Aristotle

This article examines five common misunderstandings about case-study research: (a) theoretical knowledge is more valuable than practical knowledge; (b) one cannot generalize from a single case, therefore, the single-case study cannot contribute to scientific development; (c) the case study is most useful for generating hypotheses, whereas other methods are more suitable for hypotheses testing and theory building; (d) the case study contains a bias toward verification; and (e) it is often difficult to summarize specific case studies. This article explains and corrects these misunderstandings one by one and concludes with the Kuhnian insight that a scientific discipline without a large number of thoroughly executed case studies is a discipline without systematic production of exemplars, and a discipline without exemplars is an ineffective one. Social science may be strengthened by the execution of a greater number of good case studies.

Back cover text: If the new fin de siècle marks a recurrence of the real, Bent Flyvbjerg’s Rationality and Power epitomizes that development and sets new standards for social and political inquiry. The Danish town of Aalborg is to Flyvbjerg what Florence was to Machiavelli: a laboratory for understanding the real workings of power, and for grasping what they mean to our more general concerns of social and political organization. Politics, administration, and planning are examined in ways that allow  a rare, in-depth understanding. The reader witnesses, firsthand, the classic and endless drama which defines what modernity and democracy are and can be.

I argue that happiness, for Aristotle, does not consist exclusively in excellent activity. It also includes at least some of what he calls "the external goods" and goods that are not simply identifiable with forms of excellent activity (e.g., pleasure, freedom from intense pain, etc.). External goods that are actual constituents of happiness for Aristotle include such goods as friends, family, and honor.

ABSTRACT: This paper serves two purposes: (i) it can be used by students as an introduction to chapters 1-5 of book iii of the NE; (ii) it suggests an answer to the unresolved question what overall objective this section of the NE has. The paper focuses primarily on Aristotle’s theory of what makes us responsible for our actions and character. After some preliminary observations about praise, blame and responsibility (Section 2), it sets out in detail how all the key notions of NE iii 1-5 are interrelated (Sections 3-9). The setting-out of these interconnections makes it then possible to provide a comprehensive interpretation of the purpose of the passage. Its primary purpose is to explain how agents are responsible for their actions not just insofar as they are actions of this kind or that, but also insofar as they are noble or base: agents are responsible for their actions qua noble or base, because, typically via choice, their character dispositions are a causal factor of those actions (Section 10). The paper illustrates the different ways in which agents can be causes of their actions by means of Aristotle’s four basic types of agents (Section 11). A secondary purpose of NE iii 1-5 is to explain how agents can be held responsible for consequences of their actions (Section 12), in particular for their character dispositions insofar as these are noble or base, i.e. virtues or vices (Section 13). These two goals are not the only ones Aristotle pursues in the passage. But they are the ones Aristotle himself indicates in its first sentence and summarizes in its last paragraph; and the ones that give the passage a systematic unity. The paper also briefly consider the issues of freedom-to-do-otherwise, free choice and free-will in the contexts in which they occur (i.e. in the final paragraphs of Sections 6, 7, 12, 13).

The phenomena of life and their explanation was at the center of much of ancient Pre-Socratic cosmological reflection about the nature of the universe as a whole. I offer a short description of the core commitments of what I call the „cosmological method“ of these early Greek thinkers. These commitments may be summarized under three headings: organic holism (the whole universe is one living thing, of which we and everything else in it are parts), methodological monism (one and the same mode of explanation and one set of principles for all things in the cosmos), and ultimate philosophical ambition (the ambition of answering the deepest metaphysical questions). I argue that Plato, in spite of his revolutionary innovation of the cosmological method through the introduction of the teleological mode of explanation and its juxtaposition with a mechanical mode of explanation, fundamentally continues to be a part of that same tradition. It is only with Aristotle that the core tenets of the old cosmological tradition are abandoned. Aristotle distinguishes between several different, and partly overlapping, sciences. In particular, the study of living things becomes an autonomous science with principles, methods and ambitions of its own. Aristotle furthermore introduces for the first time the idea that living things are ends in themselves. With this, I argue, he paved the way for what we since then recognise as biology.

This article presents the theoretical and methodological considerations behind a research method which the author calls ‘phronetic planning research’. Such research sets out to answer four questions of power and values for specific instances of planning: (1) Where are we going with planning? (2) Who gains and who loses, and by which mechanisms of power? (3) Is this development desirable? (4) What, if anything, should we do about it? A central task of phronetic planning research is to provide concrete examples and detailed narratives of the ways in which power and values work in planning and with what consequences to whom, and to suggest how relations of power and values could be changed to work with other consequences. Insofar as planning situations become clear, they are clarified by detailed stories of who is doing what to whom. Clarifications of that kind are a principal concern for phronetic planning research and provide the main link to praxis.

