Françafrique, a reluctant hegemony ?

ASRIE Geopolitical Report Volume 4/2018 ISSN 2532-845X Françafrique, a reluctant hegemony? by Ugo Maria Gaudino* Abstract in English In this short essay I will try to bring into sharper focus how much sway France holds over its former Western and Central African colonies. I will address the current state of the so-called French-African connection through a sheer analysis of French assets in the continent, namely its military, economic and cultural power. According to a consistent body of IR scholarship, these factors can be used as benchmark to measure the global or regional hegemony of a country. The threefold analysis reveals that France can be considered as a hegemonic power only from a military perspective, as the international community largely recognizes. Nobody among other geopolitical actors might challenge French presence and expertise on the ground, at least in the short run. Nonetheless, the Old Empire lost its privileged economic position in the African sub-region, which is currently endangered by the rising Chinese presence. As for cultural resources, Francophonie should still be deemed as a useful “soft power” asset, though it is sometimes overlooked by politicians. Therefore, I argue that it is possible to apply the definition of Françafrique only over the extent of military hard power. On the other hand, the former economic supremacy risk to be headed into trouble waters and the cultural and linguistic tools, likewise, are challenged by the rising diffusion of English. The future relations will depend on the French possibilities to win out the competitors and act as a full hegemonic power in the sub-region. Keywords: Françafrique; hard power; soft power; military intervention; hegemony; neo-colonialism Abstract in italiano In questo breve saggio cercherò di concentrare l'attenzione su quanto influenza la Francia sulle sue ex colonie occidentali e centrafricane. Tratterò lo stato attuale della cosiddetta connessione franco-africana attraverso un'analisi dei beni francesi nel continente, vale a dire il suo potere militare, economico e culturale. Secondo un corpo coerente di borsa di studio IR, questi fattori possono essere usati come riferimento per misurare l'egemonia globale o regionale di un paese. La triplice analisi rivela che la Francia può essere considerata un potere egemone solo da una prospettiva militare, Pag. 83 ASRIE Geopolitical Report Volume 4/2018 ISSN 2532-845X come ampiamente riconosciuto dalla comunità internazionale. Nessuno tra gli altri attori geopolitici potrebbe mettere in discussione la presenza e l'esperienza francesi sul campo, almeno nel breve periodo. Nondimeno, l'Antico Impero perse la sua posizione economica privilegiata nella sub-regione africana, attualmente minacciata dalla crescente presenza cinese. Per quanto riguarda le risorse culturali, la Francofonia dovrebbe ancora essere considerata un utile "potere soft", anche se a volte viene trascurata dai politici. Pertanto, sostengo che è possibile applicare la definizione di Françafrique solo sulla portata del duro potere militare. D'altra parte, l'antica supremazia economica rischia di essere diretta in guai acque e gli strumenti culturali e linguistici, allo stesso modo, sono sfidati dalla crescente diffusione dell'inglese. Le relazioni future dipenderanno dalle possibilità francesi di vincere i concorrenti e agire come una potenza egemonica nella sub-regione. Parole chiave: Françafrique, hard power, soft power, intervento militare, egemonia, neocolonialismo *Ugo Maria Gaudino holds a master degree in International Relations from Università La Sapienza. He is currently attending a Master in "Economy and Instituions of Islamic Countries" at Università LUISS. He has been a visiting student at " École Normale Supérieure" in Paris. He is also an editor of the italian review "Geopolitica" and a member of the "Istituto di Alti Studi in Geopolitica e Scienze Ausiliarie" (IsAG) and had a collaboration with the Institute "Archivio Disarmo" from 2016. His researches focus on geopolitics of the Mediterranean region, IR and security studies. E-mail: [email protected] Introduction In this paper I focus on the role of France in sub-Saharan Africa and in particular on the widespread sphere of influence built up in its former colonies. The article tries to theoretically situate the current state of the French-African connection and to analyse the position of the Hexagone in the context by comparing it with the definition of regional power and regional hegemony. I argue that France nowadays does not represent anymore the unique hegemonic actor in the area as it was during the colonial period. Paris seems to behave as a regional power, whose willingness and means to lead the game are gradually decreasing, threatened by the more assertive African policies of emerging States, especially China. However, it’s undeniable that France wields a level of influence that it cannot command anywhere else in the world, as we can see in crisis Pag. 84 ASRIE Geopolitical Report Volume 4/2018 ISSN 2532-845X situation. François Hollande attempted to endeavour a new approach towards Africa, in order to reduce the old liaisons with the so called Françafrique and to define a fresh start in bilateral relationships, but the military interventions in