The Struggle to Reform Intelligence after 9/11

Nancy C. Roberts, Editor Richard J. Harknett James A. Stever University of Cincinnati Public Documents: Is American Intelligence Organized to Thwart the Next Terrorist Attack? he Struggle to Reform Intelligence after 9/11 Richard J. Harknett is an associate professor of political science and chair of the University Faculty at the University of Cincinnati. He has published widely in the area of international and national security studies as well as international relations theory. His two most recent published articles examine cybersecurity both in terms of deterrence and warfighting strategies and in the context of national policy. E-mail: [email protected] Two years after the Homeland Security Act of 2002, Congress passed the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act. his act aspired to replace a sprawling agency-oriented intelligence apparatus with an integrated, networked intelligence community. he act envisioned a director of national intelligence who would accomplish sweeping structural reforms, while at the same time maintaining and improving the efficiency and effectiveness of intelligence operations. his vision has not materialized. he director of national intelligence does not have the power to implement structural reforms. Schisms between the legislature and the executive also hamper reforms. James A. Stever is a professor of political science at the University of Cincinnati. His research and publications focus on public administration theory, federalism, and intergovernmental management. He previously worked in the Government Accountability Office, evaluating how presidents manage intergovernmental relations. He is also an adjunct professor in the National Agricultural BioSecurity Center. E-mail: [email protected] 700 form and scope from the Homeland Security Act, the IRTPA shared the same impetus—a sense of failure to anticipate the 9/11 attacks. For decades, serious analysts of the American intelligence system had warned of its inadequacies and called for reforms. he National Security Act of 1947 created the anchor of the intelligence community— the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)—and defined the parameters in which it would function along with independent military and domestic intelligence agencies. For the CIA, the primary goal was to collect foreign intelligence that would guide policy makers embroiled in the Cold War following World War II and engage in operations to forward policy makers’ he public administration equivalent of the decisions. he scale and scope of intelligence needs cosmic big bang occurred in the aftermath of 9/11. To ensure national security, 22 programs throughout the Cold War, in parallel with the growth of the national security bureaucracy, led to a prolifor agencies were moved into a new federal agency— eration of intelligence agencies. he Federal Bureau the Department of Homeland Security. Critics of this of Investigation (FBI); the U.S. Navy, Air Force, convulsive organizational change could argue that the and Coast Guard; and the Departments of State and consolidation should have taken place decades earlier Treasury created intelligence-gathering units that in response to the new threats of international terrorsuited their particular agency’s purpose (Marks 2010, ism. However, the energy and political will for this 66). he resulting intelligence apparatus, which was crisis-driven creation did not exist until the terrorist in place on September 11, 2001, provided decision attack on the World Trade Center clearly demonmakers with a cacophonous strated the need for pervasive breadth of coverage across the structural change. perspectives and purposes of Within two years of the individual agencies. However, it he Homeland Security Act of passage of the Homeland suffered from its individual-unit 2002 set in motion a series of Security Act, Congress initiated bureaucratic, silo-like orientastructural changes with the goal structural changes specific to tion, which by definition lacked of creating a network of agenstrategic allocation of intellithe intelligence community as cies throughout the American gence assets and weak strategic federal system to mitigate the part of the Intelligence Reform prioritization of intelligencethreat of international terrorism. and Terrorism Prevention gathering efforts, particularly Within two years of the passage Act (IRTPA) of 2004. While in the absence of the previous of the Homeland Security Act, different in form and scope Cold War framework. Discrete Congress initiated structural from the Homeland Security analysis and fragmentation changes specific to the intelliAct, the IRTPA shared the same ruled. gence community as part of the Intelligence Reform and Terimpetus—a sense of failure to he National Commission rorism Prevention Act (IRTPA) anticipate the 9/11 attacks. on Terrorist Attacks upon the of 2004. While different in T Public Administration Review • September | October 2011 United States—commonly known as the 9/11 Commission—determined that, in retrospect, this was a system primed to fail, and its report conspicuously and painstakingly documented the points of failure. he pervasive theme of the commission’s initial 585-page report (2004) was the lack of unity among the existing intelligence agencies. hough the set of intelligence agencies that existed on September 11, 2001, could be loosely