Journal Articles by Carsten Rauch
Given the current redistributions in the global balance of power, power transition theory (PTT) h... more Given the current redistributions in the global balance of power, power transition theory (PTT) has once again become an important intellectual factor. Many observers employing PTT are anxious about China’s ascendance and expect serious conflicts between Washington and Beijing in the coming years. Such skepticism, however, is problematic for three reasons. First, it is false theoretically; PTT does not claim that all rising powers will resort to war or that all power
transitions will result in war. Second, it is false empirically; not all power transitions in history have resulted in Great Power wars. Third, it leads to flawed policy advice; if rising powers are not always dissatisfied and do not always challenge the status quo, then policies meant to oppose
them might breed dangerous dissatisfaction in the first place.
This article amends PTT by adding a variable, the “will to power” (WTP), that captures the willingness of rising powers to commit themselves to changing the status quo. Furthermore, it scrutinizes two historical power transition constellations (United Kingdom–United States and United Kingdom–Imperial Germany). In both cases the new variable is consistent with the outcome and particularly in the United Kingdom–United States case the WTP variable broadens our understanding by making it possible to see this relationship as “missed” or “eschewed” instead of as a peaceful power transition. Doing so extends the power transition dichotomy to a much more complex and realistic typology of power transition constellations.
Power shifts and especially power transitions in the international system are often associated wi... more Power shifts and especially power transitions in the international system are often associated with (military) confl ict. Power Transition Theory (PTT) does offer an
analysis of this phenomenon but no remedy. We suggest easing the tensions related to ongoing worldwide power shifts by introducing a new informal multilateral security
governance institution, based on the idea of a concert of powers. The historical European Concert of the 19th century prevented the outbreak of great power wars for more than a generation by providing a cooperation framework, based on shared norms and common
procedures. In this article we explore the possibility of utilizing a modernized concert of powers as a framework for managing the coming power shifts. In order to do so, we introduce two new elements in Power Transition Theory: (1) the importance of the (dis)satisfaction of the declining hegemon with the anticipated future order, and (2) a broader multilateral framework of major powers that overcomes the Power Transition Theory’s traditional bilateral “duel” situation. On this basis, institutionalized power transition management becomes possible. We then work out the norms, strengths and weaknesses
of the historical concert and update it with a few new features that would be necessary for it to be successful in the 21st century.
Dieses Einleitung skapitel präsentiert zunächst einen verbesserten Analyserahmen für die Untersuc... more Dieses Einleitung skapitel präsentiert zunächst einen verbesserten Analyserahmen für die Untersuchung von Revisionismus in der internationalen Politik. Darauf aufbauend entwickeln die Autoren das Puzzle dieses Sonderhefts das Problem der Unzufriedenheit und des Revisionismus im Allgemeinen und die Frage, weshalb gerade erfolgreiche Aufsteiger eine etablierte Herrschaftsordnung offen herausfordern sollten im Speziellen. Den Abschluss bildet ein Überblick
über die nachfolgenden Fallstudien, die sich mit der Klärung dieser Fragestellung befassen.
This introductory contribution first explicates an improved analytical
framework for studying revisionism in international politics. Building on that, it develops the puzzle underlying this special issue – the problem of dissatisfied great powers and the question why rising powers should want to challenge an established internation al order that facilitated their extraordinary growth. The article concludes with an overview of the four historical case studies which address our research question.
Im vorliegenden Beitrag werden zunächst (Macht-)Position
und Revisionismusausprägung der Weimarer... more Im vorliegenden Beitrag werden zunächst (Macht-)Position
und Revisionismusausprägung der Weimarer Republik herausgearbeitet. Dabei wird deutlich, dass oppositionelle und dissidente Politik nicht erst im Dritten Reich sondern bereits in der Weimarer Republik verbreitet waren, aber in Grad, Tiefe und Breite variierten. Schließlich wird analysiert, inwieweit das Vorhandensein und die jeweilige Ausprägung von lateralem Druck (eher schwächer) und Statusansprüchen
(eher stärker) mit dem jeweiligen Vo rkommen von Revisionismus in der deutschen Politik korrespondieren.
The article first traces the power position and the degree of revisionism
of the Weimar Republic. It shows that oppositional and dissident politics did not emerge with the beginning of the Third Reich but were already prevalent during the Weimar Republic, where they varied, however, in terms of degree, breadth and depth. The article analyses to what extent the occur rence and manifestation of lateral pressure (rather weak) and status claims and grievances (rather high) correspond with the respective form of German revisionism.
The American Civil War is one of the favoured examples of scholars aiming to show the spuriousnes... more The American Civil War is one of the favoured examples of scholars aiming to show the spuriousness of the claim that democracies do not fight each other. While proponents of democratic peace theory (DPT) point to the fact that the theory in its mainstream version does not cover intrastate wars and also question whether the slave-holding Confederate States of America can be classified as a democracy, this article takes a different approach. Using insights from the perceptional interpretation of DPT and interpreting discourses and speeches from the North as well as the South, I will show that a closer look at the case reveals it is very much in line with DPT and underlines rather than undermines the logic of the democratic peace.
Power shifts and especially power transitions in the international system are often associated wi... more Power shifts and especially power transitions in the international system are often associated with (military) conflict. Power transition theory (PTT) does offer an analysis of this phenomenon but no remedy. We suggest easing the tensions related to the ongoing worldwide power shifts by introducing a new informal multilateral security governance institution, based on the idea of a concert of powers. The historical European Concert of the 19th Century prevented the outbreak of great power wars for more than a generation by providing a cooperation framework, based on shared norms and common procedures. In this article we explore the possibility of utilizing a modernized concert of powers as a framework for managing the coming power shifts. In order to do so, we introduce two new elements in Power Transition Theory: (1) the importance of the (dis-)satisfaction of the declining hegemon with the anticipated future order, and (2) a broader multilateral framework of major powers that overcomes PTT's traditional bilateral ‘duel’ situation. On this basis, institutionalized power transition management becomes possible. We then work out norms, strengths and weaknesses of the historical concert and update it with a few new features that would be necessary for it to be successful in the 21st Century.
