Arab nationalism

At the dawn of the 1950s, when the Arabian Gulf stood at the precipice of a period of great social, economic, and political upheaval, two small sheikhdoms embarked upon an enterprise that would have a profound impact on the development of the future United Arab Emirates (UAE). Kuwait was larger and wealthier than its southern neighbor Sharjah. Additionally, though both had signed protection treaties with the British, Kuwait enjoyed far greater autonomy, enabling it to attain independence a decade before the other small Gulf monarchies. Crucially, Kuwait also had a head start in the development of modern education. Sharjah, the first among the Trucial States to seek to modernize its schools, thus turned to Kuwait for assistance. Kuwaiti educational aid began on a small scale, gradually growing until it extended to all but one of the Trucial States and had broadened in scope to include medical and development assistance. This aid was based on a vision of inter-Arab cooperation shared between Kuwaiti authorities and Sharjah's ruler Sheikh Saqr bin Sultan Al Qasimi. Some scholars characterize Kuwait's educational assistance program as subservient to Britain and opposed to the regional policies of Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser. However, an in-depth examination of Kuwait's educational role in Sharjah demonstrates the Pan-Arabist and anti-colonial nature of the program. Well before Kuwait's educational aid began, Sharjah was an established cultural center of the Trucial States. This had much to do with its success as a pearling and trading port. In the early twentieth century, Sharjah claimed one of the largest pearling fleets in the region and had sizeable communities of Indian and Iranian

First published in Buzzle on 16th August 2006

Republished on the same day here:
http://sudaneseonline.com/en2/publish/Articles_and_Analysies_12/Sudan_s_Beja_Blemmyes_and_their_Right_to_Freedom_a_929.shtml

Republished on 23rd August 2006 and discussed in the forum below:
http://www.politicsforum.org/forum/viewtopic.php?t=62793
At the moment the misinformed international community plans to spend so easily US $ 3 billion for Lebanon's reconstruction, it is essential to highlight that much less money would be enough to bring peace in the strategically crucial area of Eastern Sudan where the Blemmyes / Beja have started their struggle for self-determination and independence. Support to historically indigenous Beja would bring the Khartoum tyrants at the brink of collapse, opening the path of independence for the oppressed peoples of Sudan, and at the same time it would reshape the entire area of the Red Sea where historical nations demand international recognition.

The mere mention of Henri Lammens (SJ) provokes unease, notorious as this militant “priest-scholar” has become in postcolonial circles. Yet his human failings notwithstanding, Lammens has been a victim of the academic conceits and biases of postmodernist postcolonialist demagogues through whose prisms he often emerges as a cantankerous, inflammatory, Christian polemicist, hell-bent on defaming an otherwise blameless beatific Islam. This essay, part of an upcoming intellectual biography of Lammens, suggests that a more nuanced gaze be cast at the man and missionary before judging his scholarship; a corrective of sorts, shedding light on the life and times of a Belgian boy, who traveled East at the tender age of fifteen, who fell in love with Near Eastern Christians, and who set out to write their story and restore their suppressed history—doing so not without the passion and affection of the insider, the neophyte, the friend.

Once Nizar Qabbani, the most widely read contemporary Arab poet wrote in her poem "Are we Arabs one big lie?" To answer Qabbani’s rather provocative question or under-statement, it was necessary to look at the theorists’ theories of nation and nationality in order to find out how Arab and Arabism is being defined. It was an important research exercise to find different versions on self-determination issue, i.e. how Arab intellectuals defined their belonging to Arab-ness. The motives for Arab nationalism and individuals carrying the intellectual power behind such calls are one specific topic of this research.  Once, the doors of Arab-ness were open it was fascinating to realize that Pan Arabism and Arab nationalism are two different wonders. Since, the research brings a title Arab nationalism - Utopia or Reality it was necessary to go deep in historical details in order to determine how real or Utopian Arab Nationalism was. The central part in the paper is how to differentiate Pan Arabism from Arab Nationalism. Equally important was to have a deep dive in the role of religion in spreading Arab nationalism in the region. Remarkable enough was to see how the Arab language as holy language of Islam did not threaten the feelings of the Christian Orthodox Arab nationalists who were cherishing equally nationalistic thoughts as the Muslims. The overall academic exercise in the research is to provide an analytical framework on Arab nationalism. It is done to unable a reader to grasp the complexity, polarization and internal correlations to recognize if Arab nationalism was truly based and well thought ideology and to be able to sustain itself by the Arab people and not by external or domestic political leadership. To achieve this it was necessary to demonstrate the substance and interlink between Arab (Arab-ness) – Pan Arabism – Arab Nationalism.

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Getrieben von dem Gedanken, dass durch die europäische Kolonialherrschaft in der islamischen Welt historisch etwas schiefgelaufen sei, sahen sich Politiker, Geistliche und Intellektuelle Anfang des 20. Jahrhunderts gedrängt, auf die neuen Machtverhältnisse zu reagieren. Der aufkeimende Diskurs über den nationalstaatlichen Fortschritt wurde unter anderem mit der Modernisierung der Frauenrolle verknüpft. Eine exemplarische Gesellschaftsanalyse des Irak unter britischer Mandatsherrschaft zeigt, dass die Transformation vom familiären Patriarchat zum neopatriarchalen Staat erkennbare Umgestaltungen, aber keine fundamentalen sozioökonomischen Verbesserungen für die Frauen im privaten und öffentlichen Raum lieferte. Zwar banden Frauen jeglicher Couleur ihre Forderungen nach rechtlicher Gleichberechtigung  im  nationalistischen  Diskurs  ein,  doch  übten  hauptsächlich  Vertreter  elitärer  Zirkel  mit Kontakten zu Politik und Kolonialvertretern tatsächlichen Einfluss aus.