Taken together, the works of Jurgen Habermas and Michel Foucault highlight an essential tension in modernity. This is the tension between the normative and the real, between what should be done and what is actually done. Understanding this tension is crucial to understanding modern democracy, what it is and what it could be. It has been argued that an effective way of making democracy stronger is to strengthen civil society. This article contains a comparative analysis of the central ideas of Habermas and Foucault as they pertain to the question of democracy and civil society. More specifically, the discourse ethics of Habermas is contrasted with the power analytics and ethics of Foucault evaluating their usefulness for those interested in understanding, and bringing about, democratic social change.

According to a philosophical commonplace, Aristotle defined human beings as rational animals. When one takes a closer look at his texts, however, it is surprisingly hard to find such a definition. In this paper, I will argue that this is no accident. Human being as an object for systematic explanation simply does not fit neatly into Aristotle’s conception of the sciences. By Aristotle’s lights, human being belongs to two completely different ontological realms and therefore must be investigated by two different kinds of sciences: humans as animals are investigated by physics, and more particularly by zoology, whereas humans as rational beings are investigated by theology. Since definitions fix the basic terms for each science and serve as explanatory principles within them, it follows that there cannot be a unified definition of human being. For Aristotle, humans are, as it were, ontologically divided and therefore there can be neither a science of humanity nor a unified definition of what it is to be human.

In this paper we argue that the use of the communicative theory of Jürgen Habermas in planning theory is problematic because it hampers an understanding of how power shapes planning. We posit an alternative approach based on the power analytics of Michel Foucault which focuses on ‘what is actually done’, as opposed to Habermas’s focus on ‘what should be done’. We discuss how the Foucauldian stance problematises planning, asking difficult questions about the treatment of legitimacy, rationality, knowledge and spatiality. We conclude that Foucault offers a type of analytic planning theory which offers better prospects than does Habermas for those interested in understanding and bringing about democratic social change through planning.

For some time now moral psychologists and philosophers have ganged up on Aristotelians, arguing that results from psychological studies on the role of character-based and situation-based influences on human behavior have convincingly shown that situations rather than personal characteristics determine human behavior. In the literature on moral psychology and philosophy this challenge is commonly called the “situationist challenge,” and as Prinz (2009) has previously explained, it has largely been based on results from four salient studies in social psychology, including the studies conducted by Hartshorne and May (1928), Milgram (1963), Isen and Levin (1972), and Darley and Batson (1973). The situationist challenge maintains that each of these studies seriously challenges the plausibility of virtuous personal characteristics by challenging the plausibility of personal characteristics more generally. In this article I undermine the situationist challenge against Aristotelian moral psychology by carefully considering major problems with the conclusions that situationists have drawn from the empirical data, and by further challenging the accuracy of their characterization of the Aristotelian view. In fact I show that when properly understood the Aristotelian view is not only consistent with empirical data from developmental science but can also offer important insights for integrating moral psychology with its biological roots in our natural and social life.

https://doi.org/10.1515/ppb-2015-0011
https://doctorcroom.com/croom-2015g

This article provides an answer to what has been called the biggest problem in theorizing and understanding planning: the ambivalence about power found among planning researchers, theorists, and students. The author narrates how he came to work with issues of power and gives an example of how the methodology he developed for power studies—phronetic planning research—may be employed in practice. Phronetic planning research follows the tradition of power studies running from Machiavelli and Nietzsche to Michel Foucault and Pierre Bourdieu. It focuses on four value-rational questions: (1) Where are we going with planning? (2) Who gains and who loses, and by which mechanisms of power? (3) Is this development desirable? (4) What should be done? These questions are exemplified for a specific instance of Scandinavian urban planning. The author finds that the questions, and their answers, make a difference to planning in practice. They make planning research matter.

The Aalborg Project may be interpreted as a metaphor of modern politics, modern administration and planning, and of modernity itself. The basic idea of the project was comprehensive, coherent, and innovative, and it was based on rational and democratic argument. During implementation, however, when idea met reality, the play of Machiavellian princes, Nietzschean will to power, and Foucauldian rationality-as-rationalization resulted in the fragmentation of the project.

