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Derek Turner

Connecticut College, Philosophy, Faculty Member

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I have broad research and teaching interests in philosophy and the life sciences, as well as environmental philosophy. Some of my specific research interests in philosophy of science include:

Historical contingency
Macroevolutionary theory
Evolutionary explanations of stasis
Epistemological issues in historical science
The epistemology of historical counterfactuals
Arguments about scientific realism (especially in historical contexts)
Address: Box #5606
Connecticut College
270 Mohegan Avenue
New London, CT, USA 06320

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Papers by Derek Turner

Biases in the Selection of Candidate Species for De-Extinction

Entrenched biases in favour of large, charismatic mammals, towards predators, towards terrestrial... more Entrenched biases in favour of large, charismatic mammals, towards predators, towards terrestrial animals and towards species that have cultural importance can in uence the selection of candidate species for de-extinction research. Often, the species with the highest existence value will also be the ones that raise the most serious animal welfare concerns.

De-extinction as Artificial Species Selection

This paper offers a paleobiological perspective on the debate concerning the possible use of biot... more This paper offers a paleobiological perspective on the debate concerning the possible use of biotechnology to bring back extinct species. One lesson from paleobiology is that extinction selectivity matters in addition to extinction rates and extinction magnitude. Combining some of Darwin's insights about artificial selection with the theory of species selection that paleobiologists developed in the1970s and 1980s provides useful context for thinking about de-extinction. Using recent work on the prioritization of candidate species for de-extinction as a test case, the paper argues that de-extinction would be a form of artificial species selection in which humans influence which species persist vs. go extinct. This points to a serious gap in our ethical theory: Much work has been done to clarify the value(s) of biological diversity, but we also need theoretical guidance for decisions that amount to species sorting, and that will shape the macroevolutionary future.

Scientific Knowledge of the Deep Past (With Adrian Currie)

by Derek Turner and Adrian Currie

Historical scientists, from cosmologists to archaeologists, tackle important but difficult tasks:... more Historical scientists, from cosmologists to archaeologists, tackle important but difficult tasks: reconstructing the events and entities which populate the deep past, understanding their formation and development, and learning how to see our contemporary world in terms of its long history. Of late, philosophers have paid increasing attention to these epistemic challenges and the nature of such sciences (see Turner 2014). The papers collected here offer both a (by no means exhaustive) look at the variety of epistemic practices and targets found in the historical sciences and illustrate new directions in the philosophy of historical science 1 . We take 'historical scientists' to be those involved in the scientific investigation of the deep past.

A Second Look at the Colors of the Dinosaurs

In earlier work, I predicted that we would probably not be able to determine the colors of the di... more In earlier work, I predicted that we would probably not be able to determine the colors of the dinosaurs. I lost this epistemic bet against science in dramatic fashion when scientists discovered that it is possible to draw inferences about dinosaur coloration based on the microstructure of fossil feathers (Vinther et al., 2008). This paper is an exercise in philosophical error analysis. I examine this episode with two questions in mind. First, does this case lend any support to epistemic optimism about historical science? Second, under what conditions is it rational to make predictions about what questions scientists will or will not be able answer? In reply to the first question, I argue that the recent work on the colors of the dinosaurs matters less to the debate about the epistemology of historical science than it might seem. In reply to the second question, I argue that it is difficult to specify a policy that would rule out the failed bet without also being too conservative.

Contingency and the explanation of evolutionary trends

Biological Explanation: An Enquiry into the Diversity of Explanatory Patterns in the Life Sciences, edited by Christophe Malaterre and Pierre-Alain Braillard, Springer, 2015, pp. 73-90., 2015

One “big question” of macroevolutionary theory is the degree to which evolutionary history is con... more One “big question” of macroevolutionary theory is the degree to which evolutionary history is contingent. A second “big question” is whether particular large-scale evolutionary trends, such as size increase or complexity increase, are passive or driven. Showing that a trend is passive or driven is a way of explaining it. These two “big questions” are related in both a superficial and a deep way. Superficially, defending historical contingency and showing that major trends are passive are two complementary ways of downplaying the importance of natural selection in evolutionary history. A passive trend is one that’s not explained by selection. In order to appreciate the deeper connection between the two issues, it is necessary to distinguish different senses of contingency (especially sensitivity to initial conditions vs. unbiased sorting). It’s plausible that passive trends are generally due to unbiased sorting processes. Serendipitously, thinking of contingency as unbiased sorting also helps to clarify its relationship to species selection, which some think of as biased sorting. Macroevolutionary theory thus turns out to have considerable unity.