Scholarly literature highlights the systematic actions taken in the modern Middle East to destroy the Kurdish language. With a primary focus on Turkey, scholars have described this process as a policy of linguicide, or language genocide, which is “the extermination of languages, an analogous concept to (physical) genocide.”2 In contrast, similar processes at work in southern Kurdistan (Kurdistan of northern Iraq) have often been described as “linguistic suppression.”3 This paper argues that linguistic suppression does not adequately describe the Iraqi Kurds’ experiences. Rather, linguicide better captures the practices of cultural genocide that have targeted this group. This paper focuses on how the Kurds in modern-day Iraq were subjected to linguicide under the Language Education Policy (LEP) from 1932 to 1991. This policy was established during the monarchy (1921–1958), and advanced through the time of Saddam Hussein’s regime (1979–1991).4 While much scholarly work has associated the process of linguicide with the birth of a nation-state,5 this article further argues that linguicide in the Iraqi Kurdish case predates the formation of the Iraqi nation-state.

Der Irak ist heute in vieler Hinsicht ein failed state. Die derzeit mit 37 Millionen bezifferte irakische Bevölkerung zeichnet sich durch eine große religiöse, kulturelle und ethnische Diversität aus. Gegenwärtige ethno-konfessionelle Spannungen blicken auf eine lange Vorgeschichte zurück. Dieser Umstand sowie die Gründungsgeschichte des irakischen Staates boten schon seit langem immer wieder Anlass, die angeblich mangelnde Authentizität der irakischen Nation und die Künstlichkeit des nach Ende des ersten Weltkrieges von britischen Kolonialherren geschaffenen Staates zu thematisieren. Doch so einfach ist es nicht.

In 1948, a war broke out that would result in Israeli independence and the erasure of Arab Palestine. Over twenty months, thousands of Jews and Arabs came from all over the world to join those already on the ground to fight in the ranks of the Israel Defense Forces and the Arab Liberation Army. With this book, the young men and women who made up these armies come to life through their letters home, writing about everything from daily life to nationalism, colonialism, race, and the character of their enemies. Shay Hazkani offers a new history of the 1948 War through these letters, focusing on the people caught up in the conflict and its transnational reverberations.

Dear Palestine also examines how the architects of the conflict worked to influence and indoctrinate key ideologies in these ordinary soldiers, by examining battle orders, pamphlets, army magazines, and radio broadcasts. Through two narratives—the official and unofficial, the propaganda and the personal letters—Dear Palestine reveals the fissures between sanctioned nationalism and individual identity. This book reminds us that everyday people's fear, bravery, arrogance, cruelty, lies, and exaggerations are as important in history as the preoccupations of the elites.

Abstract : The beginnings of Arabism are to be found in the last decades of the Ottoman Empire. It was first an identity assertion against the Turks, before defining itself in the aftermath of the First World War, in the shadow of the Iraqi Faisal’s kingdom and French and English mandates. The task of managing segmented territories and peoples was a permanent challenge to the 1950s and 1960s pan-Arabism which finally provided an authoritarian and dictatorial response. Arabism’s great and beautiful utopia would eventually become a nightmare.
Résumé : Les prémices de l’arabisme sont à chercher dans les dernières décennies de l’Empire ottoman. Elle fut d’abord une affirmation identitaire contre les Turcs, avant de se définir au lendemain de la Première Guerre mondiale, à l’ombre du royaume irakien de Fayçal et des mandats français et anglais. La tâche de gérer des territoires et des peuples segmentés fut un défi permanent auquel le panarabisme des années 1950 et 1960 fournira une réponse autoritaire et dictatoriale. La belle et grande utopie de l’arabisme allait tourner au cauchemar.

In the period immediately after the Suez Crisis, Harold Macmillan continued the Eden
government’s previous efforts to bring down the Nasser regime in Egypt. This policy
produced mixed reactions in Whitehall, although officials withheld their doubts while the
new government sought to repair relations with the Eisenhower administration in 1957. The inconclusive outcome of the Jordan and Lebanon interventions in 1958 ultimately allowed the Foreign Office to push for a policy of disengagement from the wider region, although a strengthened British military posture in the Gulf and southwestern Arabia threatened renewed difficulties with local nationalists by the time Macmillan left office in 1963.

Dal 1516 fino alla fine della prima guerra mondiale, la regione del Vicino Oriente, con gradazioni, storie e assetti differenti, ricadeva sotto il dominio dell'Impero Ottomano 1 , costituendone il cuore delle province arabe; si estendeva, sul versante interno, intorno alle città di Aleppo, Damasco e Gerusalemme fino a comprendere, sulla costa, Jaffa, Acri, Haifa e Beirut. In questa regione del Mediterraneo orientale si sviluppò, fin dai primi decenni del dominio ottomano, un sistema di autonomie molto più profondo rispetto alle altre zone dell'Impero soprattutto grazie alla considerevole lontananza geografica dal centro. Per grande parte del XIX secolo e fino allo scoppio della Prima guerra mondiale, la regione fu divisa in vilayet e mutassarifat: l'attuale Siria era divisa tra il vilayet di Aleppo e quello di Damasco (detto anche di Siria) 2 ; a partire dal 1861 venne creato il mutassarifat del Monte Libano 3 caratterizzato da una tra le più forti forme di autonomia sotto l'Impero ottomano e di fondamentale importanza poiché sarà una delle regioni in cui maggiormente e più palesemente si mostreranno le contraddizioni e i dilemmi dell'impero e del suo rapporto con le potenze europee; infine, Gerusalemme divenne a metà del XIX secolo un sangiaccato del vilayet siriano per trasformarsi, verso la fine del secolo, in ragione della sua importanza religiosa, anch'esso in un mutassarifat con rapporti diretti con Costantinopoli 4 . Nel 1888, inoltre, Beirut e la zona costiera circostante fino a quel momento ricompresa nel vilayet della Siria, costituirono un nuovo vilayet separato da quello siriano in ragione dell'importanza che questa zona aveva ormai assunto per l'Impero soprattutto dal punto di vista commerciale.

