Confluence Approaches and the Systems Model of Creativity

5 Confluence Approaches and the Systems Model of Creativity Until recently, many researchers have attempted to isolate or focus on single components of creativity with particular emphasis in the West on the individual. Those who study creativity from this perspective rarely look outside their own school of thought for competing or complementary views (Hennessey and Amabile 2010). Although most of these approaches are considered valid within their own academic frameworks and supported by the evidence collected, what they reveal does not give a full and comprehensive picture of creativity. In contradistinction to this approach, as mentioned briefly in the last chapter, a number of confluence approaches have been put forward by a variety of researchers. What this latter group have in common is the idea that there is no one sole cause of creativity but that the production of valued novelty comes about as the result of a confluence of factors at work. Some of these approaches are worth highlighting. Teresa Amabile (1983), for example, makes a persuasive argument in her book The Social Psychology of Creativity and Growing up Creative that creativity comes about from a confluence of components that are all necessary in order for creativity to occur. These parts of what she labels a componential model of creativity include the necessity of intrinsic © The Author(s) 2018 P. McIntyre et al., Educating for Creativity within Higher Education, Creativity, Education and the Arts, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-90674-4_5 79 80 P. McIntyre et al. motivation, domain relevant skills and creativity relevant skills. For her, as detailed in Chap. 3, intrinsic motivation has been opposed to extrinsic motivation which she asserts must be detrimental to creativity. However, there has been some debate in the literature over which arm of the duality is more important and whether or not the concentration on intrinsic motivation is a form of remnant romanticism (Eisenberger and Shanock 2003). The next component of Amabile’s confluence model is what she calls domain relevant skills. These include ‘everything that the individual knows and can do in the particular domain in question’ (2001, p. 333). This is based on their knowledge about the area they are working in, their applicable technical skills that are required to work with the ideas and objects specific to that domain, and a modicum of talent, which itself depends on ‘innate cognitive abilities and innate perceptual and motor skills’ (ibid.). Domain relevant skills most definitely depend on ‘formal and informal education, on the individual’s learning from, exposure to, and experience in the domain’ (ibid., pp. 333–334). For Amabile, the other component of this model is what are called creativity relevant skills. These are constituted by a suitable cognitive style and ‘an implicit or explicit knowledge of heuristics for generating novel ideas (e.g., using analogies), and a conducive work style—including, importantly, an orientation toward working hard’ (ibid., p. 334). Amabile goes on to assert that ‘these elements depend on training, experience in idea generation, and personality characteristics’ (ibid.). In presenting this componential model, Amabile argues that: the first two components, domain-relevant skills and creativity-relevant skills, are viewed as the necessary raw materials for determining what an individual can do in a given domain. However, it is the third component, task motivation, that determines what the individual will do and how it will be done. (ibid., p. 334) What is important to note is that each component in the model is necessary but not sufficient for creativity to occur. Similarly, for Sternberg and Lubart’s investment model, creativity requires the ‘confluence of six distinct but interrelated resources: intellectual abilities, knowledge, styles of thinking, personality, motivation and environment’ (1999, p. 11). Once all of these factors are in play: Confluence Approaches and the Systems Model of Creativity 81 Creativity is hypothesized to involve more than a simple sum of a person’s attained level of functioning on each component. First, there may be thresholds for some components (e.g. knowledge) below which creativity is not possible, regardless of the levels attained on other components. Second, partial compensation may occur in which a strength on one component (e.g. motivation) counteracts a weakness on another component (e.g. environment). Third, interactions may also occur between components, such as intelligence and motivation, in which high levels on both could multiplicatively enhance creativity. (Sternberg and Lubart 1999, p. 11) John Dacey and Kathleen Lennon also developed a set of confluencebased ideas arguing that ‘all human capacities have biological, psychological, and social elements’ (1998, p. 8). It is the interplay of these ‘salient factors that collectively make creativity most likely to develop’ (ibid., p. 10). They suggest that ‘in the fast changing world to come, the ability to deal with a vast range of complex problems and opportunities will be at a premium … This growing complexity exists in most aspects of human endeavor’ (ibid., p. 3). The primary goal they sought in their confluence-based work was ‘to determine the salient factors that collectively make creativity most likely to develop’ (ibid., 1998, p. 10). The model they constructed ‘highlights