9/11 and Iraq: Intelligence Failure and Bad Policy

Intelligence and National Security, 2011

"The 9/11 terrorist attacks have been intensively examined as both tactical and strategic intelligence failures but less attention has been paid to the policy failures which preceded them. Perhaps this is due to the presumption that intelligence analysis influences decision-making as a precursor to and foundation for policy. This assumption about the influence of analysis on decision deserves a much closer examination. The 9/11 terrorist attacks provide a good case to study for greater understanding of the influence, or lack of influence, that intelligence analysis has on decision-making. Specifically, the 9/11 Commission Report identifies as a significant failure the lack of a National Intelligence Estimate on the terrorist threat between 1998 and 2001, and implies that if one had been produced it might have helped enable decision-makers to prevent the 9/11 attacks. In other words, a failure of strategic intelligence analysis lay at the foundation of the failure to prevent 9/11. But was this really the case? This article takes a closer look at the case of the missing National Intelligence Estimate by first evaluating what decision-makers knew about the threat prior to the 9/11 attacks, the policies they were implementing at the time, and the extent to which the hypothetical National Intelligence Estimate described by the 9/11 Commission would have mattered in terms of influencing their judgement and policy for the better. It concludes that the 9/11 terrorist attacks were more a failure of policy than strategic intelligence analysis. Link to article is here: http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/02684527.2011.559140#.Un-sqCoo7WM"

Journal of Strategic Studies, 2005

ABSTRACT Many scholars and analysts have studied intelligence failure and surprise and developed theories to explain disasters such as the attack on Pearl Harbor. Others, especially since the 9/11 attacks, have examined the rising threat of terrorism and see it as posing a particularly difficult challenge for the intelligence community. But little work has been done to integrate the earlier literature on intelligence failure with the newer threat of terrorist attack. This article attempts such an integration, by examining the bombing of the US Marine Barracks in Beirut in 1983; it concludes that most studies of the Beirut bombing are mistaken in their assessment of the role played by intelligence in that disaster, and suggests that our understanding of intelligence failure against surprise attacks needs to be revised in the age of terrorism.

