Books by Jennifer Welchman
Papers by Jennifer Welchman
Do the first two books of Hume’s Treatise form a “compleat chain of reasoning” on the subject of ... more Do the first two books of Hume’s Treatise form a “compleat chain of reasoning” on the subject of personal identity? Not if a complete chain of reasoning is one that explains the origin of the fictitious beliefs that we remain identical through time, “as it regards our thought or imagination, and as it regards our passions or the concern we take in ourselves.” Book 1 explains how we come to believe that we are persisting subjects of conscious experience of an external world. Book 2 explains our belief that we are persisting subjects of passions and powers of practical agency. But neither explains the origin of the mistaken belief that we are also persisting objects of our own practical agency or the equally mistaken belief that we are naturally and powerfully disposed to “concern” for ourselves. If we are not the enduring objects of our practical agency and if, as Hume explicitly states in Book 2, we do not love our “selves,” how do we come to make these mistakes? And what actually plays the causal role in moral and social life vulgarly attributed to self-love? Were Hume to leave these phenomena unexplained, his chain of reasoning regarding personal identity would be incomplete. Hume supplies this account in Book 3. Thus the first two Books do not form a complete chain of reasoning as regards personal identity.
See M. Berman & R. Dalvi, eds., Heroes, Monsters, Values: Science Fiction Films of the 1970s (Cambridge Scholars, 2011)
Hume Studies, Jan 1, 2008
Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society, Jan 1, 2006
Abstract William James's "The Will to Believe" has been criticized for... more Abstract William James's "The Will to Believe" has been criticized for offering untenable arguments in support of belief in unvalidated hypotheses* Although James is no longeraccused of sug-gestingwe can create belief ex nihilo, critics con-tinue to chargethat James s defense of ...
Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Jan 1, 1995
So begins the first of Locke's Two Treatises of Government. But this Englishman, gentlem... more So begins the first of Locke's Two Treatises of Government. But this Englishman, gentleman, and self-styled 'lover of liberty' was not himself above pleading for slavery when it suited him. That plea has been an embarrassment to his admirers ever since. Locke attempted to ...
Environmental Philosophy Papers by Jennifer Welchman
Diálogos, 2024
Recently a new High Seas Treaty was adopted by the U.N General Assembly, after yea... more Recently a new High Seas Treaty was adopted by the U.N General Assembly, after years of “the most important talks no one has heard of.” If ratified, it would offer important new tools for marine conservation. Yet little notice has been taken either of the negotiations or their conclusion in the environmental ethics literature, especially in North America. I discuss possible reasons why and then go on to illustrate the gaps in current polycentric marine governance regimes with the plight of the American Eel. After discussing how the High Seas Treaty could help to protect the eels’ spawning grounds in the Sargasso Sea, I consider the objection that the High Seas Treaty not adequately unify our current polycentric nature of ocean governance or ensure just and equitable marine stewardship. I argue that if we apply Jonathan Wolf’s ‘layers of justice’ approach to norms of international cooperation, unification is not necessary to pursue justice and equity. Assuming the High Seas Treaty is ratified, we could stop worrying and learn to love (or at least live with) polycentric marine governance
Chapter in Canadian Environmental Philosophy, Edited by C. Tyler DesRoches, Frank Jankunis and By... more Chapter in Canadian Environmental Philosophy, Edited by C. Tyler DesRoches, Frank Jankunis and Byron Williston (McGill-Queen's 2019)
cientific cognitivists argue formalist aesthetics of nature are (1) inadequate for appreciating t... more cientific cognitivists argue formalist aesthetics of nature are (1) inadequate for appreciating the full range of nature's aesthetic values and (2) too subjective to be useful for defending nature conservation. I argue (1) is false because moderate formalists can appreciate nature for its performances, not merely objects and vistas. I argue (2) is false because moderate formalists can argue that appreciation of beauty (including natural beauty) is a constitutive good of human flourishing, whose realization relies on access to a rich and diverse array of aesthetically rewarding experiences throughout a lifetime. On these grounds, moderate formalists (among others) can justify conserving distinctive natural entities and environs for our own and future generations’ good.
The Environmental Ethics community has been unified in its opposition to the dichotomies of human... more The Environmental Ethics community has been unified in its opposition to the dichotomies of humanity and nature and of social and ecological communities entrenched in traditional Western thought. In place of these traditional dichotomies, environmental ethics emphasizes linkages and networks of dependence within and between the species and processes composing the environments in which we live in order to undermine destructive presumptions of human superiority over the rest of nature. So one might have expected that the recent emergence of socio-ecological concepts of resilience would be welcomed by environmental ethicists. Unlike earlier concepts of social resilience, socio-ecological resilience does not treat ecological restoration and social system restoration as disconnected or dichotomous. But no general embrace of the concept has occurred.