It has generally been assumed that Aristotle's Rhetoric was unknown or insignificant in 19th century England. This article shows that it was an important text in the period and argues that the pattern of publication of translations, editions, and student aids concerning Aristotle's Rhetoric reflects a pedagogical movement beginning with a broadly humanistic tradition of the Noetic school at Oriel College, Oxford at the beginning of the nineteenth century and ending with a more philologically oriented approach at Cambridge towards the end of the century. Among the authors discussed are

While both Isaiah Berlin and William James are widely seen as pluralists, this paper contends that neither is a pluralist tout court. Berlin certainly is a pluralist when it comes to morality and politics, but he is a monist when it comes to nature. And James is, paradoxically, both a pluralist and a monist as regards all of reality. These claims are advanced by showing how both thinkers’ approaches contrast with those of monists, not least Plato, Hegel, and Nietzsche. They are also shown to be associated with different narrative genres: tragedy in Berlin’s case, and tragicomedy in James’. The paper then concludes with a brief discussion of an alternative approach, one that treads a path in between monism and pluralism and, because of this, favours a particular form of comedy.

A NOTE TO READERS
A great many additions and revisions to this article were rushed through at the last minute, and as a result, numerous errors made their way to print. For example, "repeated" is misspelled on p. 333; the reference to Ep. 237 on p. 336 should be to Ep. 236; "horde" is misspelled four out of the five times it is used on pp. 344-45; W. A. Curtis’s name is misspelled in note 35; and the list goes on. My apologies. I ask readers to be gracious; I am aware of these and numerous other flubs throughout the piece - all rather embarrassing.

Because I am in so many ways displeased with the published version of the piece, I have revised the piece, corrected the numerous errors and polishing the rhetorical flow which was thrown together with unfortunate speed. The corrected version can be accessed below.

ABSTRACT
The following paper is both historical and constructive. The historical dimension of this paper argues that Basil of Caesarea, Gregory of Nyssa, and Gregory of Nazianzen all use a primary-secondary substance analogy to explain the one ousia and three hypostasis of the Godhead, and this basic line of Trinitarian analogy—what I will call Primary-Secondary Substance Trinitarianism (PST)—is best understood using Aristotelian categories. The constructive side of this essay concerns the question raised by modern critics of PST over whether it can ultimately avoid the charge of tritheism. Thus, after making clear my understanding of this line of analogy, I will consider several objections in an effort to show that PST can successfully sustain its claim to monotheism.

Where it [an age] is busied with establishing the "genuineness and authenticity" of the books of Scripture ... Rationalism is seen in its dullest ... form. (Mark Pattison, "Tendencies of Religious Thought in England 1688-1750 Tradition may be defined as an extension of the franchise. Tradition means giving votes to the most obscure of all classes, our ancestors. It is the democracy of the dead. Tradition refuses to submit to the small and arrogant oligarchy of those who merely happen to be walking about. All democrats object to men being disqualified by accident of birth; tradition objects to their being disqualified by the accident of death. (G. K. Chesterton, "The Ethics of Elfland".) In contemporary North American universities, a substantial number of composition classes are based on Aristotle's Rhetoric, a work which treats the classical Athenian practices of deliberative rhetoric (speaking in legislative assemblies), forensic rhetoric (presenting one's own lawsuits to a judge and jury in a society in which it was necessary to represent oneself rather than hire a lawyer), and epideictic rhetoric (display orations performed at Olympic games and other festivals showing off one's skills in extemporaneous speech to large audiences). None of these are activities twenty-first century composition students are likely to be called upon to perform during or after the course of their university educations, nor are they genres which composition professors are likely to have practiced any time in their careers 2 . Why, then, has Aristotle's Rhetoric become a standard text in the training of graduate students in rhetoric and composition and the theoretical foundation for innumerable first year composition texts and syllabi? 3 Moreover, how did the truncated syllogism model of the enthymeme which appears nowhere in the Aristotelian Corpus, become a standard part of "Aristotelian" rhetoric as it is now taught in English and Communications departments? Even more generally, how did the works of Aristotle, rather than more pragmatic works by practicing orators become the center of our contemporary rhetorical canon?

Niccolò Machiavelli, the founder of modern political and administrative thought, made clear that an understanding of politics requires distinguishing between formal politics and what later, with Ludwig von Rochau, would become known as Realpolitik. No such distinction has been employed in the study of rationality. Yet I will argue that distinguishing between formal rationality and real rationality is as important for the understanding of rationality and planning as the distinction between formal politics and Realpolitik has been for understanding politics.

