Providence in Plotinus (Neoplatonism) and Seneca (Stoicism)

1 Stoic Influences in Plotinus’ “On Providence” Mark Lamarre The doctrine of providence was fundamental in ancient philosophy and was often debated amongst various Hellenistic schools, with Platonic, Peripatetic and Stoic schools in favour of it and Epicurean and Sceptics against. Stoic and Platonist schools agreed about the notion of Providence but disagreed on points of detail. Numerous treatises’ have come down to us in one form or another, attesting to the vitality of the debate. One can find works and fragments by such philosophers as Chrysippus, Nemesius of Ephesa, Apuleuis, Calcidius, Albinus, Pseudo-Plutarch, Alexander of Aphrodisias, Seneca, Epictetus, Cicero, Plotinus, Hierocles, Proclus, Synesius, and Boethius.1 The stoic formulations in particular were important and influenced the schools that debated against them. By the second century AD, the more polemic phase of the debate had abated somewhat2 and both the later Stoic and Neoplatonic schools had evolved a reasonably stable and consistent formulation with more development in the area of ethical considerations. 3 Extensive Stoic and middle platonist influence in Plotinus’ thought has been amply documented; we are told by his pupil Porphyry that ‘’his writings are full of concealed Stoic and Peripatetic doctrines’’ (Henry lvi); a paper by P.A. Meijer has convincingly argued for an important degree of stoic influence in Enn. VI, 9, 1 citing similarities with Seneca, for example.4 This paper aims to examine possible Stoic influences in Plotinus’ treatise “On Providence” (Enneads 3.2 & 3.3). Notions and arguments that seem strongly Stoic abound. Bréhier has pointed out the numerous Stoic borrowings, especially in chapters 5 and 6 (22). For concision’s sake, fourteen will be listed and compared with similar stoic passages from Epictetus, Seneca and Marcus Aurelius (who like Plotinus lived in Rome)5, with a particular emphasis on Seneca’s De Providentia.6 The Stoic conception of providence, interchangeable with the more frequently used term of fate,7 can be described as monistic, immanentist, determist, and materialist (Merlan 124-25). Their notion of providence was developed and refined to a considerable degree by Chrysippus; Schlimi summarizes the general Stoic notion of fate thus: The Stoics did not consider this a blind, unreasoning process. On the contrary, since pneuma establishes the causal nexus which makes possible an orderly and predictable succession of events in the cosmos, it was seen as a rational force, synonymous with god and fate. When Chrysippus identifies the substance of fate as ‘a pneumatic force (dounamis pneumatiken) that governs the universe by order (tazei), this accords with his universal definition of fate as ‘a certain physical arrangement (sountazin) of the whole from eternity: some things follow upon and succeed others, whereby this interconnection is inviolable’. (146) Although this notion of fate is strongly deterministic, Chrysippus makes allowance for individual free will : Hence every living creature that moves qua living creature is moved in a movement according to impulse brought about by fate through the creature’. Although the assent that we give or withhold from an impulse is ‘in our power’, making us free agents insofar as we are responsible for our actions, assent depend upon our nature and character, which are the givens of fate. (Schlimi 150) 1 For an overview of these works, see Sharples. According to Dillon: ‘’the conflict between the doctrines of God’s providence and human free will was perhaps the most burning philosophical and spiritual issue in second-century Platonism (225). 3 According to Dillon: ‘’although the problem can hardly can hardly be said to have been solved in this period, much progress was made toward defining its parameters. Somehow the concepts of providence, free will, fate, and chance have to be fitted harmoniously into an overall world view (225). 4 ‘’ Looking closer into Plotinus' treatment of the types of unity and his usage of Stoic material, one is struck by the fact that Plotinus employs Stoic terminology only scantily, although he makes full use of their examples’’ (69). 5 The passages from Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius are from Bréhier and Armstrong. 6 See appendix for further passages that have comparable Stoic correspondences. 