Keywords: Power transition, power shift, concert of powers, multilateralism, world order, international order, international institutions
The nuclear age has been characterized by an emerging and now well-established norm of nuclear no... more The nuclear age has been characterized by an emerging and now well-established norm of nuclear non-use, the ‘nuclear taboo’. In the realistic and naturalistic setting of the science-fiction TV series Battlestar Galactica, however, nuclear weapons are used frequently and at times massively. Claiming that science fiction can function as an illuminating ‘mirror’ for international relations scholarship and that we can learn something from ‘second-order’ (fictional) worlds, this article explores potential in-show reasons that render the absence of a nuclear taboo plausible within the universe of Battlestar Galactica. We turn to the central pillars of the nuclear taboo in the real world and find them reversed in the show: nuclear weapons are (depicted as) ‘clean’, international institutions are absent, and the enemy is socially constructed as a ‘radical other’, thus rendering the possibility, if not likelihood, of nuclear war plausible. With these insights, we return to our world and argue that, particularly during the years of the George W Bush presidency, the erosion tendencies of the nuclear taboo were indeed quite serious: technological progress and growing political inclination expedited plans to develop usable nuclear weapons, arms control regimes came under considerable strain, and opponents were portrayed as ‘unjust enemies’ or ‘rogues’.
At a time in which enormous shifts in power are taking place worldwide power transition theory (P... more At a time in which enormous shifts in power are taking place worldwide power transition theory (PTT) once again rises into prominence and scholars increasingly use PTT as a template to analyze future US–China relations. From this vantage point the questions when the People's Republic will reach parity with the United States and whether China is satisfied with the international order are of paramount importance. In this article I argue, however, that PTT is in need of adjustments regarding both aspects and namely that it is necessary: a) to discard the notion of satisfaction as a dichotomous variable and b) to correct PTT's tendency to approach complex power relations as if they were simple bilateral stand-offs. I illustrate my arguments utilizing the empirical case of Weimarian Germany. For PTT Germany offers a crucial case. Three wars initiated by Germany/Prussia (the War of 1870/71, World War I and World War II) are among the chief vindications of PTTs central insight, that power transitions are prone to great power wars. In all three instances, Germany/Prussia was not only a rising power but also dissatisfied with the prevalent international order just as PTT expects. However, there are two further periods in which Germany reached parity with the dominant power in the 1920s. Peace prevailed according to the PTT account because Germany was satisfied with the status quo of the international order at the time. In this article I thoroughly analyze the European power constellations and the German (dissatisfaction n with the international order throughout the different periods of the Weimar Republic. My results show that Weimarian Germany is in fact at odds with standard PTT, as it was not clearly satisfied; but in line with my adjusted version of PTT, as the German dissatisfaction varied throughout the investigation period while Germany was always less powerful than the defenders of the status quo combined. This finding has important ramifications for the current global power shifts and a possible future power transition involving the U.S. and China.
Power Transitions in the international system are often associated with military conflict, most ... more Power Transitions in the international system are often associated with military conflict, most prominently by power transition theory (PTT). We amend PTT in two important ways: by adding dissatisfaction of the declining hegemon with the anticipated future order, and by transcending the bilateral "duel" situation by embedding the two rivals into a broader multilateral framework of major powers. On this basis, we propose the Concert of Europe as historical template for power transition management. This institution of the 19th Century prevented the outbreak of great power wars for more than a generation by providing a cooperation framework, based on shared norms and common procedures. We explore the possibility of utilizing a modernized concert of powers as a framework for managing the power transition that probably lies ahead of us.
This article argues that the spectrum of power transitions or better power transition constellati... more This article argues that the spectrum of power transitions or better power transition constellations is even broader than this and goes beyond just war and peace. Consequently, the article amends PTT by adding a variable that captures the willingness of rising powers to commit themselves to change the status quo. (This is not the same as mere dissatisfaction, and both might not be congruent.) Such an addition increases the potential types of power transitions from two (peaceful power transition and power transition war) to four. In addition, the article maintains that it is necessary to discuss the peculiar role of the dominant power within the PTT framework.
Compte tenu de la montée fulgurante de la Chine, l’émergence d’autres puissances importantes et l... more Compte tenu de la montée fulgurante de la Chine, l’émergence d’autres puissances importantes et les grandes redistributions dans l’équilibre mondial du pouvoir, le professeur Carsten Rauch argumente dans son article que la théorie de la transition de pouvoir (TTP) est redevenue un facteur intellectuel important. Bien que soulignant les dangers inhérents à la transition du pouvoir, la TTP reconnaît qu’elles pourraient aboutir à la paix aussi bien qu’à la guerre. La gamme de ces transitions, ou les meilleures situations de ces transitions, est encore plus large. L’auteur estime que la TTP devrait être modifiée par une variable qui saisit la volonté des puissances montantes de s’engager à changer le statu quo. En outre, il est nécessaire non seulement de se concentrer sur le(s) pouvoir(s) en croissance mais aussi de tenir compte de la puissance dominante. Cela prolonge la transition dichotomique du pouvoir pacifique / non pacifiques à une typologie de transition du pouvoir plus complexe et réaliste qui devrait être employée lorsque l’on évalue les perspectives des changements du pouvoir actuel.
