Analytic Metaphysics

REVIEW: YITZHAK Y. MELAMED, "La metafisica di Spinoza. Sostanza e pensiero", a cura di Emanuele Costa, Mimesis, Milano-Udine 2020. Un volume di pagine 336. [Forthcoming in "Rivista di Filosofia Neo-Scolastica" (Received: 23/12/2020, Approved: 26/12/2020). Draft version - do not quote it without the author's permission / Versione bozza - non citare senza il permesso dell'autore].

An analysis of the ordinary conception of material (ordinary) objects with the intention of overcoming the difficulties which torment their ontology. After having critically examined the contemporary ontological theories of material objects, as well as the principal questions that are involved by their ontology (such as identity, individuation, exemplification of properties, persistence over time), I proposed a new definition of the naïve notion of material object, in order to make it both internally consistent and compatible with the most accredited models of space-time continuum. According to Classical Mereology, the proposed definition is completely extensional, but according to Neo-Aristotelian Hylomorphism, it provides an ontological founding to the principle of unity which makes a mereological sum be an individual.

"ABSTRACT:
    This study assumes the subject's pursuit of meaning is generally incapacitating and should be suspended. It aims to demonstrate how such a suspension is theoretically accomplished by utilizing Lacan's formulae of sexuation integrated with his work in discourse theory and topology.
    Part I places this study into context by examining scholarship from the established fields of hermeneutics, phenomenology, (post)structuralism, aesthetic theory and psychoanalysis in order to extract out their respective theory of meaning. These theories reveal that an historical struggle with meaning has been underway since the Reformation and reaches near crisis proportions in the 20th century. On the one hand this crisis is mollified by the rise of Heideggerian-Gadamerian hermeneutical phenomenology which questions traditional epistemological approaches to the text using a new ontological conceptualization of meaning and a conscious rejection of methodology. On the other hand this crisis is exacerbated when the ubiquitous nature of meaning is itself challenged by (post)structuralism's discovery of the signifier which inscribes a limit to meaning, and by the domains of sense and nonsense newly opened up by aesthetic theory. These historical developments culminate in the field of psychoanalysis which most consequentially delimits a cause of meaning said to be closely linked to the core of subjectivity.
    Part II extends these findings by rigorously constructing out of the Lacanian sexuated formulae a decidedly non-hermeneutical phenomenological approach useful in demonstrating the sexual nature of meaning. Explicated in their static state by way of an account of their original derivation from the Aristotelian logical square, it is argued that these four formulae are relevant to basic concerns of textual theory inclusive of the hermeneutical circle of meaning. These formulae are then set into motion by integrating them with Lacan's four discourses to demonstrate the breakdown of meaning. Finally, the cuts and sutures of two-dimensional space that is topology as set down in L'étourdit are performed to confirm how the very field of meaning is ultimately suspended from a nonsensical singular point known in Lacanian psychoanalysis as objet a. The contention is that by occupying this point the subject frees himself from the debilitating grip of meaning."

Many proponents of methodological nonreductionism in contemporary science find the notion of downward causation (DC) a sine qua non of the strong (ontological) version of emergence (EM), which strives to give an account of the irreducible character of the complex levels of the organization of matter. But what for many is the essence of nonreductionist physicalism, carries with it quite a bevy of problematic issues, and becomes a stumbling block and an obstacle for those, who acknowledge the metaphysical and logical inconsistencies of the emergent theory based on the idea of DC. For how can physicalism be non-reductionist? How can DC be reconciled with the causal closure of physics? What do “higher” and “lower” levels refer to? What is causal in DC? What is being caused (acted upon)? What is the very nature of DC?

I will argue that the defense of DC requires from us a broader notion of causation, which goes beyond the efficient causes accepted and described in modern science. I want to argue in favor of the retrieval of formal causation in particular. Its acceptance not only makes EM and DC plausible, but also helps to overcome and replace Humean causation of events with the causation of living and non-living beings, explained in terms of their causal powers and dispositions. I hope to show, in the course of my presentation, that true non-reductionism needs to be philosophically grounded. Yet it can still remain compatible with science provided it values and is open to the reflection offered by philosophy of nature. My position follows new Aristotelianism developed within the analytic tradition, although an explicit reintroduction of formal cause goes beyond it to the original thought of Aristotle.

