British Foreign Office

Основываясь на новых документах из Национального архива Великобритании, автор анализирует представления британского Кабинета министров и Форин Офиса в 1944–1945 гг. по вопросам основных направлений политики Соединенного Королевства после Второй мировой войны.
Using new evidence from the British archives author analyses the main trends of thought in the British Cabinet and Foreign Office in 1944–1945 regarding the foreign policy of the United Kingdom after the Second World War.

Великобритания излиза победителка от двете световни войни и неотклонно следва своите геополитически интереси за недопускане ревизия на договорените граници. Постепенно тя губи водещата си роля, която е поета от СССР и САЩ. Великобритания отчасти отстоява политиката си по Македонския въпрос, доколкото запазва Гърция в своята орбита на влияние и не допуска комунизмът и македонизмът да нахлуят там. На север обаче тя индиректно допринася за зараждането на македонизма във Вардарска Македония. Югославският македонизъм произхожда от противопоставянето между комунизма и Версайско-Вашингтонската система, от една страна, и от противоречията между България, Сърбия и Гърция, от друга. С развитието си той еманципира Вардарска Македония най-вече спрямо България, така че в хронологията на изследвания период понятията Македония и македонец от синоними на България и българин постепенно се превръщат в техни антоними.

След излизането на |България от войната през есента на 1918 г. до възстановяване на нормалните българо-британски дипломатически отношения през есента на 1920 г., главен представител на британската официална власт се явява върховен комисар. В продължение на две години поста се заема последователно от полковниците Хари Ламб и Хърбърт Деринг. От октомври 1920 г. до март 1941 г. седем британски дипломати резидират в България – Артър Пийл (1920-1921), Уилям Ърскин (1921-1928), Роуланд Сперлинг (1928-1929), Сидни Уотърлоу (1929-1933), Чарлз Бентинк (1933-1936), Морис Питърсън (1936-1938) и Джордж Рендъл (1938-1941).
Настоящата статия представя в синтезиран вид характерните специфики на отделните британски дипломати, като хронологически проследява тяхната работа в България и отбелязва отличителните моменти за времето на техния престой. За изграждане на обективен анализ са ползвани документи от тяхната дипломатическа кореспонденция, намиращи се в Националния архив в Лондон. Трябва да отчетем факта, че британските министри имат в своите екипи множество служители, които допълнително подпомагат работата им, а в отделни моменти изиграват и ключова роля. Пример за това е активната позиция на секретар Ралф Стивънсън за потушаване на Петричкия инцидент през 1925 г., който по-късно достига до високи дипломатически постове. Секретарите Чарлз Дод, Джон Балфур и Едуард Коут също играят съществена роля в британската легация в София.

Настоящият анализ разглежда отношението на Великобритания по Македонския въпрос в самото начало на Втората световна война. Времевата рамка обхваща периода от лятото на 1938 г., когато се сменят ръководителите на Форин  офис и на британски дипломатически мисии на Балканите, до включването на България във войната на 1 март 1941 г.
Великобритания се стреми да навакса изоставането си. Инертното отношение на Лондон към Балканите, целящо мир и равновесие на силите, свършва през пролетта на 1938 г.
С началото на войната от 1 септември 1939 г., Македонският въпрос и всички останали нерешени проблеми в Югоизточна Европа, стават актуални при групирането на силите. Форин офис избягва обсъждането на проблема с Македония, но за сметка на това се вижда благоразположеност към решаването на въпроса с Добруджа в полза на България.
Предвиждайки германска окупация на Балканите, британците изработват през зимата на 1940–1941 г. план за изграждане на съпротивителни центрове на територията на отделните балкански страни. След като Форин офис отхвърля сътрудничество с ВМРО, британското разузнаване и отделът за специални операции (SOE-Special Operations Executive) се концентрират върху земеделския водач д-р Г. М. Димитров и неговата политическа партия Пладне.
Великобритания и Германия действат равнопоставено спрямо Югославия и България, и това задържа под похлупак Македонския въпрос. За разлика от тях, Италия изглежда е готова да предложи решение в полза на България, срещу Югославия. С успеха на генерал Симович в Белград и провала на Г. М. Димитров в София, двете балкански държави поемат по твърде различни орбити и проблемът с Македония придобива отново значение и се превръща в политически фактор.