7 The Greek term for ‘’fate’ is ‘’heimarmene’’, the term for providence is ‘’pronoia’’. 2 2 He stresses the importance of critical thinking within the framework of fate : Although he said, it is true that by fate all things are forced and linked by a necessary and dominant reason, nevertheless the character of our minds is subject to fate in a manner corresponding to their nature in a sound and useful manner then they pass on all the force of fate which imposes on us from outside in a relatively unobjectionable and amore acceptable way. (Aulus Gellius 7.2.7-8, Inwood & Gerson Hellenistic Philosophy 185) Moreover, he makes a distinction between two types of causality, a principle cause and auxiliary cause: For, he said some causes are perfect and principal, while others are auxiliary and proximate. Therefore, when we say all things occur by fate by antecedent cause, we do not want the following to be understood by perfect and principal causes; but we mean that they occur by auxiliary and proximate causes.’’ (Cicero On Fate 41 Inwood & Gerson Hellenistic Philosophy 187) He accounts for a certain degree of freedom in human action : The doctrine of 'co-fated' events was advanced as an argument against fatalism and for human responsibility: even though everything is fated, some things still depend on our (fated) actions. (Sharples 247) Furthermore, he accounts for the role of conscious, deliberate action within the context of fate: For many things cannot occur without our being willing and indeed contributing a most strenuous eagerness and zeal for these things, since, he says, it was fated for these things to occur in conjunction with this personal effort… But it will be in our power, he says with what is in our power being included in fate. (Diogneanus in Eusebius Prep. Ev. 6.8. 266d Inwood & Gerson Hellenistic Philosophy 190) It can sometimes be difficult to determine if the argument is specifically Middle Platonist or Stoic, as both stoics and platonists were influence by notions of providence in Plato and Aristotle, in particular in Plato’s Timaeus, and book X of the Laws as well as notions of causality from Aristotle’s Physics. According to Merlan ‘’with Posidonius (partly even with Panaetius) the Stoa opened itself to Platonic influence’’(126). To get a sense of the mutual influence of Stoicism and Middle Platonism and how it influenced Plotinus, it might be useful to briefly sketch out the ideas found in the Pseudo-Plutarch treatise ‘On Fate’, a Middle Platonist treatise with Stoic influences. The author introduces a notion of active fate, which represents the laws of nature. Substantial fate is the Soul of the universe which transmits the actions of active fate. The quality of fate refers to the cyclical nature of the universe. The universality of fate is that it makes general conditions that subsequently apply to individual cases. He details various aspects of fate, commenting on the Stoic notion that ‘everything conforms to Fate’. There is the possible, (things that are possible because they have the power to occur) and the substance. The contingent, as opposed to the necessary, refers to things that occur randomly, like rain, whereas the setting of the sun is necessary because it occurs on a regular basis. What is in our power are deliberate rational decisions. Chance is a cause not evident to human calculation, unforeseen or accidental. The spontaneous refers to things that occur outside of the usual expectations, like cold weather in summer. There are three types of providence: Primary providence is related to the primary Gods. Secondary Providence belongs to the secondary gods who move in the heaven and cause everything in generation. Tertiary Providence concerns the daimons that oversee the affairs of man. Providence is considered to be higher than Fate. 8 Plotinus’ treatise “On Providence” takes up the questions on providence that by that time had become commonplace and situates them in more dynamic metaphysical framework that makes a deeper appeal to Platonic dialogues such as the Timaeus, Phaedrus, Theaetetus, Phaedo, and Republic. 1. Troublesome situations play a role in the coordination of the whole. “And even these troubles are not altogether without usefulness for the co-ordination and completion of the whole” (I, 5, 15). 8 Plotinus also points out the difference between higher providence and lower fate, (3, 2, 5, 15). 