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In 2007 James Ladyman and Don Ross published Every Thing Must Go: Metaphysics Naturalized, an attempt to synthesize Ladyman’s ‘Ontic Structural Realism’ and Ross’s ‘Rainforest Realism’ into a unified metaphysics applicable to science from physics to economics. Beginning with a blistering polemic against what they call ‘neo-scholastic metaphysics’, Ladyman and Ross argue for an approach to metaphysics which goes far beyond the vague science-friendliness characteristic of so much of contemporary soi-disant naturalism in favour of an unabashedly ‘scientistic’ stance. Dispensing with the habitual ontology of ‘little things and microbangings’ which continues to hold sway in contemporary ‘pseudo-naturalist philosophy’, Every Thing Must Go provides the case for a radically naturalistic metaphysics capable of taking on board the most counterintuitive findings of modern physics without impugning the epistemic credentials of the special sciences. In our interview, Ladyman discusses the reasons for his exasperation with philosophers who persist in doing metaphysics as if modern science had never happened, provides a robust defence of ‘the scientistic stance’, and explains how the position developed in Every Thing Must Go provides a heuristic framework for the unification of the sciences via a dialectical synthesis of the strengths of both realism and empiricism.

This article builds on C. S. Peirce’s suggestive blueprint for an inclusive outlook that grants reality to his three categories. Moving away from the usual focus on (contentious) cosmological forces, I use a modal principle to partition various ontological layers: regular sign-action (like coded language) subsumes actual sign-action (like here-and-now events) which in turn subsumes possible sign-action (like qualities related to whatever would be similar to them). Once we realize that the triadic sign’s components are each answerable to this asymmetric subsumption, we obtain the means to track at which level of complexity semiosis finds itself, in a given case. Since the bulk of such a “trinitarian” metaphysics would be devoted to countenancing un-interpreted phenomena, I argue that current misgivings about sign-based ontologies are largely misplaced.

According to dispositional realism, or dispositionalism, the entities inhabiting our world possess irreducibly dispositional properties - often called 'powers' - by means of which they are sources of change. Dispositionalism has become increasingly popular among metaphysicians in the last three decades as it offers a realist account of causation and provides novel avenues for understanding modality, laws of nature, agency, free will and other key concepts in metaphysics. At the same time, dispositionalism is receiving growing interest among philosophers of science. This reflects the substantial role scientific findings play in arguments for dispositionalism which, as a metaphysics of science, aims to elucidate the very foundations of science. In this introductory chapter, I give an overview of the state of the debate and explain the twofold aim of the present collection of essays which is (i) to explore the ontological commitments of dispositionalism and (ii) to discuss these against the background of latest scientific research, by bringing together perspectives from both metaphysics and the philosophy of science. I finally provide a summary of this intellectual journey.

The influence of Aristotle has been growing lately in analytic metaphysics. Different positions concerning properties, natural laws, causal powers, modality,
persistence in time and, even, in meta-metaphysics have been characterized as ‘Aristotelian’ or ‘Neo-Aristotelian’. This work discusses two areas in which this influence
has been particularly noteworthy: the ontology of natural laws and meta-ontology. The last century has seen an evolution from Humean conceptions of natural laws as
regularities to conceptions of natural laws as primitive causal powers that are essential to the properties that ground them in their instantiations. Concerning meta-ontology, the Neo-Aristotelian position has moved from the Quinean idea of ontological commitment to the identification of structures of grounding and dependence. Metaphysics is conceived as concerned with questions about ontological priority and not about ‘what there is’.

‘Metaphysics’ is the quest to find the ultimate meaning and purpose of existence. It is about trying to find a decisive and conclusive resolution to the human condition, such that the human condition is fulfilled in some absolute way, and no longer at the mercy of meaningless suffering, or a dreadful sense of uncertainty. All other definitions and determinations of metaphysics are trivial, and irrelevant; and, given the critical importance of the quest for human fulfilment – our lives are not infinite, after all – really quite bewildering. Western philosophy  has never understood this, and its entire intellectual history has been characterised by a persistent debasing of any simple, straightforward and direct quest for objective metaphysical self-knowledge, preferring instead always to indulge either in pedantic squabbling over definitions, distinctions and conceptual manoeuvrings, or in flatulent ‘system building’.