called an “intelligence community,” the mélange of government agencies that constituted this community, according to the commission, had not adequately anticipated the growing homeland threat and could not provide the warning necessary to prevent a sparsely equipped and minimally trained group of al-Qaeda operatives to carry out the most devastating act of terrorism in the nation’s history. In the words of the 9/11 Commission, the existing intelligence community was guilty of four kinds of failures: “in imagination, policy, capabilities, management” (2004, 356).1 deemphasize foreign threats and minimize interaction with agencies devoted to mitigating foreign threats. Amid the new environment created by the Homeland Security Act of 2002, agencies are attempting not only to shift their orientation, but also to engage in more frequent and intense interaction with federal, state, and local agencies to which they previously paid less attention. Homeland security–oriented intelligence is problematic for the intelligence community. Intelligence agencies such as the CIA with a foreign intelligence focus are expanding domestic intelligence capabilities. his entails cooperation and interaction with not only the Defense Department and the FBI, but also with state and local law enforcement, which now must cope with foreign threats. To effectively address these threats, these agencies have acquired a domestic intelligence mission. Domestic intelligence is laden with problems. Any agency expanding its domestic security activities will be subject to criticism and In offering an assessment of the reaction and progress of intellihigh levels of scrutiny, as distrust of intelligence activities is embedgence reform in the wake of 9/11, an old metaphor applies: is the ded in American culture. “Gentlemen do not read each other’s mail” glass half full or half empty? We conclude that the response to the was the comment issued by Secretary of State complexity of the intelligence challenge is an Henry Louis Stimson in 1929 when he closed incomplete process at this stage because of the the State Department’s code-breaking office. complexity of the threat and bureaucratic en[T]he response to the Senator Frank Church accused the CIA of bevironments. Hence, the water level of reform complexity of the intelligence having like a “rogue elephant” throughout his is only mid-way in the glass, ten years out challenge is an incomplete 1975–76 hearings, which cataloged various from the precipitating event of 9/11. Whether process at this stage because of abuses of that agency. hese suspicions of the this is the extent of the reform or whether a intelligence establishment will not easily be fuller reform is possible is the open question. the complexity of the threat and bureaucratic environments. assuaged as various agencies attempt to recast To appreciate the challenges presented to the Hence, the water level of reform themselves as necessary contributors to the new homeland security mission. intelligence community, one must go beyond is only mid-way in the glass, ten those enumerated by the 9/11 Commission years out from the precipitating Moreover, the intelligence problem goes and recognize that the homeland security event of 9/11. Whether this beyond that of reeducating the public on the problems of the intelligence community are necessity of gathering not only foreign but but one component of its larger task: gatheris the extent of the reform also domestic intelligence. he scope and scale ing and integrating intelligence throughout or whether a fuller reform is of the intelligence community must expand the world to protect the security interests of possible is the open question. to include not only the FBI but also domestic the United States. he terrorist attacks challaw enforcement agencies at the state and lenged decision makers to add a new component to the existing intelligence community: an integrated homeland local levels. To be involved in the intelligence community, state and local law enforcement agencies must undergo internal cultural security component. he conceptual and organizational division of shifts and acquire new capabilities. Unlike countries such as Britain domestic versus foreign intelligence no longer corresponded to the that have extensive experience in gathering intelligence to combat new threat reality. hus, organizational change (both structural and domestic terrorism, the United States has little experience (Marks process) had to occur in order to address this reality, while simulta2010, 92). neously maintaining ongoing effective intelligence operations. he threat environment could not be put on pause to accommodate the Enter the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism installation of a new organizational framework. Prevention Act Public Law 108-458, signed on December 17, 2004, better known he Homeland Security Act of 2002 is a foundational document that created a new post-9/11 context for the intelligence community as the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act, is a 236page statute that was written and contextualized as a direct response by requiring existing government agencies at all levels of the federal to the “lessons” learned from the attacks of 9/11 as they related to system to rethink their mission. he Department of Defense is a the role of the U.S. intelligence community. he title implies both a prime example. Before 