Mali (2013) and CAR (2014), the relevant economic and commercial interests and the historical and cultural heritage in francophone countries show that France still acts as a key player in this geopolitical scenario. This French exceptionalism is rooted in the historical background of common features – first of all the language – and strengths the position of France vis-à-vis the internal and external competitors. Nevertheless, even if Paris still preserves a consistent sphere of influence, which is supposed to be barely scraped by the other actors, it sometimes falls short of adamant intentions to maintain its supremacy. I argue that this attitude can be considered as typical of a reluctant hegemonic power. Literary review The following chapter will attempt to construct the theoretical framework that appears more adequate to describe French attitude towards its former colonies by offering a synthetic overview of relevant literature concerning the concept of power, its application in a regional scheme and the differences between a regional power and a regional hegemonic actor. Before the illustration of the most valuable approaches, it’s important to stress some crucial key points: - Firstly, a regional power should obviously be a part of the region in question. Nevertheless, this statement proves not to be true for Sub-Saharan Africa. In the geopolitical vacuum of a local hegemonic power (potentially filled only by Nigeria, as analyzed in Odigbo et. al., 2014), the ancient European empires (France, UK) and other States like US and China stand up as the major competitors for the leadership. - Secondly, theories which are tied to a regional level of analysis have largely failed to properly incorporate «the region» into the concept of hegemony (Prys, Pag. 85 ASRIE Geopolitical Report Volume 4/2018 ISSN 2532-845X 2008, p.5). In fact, there is rarely an empirical correlation between expectations and reality in the attitude of the States that have been categorized as regional hegemons. - Finally, in the study of regional powers and hegemonies it seems more appropriate to adopt the approaches that deal with «the presupposition of a parallel and superposed system of global, regional and, in some cases, sub-regional power hierarchies which are in a permanent process of interaction» rather than on the hypothesis of only one global power hierarchy (Nolte, 2010, p.889). As a consequence, a specific and well-known part of the literature (Wight, 1978 1, Buzan, Waever, 20032) does not account for the most suitable framework to address the French-African connection. In fact, the main aim of the mentioned authors is to show the differences between regional great powers, middle powers and superpowers. Even if many scholars usually talk about regional powers in International Rela- tions (IR) literature, there’s no consensus regarding the defining characteristics of a regional power. The topic of regional powers addresses a research area that combines a geographic concept, region, with a basic concept of IR theory, power (Nolte, 2010, 884). The definition of power and the analysis of its distribution in international politics follows different conceptual frameworks according to the privileged perspectives adopted by the authors. It might be useful to cast a glance over the classical text Power Politics written by Martin Wight (Wight, 1978), but if our goal is to provide a correct interpretation of the French position in sub-Saharan Africa – is France still an hegemonic actor or just a downsized regional actor? -, I suggest using an approach based 1 Who stresses the differences between regional powers and superpowers, i.e. the interests of a regional powers are circumscribed in a limited region where they can act on their own accord; they are potential candidates for the status of middle powers in the international system. On the contrary, middle powers are just classified on the basis of their power (above all military power) in comparison with great powers (Wight, 1978, 63-65). 2 In the framework of their Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT), the authors differentiate between superpowers and great powers which act on a global level and regional powers, whose influence might be preponderant, but they are restricted to their backyards and so they don’t constitute a threat for higher-level powers. They also illustrate how regional powers fashion the structure of any regional security complex (Buzan and Waever, 2003). Pag. 86 ASRIE Geopolitical Report Volume 4/2018 ISSN 2532-845X on the studies about more regional hegemonies rather than compare the case study in question with the classical theories on global hegemony (e.g. Gilpin, 1981). I think it’s important to make a clear distinction in the mare magnum of literature about hegemony, in order to deal with a specific regional context. Albeit it’s worthy to stare at the mainstream works about hegemony to extract an overall accepted definition of the subject – i.e. hegemony indicates «the influence that a great power exercises over the other States of the system, that can move from leadership to supremacy» (Dunne and Schmidt, 2001) – after that it’s more useful to apply this framework to the particular regional area underlined in this paper rather than discuss on hegemony in global politics tout court. I