Laypersons and even many philosophers say that much of what's discussed and stated in analytic metaphysics is ridiculous and/or “trivial”. That may be true. Though we must have a wider and more historical vision here because isn't it also the case that this sort of thing has been said about many historical philosophical positions – both by laypersons and by philosophers?

Philosophical disgust at metaphysics goes back to Kant or further. Then, 160 years or so years after Kant, we had Rudolf Carnap speaking out against metaphysics. Then again, so too did Martin Heidegger – in his What is Metaphysics? [1929] - at roughly the same time as Carnap. Not only that: Carnap spoke out against Heidegger's metaphysics – in his The Elimination of Metaphysics Through Logical Analysis of Language [1931] - when Heidegger was himself speaking out against what he classed as “Western metaphysics”. Thus being against metaphysics – at least in the 1920s, 1930s, 1940s, and 1950s - became both a sport and a philosophical fashion.

As stated, many positions within analytic metaphysics (sometimes within the entire genus of metaphysics) are deemed by laypersons to be trivial, scholastic and/or oblivious to science. Philosophers have also had a go at analytic metaphysics. David Chalmers, for example, thinks most of the disputes are primarily “verbal” in nature.

The problem is that no only may such anti-metaphysical philosophers throw out all metaphysics with their demands (i.e., if you follow their logic to its conclusion), it may also be the case that much science will be thrown out too. (This point was famously made against certain positions advanced by the logical positivists in the 1920s and 1930s.) For example, what about empirically-untestable string theory and multiverses? Are they examples of scientific “neo-Scholasticism”? What about some of the well-known mathematical and logical problems which can simply be seen as “intellectual puzzles” and nothing more?

Again, the major criticism of analytic metaphysicians is that they more or less ignore science. In at least some cases, metaphysicians do so because they believe that metaphysics comes before physics. (Yes, despite the Greek translation of the word.) It can be said that before the rise of modern science it was indeed philosophers who investigated “the fundamental structure and nature of physical reality” (as it's often put). However, after the rise of modern science, many philosophers now argue that metaphysicians shouldn't still be doing metaphysics without the help or findings of science.... at least not in 2019!

James Ladyman and Don Ross's (who are self-described “ontic structural realists”) main criticisms of analytic metaphysics seem a little rhetorical – at least as they stand. For example, in their book *Everything Must Go: Metaphysics Naturalized*, they argue/state:

i) That metaphysics "contributes nothing to human knowledge”.
ii) That metaphysicians are "wasting their talents”.
iii) That metaphysics “fails to qualify as part of the enlightened pursuit of objective truth, and should be discontinued”.

Many people who're deeply suspicious of analytic metaphysics will be keen on the position David Manley describes as “strong deflationism”; which is a term also used by Ted Sider in his paper/chapter, 'Ontological Realism'. The position of strong deflationism is, of course, still a metaphysical position.  Manley goes on to say that “[i]n its new forms, strong deflationism poses as serious a challenge to metaphysics as ever”.

The “mild deflationist” position (as enunciated by Manley) is difficult to grasp. Manley tells us that mild deflationists “admit that there is a genuine dispute at issue”; though they also believe that “it can be resolved in a relatively trivial fashion by reflecting on conceptual or semantic facts”. Moreover, “nothing of substance is left for the metaphysician to investigate”.

In any case, can any dispute be “merely verbal” in a literal sense?

My aim in this article is twofold. First, I hope to show that, despite its seeming rehabilitation, metaphysics as systematic, speculative philosophy is no less threatened. Second, I will argue that metaphysics as systematic, speculative philosophy is ultimately revisable. That is, metaphysics is not (or should not be) the aim at a closed system of apodictic truths but, rather, an open-ended, fallibilistic pursuit of ever-more-adequate accounts of reality. Specifically, building on the work of Charles Sanders Peirce and Alfred North Whitehead, I will argue that we should conceive of metaphysics not as the quest for absolute certainty but as “working hypothesis.” Thus, the first part will be
largely historical and critical, and the second part will be  positive and exploratory.