"The aim of this paper is to establish a political framework to mitigate the crisis propensity of... more "The aim of this paper is to establish a political framework to mitigate the crisis propensity of power transitions in the international system. One approach that focuses on this phenomenon is Power Transition Theory, which warns that situations in which rising powers approach a (declining) hegemon often escalate into conflict or war. Specifically unsatisfied rising powers are expected to come into conflict with the dominant power and each other. Power Transition Theory, however, has only a limited view on the structure of the international order. It
overlooks the possibility of ruling the system by consensus rather than by coercion, highlighted by Liberal Hegemony Theory. Merging Power Transition Theory with liberal Hegemony Theory can reveal previously hidden opportunities to manage peaceful power transitions. In the light of the prolonged economic growth of countries like China and India this finding might prove to be crucial for the thinking of future world-order-governance politics."
Papers by Carsten Rauch
PRIF Working Papers, No. 28, 2016
For power transition theory (PTT) Germany offers a crucial case. Three wars initiated by Germa-ny... more For power transition theory (PTT) Germany offers a crucial case. Three wars initiated by Germa-ny/Prussia (the War of 1870/71, World War I and World War II) are among the chief vindications of PTTs central insight, that power transitions are prone to great power wars. In all three instances, Germany/Prussia was not only a rising power but also dissatisfied with the prevalent international order just as PTT expects. However, between 1870 and 1939 there are two further periods in which Germany reached parity with the dominant power in the 1920s. Peace prevailed according to PTT because Germany was satisfied with the status quo of the international order at the time. In this working paper, I will inquire into the Weimar Republics satisfaction status and show that PTT's standard argument claiming that Germany was satisfied is problematic. I argue that to bring the Weimar case in line with PTT it is necessary to adjust PTT in two ways: a) to discard the notion of satisfaction as a dichotomous variable and b) to correct PTT's tendency to approach complex power relations as if they were simple bilateral stand-offs. This finding has important ramifications for the interpretations of the current global power shifts and a possible future power transition.
HSFK Report 4/2015, 2015
At the beginning of the 21st century several publications described India as an emerging power on... more At the beginning of the 21st century several publications described India as an emerging power on its way to a true world power. Where does India stand on world stage today and what happened to its great power ambitions? Carsten Rauch analyses the Indian quest for great power status and addresses the question, whether an Indian world power will become reality in future, or whether it is a mere mirage.
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Welche Rolle spielt Indien in der Weltpolitik und wie wird sich die bevölkerungsreichste Demokratie weiterentwickeln?
Im vorliegenden Report untersucht Carsten Rauch die weltpolitische Position und den machtpolitischen Aufstieg Indiens. Er skizziert dazu die indische Selbstwahrnehmung sowie die Wahrnehmung durch Andere, vergleicht Indien anhand verschiedener Machtindikatoren mit anderen Großmächten, zeigt auf Basis des bisher zurückgelegten Weges Szenarien für die Zukunft und benennt interne und externe Hürden für den weiteren indischen Aufstieg. Nach einer theoretischen Einordnung dieser Ergebnisse entwickelt der Report Empfehlungen für die deutsche und europäische Politik im Umgang mit Indien.
The global distribution of power is changing. The consequences of this change are instabilities a... more The global distribution of power is changing. The consequences of this change are instabilities and uncertainties in world politics. The current constellation concerning the situation in the Ukraine serves as testimony that great power conflicts are – despite wishful thinking to the contrary – not yet only a thing of the distant past. How can the international society, how can the great powers, their differences and disagreements notwithstanding, prevent the escalation of conflicts and the outbreak of war? More generally, how can they work towards peaceful and constructive solutions for international security governance? A 21st Century Concert of Powers, a new great power based multilateral security institution, could be the timely answer. Based on the norms and practices of the 19th Century "European Concert" but avoiding its shortcomings, a 21st Century Concert, as imagined here, would work largely informally and constitute an effective forum for confidence building, consultation and common preparation of decisions. Given the already tightly institutionalized international order, it would not supersede but complement existing institutions, such as the United Nations.
This Policy Paper is the product of a multi-year research project "The Post-Transatlantic Age: A Twenty-First Century Concert of Powers". The project has been conducted by more than 20 researchers from seven different countries. It is funded by the “Europe and Global Challenges” programme, launched by the European foundations Compagnia di San Paolo in Turin, Italy, Riksbankens Jubileumsfond in Stockholm, Sweden, and VolkswagenStiftung in Hanover, Germany.
PRIF Report No. 85, 2008
India keeps growing – economic power, nuclear power, military power and presumably in the middl... more India keeps growing – economic power, nuclear power, military power and presumably in the middle of the millennium the country with the largest population in the world. There is no doubt: India is on its way to become a future world power. Through this it gets increasingly interesting as a political ally. But where is India positioned as a declared Non-Aligned Nation? And even more important: Where will it look for allies in the future?
Since its independence in 1947 India has declared its support for the principles of non-alignment that India’s first prime minister Nehru developed. Neutrality, non-interference, peaceful coexistence and the renunciation of any kind of aggressive action were to become principles in foreign policy.
Since the end of the Cold War it seems, however, that this concept of Non-Alignment is slowly being pushed into the background, making way for a complete reorientation. Is this the result of a radical rift?
Carsten Rauch has been investigating Indian foreign policy since the independence regarding the adherence to the principles of Non –Alignment, and demonstrates that from the beginning deviations from this ideal occurred consistently. Even Nehru always considered it the main goal to keep India’s independence and to increase its sphere of influence.
The author shows that India will gain more and more importance in setting up the world order and recommends Europe and Germany to quickly intensify its relations with India, because India, as a global player, will, with newly acquired self-assurance, keep all options open and will not necessarily consider Europe the best of all possible allies.
HSFK-Standpunkte, May 2008
Der empörte Aufschrei der Rüstungskontrollbefürworter war unüberhörbar: Wieder einmal eine auße... more Der empörte Aufschrei der Rüstungskontrollbefürworter war unüberhörbar: Wieder einmal eine außenpolitische Fehlentscheidung der amerikanischen Bush-Regierung – und dieses Mal mit dramatischen Folgen für die globale Rüstungskontrolle und Abrüstung.
