Security Intelligence Studies

VIMAL EASO VARGHESE FLR2462 SS7088 Intelligence Analysis P.G. CERTIFICATE COURSE IN SECURITY STUDIES Terror attacks in the United States – 11th September 2001 On 11th September 2001, two passenger aircraft, one belonging to the United Airlines and the other belonging to the American Airlines were used as weapons to bomb the World Trade Centre complex in the New York City. The same day, another aircraft belonging to United Airlines crashed at Pennsylvania while another American Airlines aircraft was crashed at the Pentagon, the headquarters of the United States Department of Defense. The attacks were well-coordinated and orchestrated by a group of 19 men of Middle Eastern origin who were affiliated to the Al Qaeda organization, then under the leadership of a Saudi national, Osama Bin Laden. The attacks portrayed a clear failure in the United States intelligence agency analysis of intelligence collated from various sources. The US intelligence agency was never prepared to meet the Al Qaeda group in their home-ground which clearly demonstrated a significant vulnerability in the national security setup and the United States realized it late. US government launched a series of investigations to ascertain the reason behind the attacks. During their course of investigation, it was revealed that the CIA had warned the then President about a terrorist plot of a series of airline hijackings. At the same time it was revealed that an FBI agent in Phoenix, Arizona, had written a memo stating that some among the 19 hijackers were receiving flying instructions in the United States. In 1999, the US intelligence agency had released a study asserting that al Qaeda might try suicide attacks on U.S. installations. The U.S. intelligence agency is known to be big in size and branches into several wings for the gathering of data / information. What happened then: a huge amount of information was gathered, but it was never turned into intelligence. To turn the information into intelligence, it should have been collated with other information, integrated into a coherent picture, interpreted and then used to forecast actions. This was the missing link in the intelligence analysis cycle which led to their failure in averting an attack of such a large scale. The terror attacks were known to have claimed the lives of over 3000 people. If the US government had analyzed the available information back then, they could have made real value of the intelligence. Mumbai attacks – 26th November 2008 The 2008 terror attacks struck Mumbai, the capital city of the Indian state of Maharashtra and regarded the financial hub of India. The attacks were staged over a period of 3 days, between 26th and 28th November, 2008. 10 men from Pakistan associated with the terror group Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LeT) stormed specific public venues of interest within Mumbai and killed a total of 166 people. Nine of the gunmen were killed during the attacks. The lone perpetrator to survive the attacks, Mohammed Ajmal Kasab was arrested by the Indian government and later executed on November 2012. The locations targeted were the busy Chatrapati Shivaji Terminus railway station, an Iranian - Indian managed Leopold Café, the world renowned Taj Mahal Palace & Tower Hotel, Oberoi Trident Hotel, Metro Cinema, Cama & Albless Hospital and a Jewish Charitable Trust run Nariman House. The terrorists were known to have used automatic weapons and grenades in the attacks. From the various open sources information and government released investigative journals available, it was evident that the 26/11 Mumbai attacks happened as a result of intelligence failure on the part of the Indian spy agency. It was revealed that the Indian spy agency had readymade information gathered from high-tech surveillance but failed to act upon it. According to an investigative journal report published by The New York Times, ProPublica and the PBS series Frontline titled, In 2008 Mumbai Killings, Piles of Spy Data, but an Uncompleted Puzzle, “hidden history of the Mumbai attacks reveals the vulnerability as well as the strengths of computer surveillance and intercepts as a counter-terrorism weapon. What happened next may rank among the most devastating near-misses in the history of spycraft. The intelligence agencies of three nations (India, United Kingdom and United States) did not pull together all the strands gathered by their high-tech surveillance and other tools, which might have allowed them to disrupt a terror strike so scarring that it is often called India’s 9/11.” During the course of the Indian government initiated investigation panel report, it was revealed that the Indian intelligence agency had received prior alerts from their counterparts, the American and British intelligence agencies to suggest that a terror plot was being hatched against the Indian city Mumbai. The report mentioned that at one stage, Indian and British intelligence agencies monitored online activities of a key 26/11 planner, Zarrar Shah, the technology chief of Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LeT), “but couldn’t connect the dots” before the attacks that killed 166 people, including six Americans. The Indian agency failed to believe in the information received and did not verify the information to establish the credibility of it. The Intelligence Bureau (IB) and the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) both failed in analyzing, disseminating and acting upon intelligence that was fairly specific. The then India’s foreign secretary and the former National Security Adviser Shivshankar Menon accepted in an interview that “no one put together the whole picture,” referring to the intelligence gathered by the U.S., Indian and British agencies months before the attacks. “Not the Americans, not the Brits, not the Indians...only once the shooting started did everyone share” what they had, largely in meetings between British and Indian officials, and then “the picture instantly came into focus,” said Menon. Benghazi attack on the United States Consulate – 11th September 2012 On 11th of September 2012 a compound, belonging to the United States Overseas Mission in Benghazi, Libya was breached by intruders. The perpetrators attacked and burned the US Consulate. The incident resulted in the death of two Americans, including the US Ambassador John Christopher Stevens. In the early hours of 12th September 2012, a second U.S. facility was attacked in Benghazi. Two Security contractors working for the US