Peter van Inwagen (2001) has given a probabilistic answer to the fundamental question 'why is there something rather than nothing?': There is something, because the probability of there being nothing is 0. Some authors recently examined van Inwagen's argument and concluded that it does not really work. Three points are central in their criticism: (i) the premise which states that there is only one empty possible world is false, (ii) the premise which states that all possible worlds have the same probability is not plausible and (iii) the argument is not significant for the question it sets out to answer. In this paper, I shall show that (i) even if there are many empty worlds, this does not necessarily invalidate the argument in its general lines, (ii) the examples they offer to support the intuition that possible worlds may have different probabilities fail, and (iii) even if the conclusion of the argument does not really answer the question van Inwagen sets out to answer, it is still not an insignificant response to the question.

The following is a commentary on the first and last sections (i.e.,  'The Ontology of Composite Material Objects' and 'What Should We Believe?') of Theodore Sider's paper 'Ontological Realism'; which is included in the book *Metametaphysics: New Essays on the Foundations of Ontology*.

Just as Sider's first and last sections are more or less introductory in nature; so is this commentary. I'll attempt to tackle the more technical sections within Sider's paper subsequently.

The relevance of analytic metaphysics has come under criticism: Ladyman & Ross, for instance, have suggested do discontinue the field. French & McKenzie have argued in defense of analytic metaphysics that it develops tools that could turn out to be useful for philosophy of physics. In this article, we show first that this heuristic defense of metaphysics can be extended to the scientific field of applied ontology, which uses constructs from analytic metaphysics. Second, we elaborate on a parallel by French & McKenzie between mathematics and metaphysics to show that the whole field of analytic metaphysics, being useful not only for philosophy but also for science, should continue to exist as a largely autonomous field.

Theodore Sider (sometimes deemed to be an arch-analytic metaphysician) tells us what he takes metaphysics to be. (Or, perhaps, he tells us what he thinks metaphysics *ought* to be.). In his paper/chapter, 'Ontological Realism', he writes: “The point of metaphysics is to discern the fundamental structure of the world.” What's more, “[t]hat requires choosing fundamental notions with which to describe the world". Indeed Sider continues by saying that “no one other than a positivist can make all the hard questions evaporate”.

Sider also makes it plain that metaphysics asks fundamental and important questions by asking the reader his own question:

“Was Reichenbach wrong?— is there a genuine question of whether spacetime is flat or curved?”

More technically, Sider cites Quine's work (as well as the quantification of metaphysical structure) as the means to establish an answer to the question above (as well as others). Thus what is realist in Sider's ontological realism is “objective structure”.

Sider also gets to the heart of the matter (at least in the debate between metaphysical realism and what he calls “deflationism”) when he states the following:

“Everyone faces the question of what is ‘real’ and what is the mere projection of our conceptual apparatus, of which issues are substantive and which are ‘mere bookkeeping’.”

It's hardly surprising - if we take the positions above - that Sider himself has heard “[w]hispers that something was wrong with the debate itself”. Despite that, according to Sider:

“Today’s ontologists are not conceptual analysts; few attend to ordinary usage of sentences like ‘chairs exist’.”

It's tempting to say that ontologists *should* indulge in a bit of conceptual analysis! Not that conceptual analysis should be the beginning and the end of metaphysics; only that it may help things.

Ted Sider also attacks attacks what he calls “conventionalism”. He argues that if we accept conventionalism, then we “demystify philosophy itself”. Is Sider’s account of conventionalism correct? At first blast, what he says sounds more like a description of 1930s logical positivism or 1950s linguistic philosophy than anything else!

When Sider says that by “demystifying necessity, the conventionalist demystifies philosophy itself”, he implies that philosophy is nothing more than the study of necessity! So Sider asks: What is philosophy? He answers that question thus:

Philosophy “investigates the essences of concepts”.
Philosophy “seek[s] the essence of right and wrong”.
Philosophy “seek[s] the essence of beauty”.
Philosophy “seek[s] the essence of knowledge”.
Philosophy “seek[s] the essences of personal identity, free will, time, and so on”.