Foreign Affairs, 2006

New Delhi <% Sayyid Qutb, the educator and writer whose book Milestones ignited the radical Islamist movement, is shown here displaying one of his books (probably Social Justice in Islam) to the president of Colorado State College of Education, Dr. William Ross. Greeley, Colorado, from the air in the 1940s. "The small city of Greeley, in which I am staying, is so beautiful that one may easily imagine that he is in paradise," Qutb wrote. But he also saw the darker side of America. Qutb on trial, circa 1965. He was hanged in 1966. "Thank God," he said when his death sentence was pronounced. "I performed jihad for fifteen years until I earned this martyrdom." /*£££%. Zawahiri as a schoolboy, right, and as a medical student at Cairo University, below Ayman al-Zawahiri grew up in Maadi, a middle-class suburb of Cairo. A solitary child, his classmates regarded him as a genius. He is shown in his childhood in a Cairo park. Opposite bottom: Ayman al-Zawahiri was defendant number 113 of the 302 who were charged with aiding or planning the October 1981 assassination of Anwar al-Sadat. He became spokesperson for the defendants because of his superior English. He is shown here delivering his lecture to the world press in December 1982. Many blame the torture of prisoners in the Egyptian prisons for the savagery of the Islamist movement. "They kicked us, they beat us, they whipped us with electric cables! They shocked us with electricity! And they used the wild dogs!" The defendants on trial Left: Sheikh Omar Abdul Rahman, "the blind sheikh," was one of the defendants. He was the emir of the Islamic Group at the time. *+ Left: The renovation of the Grand Mosque took twenty years. During the hajj it can accommodate a million worshippers at once. The World Trade Center as seen from New Jersey/where the followers of Sheikh Omar Abdul Rahman plotted to bring it down Ramzi Yousef was the mastermind of the first World Trade Center bombing. It was his dark imagination that gave shape to al-Qaeda's ambitious agenda. The Dar-ul-Aman Palace, Kabul. The palace was caught between the lines during the civil war that followed the Soviet withdrawal. After twenty-five years of continuous warfare, much of Afghanistan was left in ruins. Above: The ruins of the American Embassy in Nairobi, Kenya, which was bombed on August 7,1998al-Qaeda's first documented terrorist strike. The attack killed 213 people and injured thousands. More than 150 people were blinded by flying glass. Right: The American Embassy in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, was bombed nine minutes later, killing 11 and wounding 85. Left: The Clinton administration responded by destroying several al-Qaeda training camps in Afghanistan and the al-Shifa pharmaceutical plant in Khartoum, pictured here. A night watchman was killed in the plant, which later proved to have nothing to do with producing chemical or biological weapons. The USS Cole after a suicide attack by two al-Qaeda operatives in a fishing skiff in October 2000. The attack nearly sank one of the most invulnerable ships in the U.S. Navy. Seventeen sailors died. "The destroyer represented the capital of the West," said bin Laden, "and the small boat represented Mohammed." Michael Scheuer, who created Alec Station, the CIA's virtual Osama bin Laden station. He and the FBI's John O'Neill were bitter rivals. Richard Clarke, the counterterrorism czar in the White House, proposed that O'Neill succeed him in his job-an offer that may have led to his downfall. John O'Neill said goodbye to Daniel Coleman and his FBI teammates at a farewell coffee on the occasion of his retirement from the bureau on August 22, 2001. The next day he started work at the World Trade Center. Above: After gaining the names of the hijackers from al-Qaeda suspects in Yemen, Ali Soufan (left, with Special Agent George Crouch) traveled to Afghanistan. Here he stands in the ruins of what was bin Laden's hideout in Kabul. O'Neill's funeral was the catastrophe of coincidence that he had always dreaded. Here his mother, Dorothy, and his wife, Christine, leave St. Nicholas of Tolentine Church in Atlantic City. They were among a thousand mourners. The ruins of the World Trade Center burned for a hundred days. John O'Neill's body was found ten days after the 9/11 attack. THE LOOMING TOWER Like many agents, Dan Coleman had been trained to fight the Cold War. He joined the FBI as a hie clerk in 1973. Scholarly and inquisitive, Coleman was naturally drawn to counterintelligence. In the 1980s, he concentrated on recruiting communist spies in the populous diplomatic community surrounding the United Nations; an East German attaché was a particular treasure. In 