Metaphysics B considers two sets of views that hypostatize mathematicals. Aristotle discusses the first in his B.2 treatment of aporia 5, and the second in his B.5 treatment of aporia 12. The former has attracted considerable attention; the latter has not. I show that aporia 12 is more significant than the literature suggests, and specifically that it is directly addressed in M.2—an indication of its importance. There is an immediate problem: Aristotle spends most of M.2 refuting the view that mathematicals are separate; but the B.5 mathematicals are inherent. I argue that the B.5 inherence is compatible with the M.2 separateness, and further, that aporia 12 is more than just a puzzle about the hypostatization of mathematicals. It is also a puzzle about the ontological status of mathematicals relative to sensibles.

The present essay discusses the relationship between moral philosophy, psychology and education based on virtue ethics, contemporary neuroscience, and how neuroscientific methods can contribute to studies of moral virtue and character. First, the present essay considers whether the mechanism of moral motivation and developmental model of virtue and character are well supported by neuroscientific evidence. Particularly, it examines whether the evidence provided by neuroscientific studies can support the core argument of virtue ethics, that is, motivational externalism. Second, it discusses how experimental methods of neuroscience can be applied to studies in human morality. Particularly, the present essay examines how functional and structural neuroimaging methods can contribute to the development of the fields by reviewing the findings of recent social and developmental neuroimaging experiments. Meanwhile, the present essay also considers some limitations embedded in such discussions regarding the relationship between the fields and suggests directions for future studies to address these limitations.

Political theorists today are addressing issues of global concern confronting state systems and in so doing are often forced to confront the concept of Homo sapiens as a 'political animal'. Thus theorists considering Aristotle's Politics attempt to transcend his polis-centric focus and make the case that Aristotle offers ways to address these global concerns by focusing on Empire. This article, contra Dietz et al., argues that Aristotle's political science is first and foremost a science of politeia and that this approach to the operation and working of political systems is far superior to recent attempts at regime analysis in comparative politics. Thus Aristotle's mode of examining political systems offers much fruit for those interested in approaching political phenomena with precision and depth as diverse manifestations of the political communities formed by the species Aristotle called the 'political animal'. From this perspective, focusing on the politeia constituting each political community permits an analysis of contemporary transformations of political life without distorting what is being analyzed.

In previous articles, it has been shown that the deductive system developed by Aristotle in his "second logic" is a natural deduction system and not an axiomatic system as previously had been thought. It was also stated that Aristotle's logic is self-sufficient in two senses: First, that it presupposed no other logical concepts, not even those of propositional logic; second, that it is (strongly) complete in the sense that every valid argument expressible in the language of the system is deducible by means of a formal deduction in the system. Review of the system makes the first point obvious. The purpose of the present article is to prove the second. Strong completeness is demonstrated for the Aristotelian system.

The connections between transportation and subjective well-being have received increasing attention in the transportation literature. Yet there are few studies on the relationship between objective well-being and transportation. Objective well-being is the achievement of a persons' potential in knowledge, health, friendship, and other life domains, through the development of their embodied capacities to know, create and be sociable. The value of these achievements is objective, in the sense that it is not derived from a person's attitudes or mental state. Thus, objective well-being adds an important dimension to the study of well-being and transportation, as it can explain why active, embodied mobility modes such as walking and cycling-offer more opportunities for human capacity development, compared to sedentary modes such as driving and riding in a driverless car. Embodied mobility modes activate a well-rounded combination of human capacities thus contributing to better understanding of one's environment, creative flow and sociability, in turn enhancing one's overall well-being. This may add important information for transportation planners and urban designers in design and evaluation of mobility environments.

Here and elsewhere we shall not obtain the best insight into things until we actually see them growing from the beginning. --Aristotle

In the present article we attempt to show that Aristotie's syllogistic is an underlying logie which includes a natural deductive system and that it is not an axiomatic theory as had previously been thought. We construct a mathematical model which reflects certain structural aspects of Aristotle's logic and we examine both the mathematical properties of the model and the relation of the model to the system of logic envisaged in certain scattered parts of Prior and Posterior Ana/ytjes. Our interpretation restores Aristotle's reputation as a logician of consummate imagination and skill. Several attributions of shortcomings and logical errors to Aristotle are shown to be without merit. Aristotle's logic is found to be self-sufficient in several senses. In the :fint place, his theory of deduction is logically sound in every detail. (His indirect deductions have been criticized, but incorrectly on our account.) In the second place, Aristotle's logic presupposes no other logical concepts, not even those of propositional logic. In the third place, the Aristotelian system is seen to be complete in the sense that every valid argument expressible in his system admits of a deduction within his deductive system; i.e., every semantically valid argument is deducible. There are six sections in this article. The :fint section includes methodological remarks, a preliminary survey of the present interpretation and a discussion of the differences between our interpretation and that of Lukasiewicz. The next three sections develop the three parts of the mathematical model. The fifth section deals with general properties of the model and its relation to the Aristotelian system. The final section contains conclusions.