The focus of this article is an analysis of the Greek junta’s relations with the Wilson and Heath governments in the United Kingdom from 1967 to 1974. Emphasis is placed on diplomatic relations between the two traditional allies. The reactions of the military leaders of the regime in Athens and its representatives in Britain to policies pursued by London towards the establishment, consolidation and eventual demise of the colonels’ dictatorship are presented through the examination (for the first time) of official documents from both the UK and Greece. It is argued that the Greek military regime struggled to cultivate relations with Britain primarily for reasons of domestic and international prestige. Whereas Whitehall pursued a policy of “good working relations” with the junta in order to promote British interests vis-à-vis NATO, Cyprus and trade, the leadership in Athens was solely interested in using British support to gain legitimacy internationally and domestically.

During the past year, the UK Government has become the lead advocate for a perhaps surprising foreign policy goal: ending sexual violence in conflict. The participation of government representatives from more than 120 countries in a London Summit in June 2014 was the clearest manifestation of this project. This article offers an early assessment of the Preventing Sexual Violence Initiative (PSVI) and situates it within the history of global action against sexual and gender-based violence from UN Security Council Resolution 1325 onwards, with a particular focus on three key developments. First, the PSVI has embraced the already common understanding of rape as a ‘weapon of war’, and has stressed the importance of military training and accountability. This has exposed the tensions within global policy between a focus on all forms of sexual violence (including intimate partner violence in and out of conflict situations) on the one hand, and war zone activities on the other. Second, the Initiative has placed great emphasis on ending impunity, which implicates it in ongoing debates about the role of international and local justice as an effective response to atrocity. Third, men and boys have been foregrounded as ignored victims of sexual and gender-based violence. The PSVI has been crucial to that recognition, but faces significant challenges in operationalizing its commitment and in avoiding damage to existing programmes to end violence against women and girls. The success of the Initiative will depend on its ability to navigate these challenges in multiple arenas of global politics.

The establishment of an ethno-communist type of macedonism after World War II in Yugoslavia create a lot of tension among the allies.
The balance that was reached at the Yalta conference, and was upheld by the United Kingdom and USA,  and USSR on the other side, lead to fragmentation in Europe and thus in the Balkans. The Yugolsavian macedonism afterwards flourished and emancipated Vardar Macedonia, mainly towards Bulgaria.
The United Kingdom partially succeeded in defending its policy on the Macedonian question since it managed to protect Greece from it, as well as from communism, but it had to cede its influence in the north to the USSR and thus it indirectly assisted the birth of macedonism.

Bu yazı İngiltere/Londra'da bulunan Britanya Milli Arşivleri'nde (The National Archives-TNA) 1910-1919 yılları arası İngiliz Dışişleri Bakanlığı (Foreign Office-FO) kayıtları hakkında çalışma yürütecek araştırmacıların çalışmalarını zenginleştirmelerine yardımcı olması maksadıyla hazırlanmıştır. Bu yazıyı okuduğunuz zaman FO kart indekslerinden sizleri istediğiniz dokümana ulaştıracak olan katalog numarasının nasıl bulunduğunu öğrenmiş olacaksınız. Kart indekslerinin nasıl bulunduğu aşamalı olarak resimlerle desteklenerek anlatılmıştır.

This paper written in Turkish explains British Foreign Office (FO) Registers and Indexes of 1910-1919 kept in the National Archives. The author aims to explain the steps of how to reach card indexes and how to read them to find reference number for researchers in Turkey.

