Russia's Strategy: Look Scarier Than You Are

The EU and NATO are facing an increasingly uncertain and complex situation on their eastern and south-eastern borders. In what the EU has traditionally conceived as its ‘shared neighbourhood’ with Russia and NATO its ‘eastern flank’, Moscow is exhibiting a growingly assertive military posture. The context of the Baltic and the Black Sea regions differs, but Russia’s actions in both seem to be part of the same strategy aiming to transform the European security order and its sustaining principles. The Kremlin seems to follow similar policies and tactics, mainly through the militarisation of the Kaliningrad Oblast and Crimea as the centrepiece of its strategy of power projection vis-à-vis NATO and the EU. An all-out war remains an unlikely scenario, but frictions or accidents leading to an unwanted and uncontrolled escalation cannot be completely ruled out. Tensions and military developments take place in both the Baltic and Black seas, but are not only about them. Russia is testing the Euro-Atlantic response and resilience at large. To assess how far it might be willing to go, it is necessary to evaluate how Russia perceives the West and its actions, taking into account the deep and entrenched clash of perceptions between Brussels and Moscow, and the worldview of the latter.

In the last two years, Russia has demonstrated its return to an assertive foreign policy by successful military interventions in Ukraine and Syria. The capabilities it employed to do so surprised the West, despite being well advertised in advance and their development described in detail by the Russia-watching community in Western nations. The distinctive Russian approach to operations in Ukraine gave rise to an impression among some observers that its military had employed fundamentally new concepts of armed conflict. The widespread adoption of phrases such as ‘hybrid warfare’ and ‘Gerasimov doctrine’ reinforced this perception of novelty, and was indicative of a search for ways to conceptualize – and make sense of – a Russian approach to conflict that the West found at first sight unfamiliar. Nevertheless, the techniques and methods displayed by Russia in Ukraine have roots in traditional Soviet approaches. Since the end of the Cold War, Russia’s military academics have displayed an unbroken and consistently developing train of thought on the changing nature of conflict and how to prevail in it, including – but certainly not limited to – the successful application of military power. As a result, despite modern technological enablers, Russia’s intentions and actions throughout the Ukraine conflict have been recognizable from previous decades of study of the threat to the West from the Soviet Union. Today, as in the past, Western planners and policy-makers must consider and plan not only for the potential threat of military attack by Russia, but also for the actual threat of Moscow’s ongoing subversion, destabilization and ‘active measures’. Two specific tools for exercising Russian power demand close study: the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation; and the state’s capacity for information warfare. In both of these fields, Russia’s capabilities have developed rapidly in recent years to match its persistent intentions. The most visible demonstration of this has been the unprecedented near-total transformation of Russia’s armed forces since 2008. This transformation and the accompanying rearmament programme are continuing, and the Russian military is benefiting from ongoing ‘training’ under real operational conditions in Ukraine and Syria. Russia has now demonstrated both the capacity of its conventional military capabilities and willingness to use them. The trend of the past 10 years appears set to continue – the more Russia develops its conventional capability, the more confident and aggressive it will become. Despite the perception of Russian operations in eastern Ukraine as irregular warfare, it was a large-scale conventional military cross-border intervention in August 2014 that brought to a halt the previously successful Ukrainian government offensive, and stabilized the front line close to the one currently holding under the Minsk agreements. This readiness to use military force will only have been heightened by the experience of campaigning in Syria from October 2015 onwards. The February 2016 Syrian ceasefire agreement, concluded on Russian terms, in particular confirms for Moscow once again that assertive military intervention is an effective means of achieving swift and positive foreign policy results. Russia’s practice of information warfare has also developed rapidly, while still following key principles that can be traced to Soviet roots. This development has consisted of a series of adaptations following failed information campaigns by Russia, accompanied by successful adoption of the internet. Misconceptions about the nature of Russian information campaigns, and how best to counter them, remain widespread – in particular the notion that successful countermeasures consist in rebutting obvious disinformation wherever possible. Russian disinformation campaigns continue to be described in the West as failing due to the implausibility of Russian narratives. But by applying Western notions of the nature and importance of truth, this approach measures these campaigns by entirely the wrong criteria, and fundamentally misunderstands their objectives. Russia continues to present itself as being under approaching threat from the West, and is mobilizing to address that threat. Russia’s security initiatives, even if it views or presents them as defensive measures, are likely to have severe consequences for its neighbours. Russia’s growing confidence in pursuing its objectives will make it even harder for the West to protect itself against Russian assertiveness, without the implementation of measures to resist Russian information warfare, and without the availability of significant military force to act as an immediate and present deterrent in the front-line states. In short, Russian military interventions and associated information warfare campaigns in the past two years have not been an anomaly. Instead they are examples of Russia implementing its long-standing intent to challenge the West now that it feels strong enough to do so. For Western governments and leaders, an essential first step towards more successful management of the relationship with Moscow would be to recognize that the West’s values and strategic interests and those of Russia are fundamentally incompatible.