According to Sider, conventionalists believe that “these investigations ultimately concern definitions”. Again, Sider’s take on conventionalism seems thoroughly old-fashioned in nature. This, of course, isn't automatically to say that Sider's positions are false or incorrect. It's only to say, again, that they're ancient. Perhaps they're also true.

Post-QuineanNominalism is widely regarded as a metaphysics of concreteness, suggesting (in line with scientific naturalism) that ordinary language and common sense might be in the grip of "ordinary hallucinations"(Varzi 2010), or untutored belief in abstract entities. Drawing on both medieval and contemporary sources, this paper argues that, far from encouraging our minds to stick to concreteness and individuals, an untutored usage of O Ockham's razor prompts the elision of concreteness and the everyday world from contemporary metaphysics. A theory of individuality basedonHusserl's concept of Unitary Foundation is outlined, and partially traced back to the metaphysicians of essential individuality, or haecceity: Boethius, Scotus, Leibniz-the champions of the "Unitarian Tradition."

You are sitting in a fancy restaurant. After an extensively prepared, multi-course meal, out comes the dessert course: an unmodified but perfectly juicy, fresh peach. Many restaurants serve such unmodified or barely-modified foods, intending them to count as culinary art. This paper takes up the question of whether such unmodified foods, served in the relevant institutional settings, do count as culinary art. Drawing on debates about the metaphysics of art, I compare and contrast the case of unmodified food to Duchamp's "Fountain" (1917), pointing out relevant similarities and differences between the cases. I propose that there is a distinctive form of aesthetic trust involved in formal culinary settings, and it plays a central role in many instances of culinary art. Culinary institutions summon aesthetic trust, which helps to explain why a dish of unmodified food served in an appropriate institutional setting can count as culinary art.

I had two experiences today that have shed some light on the nature of the contemporary academy. The first came in responses to my use of the term 'Abrahamic' when describing the general conceptions of order (via hierarchical domination and submission [Barnesmoore 2017a; Barnesmoore 2017b], which is to say deliverance into an improved order through conquest and colonization [Warrior 1989]) that form the foundation for Judaism, Roman Christianity and Islam. The second came in a response to my use of the term 'Indigenous Worldview' when describing the differences between conceptions of natural order in the Indigenous Worldview (as an inherent good to be emulated) and conceptions of natural order in the Paternalist and Paternalist-Modernist Worldviews (as evil, fallen, chaotic or the like and thus in need of improvement through domination) from which Colonialism and Imperialism were born. Both responses came from the same professor, and both responses highlight the dangers inherent to the fetishization of difference that has come to typify contemporary Geography in Canada (and indeed much of the 'postmodern', Mostmodern academy).

En philosophie première, une tradition classique héritée de Platon et d'Aristoterécemment renouvelée par D.M. Armstrong 2 -envisage deux catégories de réalité, également essentielles, mais mutuellement exclusives : les substances (ou particuliers), lesquelles sont concrètes et particulières, et les propriétés (avec les relations), lesquelles sont universelles et abstraites. Les corps matériels sont les exemples les plus répandus de particuliers concrets, et leurs caractéristiques, conçues comme étant des entités répétables, communes à plusieurs objets différents, sont les paradigmes des universaux abstraits.