Subject of the study is a little-known aspect of Chamberlain’s appeasement policy, namely, the propaganda campaign towards the German public from September 1938 until May 1940. Although there is a vast literature about appeasement, Chamberlain’s efforts to reach the German people by way of propaganda have so far received no attention from historians. The thesis reconstructs for the first time the history of British German-language propaganda dur-ing Chamberlain’s premiership. The evolution of the institutional framework, the changing strategies and the contents of this propaganda campaign are described in detail, offering a deep insight into the thinking of the British Government about German society and exposing a naive belief in the power of propaganda.
In the thesis a new methodological approach is adopted by integrating the study of high poli-tics at the diplomatic level with the study of the propaganda campaign towards a foreign pub-lic. Whereas conventional interpretations consider appeasement a foreign policy strategy con-ducted exclusively on the diplomatic stage between the two governments of Britain and Ger-many, the author maintains that appeasement has rather to be viewed as a policy consisting of two equal and complementary pillars. The first pillar was the well-known dual policy of deter-rence and conciliation directed towards the Nazi regime at a governmental level. The second pillar was the propaganda campaign directed towards the German public over the heads of the Nazi regime. The propaganda campaign, while on the whole reflecting Chamberlain’s foreign policy on the governmental level, seems to have been regarded by the British government as an additional deterrent element to the diplomatic pillar: Hitler was to be warned that he would risk serious opposition from his own people if he provoked war, and thus be induced to seek a peaceful solution to his territorial claims. In this sense, the propaganda campaign was a safe-guard for the conciliatory part of appeasement, namely, the readiness to consider favourably Germany’s legitimate territorial and economic claims.
The thesis identifies five phases during which Chamberlain attached varying degrees of im-portance to the propaganda instrument in his dealings with Germany. Thus, the significance of propaganda increased in direct relation to the deterioration of Anglo-German negotiations on the diplomatic level. The propaganda pillar even outlasted the outbreak of war and the col-lapse of the first pillar: After negotiations on an official diplomatic level had come to an end on 3rd September 1939, Chamberlain sought to continue his policy of goodwill towards the German people by means of propaganda in the hope to stir up a revolution against Hitler.
In the end, however, British propaganda proved to be a failure. The author identifies two rea-sons for this. The first was a lack of credibility, i.e. the discrepancy between the picture of events as presented in British propaganda, and the reality as experienced by the German pub-lic. The second, and even more important, reason was, however, a whole host of unrealistic British assumptions about the Nazi state and the character of the German people. In particular, the British political elite unconsciously transferred British democratic traditions onto Hitler’s totalitarian regime. Chamberlain’s propaganda was based on the premise that public opinion did carry some weight in the Third Reich and that the German people, even though living un-der a dictatorship, would cherish similar political ideals of democratic participation and a dis-like of Hitler as British subjects.

The subject is the development of the Macedonian question in the frames of the British interests in Southeastern Europe after the First World War till outbreak of the Second World War.
The current work aims to analyze Foreign office policy regarding the Macedonian question in the interwar period and its reflection on the diplomatic relations between Great Britain and the countries involved.  For that purpose the following tasks were set up:
- To review the trends and the vision of Great Britain towards the Macedonian question in the interwar period via focusing on the work of the British diplomats on field and the reflection of their work on the matter;
- To present the complexity of the Macedonian question and its impact on the countries in Southwestern Europe and the relevant influence on their relations;
- To reveal the acts of IMRO in their search for supporters among the Great Powers in order to execute their aim – autonomy of Macedonia - and the reaction of Foreign office to that;
- Chronologically to present the trends and the changes in British views towards the Macedonian question as they follow the historical acts in the interwar period.
In order to create more precise and objective analyses I use diplomatic correspondence between London and Sofia, Athens and Belgrade.

La injerencia del Reino Unido en la guerra civil española era, y lo sigue siendo en algunos aspectos, un tema poco
estudiado y que necesita ser investigado en profundidad. La visita de Franco a Gibraltar en marzo de 1935 fue
determinante para el desarrollo de la guerra y la consolidación del régimen franquista.

Between the 1935-1936 Abyssinian crisis and the 1938 Munich conference, Britain's interests in the Balkans and its relationship with other Great Powers limited British policy towards Yugoslavia. This analysis points to a higher level of British influence in Belgrade in the mid-1930s than is usually recognised in the historiography and argues that by not responding adequately to security challenges in the Balkans after the withdrawal of French influence from the region, Britain contributed to a power-vacuum for Germany to fill. As the British position in Southeastern Europe weakened after summer 1936 due to advancing Italian and German penetration, Yugoslavia's importance grew in the eyes of Foreign Office officials. However, Britain's position in Belgrade eroded to such a degree by late 1938 that Yugoslavia was no longer willing or able to offer any assistance in the event of war. This examination provides a better understanding of Britain's interests in Southeastern Europe by highlighting the geo-strategic importance of Yugoslavia and the Balkans as a buffer zone to Central Europe and a flank of Britain's Mediterranean routes when the balance of power in the continent was disturbed to British disadvantage. Yugoslav policy has much more far reaching effects on developments all over Europe than her size and potential military strength appear to a superficial view to warrant. O'Malley, November 1936 1 Focussing on the Foreign Office and the role that key diplomats in Belgrade played between the 1935-1936 Abyssinian crisis and the 1938 Munich conference, this analysis assesses British understanding of Yugoslavia's geo-strategic position and their foreign policy in those crucial three years. As recently demonstrated, Britain was possibly the only Great Power before 1936 that considered a regional understanding as a stepping-stone to ultimate peace in the Balkans. 2 Therefore, it opposed regional alignments excluding or isolating certain countries, an attitude explaining British opposition to the Little Entente's

