NARRATING EUROPE’S MIGRATION
AND REFUGEE ‘CRISIS’
Michael Collyer and
Russell King
Abstract
It is very clear – as many journalists covering the
unfolding migration and refugee crisis have pointed
out – that geography lies at the heart of the events
taking place in Europe and the Mediterranean. It is a
story of borders and routes, of distance and proximity,
and of location and accessibility. The role of (re-)
bordering has been fundamental in states’ attempts to
‘manage’ and ‘control’ the refugee and migrant flows
and, in this respect, we observe a return to the more
traditional practices of bordering – physical barriers
and personnel-heavy security controls – rather than
the previous processes of ‘externalizing’ and ‘internalizing’ border management. In the Eastern Mediterranean and the Balkans the external border of the
European ‘fortress’ has been prised open, whilst the
free-movement ethos of the Schengen area has been
compromized by EU states’ reactions to the large-scale
movement of migrants and refugees and recent acts of
terrorism. In this introductory paper we bring a critical
geopolitical lens into play in order to understand
the European, regional and global power geometries
at work, and we critically examine the political and
media rhetoric around the various discursive constructions of the migrant/refugee ‘crisis’, including both
the negative and the Islamophobic utterances of some
European leaders and the game-changing iconicity of
certain media images.
Department of Geography,
University of Sussex
Keywords: Europe, refugee and migration ‘crisis’,
migrant fatalities, legitimation, political geography,
European Union policy
Narrando la ‘crisis’ migratoria y de refugiados
en Europa
Resumen
Está muy claro – así como lo han señalado varios
periodistas cubriendo la crisis de migración y refugiados – que la geografía está al fondo de los eventos que
se están llevando a cabo en Europa y el Mediterráneo.
Es una historia de fronteras y rutas, de distancia y
proximidad, y de ubicación y accesibilidad. El rol de
(re-)fronterizar ha sido fundamental en los intentos de
los estados de ‘gestionar’ y ‘controlar’ la circulación de
migrantes y refugiados y, en este sentido, observamos
un regreso a las practicas tradicionales de fronterizar
– barreras físicas y controles de seguridad con mucha
personería – en vez de los procesos previos de ‘externalizar’ e ‘internalizar’ la gestión de las fronteras. En
el Mediterráneo oriental y en los Balcanes la frontera
de la fortaleza europea ha sido abierta con fuerza,
mientras que el carácter distintivo del libre-movimento del área Schengen ha sido comprometida por las
reacciones de los estados europeos al movimiento de
tan grande escala de los migrantes y refugiados y las
acciones terroristas recientes. En este ensayo introductorio usamos un lente critico geopolítico para entender
1
NARRATING EUROPE’S MIGRATION AND REFUGEE ‘CRISIS’
las geometrías de poder europeo, regional, y mundial
que están trabajando, y examinamos la retórica acerca
de las varias construcciones discursivas de la ‘crisis’ de
migrantes/refugiados, incluyendo los dichos negativos
e Islamofobios de unos líderes europeos y la influyente
iconicidad de ciertas imágenes en los medios.
Palabras clave: Europa, ‘crisis’ migratoria y de
refugiados, fatalidades de migrantes, legitimación,
geografía política, política de Union Europea
Introduction
On 19 April 2015 around 800 people were drowned
in the Mediterranean Sea south of Lampedusa – the
small Sicilian island – when the hopelessly overcrowded and unseaworthy boat in which they were trying to
reach Europe capsized. This tragic accident, the most
significant loss of life in a single such incident ever
recorded, marks the beginning of a narrative of crisis
associated with the movement of people to Europe.
Unfortunately, none of this is new. Over the last few
decades, undocumented migration, meaning travel
organized specifically to avoid the institutionalized
system of state regulation, has become increasingly
common across the Mediterranean. These dangerous
journeys have often resulted in tragedy, yet this past
year has been perceived differently.
Since the 19 April tragedy, continued fatal
accidents and growing numbers of people crossing
the Mediterranean have fueled a language of crisis
associated with this undocumented migration. Yet
the unease of this ‘migration crisis’ is not primarily
caused by migration itself, but by repeated evidence
that the member-states of the European Union are
unable to respond effectively. This introductory paper,
like the rest of the contributions in this special issue,
seeks to examine the origins and nature of this ‘crisis’.
As Lindley argues, the language of ‘crisis’ is powerful,
indicating something that is both anormal and bad
(2014: 2). In these terms, the current crisis is not one
of migration, nor even of refugees or humanitarian
action, as others have argued (UNHCR 2015) but,
rather, using the term of Habermas (1988), one of
‘legitimation’.
