Free Will, Moral Responsibility

This paper responds to continuing commentary on Velmans (2002a) “How could conscious experiences affect brains,” a target article for a special issue of JCS. I focus on the final question dealt with by the target article: how free will relates to preconscious and conscious mental processing, and I develop the case for preconscious free will.  Although “preconscious free will” might appear to be a contradiction in terms, it is consistent with the scientific evidence and provides a parsimonious way to reconcile the commonsense view that voluntary acts are freely chosen with the evidence that conscious wishes and decisions are determined by preconscious processing in the mind/brain.  I consider alternative interpretations of how “conscious free will” might operate by Libet and by Mangan and respond to doubts about the extent to which the operations of mind are revealed in consciousness, raised by Claxton and Bouratinos. In reconciling commonsense attributions of freedom and responsibility with the findings of science, preconscious free will can be shown to have practical consequences for adjudications in law.

ABSTRACT: This paper serves two purposes: (i) it can be used by students as an introduction to chapters 1-5 of book iii of the NE; (ii) it suggests an answer to the unresolved question what overall objective this section of the NE has. The paper focuses primarily on Aristotle’s theory of what makes us responsible for our actions and character. After some preliminary observations about praise, blame and responsibility (Section 2), it sets out in detail how all the key notions of NE iii 1-5 are interrelated (Sections 3-9). The setting-out of these interconnections makes it then possible to provide a comprehensive interpretation of the purpose of the passage. Its primary purpose is to explain how agents are responsible for their actions not just insofar as they are actions of this kind or that, but also insofar as they are noble or base: agents are responsible for their actions qua noble or base, because, typically via choice, their character dispositions are a causal factor of those actions (Section 10). The paper illustrates the different ways in which agents can be causes of their actions by means of Aristotle’s four basic types of agents (Section 11). A secondary purpose of NE iii 1-5 is to explain how agents can be held responsible for consequences of their actions (Section 12), in particular for their character dispositions insofar as these are noble or base, i.e. virtues or vices (Section 13). These two goals are not the only ones Aristotle pursues in the passage. But they are the ones Aristotle himself indicates in its first sentence and summarizes in its last paragraph; and the ones that give the passage a systematic unity. The paper also briefly consider the issues of freedom-to-do-otherwise, free choice and free-will in the contexts in which they occur (i.e. in the final paragraphs of Sections 6, 7, 12, 13).

As the majority perpetrators of sexual violence, it is plausible to see men as responsible for war rape not only as individuals, but also as collective bystanders, facilitators and beneficiaries. Following recent criticisms of individual legal and moral responsibility for rape as a war crime in international law, this article examines how we might think of war rape as a collective action in moral and sociological terms. First, it assesses existing moral arguments for the responsibility of men in groups for rape, primarily with reference to the work of Claudia Card, Larry May and Robert Strikwerda. Critiquing elements of these arguments, it explores the difficulties in talking about ‘men’ as a coherent group and in discussing ‘collectives’ themselves. Second, the article draws out the connection between accounts of moral responsibility and accounts of causal responsibility. Drawing on critiques of collective responsibility and the long-standing agency/structure problem, it argues that causal accounts focusing on structure pose a serious challenge to ideas of both individual and collective moral responsibility. The complexities of the relationship between moral and causal claims are illustrated through a discussion of Susan Brownmiller and Catharine MacKinnon’s influential perspectives on rape. The seeming paradox of responsibility is emphasised as a problem to be addressed by gender and feminist perspectives that seek to pursue both ethical and sociological inquiry into the workings of masculinity and the political means for undoing gendered wrongs.

The free will problem is defined and three solutions are discussed: no-freedom theory, libertarianism, and compatibilism. Strict determinism is often assumed in arguing for libertarianism or no-freedom theory. It assumes that the history of the universe is fixed, but modern physics admits a certain degree of randomness in the determination of events. However, this is not enough for a compatibilist position-which is favored here-since freedom is not randomness. It is the I that chooses what to do. It is argued that the core of the free will problem is what this I is. A materialist view is favored: The I is an activity of the brain. In addition to absence of external and internal compulsion, freedom involves absence of causal sufficiency of influences acting on the I. A more elaborate compatibilist view is proposed, according to which causal determination is complete when we add events occurring in the I (of which the subject is not conscious). Contrary to what several authors have argued, the onset of the readiness potential before the decision to act is no problem here. The experience of agency is incomplete and fallible, rather than illusory. Some consequences of different views about freedom for the ascription of responsibility are discussed.

