Biological Weapons

Red Cocaine is a book written by Joseph D. Douglass, Christopher Story and Ray S. Cline that reports the application of illegal drugs, such as cocaine, in the function of biological weapons. Inspired by the Anglo-Chinese War/Opium War, Mao Tse-Tung used the same strategies of that war against his most lethal opponents, and used support from narcotraffic to reach his aims.

Producto de mi análisis de inteligencia de fuentes abiertas (Open Sources Intelligence Analysis), he llegado a la hipótesis de que Corea del Norte pudo haber sido la responsable de desarrollar en un laboratorio al nuevo coronavirus Covid-19, y de haberlo contagiado en Wuhan probablemente en octubre de 2019 durante el evento deportivo internacional llamado los VII CISM Juegos Mundiales Militares, celebrados en la ciudad de Wuhan del 18 al 27 de octubre pasados.

Bioloji silahlar digər canlılar üzərində zərərli təsirlər yaratmaq məqsədi ilə istifadə edilən bakteriya, virus və s. yoluxucu agentlərdir. Bu tərif ümumiyyətlə bioloji olaraq əldə edilən toksinləri və zəhərləri də əhatə edəcək şəkildə genişləndirilir. Bioloji döyüş vasitələri, yaşayan mikroorqanizmləri (bakteriya, protozoa, riketsia, virus və göbələk) ehtiva etdiyi kimi bitkilər və heyvanlar tərəfindən çıxarılan toksinləri (kimyəvilər) də əhatə edir. Bəzi mütəxəssislər toksinləri kimyəvi olaraq qəbul edərkən, əksəriyyəti 1972 Bioloji Silahlar Konvensiyasında (Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockilling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons on Their Destruction) da ifadə edildiyi kimi bioloji agent kimi qəbul edir.

Во академските кругови се повеќе се говори за “постомдерен тероризам” или “супер тероризам”, зад кој псевдоним се крие стравот од употребата на оружја за масовно уништување, како што се биолошкото, хемиското и нуклеарното. Покрај нивната најчеста употреба во воени цели, веќе подолго време во стручната јавност се зборува за можностите за злоупотреба на конвенционалните познати средства за напад на терористите, како експлозивот или огненото оружје, во таа смисла што постојат многу начини на кои може да се пренесе биолошко или хемиско оружје, што би значело и зголемена можност за напад, поради зголемената можност за нивен слободен прекуграничен премин. Она што во голема мера допринесува за постоење недостатоци во теоретските истражувања, се бројните проблеми при соочувањето со биотероризмот на различни нивоа (истражување на технологијата која се применува, превенција и заштита од биотерористички напади, но несомнено и различните и неускладени национални политики во поглед на биотероризмот). Терористите станаа свесни дека масовното ширење страв, како нивна основна цел е непосредно поврзано со една од највисоките човекови премиси – животот и здравјето на луѓето, кое може да биде постигнато со масовно ширење заразни болести и вируси, кои би довеле до депресии и можни вонредни состојби, кои и те како ја загрозуваат националната и меѓународната безбедност. Исто така, развојот на биолошко – хемиското оружје е тежок, скоро и невозможен за следење, поради тоа што многу малку се разликува (технички и инструментално гледано) од лабораториското производство на вакцини за медицинска употреба. Од друга страна, производството на патоген е доста едноставно, бидејќи се потребни ситни инструменти, кои е лесно да се скријат и прошверцуваат, а исто така, и мало количество на патоген е доволно за да предизвика сериозни разорни ефекти и последици кај населението.

The ‘revolution’ in synthetic biology has generated widespread concern among security experts. While both bioweapons and genome editing are by no means new, significant developments in biotechnology over the last two decades have made genetic engineering relatively easier and cheaper. These developments have led a wide variety of authors to argue that this will come nothing short of a transformation of international security and the conduct of war, and seems highly influential at policy levels.

However, recent literature has criticised this narrative, arguing that many analyses which stress the transformative effect of synthetic biology misunderstand the so-called ‘revolution’ in bio-engineering by oversimplifying its technical and social-political aspects.

This essay evaluates whether synthetic biology indeed has the potential to transform the future of warfare by critically assessing the arguments which stress the transformative effect of synbio-technology on both non-state and interstate warfare through a socio-technical analysis, augmented by relevant (historical) case studies.