Was ist passiert? Die USA haben mit Indien, das dem Atomwaffensperrvertrag (NVV) bis heute nicht beigetreten ist, ein Nuklearabkommen geschlossen. Dieser „Atom-Deal“ wird es Indien zukünftig erlauben, Technologien und Material für sein ziviles Nuklearprogramm zu importieren. Im Gegenzug unterstellt es den zivilen Teil (nur diesen!) seines Nuklearkomplexes internationaler Aufsicht.
Damit kann Indien eigene Ressourcen in sein Nuklearwaffenprogramm fließen lassen, ohne dass die entsprechenden Anlagen kontrolliert werden. Bisher waren Nukleargeschäfte mit Ländern, die nicht dem NVV angehören, verboten.
Indien erhält so scheinbar eine attraktive Sonderregelung, die wenig Verpflichtungen, dafür aber interessante Perspektiven bietet. Die Liste der möglichen Folgen ist lang: Neues Wettrüsten in Südasien, Entwertung des NVV, Behinderung der globalen Abrüstung, „Bestrafung“ vertragstreuer Staaten usw. Carsten Rauch distanziert sich von dieser apodiktischen Verurteilung und versucht eine Bewertung aus einer anderen Perspektive: Was wäre gewesen, wenn der Deal nicht zustande gekommen wäre? Hätte das womöglich auch negative Auswirkungen gehabt? Sind die negativen Folgen wirklich zwangsläufig? Er wagt einen pragmatischen Blick und kommt zu überraschenden Ergebnissen.
PRIF Working Papers, No.07, 2010
The 2008 U.S.-India nuclear deal has been widely discussed in nonproliferation circles in rec... more The 2008 U.S.-India nuclear deal has been widely discussed in nonproliferation circles in recent years. However, the proponents as well as the opponents in this debate have – with a few notable exceptions – failed to address or at least take into account three very important issues:
First, the fact that the India of today is not the India of 1974 but rather an emerging world power. Second, the possible alternatives to the deal beside a mere continuation of the status quo (India’s nuclear isolation). And third, the fact that the alternatives providing more benefits for arms-control were unlikely, given the domestic political discussion in India. In his Working Paper Carsten Rauch addresses all three points. Furthermore, he presents benefits that will take effect only in the long run (rather than gains that take effect in the short run, envisioned by most proponents of the deal) that the deal offers for the stability of the global nonproliferation regime.
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Journal Articles by Carsten Rauch
transitions will result in war. Second, it is false empirically; not all power transitions in history have resulted in Great Power wars. Third, it leads to flawed policy advice; if rising powers are not always dissatisfied and do not always challenge the status quo, then policies meant to oppose
them might breed dangerous dissatisfaction in the first place.
This article amends PTT by adding a variable, the “will to power” (WTP), that captures the willingness of rising powers to commit themselves to changing the status quo. Furthermore, it scrutinizes two historical power transition constellations (United Kingdom–United States and United Kingdom–Imperial Germany). In both cases the new variable is consistent with the outcome and particularly in the United Kingdom–United States case the WTP variable broadens our understanding by making it possible to see this relationship as “missed” or “eschewed” instead of as a peaceful power transition. Doing so extends the power transition dichotomy to a much more complex and realistic typology of power transition constellations.
analysis of this phenomenon but no remedy. We suggest easing the tensions related to ongoing worldwide power shifts by introducing a new informal multilateral security
governance institution, based on the idea of a concert of powers. The historical European Concert of the 19th century prevented the outbreak of great power wars for more than a generation by providing a cooperation framework, based on shared norms and common
procedures. In this article we explore the possibility of utilizing a modernized concert of powers as a framework for managing the coming power shifts. In order to do so, we introduce two new elements in Power Transition Theory: (1) the importance of the (dis)satisfaction of the declining hegemon with the anticipated future order, and (2) a broader multilateral framework of major powers that overcomes the Power Transition Theory’s traditional bilateral “duel” situation. On this basis, institutionalized power transition management becomes possible. We then work out the norms, strengths and weaknesses
of the historical concert and update it with a few new features that would be necessary for it to be successful in the 21st century.
über die nachfolgenden Fallstudien, die sich mit der Klärung dieser Fragestellung befassen.
This introductory contribution first explicates an improved analytical
framework for studying revisionism in international politics. Building on that, it develops the puzzle underlying this special issue – the problem of dissatisfied great powers and the question why rising powers should want to challenge an established internation al order that facilitated their extraordinary growth. The article concludes with an overview of the four historical case studies which address our research question.
und Revisionismusausprägung der Weimarer Republik herausgearbeitet. Dabei wird deutlich, dass oppositionelle und dissidente Politik nicht erst im Dritten Reich sondern bereits in der Weimarer Republik verbreitet waren, aber in Grad, Tiefe und Breite variierten. Schließlich wird analysiert, inwieweit das Vorhandensein und die jeweilige Ausprägung von lateralem Druck (eher schwächer) und Statusansprüchen
(eher stärker) mit dem jeweiligen Vo rkommen von Revisionismus in der deutschen Politik korrespondieren.
The article first traces the power position and the degree of revisionism
of the Weimar Republic. It shows that oppositional and dissident politics did not emerge with the beginning of the Third Reich but were already prevalent during the Weimar Republic, where they varied, however, in terms of degree, breadth and depth. The article analyses to what extent the occur rence and manifestation of lateral pressure (rather weak) and status claims and grievances (rather high) correspond with the respective form of German revisionism.