Causal explanations of historical trends

Explanation in the Special Sciences – The Case of Biology and History, edited by Marie Kaiser, Andreas Hüttemann, Daniel Plenge, and Oliver Scholz, Springer, 2014, pp. 255-269., 2014

Philosophers interested in historical explanation have tended to focus on causal explanations of ... more Philosophers interested in historical explanation have tended to focus on causal explanations of particular events, states of affairs, or observable traces. Yet researchers working in fields ranging from paleontology and evolutionary biology to climate science and economics seek to document and explain the occurrence of historical, population-level trends, where a trend is a persistent, directional change in some state variable. Examples of such trends include everything from evolutionary size increase (Cope's rule), to changes of gene frequencies in an evolving population, to global warming. This chapter explores the idea that explanations of historical trends are typically causal explanations. Woodward's interventionist theory treats causation as a relation between variables and so lends itself readily to the idea that trends can be causes and effects. A small extension of Woodward's theory can help illuminate cases in which scientists talk of one trend as being the cause of another. However, paleontologists often explain trends by claiming that they are passive, that is, that they involve a random walk away from a fixed boundary in the state space. This type of explanation of an historical trend does not invoke any causes in the interventionist sense, which suggests that some explanations of historical trends might not be causal explanations.

Historical Geology: Methodology and Metaphysics

This chapter engages critically with Carol Cleland's recent work in the philosophy of historical ... more This chapter engages critically with Carol Cleland's recent work in the philosophy of historical science. Much of the practice of historical geology fi ts her description of the methodology of "prototypical historical science" quite well. However, there are also important kinds of historical scientifi c research that do not involve what she calls the search for the smoking gun. Moreover, Cleland's claim that prediction is not a major factor in historical natural science depends on taking an overly restrictive view of what counts as a prediction. Finally, Cleland's approach, which emphasizes methodology, is just one possible way of thinking about the difference between historical and nonhistorical science. Rather than focusing on the "how" of historical science, one can also focus on the "what" of historical science-on the nature of the processes and events that historical geologists study.

Proportionality and the Precautionary Principle

Ethics, Policy, and Environment 16: 338-340., 2013

The restorationist argument for extinction reversal

The Ethics of Animal Re-Creation and Modification: Reviving, Rewilding, Restoring. Edited byMarkku Oksanen and Helena Siipi. Palgrave Macmillan, 2014, pp. 40-59.

Reply to Critics: Why not NIMBY? (with Simon Feldman)

Ethics, Policy, and Environment 17(1): 105-115, 2014

This paper develops responses to several critics who commented on an earlier paper that we publis... more This paper develops responses to several critics who commented on an earlier paper that we published in this journal (Feldman and Turner 2010). In that paper, we argued that there is nothing necessarily wrong with NIMBY claims or those who make them. The critics raised some important issues, such as whether "NIMBY" is essentially a pejorative term; the possibility that NIMBY claimants are saying something deep about the noncomparability of places; what exactly it means for policy makers to defer to a NIMBY claim; the relationship between NIMBY and environmental justice claims; and whether there is any principled way to distinguish good from bad NIMBY claims. We explore these issues further, and in the course of responding to the critics, we develop some further reasons for skepticism about the prospects for distinguishing good from bad NIMBY claims in a principled way.

The topography of historical contingency (with Rob Inkpen)

Journal of the Philosophy of History, 2012

Gould’s replay revisited

Biology & Philosophy, 2011

This paper develops a critical response to John Beatty’s recent (2006) engagement with Stephen Ja... more This paper develops a critical response to John Beatty’s recent (2006) engagement with Stephen Jay Gould’s claim that evolutionary history is contingent. Beatty identifies two senses of contingency in Gould’s work: an unpredictability sense and a causal dependence sense. He denies that Gould associates contingency with stochastic phenomena, such as drift. In reply to Beatty, this paper develops two main claims. The first is an interpretive claim: Gould really thinks of contingency has having to do with stochastic effects at the level of macroevolution, and in particular with unbiased species sorting. This notion of contingency as macro-level stochasticity incorporates both the causal dependence and the unpredictability senses of contingency. The second claim is more substantive: Recent attempts by other scientists to put Gould’s claim to the test fail to engage with the hypothesis that species sorting sometimes resembles a lottery. Gould’s claim that random sorting is a significant macroevolutionary phenomenon remains an intriguing and largely untested live hypothesis about evolution.