argue that this regional point of view might be more suitable for the analysis of a small-scale leadership like French one in its former colonies. The review of the apical publications about regional powers in the IR literature unveils a generally accepted array of common features that they share, but scholars have argued regarding which characteristic should be prevalent. Researches belonging to a strict realist perspective (Neumann, 1992) define a regional power as a State that is able to stand up against any coalition of regional rivals, that is highly influential in regional affairs and that, contrary to a middle power, might also be a great competitor on a global scale. This kind of discourse focuses on traditional power resources like hard and soft power or smart power – the right combination of the two (Nye, 2008) – and on objective criteria such as military power, GDP etc., but there are as well different approaches based on a constructivist framework which highlight the importance of perception (of itself and by other States) to build the status of a regional power. For that reason, Schirm combines the two aspects and postulates that a regional power consists both in its material superiority and in the self-conception (Schirm, 2010), bolstered by the recognition of this status by other actors. So, the factors which deal with the social construction of identity and reputation are crucial in its definition of a regional power, whose main feature is the articulated claim for leadership as rule maker, immediately followed by the tough material and organisational resources. Pag. 87 ASRIE Geopolitical Report Volume 4/2018 ISSN 2532-845X Therefore, the need for a complete definition of a regional power entails that all the mentioned elements might be taken into account. Detlef Nolte tries to sort out by making an exhaustive list of all the core features related to a regional power (Nolte, 2009, p.893), defined as a State - which articulates the pretension (self-conception) of a leading position in a region that is geographically, economically and political-ideationally delimited; - which displays the material (military, economic, demographic), organisational (political) and ideological resources for regional power projection; - which truly has great influence in regional affairs (activities and results). In addition, it is expected that a regional power is a State: - which is economically, politically and culturally interconnected with the region; - which influences in a significant way the geopolitical delimitation and the political-ideational construction of the region; - which exerts this influence by means of regional governance structures; - which defines and articulates a common regional identity or project; - which provides a collective good for the region or participates in a significant way in the provision of such a collective good; - which defines the regional security agenda in a significant way; - whose leading position in the region is recognised or at least respected by other States inside and outside of the region, especially by other regional powers; - which is integrated in interregional and global forums and institutions where it articulates not only its own interests but acts as well, at least in a rudimentary way, as a representative of regional interests. Pag. 88 ASRIE Geopolitical Report Volume 4/2018 ISSN 2532-845X After the conceptualization of a regional power, now it’s time to jump to the next step by underlying the differences with the conditions that allow a State to achieve a full regional hegemony in a geographical area. According to a classical definition, regional hegemons are «States which possess sufficient power to dominate subordinate State systems» (Myers, 1991). But what kind of domination are scholars talking about ? It’s possible to observe two main approaches: - A framework inspired to realism, which is focalised on the dimension of hard power and employs the Correlates Of War (COW) Project’s composite capabilities index to gauge the relative capabilities of Regional Powers compared to the rest of their region. The COW capabilities index includes consideration of each State’s assets along military, demographic, and economic dimensions (Lemke, 2010). - A framework inspired to institutionalism, which states that regional hegemons firstly need regional followers and takes the shape of the institutions of regional governance as an indicator for the power distribution in the region and the type of regional hegemony (Nolte, 2010, p.894). This approach suggests that a domination undergirded by a cooperative modus operandi might produce more gains to the hegemonic power. A cooperative hegemony is more stable and more legitimate because it offers positive incentives to demand the collaboration of different States and guarantees stability on a long term. As France has a particular relationship with the region we are dealing with, since it’s an external actor whose influence depends above all on historical conditions, the first theoretical framework appears more adequate to address my research question: is France just a regional power threatened by the growing presence of arising competitors or a hegemonic power with an untouchable sphere of influence ? Military hegemony: the interventions in Mali and CAR Pag. 89 