Keywords: Power transition, power shift, concert of powers, multilateralism, world order, international order, international institutions
overlooks the possibility of ruling the system by consensus rather than by coercion, highlighted by Liberal Hegemony Theory. Merging Power Transition Theory with liberal Hegemony Theory can reveal previously hidden opportunities to manage peaceful power transitions. In the light of the prolonged economic growth of countries like China and India this finding might prove to be crucial for the thinking of future world-order-governance politics."
Papers by Carsten Rauch
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Welche Rolle spielt Indien in der Weltpolitik und wie wird sich die bevölkerungsreichste Demokratie weiterentwickeln?
Im vorliegenden Report untersucht Carsten Rauch die weltpolitische Position und den machtpolitischen Aufstieg Indiens. Er skizziert dazu die indische Selbstwahrnehmung sowie die Wahrnehmung durch Andere, vergleicht Indien anhand verschiedener Machtindikatoren mit anderen Großmächten, zeigt auf Basis des bisher zurückgelegten Weges Szenarien für die Zukunft und benennt interne und externe Hürden für den weiteren indischen Aufstieg. Nach einer theoretischen Einordnung dieser Ergebnisse entwickelt der Report Empfehlungen für die deutsche und europäische Politik im Umgang mit Indien.
This Policy Paper is the product of a multi-year research project "The Post-Transatlantic Age: A Twenty-First Century Concert of Powers". The project has been conducted by more than 20 researchers from seven different countries. It is funded by the “Europe and Global Challenges” programme, launched by the European foundations Compagnia di San Paolo in Turin, Italy, Riksbankens Jubileumsfond in Stockholm, Sweden, and VolkswagenStiftung in Hanover, Germany.
Since its independence in 1947 India has declared its support for the principles of non-alignment that India’s first prime minister Nehru developed. Neutrality, non-interference, peaceful coexistence and the renunciation of any kind of aggressive action were to become principles in foreign policy.
Since the end of the Cold War it seems, however, that this concept of Non-Alignment is slowly being pushed into the background, making way for a complete reorientation. Is this the result of a radical rift?
Carsten Rauch has been investigating Indian foreign policy since the independence regarding the adherence to the principles of Non –Alignment, and demonstrates that from the beginning deviations from this ideal occurred consistently. Even Nehru always considered it the main goal to keep India’s independence and to increase its sphere of influence.
The author shows that India will gain more and more importance in setting up the world order and recommends Europe and Germany to quickly intensify its relations with India, because India, as a global player, will, with newly acquired self-assurance, keep all options open and will not necessarily consider Europe the best of all possible allies.
Was ist passiert? Die USA haben mit Indien, das dem Atomwaffensperrvertrag (NVV) bis heute nicht beigetreten ist, ein Nuklearabkommen geschlossen. Dieser „Atom-Deal“ wird es Indien zukünftig erlauben, Technologien und Material für sein ziviles Nuklearprogramm zu importieren. Im Gegenzug unterstellt es den zivilen Teil (nur diesen!) seines Nuklearkomplexes internationaler Aufsicht.
Damit kann Indien eigene Ressourcen in sein Nuklearwaffenprogramm fließen lassen, ohne dass die entsprechenden Anlagen kontrolliert werden. Bisher waren Nukleargeschäfte mit Ländern, die nicht dem NVV angehören, verboten.
Indien erhält so scheinbar eine attraktive Sonderregelung, die wenig Verpflichtungen, dafür aber interessante Perspektiven bietet. Die Liste der möglichen Folgen ist lang: Neues Wettrüsten in Südasien, Entwertung des NVV, Behinderung der globalen Abrüstung, „Bestrafung“ vertragstreuer Staaten usw. Carsten Rauch distanziert sich von dieser apodiktischen Verurteilung und versucht eine Bewertung aus einer anderen Perspektive: Was wäre gewesen, wenn der Deal nicht zustande gekommen wäre? Hätte das womöglich auch negative Auswirkungen gehabt? Sind die negativen Folgen wirklich zwangsläufig? Er wagt einen pragmatischen Blick und kommt zu überraschenden Ergebnissen.
First, the fact that the India of today is not the India of 1974 but rather an emerging world power. Second, the possible alternatives to the deal beside a mere continuation of the status quo (India’s nuclear isolation). And third, the fact that the alternatives providing more benefits for arms-control were unlikely, given the domestic political discussion in India. In his Working Paper Carsten Rauch addresses all three points. Furthermore, he presents benefits that will take effect only in the long run (rather than gains that take effect in the short run, envisioned by most proponents of the deal) that the deal offers for the stability of the global nonproliferation regime.
transitions will result in war. Second, it is false empirically; not all power transitions in history have resulted in Great Power wars. Third, it leads to flawed policy advice; if rising powers are not always dissatisfied and do not always challenge the status quo, then policies meant to oppose
them might breed dangerous dissatisfaction in the first place.
This article amends PTT by adding a variable, the “will to power” (WTP), that captures the willingness of rising powers to commit themselves to changing the status quo. Furthermore, it scrutinizes two historical power transition constellations (United Kingdom–United States and United Kingdom–Imperial Germany). In both cases the new variable is consistent with the outcome and particularly in the United Kingdom–United States case the WTP variable broadens our understanding by making it possible to see this relationship as “missed” or “eschewed” instead of as a peaceful power transition. Doing so extends the power transition dichotomy to a much more complex and realistic typology of power transition constellations.
analysis of this phenomenon but no remedy. We suggest easing the tensions related to ongoing worldwide power shifts by introducing a new informal multilateral security
governance institution, based on the idea of a concert of powers. The historical European Concert of the 19th century prevented the outbreak of great power wars for more than a generation by providing a cooperation framework, based on shared norms and common
procedures. In this article we explore the possibility of utilizing a modernized concert of powers as a framework for managing the coming power shifts. In order to do so, we introduce two new elements in Power Transition Theory: (1) the importance of the (dis)satisfaction of the declining hegemon with the anticipated future order, and (2) a broader multilateral framework of major powers that overcomes the Power Transition Theory’s traditional bilateral “duel” situation. On this basis, institutionalized power transition management becomes possible. We then work out the norms, strengths and weaknesses
of the historical concert and update it with a few new features that would be necessary for it to be successful in the 21st century.