Abstract: The legacy of the ancient Greece, in idealized form, became a model
for the perfect society in 19th century. Educational system and the
predominating social values of the 19th cent. Europe, would send a message to
the prospective elite that the contemporary European civilization has its origins
in the classical Antiquity. Generations of young Europeans, Serbs scattered all
around the European universities among them, grew up in this belief. In this
context, works of art, often by government order, had been created, representing
individual nations by certain characterizing symbols. An example of such
representation of the national characteristics projected in the symbols of
Antiquity, as a reflection of the contemporary politics and prejudices, is the
mural Britannia Pacificatrix of Sigismund Goetze, painted at the British Foreign
Office, at the end of the World War I, when the afore-mentioned ratio of the
ancient heritage has still been of influence. Among the figures represented at
the mural, there is a personification of Serbia. Representation of Serbia among
winning countries, at the place where a number of high-ranging diplomats are
passing by, is a valuable legacy that requires special attention. Deciphering the
symbols at the afore-mentioned mural reveals the British vision of the world
order at the end of the World War I, and the place of Serbia within it.
Key words: Serbia, The Foreign Office, Britannia Pacificatrix, ancient iconography,
Sigismund Goetze.

British foreign policy in the Middle East has been well researched. However, there are still aspects of Britain’s approach towards the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) that have yet to be researched. One such aspect is Britain’s encounter with the rise of political Islam in MENA and the way(s) in which this phenomenon was deciphered. Even though political Islam dates back to the late 19th and early 20th century, our study focuses on the period between the turbulent years of the outburst of the Iranian Revolution in 1978–1979 and its widely-felt influence until 1990. Our methodological tools include Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) archival material that addresses the phenomenon of political Islam and its implications for British interests and international relations in general. We choose the concept of political Islam and its adherents that are widely acknowledged as political, comparatively to those of da’wa and Jihadi Islamism. We argue that British officials were widely i...

Μία από τας σημαντικοτέρας και πλέον δραστήριους μορφάς της νεωτέρας εκκλησιαστικής ιστορίας αποτελεί η ρωμαλέα περίπτωσις του Μελετίου Μεταξάκη, ο οποίος άφησεν ανεξίτηλον το στίγμα του από τας διαφόρους εκκλησιαστικός επάλξεις όπου εκλήθη να υπηρέτηση κατά σειράν ως Μητροπολίτης Κιτίου (1910 - 1918), Μητροπολίτης Αθηνών (1918 - 1920), Οικουμενικός Πατριάρχης (1921 - 1923) και Πατριάρχης Αλεξανδρείας (1926 - 1935), "της οποίας προσωπικότητος αι πτέρυγες, κατά την έκφρασιν του αοιδίμου Πατριάρχου Ιεροσολύμων Τιμοθέου, εκάλυπτόν τον όλον ορίζοντα της Ορθοδοξίας κατά τας τέσσαρας πρώτας δεκαετηρίδας του αιώνος μας". [...] (Από την εισαγωγή της έκδοσης)

The article presents a complex picture of the psychological tension between the two allies fighting against the Ottoman Empire, Bulgaria and Greece. The pressure was developed in Salonica - a highly coveted by both sides city. Salonica is the second city after Constantinople which has a great strategic importance at the crossroads between Europe and Asia and it is also in the political appetites of every expansion. During the First Balkan War both armies, Bulgarian and Greek, were aiming to be the first to enter and to take over the important port city.

This modern history of Gibraltar updates and enhances scholarship on the Rock's history by bringing together the authors' extensive archival research and developments in the secondary literature surrounding British Gibraltar. Central to its narrative is an examination of the development of a Gibraltarian community amidst Britain's imperial rise and decline and Anglo-Spanish diplomatic vicissitudes. Gibraltar: A Modern History is the first twenty-first century history of Gibraltar to tie together not only the development of a Gibraltarian community, but also the way in which this community has been shaped by wider forces in the modern world.