This essay concludes that arguments in favour of the transformation of warfare are based on mistaken assumptions about the impact of synthetic biology. They overestimate the supposed easiness of pathogen manipulation, and have an overt focus on the technological drivers of change, ignoring political factors which underpin revolutions in warfare. As such, this essay argues that while synthetic biology is a rapidly developing field with huge potential and consequences for many areas, it is unlikely that the changes in synthetic biology will transform the conduct of war.

A oitava conferência de revisão da Convenção das Armas Biológicas teve a tarefa de reexaminar uma Convenção que enfrenta múltiplos desafios que
se estendem, desde os desenvolvimentos tecnológicos em curso, à globalização das tecnologias, equipamentos e acessibilidade ao conhecimento, às sensibilidades políticas quanto ao equilíbrio entre segurança e desenvolvimento nos critérios de implementação da Convenção, à relação entre o controlo de armas, a luta contra o terrorismo, a segurança interna e a necessidade objetiva de incluir o tema da saúde pública nos debates sobre segurança.

The limitation, reduction, prohibition or elimination of specific types of weapons, particularly nuclear weapons is, and will continue to be, one of the most important challenges that the international community should face in the 21th century.
To overcome these challenges a multilateral approach through the United Nations and its main organs and specialised international organisations involved in non-proliferation, disarmament and arms control issues is needed. These organs and specialised international organisations are: the General Assembly and its main subsidiary bodies, the Security Council, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) and the Conference on Disarmament (CD).

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is a relative
newcomer to the field of bioterrorism defense. Only
after September 11, 2001 did the Alliance, for the first time
in its more than 50-year history, launch specific initiatives
to address the threat of bioterrorism.

In the aftermath of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United States and the subsequent war against the Taleban and al-Qaeda in Afganistan, United States leaders turned their attention toward Iraq, specifically its dictatorial leader, Saddam Hussein. Although Iraq was not as powerful a military threat as it was during the Persian Gulf War of 1990-1991, U.S. officials asserted that Iraq's proven development and use of weapons of mass destruction made Iraq a potential source of those weapons for terrorists who could then use them against U.S. or other Western targets.

During the 1980s Iran-Iraq War, Hussein ordered the use of chemical weapons against Iranian forces, and additionally used chemical weapons against civilians in rebellious areas of Iraq.

After Iraqi forces were expelled by U.S. led western coalition forces during the Persian Gulf War, as a part of the agreements that prevented the occupation of Iraq and allowed Hussein to remain in power, Hussein agreed to destroy all weapons of mass destruction and forsake the future development of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons.

Over a period of twelve years, 17 specific United Nations Security Council resolutions, weapons inspection programs, and economic sanctions against Iraq failed to secure Hussein's full compliance with U.N. resolutions and assure the international community that Iraq had indeed disposed of weapons of mass destruction and abandoned programs to develop new weapons of mass destruction.

Hussein, in an effort to bolster his strong-man image that helped maintain his power in Iraq and influence in the region, played cat and mouse with international inspection teams. Fearing it would make him weak and vulnerable, Hussein refused to give up the appearance that his regime still might control weapons of mass destruction.
 
Despite U.N. resolutions, in 1998 Iraq expelled U.N. weapons inspectors and no meaningful inspections took place between 1998 and 2002.

Hussein's obstruction, pretense, and posturing resulted in highly polarized Western intelligence assessments of his warfare capacity and willingness to use WMD's.  Especially in light of the barrage of bellicose threats issued by Hussein and his official spokesman, intelligence agencies in the West scrambled to make an accurate assessment of Hussein's warfare --and specifically WMD -- capacity.

Iraqi defiance of U.N. resolutions continued throughout the 1990s. Confounding the threats from Hussein was the fact that while older weapons were subsequently discovered and destroyed by U.N. inspection teams in Iraq, there was no direct evidence -- and only weak or conflicting evidence --  that Hussein's threats were backed by the acquisition or development of either replacement or new weapons of mass destruction.

Hussein played a dangerous bluff -- bet on the lives of the Iraqi people -- that was ultimately called when the United States invaded and deposed him from power.