The paper addresses the issue of the impact of neuroscientific research and techniques on moral and legal responsibility in a methodological perspective and using the method of the conceptual analysis. It contains a discussion of some philosophical and legal problems – the foundation of the concepts of capacity and person, the conceptual link between capacity and responsibility, the legal doctrine of “irresistible impulse”, the problem of automatism and the issue of the psychopath’s responsibility. Its aim is to show what the sciences of the mind cannot do. They cannot put in jeopardy beliefs the justification of which don’t depend on empirical facts, insofar as they are part of the basic conceptual structure through which a complete and consistent description and understanding of the world is possible – that there exist macroscopic objects like persons, that responsibility is compatible with the causal explanations of human behaviour, that the mind and the will are capacities and not mechanical objects, that it is possible to exercise certain abilities without being self-conscious, and that the limits of the participation to a moral community are not defined according to one’s adherence to its norms, but through the general ability of rule-following.

"Resumen
Este capítulo tiene como base el programa de una asignatura optativa de segundo ciclo de la licenciatura de psicología impartida en el Departamento de Psicología Básica de la Facultad de Psicología de Valencia.
El programa está constituido por seis módulos temáticos:
I Aspectos básicos de la Psicologia del Pensamiento Sociomoral y Conducta Prosocial
II Pensamiento Sociomoral (PS)
III Conducta Prosocial (CP)
IV Aspectos intrumentales en la evaluación del PS y la CP
V Relación entre PS y CP
VI Intervención en el PS y CP
Todos los módulos tienen la misma estructura:
Relación de temas que lo componen, los contenidos a tratar, la guía de aprendizaje y la bibliografía (básica, de consulta y de ampliación)
Recursos didácticos disponibles
Diseño de actividades prácticas
El objetivo que se persigue con este programa es la adquisición de una serie de competencias específicas y transversales respecto al Pensamiento Moral y la Conducta Prosocial, es decir, capacidad para describir, medir y aplicar variables y procesos psicológicos relacionados con la psicología moral.


Resum
Aquest capítol té com a base el programa d'una assignatura optativa de segon cicle de la llicenciatura de psicologia impartida en el Departament de Psicologia Bàsica de la Facultat de Psicologia de València.
El programa està constituït per sis mòduls temàtics:
I Aspectes bàsics de la Psicología del Pensament Sociomoral i Conducta Prosocial
II Pensament Sociomoral (PS)
III Conducta Prosocial (CP)
IV Aspectes instrumentals en l'avaluació del PS i la CP
V Relació entre PS i CP
VI Intervenció en el PS i CP
Tots els mòduls tenen la mateixa estructura:
• Relació de temes que ho componen, els continguts a tractar, la guia d'aprenentatge i la bibliografia (bàsica, de consulta i d'ampliació)
• Recursos didàctics disponibles
• Disseny d'activitats pràctiques
L'objectiu que es persegueix amb aquest programa és l'adquisició d'una sèrie de competències específiques i transversals en relació al Pensament Moral i la Conducta Prosocial, és a dir, capacitat per a descriure, mesurar i aplicar variables i processos psicològics relacionats amb la psicologia moral

Abstract
Sociomoral thought and prosocial behaviour
This chapter is based on the program of an optative subject of Psichology at the Basic Psichology Department of the Faculty of Psichology of Valencia.
The program is divided in six thematic modules.
I Basic aspects of Psichology of Sociomoral thought and Prosocial Behaviour
II Sociomoral Thought
III Prosocial Behaviour
IV Instrumental aspects in the evaluation of Sociomoral Thought and Prosocial Behaviour
V Relation between Sociomoral Thought and Prosocial Behaviour
VI Intervention in Sociomoral Thought and Prosocial Behaviour
All the modules have the same structure:
-Relation of the themes, contents, learning guide and bibliography (basic, of request and of extension)
-Available didactic resources
-Design of practical activities.
The aim is to acquire some specific and transverse competences related to Moral Thought and Prosocial Behaviour: writing capacity, to measure and apply variables and psichological processes related to Moral Psichology."