ASRIE Geopolitical Report Volume 4/2018 ISSN 2532-845X Albeit in the sub-Saharan theatre France can boast a considerable quantity of the traditional resources of hegemony – military, economic and cultural, as widely accepted by scholars (Andreatta et al., 2012, Dunne et al., 2013) –, I argue that the country cannot and doesn’t want to act as a full hegemonic player. The concept of Françafrique could still result appropriate to describe this geopolitical context, so long as military power and cultural influence override the reduction of economic interests and the pervasive presence of other States. But what jumps out is the ambivalent attitude of Paris, which hesitates between cutting the old ties and acting like the gendarme of the continent (as the Senate pointed out in the Rapport sur l’Afrique of 2013). The willingness to play the role of the leading power of the region is the key factor to determine if in the future France will choose an hegemonic destiny or will downsize its influence on a minor scale and behave as a normal player. France’s colonial system was quite unique as it considered its colonies to be an integral part of the country. The incorporation into the national political system obeyed to a kind of mission civilisatrice which aimed at spreading French political and cultural values. This conception of empire explains why an attack on the colonies was not unlike an attack on France itself. This pattern was often repeated even after decolonization, with deep French military engagement in the continent – it intervened 19 times between 1962 and 1995 (Melly and Darracq, 2013, p.4). This form of ambiguous relationship between France and West African countries is called Françafrique, which is broadly used to refer to the sphere of influence that the Métropole can still boast in that geopolitical context. This expression first emerged in 1955 and gradually came to be linked with the corrupt, informal and clientelistic ties between both African and French leaders and influential businessmen (Bovcon, 2011). This French-African connection represents a massive heritage that every candidate of the Elysée ought to take into account. In last twenty years we have assisted at the attempt to downsize the insidious web of relationships and to normalize African policy. The socialist prime minister Lionel Jospin, appointed in June 1997, stated in a visit in Bamako that it was necessary to break Pag. 90 ASRIE Geopolitical Report Volume 4/2018 ISSN 2532-845X with the paternalistic tradition in Africa and to establish relationships based on an equal foot, not on intervention nor on indifference – the so-called ni-ni doctrine (Gounin, 2009, p.53). The strongest sign of a shift was the suppression of the Minister of Cooperation, which had a remarkable influence in African affairs, but the government of Jacques Chirac also fostered a more multilateral approach regarding defence policies, with sharp reductions in the size of military, base closures and the promotion of an “Africanization” of crisis management. A changed strategic climate after the end of cold war and the concerns about the shoestring budget pushed France to review its doctrine and to disavow unilateral actions of the Foccart era (Bat, 2012). The programme RECAMP (Renforcement des capacités africaines de maintien de la paix) began in 1997 in order to give Africa the instruments and the know-how to figure out regional crisis on his own, to provide assistance, formation and technical support to the multinational forces of sub-regional African organizations during the peacekeeping missions. The re-election of Chirac in 2002 and the end of the cohabitation with socialist brought to a more muscular approach (summarized in the doctrine of accompagner sans contraindre), but the government kept the preference for a multilateral action, as it emerged in 2002 when France sent boots on the ground for Operation Licorne in Ivory Coast, authorized by the UN Security Council an year later (with the Resolution n.1464 of 14/2/2003). The repetition of a similar scenario in 2013 and 2014 – since the UN gave green light to Operation Serval in Mali and then to the intervention in CAR – shows that even if France is still involved in crisis management, it doesn’t act anymore like the only dominant great power but with the collaboration of international organizations (African Union, European Union) and the endorsement of United Nations (Gounin, 2009, p.102). The multilateral option was preferred by Hollande, who pledged for a significant reset in African affairs (Melly and Darracq, 2013, p.9). Nonetheless, this content does not entail a massive reduction in France’s presence on the ground, since its political weight and military clout haven’t been dented so far. Pag. 91 ASRIE Geopolitical Report Volume 4/2018 ISSN 2532-845X Nowadays France represents the major security provider of the region, as it usually was in the past. With the deployment of troops in 2013-14 in order to face the turmoil in Mali and CAR, Hollande gave way to a strategy of interventions, akin to the policies followed by the former presidents. This choice seems to jar with the claim for a progressive disengagement from the continent and for the Africanization of the operations on the ground. However, the interventions are not surprising insofar