As of July 2003, no new weapons of mass destruction -- or significant infrastructure to indicate programs to build same -- had been found by U.S. or other Coalition forces in control of Iraq.  By the end of May 2003, both British and American intelligence agencies began to downplay the possibility of finding large stores of such weapons. Although both U.S. and British officials continued to assert prior claims about the extent of Iraq's arsenal, questions arose as to whether the weapons had been removed, destroyed, or whether intelligence reports regarding the weapons had been mishandled, exaggerated, or falsified.

Although some seized upon the growing controversy regarding the lack of WMD finds as a partisan political issue, the record was clear that all Western intelligence agencies, including those of war dissenter nations France and Germany, agreed before the war that Hussein's regime possessed weapons of mass destruction.

At the end of July 2003, several inquires were underway into the formulation and use by Coalition governments of intelligence related to Iraqi possession development of weapons of mass destruction.

Author's note: This article contains two Addendum sections:

Addendum I: U.K. Prime Minister Tony Blair's "Iraq War speech" to Parliament that resulted in the government voting to use 'all means necessary to ensure the disarmament of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction" on March 18, 2003.

ADDENDUM II:  A brief overview of the immediate aftermath of the invasion of Iraq.
(Author's note subsequently edited in August 2003 to be a separate article in EEIS.)
(download to read more)

In late December 1949, the Soviet Union conducted a somewhat
unexpected war crimes tribunal in the Russian Far East city of
Khabarovsk (‘Khabarovsk Trial’). It was the only Allied trial entirely
dedicated to the Japanese bacteriological weapons programme and human experiments related to it. Twelve Japanese war criminals had to finally stand trial before a Military Tribunal after they had been held captive by the Soviets for four years. They were sentenced to a forced labour camp for between two and 25 years, but all those convicted returned to Japan by 1956. The unusually light sentences seem to have been handed down in exchange for “valuable” data on bacteriological warfare.

Selected by the Defense Intelligence Agency, FBI, Naval War College Library, UK Defence Staff College,  and other official defense/intelligence collections including  Georgetown University, which included  EEIS in its Selected Resources for Security Studies, calling EEIS  "a sound starter resource for undergraduate students.” .// ""In composing The Encyclopedia of Espionage, Intelligence, and Security (EEIS) our goal was to shape a modern encyclopedia offering immediate value to our intended readers by emphasizing matters of espionage, intelligence, and security most frequently in the news. // EEIS is not intended as a classical "spy book," filled with tales of daring operations. More comprehensive coverage of a long history and intricate web of characters, intrigues, and evolution of agencies from a global perspective will require additional volumes. Instead, within a framework of historical overviews, EEIS emphasizes the scientific foundations, applications of technology, and organizational structure of modern espionage, intelligence, and security…. (download to read more) — K. Lee Lerner & Brenda Wilmoth Lerner, editors. Cornwall, England. May, 2003"

This manuscript presents an introduction to the phenomenon of viral bio-spiritual weaponization and warfare that describes the crux of the present and many other retroviruses launched against us during the course of our history by a nefarious group of energetically parasitic beings that is collectively referred to as 'negative aliens.' This is a new age of enlightenment and humanity is only beginning to awaken from slumber and unconsciousness to realize that, indeed, we are all energetic beings comprised of quanta of energy that when is congealed, forms the dark matter essence of our core manifestation body that, in turn, is arranged in a multidimensional configuration that is referred to as our 'morphogenetic field.' Accordingly, what you have not been taught is that your 'genetic' essence or body is comprised of the same quanta of energy that function via your bioenergetics in the form of your Light Body or Aura, an ovoid contour of energy that defines your 'consciousness space.' Indeed, we all thrive within a consciousness 'field' comprised of countless Light as well as 'dark' beings that either share the space-time we thrive in physically, or are privy to look upon us from higher 'grounds,' that we refer to as inner or higher dimensions of consciousness, going all the way to the innermost of Cosmos, in which our God-SOURCE, as an incredibly Omnipotent, Omniscient, Omnipresent fountain of energy and the progenitor of our consciousness, provides its energetic to us via an open loop of energy of consciousness. And, within this field of consciousness there also

The advent of molecular technologies and the application of genetic identification in clinical and forensic microbiology have greatly improved the capability of laboratories to detect and identify organisms used in biological weapons. Not only does this ability enhance national defense capabilities, but also the development and administration of countermeasures, including vaccines.