Punctuated equilibrium and species selection: what does it mean for one theory to suggest another?

Theory in Biosciences, 2010

McMullin (In: Cohen et al. (eds.) Essays in memory of Imre Lakatos, 1976, In: Leplin (ed.) Scient... more McMullin (In: Cohen et al. (eds.) Essays in memory of Imre Lakatos, 1976, In: Leplin (ed.) Scientific realism, 1984) argues that fertility is a theoretical virtue. He thinks of a fertile theory as one whose central metaphors suggest new directions for theoretical development, where those new developments help solve previous problems and anomalies. Nolan (Br J Philos Sci 50:265–282, 1999) argues that fertility in this sense is not a distinctive theoretical virtue in its own right. Rather, Nolan thinks that fertility is reducible to predictive novelty. This article explores the relationship between punctuated equilibrium (PE) and species selection in the light of this philosophical debate about the nature of theoretical fertility, or suggestiveness. I argue that (1) PE suggests, but does not imply, that species selection is a mechanism of evolution; (2) the suggestiveness in this case is not reducible to predictive novelty; (3) species selection is not a metaphorical extension of PE; and (4) getting clear about the way in which PE suggests species selection can help solve a puzzle about punctuated equilibrium. The puzzle is that Eldredge and Gould’s initial presentation of PE seems to presuppose a minimalist or extrapolationist view of macroevolution, even though many scientists take PE to challenge that minimalist view.

Why Not NIMBY? (with Simon Feldman)

Ethics, Place & Environment, 2010

This paper examines a particularly egregious example of a NIMBY (‘Not in my backyard’) claim and ... more This paper examines a particularly egregious example of a NIMBY (‘Not in my backyard’) claim and considers three proposals for explaining what about that claim might be ethically problematic: (1) The NIMBY claimant is being selfish or self-serving; (2) The NIMBY claim cannot be morally justified, because respecting everyone's NIMBY claims leaves communities worse off; and (3) if policymakers were to defer to people's NIMBY claims, they would end up perpetuating environmental injustices. We argue that these proposals fail to explain why there is anything wrong with the NIMBY claim per se.

How much can we know about the causes of evolutionary trends?

Biology & Philosophy, 2009

One of the first questions that paleontologists ask when they identify a large-scale trend in the... more One of the first questions that paleontologists ask when they identify a large-scale trend in the fossil record (e.g., size increase, complexity increase) is whether it is passive or driven. In this article, I explore two questions about driven trends: (1) what is the underlying cause or source of the directional bias? and (2) has the strength of the directional bias changed over time? I identify two underdetermination problems that prevent scientists from giving complete answers to these two questions.

Beyond Detective Work: Empirical Testing in Paleobiology

In M. Ruse and D. Sepkoski (eds.), The Paleobiological Revolution: Essays on the Growth of Modern Paleontology, University of Chicago Press, 2009, pp. 201-214. , 2009

Just another drug? A philosophical assessment of randomized, controlled studies of intercessory prayer.

Journal of Medical Ethics, 2006

Local Underdetermination in Historical Science

Philosophy of Science, 2005

ABSTRACT

Misleading observable analogues in paleontology

Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, 2005

Carman argues, in ‘The electrons of the dinosaurs and the center of the Earth’, that we may have ... more Carman argues, in ‘The electrons of the dinosaurs and the center of the Earth’, that we may have more reason to be realists about dinosaurs than about electrons, because there are plenty of observable analogues for dinosaurs but not for electrons. These observable analogues severely restrict the range of plausible ontologies, thus reducing the threat of underdetermination. In response to this argument, I show that the observable analogues for ancient organisms are a mixed epistemic blessing at best, and I discuss some cases from the history of paleontology in which the observable analogues—ducks, shrimp, and lizards—have led scientists into persisting error. I also give reasons for thinking that underdetermination will be just as serious a problem in historical as in experimental science. I conclude that Carman has not succeeded in showing that dinosaurs ‘come off better’ than electrons.