9/11, the mission of this department was connectedness between the needs to reform intelligence and prevent focused on threats originating from outside territories controlled terrorism and a separateness between the two tasks. While a terrorist by the United States. he new domestic threats evident after 9/11 attack was the precipitating event that led to reform, the act and required the Defense Department to add an internal focus to its its subsequent implementation recognized that reform efforts were intelligence mission parameters. NORTHCOM (U.S. Northern Command) was one result. he FBI offers another example. A near- to be grounded in a national and international threat environment much more expansive than terrorism alone. his starting point is exclusive domestic law enforcement orientation led this agency to The Struggle to Reform Intelligence after 9/11 701 found in the two subsequent core strategy documents to emanate from the reformed intelligence community’s Office of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI), Vision 2015: A Globally Networked and Integrated Intelligence Enterprise and the 2009 National Intelligence Strategy.2 Both are anchored on threat assessments in which terrorism is only one component. Moreover, the IRTPA extended the same general logic on which the Homeland Security Act of 2002 was based. he act rested on two pillars: an expanded range of threats to U.S. national security and the new exigency to merge domestic and foreign intelligence. he IRTPA envisioned a new intelligence community, one that combined 16 intelligence agencies in new ways to enhance information sharing, coordination of intelligence activities, and the vetting of intelligence analysis. he single most important reform initiated by the IRTPA appeared in its opening section. his section specified the creation of a director of national intelligence who shall, (1) serve as head of the intelligence community; (2) act as the principal adviser to the President, to the National Security Council, and the Homeland Security Council for intelligence matters related to the national security; and (3) consistent with section 1018 of the National Security Intelligence Reform Act of 2004, oversee and direct the implementation of the National Intelligence Program. DNI responsible for integrating the 15 independent members of the Intelligence Community. But it gives him powers that are only relatively broader than before. he DNI cannot make this work unless he takes his legal authorities over budget, programs, personnel, and priorities to the limit. It won’t be easy to provide this leadership to the intelligence components of the Defense Department, or to the CIA. hey are some of the government’s most headstrong agencies. Sooner or later, they will try to run around—or over—the DNI. hen, only your determined backing will convince them that we cannot return to the old ways.4 Both the Commission on Intelligence Capabilities and the 9/11 Commission stressed the same theme: structural reform of the intelligence community was essential. he Commission on Intelligence Capabilities expressed throughout its report serious reservations about whether the Office of the Director of National Intelligence was positioned for success. he commission made 74 specific recommendations, many of which dealt with organizational issues in the intelligence community, but all of which were grounded on the same assumptions behind the IRTPA—that the intelligence community was too disparate in its organization and its functioning. Strategy and Vision under the Director of National Intelligence he dual charge of the DNI—to coordinate daily intelligence and he establishment of a director of national intelligence reshaped the to pursue fundamental reform—found its formal outlet in the two National Security Act of 1947. his post–World War II act had crecore strategy documents mentioned earlier. While the 2009 Naated the CIA and its directorship, but it had tional Intelligence Strategy details the strategic not created an integrated intelligence comobjectives of U.S. intelligence, it is framed munity. he congressional record and ensuing within the context of Vision 2015, which he dual charge of the DNI— debate that forged the IRTPA made it clear lays out the reform-initiated transformation to coordinate daily intelligence that a lack of integration within the intelof how U.S. intelligence must operate in the and to pursue fundamental ligence community had significantly contribearly twenty-first century. reform—found its formal uted to the success of the terrorist attack on outlet in the two core strategy the World Trade Center.3 To make the case for a transformative reform, documents mentioned earlier. Vision 2015 offers a strategic assessment of the challenges facing twenty-first-century inhe Office of the Director of National IntelWhile the 2009 National telligence that is consistent with the National ligence formally began operating on April 22, Intelligence Strategy details Intelligence Strategy produced in 2005 (and 2005, with the dual charge of serving as the the strategic objectives of U.S. updated in 2009). he document considers principal advisor on daily intelligence and the intelligence, it is framed within the threat environment to be broad and fluid: principal driver of near-term and over-thethe context of Vision 2015, horizon intelligence reform. It is important which lays out the reformWe