In this paper I will discuss sources of ethical resistance within several different branches of the environmental ethics community; including Biocentrism, Ecocentrism, and Weak Anthropocentrism (or Environmental Pragmatism). While I concede that some Biocentrists n and some Ecocentrists may be unable to embrace this concept of resilience, I argue that nothing about the concept should make it unacceptable for the more pragmatic Weak Anthropocentrist majority – including those such as O’Neill, Holland, & Light who argue that some wild species and environs might be irreplaceable even for human flourishing. Nevertheless, the ethical concerns responsible for resistance within some branches of environmental ethics should not be ignored. It is vital that the environmental ethics community (among others) engage with proponents of socio-ecological resilience to ensure the concept does not devolve into a simplistic economism for which resilience requires no more than conservation of instrumentally valuable resources and ecosystem services. Environmental philosophers will not be able to play this useful role unless they are prepared to engage in the development of this concept of resilience going forward.
The Journal of Value Inquiry, Jan 1, 2009
Philosophy & Geography, Jan 1, 2001
Environmental Ethics, Jan 1, 1999
Chapter 7 in Restoring Layered Landscapes, History, Ecology, and Culture, edited by Marion Hourde... more Chapter 7 in Restoring Layered Landscapes, History, Ecology, and Culture, edited by Marion Hourdequin and David G. Havlick
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Books by Jennifer Welchman
Papers by Jennifer Welchman
Environmental Philosophy Papers by Jennifer Welchman
In this paper I will discuss sources of ethical resistance within several different branches of the environmental ethics community; including Biocentrism, Ecocentrism, and Weak Anthropocentrism (or Environmental Pragmatism). While I concede that some Biocentrists n and some Ecocentrists may be unable to embrace this concept of resilience, I argue that nothing about the concept should make it unacceptable for the more pragmatic Weak Anthropocentrist majority – including those such as O’Neill, Holland, & Light who argue that some wild species and environs might be irreplaceable even for human flourishing. Nevertheless, the ethical concerns responsible for resistance within some branches of environmental ethics should not be ignored. It is vital that the environmental ethics community (among others) engage with proponents of socio-ecological resilience to ensure the concept does not devolve into a simplistic economism for which resilience requires no more than conservation of instrumentally valuable resources and ecosystem services. Environmental philosophers will not be able to play this useful role unless they are prepared to engage in the development of this concept of resilience going forward.
In this paper I will discuss sources of ethical resistance within several different branches of the environmental ethics community; including Biocentrism, Ecocentrism, and Weak Anthropocentrism (or Environmental Pragmatism). While I concede that some Biocentrists n and some Ecocentrists may be unable to embrace this concept of resilience, I argue that nothing about the concept should make it unacceptable for the more pragmatic Weak Anthropocentrist majority – including those such as O’Neill, Holland, & Light who argue that some wild species and environs might be irreplaceable even for human flourishing. Nevertheless, the ethical concerns responsible for resistance within some branches of environmental ethics should not be ignored. It is vital that the environmental ethics community (among others) engage with proponents of socio-ecological resilience to ensure the concept does not devolve into a simplistic economism for which resilience requires no more than conservation of instrumentally valuable resources and ecosystem services. Environmental philosophers will not be able to play this useful role unless they are prepared to engage in the development of this concept of resilience going forward.
(I) Animal suffering is inevitable.
(II) Serious adverse ecological effects are possible.
(III) Feasibility as a means of maintaining biodiversity is dubious.
(IV) It’s a bait-and-switch substituting inauthentic artificial bio-objects rather than extinct wild species.
(V) Its yet another expression of deplorable human arrogance towards nature.
These five are often presented as if equally applicable to all deextinction projects. But this overlooks significant differences in the nature and timing of species extinction. Broadly, extinctions may be grouped into three classes; (i) those occurring in the distant past, to species whose natural environments no longer exist; (ii) those occurring in the recent past, to species whose natural environments persist to some degree; and (iii) those not yet complete; the functional extinctions of living dead species not yet extinct in the wild
The five standard objections to de-extinction are not equally potent against all attempts at extinction reversals. While all seem applicable to de-extinctions of the 1st type, this isn’t necessarily the case for the 2nd, let alone the 3rd. In some cases of type 3 de-extinctions, I will argue environmental philosophers should often side with rather than against de-extinction.