as the ancient empire is yet to cut the umbilical cord with the former colonies, as regards defence affairs and military operations. After the process of decolonization, France started to sign some defence agreements with African countries to preserve its strong influence in the area. Gradually, the idea that France had to change attitude towards Françafrique and embrace multilateral solutions suggested a shift in French policies and thus the need to refresh the old treaties has been a central issue for the last twenty years. Following the publication of the White paper on defence of 2008, the government has renewed the agreements with eight countries – Cameroon, CAR, Comoros, Ivory Coast, Djibouti, Gabon, Senegal and Togo (Guilhaudis, 2016). The goal of these treaties – signed after the strategic agreements between European Union and African Union – is the construction of a true partnership which will help Africa to establish a common and solid system of collective security. The preference for multilateralism doesn’t rub out Realpolitik: France also wanted to strengthen its enviable role of major military partner of sub-Saharian Africa, which is clear if we take into account the growing number of French troops in the continent (about 9000 units vis-à-vis the 5000 of 2012, located in eight bases which provide a unique strategic position and the freedom to rapidly line up over different zones) and the consistent economic burdens Paris is affording, with more than 1 billion per year to assure the physical presence and about 70% of the budget for military cooperation aid given to Africa (Hugon, 2016). The possibility to quickly deploy boots on the ground is the key distinctive element of France compared to other competitors. Moreover, the “soft power” linked to the historical and cultural background shared with Pag. 92 ASRIE Geopolitical Report Volume 4/2018 ISSN 2532-845X the former colonies is the main tool to generate consensus towards French interventions. If France often appears chained to a “path dependency” and feels obliged to preserve the old connections, on the other side African countries often fall short of adequate capabilities to prevent the destabilization of the area and thus they can’t help asking for international aid. Paris’ leadership is recognized not only by the African junior partners but also by other actors interested in the stability of the region, such as United States, whose ambassador to African Union Michael Battle acclaimed Operation Serval because France was the only western State with the effective know-how to act in the Malian scenario, thanks to its military bases and its soldiers accustomed to African reality (Rapport du Sénat L’Afrique est notre avenir, 2013, p.256). Operation Serval in Mali represented a watershed in the last events related to Françafrique, since it has underlined France’s capacity to tackle and neutralize a highrisk emergency in a short time. The counterterrorist mission successfully stopped the jihadist advance and prevented several terrorist groups from endangering stability in Mali (Boeke, 2016, pp. 38-45). Therefore, the operation blocked the formation of a potential rogue State at the doorstep of Europe and clearly met the objectives laid out in the White paper on defence of 2013, which explicitly strengthens the priority given to Africa in national defence and security strategy (in particular to the Sahel, the Maghreb and the Gulf of Guinea). The definition of a clearer national interest in Africa is helpful to sort out the dilemma of the so called politique du yoyo, that is the ambivalence of the Hexagon visà-vis African affairs (Leboeuf and Quénot-Suarez, 2014, p.35). The option for a military intervention has become more urgent, but it doesn’t mean the return to unilateral approaches: in fact, in 2014 Operation Serval was replaced by Operation Barkhane, an ongoing counter-terrorism mission which purports at an even stronger cooptation of local allies such as the G5 Sahel (Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger). It consists of 3000 French troops headquartered in N’Djamena, which will lead the regional African troops and support UN mission MINUSMA (Boeke, pp. 53-54). From Pag. 93 ASRIE Geopolitical Report Volume 4/2018 ISSN 2532-845X this perspective, France gathers the fruits of its historical role of gendarme and can still act as a significant hegemonic actor. With respect to military power, there are no serious rivals that could topple French supremacy. Overall, a comparative analysis of different fields (such as economic relationships and cultural influence) discloses a presence on the retreat. France’s exceptionalism cannot be measured anymore through material criteria, since the country was dethroned as the first economic partner of Africa, even in the francophone States (Rapport du Sénat L’Afrique est notre avenir, 2013, p.221). In spite of the solid ties with some former colonies, the old paradigm of Françafrique is quivering, due to the action of emerging economic powers and to French intentions to loosen the linkages with the region. Economic retreat and cultural stalemate It would be difficult to overlook French cultural influence in the region, which is considered as a strategic tool to gain support and legitimacy toward its foreign stance. Firstly, there