Papers by Douglas I Campbell
Synthese
So-called ‘distinctively mathematical explanations’ (DMEs) are said to explain physical phenomena... more So-called ‘distinctively mathematical explanations’ (DMEs) are said to explain physical phenomena, not in terms of contingent causal laws, but rather in terms of mathematical necessities that constrain the physical system in question. Lange argues that the existence of four or more equilibrium positions of any double pendulum has a DME. Here we refute both Lange’s claim itself and a strengthened and extended version of the claim that would pertain to any n-tuple pendulum system on the ground that such explanations are actually causal explanations in disguise and their associated modal conditionals are not general enough to explain the said features of such dynamical systems. We argue and show that if circumscribing the antecedent for a necessarily true conditional in such explanations involves making a causal analysis of the problem, then the resulting explanation is not distinctively mathematical or non-causal. Our argument generalises to other dynamical systems that may have purpo...
Synthese, 2016
How many attitudes must be posited at the level of reductive bedrock in order to reductively expl... more How many attitudes must be posited at the level of reductive bedrock in order to reductively explain all the rest? Motivational Humeans hold that at least two attitudes are indispensable, belief and desire. Desire-As-Belief theorists beg to differ. They hold that the belief attitude can do the all the work the desire attitude is supposed to do, because desires are in fact nothing but beliefs of a certain kind. If this is correct it has major implications both for the philosophy of mind, with regards the problem of naturalizing the propositional attitudes, and for metaethics, with regards Michael Smith's 'moral problem'. This paper defends a version of Desire-As-Belief, and shows that it is immune to several major objections commonly levelled against such theories.
The Philosophical Quarterly, 2016
Famous examples of conceivability arguments include: (i) Descartes' argument for mind-body dualis... more Famous examples of conceivability arguments include: (i) Descartes' argument for mind-body dualism; (ii) Kripke's 'modal argument' against psychophysical identity theory; (iii) Chalmers' 'zombie argument' against materialism; and (iv) modal versions of the ontological argument for theism. In this paper we show that for any such conceivability argument, C, there is a corresponding 'mirror argument', M. M is deductively valid and has a conclusion that contradicts C's conclusion. Hence a proponent of C-henceforth, a 'conceivabilist'-can be warranted in holding that C's premises are conjointly true only if she can find fault with one of M's premises. But M's premises-of which there are just two-are modeled on a pair of C's premises. The same reasoning that supports the latter supports the former. For this reason a conceivabilist can repudiate M's premises only on pain of severely undermining C's premises. We conclude on this basis that all conceivability arguments, including each of (i)-(iv), are fallacious.
Animal Studies Journal, 2017
Are the methods of synthetic biology capable of recreating authentic living members of an extinct... more Are the methods of synthetic biology capable of recreating authentic living members of an extinct species? An analogy with the restoration of destroyed natural landscapes suggests not. The restored version of a natural landscape will typically lack much of the aesthetic value of the original landscape because of the different historical processes that created it – processes that involved human intentions and actions, rather than natural forces acting over millennia. By the same token, it would appear that synthetically recreated versions of extinct natural organisms will also be less aesthetically valuable than the originals; that they will be, in some strong sense, ‘inauthentic’, because of their peculiar history and mode of origin. I call this the ‘genesis argument’ against de-extinction. In this article I critically evaluate the genesis argument. I highlight an important disanalogy between living organisms and natural landscapes: viz., it is of the essence of the former, but not ...
This paper concerns the three great modal dichotomies: (i) the necessary/contingent dichotomy; (i... more This paper concerns the three great modal dichotomies: (i) the necessary/contingent dichotomy; (ii) the a priori/empirical dichotomy; and (iii) the analytic/synthetic dichotomy. These can be combined to produce a tri-dichotomy of eight modal categories. The question as to which of the eight categories house statements and which do not is a pivotal battleground in the history of analytic philosophy, with key protagonists including Descartes, Hume, Kant, Kripke, Putnam and Kaplan. All parties to the debate have accepted that some categories are void. This paper defends the contrary view that all eight categories house statements—a position I dub 'octopropositionalism'. Examples of statements belonging to all eight categories are given. Keywords Analytic × A Priori × Necessary × Hume × Kant × Kripke
Polish Journal of Philosophy, 2017
David Lewis describes, then attempts to refute, a simple anti-Humean theory of desire he calls 'D... more David Lewis describes, then attempts to refute, a simple anti-Humean theory of desire he calls 'Desire as Belief'. Lewis' critics generally accept that his argument is sound and focus instead on trying to show that its implications are less severe than appearances suggest. In this paper I argue that Lewis' argument is unsound. I show that it rests on an essential assumption that can be straightforwardly proven false using ideas and principles to which Lewis is himself committed.