According to Augustine's doctrine of original sin, Adam's progeny share a collective guilt which, like an infection, spreads through wayward sexual desires, passing from parent to child. But is it fair to blame sinners if they inherit evil like a disease? In Stricken by Sin, Cured by Christ Jesse Couenhoven clarifies the logic and illogic of Augustine's controversial views about human agency. The first half of the book examines why Augustine believed we are trapped by evil, and why only Christ can save us. Couenhoven examines overlooked texts Augustine wrote at the culmination of his career and offers a novel reading of his views about whether we control our personal identities, what we should be held culpable for, and whether freedom is compatible with necessity. The second half of the book develops a philosophically and scientifically astute theory of responsibility that makes it possible to retrieve some of Augustine's most divisive claims.

Couenhoven makes a case for the surprising thesis that a carefully formulated doctrine of original sin is profoundly humane. The claim that sin is original takes seriously our dependence on one another for essential aspects of character and personality, our ownership of cognitive and volitional states that are not simply products of voluntary choices, and our status as personal agents of evil. Attending to these aspects of our lives challenges the idea that each individual's moral and spiritual standing is up to her or him, and drives us to ponder not only the nature of our responsibility and the shape of the freedom we seek, but also the need for grace we all share.

This paper reflects on the articles submitted for the Symposium Confronting the Internet's Dark Side. I discuss some of the criticisms of the book's theory and my treatment of hate speech. The responsibilities of Internet Service Providers (ISPs) and Web-Hosting Services (WHSs) are in the fore, arguing that as they are the gatekeepers, they need to be proactive far more than they are now. This paper, like my book, strives to suggest an approach that harnesses the strengths and capabilities of the public and the private sectors in offering practical solutions to pressing problems.

Hannah Arendt’s concept of the banality of evil is sometimes read as ‘letting off’ Eichmann, by portraying him as a moral idiot who was unable to think for himself. While I ultimately reject such readings of Arendt, I do reach a similar conclusion, via a different route, by arguing that Arendt’s account of the ‘nobody’ does undermine the grounds for ascribing responsibility to Eichmann. Thankfully, though, this unfortunate conclusion can be avoided by revising the concept of the banality of evil.

Matt King and Peter Carruthers have recently argued that consciousness of our attitudes cannot play a role in distinguishing actions for which we are responsible from those for which we are not, because there are no conscious attitudes. This claim, in turn, is defended on the basis of Carruthers’ argument that access to the content of our attitudes is interpretive rather than introspective. In the first, briefer, part of this paper, I argue that however we come to be aware of the content of our attitudes, whether we are aware of this content makes a morally significant difference. In the second, longer, part of the paper I consider the implications of Carruthers’ view for moral responsibility for actions caused by implicit attitudes. We appear regularly to be aware of the content of our implicit attitudes; moreover, if Carruthers is right, we discover this content by much the same route as we discover the content of our explicit attitudes. There seems, therefore, to be a case for treating implicit and explicit attitudes alike, so far as moral responsibility is concerned. I argue that awareness of the content of our implicit attitudes is not sufficient for moral responsibility for actions caused by them. Implicit attitudes impact on behavior in ways that differ systematically from the way explicit attitudes impact on behavior. I argue that attitudes that are reportable (as propositional attitudes) have broader and more integrated structures than attitudes that cannot be reported, and that this entails that the former have a role in integrating behavior lacked by the latter. Because moral agency and responsibility requires a high degree of unity on behalf of the agent, this difference makes a morally significant difference.

In this paper I examine Kant’s discussion of freedom in the Metaphysics of Morals, while devoting special attention to the question as to whether indeed, as many commentators have claimed, it contains a solution to an objection raised by Carl Leonhard Reinhold in the collected edition of his Letters on the Kantian Philosophy and again by Henry Sidgwick in a famous paper published in 1888. In the first section, I provide a concise formulation of what I believe to be the core of Reinhold’s and Sidgwick’s objection under the title “Objection R/S” and then describe the general structure of the predominant strategy by which commentators have tried to avoid it through recourse to a famous passage in the Metaphysics of Morals. In the second, I recount just enough of the history behind this passage to provide a proper context for its interpretation and, in particular, to show its historical link to Objection R/S. In the remaining sections, I argue that the passage pointed to by commentators does not and indeed cannot contain any solution along the lines so far suggested. By way of conclusion, I consider whether the results I have reached cohere with other passages from Kant’s works and briefly suggest but leave undeveloped an alternative strategy for meeting Objection R/S.