2
Habermas’ classic work (published in German in
1973 and in English in 1988) examines the crisis of
capitalism, which he argues may be of four closely
related crisis types: economy, rationality, legitimation and motivation. All rely on the central theme
of legitimation, which highlights the requirement of
the modern liberal state to be seen as governing in
the interest of citizens, beyond the formal democratic
mandate of government. In order to gain the continued
consensus of citizens, state administrative institutions
must be perceived as good, just, and governing in
the broader interest. A specific crisis of legitimation
is associated with socio-cultural implications of state
involvement in the economy. A legitimation crisis
results from a widespread perception that state institutions have failed in normative terms.
We feel that this diagnosis captures the current
situation in Europe particularly well. Although the
‘crisis’ is widely expressed in terms of migration, it
relates much more broadly to the perceived legitimacy
of state institutions to perform the increasingly wide
range of administrative functions that are necessary
to manage the complex realities of state facilitation
of the market economy. This increasingly takes place
at the European Union (EU) level. Indeed the EU’s
responsibility for coordinating border control at the
‘external’ borders of Europe1 is directly related to the
gradual suppression of internal controls, originating
in the 1985 Schengen Agreement, associated with
the expansion of the European Single Market. The
expansion of the EU’s remit into migration management and border control, which is now seriously
critiqued by both left and right, is therefore initially
a result of the expansion of the state and supra-state’s
role in managing the economy. This introductory
paper sets the analysis of this legitimation crisis into
the context of the entire special issue. It falls into three
main sections which examine, in turn, the ways in
which migration data are presented, the distinctiveness
of the current crisis, and the central role of political
geography in explaining it. A final section overviews
the remaining papers in the special issue.
1 This shorthand has become common in critical literature
on the European Union. We use it here in territorial terms to
distinguish the current EU28 from the far more territorially
uncertain and culturally defined notion of ‘Europe’.
Human Geography
MICHAEL COLLYER AND RUSSELL KING
Characterizing the ‘crisis’: difficulties with data
Although the ‘migration crisis’ is about much more
than migration, the ways in which the ‘movement of
people’ (to employ a broader and more neutral term)
is measured, categorized and understood is undeniably
an important contributory factor. The measurement
of movement is extremely challenging and subsequent
categorization of that movement is inevitably highly
political (Collyer and de Haas 2012). This starts with
the choice of the information to be measured.
The significance and frequency of fatal accidents
is perhaps the most significant concern underlying the
crisis narrative, yet it is also one of the most difficult
areas in which to collect accurate information. In any
fatal accident there is a close link between accuracy of
information, identification of those killed and tracing
family members, all closely related to basic human
respect for the dead. It is the lack of this respect which
aggravates the tragedy of fatalities of undocumented
migrants. Data on the number of dead in the incident
on 19 April 2015, like all such tragedies, are still approximate. Only 28 people survived and 24 bodies
were recovered, so estimates of the number of dead
are based on survivors’ testimonies of the number of
people on board when the boat left Libya. These vary
from 700 to 900. The UNHCR (2015) cites a figure
of ‘over 600’; the figure of 800 that we have cited
comes from a first-hand interview by the BBC with a
group of survivors (BBC News 23 April 2015). Such
variation would be unimaginable in any other transportation disaster. It is a powerful illustration of the
diminished value of human life. It also undermines
the potential to use fatalities as a measure of severity
in these situations.
The Missing Migrants project, managed by the International Organization for Migration, has become
the most widely cited authority on these statistics
(IOM 2016). Despite the tremendous uncertainties
surrounding the information, their figure of 3,770
fatalities in the Mediterranean in 2015 has gained a
level of authority by repetition and is widely used in
both media reports and academic analysis. This figure
is clearly unacceptable and is one of the most significant concerns driving the humanitarian argument for
crisis. Yet, given the larger number of crossings of the
Mediterranean, it is not dramatically different from the
previous decade. Fargues and Di Bartolomeo (2015)
conducted an analysis of the risk of dying at sea on a
Mediterranean crossing which has fluctuated between
1 and 4 percent since the substantial undocumented
migration in the Mediterranean began in 2001.
A second widely cited statistical measure is the
number of people who have entered Europe without
authorization. Undocumented migration is, by its
very definition, impossible to count accurately, though
that proviso never appears in media commentaries.
There are two widely used proxies for undocumented
migration to Europe: quarterly data from Frontex (the
European border control agency) on ‘detections of
illegal border crossings at the EU’s external borders’
(Frontex 2016), and the total number of asylum applications registered in the European Union. Both statistics have been widely cited as if they were the reality
of the situation, but they are approximate indicators,
at best, of the numbers of people arriving.