five source of creative ability, from the smallest environment (the brain cell) to the largest (the world culture)’ (ibid.). They assert that these include: biological feature from microneurons through to interhemispheric coordination; personality characteristics such as tolerance of ambiguity and risk taking; cognitive traits which feature remote associations and divergent thinking; what they call microsocietal circumstances such as family relationships and where one lives; and, finally, macrosocietal conditions which may be comprised of the political, legal, educational, religious, educational and ethnic environments the creator operates within (ibid., pp. 10–11). They point out that ‘this graduation from smallest to largest is not meant to represent the factors relative importance. Each of the five stage plays a significant role … Each factor influences the others bidirectionally’ (ibid., p. 11). While there is much to be praised about this approach, specifically the fact they combine the biological, the psychological and social into a multifactorial and interactive biopsychosocial model, it is worth pointing out that they fall 82 P. McIntyre et al. Fig. 5.1 Systems model of creativity. (Based on Csikszentmihalyi 1999, p. 315) short of labelling their approach a scalable system although it seems that is what they are talking about. Keith Sawyer, a former postgraduate student of Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi, adapted the systems model of creativity developed by Csikszentmihalyi (1988), set out more fully below (see also Fig. 5.1), and relabeled it the sociocultural approach (Sawyer 2006, 2012). This relabeling may have had the purpose of differentiating his adaptation from the systems model on which it is based, and thus also allows the approach to be set in distinction to the more individually-focused understandings Sawyer was encountering within his discipline of psychology. Psychologists have tended to view creativity as an individual-level phenomenon. That is, they have tended to concentrate on the cognitive processes, personality traits, and developmental antecedents associated with individual creators. This focus follows naturally from the very nature of psychology as a scientific enterprise dedicated to understanding individual mind and behavior. Yet this tradition of “psychological reductionism” has also inspired Confluence Approaches and the Systems Model of Creativity 83 an antithetical conception of creativity as an exclusively societal-level event. In the extreme form, that of a complete “sociocultural reductionism,” the individual becomes a mere epiphenomenon without any causal significance whatsoever. (Simonton 2003, p. 304) Despite its emphasis on the sociocultural as its prime terminology, Sawyer’s model still accounts, much like Dacey and Lennon’s model, for biological and psychological as well as social and cultural components. Labeling it simply a sociocultural approach is therefore misleading and runs the risk of being seen, in Simonton’s (2003) terms, as socioculturally reductionist. If one wanted to include the component parts in the label it would be apposite to, instead, call this approach the bio-psycho-sociocultural approach. A reversion to the simpler and more inclusive title, the systems model, may be apt. This systems approach was also taken up by Howard Gardner, who along with David Feldman collaborated on some of the earlier work developed by Csikszentmihalyi. Set out in their book Changing the World: A Framework for the Study of Creativity (Feldman et al. 1994), the DIFI model of creativity, which stands for Domain Individual Field Interaction, was another way to express the idea that creativity emerges from a deeply interactive system. It was originally thus named in 1988 by Csikszentmihalyi and had the full support of his fellow researchers. Gardner wrote that, ‘in Csikszentmihalyi’s persuasive account, creativity does not inhere in any single node, nor, indeed, in any pair of nodes. Rather creativity is best viewed as a dialectical or interactive process’ (2011, p. 36). Gardner then went on to use this as the basis for his groundbreaking work published in Creative Minds: An Anatomy of Creativity (1993/2011). His work, as a result, was also confluence-based. He listed a number of areas that needed to be accounted for if one was to comprehensively understand creativity. Each of these corresponds in some way to the three nodes of the systems or DIFI model, that is, domain, individual and field. To understand fully what is going on with creativity, Gardner suggested that an understanding of creativity is beyond the analysis of any one discipline. Instead, we need to explore this phenomenon from at least four levels of analysis (1993/2011, p. 35). He calls these: the subpersonal, where we need to look at the genetics and 84 P. McIntyre et al. neurobiology of creative individuals; the personal, where cognitive processes and an understanding of personalities is warranted; the impersonal, where we need to look at the domain of knowledge a creative individual must interact with; and the multipersonal, where Gardner adopts ‘Csikszentmihalyi’s term “field” to describe this cogeries of forces, the study of which is fundamentally sociological’ (ibid.). All of these levels of analysis are necessary to engage with in studying creativity. In addition, Gardner is perhaps better known for his work on multiple intelligences but there are relatable aspects here as well. For