3 “For the present, I will say so much of the eventualities that you style harsh, unfortunate and detestable; in the first place, they benefit the individuals to whose lot they fall, and, in the second place , they benefit the whole body of mankind, for which the gods are more concerned than they are of individuals” (Seneca 3, 1, 15)9 2. Nothing that happens is bad for the good man; nothing that happens is good for the bad man. “As for people getting what they do not deserve, when the good get what is bad and the bad the opposite, it is correct to say that nothing is bad for the good man and nothing, correspondingly, good for the bad one; (3, 2, 6, 5).” “’Why do many misfortunes fall to the lot of good men?’ It is not possible that any evil can befall a good man” (Seneca 2, 1, 12). “Yet why does god allow evil to happen to good men? But in fact he does not” (Seneca 6, 1, 26). 3. Troubles serve to awaken us and help us understand the nature of virtue and vice. “For it makes men awake and wakes up the intelligence and understanding of those who are opposed to the ways of wickedness” (3, 2, 5, 20). “Do not, I beseech you, dread the things which the immortal gods apply to our souls like goads; disaster is virtue’s opportunity”. (Seneca 4, 6, 20). 4. Why are good people sometimes disfavored and bad people sometimes favored? “But what if one considers the comparative distribution of evils to men of opposite character, that the good are poor and the wicked are rich, and the bad have more than their share of things which those who are human beings must have, and are masters, and peoples and cities belong to them?” (3, 2, 7, 30). ‘’Yet why was god so unfair in distributing destinies as to allot good men poverty and wounds and painful death?’’ (Seneca 5, 9, 25) 5. The earth is very small and unimportant compared to the vastness of the universe. “but men are in the middle and below, and above are heaven and the gods in it; but the earth is like a central point even in comparison with only one of the stars” (3, 2, 8,5). “The whole earth is a mere point in space: what a minute cranny within this is your own habitation, and how many and what sort will sing your praises here!” (Marcus Aurelius 4, 3). 6. It is normal for things to happen according to physical laws, such as the stronger defeating the weaker. “Then again, it is ridiculous for people to do everything else in life according to their own ideas, even if they are not doing it in the way which the gods like, and then be merely saved by the gods without even doing the things by means of which the gods command them to save themselves?” (3, 2, 8, 40) “Somewhere or other we are going to have encounters with wild beasts, and with man, too – more dangerous than all those beasts. Floods will rob us of one thing, fire of another. These are conditions of our existence which we cannot change’’ (Seneca Epist. 107, 7, 226) 7. The good life consists in being good; a bad life consists in being bad (I, 9,10). “But it says that those who have become good shall have a good life, now, and laid up for them hereafter as well, and the wicked the opposite” (3, 2, 9, 10). “But to you I have given goods that are sure and abiding, goods which are better and greater the more one turns them about and scrutinizes them from every side. (Seneca 6, 5, 27) 8. Adversity has benefits that are either evident are otherwise hidden. “No, it is necessary that these, too, should exist; and some of the benefits which come from them are obvious, and those which are not evident, many of them time discovers”(3, 2, 9,35). “Of all these propositions the most difficult, apparently, is the first in the list, that the objects of our dread and horror are actually advantageous to the persons to whose lot they fall” (Seneca, 3, 2, 15) 9. Things occur in a chain of causation. 9 Bréhier points out this notion in Plotinus (3, 2, 17) and compares it to a passage in Chrysippus (48). 4 “Given a first principle, it accomplishes what follows with the inclusion in the chain of causation of all principles there are; but men, too , are principles; at any rate, they are moved to noble actions by their own nature, and this is an independent principle” (3, 2, 10, 15). “I know that all things proceed according to a law that is fixed and eternally valid. Fate directs us, and the first hour of our birth determines each man’s span. Cause is linked with cause, and a long chain of events governs all matters public and private” (Seneca 5, 7, 24-5). 