Frontex is initially clear in the description of its
central statistical measure, though the way the data are
then presented and used, particularly by media sources
down the line, camouflages this clarity considerably. It
is important to highlight two important features of
data on ‘detections of illegal border crossings at the
EU’s external borders’. First, it relates only to detections. The number of individuals who cross a border
undetected is unknowable, so the accuracy of the
measure basically relates to the effectiveness of surveillance operations. On maritime borders, surveillance
is relatively accurate but, on land borders without
sophisticated surveillance mechanisms, undetected
crossings are likely to be higher. Second, this measure
relates only to border crossings, not to numbers of
individuals. This is likely to be a much larger discrepancy, since the same individuals may be recorded
several times. A journey from Turkey to Germany, for
example, involves an entry into Greece, then a crossing
out of the EU into Macedonia and a second crossing
of an external EU border into Croatia or Hungary.
Nando Sigona (2015) highlighted this practice in a
publicized exchange with Frontex, estimating that, if
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NARRATING EUROPE’S MIGRATION AND REFUGEE ‘CRISIS’
these figures are interpreted as individuals entering
Europe, they may lead to as much as double counting.
The legitimation crisis and the ‘European
response’
Using asylum statistics as a proxy for undocumented entry to the EU is equally problematic.
According to Eurostat (2016), in 2015 there were just
over 1.3 million claims for asylum registered in the
28 member-states of the EU. Given the widespread
fingerprinting of asylum applicants through the
EURODAC database, it is more certain that each application was registered by a different individual. Still,
there is no record of how these individuals entered
the EU, nor how long they had been there before
registering an asylum claim, so it would be a mistake
to interpret this as the number of people who entered
the EU in that year. It is also a mistake to interpret
these data historically. The previous peak in asylum
applications in the EU occurred in 1992, when just
over 672,000 applications were received (Eurostat
2016). This has fueled widespread reports that the EU
received double the previous maximum number of
asylum applications in 2015. Yet, in 1992, there were
only 15 countries in the EU, compared to the current
28. Although most of the 13 newest members receive
very few asylum applications, Hungary received the
second-highest number after Germany. The 15 states
that were members of the EU in 1992 received just
over 1 million asylum applications in 2015. This is
significantly higher than the 672,000 for 1992, but
well short of double the previous peak – in fact it
represents an increase of 49 percent.
The European Union has not experienced anything
approaching the scale of the current refugee situation
in Lebanon, or even Turkey or Jordan, since the Second
World War. Displacement in Europe during and immediately after the war motivated the construction
of the global regime of refugee protection, founded
on the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of
Refugees. There have been other significant arrivals in
Europe, notably the 1991 movement from Albania to
Italy and Greece, and other displacements across the
Western Balkans from 1992 onwards. Although those
displacements are far short of movements elsewhere
in the world, they were similar to the situation
experienced in the EU in 2015. Significantly, the
European Union coped quite successfully with these
earlier refugee and migration episodes. In 1992,
Germany received 438,191 applications for asylum,
only marginally fewer than the 476,510 received in
2015. Although some institutions were undoubtedly
stretched, there was nothing like the current rhetoric
of ‘crisis’ or developing right-wing activism.
Each of these statistical measures has been used as
if they were much more accurate than they really are.
They have also been used in ways which exaggerate the
significance of recent movements compared to historical periods. This is certainly not to say that migration
is objectively irrelevant, but the nature of the presentation of the movement of people is an important
element in how the crisis has been framed. This has
informed the regularly updated political response,
which is always introduced in terms of changing strategies of migration management. However, these have
ultimately drawn attention away from the underlying
issues of legitimation at a European level.
4
The panicked response to the 2015 ‘crisis’ contrasts
significantly with these earlier events. Certainly,
nothing so bold as the 1951 Convention has even
been discussed. Indeed any mention of the Convention by European policymakers involves suggestions
to roll back the protections which it guarantees, and
refugee advocates have wisely steered this off the
policy agenda. What, then, distinguishes the current
legitimation crisis from earlier concerns around mass
arrivals? Four possible features of the current European
response are apparent:
•
the withdrawal of the state from all forms of
public provision;
•
the broader economic and political crisis experienced in the EU, particularly since 2008;
•
the re-imposition of controls at borders within
Europe; and
•
the change in the nature of migrants’ and
refugees’ journeys to reach EUrope.
Human Geography
MICHAEL COLLYER AND RUSSELL KING
Each of these has exacerbated the sense of a crisis
of legitimation within the EU and, although the focus
on migration has sought to redirect attention from
this broader crisis, the continued failure of policy
responses has only intensified.