The Kierkegaardian account of becoming a Christian has come to be perceived in radically egocentric terms. This study serves to challenge this perception by demonstrating that Kierkegaard was devoted to expounding Christian conversion as a transformative process of becoming that is grounded in an active relationship initiated through the agency of the eternal God who has established kinship with us in time.
At the same time, this study will also explore the way that Kierkegaard confronts some of the key errors that arise in overly systematic accounts of Christian conversion: (1) the inherent weakness of approaches that seek to dichotomise, and then quantify separately, the contributions of God’s grace and human freedom; (2) the inclination to objectify God and human beings in ways that neglect their existence as living agents; (3) the overemphasis on conversion as a monadic event of individual transformation rather than an event of reconciliation; (4) the tendency to prioritise epistemology over ontology in discussions of becoming a Christian; and (5) the propensity to lose sight of God’s all-embracing purpose of reconciling persons into their one true form of existence ‘before God’.
Finally, this study will also consider how Kierkegaard was able to negotiate his emphasis on the God-relationship with his emphasis on the importance of individual reflection, decision and action in the Christian life. It will conclude that, for Kierkegaard, the freedom to become a Christian is not the freedom to awaken ourselves into the Christian life but a decision to embrace the Christian life into which God awakens us.

Contents

Introduction
I. Listening to Kierkegaard Alongside his Pseudonyms
a. Kierkegaard and Climacus
b. Anti-Climacus and Kierkegaard

Chapter One: The Communication of the Christian Truth
I. Can the Truth Be Learned?
II. The Relationship or Non-Relationship between Subjectivity and Objectivity
III. The Revelation of Sin
a. Despair
b. The infinite qualitative difference and sin-consciousness
IV. Being in the Truth
V. Passion in Kierkegaard’s Thought
a. The Passion of Thought
b. Passionate Responsibility
c. The Passion of Faith
VI. Conclusion

Chapter Two: The Possibility of Reconciliation
I. The Tale of the King and the Maiden
II. Drawing Another to Oneself
III. The Possibility of Reciprocity
IV. The Possibility of Offense
V. Encountering God in Time
VI. Conclusion

Chapter Three: The Orientation of a Life Lived in Relationship with God
I. The Religious Category of Existence
II. Søren Kierkegaard’s Christian Realism
III. Immanent Religiousness and Christianity
IV. Sin-consciousness and Guilt-consciousness
V. Repentance
VI. Conclusion

Chapter Four: The Orientation of a Life Lived in Relationship with God
I. Following Scripture Faithfully
a. Reading a Letter from a Beloved
b. The Perspicuity of Scripture
c. The Uncertainty of Scripture
II. The Single Individual
III. Christ is the Way
a. Following Christ
b. Following Christ Voluntarily
c. Christ as Prototype and Redeemer
IV. Becoming a Christian in the World
V. Conclusion

Chapter Five: The Freedom to Become a Christian in Relationship with God
I. Approaching Christianity
II. The Passionate Transition
a. Venturing the Leap
b. Preparing to become a Christian?
c. Relationship with “the paradox”
III. Faith in the Presence of God
IV. The Choice to Become a Christian
a. The Freedom of the Individual to Relate to God
b. Willing Beliefs
c. Human Responsibility for Sin
d. Transforming the Will
V. The Freedom to Love
VI. Conclusion

Closing Reflection
I. Kierkegaard’s Low Pneumatology
II. Communion with the One Who Establishes Kinship with Us in Time
III. Conclusion

Against its prominent compatiblist and libertarian opponents, I defend Galen Strawson’s Basic Argument for the impossibility of moral responsibility. Against John Martin Fischer, I argue that the Basic Argument does not rely on the premise that an agent can be responsible for an action only if he is responsible for every factor contributing to that action. Against Alfred Mele and Randolph Clarke, I argue that it is absurd to believe that an agent can be responsible for an action when no factor contributing to that action is up to that agent. Against Derk Pereboom and Clarke, I argue that the versions of agent-causal libertarianism they claim can immunize the agent to the Basic Argument actually fail to do so. Against Robert Kane, I argue that the Basic Argument does not rely on the premise that simply the presence of indeterministic factors in the process of bringing an action about is itself what rules out the agent’s chance for being responsible for that action.