1990, however, when the Cold War had just ended, he found himself on a squad devoted to Middle Eastern terrorism. There was little in his background that prepared him for this new turn-but that was true of the bureau as a whole, which regarded terrorism as a nuisance, not a real threat. It was difficult to believe, in those cloudless days after the fall of the Berlin Wall, that America had any real enemies still standing. Then, in August 1996, bin Laden declared war on America from a cave in Afghanistan. The stated cause was the continued presence of U.S. forces in Saudi Arabia five years after the first Gulf War. "Terrorizing you, while you are carrying arms in our land, is a legitimate right and a moral obligation, ,, he stated. He presumed to speak on behalf of all Muslims, and even directed some of his lengthy fatwa to U.S. Secretary of Defense William Perry personally. "I say to you, William, that: These youths love death as you love life.... These youths will not ask you for explanations. They will sing out that there is nothing between us that needs to be explained, there is only killing and neck-smiting." Other than Coleman, few in America-even in the bureau-knew or cared about the Saudi dissident. The thirty-five volumes in Alec Station painted a picture of a messianic billionaire from a sprawling, influential family that was closely connected to the rulers of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. He had made a name for himself in the jihad in Afghanistan against the Soviet occupation. Coleman had read enough history to understand the references in bin Laden's war cry to the Crusades and the early struggles of Islam. Indeed, one of the striking features of the document was that time seemed to have stopped a thousand years ago. There was now and there was then, but there was nothing in between. It was as if the Crusades were still going on in bin Laden's universe. The intensity of the anger was also difficult for Coleman to grasp. What did we do to him? he wondered. Coleman showed the text of bin Laden's fatwa to prosecutors from the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York. It was droll, it was weird, but was it a crime? The lawyers puzzled over the language and found a rarely invoked seditious conspiracy statute The Martyr THE END OF THE WORLD war had brought America victory but not security. Many Americans felt that they had defeated one totalitarian enemy only to encounter another far stronger and more insidious than European fascism. "Communism is creeping inexorably into these destitute lands/ 7 the young evangelist Billy Graham warned, "into war-torn China, into restless South America, and unless the Christian religion rescues these nations from the clutch of the unbelieving, America will stand alone and isolated in the world." The fight against communism was being waged inside America as well. J. Edgar Hoover, the Machiavellian head of the FBI, claimed that one of every 1,814 people in America was a communist. Under his supervision, the bureau began to devote itself almost entirely to uncovering evidence of subversion. When Qutb arrived in New York, the House Un-American Activities Committee had begun hearing testimony from a Time magazine senior editor named Whittaker Chambers. Chambers testified that he had been part of a communist cell headed by Alger Hiss, a former Truman administration official, who was one of the organizers of the United Nations and was then president of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. The country was riveted by the hearings, which gave substance to the fears that communists were lurking in the cities and the suburbs, in sleeper cells. "They are everywhere," U.S. Attorney General Tom Clark asserted, "in factories, offices, butcher shops, on street corners, in private businesses-and each carries with him the germs of death for society." America felt itself to be in danger of losing not only its political system but also its religious heritage. "Godlessness" was an essential feature of the communist menace, and the country reacted viscerally to the sense that Christianity was under attack. "Either Communism must die, or Christianity must die, because it is actually a battle between Christ and the anti-Christ," Billy Graham would write a few years later-a sentiment that was very much a part of the mainstream Christian American consensus at the time. Qutb took note of the obsession that was beginning to dominate American politics. He was himself a resolute anti-communist for similar reasons; indeed, the communists were far more active and influential in Egypt than in America. "Either we shall walk the path of Islam or we shall walk the path of Communism," Qutb wrote the year 42