live in a dynamic world in which the to note that this overall starting premise for pace, scope, and complexity of change reform—that structural change was necesinitiated transformation of how are increasing. he continued march of sary—was reinforced shortly before the new U.S. intelligence must operate DNI, John Negroponte, was sworn into ofin the early twenty-first century. globalization, the growing number of independent actors, and advancing technology fice. A month earlier, the Commission on the have increased global connectivity, interIntelligence Capabilities of the United States dependence and complexity, creating greater uncertain-ties, Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction had released its report, systemic risk and a less predictable future. hese changes have noting in its cover letter that “[o]ur review has convinced us that the led to reduced warning times and compressed decision cycles. best hope for preventing future failures is dramatic change.” Its lead… Intelligence must be more integrated and agile to assist in ing recommendation to President George W. Bush was to preventing and responding to these challenges. (Office of the Director of National Intelligence 2008, 4) Give the DNI powers—and backing—to match his responsibilities. In your public statement accompanying the Building on the presumptions of the 2002 reforms initiated with announcement of Ambassador Negroponte’s nomination as the creation of the Department of Homeland Security, the docuDirector of National Intelligence (DNI), you have already ment further asserts that moved in this direction. he new intelligence law makes the 702 Public Administration Review • September | October 2011 foremost among these challenges is the blurring of lines that once separated foreign and domestic intelligence, and the increased importance of homeland security…. In this new environment, geographic borders and jurisdictional boundaries are blurring; traditional distinctions between intelligence and operations, strategic and tactical, and foreign and domestic are fading; … To succeed in this fast-paced, complex environment, the Intelligence Community must change significantly. (4–5) he change that is envisioned is a shift from an agency-centric community model to an integrated networked enterprise modality. he existing agency-centric Intelligence Community must evolve into a true Intelligence Enterprise established on a collaborative foundation of shared services, mission-centric operations, and integrated mission management, all enabled by a smooth flow of people, ideas, and activities across the boundaries of the Intelligence Community agency members. (5) Vision 2015 conceptualized the threat environment as a combination of three factors: fluidity of technology, uncertainty of source/ threat identification (more potential anonymity), and the multiplication of relevant actors who pose a threat, leading to intelligence operatives’ quandary of reduced warning time and compressed decision-making cycles within which they must provide salient information and analysis. he document rests on the presumption that the end of the Cold War is actually the appropriate starting point to consider the need for intelligence reform (rather than the attacks of 9/11). In the past, the Intelligence Community was siloed into discrete disciplines (e.g., signals intelligence, human intelligence, geospatial intelligence, counterintelligence) and functions (e.g., tasking, collection, analysis, dissemination). hese silos often led to competition and duplication. Although the agency-centric operating model worked well during the Cold War, it cannot succeed in the current environment, which changes rapidly. We need a mission-focused operating model that is agile, lean, and flexible enough to respond to a dynamic environment. (10) Much of the remaining portion of Vision 2015 details the organizational reforms required to bring about a shift to an intelligence enterprise, including joint duty pathways, integrated mission management, and changes in collection and analytical methods. he document explicitly recognizes the difficulty of the shift it requires and anticipates the main objections to its mandate. he first and most significant impediment to implementation is internal and cultural: we are challenging an operating model of this Vision that worked, and proponents of that model will resist change on the basis that it is unnecessary, risky, or faddish. hese opponents will posit that incremental change is working, the environment is not really that different, and the new methods are unproven. A second impediment is existing institutional barriers, which create friction. Few things sap the determination for change as effectively as the friction induced Enterprise Objectives Mission Objectives MO1: Combat violent extremism MO2: Counter WMD proliferation MO3: Provide strategic intelligence and warning MO4: Integrate counterintelligence MO5: Enhance cybersecurity MO6: Support current operations EO1: Enhance community mission management EO2: Strengthen partnerships EO3: Streamline business processes EO4: Improve information integration and sharing EO5: Advance S&T/R&D EO6: Develop the workforce EO7: Improve acquisition Source: Office of the Director of National Intelligence (2009, 6–17). by layers of bureaucratic inefficiency working to frustrate any endeavor. Stove-piped “back-office” functions that make even