Im Alltag reden wir häufig darüber, etwas verändere sich -sei es das Klima, FOLIE 1 der Leitzins oder etwa der Schimmelfleck in unserer Wohnung. Auch Streitigkeiten darüber, ob sich etwas verändert habe, zum Beispiel mit dem Vermieter, der zur Veränderung des Schimmelflecks seine ganz eigene Meinung hat, finden statt. Für einen Philosophen ist es also nicht abwegig, danach zu fragen, wie man über Veränderung kontrolliert und allgemeingültig reden, also: welchen Begriff von Veränderung man haben sollte. Tatsächlich finden im Philosophiebetrieb -vor allem in den Strömungen, die als »analytisch« bezeichnet werden -kontroverse Auseinandersetzungen darüber statt, wie Veränderung begrifflich zu fassen sei. Diese Auseinandersetzungen gehen durchweg von einem bestimmten FOLIE 2 prädikatenlogischen Veränderungsbegriff aus, dessen Unzulänglichkeit ich am Anfang des Vortrags aufzeigen möchte. Im Anschluss werde ich einen Gegenvorschlag machen und versuchen zu zeigen, dass ein zeichenlogisch fundierter Veränderungsbegriff weniger problematisch und dabei leistungsfähiger sein könnte. Nach dem von mir kritisierten so genannten Cambridge-Konzept gilt: FOLIE 3 »Veränderung ist der Unterschied der Wahrheitswerte zweier wahrheitsfähiger FOLIE 4 Behauptungen über dieselbe Entität, die bis auf die Angabe unterschiedlicher 1

Before going much further, given the engagement with Foucault that occupies much of the early sections of this nomadic exploration, I should address Foucault's (1972) theorizations of History in The Archaeology of Knowledge and his problematization of " the search for a total history, in which all the differences of a society might be reduced to a single form, to the organization of a world-view, to the establishment of a system of values, to a coherent type of civilization " (p. 12) therein as my reading does not fully cohere with Ball's (2013) assertion that Foucault " reject[ed]… essentialisms and universals ".

From a logical point of view, Classical Mereology is surely more preferable than any intensional mereology. However, if we apply Classical Mereology to ordinary objects, instead of logical objects, the peculiar characteristics of Classical Mereology, namely the principle of unrestricted mereological composition (UC) and the theorem of extensionality (TE), produce a lot of difficulties, especially with respect to the common understanding of ordinary objects. If UC is replaced by the principle of a restricted composition (RC), we will have a highly counter-intuitive conception of ordinary objects: they will become mere conventional entities. On the other hand, if TE is rejected, we can adopt an intensional approach to mereology, according to which a plurality of objects can generate a whole only if they are arranged in a certain way. In this case, the trouble is that the ontological commitment inevitably increases.
My intent is to propose a third option. I will start by assuming RC without abandoning extensionality; but in the meanwhile, I will show that, in the case of ordinary objects, the restriction is not merely conventional, because, as for intensional mereologists, not every part has the same importance with respect to the whole, although I will not make the ontological commitment grow.

When we examine psychoanalytic theory the burning question that should occupy our time should concern where the complex of ideas that constitute Western civilization originated, how they originated, and whether they have any realistic correspondence to what we can observe and expreince in nature. I think they do not correspond, and I wonder quite often and quite profoundly if the Western psyche has been interfered with at some remote time in planetary history." (Deloria Jr. 1999b, p. 30) 'Primal Feminine Dominion' "Let me emphasize neolithic man's concentration on organic life and growth: not merely a sampling and testing of what nature had provided, but a discriminating selection and propagation, to such good purpose that historic man had not added a plant or animal of major importance to those domesticated or cultivated by neolithic communities. Domestication in all its aspects implies two large changes: permanence and continuity in residence, and the exercise of control and foresight over processes once subject to the caprices of nature. With this go habits of gentling and nurturing and breeding. Here woman's needs, woman's solicitudes, woman's intimacy with the process of growth, woman's capacity for tenderness and love, must have played a dominating part." (Mumford 1961, p. 12) "Under woman's dominance, the neolithic period is pre-eminently one of containers… It was in permanent containers that neolithic invention outshone all earlier cultures…" (Mumford 1961, p. 16) Whether we accept the notion of a feminine principle associated with love, care, regeneration, resiliency-with the qualities of darkness and the night-or not, and while we should surely reject the patriarchal undertones in Mumford's work, it is clear that Mumford's summation of woman's 'dominating part' clearly illustrates his subjugation to the Artificial Worldview and its assumptions concerning the relationship between order and domination. Femininity, like masculinity, need not play a dominating part… The feminine principle, which, like the masculine principle, exists in all people regardless of their biological identity, can just as easily be seen as playing a reciprocal, harmonious role of power with (power with the order of nature, power with the masculine principle, power with our plant and animal kin, etc.) rather than a domineering role of power over. What is more, the notion of 'permanent containers' is as problematic as the notion of 'permanent dwellings'-better that we say long term rather than permanent, for nothing with a beginning lacks an end… This is the same distinction we have attempted to draw between the quest for life extension and the quest to 'conquer death' (to 'eat death') and thus attain 'permanent life'.