über die nachfolgenden Fallstudien, die sich mit der Klärung dieser Fragestellung befassen.
This introductory contribution first explicates an improved analytical
framework for studying revisionism in international politics. Building on that, it develops the puzzle underlying this special issue – the problem of dissatisfied great powers and the question why rising powers should want to challenge an established internation al order that facilitated their extraordinary growth. The article concludes with an overview of the four historical case studies which address our research question.
und Revisionismusausprägung der Weimarer Republik herausgearbeitet. Dabei wird deutlich, dass oppositionelle und dissidente Politik nicht erst im Dritten Reich sondern bereits in der Weimarer Republik verbreitet waren, aber in Grad, Tiefe und Breite variierten. Schließlich wird analysiert, inwieweit das Vorhandensein und die jeweilige Ausprägung von lateralem Druck (eher schwächer) und Statusansprüchen
(eher stärker) mit dem jeweiligen Vo rkommen von Revisionismus in der deutschen Politik korrespondieren.
The article first traces the power position and the degree of revisionism
of the Weimar Republic. It shows that oppositional and dissident politics did not emerge with the beginning of the Third Reich but were already prevalent during the Weimar Republic, where they varied, however, in terms of degree, breadth and depth. The article analyses to what extent the occur rence and manifestation of lateral pressure (rather weak) and status claims and grievances (rather high) correspond with the respective form of German revisionism.
Keywords: Power transition, power shift, concert of powers, multilateralism, world order, international order, international institutions
overlooks the possibility of ruling the system by consensus rather than by coercion, highlighted by Liberal Hegemony Theory. Merging Power Transition Theory with liberal Hegemony Theory can reveal previously hidden opportunities to manage peaceful power transitions. In the light of the prolonged economic growth of countries like China and India this finding might prove to be crucial for the thinking of future world-order-governance politics."
***
Welche Rolle spielt Indien in der Weltpolitik und wie wird sich die bevölkerungsreichste Demokratie weiterentwickeln?
Im vorliegenden Report untersucht Carsten Rauch die weltpolitische Position und den machtpolitischen Aufstieg Indiens. Er skizziert dazu die indische Selbstwahrnehmung sowie die Wahrnehmung durch Andere, vergleicht Indien anhand verschiedener Machtindikatoren mit anderen Großmächten, zeigt auf Basis des bisher zurückgelegten Weges Szenarien für die Zukunft und benennt interne und externe Hürden für den weiteren indischen Aufstieg. Nach einer theoretischen Einordnung dieser Ergebnisse entwickelt der Report Empfehlungen für die deutsche und europäische Politik im Umgang mit Indien.
This Policy Paper is the product of a multi-year research project "The Post-Transatlantic Age: A Twenty-First Century Concert of Powers". The project has been conducted by more than 20 researchers from seven different countries. It is funded by the “Europe and Global Challenges” programme, launched by the European foundations Compagnia di San Paolo in Turin, Italy, Riksbankens Jubileumsfond in Stockholm, Sweden, and VolkswagenStiftung in Hanover, Germany.
Since its independence in 1947 India has declared its support for the principles of non-alignment that India’s first prime minister Nehru developed. Neutrality, non-interference, peaceful coexistence and the renunciation of any kind of aggressive action were to become principles in foreign policy.
Since the end of the Cold War it seems, however, that this concept of Non-Alignment is slowly being pushed into the background, making way for a complete reorientation. Is this the result of a radical rift?
Carsten Rauch has been investigating Indian foreign policy since the independence regarding the adherence to the principles of Non –Alignment, and demonstrates that from the beginning deviations from this ideal occurred consistently. Even Nehru always considered it the main goal to keep India’s independence and to increase its sphere of influence.
The author shows that India will gain more and more importance in setting up the world order and recommends Europe and Germany to quickly intensify its relations with India, because India, as a global player, will, with newly acquired self-assurance, keep all options open and will not necessarily consider Europe the best of all possible allies.
Was ist passiert? Die USA haben mit Indien, das dem Atomwaffensperrvertrag (NVV) bis heute nicht beigetreten ist, ein Nuklearabkommen geschlossen. Dieser „Atom-Deal“ wird es Indien zukünftig erlauben, Technologien und Material für sein ziviles Nuklearprogramm zu importieren. Im Gegenzug unterstellt es den zivilen Teil (nur diesen!) seines Nuklearkomplexes internationaler Aufsicht.
Damit kann Indien eigene Ressourcen in sein Nuklearwaffenprogramm fließen lassen, ohne dass die entsprechenden Anlagen kontrolliert werden. Bisher waren Nukleargeschäfte mit Ländern, die nicht dem NVV angehören, verboten.
Indien erhält so scheinbar eine attraktive Sonderregelung, die wenig Verpflichtungen, dafür aber interessante Perspektiven bietet. Die Liste der möglichen Folgen ist lang: Neues Wettrüsten in Südasien, Entwertung des NVV, Behinderung der globalen Abrüstung, „Bestrafung“ vertragstreuer Staaten usw. Carsten Rauch distanziert sich von dieser apodiktischen Verurteilung und versucht eine Bewertung aus einer anderen Perspektive: Was wäre gewesen, wenn der Deal nicht zustande gekommen wäre? Hätte das womöglich auch negative Auswirkungen gehabt? Sind die negativen Folgen wirklich zwangsläufig? Er wagt einen pragmatischen Blick und kommt zu überraschenden Ergebnissen.