simple personnel or operational activities difficult will complicate nearly every aspect of transformation. A third impediment is budgetary. Dramatic transformation of the Intelligence Community will require stable and somewhat predictable budgets. (21) However, perhaps the greatest challenge facing Vision 2015 is the “tyranny of the immediate” (Mazzafro 2008). he DNI faces the exigency of implementing significant organizational changes that, by their very nature, disrupt established standard operating procedures, while simultaneously directing the national intelligence program of the United States, which on a daily basis assesses active threats to the United States. he DNI’s requirement to produce a daily intelligence briefing is in tension with the desire to improve intelligence through structural innovation. Innovation entails risk and disruption to ongoing, proven established operations. In balancing immediate operational concerns against reform concerns, the bias is inevitably in favor of incremental change or no change at all.5 he 14-page 2009 National Intelligence Strategy recognizes this tension. On one hand, eight pages are dedicated to providing an overview of the strategic threat environment and a discussion of operational goals to address these threats. On the other hand, six pages (nearly half ) are dedicated to the objectives necessary to reform the structure and operations of the intelligence community in order to transform it into a functioning intelligence enterprise. he National Intelligence Strategy aspires to simultaneously guide operations in an active and dangerous threat environment and undertake structural/functional reform. he strategy competently lays out how this can be achieved while recognizing the daunting nature of the dual task. he documentary trail of the past ten years reveals that the attacks of 9/11 precipitated demands for reform that have led to a vision of transformed intelligence. However, vision and implementation are two different things. Both the IRTPA of 2004, which created the foundation for reform, and executive branch implementation created an office that could be visionary, but did not empower an officer that could be transformational. he most telling example of this, of course, is the fact that four very accomplished officials with wide and successful national security experience have held the position in only six years. What is most interesting is that the three men who left the post subsequently concluded in comments and writings that the office of the DNI is essential (its creation was the right thing to do), but fundamentally hamstrung (Blair 2010; Hayden 2010; Negroponte and Wittenstein 2010).6 One of the key The Struggle to Reform Intelligence after 9/11 703 problems is embedded in the IRTPA legislation and can be found in the opening section, which establishes the office. While the IRTPA enumerates the elevated purpose of the DNI relative to the existing intelligence community, section 1018 of the law specifies guidelines for the president in implementing the creation of the DNI,7 stating, he President shall issue guidelines to ensure the effective implementation and execution within the executive branch of the authorities granted to the Director of National Intelligence by this title and the amendments made by this title, in a manner that respects and does not abrogate the statutory responsibilities of the heads of the departments of the United States Government concerning such departments. he IRTPA was the foundation for a vision of a very different intelligence community—an intelligence enterprise model consistent with that articulated by the 9/11 Commission and the Commission on Intelligence Capabilities. However, the IRTPA proved to be a tenuous step toward genuine structural reform. It created a central office without giving this office broad control over separate existing agencies. he IRTPA did not emulate the sweeping reforms inherent in the Homeland Security Act of 2002—reforms that involved the creation of a new department complete with a cabinet-level secretary. he IRTPA placed emphasis on the person who would hold the office and the relationship that he or she would have with the president. he empowerment for transformation would not come from the legislation, but from granted presidential authority and power of persuasion vis-à-vis existing intelligence agencies. Although the act leaves the door open for structural transformation, it is difficult to imagine that any president being briefed every morning on imminent and active threats would allow the DNI to risk a major break in ongoing intelligence, as the DNI proposes new structural reforms that would better integrate the intelligence community. If one adds to the “tyranny of the immediate” traditional public administration variables such as bureaucratic budgetary turf and organizational culture clashes, it is difficult to imagine the reforms begun in the wake of 9/11 moving any differently in scale and pace. he future scenario for implementing reforms inherent in the IRTPA would be more promising if Congress were an effective partner in guiding and supporting these reforms. Such is not the case. he following section argues that congressional assistance is unlikely in part because of a lack of analytical capacity and effort.8 Missing Evaluative Component Handicaps Legislative Documents Congressional Hearings As government documents,9 