are almost 100 million of francophone people and about 235.000 French natives living in the continent, while more than 2.3 million of African migrants and 100.000 African students reside in France (Védrine et al., 2013, p.4). The importance of human capital is a key asset to spread the national “soft power” and to assure that millions of Africans will opt for French as long as possible. The myriad of French institutes and schools widespread in the continent avail to fulfil that aim, on a pair with audio-visual tools like the channel TV5, received in more than 10 million houses in 48 countries (Ibid., p.65). At the same time, the dark side of the colonial inheritance is pushing young people far from the French background, as they seem more interested in the Anglo-American culture and values (Rapport du Sénat L’Afrique est notre avenir, 2013, p.298). Like in other parts of the world, the pivotal role of Anglosphere lures a consistent number of people: why is France reacting so softly? There is a strong likelihood that the negative image conveyed by the debates upon the dark sides of Françafrique persuaded the political leaders to turn away from the old back garden and to look Pag. 94 ASRIE Geopolitical Report Volume 4/2018 ISSN 2532-845X at new opportunities in other regions of the continent – for example in non-francophone countries, where French language is actually increasing (Ibid., p.297). The willingness to loosen the network with sub-Saharan States adheres to the projected reduction of the engagement claimed by the recent French administrations, except for compelling interventions like in Mali or CAR in order to provide the stability of the area, to help local actors realize their own security system and to avoid the risk of contagious effects of Islamic terrorism on the Southern side of Europe. But the shift in African strategy may jeopardize on the long term the role of France as a regional power and cause the wane of its influence: the new fresh start shouldn’t peter into a banalisation of the historical partnerships. The dilemma about French strategic plans for the future is constantly raised up by some African ambassadors who wonder why France is leaving the continent during the rushing penetration of competitors like BRICS. With respect to business affairs, France naturally represents one of the major stakeholders of the continent and in particular of the sub-Saharan region. In 2011 Africa accounted for 17% of French export - above all high-tech products - and 13% of import - above all oil, metals and nuclear fuels (Ibid., 243). Moreover, French enterprises can gain more benefits from the CFA franc, that is the name of two currencies used in Africa which are guaranteed by the French treasury (the West African CFA franc and the Central African CFA franc). This advantage allows a great stock of French direct investments, which in sub-Saharan area increased from 6.4 in 2005 to 23.4 billion € in 2011 (Hugon, 2016), making France the third investor in the continent and giving it the possibility to reach China in the 14 countries using CFA franc, where French enterprises share the 17.2% of the market in front of the Chinese 17.7% (Leboeuf and Quénot-Suarez, 2014, p.43). In addition, the leadership on the continent of some French industrial giants is not in discussion, especially for what concerns key sectors like mineral exploitation (Total, Areva), public works (Bouygues) and telecommunication (Orange). French enterprises boast a respectable reputation and are among the major employers in the region. Finally, subPag. 95 ASRIE Geopolitical Report Volume 4/2018 ISSN 2532-845X Saharan Africa still receives most of French development aid, as we can notice in the last database provided by OECD3. Albeit the large amount of interests holds in the region, France cannot move as an hegemonic actor from the economic point of view as its ancient supremacy has been recently endangered by the growth of other actors. China stands as the biggest threat, as its part in African market went up from 2% in the Nineties until a remarkable 16% in 2011 (Védrine et al., p.46). The penetration of Beijing depends in particular on thick commercial fluxes, increased in the later years, with the level of exchanges reaching 198.5 billion $ in 2012, on direct investments (that grew up to 15% of total Chinese investments between 2005 and 2011) and finally on a big diaspora, consisting of nearly a million of Chinese people now living in Africa (Ibid., pp.47-48). France cannot ignore that the continent is petering into an attractive destination for foreign direct investments of other countries and should face the loss of its parts of African market – from 10.1% in 2000 to 4.7% in 2011 (Ibid., p.52) with less ambiguity and recalcitrance. French businessmen have suffered badly from lower-price competition of other actors and although the total value of exports and imports of national merchandise to Africa has increased since 1960, the percentage has dramatically declined – apart from some bright spots like champagne sales (Melly and Darracq, pp.18-20). The downsize of economic weight may be difficult to fight, but France can still count on a large array of cultural, institutional and linguistic tools that other competitors lack of. Even though the soft power of the République