Neoliberalism involves an extension of the role of
state institutions in the management of the economy
and a simultaneous reduction of state involvement in
all forms of social provision (Harvey 2007). These two
processes are central to what Habermas (1988) referred
to as an economic crisis and a legitimation crisis. They
are closely related and help to explain why the 2015
mass arrival has been framed as a crisis, whereas similar
events over the last few decades have not. As state institutions responsible for basic services to support new
arrivals have failed, citizen activists have frequently
stepped in to fill the gap. This has been particularly
apparent in countries such as Greece and Italy, which
were particularly hard hit by the dramatic reductions
in state expenditure associated with the 2008 financial
crisis. It has also been the case in Germany, where
volunteers have come forward to help with reception
activities and language support, and even in the UK
where, despite the very small number of arrivals, there
has been substantial mobilization to provide support
to the few thousand destitute refugees camped outside
the Channel ports of Calais and Dunkirk. The
provision of services is not the only migration-related
activity that state institutions have slowly withdrawn
from. The process of border control itself is now
very significantly outsourced to private companies
providing equipment and services (Andersson 2014).
International coordination of border control activities
is undertaken by EU agencies, particularly Frontex,
but also Europol (Carrera and Guild 2016).
The changing role of EU institutions is the second
important contribution to the current legitimation
crisis. Over the last few decades the European Union
has become much more involved in both the broader
management of the economy, through the common
market, and the coordination and regulation of associated social provision. The entry into force of the Treaty
of Amsterdam in 1999 also significantly extended the
role of EU institutions in managing and legislating
around border control, and marked the final incor-
poration of all legislation related to the Schengen area
of free movement into EU treaties. The additional
responsibilities of EU institutions became much
more apparent during the 2008 financial crisis, which
generated widespread resentment of the EU amongst
EU citizens, particularly those in the countries the
most affected. The limited contact between most
European citizens and EU institutions has allowed
national governments to avoid responsibility for
unpopular decisions, blaming them directly on the
EU. This tactic has only exacerbated the legitimacy
crisis, fueling an impression of the fading power of
national governments whereas, in many cases, the
EU has provided national governments with an ideal
forum for passing legislation that would otherwise be
difficult to pass. This process has been referred to as
‘venue shopping’, and it is particularly apparent in
the field of migration (Guiraudon 2000). In the UK,
for example, the current government has repeatedly
framed its failure to reduce net migration as a result
of the policy of free movement within the EU, failing
to highlight that UK citizens are some of the greatest
beneficiaries of this policy. This fuels opposition to the
EU at the time of the very genuine risk of the first
departure of a member-state.2
The final two characteristics of the current legitimacy crisis focus more particularly on the changing
practices of border control and on the evolving nature
of movement itself. Over the last decade or so, analysis
of border control has begun to consider the border as
a process, rather than as a linear location. Individuals
wishing to cross a border must pass through a diffuse
array of processes that are physically dispersed and
often managed remotely. Yet, at the same time, border
walls and fences have become increasingly common
as material realities. Recent analysis in The Economist
(2016) highlighted that 40 countries have built new
border walls since the end of the Cold War; 30 of
those were constructed since 9/11 and 15 in 2015
alone. Of these latter 15, eight were in Europe. As
Reece Jones (2012) has argued, such concentration
of often hugely expensive constructions cannot be
explained entirely by their often limited effectiveness at deterring crossing. Crawley (this issue) uses
2 The referendum which may result in ‘Brexit’ is scheduled
for 23 June 2016.
Volume 9, Number 2 2016
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NARRATING EUROPE’S MIGRATION AND REFUGEE ‘CRISIS’
the excellent example of the publicity campaign for
the new border controls in Hungary, which involves
posters printed in Hungarian. This clearly highlights
how policies are not designed to address migration
or migrants, but to calm the concerns of electorates.
They are essentially costly performances of statecraft.
Further problems arise when the policies prove ineffective at reducing migration, as they so often do.
This heightens the impression that the state is out of
control and further exacerbates the legitimacy crisis.
These three developments – the ongoing neoliberal
scaling back of the state, the continued impacts of the
financial crisis in the EU, and the more performative
approach to border control – are all interrelated with
developments in the processes of migration themselves.
Over the last few decades the geography of migration
to and within Europe has changed very considerably
(King 2002), and these changes are ongoing, involving
new routes and access-points. The growing preponderance of dangerous overland journeys is a significant
element of this change. As it has become increasingly
difficult, and therefore expensive, to gain access to
Europe directly by air without authorization, longer
land journeys have developed as an alternative, even
before the southern or eastern shores of the Mediterranean are reached. These journeys are typically not
linear. They result from a succession of attempts to
gain greater safety and security, with often long stops
in locations on the way in a characteristic fragmented
pattern (Collyer 2012). Fragmented migration
involves journeys that are not directly from a point
of origin and only appear as journeys to anywhere in
particular in retrospect. This more complex geography
of migration has significant implications for control
and regulation. Individuals are typically not traveling
directly from their country of citizenship, so changes
in the political and economic conditions in those
countries will have limited influence on their further
patterns of travel. This new geography of migration
has further impacts on any explanation of the crisis.