В настоящата статия се разглеждат първите месеци от дипломатическата дейност на Сидни Уотърлоу (1878-1944) като пълномощен  министър на Великобритания в България. Престоят му в България може да бъде считан като връх в неговата дипломатическа кариера и в активността на британската дипломация по решаване на Македонския въпрос в годините между двете световни войни.
Далновидността и прозорливостта на Сидни Уотърлоу по разрешаване на Македонския въпрос не срещат подобаваща оценка и това попарва неговия ентусиазъм. Британският дипломатически представител в София продължава да изпълнява своите задачи и не пропуска да предлага възможни решения за намаляне напрежението по Македонския въпрос. Динамиката на събитията и съпътстващата ги кореспонденция са свидетелство за значението на въпроса. Приповтарянето на вече изказани становища от Форин офис в по-ранни меморандуми показва последователността и най-вече твърдостта на британската външна политика в региона. Подготовката, познанията и аналитичността на дипломат Уотърлоу не намират одобрение в Лондон и може би поради тази причина през 1933 г. той е преместен на същия пост в Атина.
Политиката на британското правителство по Македонския въпрос през пролетта на 1930 г. се характеризира с няколко акцента: 1. Отказ да се признае отделна македонска националност, която би изисквала както независимост, така и интегриране в България. 2. Неприемане на автономия в степен, която Югославия не би одобрила.  3. Ненасърчаване повдигането на Македонския въпрос в Обществото на народите, освен при крайна необходимост. 4. Упражняване на натиск в София, за да се накара българското правителство да отслаби мощта на ВМРО в България. 5. Подтикване на югославското правителство да се въздържа от подпомагане на българските политически емигранти и убеждаването му в необходимостта от подобряване материалното състояние на „българофонното население” в Македония.

Bulgars, Bulgarophonic, Slavophonic, South Slavs, Macedonian Slavs... These are some of the labels that the British Foreign office is trying to establish and use in its diplomatic correspondence in the interwar period for the population in Vardar and Aegean Macedonia. The process and the progress of entitling as well as the British politics show their desire of subsiding the Macedonian question.

Η ηγετική φυσιογνωμία του κρητικής καταγωγής Μελετίου Μεταξάκη αποτελεί εξέχουσαν φυσιογνωμίαν του 20ού αιώνος εις τον χώρον της ελληνοφώνου Ορθοδοξίας, κατορθώσασα να συνταυτίση το όνομά της με την περίοδον κατά την οποίαν εδραστηριοποιήθη και εμεγαλούργησεν.
Ο κατ' εξοχήν χώρος δράσεως, εις τον οποίον ο Μελέτιος Μεταξάκης κατώρθωσε να ξεδιπλώση την πολυτάλαντον προσωπικότητά του, υπήρξεν ο Αλεξανδρινός Θρόνος, επί κεφαλής του οποίου διετέλεσε δια μίαν σχεδόν δεκαετίαν (1926-1935). Είναι δε άκρως ενδιαφέρον δια τον μελετητήν της νεωτέρας εκκλησιαστικής ιστορίας το γεγονός ότι η πλέον γόνιμος περίοδος της πρωθιεραρχικής διακονίας του Μελετίου Μεταξάκη συμπίπτει με την τελευταίαν περίοδον του επιγείου βίου του, δεδομένης μάλιστα της πολυκρότου και πολυδιαστάτου κληρικής και πρωθιεραρχικής πορείας του Μελετίου εις όλα σχεδόν τα μεγάλα κέντρα της ελληνοφώνου Ορθοδόξου Οικουμένης της εποχής (με το πέρασμά του από τα Ιεροσόλυμα, την Αντιόχειαν, τας Αθήνας, την Κωνσταντινούπολιν και την Αμερικήν) κατά την προγενεστέραν εκκλησιαστικήν του διακονίαν, πολλώ δε μάλλον καθ' όσον αι πρώται δεκαετίαι του παρελθόντος αιώνος συνυφαίνονται μέσα από τας περιπετείας των αιματηρών διεκδικήσεων των διαφόρων Βαλκανικών λαών, οίτινες επεζήτουν την εθνικήν των ολοκλήρωσιν δια της οριστικής διαλύσεως της Οθωμανικής Αυτοκρατορίας και της εγκαθιδρύσεως του διαδόχου πολιτικού σχήματος των εθνικών κρατών κατά τα προτάγματα του Ευρωπαϊκοϋ Διαφωτισμού. [...] (Από τον πρόλογο της έκδοσης)