congressional hearings are concatenated, rambling, and inherently unsystematic. However, the confirmation hearings held by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) to confirm the initial director of national intelligence and his three successors are instructive. hey provide some insight into why Congress has not been an effective component in the mosaic of intelligence reform. On April 12, 2005, the SSCI held hearings to confirm the first DNI, John Negroponte, who served 22 months. He was succeeded by Admiral Michael McConnell, who served 23 months. Dennis Blair, the third DNI, served 18 months and was succeeded by 704 Public Administration Review • September | October 2011 General James Clapper. he appearance of four candidates before the SSCI within a five-year period is interesting in itself—suggesting that the IRTPA may have created a difficult role that mortal men have found quite difficult to perform. Beyond that, however, the existence of four identical hearings within a five-year period affords an excellent opportunity for some comparative observations, both quantitative and qualitative. Predictably, the Negroponte hearings were the most intense and required more printed pages of testimony (Negroponte, 59 pages; McConnell, 29 pages; Blair, 38 pages; Clapper, 42 pages). It is clear from the intensity of the senatorial questions that those on the panel held not only high expectations for the new DNI position, but also anticipated a greater role for the SSCI in the intelligence community. A question from Chairman Pat Roberts captured the SSCI’s mind-set: Chairman Roberts: Mr. Ambassador, do you agree to appear before the Committee here or in other venues when invited? Ambassador Negroponte. Yes, sir. Chairman Roberts: Do you agree to send the intelligence community officials to appear before the Committee and designated staff when invited? Ambassador Negroponte: Yes, sir. Chairman Roberts: Do you agree to provide documents or any material requested by the Committee in order to carry out its oversight and its legislative responsibilities? Ambassador Negroponte: I do, sir. Yes. Chairman Roberts: Will you ensure that all intelligence community elements provide such material to the Committee when requested? Ambassador Negroponte: I do. (SSCI 2005) From the foregoing interchange and others throughout the hearing, it is evident that the committee believed that with the passage of IRTPA, they were forging not only a new relationship to the intelligence community, but also a new foundation for congressional involvement in intelligence policy. he tone of subsequent hearings indicated that the high expectations the senators believed they had established in the initial hearings had not been met. A statement by an irritated Vice Chairman Senator Christopher Bond in the second DNI confirmation hearings articulated the new mood of the SSCI. We are not going to accept national security issue judgment without examining the intelligence underlying the judgments, and I believe this Committee has an obligation to perform due diligence on such important documents. When we ask for documents, however, we’ve run into resistance, and the IC claims we should not be looking over its shoulder and checking its work. To me, that’s basically what oversight is all about. And I think the Committee must look into the materials on which you base the judgment. (SSCI 2007) Senator Bond’s frustration stems from an enduring issue in the intelligence community grounded in the U.S. system of divided government: specifically, who is in charge of the intelligence—the executive or the legislature? Neither the DNI nor the IRTPA effectively addressed this issue. its marginal role. Four years after IRTPA, amid mounting congressional discontent, it argued before the Senate for a greater role in intelligence analysis (GAO 2008). In his testimony, Comptroller General David M. Walker stressed that management oversight could improve personnel management throughout the intelligence community and the laborious security clearance process. Conclusions It is still an open question whether the IRTPA’s vision of transformhe schism between the executive and Congress has been exacering agency-based intelligence into an integrated networked intellibated by the CIA. he CIA refuses to supply information to the gence enterprise can succeed. he intelligence community confronts Government Accountability Office (GAO) and encourages other an old conundrum: revolution versus evolution. Reform in the latter intelligence agencies to do the same (Donaldmode defaults to the importance of the immeson 2010, 21–23). his controversial refusal diate and thus to a less disruptive incremental It is still an open question is supported by the Justice Department Office approach; reform in the former mode gives whether the … vision of of Counsel’s 1988 opinion that intelligence priority to the consequences of future failure transforming agency-based activities are exempt from GAO reviews.10 and thus supports dramatic overhaul. As we intelligence into an integrated When the Senate in 2010 attempted to settle noted earlier, the intelligence reforms of 9/11 the issue and pass legislation granting the created an office that could be visionary, but networked intelligence GAO the authority to review the full array of it did not empower an officer that could be enterprise can succeed. he agencies in the intelligence community, Peter