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2017, Functional Ecology
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4 pages
1 file
Responses to technical innovations are varied, with some people engaging early with new technology and pushing the envelope to see what could be achieved, whereas others push back against change. Then there are those who are most interested in the implications of a new way of doing something. Often the reality of a technical advance means users are obliged to adjust; for example, to electronic money transfer (Freedman 2000). Sometimes, the mere promise or potential of something revolutionary is enough to force a reaction, for example, cold fusion (Close 1991). De-extinction, the resurrection of extinct species, sits in this second category. Not so much a single technical advance (though the new gene-editing tool CRISPR will be transformative), as a coming together of developing techniques that make a new application possibleand it is possible, make no mistake. The next decade will see the cloning or genetic reconstruction of some version of a formerly extinct species; one that will live long enough to breathe and shake its fur, feathers, or scales, or to unfurl a leaf. The technical challenges that remain are formidable, but so very much has already been achieved along the de-extinction pathway. I'm often asked, 'Is this really possible?' My answer is yesde-extinction has moved from science fiction to science feasibility-and I point to the case of the successful cloning using tissue from the extinct Pyrenean ibex and a hybrid goat as a gestational surrogate (Folch et al. 2009). It was only 6 years ago that a New Zealand politician was mocked by his Parliamentary colleagues for mooting the idea of de-extincting (we still need to get the verb right) the moa (Smith 2014). Since then some serious and seriously smart people have been working towards resurrecting (a better word) the moa, the passenger pigeon, even the woolly mammoth. The prospect of de-extinction has stimulated the public debate and galvanized the media. True, they have to get past the obsession with mammoths, but at least, it is widely understood that dinosaurs are not on any de-extinction candidate lists. Much of the general discussion has dealt with ethical issues, revisiting the genetically modified organism (GMO) debate and questioning the hubris of 'playing God', our duty to right past wrongs, and the moral hazards of changing the public perceptions of the finality of species extinction (Sandler 2013). On the other side, much of the technical material concerns how de-extinction might be achieved, and there are many who
Philosophical discussions of de-extinction usually focus on projects aimed at “reviving” extinct animal species, such as aurochs, passenger pigeons, and woolly mammoths, through back-breeding, cloning, and/or genetic engineering. Environmental philosophers are usually dismissive of these as strategies for biodiversity conservation on moral and practical grounds. Some or all of the following five objections are standard. (I) Animal suffering is inevitable. (II) Serious adverse ecological effects are possible. (III) Feasibility as a means of maintaining biodiversity is dubious. (IV) It’s a bait-and-switch substituting inauthentic artificial bio-objects rather than extinct wild species. (V) Its yet another expression of deplorable human arrogance towards nature. These five are often presented as if equally applicable to all deextinction projects. But this overlooks significant differences in the nature and timing of species extinction. Broadly, extinctions may be grouped into three classes; (i) those occurring in the distant past, to species whose natural environments no longer exist; (ii) those occurring in the recent past, to species whose natural environments persist to some degree; and (iii) those not yet complete; the functional extinctions of living dead species not yet extinct in the wild The five standard objections to de-extinction are not equally potent against all attempts at extinction reversals. While all seem applicable to de-extinctions of the 1st type, this isn’t necessarily the case for the 2nd, let alone the 3rd. In some cases of type 3 de-extinctions, I will argue environmental philosophers should often side with rather than against de-extinction.
Hastings Center Report, 2017
Decades of globally coordinated work in conservation have failed to slow the loss of biodiversity. To do better—even if that means nothing more than failing less spectacularly—bolder thinking is necessary. One of the first possible conservation applications of synthetic biology to be debated is the use of genetic tools to resurrect once‐extinct species. Since the currency of conservation is biodiversity and the discipline of conservation biology was formed around the prevention of species extinctions, the prospect of reversing extinctions might have been expected to generate unreserved enthusiasm. But it was not universal acclaim that greeted the coming‐out party for “de‐extinction” that was the TEDx conference and accompanying National Geographic feature in 2013. Why the concern, the skepticism, even the hostility among many conservationists about the idea of restoring lost species? And how does this professional concern relate to public perception and support for conservation? Thi...
2016
The title of Beth Shapiro’s ‘How to Clone a Mammoth’ contains an implicature: it suggests that it is indeed possible to clone a mammoth, to bring extinct species back from the dead. But in fact Shapiro both denies this is possible, and denies there would be good reason to do it even if it were possible. The de-extinct ‘mammoths’ she speaks of are merely ecological proxies for mammoths—elephants re-engineered for cold-tolerance by the addition to their genomes of a few mammoth genes. Shapiro’s denial that genuine species de-extinction is possible is based on her assumption that the resurrected organisms would need to be perfectly indistinguishable from the creatures that died out. In this article I use the example of an extinct New Zealand wattlebird, the huia, to argue that there are compelling reasons to resurrect certain species if it can be done. I then argue that synthetically created organisms needn’t be perfectly indistinguishable from their genetic forebears in order for species de-extinction to be successful.