government were killed in the assault. They are identified as Tyrone Woods and Glen Doherty. Initially, US government officials announced the attack as a violent act perpetrated by an angry mob responding to a video made in the U.S. that ridiculed Islam and its messenger, but later retracted their statement to confirm the incident as a terrorist attack. During the course of the incident review, it was understood that the US State Department was not being fed with the right information by the national intelligence agency. This was evident, when on 9th October 2012 almost a month after the attack the US State Department acknowledged that the US Consulate attacks in Libya was not precipitated by an anti-American protest, as had originally been reported. The US State Department then admitted that gunfire and explosions were reported near the front gate of the US compound that were the first signs of danger precipitating the attacks that killed US ambassador and the other three Americans. Later in May 2014, the U.S. House of Representatives formed a select committee to investigate on the 2012 Benghazi attacks. The House of Representatives Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence released a report on 21st November 2014 in which they found conflicting intelligence in the wake of the attack about the motive and cause were reflected in early public comments by the US government officials. It was further revealed in a Special Report on the terrorist attack in Benghazi released by the U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs on 30th December 2012 that the CIA had warned the US government, weeks before the attacks that Islamist militias were building a presence in Benghazi and that U.S. facilities lacked adequate defense. The study also reflected on the imprudence displayed by the US intelligence agency in underestimating the militant capability in a country like Libya which had no political stability and fluid security situation. The following is an excerpt from the Accountability Review Board Documents published on the US State Department surrounding the Benghazi attacks investigation - “The board found that intelligence provided no immediate, specific tactical warning of the September 11 attacks. Known gaps existed in the intelligence community’s understanding of extremist militias in Libya and the potential threat they posed to U.S. interests, although some threats were known to exist. The report also mentioned that the Benghazi’s threat environment had been generally deteriorating since the “gelatina” bomb was thrown over the SMC fence on April 6, but was not judged to have reached a critical point before September 11.” The intelligence gathered, analyzed and made available was limited to foresee the threat of a brewing terrorist plot to attack the US Consulate in Benghazi. Paris terror attacks – 7th to 9th January 2015 On 7th January 2015, masked gunmen carried out an assault on the Charlie Hebdo headquarters, home of a leading French satirical weekly newspaper. The gunmen initially killed 11 people at the newspaper office, including two police officers who were assigned to protect the publication. The gunmen then fled the scene. The gunmen were aided by a getaway driver. Two days later, assailants entered a kosher supermarket located east of Paris suburbs and took all who were inside, hostages. During the hostage crisis, four Jewish hostages were killed by the assailants. On 9th January 2015, the French police rounded the gunmen at a printing plant and killed them. One of the assailants was killed while the other fled when police raided the kosher supermarket. The two day terror incident resulted in the killing of 17 French citizens. Following the incident, the French Intelligence agency was blamed for their failure to catch the perpetrators of the attacks and prevent the incidents from taking place. During the course of the study, it was revealed that the French authorities were aware that Cherif and Said Kouachi, the gunmen who carried out the the Charlie Hebdo attack, had been arrested a decade ago for their ties to a terrorist organization. In 2008, Cherif was convicted of terrorism and sentenced to three years in prison, with 18 months suspended, for having assisted in sending fighters to the Al Qaeda network’s group in Iraq. They also knew that two brothers’ names reflected on both the British and US No-Fly passenger list due to their involvement in terror-related activity. In fact, the perpetrators were known not just to French but also to other European and American authorities. Moreover, it was also understood that Amedy Coulibaly, who took hostages in a kosher shop, and Hayat Boumeddiene, Coulibaly's girlfriend, were connected both to each other, and to a large network of extremist organizers in Europe. It was also known to the authorities that Said Kouachi undertook military training in Yemen in 2011, where it is alleged that he met the influential preacher Anwar al-Awlaki. Awlaki was a senior figure in al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), the branch of al-Qaeda that claimed responsibility for the French attacks. Bibliography The 9/11 Commission Report, prepared by the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States and published on 22 July, 2004. Article on Sept. 11: What Did Bush Know and When Did He Know It? Posted on 21 May, 2002 by Stratfor Global Intelligence Article on “One Officer's Perspective: The Decline of the National Reconnaissance Office” by Robert Kohler posted on 14 April, 2007 CIA Library on Center for the Study of Intelligence Independent Investigative Committee Report on 26/11 attacks prepared by the Ram Pradhan Commission and presented on 4 April, 2009. Mumbai Terror Attacks: An Analysis by Samarjit Ghosh Posted on the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies website, on February 2009. “Flashing Red: A Special Report on the terrorist attacks at Benghazi” prepared by the US Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs and published on 30 December 2012. US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Review of the terrorist attacks on US facilities in Benghazi, Libya published on 15 January, 2014. Al Qaeda entry in Wikipedia Report of the United States Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, The US Intelligence Community’s pre-war intelligence assessments on Iraq, Published on 7 July 2004 obtained from Global Security.org website. The CNN news excerpt on a timeline of the Charlie Hebdo attacks posted on 9 January, 2015 VEV/02/2015/AR1Page 5