transformational. If one accepts the premises intelligence community Orszag, director of the Office of Management of Vision 2015—that we face a threat enviconfronts an old conundrum: and Budget, informed Senator Dianne Feinronment that requires an intelligence structure revolution versus evolution. stein that the president would veto the bill if that is agile, flexible, and adaptive—then the Reform in the latter mode it included that provision.11 conclusion one must draw ten years out from 9/11 is that we have a vision of where we need defaults to the importance of to go, but not the legislative basis on which to his schism has reduced the scope of legislathe immediate and thus to move beyond the half measure of intelligence tive involvement in the intelligence commua less disruptive incremental reform that is the IRTPA. Ten years after nity. Deprived of GAO analysis to inform and approach; reform in the former 9/11, it remains unclear whether the IRTPA support its recommendations, the congresmode gives priority to the and the documents that the act inspired repsional impact on the budget, policy, and consequences of future failure resent a road to reform that is potentially only structure of intelligence agencies has been half traveled or has run its course. reduced. he secondary effect is that GAO and thus supports dramatic analysis is not available to institutions outside overhaul. Acknowledgments the Congress and to the public. he Office he authors wish to thank Donald Kluba for of Management and Budget, which has full his constructive review and John Callaghan for providing backaccess to intelligence community budgetary information, does not share and publish this information in the same manner as the GAO. ground information that informed this article. here are, of course, two separable points of contention here relating to congressional involvement. First is the potentially less controversial notion that more GAO access in evaluating budgets, policies, and structures of intelligence agencies would position congressional committees to more effectively conduct their oversight roles. In the particular area of how structural reforms are influencing function, the lack of GAO analysis likely handicaps informed congressional action. Second, and more to Senator Bond’s point, is the more controversial and problematic contention that greater access is needed so that analysis of the analysis could take place. Here, the point is that if committee staff had more access to the raw intelligence underlying finished intelligence products (judgments produced by the intelligence agencies), the committees could make their own analytic judgments and thus judge the professional assessments of the intelligence agencies. Of course, the inherent political nature of Congress raises the concern that legislative involvement in intelligence analysis would politicize the analysis. Where the GAO should fit regarding these points of contention was not addressed in the IRTPA. he GAO has not been silent about Notes 1. he 9/11 Commission’s conclusion that organizational structure and processes were central to an intelligence failure on that day is vehemently rejected by the former head of the CIA’s Bin Laden Unit, Michael Scheuer, who resigned from the agency in November 2004. See his blog post “Might as Well Call in the Marx Brothers,” May 24, 2010, at http://security.nationaljournal.com/2010/05/ is-it-time-to-kill-off-the-dni.php [accessed May 25, 2011]. his article sets aside this debate and focuses on the reforms that followed from the commission’s report. 2. he first National Intelligence Strategy was released in 2005. For the purposes of this essay’s focus on the evolution of reform since 9/11, the 2009 updated strategy conveys the essence of the 2005 version and, at time of publication, represents the national strategic position paper for intelligence and thus is the version to be analyzed. 3. It is important to note an alternative view of the past ten years that might suggest that the most important change regarding intelligence has been an almost doubling of spending on intelligence. Ultimately, one might argue that more important than structure is simply the relationship between resources and tasks. If you dedicate enough resources to a target, you enhance the chances significantly of intelligence success. Of course, two issues with this operations perspective are The Struggle to Reform Intelligence after 9/11 705 that it does not resolve the issue of which tasks should be prioritized and whether they are the right priorities and what happens if spending cannot stay at a high level. Neary (2010) raises the concern that spending is unlikely to be sustained, and thus structural reforms need to be pursued. 4. Subsequently in practice, the two agencies have reacted a bit differently to the creation of the DNI. Some suggest that the Defense Department has largely ignored the DNI, where direction has not been taken and influence has not been accepted. here are indications, particularly in the area of mission management, that the CIA, on the other hand (perhaps as a result of its status as an agency and not a department), has been more willing to accept influence bordering on guidance from the DNI. 5. Some scholars suggest that the IRTPA has as much potential for structural reform as the Goldwater-Nichols reforms of the U.S. military structure. A critical difference is the environment in which they were instituted. he military reforms were conducted in a strategic environment that was stable and, in the late 1980s, improving between the United States and the Soviet Union. he post-9/11 environment is both unstable and laden with new threats. Hence, the tyranny of the immediate is much more salient as a hurdle to post-9/11 intelligence reform. 