When an ancient Greek dēmos (“people,” “assembly”) deliberated, what did it do? On one view, it engaged in a form of public conversation along the lines theorized by contemporary deliberative democrats; on another, a small number of active citizens debated before a much larger, more passive audience. Both accounts represent deliberation as an external, speech-centered activity rather than an internal, thought-centered one. The democratic ideal, it is suggested, was at least occasional participation in public speech. This article questions that interpretation. A study of βουλεύομαι, “deliberate,” and related terms from Homer to Aristotle reveals three models of deliberation: internal, dialogical, and another that I call “audience,” in which a deliberating audience came to a decision after hearing advice. Assembly deliberation was almost always represented as audience deliberation. The dēmos, or listening mass, deliberated (ἐβουλεύετο), that is came to a decision about an action in its power, while those who spoke before it advised (συνεβούλευσε). Citizens did not fall short of a democratic ideal when they did not speak publicly. To the contrary, the dēmos was expected to exercise its authority through internal reflection, culminating in a vote. This argument has profound implications for our conceptualization of ancient Greek democracy and its differences from its modern counterpart.

RESUMEN: En este artículo se abordan las reflexiones que realizó Aristóteles en su Retórica y en su Política sobre el papel de los jurados populares y sobre los principios que establecen la función jurisdiccional de los ciudadanos jueces. Es en el marco de esta reflexión donde Aristóteles reconoce como principio básico de la función juzgante la necesidad de que la sentencia corresponda al ēthos de la politeía y, por lo tanto, a esa noción de «justicia global», que es el idem sentire de la comunidad política. ABSTRACT: The article discusses Aristotle's thought as regards the role of popular juries and the principles that assigned judicial power to citizens. It is precisely within the framework of this reflection that Aristotle recog-nises the founding principle behind making judgements. This is the need for the sentence to correspond to the ēthos of the constitution and therefore 1. El trabajo se ha realizado en el marco del proyecto HAR2015-63549-P (MINECO/ FEDER).

I present Maimonides as a phenomenologist. In order to avoid the charge of ahistoricism, I carefully show how both Maimonides’s Muslim milieu and his background in Aristotle’s thought are the source of his phenomenological orientation. On point of the former, I stress how the Quran and the 11th century Muslim philosopher, Al-Ghazālī (who was likely the source for the title of Maimonides’s Guide for the Perplexed), themselves evince a distinct phenomenology in their understanding of what it means to possess certainty. On the point of the latter, I show, following the phenomenologist, Martin Heidegger, that Aristotle himself (also a well known source for Maimonides) can be understood to have phenomenological commitments. Maimonides’s phenomenological approach depends on revealing how a not wholly cognitive, but rather practical, embodied relationship to the world—what philosophers might call a “pre- predicative” relationship—is expressive equally of a practical orientation towards ultimate reality (God), and of a fundamentally “positive” attitude that invites us perpetually to engage in an exploration of the world. Through a phenomenological investigation of the world and its elements, we are led to the certainty—albeit a practical certainty—of the existence of God. Acknowledging this phenomenological core allows us to see Maimonides’s Guide and broader work in a new light.

Abstract: Treatments of collective action in political science, classical Greek history, and democratic theory often focus on the episodic and public-facing dimensions of dissent. This article turns to Aristotle for an account of solidaristic political action whose scale and tempo is sometimes obscured by such engagements. Revisiting the Athenian Constitution’s account of the tyrannicides of 514 BCE and the democratic revolution of 508/7 BCE, I argue for the centrality of comradeship to Aristotle’s discussion of these episodes. I demonstrate that Aristotle’s attention to the politics of comradeship is also legible in Politics 5—which notes the dangers political clubs (hetaireiai) pose to tyranny—as well as Aristotle’s discussions of comrades (hetairoi) in the Nicomachean and Eudemian Ethics. This article contributes to our understanding of the birth of Athenian democracy and how comradeship—a vice, to Aristotle, under ordinary political circumstances—becomes a virtue.