First, the fact that the India of today is not the India of 1974 but rather an emerging world power. Second, the possible alternatives to the deal beside a mere continuation of the status quo (India’s nuclear isolation). And third, the fact that the alternatives providing more benefits for arms-control were unlikely, given the domestic political discussion in India. In his Working Paper Carsten Rauch addresses all three points. Furthermore, he presents benefits that will take effect only in the long run (rather than gains that take effect in the short run, envisioned by most proponents of the deal) that the deal offers for the stability of the global nonproliferation regime.
Seit seiner Unabhängigkeit 1947 bekannte sich Indien zu den Prinzipien der Blockfreiheit, die Indiens erster Premierminister Nehru entwickelte. Neutralität, Nichteinmischung, friedliche Koexistenz und der Verzicht auf jegliche Angriffshandlungen sollten zu Axiomen des außenpolitischen Handelns werden.
Seit Ende des Kalten Krieges scheint allerdings das Konzept der Blockfreiheit mehr und mehr in den Hintergrund gedrängt zu werden und einer völligen Neuorientierung Platz zu machen. Ist es hier zu einem radikalen Bruch gekommen?
Carsten Rauch überprüft die indische Außenpolitik seit der Unabhängigkeit auf die Einhaltung der Kriterien der Blockfreiheit und fördert zutage, dass von Anfang an von diesem Ideal immer wieder abgewichen wurde. Selbst Nehru sah es stets als übergeordnetes Ziel, Indiens Unabhängigkeit zu bewahren und seine Einflussmöglichkeiten zu steigern.
Der Autor zeigt, dass Indien bei der Gestaltung der Weltordnung zunehmend Gewicht bekommen wird und empfiehlt Europa und Deutschland, die Beziehungen zu Indien schnellstens zu intensivieren, denn Indien wird sich als Global Player mit neuem Selbstbewusstsein alle Optionen offen halten und nicht zwangsläufig Europa als den besten aller möglichen Verbündeten ansehen.
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This “deal” is quite explosive, because India is not a member of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and at least since 1998 possesses nuclear weapons. In case of an agreement the US would grant India’s nuclear program a special status. This increases the danger that the already weakened NPT could be undermined even more.
In this report Harald Müller and Carsten Rauch point out how the damage to the NPT caused by the “Nuclear Deal” could possibly be alleviated and how Germany should act.
***
Ein „Atomdeal“ zwischen Indien und den USA erscheint als fast beschlossene Sache. Zumindest verhandeln die beiden Mächte seit gut zwei Jahren über die Konditionen eines solchen Nuklearabkommens, das den zivilen Nuklearhandel zwischen den beiden Staaten wieder ermöglichen soll. Dabei ist den Indern daran gelegen, anerkanntes Mitglied des „nuklearen Clubs“ zu werden. Die USA dagegen legen Wert darauf, dass Indien im Gegenzug ein Sicherheitsabkommen mit der Internationalen Atomenergiebehörde (IAEO) abschließt, das regelmäßige Inspektionen umfasst.
Dieser "Deal" ist deshalb brisant, weil Indien kein Mitglied des Nuklearen Nichtverbreitungsvertrages (NVV) ist und spätestens seit 1998 über Atomwaffen verfügt. Im Falle eines Abkommens würden die USA dem indischen Nuklearprogramm einen Sonderstatus zuerkennen. Dabei besteht die Gefahr, dass der ohnehin geschwächte NVV noch weiter unterwandert werden könnte.
Wie der aus dem „Atomdeal“ erwachsende Schaden für den NVV möglicherweise gemildert werden könnte und wie sich Deutschland verhalten sollte, zeigen Harald Müller und Carsten Rauch in ihrem Report.
The 19th century European Concert was not only able to ensure a period of exceptional peacefulness among the European great powers, it also limited the scope and duration of the few wars that did break out. The chapter authors discuss the achievements and limits of the historical concert, define the requirements that a new concert would have to meet, critically evaluate obstacles and risks of the approach and indicate how a 21st century concert of powers could complement, and fit into, the present legal and institutional setting of global politics.
This volume offers a systematic examination of the norms and tools of the historical template and scrutinizes these tools for their utility in our time. It will be of great interest to a wide range of scholars and students in areas such as International Relations, History and International Law.
We regard the United States and Russia as established great powers. While the United States has been the dominant power since the end of World War II, the position of Russia is somewhat delicate as it was never a global hegemon but instead the primary challenger to the US-led international order.
Both, however, played a pivotal role in the creation of the regimes under scrutiny here, given the assumption of nuclear parity. They should act valiantly in a) defending and enforcing the regimes and b) opposing norm change; something that the United States – as the permanent number one – is expected to do even more than Russia.
China and India are rising great powers. Both were great empires in the past, but were subjected to repression and humiliation during the era of imperialism. They were comparatively weak when the current world order was established in the aftermath of World War II and remained on the periphery of world politics during the Cold War. From the 1980s (China) and 1990s (India) onwards, both started a spectacular rise. They can thus be expected to put forward alternative norms to those existing and to justify their proposals by arguing that the present order is profoundly unjust. They might also be more hostile towards those regimes that had been established before their rise began (NPT and BWC) than towards those that have been established later (e.g., CWC, SALW PoA).
power transitions in the international system. One approach that focuses on this phenomenon
is the Power Transition Theory originally established by A.F.K. Organski and Jacek Kugler. This
theory warns that situations in which a (declining) hegemon is approached by rising powers
often escalate into conflict or even war. Specifically unsatisfied rising powers are expected to
come into conflict with the dominant power and each other. The nature and origin of such
dissatisfaction is not spelled out clearly, which remains one the central weaknesses of the
theory. Power Transition Theory, we argue, has only a limited view on the structure of the
international order. It overlooks the possibility of ruling the system by consensus rather than
by coercion, highlighted by Liberal Hegemony Theory. The concept of liberal hegemony by G.