Explaining the ‘crisis’: the role of political
geography
The observation that geography is central to the
current crisis has become commonplace in media
6
discussions. Newspapers have published many maps
of access routes and border regions, and journalists
and news reporters have repeatedly stated in their
dispatches from the field that ‘geography is vital’ in
understanding the unfolding dynamics of migrants’
and refugees’ constantly shifting routes and border
crossings. It is true, of course, that the South and East
of Europe have received larger numbers of migrants
and refugees than the rest of Europe. This is a banal
interpretation of political geography, since it is fairly
obvious that migrants and refugees crossing from
Turkey or Libya will arrive in large numbers in Greece
or Italy. It is also not entirely accurate, since it does
not explain why people come in the first place, or why
Germany received far more asylum applications than
any other member-state in 2015; nor does it account
for the astonishing inventiveness of refugees who
seek new opportunities whenever more-established
opportunities fade. In August 2015, stories began
to circulate of Syrian refugees crossing the Russian–
Norwegian border. The Independent reported that,
since border regulations prohibited crossing on foot
or as a passenger, 151 individuals crossed on bicycles
in the year to August 2015 (Independent 31 August
2015). More-substantial interpretations of political
geography involve the central geopolitical nature of
EU migration governance and the perspectives of
relevant migrant and refugee groups. These two points
help to highlight the nature of the legitimation crisis.
Both Crawley and Lulle (this issue) argue
that the crisis is a geopolitical one rooted in morefundamental divisions in Europe. This is certainly
true but the geopolitical approach applies particularly
clearly to strategies of migration governance at EU
level, which have traditionally failed. Bojadžijev and
Mezzadra (2015) argue that it is a crisis of European
migration policies and there is much to substantiate
this view. The Dublin Convention, incorporated most
recently (2013) into EU legislation as the Dublin
III Regulation,3 is a prime example. Dublin-related
legislation was designed to ensure that each asylumseeker would have his or her claim considered by one
member-state, but only one. The Regulation seeks to
identify which member-state should hear that claim,
drawing on a slightly modified formulation in which
3
Regulation No. 604/2013 of 26 June 2013.
Human Geography
MICHAEL COLLYER AND RUSSELL KING
states bearing the greatest responsibility for an individual’s presence on EU territory are obliged to consider
the claim. This system has resulted in highly regressive
movements of individuals seeking refuge in the North
and West of the continent, where arrival is the most
difficult, towards the South and East, where there is
the least money to pay for an effective response. In an
interesting sleight of geopolitical hand, the legislation
treats the EU as 28 member-states for the purposes
of the eventual location of the refugee but only as a
single state for the purposes of complying with the
1951 Convention. Although the Dublin principle of
country of first arrival has long been criticized, it is
significant that this system finally began to collapse in
August 2015, when Germany suspended all returns
of Syrians to Greece under the Dublin convention
(Dernbach 2015).
There is another way that geography – in its
elemental forms of spatial analysis of point, line,
and area (cf. Cole and King 1968) – enters into the
mechanics of migratory movements and of control
over those movements. The Dublin legislation is part
of a shift from point to areal forms of migration management that has driven EU migration legislation over
the last few decades. Most international migration
is regulated through point forms of control, at ports
or airports. The increasingly rapid construction of
border walls or fences marks a change to a line-based
system, where the border itself is reinforced along its
entire length. Finally, systems of control have moved
to areas, which may be maritime zones – as in the
case of the Mediterranean – and extending beyond
the EU, as in the discussion of ‘partnerships’ with
neighboring non-EU countries. On the other side of
the areal control coin, the combination of Schengen
and Dublin seeks to facilitate and regulate movement
within the EU. Each of these different systems of point,
line, and area has different implications for strategies
to control migration and for the EU’s relationship
with its neighbors. Point is the easiest to manage and
this is the form of control that the EU’s response in
the Mediterranean has taken most recently, through
the establishment of ‘hotspots’ – centers that provide
administrative support to new arrivals.