The genetic identification of microorganisms utilizes molecular technologies to evaluate specific regions of the genome and to determine the genus, species, or strain of a microorganism. This work grew out of the similar, highly successful applications in human identification using the same basic techniques. Thus, the genetic identification of microorganisms also has been referred to as microbial fingerprinting, and it is a key way in which bioinformatics can assist in the identification of pathogens….

Genetic technologies are especially useful in the detection of biological weapons. Of particular note is the polymerase chain reaction, or PCR, which uses selected enzymes to make copies of genetic material. If the genetic material is unique to the microorganism (e.g., a gene encoding a toxin), then investigators can use PCR to detect a specific microorganism from among the other organisms present in the sample. Traditional PCR detects RNA at the end point of the process (the plateau stage), however advances in the technology led to real-time PCR detection. This gave scientists the ability to collect data in the exponential growth phase, making DNA and RNA quantitation more efficient and accurate, and facilitated the development of hand-held detectors. Hand-held PCR detectors used by United Nations inspectors in Iraq during their weapons inspections efforts of 2002/2003 were sensitive enough to detect a single living Bacillus anthracis bacterium (the agent of anthrax) in an average kitchen-sized room. (download to read more)

Weapons of mass destruction (WMD), nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, are commonly detected by monitoring an array of activities common to their development and testing. Lack of access to weapons production facilities, which in the context of both state level and terrorist activities, offer special testing challenges and create the need for  sophisticated monitoring protocols as well as the capacity to detect weapons without access to suspect sites, while in transit, and/or while in component pre-assembly phases of development. WMD detection techniques and devices span and array of technologies. In the early 2000s, detection technology included devices like the Handheld Advanced Nucleic Acid Analyzer (HANAA) and techniques ranging from standard forensic laboratory testing to Matrix-Assisted Laser Desorption/Ionization Mass Spectroscopy (MALDI-MS). Autonomous Pathogen Detection System (APDS) and other deployable devices allowed rapid identification of biologic agents while portable devices were available that could identify chemicals in a vapor within minutes under challenging conditions. The genetic detection of biological agents is increasingly exquisite. Gene probe sensors can detect and identify bacteria based upon the presence of a stretch of genetic material that is unique to the microorganism. (download to read more)

This seminar work presents the new emerging global threat - the ethnobiological warfare. Using the knowledge in DNA manipulation can lead to many peaceful objectives, but on the same time can be used for a new generation of biological warfare. Because of its nature of stealthy and selectivity, it may be considered as much worse threat than the "conventional" nuclear weapon. [Written in Hebrew].

The Austrian university professor Heinrich Brandweiner (1910-97) had headlines in the 1950s as a member of an investigation team travelling North Korea and coming back with "proof" for the use of biological weapons by the US led UN troops.
The book analyses the biography of Brandweiner and his career in the Third Reich, postwar Austria and as an posterboy of the Communist led Peace Movement.

Elvira Rosert/Una Becker-Jakob/Giorgio Franceschini/Annette Schaper 2013: Arms Control Norms and Technology, in: Müller, Harald/Wunderlich, Carmen (ed.): Norm Dynamics in Multilateral Arms Control. Athens: University of Georgia Press, 109-140.

Hutton report looked into the death of Dr David Kelly, a Welsh scientist and authority on biological warfare and an honourable government civil servant.

“For me, his death, lying in an English field with his wrists slashed, became the most symbolic moment of the whole of the Iraq War.’ - Simon Armitage

“It is no exaggeration to say that between 1990 and his death in 2003, Dr Kelly probably did more to make the world a more secure place than anyone on the planet. Even among the elite group of international weapons inspectors, he was regarded with some awe, as the inspectors' inspector.”
- Norman Baker, The Strange Death of David Kelly. London: Methuen 2007 p. 358

Poems for Lord Hutton,  Ed Todd Swift Nthposition 2003 p.8

In the early 20th century, the emerging branch of military history picked up on the possible role of Mongol artillery in the Black Death #pandemic . As de Mussi was the only source for such a claim, authors established the plausibility of the allegation by focussing on three areas, namely the availability of the military technology capable of launching cadavers over city walls, the commonality of catapulting cadavers in medieval siege #warfare, and the geography surrounding Caffa that precluded the natural introduction of the plague into the city by rats.