2005

The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, Authorized Edition. W. W. Norton and Company, 2004. xviii, 567 pp. $10.00 USD (paper). ISBN 0-39332-671-3. Companion Web site: http://www.9-11commission.gov This report, issued by the independent, bipartisan National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, is the resulting work of an intense investigation and scrutiny of the events related to September 11, 2001, the day of the largest terrorist attacks in U.S. history. The commission was made up of five Republicans and five Democrats, and led by Thomas H. Kean as its chair and vice chair Lee H. Hamilton. In order to fulfill its mandate of investigating the facts and circumstances surrounding the attacks, the commission and its staff members reviewed more than 2.5 million pages of documents, interviewed more than 1200 people, and held nineteen days of public hearings. The resulting report includes a readable condensation of the events of that day, background and explanations of the various factors that taken together made the horrible day possible, and recommendations as to what the government's response should be in order for the United States to be stronger and safer. This report examines which government agencies were involved in both failed and successful intelligence and information gathering, communication, and it reveals information about the emergence of a new form of terrorism by Al Qaeda and individual terrorists. The style of writing combines drama not unlike that found in a thrilling novel rather than a straight report of facts and evidence. The report has been criticized for the former by some, but the bottom line is that such style is what will get people to continue reading after they pick up the report. Several characteristics, beyond its subject matter, distinguish this government report from most other government reports, publications, and documents. One is that immediately upon its release, it shot to the top of best seller's lists as it was brokered widely in bricks and mortar and online bookstores. Another is that the first publisher of the authorized edition was not a government agency, but a private publishing company, W.W. Norton, which nominated it for the National Book Award for non-fiction in 2004; the report became a finalist. In addition, the import of this title will continue to be evident far into the future, and it certainly holds rank among modern-era milestone documents of the United States. Two titles of the thirteen chapters, into which the report is divided, exemplify the report's dramatic style of presentation. The first chapter, bWe Have Some PlanesQ follows the four ill