More-individual calculations of geopolitics inform
the origins and continued fragmented movements
of migrants and refugees. The levels of despair and
hopelessness that many people report in relation to
their future prospects in their place of origin highlight
a particular geopolitics of home. In one of the most
powerful testaments to the current situation – Warsan
Shire’s 2015 poem ‘Home’ – Shire writes ‘no one
would leave home/unless home chased you to the
shore’. The rich geographical literature on geographies of home (Blunt and Dowling 2006) highlights
situations in which the ideal of home is undermined,
resulting in displacement. The journey provides an
alternative ideal which allows individuals to replace
this geopolitics of home with what Erciyes (this issue)
refers to as a ‘geopolitics of hope’. Hope, for anyone
traveling in such hazardous ways, is located in the
imagined destination. The processes by which this
hope is generated, the implications of the fragmented
journeys that it generates, and the consequences
for the broader narrative of ‘crisis’ in Europe are an
important focus for research which we explore in this
special issue.
What role for analysis? The papers in the special
issue
We round off this scene-setting paper by walking
readers through the papers which follow: an appropriate metaphor since most of the journeys undertaken
by the migrants and refugees themselves are made on
foot. Even for the able-bodied, these journeys are made
under great duress, in extremes of heat and cold, in
snow, wind and rain; they are even more challenging
for the lame, the sick, the old and children. The papers
provide a series of thematic and geographic snapshots
along the trajectories of these often epic journeys.
They do not constitute the full story, but from origins
in Syria, Afghanistan and Eritrea, through Turkey and
Greece, and onward through the Western Balkans
to Hungary and, for most, ultimately Germany, the
papers provide critical analytical portrayals of some of
the steps along the way.
In the paper following this one, Heaven Crawley
makes a powerful deconstruction of the European
response to the so-called ‘migration crisis’. She first
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NARRATING EUROPE’S MIGRATION AND REFUGEE ‘CRISIS’
enlarges on the key point raised above in this introductory paper, namely that the migration crisis is not really
about the numbers of refugees and migrants arriving on
the shores of Europe over the past year and more, but
is, rather, a crisis of political solidarity, which has been
so comprehensively lacking. In short, it is the EU itself
which is in crisis due to its failure to find a solution to
a humanitarian and organizational challenge which,
on the basis of both historical precedent and geographical parallels elsewhere in the world, should be
manageable. Surely a European Community of 500
million people, mostly living in wealthy countries,
can create the means to accommodate 1 million
refugees and migrants – or even 2 or 3 million if the
flow continues in the next few years, as seems highly
likely? That the failure to do so has been so palpable is
due to several factors, according to Crawley. The lack
of a common political will across the EU countries
is obviously one, and this fracture between East and
West within the EU is further analyzed in a later paper
by Lulle. Other factors include a lack of regard for
the results of research, and a failure to understand the
changing nature of the forms, processes and routes of
migration. Crawley also points out the unhelpful role
of ‘cascading border closures’ and the way in which
EU-level agreement on migration policy is repeatedly
stymied by national governments’ apparent need to
placade their respective electorates and reassure them
that they will not be ‘overwhelmed’ by refugees and
migrants ‘flooding in’ and claiming benefits. Instead,
EU money and resources are thrown at the wider
strategic issue of controlling the external borders of
the European ‘fortress’.
The next paper, by Jade Cemre Erciyes, focuses
on the plight of the 2.5 million Syrians in Turkey and
employs the instructive but controversial binary of
‘paradise’ vs purgatory’ to speculate on their current
living conditions and their future life. The future is
constructed as bi-directional – either a return to the
paradise of the peace-restored Syrian homeland (an
unlikely scenario at present) or an onward migration
to the imagined paradise of Germany or some other
North European country. Meantime, they are stuck
in the ‘purgatory’ of Turkey, where they are labeled
as ‘guests’ staying in ‘temporary protection centers’.
They have limited access to properly paid work and to
8
education, healthcare, and other support systems, and
suffer from discrimination and stigmatization. This
is the general picture, but Erciyes also reports ‘good
conditions’ in some refugee camps and also some cases
of ‘well-off’ Syrians who have set up cut-price shops.
Our next stop along the migrant trail is the
Turkish-Greek border and the dangerous attempts to
cross the relatively narrow but often stormy stretches
of sea to the nearest Greek islands, especially Lesbos.
This island-dotted maritime border at the outer edge
of Europe is the subject of the paper by Ioanna Tsoni,
who mobilizes a range of anthropological and geographical concepts to understand what has been going
on in this maritime and insular ‘borderscape’. Tsoni sees
the migrant and refugee transit across the sometimes
calm but often rough and dangerous stretch of sea as
a ‘rite of passage’, not just from one place/country to
another but also as a passage from one life to another.
Her mobilization of the concept of liminality refers
not just to the liminal spaces occupied and transited
by the asylum-seekers but also as a life-stage between
their traumatized recent past and an aspired-to future.