Although those researchers initially assumed de Mussi’s presence in the Crimean trading post, later they determined that his location did not materially affect their focus of interest, namely the claim of early biological warfare. However, establishing the plausibility of certain circumstances that might have enabled a certain event to take place still does not prove that the event happened.

The second issue of Historical Notes looks deeper into the claim that the catapulting of human or animal corpses was a fairly common practice in medieval warfare aiming to provoke disease outbreaks in besieged castles or cities. European, Muslim and Asian literary sources mention the use of body parts and cadavers as artillery projectiles without suggesting that it ever became conventionalised as a method of combat. Passages may point to a singular incident or describe a small barrage. Overall, the sparsity of references suggests a rare practice.

The opportunity to project body parts or whole cadavers depended on then available weapon technology. Two types of trebuchet are central to the present discussion, namely the mangonel or traction trebuchet using rope pullers, and the counterweight trebuchet relying on gravity for dropping the counterpoise.

All descriptions of hurtling body parts before the 14th century concern heads of decapitated individuals. This is essentially an expected situation because of the limited throw weight of mangonels. With one exception, no narrative suggesting the projecting of complete corpses precedes the start of the Hundred Years’ War in 1337. By then, counterweight trebuchets were attaining their maximal destructive power.

'aka Roodeplaat Research Laboratories' is part of a broader research project into Project Coast, the top secret apartheid-era chemical and biological weapons programme.

This work presents photographs taken during a 2014 site visit to the Agricultural Research Council's offices at Roodeplaat in Gauteng. This facility used to be known as Roodeplaat Research Laboratories (RRL) until 1993. RRL was one of a plethora of front companies of the South African Defence Force, and one of two principle laboratory complexes (the other was Delta G scientific) associated with Coast.

The secrecy surrounding Project Coast was such that information about the project only came to light during the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, when some of the scientists associated with the project submitted amnesty
applications. Its impetus was ‘effective crowd control’ after the 1976 Soweto uprising, and concerns that Soviet and Cuban troops in Angola might use chemical weapons against South
African soldiers in the Border War.

Project Coast's chief officer was doctor-soldier Wouter Basson who, although he has recently been found guilty of ethical misconduct by the Health Professions Council of South Africa, has managed to elude all other forms of criminal prosecution, despite significant evidence that he was the mastermind of one of the most complex cases of fraud and misconduct South
Africa's courts have yet seen.

RRL's once state-of-the-art facilities have since been sold back to the South African government. The laboratories where scientists now work to safeguard our food supply through
crop research are the same spaces where Basson's team manufactured vast quantities of teargas, Mandrax and Ecstasy, and where animal experimentation was undertaken to develop a contraceptive targeted exclusively at black women, and a poison undetectable postmortem, amongst other products such as beer laced with thallium (available in bottles or cans), cyanide and arsenic-laced peppermint chocolate, and sugar spiked with salmonella.

As it has been almost impossible to conclusively link victims to these activities - the poisoning of Reverend Frank Chikane is a possible exception - and the reluctance of those commanding the project to discuss their activities, our understanding of Project Coast remains largely unresolved. Needless to say, Project Coast raises key questions around science's complicity in apartheid-era human rights abuses, about which the scientific community has been conspicuously silent.

A recent article by Gould, Harris, Rappert and Smith (2014) notes, "In remembering Project Coast, and what motivated it, we hope to remind ourselves of how easy it can be to justify programmes like this when a government comes under pressure."

Basson currently practices as a highly regarded cardiologist in Durbanville. His HPCSA sentencing hearing is ongoing.

States have constructed an ill-considered and potentially dangerous biological weapons (BW) taboo that rebukes the fundamental logic of arms control. Historically, to prevent war, minimize the costs and risks of arms competition, and curtail the scope and violence of war, states embraced an arms control regime that limited both the acquisition and use of BW. However, efforts to limit BW capabilities have stalled even as prohibitions on their use have been maintained and strengthened. The new regime effectively allows states to retain suspicious capabilities that will be viewed as very threatening by their peers. This approach is particularly troublesome as many states now embrace counterproliferation strategy and the prospect of preventive war. The Obama administration seems to have preserved perilous elements of the so-called “Bush Doctrine.” The international community should redouble efforts to build a more effective and verifiable biological weapons nonproliferation regime to augment the existing taboo against use.