10. Beauty and order in the natural world is a sign of providence “for example, the workmanship which produces wonders in rich variety in ordinary animals, and the beauty of appearance which extends to the fruits and even the leaves of plants, and their beauty of flower which comes so effortlessly, and their delicacy and variety, and that all this has not been made once and come to an end but is always being made as the powers above move in different ways over this world” (3, 2, 13, 20). “that this orderliness is not a property of matter moving at random; and that fortuitous conglomerations cannot arrange their balance so skillfully that the earth, which is heaviest in weight, should abide unmoved and, as spectator, observe the rapid flight of the surrounding sky, how the seas are distilled into the valleys to soften the earth, how huge growths burgeon from tiny seeds” (Seneca 1, 2, 10-11) 11. Play your role in life as actor in a play “But in the truer poetic creation, which men who have a poetic nature imitate in part, the soul acts, receiving the part which it acts from the poet creator; “ (3, 2, 17, 35) “Remember that you are an actor in a drama, of such a kind as the author pleases to make it“ (Epictetus, Manuel, 17 ). 12. Death is like an actor exiting a play. “If, then, death is a changing of body, like changing of clothes on the stage, or, for some of us, a putting off of body, like in the theatre the final exit, in that performance, of an actor who will on later occasion come in again to play, what would there be that is terrible in a change of this kind of living beings into other?” (3, 2, 15,20). “It is like the officer who engaged a comic actor dismissing him from the stage.’ But I have not played my five acts, only three.’ Completion is determined by that being who caused first your composition and now your dissolution. You have no part in either causation. Go then in peace: the god who lets you go is at peace with you.” (Marcus Aurelius XII, 36) 13. Mishaps should be seen as a children’s game “But if anyone joins in their play and suffers their sort of sufferings, he must know that he has tumbled into a children’s game and put off the play-costume in which he was dressed” (3, 2, 15,40). “Thus, when you are unable to convince any one, consider him as a child, and clap your hands with him; (Epictetus I, 29, 30-32) 14. The wrongdoer is punished by becoming wicked ‘’But those who do these things are punished, first by being wolves and ill-fated men;’’ (3, 2, 4, 25) ‘’But he is the person hurt who suffers the most miserable and shameful evils; who, instead of a man, becomes a wolf or viper or a hornet’’ (Epictetus IV, 1, 127) On the whole a treatise like Seneca’s On Fate is very different from Plotinus’ On Providence.10 Seneca encourages a martial heroic outlook where god is like a stern and benevolent father to the good person and brings adversity upon him to strengthen and test him. The stoic philosopher welcomes and actually seeks challenges to test himself. He lives in an optimistic world designed to benefit man and is under the special care of god. He essentially presents a philosophy of action with a Ciceronian patriotic use of historical examples. With Plotinus man is in an intermediary position between gods and beasts and must become aware of his moral responsibility in the vast interplay of dynamic changes and movement. The immortality of the soul is a 10 Although, as Bréhier notes, they both share a similar structure of presenting the three commonplace questions on providence while giving prominence to the third point. 5 fundamental consideration with the ideas of the process of reincarnation and the judgment of the soul create a strong pervasive determinism where every misguided action committed is subject to a punitive retribution. At the same time, they share basic notions on providence where man’s essential path to goodness is to cooperate with a providence that represents a natural order. The discomforts and adversities of existence should not affect the inherent goodness of a person.11 According to Bréhier, the most prominent aspect of the treatise, is, the place that the famous theory of the Logos holds (chapters 15-18), highly unusual for Plotinus.12,13 They believe that there are two principles of the universe, the active and the passive. The passive, then, is unqualified substance, i.e., matter while the active