But – and this is her key point – this liminality risks
becoming a prevalent, semi-permanent state given the
impasse that the migrants have unwittingly entered
into: unable to stay, unable to move on, and unable to
further their life ambitions, which are often simply to
survive and have a better life. Through autoethnography and participant observation on Lesvos, the author
is also able to examine the complex interactions
between the arriving refugees, the local population,
the ‘authorities’ and their (non-)policies, and the array
of disparate volunteers and media personnel who
congregated together on the island.
The focus of the world’s media on the TurkeyGreece-Balkan route for Syrian and other Middle
Eastern refugees aiming for Europe over the past year
has taken attention away from the Central Mediterranean route from Libya to Sicily – a much longer
and potentially more hazardous sea crossing which has
continued to operate, and to claim lives. The paper by
Milena Belloni looks at this crossing from the perspective of another of the world’s major refugee-producing
countries, Eritrea. Belloni’s paper introduces a range
of interlinked actors into the analysis of these mostly
Human Geography
MICHAEL COLLYER AND RUSSELL KING
‘irregular’ migrant journeys and border crossings: not
only the migrants/refugees themselves but also their
family members who may (or may not) finance the
move and the smugglers who facilitate the complex
journey from Eritrea through Ethiopia and Sudan to
Libya and then on to Italy and perhaps beyond. The
result is a complex ‘game’ of moral pressures, risks and
dilemmas, in which the migrants gamble that kinship
and emotional solidarity on the one hand, and the fear
of smugglers’ retributions on the other, will lead their
relatives to send money despite their initial refusal
to do so. Belloni shows that the successful migrants
are those who are willing to take risks and who can
mobilize economic resources from their transnational
kinship networks by exploiting shared moralities and
emotional capital.
Ceri Oeppen then takes us to Afghanistan, one
of the major and longest-running source countries
for refugees applying for asylum in Europe and
elsewhere. Her focus is on so-called ‘information
campaigns’ launched by migrant- and refugeereceiving countries to discourage potential migrants
and asylum-seekers from coming. The messages
conveyed by such campaigns – Oeppen makes a case
study of the ‘Rumours About Germany’ campaign
launched by the German government in Afghanistan
– are decidedly duplicitous. Ostensibly they convey a
‘realist’ message to inform would-be migrants of the
physical and financial dangers involved, and hence
purport to have a protective, even a humanitarian,
function. But they are also, more cynically, a tool of
migration control, designed to stop migrants before
migration even occurs. And their message is not
just intended for migrants; it is also an instrument
of appeasement for the German host population, to
demonstrate that ‘something is being done’. Even
more cynically, such a campaign shifts responsibility
for the risks of the journey onto Afghans themselves,
rather than admitting that these risks derive from the
increasingly restrictive border-control regimes of the
EU. Moreover, the campaign comes at a time when
the field research evidence shows that Afghanistan is
becoming less, rather than more, secure.
At the northern end of the Balkan route into
Europe stands Slovenia, the subject of the article by
Toby Applegate, who carried out field observations
on the southern, Slovenian-Croatian border and
on the northern, Slovenian-Austrian border. Like
most of the post-socialist countries of Central and
Eastern Europe, Slovenia is ethnically homogenous,
nationalistic, and neoliberal in ideology – not great
credentials for dealing with the social and humanitarian challenges of migration and asylum. The care and
transfer of refugees has brought into sharp relief fundamental questions about Slovenian identity and the
country’s place in Europe, and Applegate shows how
these tensions and ambiguities are played out at the
border crossings, where landscapes and performances
of control are enacted.
Moving on to Northern Europe and the main
destination country for Syrian refugees, Sophie
Hinger examines the culture of welcome and support
that characterizes the German reaction to the ‘refugee
crisis’. Hinger shows how the celebrated Willkommenskultur, articulated at the European and global
levels by leader Angela Merkel and resonating down
to civil society, local support groups and individuals,
was accompanied by episodes of xenophobic violence
and protest in some towns and cities. For a time,
in summer 2015 and beyond, Merkel’s Germany
claimed the moral high ground in confronting the
refugee emergency, opening the German border to
Syrian refugees and thereby suspending the Schengen
and Dublin Conventions. In this paper, the empirical
analysis focuses on one local example of a welcome
initiative in a typical middle-sized German city and
the local municipality’s setting up of accommodation
centers for refugees. At a broader discursive level,
Hinger analyzes the dual framing of the recent and
current refugee movements into Germany as both a
‘humanitarian crisis’ that needs to be responded to by
collective solidarity and compassion, and as a ‘threat’
which requires management and control, for instance
through policies of dispersal and ‘burden-sharing’ and
the selective deportation of failed asylum cases.