In politics, conflicts emerge from a change in the balance of power and destruction of the status quo. The collapse of regimes in Ukraine and in the Middle East created low-pressure zones, drawing neighboring countries into the regional storm. Having found itself in a hurricane, Moscow made its choice. It could have lowered its sails and followed the wind, but it preferred to keep to its course even if it meant sailing against the wind. Moscow's offensive had its achievements: Russia is holding the initiative and managing crises wisely for its own purposes. However, in recent months Russia missed at least two sensitive blows. The first was miscalculating the consequences of the public protests in Kyiv in late 2014; the second was underestimating the risk of a Turkish military provocation during Russia's Syrian operation. However cautious Moscow is in its foreign policy, blind spots trouble every experienced operator. Modern Russia is a status quo player focused predominantly on its nearest neighbors. Neither Russian security priorities nor its resources can compel Moscow to project power beyond one thousand kilometers from its borders. When Russia sees the security environment around it as certain and predictable, it feels no need for intervention. But when uncertainty arises and a crisis occurs, Russia responds forcefully. Understanding how Russia prioritizes its security challenges and how it assesses the security situation on its borders is a start to clearing up much of the uncertainty in Eurasia today. This analysis focuses on critical situations that may develop this year into vital challenges to Russian interests, triggering a response from Moscow.

Washington Quarterly, 2007

— For the past 30 years, NATO, the EU and the West in general have consistently struggled to find means of dissuading Russia from taking actions that they find undesirable or unacceptable. The absence of major multinational conflict in Europe argues a success of deterrence, primarily by NATO; but the prevalence of overt or covert hostile actions by Russia, whether military or in other domains, there and across the globe shows that this success is only partial. — The question of how to deter Russia from future actions that threaten other states, their governments, economies or people recurs repeatedly in policy discussions. A core challenge to finding an answer lies in Russia’s consistently acting beyond the boundaries of what its Western counterparts consider to be normal and rational state behaviour. — Two further asymmetries exacerbate this challenge: the differing assessments by Russia and many Western countries of both the current and the desired state of relations between them; and a gulf in attitudes to using hostile measures, whether military or non-military, to achieve state or leadership objectives. Moscow, perceiving itself already to be in a state of conflict with the West, is not subject to the self-imposed constraints of its targets, which believe they are still in a state of peace with Russia. Similarly, Russia has repeatedly achieved its objectives by exploiting the fact that Western states have prioritized ending conflict over achieving a satisfactory outcome in it. — The precise methods by which Russia might successfully be dissuaded or deterred are as varied as the situations in which they would have to be applied. But a number of key principles for successful deterrence can be deduced from consistent Russian state behaviours and attitudes, which remain relatively constant determinants throughout all these situations. Lessons can also be drawn from past examples where these behaviours and attitudes have been understood and leveraged to achieve a successful outcome – or ignored, resulting in failure. — This paper considers all of these factors to offer a range of recommendations for appropriate action and messaging to influence Russia away from destructive activities.