Purpose–The purpose of this paper is to introduce practitioners to the appropriate use of measures of unethical behaviour, evaluate the use of integrity-related assessments for use in personnel selection, and determine the validity of the moral competency index (MCI) instrument using standard validation procedures. Design/methodology/approach–Content, construct, convergent and discriminant approaches are applied to establish the relative validity of the assessment tool.

Purpose -This paper aims to examine how to further embed CSR thinking and practice into corporations, particularly in emerging markets, by reviewing and drawing similarities between key issues faced by all senior managers, namely ethics, leadership, personal responsibility and trust.

Since the 1970s and 1980s, national newspapers in France, both general and political, have regularly praised ‘investigative journalism’ and its role in unveiling ‘scandals’. To gain an understanding of how this new model of professional excellence arose, even though it concerns only a small number of journalists, we need to show the extent to which it is first of all largely symptomatic of a series of changes that have occurred outside the field of journalism, especially in the political and legal worlds, and in the relationships these spaces maintain with one another. In particular it is important to show that the media space has become highly strategic, notwithstanding its relative lack of autonomy. What is covered by the media is largely the outcome of power relations within different social spaces that are then translated in accordance with media processes. Thus ‘investigative journalism’ is often based less on journalists’ own investigations than on state-sponsored studies: reports, inquests, etc. The present article endeavours to show how and why these ‘scandals’ have been exposed only where such external changes have also found an echo in the field of general and political media nationally, in particular among a group of politicized journalists who constitute a new specialist field within the profession. The rise of ‘investigative journalism’ and its successful profile in the discourse of the profession both result from and reveal transformations affecting the whole space of journalism.

Edited by Rick Repetti. Routledge / Taylor & Francis (August 2016).

CONTENTS

Foreword by Daniel Cozort
Acknowledgments
Contributors
Preface
Introduction

1 Why the Buddha Did Not Discuss ‘the Problem of Free Will and Determinism’
Christopher W. Gowans 

2 Why There Should Be a Buddhist Theory of Free Will
Rick Repetti

3 Uses of the Illusion of Agency: Why Some Buddhists Should Believe in Free Will
Charles Goodman

4 Just Another Word for Nothing Left to Lose: Freedom, Agency and Ethics for
Mādhyamikas
Jay Garfield

5 Negative Dialectics in Comparative Philosophy: The Case of Buddhist Free Will Quietism
Owen Flanagan

6 Free Will and the Sense of Self
Galen Strawson

7 What Am I Doing?
Susan Blackmore

8 Freedom from Responsibility: Agent-Neutral Consequentialism and the
Bodhisattva Ideal
Christian Coseru

9 Free Will, Liberation and Buddhist Philosophy
Marie Friquegnon

10 Buddhism and Free Will: Beyond the ‘Free Will Problem’
B. Alan Wallace

11 Degrees of Freedom: The Buddha’s Implied Views on the (Im)possibility of Free
Will
Martin T. Adam

12 Buddhist Paleocompatibilism
Mark Siderits

13 Shifting Coalitions, Free Will, and the Responsibility of Persons
Ben Abelson

14 Psychological versus Metaphysical Agents: A Theravāda Buddhist View of Free
Will and Moral Responsibility
Peter Harvey

15 Emotions and Choice: Lessons from Tsongkhapa
Emily McRae

16 Grasping Snakes: Reflections on Free Will, Samādhi, and Dharmas
Karin Meyers

17 Agentless Agency: The Soft Compatibilist Argument from Buddhist Meditation,
Mind-Mastery, Evitabilism, and Mental Freedom
Rick Repetti

Index

The aim of the present study was to examine to what degree different mechanisms of moral disengagement were related to age, gender, bullying, and defending among school children. Three hundred and seventy-two Swedish children ranging in age from 10 to 14 years completed a questionnaire. Findings revealed that boys expressed significantly higher levels of moral justification, euphemistic labeling, diffusion of responsibility, distorting consequences, and victim attribution, as compared with girls. Whereas boys bullied others significantly more often than girls, age was unrelated to bullying. Moral justification and victim attribution were the only dimensions of moral disengagement that significantly related to bullying. Furthermore, younger children and girls were more likely to defend victims. Diffusion of responsibility and victim attribution were significantly and negatively related to defending, while the other dimensions of moral disengagement were unrelated to defending.