This research argues that during the inter-war years in Palestine, British power was dependent upon intelligence. Intelligence was fundamental to the security of the country, since it varyingly augmented understrength force, or supported overwhelming force. Intelligence also supported policymakers as issues of governance were debated. It allowed British decision makers to avoid making a decision on self-government during the 1920s and it supported Britain’s failed attempts to introduce a constitution during the 1930s. Intelligence also was crucial to Britain’s relations with the Arab nationalist and Zionist communities. Of particular importance was Britain’s partnership and subsequent war with the Mufti of Jerusalem, Hajj Amin al-Husseini. This thesis sheds new light on the role of intelligence in British colonial policymaking, the development of the Arab-Zionist conflict, and how Britain failed to manage communal violence.
This research offers a new and improved explanation of the origins, unfolding, and defeat of the Palestinian Arab rebellion. British intelligence and policymakers failed to grasp the sophistication of the Palestinian national movement until the mid-1930s, and even then, they focused on clan competition and the politics of ‘notables’. Intelligence and military records explain how British police and military struggled, but ultimately succeeded to suppress and defeat this rebellion. Victory was made possible by innovations within the intelligence and planning staffs, as well as Zionist cooperation.
Intelligence shaped policy most clearly at the beginning and end of the period under examination. During 1918-20, the military government was administered by intelligence officers who guaranteed Britain’s future control in Palestine both domestically, and at the League of Nations. In 1939, British policy abandoned its traditional Zionist partners when the need to impose a solution on Palestine coincided with the opportunity, revealed by signals intelligence, to bolster and leverage the influence of ‘Abdul ‘Aziz ibn Sa’ud over the Arab national movement.

Arab nationalism is not a monolithic construct. In the case of Algeria, the nationalist period undoubtedly played a significant role in determining the nature of its nationalist movement, its foundational principles and the nature of the future independent country. It was during the nationalist period that disputes regarding the colonial order, autonomy versus independence and the definition of Algerian identity emerged.
The anti-colonial revolution occurred after a long period of gestation, the result of a combination of people’s spontaneous initiative, the action of forces fed by new or existing ideas and the influence of the international context.
This article provides an overview of Algerian nationalism—including both Arab and Berber nationalisms—from the 1920s to the 1950s, identifying parties, leaders and currents of thought.

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Arap Sosyalizmi olarak da adlandırılan Baasçılık, Ortadoğu'da en çok Suriye ve Irak'ta egemn olmuştu. Mısır'da Hür Subaylar darbesi ile beraber gelen Nasır'ın izlediği Pan-Arabizm'den ayrı düşünülmemesi geren Baas'ın kökenleri daha eskiye dayanmaktadır. Mişel Eflak ve al-Bitar tarafında fikirsel olarak 20.yy'ın hemen başlarında gelişen Baasçılık, Avrupalı ülkelerin Ortadoğu üzerindeki sömürgecilik telaşını karşı verilen milliyetçi bir tepkiydi. Sosyalizmi benimsemeleri ve Sovyetler ile olan işbirlikleri bu rejimleri Soğuk Savaşın'da parçası haline getirdi.

‘Abd al-Ḥamīd al-Zahrāwī, an Ottoman-Arab MP, has been studied exclusively from the perspective of Arab nationalism. In fact, he highly evaluated the imperial framework and deduced that the only possible way of resisting the Western invasion was by means of power. Zahrāwī espoused the political unity of Ottomans, based on communities and not individuals. He advocated the need for political education in order to realize this desirable political unity, without inviting the ethno-religious conflicts. His elitist mentality led him to rely on, if necessary, disciplinary coercion and educate the “ignorant” masses and the “barbarous” nomads. His theoretical contributions notwithstanding, Zahrāwī could not persuasively introduce a pragmatic alternative to realize his ideas in the context of Ottoman constitutional politics. His preference of communitarian over individual egalitarianism contradicted the legal as well as institutional reality of Ottoman constitutionalism. From the viewpoint of Ottoman intellectual history, Zahrāwī had much in common with his non-Arab colleagues.

This paper aims to uncover what has become of the age-defining socio-political ideology of Arab Nationalism. What was once the rallying call of leaders around the Arab world seems to have changed its nature in becoming disassociated from political discourse. Countries once identified with the generalising epithet ‘Arab’ have now gone their separate ways; casting doubt over the existence of any form of Arab unity, in a world where societies are increasingly turning inward rather than opening up to their neighbours. The events of the Arab Spring however, show that some form of linkage between the four corners of the Arab world persists to this day. It is therefore legitimate to wonder if a unifying sentiment of Arab identity still exists, whether it constitutes a form of nationalism and in any case, whether it has political relevance. If on the contrary such a sentiment does not exist, the issue of what defines identity across the Arab world today arises. Answering these questions is the purpose of this paper.