John Ikenberry and Charles Kupchan is based on three criteria: “bonding, binding and
institutionalized voice opportunities”. The partner states are thus part of the system and not
mere subordinates. They can influence the institutional rules and do not have to fear the
dominance of the hegemon. Merging Power Transition Theory with liberal Hegemony Theory
can reveal previously hidden opportunities to manage peaceful power transitions in ways that
benefit all members of the international system. Through institutional binding and bonding
the hegemon can control the rising powers. Through institutionalized voice opportunities the
rising powers have the chance to influence the hegemon, even before they have reached the
crucial state of power parity. In the light of the prolonged economic growth of countries like
China and India that foreshadows an upcoming power transition, this finding might prove to
be crucial for the thinking of future world-order-governance politics."
We argue that the failure of a taboo to develop in BSG can be attributed to three key factors: (1) Horrendous effects of nuclear weapons, crucial for the emergence of the taboo in our world, are, if present at all, significantly mitigated in the series. (2) In our international system, a tight web of discourses, regimes and institutions facilitated the emergence of strong norms against the use of nuclear weapons. The BSG universe does not know such institutions, not to speak of arms control or even comparable international interaction. (3) Both actors, Cylons and Colonials, socially construct each other as a ‘radical other’, which renders possible – and even calls for – the goal of destroying the enemy with no means precluded.
Using BSG as a science-fictional quasi-factual, we outline dangers to ’our’ taboo which, in contrast to BSG, are very real, especially since the Bush years: (1) technological progress and growing political inclination to develop ‘clean’ mini nukes, (2) continuous portrayal of opponents as ‘unjust enemies’ or rogues, and (3) arms control regimes under considerable strain.
"
A great power concert has been suggested by some as a suitable management instrument. This is not surprising given the success of the historical Concert of Europe in contributed to preventing European great-power war for prolonged periods during the nineteenth century despite the profound social, economic, and political transformations of this era.
However, what exactly is a concert and what has been the Concert? Reviewing the existing literature we find that scholars define the historical concert as well as the general concept of concert quite dissimilar. These differences emerge on several axes: A concert can be rather realist or constructivist in IR terms, imperial or pacifist in its outward activity and liberal or conservative in its inwards orientation to name but a few.
Before it makes sense to suggest (or condemn) a concert approach for the 21st century, one first has to be clear about which kind of concert one has in mind. We offer a concert-typology that will make this choice easier and more transparent.
Justice and fairness considerations enter the realm of a potential 21st Century Concert in both a rather abstract and a rather concrete way and furthermore from the inside as well as from the outside. Specifically they concern the relations between concert members (for example in questions of decision making) and the relations between the Concert as such and non-members (exclusion-problem, legitimacy).
This paper explores the different issues, sites and stages, in which justice issues could complicate the coming-into-being and working of a 21st Century Concert. Furthermore it offers some remedies that might be able to ease at least some of these justice-tensions. It concludes that – in order to fulfill its promises – a 21st Century Concert cannot be just a Concert, but has to be conceived as a just Concert.
"
When it comes to the control of weapons of mass destruction, the position of India is highly ambivalent. India has signed and ratified the biological and chemical weapons conventions. At the same time, India has refused to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the Compre-hensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and tested nuclear weapons in 1998. For that reason India has been isolated and ‘outlawed’ from international civil nuclear cooperation. This changed in 2008, when the so-called nuclear deal between India and the United States was finalized. This deal re-integrates India in international civil nuclear trade even while India remains outside of the most important institutions of the global non-proliferation (NP) regime. Non-proliferation and arms con-trol experts have therefore deemed the deal as detrimental to global efforts of achieving meaningful efforts in the fields of nuclear non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament. Their case be-comes even stronger, as the proponents of the deal mainly presented bogus arguments that have been easily dismissed by the critics. However, some of their owen arguments also seem exagger-ated. Furthermore I maintain that there are ‘better’ arguments in favour of the deal which, however, have not received very much prominence yet but which should be brought to the forefront. These arguments can be derived from such differing theoretical traditions as Power Transition Theory (PTT) and Democratic Peace Theory (DPT). In addition to these theoretical arguments, the empiri-cal case can be made that there are reasonable possibilities to reduce the risks of the deal and that the most probable alternatives to the deal would have yielded even worse rather than better results.
While incoporating some severe risks that are visible and noticable immediately, the nuclear deal, I suggest, can - in the long run - be conductive to the stability of the world order and the global non-proliferation regime, by (a) changing the Indian perception of the NP regime, (b) satis-fying India with the international status quo, and (c) easing the formerly strained relations between India and the United States.
In this paper I first recapitulate the unique story of the Indian ‘quest’ for nuclear weapons from the newly found independence in 1949 until ‘Operation Shakti’ in 1998, when India finally aban-doned its nuclear ambiguity in favour of open nuclearization (section 2). I continue to assess the nuclear deal (section 3) and discuss the issues raised by the critics (section 4) before highlighting some points were it could have a positive impact on the nonproliferation regime (section 5). I con-clude with a call for pragmatism and an unlikely ‘road to heaven’ (section 6).
Theory (PTT) sees two important variables at work: a) a transition or a prolonged period of parity between the
dominant power and a new rising contender and b) dissatisfaction with the status quo of the international order on the
part of the contender. While the majority of the PTT school is rather deterministic and does not offer policy
prescriptions, there are at least three different ways for a declining hegemon to deal with an impending power
transition. He can ignore it, resist it or accept it. As soon as it is accepted, in principle the task becomes managing the
power transition in a peaceful way. One possible template, the Concert of Europe, was able to prevent the outbreak of
great power wars for more than a generation by providing a cooperation framework, which was based on shared norms
and procedures. In this paper we explore the possibility of utilizing a modernized concert of powers as a framework for
managing the probable transition of power in the not too distant future as well as the advent of a multipolar system in
general."