The past vs. the tiny: historical science and the abductive arguments for realism

Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, 2004

Scientific realism is fundamentally a view about unobservable things, events, processes, and so o... more Scientific realism is fundamentally a view about unobservable things, events, processes, and so on, but things can be unobservable either because they are tiny or because they are past. The familiar abductive arguments for scientific realism lend more justification to scientific realism about the tiny than to realism about the past. This paper examines both the “basic” abductive arguments for realism advanced by philosophers such as Ian Hacking and Michael Devitt, as well as Richard Boyd’s version of the inference to the best explanation of the success of science, and shows that these arguments provide less support to historical than to experimental realism. This is because unobservably tiny things can function both as unifiers of the phenomena and as tools for the production of new phenomena, whereas things in the past can only serve as unifiers of the phenomena. The upshot is that realists must not suppose that by presenting arguments for experimental realism they have thereby defended realism in general.

Biases in the Selection of Candidate Species for De-Extinction

Entrenched biases in favour of large, charismatic mammals, towards predators, towards terrestrial... more Entrenched biases in favour of large, charismatic mammals, towards predators, towards terrestrial animals and towards species that have cultural importance can in uence the selection of candidate species for de-extinction research. Often, the species with the highest existence value will also be the ones that raise the most serious animal welfare concerns.

De-extinction as Artificial Species Selection

This paper offers a paleobiological perspective on the debate concerning the possible use of biot... more This paper offers a paleobiological perspective on the debate concerning the possible use of biotechnology to bring back extinct species. One lesson from paleobiology is that extinction selectivity matters in addition to extinction rates and extinction magnitude. Combining some of Darwin's insights about artificial selection with the theory of species selection that paleobiologists developed in the1970s and 1980s provides useful context for thinking about de-extinction. Using recent work on the prioritization of candidate species for de-extinction as a test case, the paper argues that de-extinction would be a form of artificial species selection in which humans influence which species persist vs. go extinct. This points to a serious gap in our ethical theory: Much work has been done to clarify the value(s) of biological diversity, but we also need theoretical guidance for decisions that amount to species sorting, and that will shape the macroevolutionary future.

Scientific Knowledge of the Deep Past (With Adrian Currie)

by Derek Turner and Adrian Currie

Historical scientists, from cosmologists to archaeologists, tackle important but difficult tasks:... more Historical scientists, from cosmologists to archaeologists, tackle important but difficult tasks: reconstructing the events and entities which populate the deep past, understanding their formation and development, and learning how to see our contemporary world in terms of its long history. Of late, philosophers have paid increasing attention to these epistemic challenges and the nature of such sciences (see Turner 2014). The papers collected here offer both a (by no means exhaustive) look at the variety of epistemic practices and targets found in the historical sciences and illustrate new directions in the philosophy of historical science 1 . We take 'historical scientists' to be those involved in the scientific investigation of the deep past.

A Second Look at the Colors of the Dinosaurs

In earlier work, I predicted that we would probably not be able to determine the colors of the di... more In earlier work, I predicted that we would probably not be able to determine the colors of the dinosaurs. I lost this epistemic bet against science in dramatic fashion when scientists discovered that it is possible to draw inferences about dinosaur coloration based on the microstructure of fossil feathers (Vinther et al., 2008). This paper is an exercise in philosophical error analysis. I examine this episode with two questions in mind. First, does this case lend any support to epistemic optimism about historical science? Second, under what conditions is it rational to make predictions about what questions scientists will or will not be able answer? In reply to the first question, I argue that the recent work on the colors of the dinosaurs matters less to the debate about the epistemology of historical science than it might seem. In reply to the second question, I argue that it is difficult to specify a policy that would rule out the failed bet without also being too conservative.