Unsuccessful attempts by Russia to push Ukraine to join the Moscow-led Eurasian Economic Union and successful Russian pressure on the country to drop its Association Agreement with the EU led to political protests in Kiev in fall 2013. In spring 2014, while revolution brought pro-European regime change in Ukraine, Russia occupied and annexed Crimea and started a war in Donbas, violating international law, various bilateral and multilateral agreements as well as undermining the foundations of the post-Cold War order in Europe. It led to the most serious crisis in Russian–Western relations since the end of the Cold War, involving mutual sanctions by the United States, the EU and some other Western allies on one side and Russia on the other. However grave the crisis is, these events are yet another in a whole series of crises between Russia and the West over the 25 years since the breakup of the Soviet Union. On the other hand we also witnessed periods of quite positive, pragmatic cooperation between the two during that time. Unfortunately, none of these lasted long, nor was able to create a critical mass allowing for a positive breakthrough in mutual relations. This chapter is a modest attempt to offer some interpretations that may be helpful in answering questions: why it has happened and where we should go from here? In the first part it assesses differences between Russia and the West related to perceptions, political cultures, values and interests. In the second part it provides several conclusions based on analysis of past periods of both cooperation and conflict between the two sides. In the third part it gives recommendations on Western policies toward Russia: what approaches should be avoided and why, as well as what policies should be pursued.

Unsuccessful attempts by Russia to push Ukraine to join the Moscow-led Eurasian Economic Union and successful Russian pressure on the country to drop its Association Agreement with the EU led to political protests in Kiev in fall 2013. In spring 2014, while revolution brought pro-European regime change in Ukraine, Russia occupied and annexed Crimea and started a war in Donbas, violating international law, various bilateral and multilateral agreements as well as undermining the foundations of the post-Cold War order in Europe. It led to the most serious crisis in Russian–Western relations since the end of the Cold War, involving mutual sanctions by the United States, the EU and some other Western allies on one side and Russia on the other. However grave the crisis is, these events are yet another in a whole series of crises between Russia and the West over the 25 years since the breakup of the Soviet Union. On the other hand we also witnessed periods of quite positive, pragmatic cooperation between the two during that time. Unfortunately, none of these lasted long, nor was able to create a critical mass allowing for a positive breakthrough in mutual relations. This chapter is a modest attempt to offer some interpretations that may be helpful in answering questions: why it has happened and where we should go from here? In the first part it assesses differences between Russia and the West related to perceptions, political cultures, values and interests. In the second part it provides several conclusions based on analysis of past periods of both cooperation and conflict between the two sides. In the third part it gives recommendations on Western policies toward Russia: what approaches should be avoided and why, as well as what policies should be pursued.

2017

The EU and NATO are facing an increasingly uncertain and complex situation on their eastern and southeastern borders. In what the EU has traditionally conceived as its 'shared neighbourhood' with Russia and NATO its 'eastern flank', Moscow is exhibiting a growingly assertive military posture. The context of the Baltic and the Black Sea regions differs, but Russia's actions in both seem to be part of the same strategy aiming to transform the European security order and its sustaining principles. The Kremlin seems to follow similar policies and tactics, mainly through the militarisation of the Kaliningrad Oblast and Crimea as the centrepiece of its strategy of power projection vis-à-vis NATO and the EU. An all-out war remains an unlikely scenario, but frictions or accidents leading to an unwanted and uncontrolled escalation cannot be completely ruled out. Tensions and military developments take place in both the Baltic and Black seas, but are not only about them. Russia is testing the Euro-Atlantic response and resilience at large. To assess how far it might be willing to go, it is necessary to evaluate how Russia perceives the West and its actions, taking into account the deep and entrenched clash of perceptions between Brussels and Moscow, and the worldview of the latter.