South Asia’s encounter with Western colonialism preceded that of the Arab world, arguably rendering it more sensitive to the intellectual challenges implicit in political subjugation. Consequently, scholars of South Asian Islam, such as Francis Robinson, have highlighted its role historically more as an exporter than as an importer of reformist ideas, particularly during the decades of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The subject of this book, Shaykh Abu al-Hasan Ali Nadwi (1915–99), exemplifies both these tendencies through his life and works. First, he confronts head-on the challenges posed to Muslim civilization by Western cultural and political hegemony. Second, through a corpus of eloquent and passionate Arabic publications and frequent lecture tours abroad, he speaks to the trauma of a post-colonial Arab world still reeling with the shock of its inglorious place in the new global political order.

FULL BOOK REVIEW CAN BE ACCESSED HERE: http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/h4ra9XG7a9gDYEs8Gn5A/full

This chapter revisits the political phenomenon of “Nasserism,” acknowledging that it has multiple connotations and yet enduring significance across the Arab world. It discusses Nasserism under Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser (1918–1970) during his 1952–70 leadership, and Nasserism as the political tradition that survived him. The chapter’s range generates the conclusion that Nasserism has transcended its historical origins. It is now widely employed in political contestation to signal a set of enduring principles and aspirations for sovereignty and dignity across the Arab world. At the same time, it is an important node in critiques of contemporary political centralization and authoritarian rule in Arab republics. Sparking debate between these poles continuously, and as a political tradition with movements in most Arab countries today, Nasserism is set to remain a force to be reckoned with in Egyptian and Arab politics for the foreseeable future.

French rule over Syria and Lebanon was premised on a vision of a special French protectorate established through centuries of cultural activity: archaeological, educational and charitable. Initial French methods of organising and supervising cultural activity sought to embrace this vision and to implement it in the exploitation of antiquities, the management and promotion of cultural heritage, the organisation of education and the control of public opinion among the literate classes. However, an examination of the first five years of the League of Nations-assigned mandate, 1920-1925, reveals that French expectations of a protectorate were quickly dashed by widespread resistance to their cultural policies, not simply among Arabists but also among minority groups initially expected to be loyal to the French. The violence of imposing the mandate 'de facto', starting with a landing of French troops in the Lebanese and Syrian coast in 1919 - and followed by extension to the Syrian interior in 1920 - was met by consistent violent revolt. Examining the role of cultural institutions reveals less violent yet similarly consistent contestation of the French mandate. The political discourses emerging after World War I fostered expectations of European tutelages that prepared local peoples for autonomy and independence. Yet, even among the most Francophile of stakeholders, the unfolding of the first years of French rule brought forth entirely different events and methods. In this book, Idir Ouahes provides an in-depth analysis of the shifts in discourses, attitudes and activities unfolding in French and locally-organised institutions such as schools, museums and newspapers, revealing how local resistance put pressure on cultural activity in the early years of the French mandate

`This excellent study is a welcome addition to the scholarship on the inter-war mandates of Syria and Lebanon. Ouahes focuses on the cultural institutions through which the French authorities imposed their rule, ably demonstrating the ways in which the mandate system was transformed into a political and cultural framework akin to colonialism. While tracing the disillusion and contestations that ensued, he nonetheless discusses the impact and disparate legacy of the period on both the French and the diverse populations of the two mandates.' - Patricia M.E. Lorcin, Professor of History and Samuel Russell Chair in Humanities, University of Minnesota-Twin Cities, `Resisting the imposition of French imperial control in 1920s

'Syria was never solely a matter of violent opposition. Ranging from classrooms and museums, to archaeological sites and vernacular journalism, in this richly evocative text Idir Ouahes reveals how Syrians contested the imposition of French Mandate rule in the realms of cultural heritage, educational provision and print media.' - Martin Thomas, Professor of Imperial History, University of Exeter

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During 1917-18, Sir Mark Sykes represented the cabinet's Middle Eastern policy, working with members of General Allenby's staff in Cairo, including his staff intelligence and the Arab Bureau, which handled political intelligence in the region. These intelligence officers were also responsible for handling negotiations with the Hashemite chief Sherif Husayn of Mecca in 1915. Sykes and these officers had to simultaneously plan victory and Britain's postwar interests. Few British officials recognised the inherent contradiction in their promises to Zionists and Arabs between 1917 and 1919. This chapter argues that Britain's lack of appreciation for the conflict inherent in its various commitments derived more from weak assessments of Arab politics than from malevolence toward its new junior partners. By comparing what British intelligence officers believed about the relationship between Arab nationalist societies and the hashemites against the reality of that relationship, it is possible to understand Britain's contradictory policy commitments, which were made as British war aims evolved along with the conditions produced by the conflict.

Until the conclusion of the 1948 Arab-Israeli war, there were roughly 750,000 Jews living in Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia, Yemen, Algeria and Palestine/Israel. A comparative electronic survey of some 900 journals reveals that when scholars referred to these individuals collectively during the last 200 years they employed some twenty different signifiers. The question I address is simple yet potentially foundational: which collective signifier can define and capture most productively, inclusively and comprehensively the socio-political and cultural experiences of those who comprised the Arab Middle East's ten indigenous Jewish minority communities prior to their dispersal (in the post-1949 armistice period)? I propose that the signifier ‘Arabized-Jews’ exhibits explanatory properties that outweigh those of its alternatives both quantitatively and qualitatively. As such, ‘Arabized-Jews’ denotes Jews who were culturally and/or linguistically Arab yet who did not self-define primarily as Arab, let alone in political terms. In exploring the dialectic interface between ethno-politics, terminological formations and the production of meaning, this article suggests that it makes sense for contemporary scholars to employ ‘Arabized-Jews’ to refer collectively to Jews across the modern Arab Middle East.