Anthrax is a zoonotic disease that affects mainly large domesticated animals and caused by the bacterium Bacillus anthracis. Man acquires the disease accidentally through contact with infected animals or their products, often by the cutaneous route and only rarely by the respiratory or gastrointestinal routes. B. anthracis is on the top of the list of agents used in biological weapons programs in many countries. Recent events that occurred in mid-September last year in United States involving the intentional distribution of B. anthracis spores through postal system has resulted in a worldwide interest in anthrax. This article was intended to give a fair idea on the causative agent and its epidemiology, determinants of pathogenicity, clinical manifestations, clinical and laboratory diagnosis, treatment, and prevention and control of the disease.

Războiul biologic nu este o invenție a epocii moderne. El a fost practicat încă din Antichitate, când hitiții au trimis bolnavi de ciumă în taberele egiptene pentru a-şi decima dușmanii înainte de luptă. Diferenţa dintre epoci este făcută doar de tehnologia actuală, capabilă să multiplice, să selecteze, să diversifice şi să hibridizeze vectorii războiului biologic. Astfel, în prezent, o bacterie, crescută într-o cămară transformată în laborator, poate fi mai letală decât orice armă chimică. Întrucât, în epoca modernă a accesului public la informații, limita între pandemia spontană, naturală şi atacul biologic urmat de izbucnirea unei pandemii este tot mai îngustă, vectorii unei pandemii naturale pot oricând deveni, în ochii opiniei publice, vectorii unui atac biologic. Dar şi invers, până la descoperirea "pacientului zero"-la nivelul căruia s-au produs mutațiile genomice naturale-, orice armă biologică poate fi considerată "mutație naturală" responsabilă de declanșarea unei pandemii cu efecte devastatoare. Prin urmare, care sunt caracteristicile unei arme biologice? Care sunt principalele categorii de arme biologice? Care sunt principalii vectori pandemici? Cuvinte-cheie: pandemie, război biologic, vectori pandemici, fitoagenți, Covid-19. * A absolvit Universitatea de Medicină şi Farmacie "Carol Davila" din Bucureşti, deţine un master în sănătate publică şi a lucrat mai mulți ani în Africa, unde s-a dedicat combaterii epidemiilor de HIV, TBC şi malarie.

We present results obtained by a detection system designed to measure laser-induced fluorescence from individual aerosol particles using dual excitation wavelengths. The aerosol is sampled from ambient air and via a 1 mm diameter nozzle, surrounded by a sheath air flow, confined into a particle beam. A continuous wave blue laser at 404 nm is focused on the aerosol beam and two photomultiplier tubes monitor the presence of individual particles by simultaneous measuring the scattered light and any induced fluorescence. When a particle is present in the detection volume, a laser pulse is triggered from an ultraviolet laser at 263 nm and the corresponding fluorescence spectrum is acquired with a spectrometer based on a diffraction grating and a 32 channel photomultiplier tube array with single-photon sensitivity. The spectrometer measures the fluorescence spectra in the wavelength region from 250 to 800 nm. In the present report, data were measured on different monodisperse reference aerosols, simulants of biological warfare agents, and different interference aerosol particles, e.g. pollen. In the analysis of the experimental data, i.e., the time-resolved scattered and fluorescence signals from 404 nm c.w. light excitation and the fluorescence spectra obtained by a pulsed 263 nm laser source, we use multivariate data analysis methods to classify each individual aerosol particle. Downloaded From: http://proceedings.spiedigitallibrary.org/ on 05/26/2015 Terms of Use: http://spiedl.org/terms Proc. of SPIE Vol. 9455 945509-9 Downloaded From: http://proceedings.spiedigitallibrary.org/ on 05/26/2015 Terms of Use: http://spiedl.org/terms View publication stats View publication stats

This article seeks to develop alternative ways to conceptually grasp international prohibition/regulatory regimes. It attempts to go beyond existing, and piecemeal, analysis of regimes within the intellectual field of IR based on conventional grand/mid-range theorization. It is argued that traditional theorization of regimes fashioned as IR theory has hindered, rather than helped, to understand regimes in their complexities, vagaries, and in terms of various forces simultaneously involved. The article answers a question of how to strike a balance between theoretical eclecticism, which is believed to be vital for a comprehensive analysis of security regimes, and the need to have a uniting device to organize such research. It is for these reasons that a power-analytical approach utilizing four types of powers-productive, structural, institutional, and compulsory-is used, and its advantages for regime analysis are flagged. The value added of such an advancement lies in international security regimes being understood more plastically than through conventional lenses. Specifically, they are approached as intertwined sets of normative discourses, political structures (anarchies, hierarchies, and heterarchies), and agencies through which power operates within a given security issue area with a regulatory effect. Specific renderings of discourses and heterarchies establish channels through which sociopolitical and economic privileges get distributed; they create structural relations among actors with a possibility of their reversal or rearticulation; and they build up, challenge, and relocate walls of legal obligations.