One of the main functions of visual system is to construct representations of objects. These ‘visual objects’ are formed by developing the structure of more primitive visual representations. In the course of the article, I define the notions of ‘minimal visual object’, ‘maximal-non object representation’, and ‘constructing characteristic’ that differentiates minimal objects from maximal non-objects. Relying on these distinctions, I consider the type of ontological change that transforms visual regions, treated as maximal non-object representations, into basic, low-level visual objects. In order to identify such a change, theories of early vision, models of figure/ground distinction, and analytic, ontological notions of objects’ structure are discussed. Finally, a thesis is stated that external relations constitute the main structural factor that determines the ontological transition between non-object representations and visual objects.

Should we posit sparse properties? This paper aims to explore the issue of postulating sparse properties in one’s ontology. Sparse properties (particularly, the Lewisian variant of sparse properties) being the
important differentiator that distinguishes pluralist theories of properties from their competitors, through a structural division between an elite subset of properties and the vast hordes of properties whose sole function is to act as the value of predicates. The importance of this distinction being that sparse properties are taken as fulfilling an assortment of roles, more than enough to satisfy the price of entry (what I shall call ‘The Work-Load Principle’). This paper will argue that there is a cumulative case to be made against reifying the Lewisian variant of sparse properties, in the hopes that this will dissuade metaphysicians from positing Lewisian sparseness.
Key Words: Properties, David Lewis, Sparseness, Naturalism, Pluralism.

The paradigmatic examples of what we call nowadays ‘mere Cambridge changes’ are relational properties. If someone is on the left of a table at t-1 and on the right of this table at t, the table does not undergo a physical change, but it has nonetheless new relational properties. What kind of relation lies behind this kind of change? Should we abandon the definition of identity as a set of permanent properties through time? This concern with identity and change was already present in Aristotle’s Physics 5 and 7 and medieval commentators tackled the problem with some important refinements due to their metaphysical discussions about the nature of relations. John of Jandun’s discussion of this topic, at the beginning of the fourteenth century, is particularly interesting. First, he defines self-identity as a relation of reason, which means for him that it is not a real relation. Second, he distinguishes two kinds of relational changes: those involving real relations and the acquisition a qualitative property; and those that are based on relations of reason. In the second case, there is no real change and the relation is established by the mind. After a presentation of his ontology of relations and changes, we will discuss the application of Jandun’s theory to sensation and intellectual knowledge, which he treats as relational changes.

：Most of ordinary objects are "mereologically transparent": individuation of the sum of their parts is equivalent to the sum of the individuation of the parts. Are events mereologically transparent? It seems not: the rule of mereological transparency does not apply to them. I will argue in the paper that mereological transparency is less an essential character of individuability than a symptom of the underlying conflation of literal and mereology claims and fuzzy ones. Events constitute an important subset of what we call "discrete functional entities", which are individuated by fuzzy mereology claims. Accordingly a functional account of events can be suggested, according to which the essential function of events is to make corresponding propositions true with most thrifty material available. Finally, on the basis of such functional account, an event identification criterion is given, which would be helpful in elucidating and resolving some notorious event identification cases, which the traditional approaches like Davidson's and Kim's may have troubles to deal with.