The paper seeks a definition of money by bringing the approaches of Spengler, Plato, Aristotle and Keynes into dialogue. All four promote alternative views of the ontology of money as anchored either in supra-individual thought or actual behaviour, and scrutinize its relationship with mathematics. The discussion leads to an understanding of money as originating in human action and as a numerical tool that can only be understood from its ends in use. The essence of money is therefore ethical. The paper concludes with a novel combination of Aristotle’s and Keynes’ ideas: the crucial element of money is learning good money practices, not from, but to 'society'. This can be achieved by harmonizing money’s material part as mere actuality with money’s mathematical part as potentiality.

The advent of contemporary evolutionary theory ushered in the eventual decline of Aristotelian Essentialism (Æ) – for it is widely assumed that essence does not, and cannot have any proper place in the age of evolution. This paper argues that this assumption is a mistake: if Æ can be suitably evolved, it need not face extinction. In it, I claim that if that theory’s fundamental ontology consists of dispositional properties, and if its characteristic metaphysical machinery is interpreted within the framework of contemporary evolutionary developmental biology, an evolved essentialism is available. The reformulated theory of Æ offered in this paper not only fails to fall prey to the typical collection of criticisms, but is also independently both theoretically and empirically plausible. The paper contends that, properly understood, essence belongs in the age of evolution.

"Table of Contents / Pagination is incorrect:
THE WAYS OF ARISTOTLE – ARISTOTELIAN PHRÓNÊSIS, ARISTOTELIAN PHILOSOPHY OF DIALOGUE, AND ACTION RESEARCH
Olav Eikeland
Preface 1
PART 1 – ARISTOTLE, SOCIAL RESEARCH, AND ACTION RESEARCH 3
1. Introduction – The Challenge of Phrónêsis 3
1.1 Three Kinds of General Theory 10
1.2 Aristotle and Critical Action Research 17
2. Action Research Approaching Phrónêsis 20
2.1 A Philosopher Defending Action Research 21
2.2 Making Social Science Matter 23
2.3 Abandoning Techniques 25
PART 2 – READING ARISTOTLE – LIMITS AND POSSIBILITIES FOR PHRÓNÊSIS 27
3. Virtues – Intellectual and Ethical 29
3.1 Particulars of Ethical Virtues 34
4. Phrónêsis and the Other Intellectual Virtues 38
4.1 Theoretical Knowledge, and Knowledge about Things We Influence 40
4.1.1 Overlaps and Intermeshes 45
4.2 Phrónêsis as an Intellectual Virtue 48
4.2.1 Excursus: Knowledge Forms and Ways of Knowing in Aristotle 49
4.2.1.1 Praxis, Poíêsis, Khrêsis, Páthos – And the Various Forms of the Epistêmai 50
4.2.1.2 Theoretical and Practical Truth 61
4.2 (Continued) Phrónêsis as an Intellectual Virtue 64
4.3 Phrónêsis and Rhetoric, Phrónêsis and Practical Syllogisms 70
4.3.1 The relationship to rhetoric 70
4.3.2 The relationship to practical syllogisms 75