Εισαγωγή Τον Δεκέμβριο 1942, μεσούντος του δεύτερου παγκόσμιου πολέμου, οι τρείς μεγάλες Συμμαχικές χώρες, ΗΠΑ, Μεγάλη Βρετανία και Σοβιετική Ένωση, έκαναν και οι τρείς συντονισμένες δηλώσεις που αφορούσαν την Αλβανία. Η δήλωση της Αγγλίας προκάλεσε την αντίδραση του Παναγιώτη Κανελλόπουλου, αντιπρόεδρου και υπουργού εθνικής αμύνης στην εξόριστη ελληνική κυβέρνηση στο Κάϊρο, ενώ ο Πρωθυπουργός Τσουδερός και ο Βασιλέας Γεώργιος Β' δεν αντέδρασαν καθόλου. Το σημείωμα αυτό αναφέρεται στην αντίδραση του Κανελλόπουλου και την κύρια επίπτωση της, που ήταν η παραίτηση του, που όμως έγινε σε λάθος στιγμή. Στην αρχή θα κάνω μια συνοπτική αναφορά στη θέμα της Βορείου Ηπείρου, και στη συνέχεια μια σύντομη αναδρομή στην πολιτική της Αγγλίας προς την Ιταλία και την Αλβανία μέχρι το 1939. Θα συνεχίσω με την αντίδραση του Κανελλόπουλου, την μετάβαση του στο Λονδίνο, και θα κλείσω με την άδοξη παραίτηση στην οποία οδηγήθηκε λίγο αργότερα.

In the article were discovered reasons, course and results
of unofficial negotiations about separate peace between Ottoman Empire and Great Britain in
Switzerland in July 1917. As meetings of British captain Aubrey Herbert with Porte representa-
tives showed, anglophile opposition ready to compromise had appeared inside Ottoman govern-
ment. However, preparing terms of the peace included a lot of problems. The main difficulties
were: fear of both sides, British and Ottoman that negotiations in reality were a trap; difficulty
of forming peace terms which could satisfy not only London and Istanbul but also British allies;
unpredictable situation with Russian army, and waiting by the Young Turks of results of autumn
campaign in Mesopotamia. Eventually, decay of Russian army, closeness of autumn warfare, scep-
tical position of British headship on preparing of separate peace did not give rise to the cause.

In 1918 Great Britain, along with the rest of Europe, was in an uncertain state, and many questions arose about government and society that were catalysed by the effect of war. During and after the conflict, the failings of the 'old diplomacy' were evident, and on 23 rd August 1918, Eyre Crowe warned that there "is a crying need

В настоящата статия са приложените два документа на британската дипломация при мирното уреждане на гръцко-българският конфликт от есента на 1925 г. Те са от Националният архив на Великобритания, и са част от дипломатическата кореспонденция на Форин офис. Пускането им в обръщение би спомогнало за по-ясната картина на събитията от есента на 1925 г. в Петричко и би представлявало интерес както за специалисти, така и за широк кръг читатели. Подбраните документи, на фона на множество шифровани телеграми, динамични преписки, запознават в детайли британските дипломатически специалисти и са своебразен аналитичен свидетел на събитието. Благодарение на обективността им, Форин офис професионално подхожда и към двете страни, въвлечени в проблема – България и Гърция, без ни най-малко да показва пристрастие към една от тях, или взимане на страна. Великобритания, заедно с Франция, а до известна степен и Италия, изиграват най-важната роля в предотвратяване опасността от нова война на Балканите, и подпомагат дейността на Обществото на народите за бързото урегулиране на гръцката интервенция. Решенията и намесата на ОН относно гръцката инвазия в Петричко са ювелирна кулминация в дейността на международната организация за целия ѝ период на действие.

The article sheds light on British policy of bringing Greece into the First World War on Entente's side. Interests of mutual cooperation between Greek political circles and Foreign Office, the course of negotiations about terms of Greek participation in the war, and requirements of the sides are analyzed. Factors that made an influence on Great Britain's diplomacy are researched, namely: a danger of joining Ottoman Empire and Bulgaria to Central Powers after entering into the war by Greece in the first months of the conflict, an influence of Dardanelles operation on the positions of Greece and British diplomacy, an activity of French foreign service. Methods of British diplomacy, notably territorial compensations, financial assistance and bribery, were discovered.