is decreasing, there is no doubt that Francophonie might be capitalized as an instrument for economic and commercial growth, as pointed out in a recent report (Attali, 2014) focused on the opportunities provided by the French-speaking universe and promoted by the OIF (Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie), which aims at establishing relations of cooperation and peace among francophone States (Leboeuf and Quénot-Suarez, 2014, 3 Geographical Distribution of Financial Flows to Developing Countries. Disbursements, Commitments and Country Indicators, OECD, 2016, pp.36-37 (https://data.oecd.org/oda/distribution-of-net-oda.html). Pag. 96 ASRIE Geopolitical Report Volume 4/2018 ISSN 2532-845X pp.45-46). The OIF is made up of 77 partners (57 members and 20 observers) that roll around the French pivot, as far as the Quai d’Orsay will contribute for more than a half of the budget. The institutional leadership might be used to strengthen France’s cultural diplomacy, to foster the creation of new commercial ties and to legitimize the claim for a more complete hegemony in the region. This is up to Emmanuel Macron, who in turn seems to be truly aware of the strategic importance of Africa for international affairs (Boisbouvier, 2018). After all, as the far-sighted François Mitterrand prophesized in 1957, «without Africa, France will have no history in 21st century». Conclusion Nowadays Françafrique is still alive. Although France’s pledges to rid itself of the colonial heritage, it remains a crucial actor in sub-Saharan Africa as it wields a high level of influence in the region, both for its hard and soft power resources. Moreover, its role is legitimated by local States, which often claim for a French intervention to stabilize the area. For what concerns military tools, France performs as a pivot player and the major security provider of the geopolitical region. This pattern is apparent if we take into account the defence agreements renewed with some local countries, the number of troops deployed in the continent and the amount of budget given to Africa for military cooperation. The scheme was confirmed during the operation in Mali and CAR, praised by Paris’ allies since they rapidly stopped an insurgency which could threaten the stability of Sahel and Southern Europe. Instead, regarding business affairs, France doesn’t embody anymore the major commercial partner of its former colonies and its presence is on the wane, as its worry ambassadors and representatives point out. The budgetary review and the substantial investments of emerging powers are reducing France’s legroom in its ancient backyard. Finally, the analysis of cultural atouts reveals that Francophonie might be a strong bulwark to defend the sphere of influence from the attractiveness of different models and Pag. 97 ASRIE Geopolitical Report Volume 4/2018 ISSN 2532-845X a valuable opportunity to increase the ties with African countries. France should improve its network of schools and institutions abroad and try to reverse the growing tendency of African students who opt for Anglosphere. From a theoretically point of view, I focused on the conceptual frameworks of regional power and regional hegemony to see if they are correct to describe French exceptionalism in the area. The list of core criteria of a regional power shows that France has for sure those characteristics. In fact, it boasts a great influence in regional affairs, its leading position is legitimated and respected by African allies (and also by other foreign competitors), it is economically, politically and culturally interconnected with the area, it assures regional security, it provides a collective good for the region (at least regarding CFA franc) and it is integrated in global forums and institutions (like in UN Security Council, where France has taken the lead on debating African affairs for a long time). These advantages, however, are not enough to define its position as the prevalent hegemonic player because it doesn’t completely dominate the subordinate State system as it occurred during the colonial era. The rationale behind this posture depends not only on the lower economic resources, but also on the attempts to act as a more normal player by choosing a multilateral approach and involving local partners. Therefore, I suggest that France’s condition is more similar to a reluctant hegemony rather than a full hegemony, also because it sometimes lacks a coherent strategy vis-à-vis African policy. The willingness of the old empire is ambivalent: on one hand the last administrations claimed for disengagement, but on the other hand it’s uneasy to definitely cut the bonds with a region considered for a long time as part of the national country. References Andreatta F. et. al. (2012). Relazioni internazionali. Bologna, Italy: Il Mulino. Pag. 98 ASRIE Geopolitical Report Volume 4/2018 ISSN 2532-845X Attali J. (2014, August). La francophonie et la francophilie, moteurs de croissance durable. Rapport à François Hollande. Bat J.-P. (2012). Le syndrome Foccart. La politique française en Afrique, de 1959 à nos jours. Paris, France: Gallimard. Boeke, S. (2016). Transitioning from military interventions to long-term counterterrorism policy: The case of Mali (2013-2016). 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