Hart and Honoré’s work on causation in the law – first published in 1959 – represented a major turn in contemporary reflection on causation. Causation in the law defended an original contextualist view of causation, which claims for the existence of special common sense principles governing singular causal judgments in human affairs, and emphasizes the special role of human intervention in causal chains. This work was also the starting point for Honoré’s more recent work in the theory of responsibility, focused on «outcome responsibility». Outcome responsibility is a concept distinct from «fault responsibility», built by Honoré against the background of the contemporary debate on the moral foundation of tort law. It derives from a combination of theses on causation, personal rights, moral luck, and the importance of the recognition of human capacity of agency in the formation of an individual personality.

This work approaches the ever-unresolved question about the families’ educative task in the current society. This task is justified by the need of establishing new criteria and educative orientations on the bases of the current events that family life is going through. After a brief description of the reality sociological family in Spain, it is laid down that family is an ethnic community of people where hospitality lives as a criterion to build the morality of the individual. The family is the social space where it is effectively the responsibility of parents caring for their children. If family relations are hospitality praxis, then family life is a privileged
space for the teaching of value that is experienced by the other as a responsible citizen. Therefore, values are learned in and from host experience, donation as well as the accompaniment of the adults in the shape of narration and testimony of both children and teenagers. The experience of receiving care becomes responsible for the fathers to their children; the Responsible Care Ethic is the fundamental attitude that the children can learn moral values in family life. From this attitude are derived three basic criteria for relationships between family members can promote the learning of values. On the one hand, states that pedagogical  houghtfulness is an appropriate way establishing relationships between parents and children. Next to this tact, indicates that careful listening is another important ingredient of education in values, in which dialogue and humor become dynamic elements of interpersonal communication between parents and children in family life.

Philosophical problems of freedom and responsibility are among the most recalcitrant philosophical problems that we have, and are connected to a range of important issues in our understanding of agency, autonomy, blame, and the grounds of moral assessment. Freedom, Fairness and Responsibility argues for a 'Hybrid View' on these issues: that is, a view that combines the insights of more traditional compatibilist and incompatibilist theories into a unified solution to this set of closely connected philosophical problems.

The notion of a free will is a notion we have inherited from antiquity. It was first in antiquity that one came to think of human beings as having a free will. But, as with so many other notions we have inherited from antiquity, … we have to ask ourselves whether the notion of a free will has not outlived its usefulness, has not become a burden rather than of any real help in understanding ourselves and what we do." 1 I

The aim of this Chapter is to explore the relation between normative and empirical expectations, and attributions of responsibility. As I argued in Chapters 3 and 4, social commitments give rise to both types of expectations. On the one hand, social commitments are fulfilled on a regular basis, and this regularity creates empirical expectations about what agents will do. On the other hand, social commitments create social obligations, which are normative (or justificatory) reasons for actions that are socially acquired and acknowledged. By becoming socially committed, agents create normative expectations, and acknowledge being the target of such expectations. These expectations refer to what the agents should do.
Responsibility is a very broad concept. Moral and legal philosophy have provided many different definitions of what responsibility is, as well as different set of criteria an agent has to meet in order to be held responsible. The claim I will defend here is that responsibility can be understood in a non‑moral and non‑legal sense, as a relation between an agent and an outcome to another agent, who attributes responsibility. This relation is basically explanatory: an agent is responsible for an outcome if it is possible to explain the outcome in terms of the agent's authorship.
The structure of this Chapter is as follows. Section 5.1 analyses different concepts of responsibility, and argues for a normative notion of responsibility as attributability which precedes moral or legal responsibility. In Section 5.2, I examine two traditional criteria for attributing responsibility. Intuitively, an agent can only be responsible for what she has caused; I will present an overview of some problems related to causal responsibility. Then, I move to analysing the criteria regarding the agent's capabilities, both external (freedom conditions) and internal (self‑control and reason‑responsiveness). In the Section 5.3, I will present a contrastive account of causal explanations. The practice of asking and giving explanations is contextual to the background assumptions against which the explanation is required. I will argue that empirical and normative expectations play a fundamental role in explaining the causal relevance given to agents. I finally examine the relation between explanation and justification of action through the distinction between exemptions and excuses.