Contingency and the explanation of evolutionary trends

Biological Explanation: An Enquiry into the Diversity of Explanatory Patterns in the Life Sciences, edited by Christophe Malaterre and Pierre-Alain Braillard, Springer, 2015, pp. 73-90., 2015

One “big question” of macroevolutionary theory is the degree to which evolutionary history is con... more One “big question” of macroevolutionary theory is the degree to which evolutionary history is contingent. A second “big question” is whether particular large-scale evolutionary trends, such as size increase or complexity increase, are passive or driven. Showing that a trend is passive or driven is a way of explaining it. These two “big questions” are related in both a superficial and a deep way. Superficially, defending historical contingency and showing that major trends are passive are two complementary ways of downplaying the importance of natural selection in evolutionary history. A passive trend is one that’s not explained by selection. In order to appreciate the deeper connection between the two issues, it is necessary to distinguish different senses of contingency (especially sensitivity to initial conditions vs. unbiased sorting). It’s plausible that passive trends are generally due to unbiased sorting processes. Serendipitously, thinking of contingency as unbiased sorting also helps to clarify its relationship to species selection, which some think of as biased sorting. Macroevolutionary theory thus turns out to have considerable unity.

Causal explanations of historical trends

Explanation in the Special Sciences – The Case of Biology and History, edited by Marie Kaiser, Andreas Hüttemann, Daniel Plenge, and Oliver Scholz, Springer, 2014, pp. 255-269., 2014

Philosophers interested in historical explanation have tended to focus on causal explanations of ... more Philosophers interested in historical explanation have tended to focus on causal explanations of particular events, states of affairs, or observable traces. Yet researchers working in fields ranging from paleontology and evolutionary biology to climate science and economics seek to document and explain the occurrence of historical, population-level trends, where a trend is a persistent, directional change in some state variable. Examples of such trends include everything from evolutionary size increase (Cope's rule), to changes of gene frequencies in an evolving population, to global warming. This chapter explores the idea that explanations of historical trends are typically causal explanations. Woodward's interventionist theory treats causation as a relation between variables and so lends itself readily to the idea that trends can be causes and effects. A small extension of Woodward's theory can help illuminate cases in which scientists talk of one trend as being the cause of another. However, paleontologists often explain trends by claiming that they are passive, that is, that they involve a random walk away from a fixed boundary in the state space. This type of explanation of an historical trend does not invoke any causes in the interventionist sense, which suggests that some explanations of historical trends might not be causal explanations.

Historical Geology: Methodology and Metaphysics

This chapter engages critically with Carol Cleland's recent work in the philosophy of historical ... more This chapter engages critically with Carol Cleland's recent work in the philosophy of historical science. Much of the practice of historical geology fi ts her description of the methodology of "prototypical historical science" quite well. However, there are also important kinds of historical scientifi c research that do not involve what she calls the search for the smoking gun. Moreover, Cleland's claim that prediction is not a major factor in historical natural science depends on taking an overly restrictive view of what counts as a prediction. Finally, Cleland's approach, which emphasizes methodology, is just one possible way of thinking about the difference between historical and nonhistorical science. Rather than focusing on the "how" of historical science, one can also focus on the "what" of historical science-on the nature of the processes and events that historical geologists study.

Proportionality and the Precautionary Principle

Ethics, Policy, and Environment 16: 338-340., 2013

The restorationist argument for extinction reversal

The Ethics of Animal Re-Creation and Modification: Reviving, Rewilding, Restoring. Edited byMarkku Oksanen and Helena Siipi. Palgrave Macmillan, 2014, pp. 40-59.

Reply to Critics: Why not NIMBY? (with Simon Feldman)

Ethics, Policy, and Environment 17(1): 105-115, 2014

This paper develops responses to several critics who commented on an earlier paper that we publis... more This paper develops responses to several critics who commented on an earlier paper that we published in this journal (Feldman and Turner 2010). In that paper, we argued that there is nothing necessarily wrong with NIMBY claims or those who make them. The critics raised some important issues, such as whether "NIMBY" is essentially a pejorative term; the possibility that NIMBY claimants are saying something deep about the noncomparability of places; what exactly it means for policy makers to defer to a NIMBY claim; the relationship between NIMBY and environmental justice claims; and whether there is any principled way to distinguish good from bad NIMBY claims. We explore these issues further, and in the course of responding to the critics, we develop some further reasons for skepticism about the prospects for distinguishing good from bad NIMBY claims in a principled way.