Вековима уназад биолошки агенси су коришћени за ратовање, терористичке или криминалне активности. Може се рећи да је изгледало да ће потписивање Конвенције о биолошком оружју допринети да ono постане само непријатна успомена на времена када се употребљавало. Међутим, биотероризам је постао реалност савременог света због својих карактеристика и последица које узрокује. При томе, експанзија високе технологије с једне и способност биолошког оружја да изазове ,,масовно уништавање“ или ,,масовне жртве“ с друге стране, помера фокус јавности и стручњака са питања ,,да ли ће се“ на питање ,,када ће се догодити терористички напад биолошким оружјем“.
Управо стога у раду је дат осврт на појам, класификацију и историјат употребе биолошког оружја. Такође је дат и генерални преглед могућности његове употребе у терористичке сврхе и заштите од биолошког оружја.

The controversy surrounding recent uses of white phosphorus (WP) to ‘flush-out’ suspected insurgents or in attacks against military targets in open ground has led to a renewed media interest in the legal status of WP-based munitions. An inherent public dislike for weapons that cause death or injury by fire is very natural, so one is entitled to ask whether humanity should not prevail when it comes to anti-personnel uses of such weapons. In the absence of a specific treaty dealing with the use of WP, this article, written jointly by a retired military lawyer and a scientist interested in the law, examines the use of such weapons in practice as well as the relevant legal and scientific background before attempting to reach conclusions about their legality. This involves a consideration of the reasons for the development of WP-based munitions, of their usual military uses and of some unconventional uses of such weapons. There follows an examination of the basic principles of customary international law as well as the treaty provisions dealing with incendiary weapons. Furthermore, because of the various harmful physiological interactions of WP, it was necessary to look closely at the legal provisions on poison, gas and chemical weapons. That demanded an interpretation of multiple aspects of the Chemical Weapons Convention before the legal status of WP could be fully determined. The convention is constructed in such a way that what at first sight appears to be a chemical weapon may not be as a matter of law unless it is consciously applied in a prohibited manner.

Broń biologiczna to broń wykorzystująca bojowe środki biologiczne, do których zaliczamy patogenne bakterie, wirusy (drobnoustroje niezdolne do samodzielnej replikacji – wymagają żywiciela), grzyby i inne organizmy żywe (np. riketsje – bakterie, które do rozmnażania wymagają organizmu gospodarza), toksyny ekstrahowane z materiału biologicznego oraz środki przenoszenia.
The aim of the article is to present biological weapons in the context of its military usefulness. The author characterizes the notion  of “biological weapon” and presents some weaponized biological agents. Then, the concise historical review of practical application of biological weapon is carried out. The possibility to use biological weapons in armed conflicts, both on classical battlefield and in terrorist attacks, is also taken into consideration, as well as the problems related to the development of such weapons.

Terahertz wavelengths can pass through dry, non-polar, non-metallic materials that are opaque at visible wavelengths. Moreover they can be manipulated using millimeter wave and quasi-optical techniques to form an image. Sensing in this band potentially provides advantages in a number of areas of interest for security and defense, such as screening of personnel for hidden objects, and the detection of chemical and biological agents. This paper reviews recent research into THz applications by groups across Europe, the US, Australasia, and the UK. Several private companies are developing smaller and cheaper reliable devices allowing for commercialisation of these applications. While there are a number of challenges to be overcome there is little doubt that THz technologies will play a major role in the near future for advancement of security, public health and defense.

In this conference presentation that was delivered during my absence in a panel of the 15th annual conference of the European Society of Criminology on September 3rd 2015, I underline the importance of reseaching WMD and delivery systems. I draw on my North Korean research to argue wherefore also nuclear and ballistic missile proliferation has to become subject of criminoligical research.