is the rational principle logos in it, i.e., god. For he, being eternal and penetrating all of matter, is the craftsman of all things. (Diogenes Laertius 7.134 Inwood & Gerson Hellenistic Philosophy 132) Plotinus’ makes use of a universal governing logos to account for diversity and conflict. Bréhier considers it a clear attempt by Plotinus to assimilate the stoic notion of the logos into a Platonic framework, evoking similarities with Philo and Origen (19-23). It is in the area of ethics that one can find many notions that can denote a Stoic influence or have a close similarity to Stoic ideas. According to Dillon: Plotinus’ predecessors had produced various rather facile formulations, side-stepping rather than meeting the Stoic challenge. Plotinus does not shirk the difficulties, but does not really resolve the problems. If anything, he comes down on the Stoic side, in the process of producing some observations that appear to us distinctly harsh. (xcix)14 Simplicius, who wrote a neoplatonic commentary on the Manual of Epictetus’ explains the ethical compatibility between stoicism and neoplatonism, despite the metaphysical differences: But even if it were supposed that the soul is mortal, and that it is destroyed along with the body, still, in that case anyone who lived according to these precepts would be genuinely happy and blessed, since he would achieve his own perfection, and reach the good proper to him. (Simplicius 2,1 8-10) Iamblichus succinctly ‘’summed up the similarity between Stoa and Neoplatonism by saying: both systems believe in the identity of the cosmic soul with the soul in us’’(Merlan 131). Stoicism then can be to seen to represent a considerable influence that neoplatonists integrated and synthesized. Part of the reason Plotinus is considered so important is his capacity to reflect on and integrate a wide variety of ideas from different schools of philosophy. He began a school that was ‘’regarded, with considerable justification, as the philosophia perennis of Greek civilization’’ (Inwood & Gerson, Introduction xix). Thanks to Brooks Sommerville for his valuable comments and suggestions. Merlan remarks: ‘’As far as ethics is concerned, Plotinus must, of course, have been in sympathy with Stoic indifference to everything external; thus, he, differing from both the Academy and the Peripatos, recommends Stoic apathy and, as we have seen, believes that perfection suffices to makes its possessor happy. But what the Stoic considers to be man’s ultimate goal, viz. independence and inner freedom, is, for Plotinus, only preliminary to the complete union with the supreme deity-be it in this life in mystical ecstasy, be it in the future, when the soul will return to its original home” (Merlan 130). 12 ‘’Le trait le plus saillant du traité, c’est la place, tout à fait inaccoutumée chez Plotin, qu’y tient la célèbre théorie du Logos’’ (18). 13 See Plotinus 3, 2, chapters 15-18 and passages 11-13 of this paper. 14 For example: ‘’Or would it not be right for even the lawgiver to allow them to suffer this as a penalty for their laziness and soft and slack living allowed themselves to become fattened lambs, the prey of wolves?” (I, 8,25). 11 6 Appendix 1. One can see the order of nature by observing that each part of the body is designed for a useful function (3, 3, 35) (Epictetus 1, 16, 2) 2. Destruction is a necessary part of nature. There are phases of order and disorder (3, 2, 4, 15) (Marcus Aurelius 9, 1, 5) 3. Situations like poverty and sickness are not bad things for good people (3, 2, 5, 10). (Epictetus (3, 17, 1) 4. One should be self-reliant and not blame providence (3, 2, 9, 15). Epictetus (1, 6, 5) 5. The rational principle governs the all (3, 2, 11). (Marcus Aurelius 6, 42) 6. Good conduct consist in acting in accordance with providence (3, 3, 5,45) (Seneca, 5, 41) 7. No one blames providence when animals attack men (3, 3, 9, 35) (Seneca 2, 31) 8. Providence heals like a doctor healing an wound or sickness (3, 3, 5, 30) (Marcus Aurelius 5, 8) 7 Works Cited Dillon, John. "Plotinus, an Introduction". Plotinus. The Enneads. London: Penguin Books, 1991. lxxxiv-ciPrint. Dillon, John. "Plutarch and second Century Platonism". Classical Mediterranean Spirituality. A.H. Armstrong, ed. New York: Crossroads, 1986. 220-232. Print. Epictetus. Moral Discourses. Enchiridion and Fragments. E. Carter, transl. 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