The topography of historical contingency (with Rob Inkpen)

Journal of the Philosophy of History, 2012

Gould’s replay revisited

Biology & Philosophy, 2011

This paper develops a critical response to John Beatty’s recent (2006) engagement with Stephen Ja... more This paper develops a critical response to John Beatty’s recent (2006) engagement with Stephen Jay Gould’s claim that evolutionary history is contingent. Beatty identifies two senses of contingency in Gould’s work: an unpredictability sense and a causal dependence sense. He denies that Gould associates contingency with stochastic phenomena, such as drift. In reply to Beatty, this paper develops two main claims. The first is an interpretive claim: Gould really thinks of contingency has having to do with stochastic effects at the level of macroevolution, and in particular with unbiased species sorting. This notion of contingency as macro-level stochasticity incorporates both the causal dependence and the unpredictability senses of contingency. The second claim is more substantive: Recent attempts by other scientists to put Gould’s claim to the test fail to engage with the hypothesis that species sorting sometimes resembles a lottery. Gould’s claim that random sorting is a significant macroevolutionary phenomenon remains an intriguing and largely untested live hypothesis about evolution.

Punctuated equilibrium and species selection: what does it mean for one theory to suggest another?

Theory in Biosciences, 2010

McMullin (In: Cohen et al. (eds.) Essays in memory of Imre Lakatos, 1976, In: Leplin (ed.) Scient... more McMullin (In: Cohen et al. (eds.) Essays in memory of Imre Lakatos, 1976, In: Leplin (ed.) Scientific realism, 1984) argues that fertility is a theoretical virtue. He thinks of a fertile theory as one whose central metaphors suggest new directions for theoretical development, where those new developments help solve previous problems and anomalies. Nolan (Br J Philos Sci 50:265–282, 1999) argues that fertility in this sense is not a distinctive theoretical virtue in its own right. Rather, Nolan thinks that fertility is reducible to predictive novelty. This article explores the relationship between punctuated equilibrium (PE) and species selection in the light of this philosophical debate about the nature of theoretical fertility, or suggestiveness. I argue that (1) PE suggests, but does not imply, that species selection is a mechanism of evolution; (2) the suggestiveness in this case is not reducible to predictive novelty; (3) species selection is not a metaphorical extension of PE; and (4) getting clear about the way in which PE suggests species selection can help solve a puzzle about punctuated equilibrium. The puzzle is that Eldredge and Gould’s initial presentation of PE seems to presuppose a minimalist or extrapolationist view of macroevolution, even though many scientists take PE to challenge that minimalist view.

Why Not NIMBY? (with Simon Feldman)

Ethics, Place & Environment, 2010

This paper examines a particularly egregious example of a NIMBY (‘Not in my backyard’) claim and ... more This paper examines a particularly egregious example of a NIMBY (‘Not in my backyard’) claim and considers three proposals for explaining what about that claim might be ethically problematic: (1) The NIMBY claimant is being selfish or self-serving; (2) The NIMBY claim cannot be morally justified, because respecting everyone's NIMBY claims leaves communities worse off; and (3) if policymakers were to defer to people's NIMBY claims, they would end up perpetuating environmental injustices. We argue that these proposals fail to explain why there is anything wrong with the NIMBY claim per se.

How much can we know about the causes of evolutionary trends?

Biology & Philosophy, 2009

One of the first questions that paleontologists ask when they identify a large-scale trend in the... more One of the first questions that paleontologists ask when they identify a large-scale trend in the fossil record (e.g., size increase, complexity increase) is whether it is passive or driven. In this article, I explore two questions about driven trends: (1) what is the underlying cause or source of the directional bias? and (2) has the strength of the directional bias changed over time? I identify two underdetermination problems that prevent scientists from giving complete answers to these two questions.

Beyond Detective Work: Empirical Testing in Paleobiology

In M. Ruse and D. Sepkoski (eds.), The Paleobiological Revolution: Essays on the Growth of Modern Paleontology, University of Chicago Press, 2009, pp. 201-214. , 2009

Just another drug? A philosophical assessment of randomized, controlled studies of intercessory prayer.