example, Clive Harrison has provided evidence to suggest that the various forms of intelligences Gardner addresses—linguistic-verbal, musical-aural, logical-mathematical, visual-spatial, bodily-kinesthetic, interpersonal, intrapersonal and naturalistic intelligences—also provide a point of confluence with either, once again, the individual, the domain or the field aspect of Csikszentmihalyi’s tripartite systems model (Harrison 2016). This research supports, of course, Bill Lucas’s contention that ‘understanding multiple intelligence theory is, I believe, a fundamental principle of creativity’ (2001, p. 38). To explore this systems model more fully, and the one we use as the basis for our Systems Centred Learning (SCL) approach, we can point out that Csikszentmihalyi (1988, 1997, 1999, 2014) proposed that creativity emerges from what has since been labelled a creative system in action (McIntyre et al. 2016). In summary, it necessarily involves (see Fig. 5.1): three major factors, that is, a structure of knowledge manifest in a particular symbol system (domain), a structured social organization that understands that body of knowledge (field), and an individual agent (person) who makes changes to the stored information that pre-exists them, are necessary for creativity to occur. These factors operate through ‘dynamic links of circular causality’ (1988, p. 329) with the starting point in the process being ‘purely arbitrary’ (ibid.) indicating the systems essential nonlinearity. (McIntyre 2009, p. 160) Susan Kerrigan took the fundamentals of this model and reconceptualised it (2013, p. 114). She re-labeled the individual as a creative agent Confluence Approaches and the Systems Model of Creativity 85 emphasising the fact that choice making entities can be groups as well as individuals. She also places creative practice at the centre of the model so as to highlight the confluence of factors leading to the necessary work undertaken in producing novelty. This placement also differentiates this reconceptualisation from other conceptions that emphasise either the creative product or creative persons. Fortuitously, she also used a Venn diagram (see Fig. 5.2) as the basis for this rethinking of the way the system model is generally presented, giving a more obvious focus to the systems non-linearity and interactivity than the former line diagram representations did. This reconceived model is representative of a complex adaptive system at work. As such it is a representation, in part, of many agents acting in parallel, as each agent, those who occupy the field and those individuals who stimulate novelty in the field, ‘finds itself in an environment produced by its interactions with the other agents in the system’ (Waldrop 1992, p. 145). Furthermore, the control of the system is dispersed, meaning that Fig. 5.2 Revised systems model of creativity incorporating creative practice. (Based on Kerrigan 2013, p. 114) 86 P. McIntyre et al. ‘if there is to be any coherent behavior in the system, it has to arise from competition and cooperation among the agents themselves’ (ibid.). Additionally, rather than being a single generic system one must keep in mind one of the chief characteristics of all systems and that is the notion of what Arthur Koestler called a holarchy. This term simply indicates that the creative system can be scaled vertically to be operative at the individual, group, organisational, institutional and sociocultural levels: system within system within system (McIntyre and Thompson 2016). This scalable system is also interactive horizontally in that each domain and field draws something from the fields and domains that operate in proximity to it. For example, film, as a domain of knowledge, conventions, skills and techniques, draws something from theatre, the performing arts, photography and other nearby domains. The last thing to be aware of here is that complex adaptive systems like this one ‘are constantly revising and rearranging their building blocks as they gain experience’ (Waldrop 1992, p. 146). It is from this non-static process that creativity becomes an emergent property of a scalable, interactive, multi-factorial and dynamic system at work (McIntyre et al. 2016). With those generalities in place, it is time now to turn to the component parts of the system while at the same time remembering that none of these component parts is at all isolable from any of the others. Each component in the system, the domain, field and agent, is necessary but not sufficient in and of itself to produce creativity. To begin, Csikszentmihalyi (1988, 1997, 1999) uses the term ‘domain’ to describe the cultural or symbolic aspect of the system from which creativity emerges. Incorporating this concept of the domain into notions of creativity provides the deep cultural grounding lacking in most traditional representations of the artist as genius or those ideas about creativity hyper-focused at singular individuals. Accordingly, the domain refers to the discipline or discourse of a particular area and includes all the knowledge, symbol systems, culture and conventions an artist is immersed in when working in that area. Csikszentmihalyi argues individuals must access and then build on the domain of a given area if they hope to be creative within it, returning to the adage that you must learn the rules before you can break them as ‘it is impossible to introduce a variation without reference to an existing pattern. “New” is meaningful