OSW Point of View No. 76, 2019

The collapse of the Soviet bloc’s structures (the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance and the Warsaw Pact) and then of the Soviet Union itself in 1989–1991 was a kind of geopolitical earthquake in Europe. The main political and legal successor of the USSR, the Russian Federation, had to determine its place in the European order that was being formed, including the security sphere. The new Russia, which inherited from the USSR its membership in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) and the newly established North Atlantic Co-operation Council (NACC), declared its attachment to European democratic values, suggesting that it was ready to embark on close co-operation and, at some point in the future, even join the European and EuroAtlantic security structures (including NATO) that had been formed during the Cold War era in opposition to the USSR. However, Russia’s Soviet legacy also included elements of its strategic culture, political concepts and a significant share of personnel whose views had already been formed. This, in turn, meant that both the will and ability of Russia’s most senior state authorities to put these declarations into practice were highly uncertain. Even though, due to the economic crisis and process of disintegration, Russia turned out to be weaker than the USSR in the 1970s and 1980s, it did not relinquish either its status as a powerful state or the related idea – viewed in maximalist terms – of political sovereignty (even from the West). The government elites of the Russian Federation (like the last Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev and his aides before them) wanted to create a new security architecture in Europe. If constructed according to Moscow’s concepts such an architecture would lead to marginalisation or disbanding of the existing Western security structures (especially NATO) and curbing the US presence and influence in Europe. Above all, it would ensure Moscow’s de facto participation in the decision-making processes concerning European security. In addition, Russia did not wish to relinquish its objective of maintaining its zone of influence in the post-Soviet area (temporarily excluding the Baltic states). It was ready to use military force to foment and capitalise on political and ethnic conflicts in this area to achieve this goal. It also launched a political campaign to counter the efforts of Central European countries – the former (involuntary) participants of the Soviet bloc – to join NATO, attempting to create a more or less formal buffer zone in this region. The overriding goals of Russia’s European security policy have remained unaltered, regardless of the various initiatives taken by Moscow: strategic control of the post-Soviet area, the existence of a security buffer zone in Central Europe and the transformation of the existing NATO-based security system in Europe in a manner that would maximise Russia’s political and security influence and minimise that of the USA. What has changed and been diversified are the institutional solutions Moscow has employed in an attempt to achieve these goals: basing European security on the OSCE (predominant in its policy in the 1990s) or as part of a special partnership with NATO (mainly in the first decade of the 2000s) or through attempts to use the European Security and Defence Policy to enhance security co-operation with the EU. Over time, the Kremlin’s ambitions were gradually curtailed after Russian foreign policy had suffered further defeats. When it was launching the campaign against NATO enlargement eastwards, Moscow initially concentrated its efforts on the Visegrad Group countries, then on the Baltic states and finally, as the enlargement process continued, on Ukraine and Georgia. Initially, the security buffer zone in Central Europe was intended to separate the areas of NATO and Russia (and other CIS countries). However, when this proved impossible, it was to be established inside NATO on its eastern flank. From today’s perspective, it can be concluded that none of the strategic goals of Russia’s European security policy have been achieved. Even through Russia has created economic, political and security structures controlled by it in the post-Soviet area, their range, effectiveness and scale of real control of the member states’ policy is far from meeting Russian expectations. The NATO–Russia Founding Act, which imposes quite imprecise restrictions on the deployment of the Allied forces on NATO’s eastern flank, albeit politically dead, is still formally respected by NATO. However, the regular reinforcement of the Allied (and bilaterally US) military presence on the eastern flank – formally as part of the so-called ‘regular rotation’ – undermines the buffer zone idea. Regardless of discussions that recur from time to time, Russia has also been unable to create any European security system as an alternative to the existing one, especially a system that would offer Moscow veto power. Furthermore, the aggressive and revisionist foreign policy that has been sustained since the second half of the 2010s on President Vladimir Putin’s initiative has led to a crisis in relations with the West, in some respects even more serious than the one that prevailed during the Cold War era. The causes of this include: Russia’s de facto withdrawal from the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) regime; undermining the system of measures for building trust and security in Europe (blocking further adaptation of the Vienna Document and violations of the Treaty on Open Skies); the erosion of the system of nuclear weapons control, provoked by Russia due to violating the INF treaty and, most importantly, Russia’s acts of military aggression in Europe (in 2008 against Georgia and in 2014 against Ukraine), involving real territorial annexations and Russia’s numerous military provocations and ‘hybrid’ actions against NATO member states and nonaligned countries. At present, Russia needs to choose: whether it should continue the present confrontational approach in its European security policy or even toughen it, thus taking the risk of increasing political, economic and security costs, or seek détente with the West, probably at the expense of certain concessions (including those as part of the Minsk process covering the conflict with Ukraine in Donbass), and by starting once more to honour at least some of the agreements concerning European security. Moscow’s decisions may be affected by a number of factors. The most essential of these seem to be the factors linked to the domestic situation in Russia, possible personnel changes inside the Russian government and an evolution of the perception and understanding of the international and regional situation by the Russian government. The present aggressive policy pursued by Russia seems incapable of being altered without major changes in these areas.