Yemen is a typically non-Arab country. However, due to colonial presence dating back to 1830s, the Orientalist fallacy of Pan-Arabism has been gradually diffused and prevailed when the supposed “revolutionaries”, imitating the Middle East’s worst failure, the idiosyncratic Nasserism, rose to power and plunged Yemen into underdevelopment, poverty, marginalization, starvation, tyranny, fratricide conflicts, and total disintegration.
First published in: http://www.fravahr.org/spip.php?article464
Sunday 31 May 2009

Title: Arab Nationalism: From Its Emergence until 1918.

In the Ottoman Empire, by the introduction of modern schools with Tanzimat and by the influence of the missionary schools opened in Syria, Lebanon and Palestine, Western nationalist ideas became prevalent, especially among the Christian Arabs. As for the Muslim Arabs, as a reaction to the irresistible regression against the West, they tried to find a solution to this regression by reviving Arabism through emphasizing on the Arab identity and culture, and its contributions to the Islamic and Western civilizations.

The Christian Arabs, besides working on the revival of the Arab language and culture, they also discussed the idea of separation and defended the idea of independence from the Ottoman Empire. But the Muslim Arabs, instead of separation, defended the unity of the Empire, but demanded their language widely used and culture to be more considered especially in their local areas. However, compared to Syrians, the Egyptian Arabs, under the influence of the British rule, developed a different understanding of nationalism by emphasizing on the idea of “motherland” and gave importance for being an “Egyptian” more than being an Arab.

Despite the nationalist movements among Muslim and Christian Arabs, the revolt started by Sheriff Hussein in Hedjaz during the First World War gained a restricted support among the Arabs. Because of the secret Sykes-Picot Agreement and Balfour Declaration, the Arabs were not able to get their independence after the First World War. Moreover, they were obliged to live under the English and French mandates by the supervision of the United Nations. So, for their independence, they had to wait until 1940’s, when the colonialist powers began to emancipate their colonies.

يقدم هذا الكتاب سيرةً شخصيةٍ كويتيةٍ مهمة لعبت دورا جوهريا في تطوير التعليم والإصلاح الإداري والسياسي والقانوني من خلال مجلس المعارف ومجلس الأمة التشريعي سنة ١٩٣٨م. وهو من رواد القومية العربية في الكويت. تميز بتفوقه في مجال التجارة وامتداد علاقاته الاجتماعية مع رجالات العالم العربي مثل الحاج أمين الحسيني وفوزي القاوقجي ومحمد علي علوبة باشا وكاظم الصلح وفخري البارودي وعبدالحميد شومان وغيرهم، واشتراكاته وصلاته المتينة بأندية وجماعات القوميين العرب. ويبرز أيضا اهتمامه الشديد بالثقافة والفكر. وكان له مساهمات فعالة في القضايا العربية وبخاصة القضية الفلسطينية التي عمل على دعمها بالمال والسلاح. كما وشارك بحركة رشيد عالي الكيلاني الذي انقلب على وصي عرش العراق الشريف عبدالإله ورئيس الوزراء نوري السعيد. ودعم عبدالله الصقر مصر بعيد العدوان الثلاثي عليها وتقلد وساما من جمال عبدالناصر. وكان الصقر من أوائل الكويتيين الزائرين لإسبانيا والمتعرفين على حضارة العرب في الأندلس. وبسبب خروجه من الكويت منذ سنة 1939م قلَّ ذكره ونُسي إلى حد بعيد. ويأمل هذا الكتاب الذي يستعين بأرشيف أسرة الصقر ومحاضر مجلس الأمة التشريعي لسنة 1939م ومذكرات عبدالعزيز حسين وغيرها من مصادر أن يُحيي ذكرى عبدالله حمد الصقر ويبرز تاريخه الذي يعد جزءا من تاريخ الكويت.