only in Confluence Approaches and the Systems Model of Creativity 87 reference to the “old”... Without these rules there cannot be exceptions, and without tradition there cannot be novelty’ (1999, p. 315). Change in a domain occurs when new products are added to the stock of common knowledge, transforming the domain for the individuals who follow. In order to become part of the domain, however, the new work must first be judged as appropriate or valuable. Csikszentmihalyi explains: most novel ideas will be quickly forgotten. Changes are not adopted unless they are sanctioned by some group entitled to make decisions as to what should or should not be included in the domain. These gatekeepers are what we call here the field. (1999, p. 315) In the systems model, the field is comprised of all those who can affect the structure of the domain (1988, 1997, 1999). In the domain of creative writing, for example, this may include members of the publishing industry such as publishers and editors, agents, critics and readers. It also includes the audience for that writing. Similar in superficial ways to Becker’s (1982) art worlds and more closely aligned to Bourdieu’s notion of field, Csikszentmihalyi’s use of the term “field” identifies the social world in which the person operates, where individual agents, groups and organisations may act to stimulate or filter innovation according to an often internalised set of criteria for judging what is good or bad, valuable or useless, acceptable or unacceptable, new or old. A field, Csikszentmihalyi says, ‘is necessary to determine whether the innovation is worth making a fuss about’ (1997, p. 41). In this way, creativity is also the product of social systems making judgements about the variations an individual produces. It is here, in this consideration of the field and the way that it works, that we can see the necessity of incorporating the more sociological components of the system, as Csikszentmihalyi himself had insisted was necessary to do (1988, p. 336). For us, the coupling of Bourdieu’s ideas, set out prior, are deeply compatible with the systems approach. However, while the systems model shows creativity is dependent on the sociocultural contexts of the field and domain, this does not imply that the individual is any less important than the other two components of the system. Each factor in the system is equally necessary but not sufficient in and of itself to allow creativity to emerge. In this way the systems model 88 P. McIntyre et al. moves away from a Ptolemaic view, where the individual is the centre of the creative universe, to a more Copernican view, where the individual acts as part of a larger system (Csikszentmihalyi 1988, p. 336). Instead of ignoring the individual agent altogether, as in some sociological theories, studies of the individual are still considered relevant in order to recognise how these people are capable of internalising domain knowledge, producing a novel variation based on that information, and interacting with the field in order for that product to be considered creative. As we have already seen, psychological research on creativity has provided a wealth of information about the individual including the genetic and biological differences, personality traits, cognitive processes, motivation, family background and development that may affect creativity. As this same research has shown, however, not all individuals who are considered creative display the same traits, processes, aptitudes, motivation or genetic make-up. In this way, no single behavioural characteristic has yet been isolated as a sufficient or even necessary condition for creativity. As Csikszentmihalyi argues, the systems model points away from trying to find universal behavioural or personality characteristics that can be attributed to all creative individuals. If creativity is systemic, and not solely the province of an individual, then the personal contribution will vary according to the states of the other subsystems. Hence it is possible to imagine that at some peculiar conjunction of social and cultural conditions creative variations will be produced by persons who are unlike any other ‘creative’ person who lived earlier or later. (1994, p. 151) Rather than acknowledging or understanding the full system in action, most individuals describe this confluence of factors as ‘luck’ (Csikszentmihalyi 1997) in order to keep the focus of the creative process on the individual. Following this model, we can see that the starting point of the interactions between the domain, the field and the individual is not one single point. While traditional views of creativity assume it is the individual’s inspiration or desire for self-expression that instigates creativity, the field and domain are equally capable of initiating novelty. If we look for a Confluence Approaches and the Systems Model of Creativity 89 beginning to the actions of the system we might start from the ‘person’, because we are used to thinking in these terms—that the idea begins, like the lighted bulb in the cartoon, within the head of the creative individual. But, of course, the information that will go into the idea existed long before the creative person arrived on the scene. It had been stored in the symbol system of the culture, in the customary practices, the language, the specific notation of the ‘domain’ (Csikszentmihalyi 1988, pp. 329–30). Instability or technological advances within the domain raise problems for