Journal of Medical Ethics, 2006

Local Underdetermination in Historical Science

Philosophy of Science, 2005

ABSTRACT

Misleading observable analogues in paleontology

Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, 2005

Carman argues, in ‘The electrons of the dinosaurs and the center of the Earth’, that we may have ... more Carman argues, in ‘The electrons of the dinosaurs and the center of the Earth’, that we may have more reason to be realists about dinosaurs than about electrons, because there are plenty of observable analogues for dinosaurs but not for electrons. These observable analogues severely restrict the range of plausible ontologies, thus reducing the threat of underdetermination. In response to this argument, I show that the observable analogues for ancient organisms are a mixed epistemic blessing at best, and I discuss some cases from the history of paleontology in which the observable analogues—ducks, shrimp, and lizards—have led scientists into persisting error. I also give reasons for thinking that underdetermination will be just as serious a problem in historical as in experimental science. I conclude that Carman has not succeeded in showing that dinosaurs ‘come off better’ than electrons.

The past vs. the tiny: historical science and the abductive arguments for realism

Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, 2004

Scientific realism is fundamentally a view about unobservable things, events, processes, and so o... more Scientific realism is fundamentally a view about unobservable things, events, processes, and so on, but things can be unobservable either because they are tiny or because they are past. The familiar abductive arguments for scientific realism lend more justification to scientific realism about the tiny than to realism about the past. This paper examines both the “basic” abductive arguments for realism advanced by philosophers such as Ian Hacking and Michael Devitt, as well as Richard Boyd’s version of the inference to the best explanation of the success of science, and shows that these arguments provide less support to historical than to experimental realism. This is because unobservably tiny things can function both as unifiers of the phenomena and as tools for the production of new phenomena, whereas things in the past can only serve as unifiers of the phenomena. The upshot is that realists must not suppose that by presenting arguments for experimental realism they have thereby defended realism in general.

Paleontology: A Philosophical Introduction

Making Prehistory: Historical Science and the Scientific Realism Debate

What do paleontologists mean by " species "? Review of W.D. Allmon and M.M. Yacobucci, eds., Species and Speciation in the Fossil Record (University of Chicago Press, 2016)

Review of Cynthia Willett, Interspecies Ethics (Columbia University Press, 2014), with Miranda Young

Review of How to Clone a Mammoth: The Science of De-Extinction, by Beth Shapiro

Review of Kostas Kampourakis, Understanding Evolution (Cambridge University Press, 2014)

Quarterly Review of Biology 90: 215-16, 2015

Review of Environmental Ethics, 6th Edition, Louis Pojman and Paul Pojman (Wadsworth Publications, 2011)

Teaching Philosophy 35: 448-451, 2012

Review of J.N. Thompson, Relentless Evolution (University of Chicago Press, 2013)

Quarterly Review of Biology 89: 173-4., 2014

Review of M. Pigliucci and M. Baudry, eds., Philosophy of Pseudoscience: Reconsidering the Demarcation Problem (University of Chicago Press, 2013)

Quarterly Review of Biology 89: 161-2., 2014

Neo-Naturphilosophie: Michael Ruse's Gaia: Science on a Pagan Planet

Soundings: An Interdisciplinary Journal 97: 477-485., 2014

Review of Robert Asher, Evolution and Belief: Confessions of a Religious Paleontologist

Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, 2012

Review of Brett Calcott and Kim Sterelny, eds. The Major Transitions in Evolution Revisitied

Reports of the National Center for Science Education

Review of E.Sober, Did Darwin Write the Origin Backwards? Philosophical Essays on Darwin's Theory (Prometheus Books, 2012)

Quarterly Review of Biology 87: 138, 2012

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, a... more JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

With Andrew Margenot, Review of The Deep Structure of Biology: Is Convergence Sufficiently Ubiquitous to Give a Directional Signal?, edited by Simon Conway Morris. Templeton Foundation Press, 2008.

Reports of the National Center for Science Education 30: 26-27., 2010

Altruism – is it still an anomaly?

Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 2005

The Progress of Darwinism

Biology & Philosophy, 2006

... Connecticut College 270 Mohegan Avenue New London CT 06320 USA E-mail:derek.turner@conncoll .... more