5. Phrónêsis on Means and Ends, Phrónêsis and General Knowledge 76
5.1 Means and Ends, and Kinds of Causes 76
5.1.1 Poíêsis Makes Things, Praxis Makes Perfect 81
5.1.2 “Professional” Deliberations and Deductions 89
5.2 Knowledge, General and Particular 94
5.2.1 General Knowledge, Appropriate Knowledge, Knowledge in Action 94
5.2.2 Héxis (Habitus), and Empeiría (Experience) 103
5.2.3 Knowing Particulars 109
5.2.3.1 By What? 110
5.2.3.2 How? 111
5.2.3.3 Preconditions for a Universally Flexible Consideration 115
6. Developing and Defining Virtue 126
6.1 Developing Virtue 127
6.1.1 Epistêmê and Virtue through the Formation of Habit, Once More 130
6.1.2 What “Means” Means 136
6.1.3 Practical Development with a Hinge to It, the Question of Standards Again 138
6.2 Defining Virtue 145
6.2.1 Nóêsis as Dialogue, or, the Reason Why Aristotle Insists on Letting Phrónêsis Deliberate about Means Only 150
6.2.1.1 The Unfolded Know-How of Nous 152
6.2.1.2 The Topica and the Enfolded Habitus of Dialectics 154
6.2.1.3 The Philosopher, the Dialectician, and Experience 160
6.2.1.3.1 Dialogical Peculiarities 165
6.2.1.3.2 Dialogue and Experience 170
6.2.1.3.3 Basic Principle, Beginning, Medium, and End 182
6.2.1.4 Ways of Learning 185
6.2.1.5 Self-Evident First Principles? 191
6.2.1.6 Praxis1, and Praxis2 194
6.2.2 The Ethical Works do not Deliberate about Means, They Develop and Define Ends 198
6.2.3 Epistêmê, Virtue, and Phrónêsis Defined 205
6.3 Who Develops and Defines? The Art and Practice of Architectonics 214
7. Eudaimonía and Wisdom as “The Highest Practical Good”; Aristotelian Phron-Ethics, Theor-Ethics, and the Way of the Intellectual Commons 219
7.1 Kinds of Theory, Kinds of Practice 220
7.2 Ethics and Politics as Methodological Guidelines for Autonomous Practitioners 230
7.2.1 The Laws of Virtue 233
7.2.2 Tékhnê and Phrónêsis – At the Parting of the Ways 239
7.3 The Wisdom of the Commons – Common Wisdom 242
7.3.1 Tà Koiná – The Commons 247
7.3.2 The Common Skholê 252
7.4 Theor-Ethics and Primary Friendship 254
7.4.1 The Noetic “I” and the Psychological “Me” 259
7.4.2 Theorethical Interventions? 268
7.5 The Way of Theor-Ethics 269
7.5.1 Ethical Excellence – Settling with the Best “for Us”, i.e. for the Second Best “Absolutely” 277
7.6 The Ways of Politics – Continuous Learning in Common 288
7.6.1 Community: What Are the Things Common? 289
7.6.2 Oikos, Pólis, and Constitutions 294
7.6.3 Developing Concord – The Ethico-Political Role of Dialogical Gatherings 299
7.6.4 Different Concepts of Politics 310
7.6.5 Unity and Diversity in the Pólis 318
7.6.6 The Koinópolis as Panarchy – Aristocracy Suspended and Transcended 328
7.6.7 Religious Politics? 338
PART 3 – ARISTOTELIAN ACTION RESEARCH – WISDOM AND EUDAIMONÍA TRANSPOSED, SOCIAL RESEARCH TRANSFORMED 344
8. Neo-Epistemic, Dialogical Action Research 344
9. From Oikos to Pólis, and Beyond 349
10. Aristotle, Marx, and Modern Work Life 359
11. Aristotle Suspended 370
12. Epilogue 376
REFERENCES 381
Appendix 394"