individuals to solve and they provide opportunities for creativity. Csikszentmihalyi (1997) argues that the field can also be the impetus for creativity in several ways. The field may not only offer training, resources and rewards to encourage creativity in a particular area but directly commission specific works. In the Renaissance era, for example, many great works of art were initiated by church or state, controlling not only the content of paintings but also the materials, techniques and colours to be used (Csikszentmihalyi 1988, 1994, 1997). In this way, the domain, the field or the individual could be considered the starting point. According to Csikszentmihalyi, the interdependence of each of the three components means choosing a starting point is often ‘purely arbitrary’ (1988, p. 329). To put this in purely systems terms this model is nonlinear in the way that it operates. As well as providing a theoretical framework for research and teaching, the systems model of creativity can also act as a guide for defining creativity more precisely than the standard definition. As we have seen, conceptions of creativity in the West have evolved from ideas of divine inspiration, through concepts of genius and extraordinary individuals to confluence approaches that believe creativity occurs in the confluence of multiple components. One of the earliest definitions of creativity is provided by Aristotle in his doctrine ‘on being’ in Metaphysics: Of things that come to be, some come to be by nature, some by art, some spontaneously. Now everything that comes to be comes to be by the agency of something and from something and comes to be something. And the something which I say it comes to be may be found in any category; it may come to be either a ‘this’ or of some size or of some quality or somewhere. (Aristotle 1928 [350BCE], p. 791) 90 P. McIntyre et al. From this perspective, we can say that creativity occurs through the agency of someone and by taking existing materials and ideas and giving them new form. Phillip McIntyre (2006a, b; McIntyre and McIntyre 2007) used Aristotle’s ideas in combination with Csikszentmihalyi’s view of creativity resulting from interactions between the individual, field and domain. The result is a definition which sees creativity as: an activity whereby products, processes and ideas are generated from antecedent conditions by the agency of someone, whose knowledge to do so comes from somewhere and the resultant novel variation is seen as a valued addition to the store of human knowledge. (McIntyre 2006b, p. 202) As seen earlier, this additional element of value has been incorporated into many definitions of creativity (see for example Bailin 1988; Csikszentmihalyi 1988; Feldman et al. 1994; Gardner 1993/2011; Negus and Pickering 2004), reflecting that a work must not only be novel but considered valuable or useful in order to be deemed creative. In fact, as Hennessey and Amabile asserted in their review of current work in creativity, as of 2010, ‘most researchers and theorists agree that creativity involves the development of a novel product, idea, or problem solution that is of value to the individual and/or the larger social group’ (2010, p. 572). With these ideas set out here we want to return very briefly to the subject/object dichotomy we introduced earlier and frame that set of supposed oppositions in terms of another: agency versus structure. We can set this out as a dichotomy where micro everyday action is put in opposition to macro structural determinants. But if we drop the oppositions and recognise the complementarity of these polar pairs (Kelso and Engstrom 2008) this action will surely say something worthwhile about creative individuals and the globally-oriented world they now exist in since creative people, all over the world, do not make choices in the absence of constraint. It is there in their biology, in their psychological make-up, in the way they have been socialised and enculturated, in the necessary structures they engage with that present possibilities of action to them. It is there in the air that they must necessarily breathe in order to exist as creative people. Yes, they are limited by these things Confluence Approaches and the Systems Model of Creativity 91 but without them they cannot act. If creative people are to make decisions, make choices about what to keep and what to throw away, about what is good and bad in the work they have put together, that is have agency, then they must necessarily rely on the structures that surround, support and enable them. The systems model highlights the fact that the social and cultural structures of the field and domain do not inhibit creativity but just as readily enable it. As Hennessey and Amabile asserted, if we are to understand creativity at all we cannot isolate a single entity and declare, ‘there, that caused creativity to happen!’ What we need is a perspective that encompasses the neurobiological, the cognitive and personality approaches, the dynamism of groups and institutions and the way they supply necessary affordances, and scale these together with the political, technological, cultural, sociological and environmental dimensions. In other words, if we are to move away from historically generated discourses and really seek to understand the truth of creativity, we need to implement ‘a systems view of creativity that recognizes a variety of interrelated forces operating at multiple levels’ (Hennessey and Amabile 2010, p. 569). Bibliography Amabile, T. M. (1983). The social psychology of creativity. New York: Springer. Amabile, T. M. (2001). Beyond talent: John Irving and the passionate craft of creativity. American Psychologist, 56(4), 333–336. Aristotle. (1928). Metaphysics (W. D. Ross, Trans.). In W. D. Ross (Ed.), The Oxford translation of Aristotle (pp. 791–795). London: Oxford University Press. Bailin, S. (1988). Achieving extraordinary ends: An essay on creativity. Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers. Becker, H. (1982). Art worlds. Los Angeles: University of California Press. Csikszentmihalyi, M. (1988). Society, culture, and person: A systems view of creativity. In R. Sternberg (Ed.), The nature of creativity: Contemporary psychological perspectives (pp. 325–329). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Csikszentmihalyi, M. (1994). The domain of creativity. In D. H. Feldman, M. Csikszentmihalyi, & H. Gardner (Eds.), Changing the world: A framework for the study of creativity (pp. 135–158). Westport: Praeger. 92 P. McIntyre et al. Csikszentmihalyi, M. (1997). Creativity: Flow and the psychology of discovery and invention. New York: Harper Collins. Csikszentmihalyi, M. (1999). Implications of a systems perspective for the study of creativity. In R. Sternberg (Ed.), Handbook of creativity (pp. 313–335). New York: Cambridge University Press. Csikszentmihalyi, M. (2014). The systems model of creativity. Dordrecht: Springer. Dacey, J., & Lennon, K. (1998). Understanding creativity: The interplay of biological, psychological, and social factors. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. Eisenberger, R., & Shanock, L. (2003). Rewards, intrinsic motivation, and creativity: A case study of conceptual and methodological isolation. Creativity Research Journal, 15(2 & 3), 121–130. Feldman, D. H., Csikszentmihalyi, M., & Gardner, H. (Eds.). (1994). Changing the world: A framework for the study of creativity. Westport: Praeger. Gardner, H. (1993/2011). Creating minds: An anatomy of creativity seen through the lives of Freud, Einstein, Picasso, Stravinsky, Eliot, Graham and Gandhi. New York: Basic Books. Harrison, C. (2016). A songwriter’s journey from little-c to pro-c creativity: An applied analytical autoethnography (PhD thesis). Callaghan: University of Newcastle. http://hdl.handle.net/1959.13/1315652. Accessed 28 Feb 2018. Hennessey, B., & Amabile, T. M. (2010). Creativity. Annual Review of Psychology, 61, 569–598. Kelso, J., & Engstrom, D. (2008). The complementary nature. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Kerrigan, S. M. (2013). Accommodating creative documentary practice within a revised systems model of creativity. Journal of Media Practice, 14(2), 111–127. https://doi.org/10.1386/jmpr.14.2.111_1. Lucas, B. (2001). Creative teaching, teaching creativity and creative learning. In A. Craft, B. Jeffrey, & M. Leibling (Eds.), Creativity in education. London: Continuum. McIntyre, P. (2006a). Radio program directors, music directors and the creation of popular music. In S. Healy, B. Berryman, & D. Goodman (Eds.), Radio in the World: Radio Conference 2005 (pp. 449–460). Melbourne: RMIT Publishing. McIntyre, P. (2006b). Paul McCartney and the creation of “Yesterday”: The systems model in operation. Popular Music, 25(2), 201–219. McIntyre, P. (2009, June 8–10). Rethinking communication, creativity and cultural production: Outlining issues for media practice. In T. Flew (Ed.), Communication, Creativity and Global Citizenship: Refereed Proceedings of the Confluence Approaches and the Systems Model of Creativity 93 Australian and New Zealand Communications Association Annual Conference, Brisbane. ISBN 987-1-74107-275-4. Available at: http://www.anzca.net/ documents/2009-conf-papers/55-rethinking-communication-creativityand-cultural-production-outlining-issues-for-media-practice-1/file.html. Accessed 4 Mar 2018. McIntyre, P., & McIntyre, E. (2007). Rethinking creativity and approaches to teaching: The systems model and creative writing. International Journal of the Book, 4(3), 15–22. McIntyre, P., & Thompson, P. (2016, December 2–4). Examining the creation of ‘Paperback Writer’: The flow of ideas and knowledge between contributing creative systems. In The 11th Art of Record Production Conference, the Spaces in Between, Hosted by the Music and Sound Knowledge group (MaSK), Aalborg University, Denmark. McIntyre, P., Fulton, J. M., & Paton, E. (2016). The creative system in action: Understanding cultural production and practice. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Negus, K., & Pickering, M. (2004). Creativity, communication and cultural value. London: Sage Publications. Sawyer, K. (2006). Explaining creativity: The science of human innovation. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Sawyer, K. (2012). Explaining creativity: The science of human innovation (2nd ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press. Simonton, D. K. (2003). Creative cultures, nations and civilizations: Strategies and results. In P. Paulus & B. Nijstad (Eds.), Group creativity: Innovation through collaboration (pp. 304–325). Oxford: Oxford University Press. Sternberg, R., & Lubart, T. (1999). The concept of creativity: Prospects and paradigms. In R. Sternberg (Ed.), The handbook of creativity (pp. 3–15). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Waldrop, M. (1992). Complexity: The emerging science at the edge of order and chaos. New York: Simon & Schuster.