1. La responsabilità tra etica e diritto. 2. L’analisi della responsabilità 3. La responsabilità come capacità 4. La responsabilità come causa.  5. La responsabilità come colpevolezza: intenzione e giustificazione 6. La responsabilità come colpevolezza: libertà e scusanti.

ABSTRACT: This is a short companion piece to my ‘Found in Translation – Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics III.5 1113b7-8 and its Reception’ in which I examine in close textual analysis the philosophical question whether these two lines from the Nicomachean Ethics provide any evidence that Aristotle discussed free choice – as is not infrequently assumed. The result is that they do not, and that the claim that they do tends to be based on a mistranslation of the Greek. (There is some inevitable overlap with Part 1 of the 'Found in Translation' paper.)

Much of chapters 2 to 6 is in agreement with publications from the last twenty years (including those of the reviewer); so for example Frede’s points that neither Aristotle nor the Stoics had a notion of free-will; that in Epictetus (for the first time) the notions of freedom and will were combined; that an indeterminist notion of free-will occurs first in Alexander. The achievement of these chapters lies in the way Frede carefully joins them together and uses them as a basis for some substantive criticism and rewriting of the history of free-will regarding late antique Pagan and Christian authors, in particular Plotinus, Origen and Augustine.

The chapter on 'The Nature of Freedom' from one of the most original essays ever written, exploring freedom from the standpoint of Post-Kantian Idealism. F.W.J. von Schelling's essay is challenging to read but it has been re-edited into chapters and presented in a new way so as to make it more easily read. Edouard d'Araille has also provided the briefest of introductions to the life and work of Friedrich Wilhelm Josef von Schelling. In his 'Prefatory Note' he provides a biographical sketch of the author and discusses his work and influences. It is followed by an extract of Josiah Royce's on Schelling which gives a larger picture of the romantic-idealist philosopher. It is a valuable contribution to the philosophy of freedom, surpassed only by Schopenhauer's 'Essay on the Freedom of Will'. This meticulous edited version of von Schelling's essay includes three portraits (one in colour) and full textual annotations.

In a much-publicized paper, Zhong and Liljenquist (2006) reported evidence that feelings of moral cleanliness are grounded in feelings of physical cleanliness: a threat to people’s moral purity leads them to seek, literally, to cleanse themselves. In an attempt to replicate and build upon these findings, we conducted a pilot study in which we unexpectedly failed to replicate the original results from the second study of Zhong and Liljenquist’s report. To investigate the source of this issue, we conducted a series of direct replications of Study 2 as reported in Zhong and Liljenquist (2006). We used the authors’ original materials and methods; we investigated samples that were more representative of the general population than in the original experiments; we investigated samples from different countries and cultures; and we substantially increased the power of our statistical tests. Nevertheless, we still failed to replicate Zhong and Liljenquist’s initial reported findings. Our research suggests that more work is needed to clarify the scope and robustness of the original results.

Автор статьи представляет критику одного из наиболее важных современных аргументов против компатибилизма в вопросе о свободе воли – «Аргумента Манипуляций» Д. Перебума. Аргумент Манипуляций построен на аналогии между внешней манипуляцией действиями агента и каузальной детерминацией. На основе этой аналогии Перебум делает вывод об отсутствии моральной ответственности агентов, действующих в условиях каузальной детерминации. Автор данной статьи предлагает расширение мысленного эксперимента Перебума. В ходе этого исследования автор приходит к выводу о том, что аргумент Манипуляций не доказывает несовместимость детерминизма с моральной ответственностью. По мнению автора, аргумент Перебума показывает только необходимость существования целостной личности и последовательной личностной истории для моральной ответственности.

ABSTRACT: A systematic reconstruction of Chrysippus’ theory of causes, grounded on the Stoic tenets that causes are bodies, that they are relative, and that all causation can ultimately be traced back to the one ‘active principle’ which pervades all things. I argue that Chrysippus neither developed a finished taxonomy of causes, nor intended to do so, and that he did not have a set of technical terms for mutually exclusive classes of causes. Rather, the various adjectives which he used for causes had the function of describing or explaining particular features of certain causes in particular philosophical contexts. I challenge the sometimes assumed close connection of Chrysippus’ notion of causation with explanation. I show that the standard view that the distinction between proximate and auxiliary causes and perfect and principal causes corresponds to the distinction between internal and external determining factors is not born out by the evidence, and argue that causes of the two types were not thought to co-operate, but rather conceived of as alternatives.