Last update 14102021
I - En Palestine, un peuple debout. Éditorial de Serge Halimi
II- مقال البوم: حين ربح نتانياهو وخسرت إسرائيل.. وفازت حماس وخسر عباس
III- HALTE À UNE NOUVELLE NAKBA! par Aicha Bouabaci
IV- Here, Jerusalemites and Jerusalemites redrawn the map.
V- Nouvelles tensions à Jérusalem autour de l'expulsion possible de Palestiniens au profit de colons
VI - Violences fascistes et racistes contre les Palestiniens à Jérusalem - silence révoltant de la France
VII - Marwan Al-Barghouti
VIII : L'Union européenne ne peut pas et ne doit pas inviter des Israéliens en Tunisie
PART IX– BOOKS
PART IX-I THE FORGOTTEN PALESTINIANS
The Forgotten Palestinians: A History of the Palestinians in Israel. Ilan Pappe. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2011)
: L'Union européenne ne peut pas et ne doit pas inviter des Israéliens en Tunisie
La Campagne Tunisienne pour le Boycott Académique et Culturel d’Israël (TACBI) a appris avec consternation que la Délégation de l’Union Européenne en Tunisie compte inviter à Tunis en janvier 2020 de  jeunes israéliens dans le cadre du programme « Dialogue Méditerranéen pour les Droits et l’Égalité » (Med Dialogue for Rights and Equality) financé par l'Union européenne. Il est indiqué que les candidats doivent avoir « entre 18 et 36 ans » et être « ressortissants des pays suivants : Algérie, Égypte, Israël, Jordanie, Liban, Libye, Mauritanie, Maroc, Palestine, Tunisie, Syrie - ou appartenir à des diasporas apparentées, notamment syriennes et palestiniennes ».
PART IX-2 -LETTERS FROM PALESTINE
An engrossing new book about the lives of Palestinian people
Many books have been written dealing with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict from the pro- Israeli perspective. However, relatively few reflect the Palestinian point of view. Letters from Palestine is one of the rare books that offers an American audience the chance to listen to and learn about the lives of actual Palestinian people as they describe what it is like to live in the occupied territories of the West Bank or Gaza, or to grow up as a Palestinian in the U.S.
Part IX-3- Requiem pour Gaza », préface d’Adonis
Signé par le poète Bernard Noël (grand prix de poésie de l’Académie française
2016), l’un des textes les plus mordants du livre décrit Gaza comme une
« réserve de chasse » dont l’État hébreu « contrôle absolument les clôtures et
qui, en connivence avec son grand allié, lui sert à sélectionner les diverses
variétés de gibier humain, de la forte tête dont on fait des cibles au pauvre indic
qu’on n’achète pas cher ».
Part X-Israel: Water as a tool to dominate Palestinians
Water consumption figures are telling: While Israelis have access to around 240 litres of water per person per day, and settlers over 300, Palestinians in the West Bank are left with 73 litres - well below the World Health Organization's minimum standard of 100.
PartXI- Crimes de guerre ou des crimes contre l'humanité
https://www.lepoint.fr/monde/j-ai-ete-le-premier-medecin-cible-par-un-sniper-a-gaza-15-03-2019-2301472_24.php
ENTRETIEN. Tarek Loubani, médecin urgentiste canadien, a été victime d'un tir israélien alors qu'il soignait des manifestants palestiniens.
ANTISEMITISME VS ANTISIONISME : LE TEMOIGNAGE DE MICHELE SIBONY QUI TRACE L’HISTOIRE D’UN PEUPLE QUI S’EST OCTROYE TOUS LES DROITS D’ENRAYER DE LA CARTE L'IDENTITE  DES PALESTINIENS
https://webmail.online.net/?_task=mail&_action=get&_mbox=INBOX&_uid=211153&_token=PxUobIl3RfAnlqXdPq00P13RElHjx55w&_part=2
XII- LA RESISTANCE CULTURELLE : LE THEATRE DE LA LIBERTE A JENINE
La victime dirigeait le théâtre de la Liberté, fondé dans le camp de réfugiés de Jénine par sa mère, Arna Mer (1930-1995), militante pour les droits des Palestiniens, tout comme son fils, et mariée à Saliba Khamis, un Arabe Israélien, dirigeant du Parti communiste israélien. A l'origine, le "Théâtre des pierres" avait été lancé durant la première Intifada (1987-1993). Pour Arna Mer, ardente militante de la paix, il s'agissait de créer un espace préservé où les enfants échapperaient à la violence du conflit et de l'occupation. Détruit en 2002 lors d'une opération de l'armée israélienne contre les groupes armés palestiniens, l'établissement a revu le jour en 2006 sous le nom de "Théâtre de la Liberté" grâce à Juliano Mer-Khamis, réalisateur du documentaire Les enfants d'Arna, avec le soutien de Zakaria Zoubeïdi, chef local du groupe armé palestinien des Brigades des martyrs d'Al-Aqsa, qui a participé aux combats à l'époque. Zakaria Zoubeïdi a déclaré à la chaîne 10 israélienne que "tout le monde l'aimait dans le camp" de réfugiés.
XIII - HOMAGE TO KHAIRAT ALSALEH (31 May 1939- 29 July 2014)
I wrote this poem several years ago. It is about the death of a child of Palestine. Many children died during the Intifada and many children died recently in Gaza. I think our genes are programmed to protect children and not to accept their death. I am dreaming of a day when the Palestinian children will have the chance to grow up normally like all other children, to laugh and play and watch children's TV, as they ehave xpressed so eloquently during the war.
Poem by Khairat Al-Saleh
POSTED BY RAINBOW DERVISH AT 8:43 AM 2 COMMENTS:
LABELS: DEDICATED TO GAZA, POEMS
http://rainbowdervish.blogspot.com/
Pourquoi la Palestine ? Pourquoi pas l’Iran, la Syrie ou la Russie ?
D’autant plus que les palestiniens sont de plus en plus réduits à rien,
quand ils ne sont pas éliminés un à un pour des raisons de sécurité ou promiscuité.
Et moi je dis que s’il n’en reste qu’un, un seul palestinien, je continuerai à dire
que cette terre lui appartient… en propre et au figuré. Et cette vérité,
je la maintiens… ou pour dire vrai, c’est elle qui me maintient… en vie.
Je ne tiens pas à verser une seule larme sur ce qui me tient le plus à cœur,
mais je tiens à faire de mon long métrage, une arme… pour BRISER tous les miroirs,
et remettre en mémoire que la Palestine est aux palestiniens…
https://www.lejournaldepersonne.com/2018/06/la-verite/
Personne est sur un nouveau projet, un nouveau film long métrage
est en cours de préparation, LA CASA DE PALESTINA
(ancien nom de L’orpheline de la Palestine).
« Vous n’avez pas besoin de moi pour oser l’imaginer…
Mais j’ai besoin de votre aide pour le réaliser. »
Pour contribuer à sa réalisation, rendez-vous sur la page de soutien : https://www.lejournaldepersonne.com/soutien-journal-de-personne/
2ème partie
Conformément à la théorie freudienne  Israël agit avec la Nakba comme un esprit traumatisé qui tente de refouler ce qui le hante. Une sorte d’”inquiétante étrangeté”, à la source d’un sentiment de honte ressenti à l’égard d’actes passés, provoque un malaise qui pousse à vouloir les faire disparaître. Ce passé dérangeant revient , selon Freud, lorsque s’effacent les limites entre l’imagination et la réalité. La mémoire de la Nakba remonte à la surface par l’intermédiaire de divers acteurs qui détruisent les créations imaginaires pour montrer la réalité, et de Palestiniens qui saisissent toutes les occasions de resurgir dans l’espace public.
In his election campaign, Trump promised and stood before the world with all his arrogance to fulfill his promise to Zionism and its birth, "Israel" to declare Jerusalem the eternal capital of the State of "Israel" Will we be satisfied with convictions and protests to keep the Arab identity of Jerusalem alive? Will we suffice tears and stand on the doors of the world, begging half solutions, but quarters and prices ?! Were all Arab, Islamic and international documents paper prisoners? Jerusalem is the flower of the cities and the city of prayer. Jerusalem is the cradle of messages, and the house of the Prophets, carrying a long history that is rooted throughout the ages to pre-heavenly religions, highlighting its Arabism under its ordeal and its rape. Can Jerusalem become cheaper than promises of Israeli peace? Come on her coffins ?!! .. Whatever the remnants of the Arab nation, you have lost the basic cause as you have lost compass in the midst of your disputes and disagreements and distributions, Jerusalem has never been the title of the Isra and Maraj and the address of the Al-Aqsa Mosque or the Church of the Holy Sepulcher, but the city of practical holiness in the case of the oppressed and the oppressed whom the oppressors deny and fought the farthest and stood "international justice" watching them and disguising themselves.
XIV- Espionnage et intimidations
XV -  Israël devient une « ethnocratie »
ESPIONNAGE ET INTIMIDATIONS
Lobby israélien, le documentaire interdit
PAR ALAIN GRESH 
Israël devient une « ethnocratie »
XVI- How  to keep the Arab identity of Jerusalem alive? By Hind Obiedin
XVII - Palestine, the Birthplace of Civilization When and where Civilization was born
Prof. Mohamed Rabie