Commercial off-the-shelf unmanned aerial vehicles are becoming a powerful force-multiplier in asymmetric conflicts. These platforms have been readily adopted by both state and non-state actors for a variety of military tasks including intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition, reconnaissance, and increasingly for direct strike missions. This chapter provides an overview of the evolution of these platforms, and discusses their use for the deployment of conventional munitions as well as chemical, biological, and radiological payloads. The chapter highlights factors that determine the effectiveness of such non-conventional attacks, including agent properties, target characteristics, and methods of delivery. It then describes factors that constrain the acquisition of CBR agents by non-state actors, as well as other barriers to a successful CBR attack using COTS small UAVs. Whilst these platforms have significant advantages over traditional ground-based CBR delivery vectors such as precision, access to targets, difficulty of interception, optimised dispersion, reduced risk of detention, anonymity, and a demonstration of ‘modern’ capabilities, their utility is limited by, amongst other factors, UAV characteristics such as payload size, range, and flight time. Governments, nevertheless, are adopting regulatory and technical control measures to manage security risks associated with the proliferation of these delivery vehicles. Manufacturers are also responding to real and perceived risk, integrating restrictions such as ‘geofencing’ and IFF systems into their products. At the same time, non-state actors have begun implementing steps to circumvent such countermeasures. On balance, although the threat of a CBR terror event using COTS UAVs remains lower than that of other attack modes, ongoing assessments of the feasibility of such attacks and of appropriate defences must remain part of the counter-terror dialogue.

Please note that errors were made in the layout of Table 2, transposing some data whilst omitting others.

WMD-related arms control and disarmament measures are a form of global public good. In addition to providing key national security benefits to participating States, adherence to such agreements can also deliver several other secondary benefits. Moreover, such treaties largely work, with significant cases of outright treaty violations a rare occurrence. Nonetheless, when violations do occur, they can have a deeply corrosive effect on a treaty regime and the wider security environment, including the integrity of WMD-related arms control and disarmament measures as a whole.
• Reaching judgements on allegations of non-compliance with the objectives and purposes of WMD-related agreements is contingent upon several different factors, including the gravity of the alleged case of non-compliance; the source and credibility of the allegation; the investigative processes, tools and resources of the regime; and the wider political context.
• Where mandated, international treaty organizations can play an important role in addressing allegations of non-compliance. However, sufficient perceived impartiality and integrity on the part of these organizations is required in order for them to be able to play that role effectively. Agreed procedures to facilitate the resolution of compliance concerns are particularly important. WMD-related treaty regimes often have some flexibility to address non-compliance within agreed parameters. Innovation is sometimes required to address novel challenges; however, innovative or ad hoc approaches are more vulnerable to criticism, particularly in times of political tension.
• WMD-related agreements provide States Parties with a range of tools to address concerns over compliance. Some of these tools are underused. For example, when political support is forthcoming, consultative mechanisms can build factual common ground on issues of non-compliance, resolve minor technical issues, and develop technical solutions to address more serious disputes. There are also advances in science and technology that, if validated, would augment existing verification arrangements.

The dual-use dilemma arises in the context of research in the biological and other sciences as a consequence of the fact that one and the same piece of scientific research sometimes has the potential to be used for bad as well as good purposes. It is an ethical dilemma since it is about promoting good in the context of the potential for also causing harm, e.g., the promotion of health in the context of providing the wherewithal for the killing of innocents. It is an ethical dilemma for the researcher because of the potential actions of others, e.g., malevolent nonresearchers who might steal dangerous biological agents, or make use of the original researcher's work. And it is a dilemma for governments concerned with the security of their citizens, as well as their health. In this article we construct a taxonomy of types of ''experiments of concern'' in the biological sciences, and thereby map the terrain of ethical risk. We then provide a series of analyses of the ethical problems and considerations at issue in the dual-use dilemma, including the impermissibility of certain kinds of research and possible restrictions on dissemination of research results given the risks to health and security. Finally, we explore the main available

The reduction or the complete elimination of specific types of weapons, particularly the elimination of all weapons of mass destruction, is one of the most important challenges that the international community should face in the 21th century. In this paper, a group of proposals on the possible roles to be played by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organisation
(CTBTO) and the Conference on Disarmament (CD) is included.