"Table of Contents / Pagination is incorrect:
THE WAYS OF ARISTOTLE – ARISTOTELIAN PHRÓNÊSIS, ARISTOTELIAN PHILOSOPHY OF DIALOGUE, AND ACTION RESEARCH
Olav Eikeland
Preface 1
PART 1 – ARISTOTLE, SOCIAL RESEARCH, AND ACTION RESEARCH 3
1. Introduction – The Challenge of Phrónêsis 3
1.1 Three Kinds of General Theory 10
1.2 Aristotle and Critical Action Research 17
2. Action Research Approaching Phrónêsis 20
2.1 A Philosopher Defending Action Research 21
2.2 Making Social Science Matter 23
2.3 Abandoning Techniques 25
PART 2 – READING ARISTOTLE – LIMITS AND POSSIBILITIES FOR PHRÓNÊSIS 27
3. Virtues – Intellectual and Ethical 29
3.1 Particulars of Ethical Virtues 34
4. Phrónêsis and the Other Intellectual Virtues 38
4.1 Theoretical Knowledge, and Knowledge about Things We Influence 40
4.1.1 Overlaps and Intermeshes 45
4.2 Phrónêsis as an Intellectual Virtue 48
4.2.1 Excursus: Knowledge Forms and Ways of Knowing in Aristotle 49
4.2.1.1 Praxis, Poíêsis, Khrêsis, Páthos – And the Various Forms of the Epistêmai 50
4.2.1.2 Theoretical and Practical Truth 61
4.2 (Continued) Phrónêsis as an Intellectual Virtue 64
4.3 Phrónêsis and Rhetoric, Phrónêsis and Practical Syllogisms 70
4.3.1 The relationship to rhetoric 70
4.3.2 The relationship to practical syllogisms 75
5. Phrónêsis on Means and Ends, Phrónêsis and General Knowledge 76
5.1 Means and Ends, and Kinds of Causes 76
5.1.1 Poíêsis Makes Things, Praxis Makes Perfect 81
5.1.2 “Professional” Deliberations and Deductions 89
5.2 Knowledge, General and Particular 94
5.2.1 General Knowledge, Appropriate Knowledge, Knowledge in Action 94
5.2.2 Héxis (Habitus), and Empeiría (Experience) 103
5.2.3 Knowing Particulars 109
5.2.3.1 By What? 110
5.2.3.2 How? 111
5.2.3.3 Preconditions for a Universally Flexible Consideration 115
6. Developing and Defining Virtue 126
6.1 Developing Virtue 127
6.1.1 Epistêmê and Virtue through the Formation of Habit, Once More 130
6.1.2 What “Means” Means 136
6.1.3 Practical Development with a Hinge to It, the Question of Standards Again 138
6.2 Defining Virtue 145
6.2.1 Nóêsis as Dialogue, or, the Reason Why Aristotle Insists on Letting Phrónêsis Deliberate about Means Only 150
6.2.1.1 The Unfolded Know-How of Nous 152
6.2.1.2 The Topica and the Enfolded Habitus of Dialectics 154
6.2.1.3 The Philosopher, the Dialectician, and Experience 160
6.2.1.3.1 Dialogical Peculiarities 165
6.2.1.3.2 Dialogue and Experience 170
6.2.1.3.3 Basic Principle, Beginning, Medium, and End 182
6.2.1.4 Ways of Learning 185
6.2.1.5 Self-Evident First Principles? 191
6.2.1.6 Praxis1, and Praxis2 194
6.2.2 The Ethical Works do not Deliberate about Means, They Develop and Define Ends 198
6.2.3 Epistêmê, Virtue, and Phrónêsis Defined 205
6.3 Who Develops and Defines? The Art and Practice of Architectonics 214
7. Eudaimonía and Wisdom as “The Highest Practical Good”; Aristotelian Phron-Ethics, Theor-Ethics, and the Way of the Intellectual Commons 219
7.1 Kinds of Theory, Kinds of Practice 220
7.2 Ethics and Politics as Methodological Guidelines for Autonomous Practitioners 230
7.2.1 The Laws of Virtue 233
7.2.2 Tékhnê and Phrónêsis – At the Parting of the Ways 239
7.3 The Wisdom of the Commons – Common Wisdom 242
7.3.1 Tà Koiná – The Commons 247
7.3.2 The Common Skholê 252
7.4 Theor-Ethics and Primary Friendship 254
7.4.1 The Noetic “I” and the Psychological “Me” 259
7.4.2 Theorethical Interventions? 268
7.5 The Way of Theor-Ethics 269
7.5.1 Ethical Excellence – Settling with the Best “for Us”, i.e. for the Second Best “Absolutely” 277
7.6 The Ways of Politics – Continuous Learning in Common 288
7.6.1 Community: What Are the Things Common? 289
7.6.2 Oikos, Pólis, and Constitutions 294
7.6.3 Developing Concord – The Ethico-Political Role of Dialogical Gatherings 299
7.6.4 Different Concepts of Politics 310
7.6.5 Unity and Diversity in the Pólis 318
7.6.6 The Koinópolis as Panarchy – Aristocracy Suspended and Transcended 328
7.6.7 Religious Politics? 338
PART 3 – ARISTOTELIAN ACTION RESEARCH – WISDOM AND EUDAIMONÍA TRANSPOSED, SOCIAL RESEARCH TRANSFORMED 344
8. Neo-Epistemic, Dialogical Action Research 344
9. From Oikos to Pólis, and Beyond 349
10. Aristotle, Marx, and Modern Work Life 359
11. Aristotle Suspended 370
12. Epilogue 376
REFERENCES 381
Appendix 394"

This book treats ancient logic: the logic that originated in Greece by the Peripatetics and the Stoics, mainly in the hundred year period beginning about 350 BCE.
Ancient Logic and Its Modern Interpretations is based on the 1973 Buffalo Symposium on Modernist Interpretations of Ancient Logic, the first conference devoted entirely to critical assessment of the state of ancient logic studies.  Contributors: Corcoran, Garver, Gould, Kretzmann, Mueller, the Mulherns, Zirin.

As well as being the name of the physical symptom of shivering, shuddering, or goosebumps, the Greek word phrikē names an emotion that is particularly associated with automatic responses to sudden visual or auditory stimuli. This makes it especially at home in a number of specialized (ritual and other) scenarios, and helps explain its recurrent role in the ancient Greek aesthetics and literary theory, a role that illustrates the importance of the visual and the physical in ancient theories of audiences’ emotional responses to the portrayal of suffering in both dramatic performance and non-dramatic narrative.