One important effect of EUrope’s reaction to the
migration and refugee emergency has been to open up
a geopolitical schism between what Aija Lulle calls
‘old’ and ‘new’ Europe – respectively the pre-2014
EU15 and the eight Central and Eastern European
Volume 9, Number 2 2016
9
NARRATING EUROPE’S MIGRATION AND REFUGEE ‘CRISIS’
(CEE) countries which joined in 2014. Following
Paasi (2015), Lulle utilizes the broad and multi-layered
notion of ‘independence’ to interrogate the specific
neoliberal political mentality that has developed in
the CEE region, along with a resurgence of ethnonationalist sentiments. According to Lulle, the CEE
countries have ‘a long and necessary journey ahead’
in terms of their relationship with migrants, refugees,
and cultural diversity. The journey is two-pronged.
The first challenge is to address and negotiate the
reality of their own internal social, cultural and ethnic
pluralities, which have been overlooked in their rush
to join the ‘EU club’. Examples of these pluralities are
the position of the former-Soviet-citizen russophones
in the Baltic states, and the Roma populations of
Hungary and the Czech and Slovak republics. The
second challenge, more immediate to the theme of the
special issue, is to overcome their seeming inability to
show solidarity and empathy for the human suffering
of others; it seems that their sharp neoliberal turn has
wiped away all consciousness of their socialist past in
favour of their inward-looking patriotic independence.
In the final paper, Daniela DeBono challenges
the notion that the return and deportation of irregular
migrants and ‘failed’ aslyum-seekers constitutes any
kind of practical or moral solution to the so-called
‘refugee crisis’. Whilst DeBono does not question the
legal right of states to send back ‘irregularly resident
migrants’, she describes the labeling of this policy as
a ‘solution’ to the ‘crisis’ as ‘abominable’. First, it is
unethical and, second, it can lead states to increase the
rate of returns by operating below minimum human
rights standards. Further difficulties surround the
distinction between forced repatriation and so-called
voluntary return, in which the true element of voluntariness is often debatable. Detailed knowledge of the
effects of deportation is scarce, but that which does
exist, including research by the author on Sweden
(DeBono et al. 2015), shows that deportation often
places deportees in a state of increased vulnerability
both materially and in terms of their physical and
psychosocial wellbeing. It is, DeBono concludes, ‘a
biopolitical process of migration management … and
embodied state violence’.
10
The insights offered by the papers collected in
this issue give little clue as to the end-game. Despite
repeated emergency meetings of EU leaders, there is
no sustainable solution in sight. Both the unfolding
events, and the refugees and migrants, move around,
or get stuck, like an elaborate geopolitical and humanitarian board game in which politics, symbolism
and hard bargaining take precedence over the lives of
those on the move or halted in makeshift camps on
islands and at borders. Pope Francis’ 16 April 2016
visit to Lesbos had considerable symbolic and media
significance, as did his initiative in giving sanctuary to
a few refugee families in the Vatican. But there remain
thousands confined by barbed wire within the main
detention camp on Lesbos, as well as on other Aegean
islands.4 Another camp of 11,000 refugees-going-nowhere has emerged on the Greek-Macedonian border
at Idomeni. Nowadays, Lesbos is no longer the theater
of water-borne drama that it was in recent memory.
Instead two other, wider processes have taken over.
First, a kind of ‘grand bargain’ (but in reality more like
a trade in the movement of bodies) has been struck
between the EU and Turkey. Turkey receives 6 billion
euros of aid to deliver humanitarian assistance to the
2.7 million Syrian refugees in that country, in return
for Turkey’s commitment to control the onward
flow of refugees to Greece and, perhaps more controversially, to take back from Greece those who are
deemed irregular migrants. This ruling, which came
into force on 20 March 2016, was greeted by protests
from migrants on the Aegean islands who declared
that ‘We’d rather die than go back to Turkey’.5 The
other side of the bargain, visa relaxation for Turks to
travel to the Schengen area, is still being hedged and
the latest news chronicles a stand-off on this crucial
issue.6 Meanwhile, the second process reactivates
itself: as Lesbos and the Western Balkan route closes
down, migrants and smugglers reactivate the Libyan
route to Sicily and Malta as the Mediterranean waters,
never fully reliable, resume their early-summer calmer
period.
4 See the reports by Helena Smith in the Guardian, 8 April
2016, p. 17 and the Observer, 3 April 2016, p. 21 and 10 April
2016, p. 27.
5 Helena Smith in the Guardian, 8 April 2016, p. 17.
6 See Peter Kingsley’s extensive report in the Observer, 24
April 2016, p. 21.
Human Geography
MICHAEL COLLYER AND RUSSELL KING
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Human Geography