The British Empire adopted an array of contradictory policies towards Muslim subjects scattered throughout the world. As it managed its post-World War I goal of dominating the former Ottoman territories, London-based policies considered varying policies. Since the British Empire managed its affairs with different Muslim subjects through different administrations based in Cairo, Bombay, and occupied Istanbul after 1918, such policies clashed, reflecting the distinctive issues facing administrators of these unique regions. This article makes the observation that there proved to be a range of policies adopted by competing entities of «His Majesty’s Government» (HMG) toward the Caliphate, requiring a rethinking of British imperialism vis-à-vis the Muslim world. Seeking to use the Caliphate from 1912 to 1924 for different objectives, the following reads these policies within the larger context of an empire facing disparate and contradictory challenges from different Muslims demands. In the process, this chapter asks why local events regularly upset such schemes that sought to mobilize the Caliphate, questions answered by returning focus to a multiplicity of factors contributing to the modern world’s (dis)order

Studies of the Arab-Zionist matrix are ordinarily written from what may be termed as a territorially Palestine-centric vantage-point; this -obviously -makes sense since the conflict"s sorrows, battles, deaths, expulsions and displacements clearly emerged there. But this approach means something else too: that regional dimensions surrounding the Palestine/Israel question are often undervalued both historically and in terms of the region"s ongoing ethno-politics. Nowhere is this more apparent than in the ever-expanding controversy between proponents of a One-State, Bi-National-State or Two-State solution to the Palestine/Israel question (1S2S). This neglect leads the numerous participants in 1S2S exchanges to debate (and devise) solutions that rest on what I term here "mandated imaginations", that is, scholarly spheres that ultimately conceive of the (post-1922) Britishmandated territory of Palestine/Israel as a secluded island in both historical and contemporary terms. The problem is that this neither was, nor is, the case. The Palestine/Israel question acquired a potent regional dimension from at least the time of the Palestinian anti-colonial revolt of 1936-9 and the historic 1937 pan-Arab gathering in Bludan, convened to overturn the first Two-State solution proposed by the royal Peel Commission. It logically follows that if prevailing diagnoses of the very question itself are incorrect or partial -due to mandated imaginations, a Palestine-centric outlook and a neglect of historical and contemporary regional variables -then the corresponding socio-political prognoses (One-State, Two-States or Bi-National-State) may also be flawed in all terms other than rhetorical-ideational. To substantiate these propositions, this article is three-fold.

According to commonly held opinion, Arab officers of the Ottoman Army were instrumental in the initiation of the Arab Revolt and the Ottoman final defeat by throwing their lot in with the British and French. This article is an effort to correct this stereotypical opinion by making use of untapped Ottoman archive records and creating a data set. Even though the Ottoman Empire did not manage to integrate different ethnic groups, it did succeed in creating a viable and effective officer corps by making use of military educational institutions for implanting general unity and a sense of inclusiveness. Thanks to esprit de corps and long-established military institutions, most of the Arab officers stayed loyal to the empire up until the very end.