British foreign policy in the Middle East has been well researched. However, there are still aspects of Britain's approach towards the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) that have yet to be researched. One such aspect is Britain's encounter with the rise of political Islam in MENA and the way(s) in which this phenomenon was deciphered. Even though political Islam dates back to the late 19th and early 20th century, our study focuses on the period between the turbulent years of the outburst of the Iranian Revolution in 1978-1979 and its widely-felt influence until 1990. Our methodological tools include Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) archival material that addresses the phenomenon of political Islam and its implications for British interests and international relations in general. We choose the concept of political Islam and its adherents that are widely acknowledged as political, comparatively to those of da'wa and Jihadi Islamism. We argue that British officials were widely influenced by the intellectual debates of the period under consideration and that they mainly adopted four analytical schemas which focused firstly on the rise of sectarian politics in MENA, secondly on the gradual accommodation of non-state actors and organizations in political analysis, thirdly on the worrisome prospect of an alliance between Islamist and communist forces, and lastly on the prevalence of the idea of Islamic solidarity and Islamic exceptionalism in exerting international politics. Our findings suggest that, at times, the FCO approaches the issue of political Islam with a reassuring mindset, focusing on its divisions and weaknesses, while at other times it analyzes it with a grave concern over stability and Britain's critical interests.

This thesis considers the role of the Information Research Department (IRD) in countering Arab nationalist and Communist propaganda directed at British interests in the Middle East and Africa between 1954 and 1963.  It argues that the 1956 Suez Crisis and its fallout was the catalyst that drove a significant expansion of IRD's remit and responsibility.  From 1956 the department – which up to this point had had a purely anti-Communist function – was given the responsibility of countering the increasing flow of Arab nationalist propaganda emerging from Egypt.  The same year, the Communist powers mounted a renewed and concerted effort to culturally and ideologically penetrate Africa.  IRD, who to this point had been excluded from directly operating in Africa, began counter-Communist work in the face of stiff Colonial Office resistance.
Analysis of IRD in the Middle East has rarely considered events beyond the immediate aftermath of Suez.  IRD's work in Africa is almost wholly unexplored.  It is a central contention of this thesis that the two regions cannot be viewed in isolation post-Suez.  Egypt's standing was buoyed by the propaganda capital of victory over Suez, and Nasser's position as the figurehead of Arab nationalism was assured.  In seeking the removal of colonial influence from the Middle East and Africa, Arab propaganda – particularly the Voice of the Arabs programme of Cairo Radio – ties the regions together.  Communist and African nationalist propagandists were drawn to Cairo in the wake of the Suez Crisis.  The former, building relationships through aid, sought to leverage Cairo's expanding influence to their own advantage.  The latter sought facilities and support for their own propaganda efforts.
After Suez, IRD sought to manage Egyptian propaganda whilst avoiding direct confrontation, seeking to normalise relations.  In Africa, the department sought to build an infrastructure for information work aimed at influencing future leaders, their efforts constrained by the timetable of British decolonisation.  In both regions, through developing relationships with local agencies and the BBC, and from initiatives such as the Transmission 'X' news commentary service, IRD continued to address Arab nationalist and Communist propaganda with a flexibility and responsiveness not recognised in the current literature on IRD.

"Several large Ships, loaded with coffee and Rice from Egypt arrived in the Canal, and some others in this Harbour": the English ambassador in Istanbul was, however, worried. This was in June 1781 , when what would normally have been welcome news for the "cité-ventre" - the arrival of provisions in the port on the coast of Sirkeci-Istanbul - was on this occasion viewed with apprehension.

During the nineteenth century the British consular service was often dismissed as an organisation with purely commercial responsibilities. A succession of governments and diplomats insisted upon this notion, despite the fact that at certain times both relied very much on consular officials for information on foreign affairs. This dependence was especially evident in Italy during the decade after 1860, when British leaders had lent their moral and diplomatic support to the creation of the modern Italian state against considerable international opposition. During this period their desire not to see the achievement undone led them to maintain a close watch on Italian affairs. The contribution made in this area by the consular service, and the manner in which that service was reorganised in response to Italian unification, show how such a role could take priority over its other functions. Although this state of affairs was no doubt exceptional on account of the remarkable level of British interest in the unification of Italy, it nonetheless provides a clear demonstration of how the consular service could be used under certain circumstances. The extent to which British consuls were used to monitor affairs in post-unification Italy also encourages reflection upon the widespread view that British foreign policy rejected interventionism in favour of isolationism from European affairs during the 1860s.