Consider two entities x and y, and a relation R which holds among them. Is R’s existence accountable merely in terms of the non relational properties exhibited by x and y, once they interact? Or, is it more appropriate to say that R is independent of x and y, and these acquire sets of relational properties because of their being related through R? In case the former option obtains, the existence of relations is reducible to the relevant properties of the related terms. As a consequence, some version of antirealism or eliminativism towards relations turns out to be true. Otherwise they are irreducible, and ontological analysis cannot be dispensed with relations treated as basic or primitive entities. The first section of my paper provides a framework for handling ontological facts about relations. I will address the assessment of the notions of internal and external relations by K. Mulligan.
In the second section I will put my cards on the table. My purpose is to defend a Moorean approach to relations, i.e. both internal and external relations exist. I will briefly outline my methodology, and I will comment on the kind of evidence usually referred to in the debate. My view is that evolutionary research on groups behavior may play an important role.
In the third section of the paper I will show that commonsense intuitions on relationships among human beings endorse an external reading of relations. My claim is supported by notorious examples drawn from literature.
In the final section I will consider whether evolutionary research on human prosociality provides an empirical setting for the assessment of the commonsense understanding of (at least some) relations in terms of externality. I expand such setting to include behaviors of social animal in general (i.e., animals whose behaviors depends on groups’ hierarchy), and I advance a few reason why empirical research needs postulating the independent existence of relations

This study has two main objectives: the first is to make compatible a set of two expressions of the Buddha that is prima facie incompatible in the Essentials of the Mahāparinirvāṇasutra written by Wonhyo; the second is to develop an understanding of the concepts dharma-kāya [法身], saṃdhoga-kāya [報身] and nirmāṇa-kāya [應身] found in The Essentials of the Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra in terms of Williamson’s analytic metaphysics.
First, each ‘Buddha’ in the set of the two expressions refers to a different object. In the first expression, the ‘Buddha’refers to the Buddha as a non-concrete object, while in the second expression ‘Buddha’ refers to a Buddha as a concrete object. In addition, each Buddha is considered neither a part of the Buddha as a whole nor a token of the Buddha type. Second, in the Essentials of the Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra, the dharma-kāya is similar to an abstract object, the saṃdhoga-kāya similar to a
non-abstract non-concrete object, and the nirmāṇa-kāya similar to a concrete object.

Key Words：Buddha, Trikāya, Concrete object, Non-abstractly non-concrete object, Abstract object

В начале было Слово. А бывшее — есть и пребудет: Исток не преходит. Поистине Слово есть главный Закон наш: знать Слово — знать всё. С тем, эллинское «логос» есть рáвно и «слово» и «закон», а Элевсинские таинства Вакха как Слова, Лозы лоз — оплот знаньям смертных. Увы, лживо чтя стих библейский, в потугах науки явить очам Мир человечество ведёт его от всего кроме Слова, не зная, чтó есть оно. И с тем всегда остается ни с чем.

Автор предлагаемой вам книги впервые в истории, длимой от времени автора и ф’ARES’ея науки мирской ARES’тотеля, покончил с этой скорбной практикой и посмотрел окрест очами Слова. И он увидел Божий Мир.

While it is widely accepted that human vision represents objects, it is less clear which of the various philosophical notions of ‘object’ adequately characterizes visual objects. In this paper, I show that within contemporary cognitive psychology visual objects are characterized in two distinct, incompatible ways. On the one hand, models of visual organization describe visual objects in terms of combinations of features, in accordance with the philosophical bundle theories of objects. However, models of visual persistence apply a notion of visual objects that is more similar to that endorsed in philosophical substratum theories. Here I discuss arguments that might show either that only one of the above notions of visual objects is adequate in the context of human vision, or that the category of visual objects is not uniform and contains entities properly characterized by different philosophical conceptions.

The main goal of the paper is to sketch an ontological model of visual content at the low- and medium-level of visual processing, relying on psychological conceptions of vision. It is argued that influential cognitive models contain assumptions concerning “objects of content”, i.e. objects whose presence is a necessary condition of visual representations’ adequacy. Subsequently, the structure of considered objects of content is presented and it is described how it develops through the perceptual process. In addition, during the course of the article I present some of the connections between analytic metaphysics and the ontology of visual content.

The  paper  is  a  survey  of  contemporary  quidditism, understood  as  two  interrelated  metaphysicalpositions  —  recombinatorial  quidditism,  which  is  an  account  of  the  nature  of  possibilities,  andindividuation quidditism, which is concerned with the problem of how to individuate properties.I  have  three  aims:  to  examine  the  commitments  and  consequences  of  both  views,  to  investigatethe relationships between them, and to sketch the logic of the dispute between structuralism andquidditism. I explain how these views relate to Ramseyan humility, according to which we cannotknow the fundamental structure of the world