6. Some make the counterargument that the creation of the DNI was a mistake. One example is Pillar (2010). A very good range of opinion on the DNI reform 7. 8. 9. 10. can be found on the blog site http://security.nationaljournal.com/2010/05/is-ittime-to-kill-off-the-dni.php [accessed May 25, 2011]. Neary (2010) has a similar focus on section 1018 and how it undermined the DNI. Neary’s piece provides an excellent insider view of the initial challenges and hurdles faced in opening the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. Congress has held four DNI confirmation hearings in the past five years. Yet the testimony reveals very little evolution of congressional thinking from the original appointment of Negroponte. One is reminded of the movie Groundhog Day, in which the protagonist wakes up every morning, starting the same day over again. While he is aware that life has moved, no one else is. McConnell, Blair, and Clapper likely experienced something like this sensation facing very similar questions to the ones posed to Negroponte. Traditionally, there are four producers of government documents: the executive branch, the legislative branch, government agencies, and the court system. he search for government documents related to IRTPA logically focuses on the executive and legislative branches, for several reasons. he act is comparatively new, and the presidency and Congress were the two major branches that framed the act. Hence, one would expect that these two branches would do the heavy lifting—producing both the strategic documents to frame and complement the IRTPA, and the evaluative documents to assist and shape its implementation. Using this search criterion, one finds an uneven quality between the strategic and evaluative documents produced by the executive and legislative branches. he details of this controversy are beyond the scope of this article. It is instructive that Leon Panetta as a congressman supported GAO review. Upon becoming CIA director, Panetta reversed his position. 11. Letter from Peter Orszag to Dianne Feinstein, March 5, 2010, http://www.fas. org/irp/news/2010/03/omb031610.pdf [accessed May 25, 2011]. References Blair, Dennis C. 2010. Interview with Charlie Rose, PBS, November 12. http://www. charlierose.com/view/interview/11291 Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction. 2005. Report to the President of the United States. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office. http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/ wmd_report.pdf [accessed May 25, 2011]. Donaldson, Patrick. 2010. Infiltrating American Intelligence: Difficulties Inherent in the Congressional Oversight of Intelligence and the Joint Committee Model. American Intelligence Journal 28(1): 13–28. Hayden, Michael V. 2010. he State of the Craft: Is Intelligence Reform Working? World Affairs, September/October, 35–47. Marks, Ronald A. 2010. Spying in America in the Post-9/11 World: Domestic hreat and the Need for Change. Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger. Mazzafro, Joe. 2008. IC Vision 2015: Too Little and Too Slow! http://www.afcea.org/ signal/articles/templates/intel_blog_template.asp?articleid=1673&zoneid=211 [accessed May 25, 2011]. Neary, Paul C. 2010. Intelligence Reform 2001–2009: Requiescat in Pace? Studies in Intelligence 54(1): 1–16. Negroponte, John D., and Edward M. Wittenstein. 2010. Urgency, Opportunity, and Frustration: Implementing the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004. Yale Law and Policy Review 28(2): 379–417. 9/11 Commission. 2004. he 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States. New York: W. W. Norton. Office of the Director of National Intelligence. 2008. Vision 2015: A Globally Networked and Integrated Intelligence Enterprise. http://www.dni.gov/reports/ Vision_2015.pdf [accessed May 25, 2011]. ———. 2009. National Intelligence Strategy. http://www.dni.gov/reports/2009_ NIS.pdf [accessed May 25, 2011]. Pillar, Paul R. 2010. Unintelligent Design. he National Interest, September/October, 43–50. U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO). 2008. Intelligence Reform: GAO Can Assist the Congress and the Intelligence Community on Management Reform Initiatives. Testimony of David M. Walker before the Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, the Federal Workforce, and the District of Columbia, Committee on Homeland Security and Government Affairs, U.S. Senate. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office. GAO-08–413T. U.S. Senate. Select Committee on Intelligence. 2005. Hearings on the Nomination of Ambassador John D. Negroponte to Be Director of National Intelligence. 109th Cong., 1st sess., April 12. ———. 2007. Hearings on the Nomination of Vice Admiral Michael McConnell to Be Director of National Intelligence. 110th Cong., 1st sess., February 1. Keep moving ahead with ASPA’s Professional Development Webinars Peruse the topics or consider submitting a proposal at http://www.aspanet.org 706 Public Administration Review • September | October 2011