NanoEthics, 2014
de-extinction" refers to the process of resurrecting extinct species by genetic methods. This science-fiction-sounding idea is in fact already in early processes of scientific implementation. Although this recent "revival of the dead" raises deep ethical questions, the ethics of de-extinction has barely received philosophical treatment. Rather than seeking a verdict for or against de-extinction, this paper attempts an overview and some novel analyses of the main ethical considerations. Five dimensions of the ethics of deextinction are explored: (a) the possible contribution of de-extinction to promoting ecological values, (b) the deontological argument that we owe de-extinction to species we rendered extinct, (c) the question of "playing God" through de-extinction, (d) the utilitarian perspective, and (e) the role of aesthetic considerations in the ethics of de-extinction. A general feature arising from the paper's discussion is that, due to de-extinction's special character, it repeatedly tests the limits of our ethical notions.
This paper offers a paleobiological perspective on the debate concerning the possible use of biotechnology to bring back extinct species. One lesson from paleobiology is that extinction selectivity matters in addition to extinction rates and extinction magnitude. Combining some of Darwin's insights about artificial selection with the theory of species selection that paleobiologists developed in the1970s and 1980s provides useful context for thinking about de-extinction. Using recent work on the prioritization of candidate species for de-extinction as a test case, the paper argues that de-extinction would be a form of artificial species selection in which humans influence which species persist vs. go extinct. This points to a serious gap in our ethical theory: Much work has been done to clarify the value(s) of biological diversity, but we also need theoretical guidance for decisions that amount to species sorting, and that will shape the macroevolutionary future.
Conservation Biology (28:2) pp. 354-60, 2014
There now appears to be a plausible pathway for reviving species that have been extinct for several decades, centuries, or even millennia. I conducted an ethical analysis of de-extinction of long extinct species. I assessed several possible ethical considerations in favor of pursuing de-extinction: that it is a matter of justice; that it would reestablish lost value; that it would create new value; and that society needs it as a conservation last resort. I also assessed several possible ethical arguments against pursuing de-extinction: that it is unnatural; that it could cause animal suffering; that it could be ecologically problematic or detrimental to human health; and that it is hubristic. There are reasons in favor of reviving long extinct species, and it can be ethically acceptable to do so. However, the reasons in favor of pursuing de-extinction do not have to do with its usefulness in species conservation; rather, they concern the status of revived species as scientific and technological achievements, and it would be ethically problematic to promote de-extinction as a significant conservation strategy, because it does not prevent species extinctions, does not address the causes of extinction, and could be detrimental to some species conservation efforts. Moreover, humanity does not have a responsibility or obligation to pursue de-extinction of long extinct species, and reviving them does not address any urgent problem. Therefore, legitimate ecological, political, animal welfare, legal, or human health concerns associated with a de-extinction (and reintroduction) must be thoroughly addressed for it to be ethically acceptable.
We live in the Anthropocene, an era characterized by widespread extinction and landscapes that are less habitable for most large mammals. Over 25 percent of terrestrial mammals are now in decline and 66 percent of top carnivores—creatures with profound ecological roles—are threatened with extinction. As habitat is fragmented and destroyed, wildlife across the world are left with both less and lower quality habitat and lack the resources necessary for survival. De-extinction is an option under consideration as the world undergoes this mass extinction event—the sixth such event in Earth’s history. However, if there is currently no room for the magnificent Bengal Tiger or African Elephant, why are we considering bringing back Woolly Mammoths?
Hastings Center Report, 2017
Among the most egregious and discouraging problems of conservation is the rapidly escalating human‐caused species extinction rate. “De‐extinction” refers to the application of certain cutting‐edge techniques for the supposed recovery of lost species and gives the impression that scientists, enlightened and empowered by the miracles of technology, are coming to the rescue. “De‐extinction” is the latest example of a long play of language that has given conservation efforts a tragically false sense of accomplishment and has worsened the conservation crisis. De‐extinction is the tip of an intellectual iceberg that sits atop of a host of profoundly questionable value systems, expectations, attitudes, and priorities that elude and bewitch critical reflection. It gives the impression that extinction is reversible and, thus, diminishes the gravity of the human annihilation of species. Here, we examine how the language of de‐extinction influences attitudes, shapes thoughts and imagination, a...
The prospect of species “de-extinction”, defined as the process of creating an organism that resembles an extinct species (but see Note on Terminology below) has moved from science fiction to plausibility within the last decade, but has been debated widely only within the last few years. The increasing public profile of species “de-extinction” has been driven in part by rapid advances in the technical capacity to read and manipulate genetic code. The discussion around revival of extinct species has shifted from “could we?” to “should we?” As with almost any new technology, enthusiastic endorsement needs to be balanced against significant concern over any possible harmful consequences. IUCN Guiding Principles on Creating Proxies of Extinct Species for Conservation Benefit. Available from: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/312579005_IUCN_Guiding_Principles_on_Creating_Proxies_of_Extinct_Species_for_Conservation_Benefit [accessed May 16, 2017].
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