2015

The author of this memoir, Michael Morell, spent 33 years at the CIA, ultimately rising to become it deputy director. Many of the details in his surprisingly candid (and even selfcritical) account of his tenure at the CIA are new and of importance to those studying the war on terror. For example, the sections dealing with the Agency’s greatest blunder, the “groupthink” mistakes on Iraq’s non-existent WMD program will be of interest to those who want to learn more about how the Agency assessed its mistakes. While President George W. Bush (whom Morell briefed on terror threats for much of his career) comes off as well-meaning, Vice President Cheney and his chief of staff Scooter Libby are described in a negative light as attempting to shape CIA intelligence on WMDs to fit their political agenda. Morell describes efforts by Libby to intervene in decisions at the Agency as “the most blatant attempt to politicize intelligence that I saw in thirty-three years in the business” (p. 87). Mor...

The politics of the sociology of terrorism. The use of intelligence and counter-intelligence by terrorist organizations Tuðman: Tuðman: Last year we discussed Intelligence at the beginning of the 21st Century. This year, we will be focussing on the events of September 11, and the consequences they will have for national and international security policy. This morning we will begin with a general framework of the issue. The floor is open. Boyadjiev: Boyadjiev: I would like to start with a short slide presentation. I recently spent a month in the States, and left New York late in the evening on September 10 with the last Lufthansa flight, just hours before the airport was closed. By chance I was taking pictures of the Twin Towers on September 10 from the other side of the Hudson river just before leaving around 5.00 pm. I was in the air when the tragedy occurred. I felt guilty to some extent that we, the professionals, had allowed such a thing to happen. I'm sure we'll discuss this later. I collected some unique slides from the Internet and would like to start our meeting with a visualization of the tragic events that have provided the incentive for meetings such as this all over the world (slides are shown). Since September 11, the world has changed radically and it is not necessary to explain why. What can we now expect? International terrorism is on the move. Many assumptions are no longer valid. Many elements of national security doctrine seem obsolete now and need to be changed. We can expect an increase in left-wing, right-wing, religious, antiglobalist, minority, nationalistic, and other forms of radicalism, and new types of attacks. Before starting the discussion I would like to show you something else. It's called the 'Handbook for the Dedicated Terrorist' and it is based on the way of 12 thinking and ideology of the Basque terrorist organization, ETA, presented by one of its leaders, Ricardo Garcia. I took some points from it to provide an overview of their philosophy and operations. What do they consider their main weapons and means to perform terrorist acts and reach their goals? What do the terrorists believe in? The first weapon, according to Ricardo Garcia, is motive, and he lists several rules: 1) Do not kill without motive; 2) your reasons for acting must be shared by others; 3) Be an honorable David against the Goliaths; 4) All rationales are valid; 5) Seek the support of reliable people; 6) Keep attacking until victory is achieved. The second weapon is efficiency, and the rules are: 7) Perform the violence with the precision of brain surgery (the tragedy on September 11 was performed in this manner); 8) A dead dog doesn't bite; 9) fast, confident and cheerful; 10) Be mercurial and militant; 11) Prepare 'the picture', the background; 12) Keep that 'patriotic flame' or religious flame burning; 13) The people's cause always is a good cause; pretend to be fighting for a real cause; 14) Kill with your brain; 15) God is accepted for he punishes and forgives; 16) Throw the stone and hide the hand. 17) Plan the terrorism like seeds. 18) Cleverness and caution (it's foolish to put your head in the lion's mouth); 19) Discretion; and 21) When you hunt deer, don't settle for a hare. The third weapon of the terrorists, according to Ricardo Garcia, is the moral weapon: 22) Who defines the morals?; 23) Let the circumstances be your shield; 24) Cover yourself in the cloak of 'progress'; 25) The violence will never appear necessary unless it is committed; 26) A drop of oil leaves a bigger stain than a bucket of water; 27) In the name of peace; 28) To harvest you must also sow; 29) Little streams make great rivers; and last 30) Do not forget that the hangman can also be hanged. Dedijer: Dedijer: What is your source? Boyadjiev: Boyadjiev: These are quotations from the Philosophy of Ricardo Garcia, the chief ideologist of the Basque terrorist organization ETA. Dedijer: Dedijer: Who published it? Boyadjiev: Boyadjiev: Somebody found it in Spanish and translated it into Bulgarian, and I got it from him. Kerr: Kerr: The only comment I'd have is that it seems to me ETA has violated all the fundamental principles you just laid out. They violated their own guidelines, because if you look where ETA is right now, it's lost any popular support. It has very little popular support. Boyadjiev: Boyadjiev: This was not written recently, but years ago. 13 Kerr: Kerr: They didn't follow their own creed very well. Smith: Smith: You're right that they did break all their rules. However, I think that the terrorists probably thought they were following their rules. We must remember that most people, but particularly fanatics, are able to convince themselves that what they are doing is right and consistent with their own rules. They set up rules and they believe they're following them. Boyadjiev: Boyadjiev: Since we will be talking about the politics and sociology of terrorism, I thought it would be interesting to share this. Tuðman: Tuðman: There is probably an explanation for that. Do you know what year it was published? Boyadjiev: Boyadjiev: I do not know exactly; probably about 10 years ago. Tuðman: Tuðman: That is exactly what I would like to discuss. The impact of terrorism on international security policy. Why is September 11 so significant? Because this is probably the first time terrorism became a global activity. Terrorists are attacking strategic targets using methods and techniques offered by the global market. That is why the character and nature of terrorist activities are changing; globalization is being utilized. Terrorism has become an international activity, because it is financed in one country, training takes place in another, and in a third, the operation is performed. So it is not just national anymore; international borders have been crossed. So now we have to find new answers for old problems, but in a completely new global context. From that point of view, we can also evaluate international security policy, and contemporary security problems and international conflicts. The case of southeast Europe and the former Yugoslavia, for example. Even today, there is no clear understanding of the sources of the conflict. Why did it happen and what was the background? Without this understanding, there can be no proper diagnosis of the situation. The international community could not reach agreement on its objectives or on ways to resolve the crisis. How to manage the crisis does not mean how to resolve the crisis. The system of international security is not designed to resolve the problem. The same problem applies to military management. The military, in my experience during the last ten years, was advocating political solutions. But the most we can say is that some countries are supporting terrorism in one way or another and that terrorist activities today are adapting themselves to the global environment and using its resources. We see that terrorists do not care anymore about the consequences. The focus now is not on threatening somebody, but protecting ourselves and our interests. Another threat which has developed as the result of global terrorist activities is that

Public Administration Review, 2011

Harknett is an associate professor of political science and chair of the University Faculty at the University of Cincinnati. He has published widely in the area of international and national security studies as well as international relations theory. His two most recent published articles examine cybersecurity both in terms of deterrence and warfi ghting strategies and in the context of national policy.

Complex Operations Case Studies Series (2011), 2013

The unfortunate events surrounding the Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab case merely reflect a global struggle between constructive and destructive elements in the “long war” on terrorism. They reflect a global reality that no one, no country, is beyond the reach of the call anarchy. As indicated by the Catholic Archbishop of Abuja, Dr. John Onaiyekan, in a 2009 Christmas Day Mass, Nigeria is not immune – and one might add that no country is immune - to the influence of terrorism that currently sweeps the world. And outrage, such as that directed against Umar Abdul Mutallab, does not fully address the problem at hand.” Simply put, to “win” the “long war” we must empower those who would serve as our allies; people like Dr. Mutallab.