This chapter examines the relationship between British colonialism and Egypt’s largest foreign resident community, the Greeks.  Drawing on postcolonial theory, the analysis argues that since 1882 British colonialism began to turn Egypt’s Greeks into semi-colonial subjects and, in so doing, colonial officials like Lord Cromer posed a greater threat to Egypt’s urban cosmopolitanism than the burgeoning Egyptian nationalist movement.  Using Greek, Egyptian, British and French archival sources, the discussion focuses on the three main responses of Egypt’s Greeks towards Cromer’s policies, described respectively as ‘collaboration’, ‘negotiation’ and ‘resistance’.  The chapter closes with the proposition that, in contrast to the dominant assumptions in Diaspora Studies approaches, British colonialism deepened divisions within the Greek community and, until 1899, it elicited a predominantly nationalist response in the form of George Averoff’s policy of ‘negotiation’.

The idea of a continued Turco-Arab coexistence under the Ottoman Sultanate might appear counterfactual or marginal-if not nostalgic-from the sober vantage of knowing "the end of history". The Ottoman Empire neither survived the Great War nor made way for a multinational coexistence of Turks and Arabs. For contemporaries, however, different models of federalism and multinationalism offered solutions to save the Ottoman Empire and safeguard Turco-Arab coexistence. While the federalist ideas of Ottoman Arabs are far better known in the academic literature, in regards to Ottoman Turks, the commonplace interpretations follow the teleology of the Turkish nation-state formation. In order to correct this misperception, I will illustrate the existence of corresponding Turkish voices and visions of federalism and multinationalism. Envisioning Turco-Arab coexistence was a serious feature of policy debates, especially in the years of crisis from the Balkan Wars to the settlement of post-Ottoman nation-states in the aftermath of the First World War.

Ancient Yemen was inhabited by a Semitic nation whose descendants are the modern Yemenites, and the modern Abyssinians, the ruling minority of the Tigray and Amhara tribes, whose ancestors had left Yemen and settled on the Red Sea African coastland in the 1st millennium BCE. The affinities between Ancient Yemenite and Gueze (Ancient Abyssinian) are such (in both levels, linguistic and scriptural) that thanks to the latter (language of the Axumite Abyssinian Christian Liturgy) we deciphered the former.

The Arabs were located in Hedjaz, between Yemen’s northernmost confines and the southern boundaries of the Aramaean Nabataean state of Rekem (Petra) in today’s southern Jordan and NW Saudi Arabia. At the times of the Periplus of the Red Sea (second half of the 1st century CE) we know that the Arabs were nomadic, barbaric and uncivilized, if compared with the settled, cultured and highly civilized Yemenites. Under any circumstances, any element of civilization, culture, scripture and language, art and religion among the Arabs has always been diffused under Aramaean impact.
First published in: http://www.fravahr.org/spip.php?article464
Sunday 31 May 2009
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To read and download the article, go here:
https://hats21t.gumroad.com/l/slyfu
and
https://www.patreon.com/posts/yemenis-are-not-77547802

This paper analyzes the transformation process of the Arab awakening emerged in the Arab provinces in the nineteenth century into Arab nationalism and Arabism over time. The administrative weakness, Napoleon's invasion of Egypt, strengthening of Wahhabi movement, the revolt of Cavallan Mehmet Ali Pasha in Egypt, rising of colonialism and the missionary activities and the development of cultural and political relations with Europe led to the emergence of “Arabism”. This movement began to develop in the second half of the nineteenth century and showed improvement especially in Syria, Lebanon and Egypt. The Arabists were active in different domains such as literature, culture and education. They also founded schools and associations. In early years of the reign of Abdulhamit II, Arabist movement showed results in Syria and Lebanon. The fact that the Sultan paid attention to the Arab provinces and followed an "Islamic unity" policy prevented the strengthening of Arabism. On the other hand, many committees and societies were established, and Arabic books, newspapers and magazines were published. Arabism made a significant progress during the second constitutionalist period. This period is a milestone in terms of both Arab nationalism and Turkish nationalism. Turkish nationalism, emerged as a response to increasing European intervention and pressure, and led to the strengthening of Arab nationalism. The Arabists established associations and issued a large number of newspapers in the free environment of the Second Constitutionalist period. They showed local reactions to the European influence. These reactions were the reflections of proto-Arab nationalism. During the Second Constitutionalist period, Arabists demanded more Arab reforms, decentralized local governance, recognition of Arabic as an official language, employment of more Arabs in the local bureaucracy and political rights for the Arabs. The mandatory use of the Turkish language in the Arab provinces caused charging of the Unionists with “Turkism”, as well as unrest in the region. As a result, Arab nationalism gained a political characteristic during the Second Constitutionalist period. In 1913 Arab Congress was held. However, separation and independence weren’t dealt with in the Congress. After all, a treaty was signed between the Unionists and Arabists. Arab
Osmanlı Arap Vilayetleri, Arabizm ve Arap Milliyetçiliği 107
nationalism which aimed independence and developed against the Ottoman / Turkish sovereignty emerged in the First World War. However, most of the Arabs remained loyal to the Caliphate and the Ottoman Empire during the war. Nevertheless, some of the Arabs revolted under the leadership of the Emir of Mecca, Sharif Hussein. At the end of the war, Arab provinces were occupied by the French and the British.

This paper works to analyze the national narratives of two political parties in the Middle East: The Arab Socialist Baath Party, and the Syrian Social Nationalist Party. The founders and leaders of these two parties, Michel Aflaq and Antoun Saadeh, both espoused different perspectives on the nature of what the 'nation' was, and what direction the Middle East was to take following independence from the Ottoman and European powers. Using Ernest Gellner as a theoretical framework, this paper aims to dissect their philosophies and understand the nature of the national narratives put forth by these philosophers,  and see whether they hold up under a critical analysis.