A brief overview of the negative aliens' history contaminating the consciousness fields of the Nebadon (our) Universe, together with a short list of atrocities that they have committed while invading the territory of Nebadon through creating unauthorized tears in the fabrics of space-times, joining them together to form wormholes, and in turn, linking these wormholes to form a black hole system, is presented. It is explicated that these negative aliens have created an incredible amount of energetic wastes or 'miasma' in the consciousness field of Earth through utilization of their AI machinery that progressively has led to the generation of' black goo' and its adherence to human DNA, culminating in a variety forms of genetic mutations and alien hybridization. Being of parallel-antiparallel dimensions to our Earth and being energetic or stealth to our physical plane, their negative agendas have been particularly carried out by a horde of narcissistic, self-serving hybrid human individuals who are firmly set on attaining fame and fortune for themselves at the expense of others, with utter apathy and ruthlessness, who consider everyone else as inferior to their 'elitist' linage and pyramidal hierarchical societal structure, even viewing other humans as nothing more than 'farm animals,' to be put in, essentially, forced labor, and being utilized as slaves and such, at the same time being totally mind controlled, mind slided, and blank slated as to not be aware of what is transpiring in their Phantom Reality, that to a significant degree, is actually governed by the negative aliens AI machinery. Finally, it is explicated as to what will happen to these nefarious individuals during the beginning of this current Ascension Cycle with reference to their new course of existence.

ABSTRACT: This book is a comprehensive study of the Stoic theory of causal and teleological determinism. It identifies the main problems the Stoics addressed, reconstructs the theory, and explores how they squared their determinism with their conceptions of possibility, action, freedom, and moral responsibility, and how they defended it against objections and criticism by other philosophers. It shows how the Stoics distinguished their causal determinism from ancient theories of logical determinism, fatalism, and necessitarianism, and shows that they developed a compatibilist theory with a rationalist component. Along the way many other related aspects of Stoic thought are discussed, including their views on the predictability of the future, the role of empirical sciences, character development, and moral freedom. The main Stoic theory of causal determinism goes back to the Stoic Chrysippus. There are some interesting developments of the theory in the later Stoa.

Il problema del libero arbitrio è tornato recentemente sulla scena filosofica grazie all'apporto di studi ed esperimenti neuroscientifici sulla volontà. Nel presente lavoro vengono trattati alcuni aspetti del problema del libero arbitrio e della volontà cosciente tra filosofia e scienza cognitiva.
Innanzitutto si definiscono le condizioni di un'azione libera (possibilità alternative e autodeterminazione) e si considera il rapporto fra libertà e determinismo illustrando pregi e difetti delle posizioni più rappresentate: le teorie della famiglia libertaria, il compatibilismo, lo scetticismo. Questa indagine conduce ad una conclusione scettica per cui il libero arbitrio risulta incoerente sia con una concezione deterministica che con una concezione indeterministica della realtà.
Viene discusso poi il rapporto fra aspetti fenomenici (soggettivi) della libertà e descrizione neuroscientifica: nello specifico viene indagato il rapporto fra decisione di compiere un'azione motoria e preparazione dell'azione a livello corticale. Alcuni recenti esperimenti presi in esame (sulla scia di quelli condotti da Benjamin Libet) mostrano che la consapevolezza cosciente della decisione di agire compare “in ritardo” rispetto all'attivazione corticale preparatoria al movimento. Grazie a questo ritardo sembra possibile prevedere in anticipo il momento in cui il soggetto agisce e l'esito della decisione. A ciò segue un'analisi di alcuni stati psicopatologici rilevanti (come la depersonalizzazione) in cui il senso dell'agency è compromesso.
Alla luce di tutto ciò viene illustrata l'ipotesi (sostenuta da D. Wegner e D. Dennett) che la volontà non rivesta un ruolo causale nel determinare le azioni, ma sia una sensazione frutto di un'autoattribuzione a posteriori del soggetto stesso: sarebbe dunque il prodotto di un'inferenza a posteriori rispetto ai correlati neuronali delle decisioni ed un meccanismo di attribuzione i cui deficit provocano una perdita del senso dell'agency.
Nelle conclusioni vengono delineate le teorie più recenti sulla volontà cosciente in relazione al rapporto fra filosofia della mente, neuroscienze, fenomenologia e psicologia.