraint or an abuse of dominance.

AFM Mars birleşmesinde en başa dönüldü 10.11.2015 / Ahmet Fatih ÖZKAN Türk rekabet hukukunda son yılların en tartışma yaratan ve yargı süreci bir türlü sona ermeyen birleşme ve devralma işlemi hangisidir sorusuna verdiğimiz yanıt şüphesiz AFM Mars birleşmesiydi. Rekabet Kurulu'nun tam dört yıl önce, Kasım 2011 tarihinde verdiği kararda sinema salonu işletmecileri olan AFM ile Mars'ın birleşmesine koşullu izin verilmişti. Bu karar bir sinemasever tarafından yargıya taşınmış ve Danıştay 13. Dairesi, Kurul kararının önce yürütmesini durdurmuş, daha sonra da kararı iptal etmişti. Bunun üzerine dosya yeniden Kurul'un önüne gelmiş ve söz konusu işlem nihai incelemeye alınmıştı. Diğer taraftan, yürütmeyi durdurma kararına yapılan itiraz sonucu Danıştay İdari Dava Daireleri Kurulu, 13. Dairenin verdiği yürütmeyi durdurma kararını bozmuştu. Rekabet Kurulu henüz nihai kararını vermeden önce Danıştay İdari Dava Daireleri Kurulu bir kez daha devreye girdi ve 13. Dairenin esas hakkındaki kararını bozdu. Hukukçu olmayanlar için deyim yerindeyse bir yılan hikayesine benzeyen bu süreçte iki yanlış bir doğruya dönüştü ve Kurul'un verdiği ilk karar hukuken tekrar geçerli hale geldi.

This study analyses the judgment of the Turkish Council of State in which it has annulled the decision of the Turkish Competition Authority to conditionally clear in Phase II the merger of the two largest cinema chains in Turkey on the grounds that the merger remedies were insufficient to eliminate all competition concerns.