Famous examples of conceivability arguments include: (i) Descartes' argument for mind-body dualis... more Famous examples of conceivability arguments include: (i) Descartes' argument for mind-body dualism; (ii) Kripke's 'modal argument' against psychophysical identity theory; (iii) Chalmers' 'zombie argument' against materialism; and (iv) modal versions of the ontological argument for theism. In this paper we show that for any such conceivability argument, C, there is a corresponding 'mirror argument', M. M is deductively valid and has a conclusion that contradicts C's conclusion. Hence a proponent of C—henceforth, a 'conceivabilist'—can be warranted in holding that C's premises are conjointly true only if she can find fault with one of M's premises. But M's premises—of which there are just two—are modeled on a pair of C's premises. The same reasoning that supports the latter supports the former. For this reason a conceivabilist can repudiate M's premises only on pain of severely undermining C's premises. We conclude on this basis that all conceivability arguments, including each of (i)—(iv), are fallacious.
How many attitudes must be posited at the level of reductive bedrock in order to reductively exp... more How many attitudes must be posited at the level of reductive bedrock in order to reductively explain all the rest? Motivational Humeans hold that at least two attitudes are indispensable, belief and desire. Desire-As-Belief theorists beg to differ. They hold that the belief attitude can do the all the work the desire attitude is supposed to do, because desires are in fact nothing but beliefs of a certain kind. If this is correct it has major implications both for the philosophy of mind, with regards the problem of naturalizing the propositional attitudes, and for metaethics, with regards Michael Smith’s ‘moral problem’. This paper defends a version of Desire-As-Belief, and shows that it is immune to several major objections commonly levelled against such theories.
Are the methods of synthetic biology capable of recreating authentic living members of an extinct... more Are the methods of synthetic biology capable of recreating authentic living members of an extinct species? An analogy with the restoration of destroyed natural landscapes suggests not. The restored version of a natural landscape will typically lack much of the aesthetic value of the original landscape because of the different historical processes that created it—processes that involved human intentions and actions, rather than natural forces acting over millennia. By the same token, it would appear that synthetically recreated versions of extinct natural organisms will also be less aesthetically valuable than the originals; that they will be, in some strong sense, ‘inauthentic’, because of their peculiar history and mode of origin. I call this the ‘genesis argument’ against de-extinction. In this article I critically evaluate the genesis argument. I highlight an important disanalogy between living organisms and natural landscapes: viz., it is of the essence of the former, but not of the latter, to regularly reproduce and die. The process of iterated natural reproduction that sustains the continued existence of a species through time obviously does not undermine the authenticity of the species. I argue that the authenticity of a species will likewise be left intact by the kind of artificial copying of genes and traits that a de-extinction project entails. I conclude on this basis that the genesis argument is unsound.
The title of Beth Shapiro’s ‘How to Clone a Mammoth’ contains an implicature: it suggests that it... more The title of Beth Shapiro’s ‘How to Clone a Mammoth’ contains an implicature: it suggests that it is indeed possible to clone a mammoth, to bring extinct species back from the dead. But in fact Shapiro both denies this is possible, and denies there would be good reason to do it even if it were possible. The de-extinct ‘mammoths’ she speaks of are merely ecological proxies for mammoths—elephants re-engineered for cold-tolerance by the addition to their genomes of a few mammoth genes. Shapiro’s denial that genuine species de-extinction is possible is based on her assumption that the resurrected organisms would need to be perfectly indistinguishable from the creatures that died out. In this article I use the example of an extinct New Zealand wattlebird, the huia, to argue that there are compelling reasons to resurrect certain species if it can be done. I then argue that synthetically created organisms needn’t be perfectly indistinguishable from their genetic forebears in order for species de-extinction to be successful.
Computing and Philosophy: Selected Papers From IACAP 2014, 2016
In this paper I argue that human beings should reason, not in accordance with classical logic, bu... more In this paper I argue that human beings should reason, not in accordance with classical logic, but in accordance with a weaker 'reticent logic'. I characterize reticent logic, and then show that arguments for the existence of fundamental Gödelian limitations on artificial intelligence are undermined by the idea that we should reason reticently, not classically.
Algorithmic Probability and Friends. Bayesian Prediction and Artificial Intelligence: Papers From the Ray Solomonoff 85th Memorial Conference, Melbourne, Vic, Australia, November 30 -- December 2, 2011, 2013
An unknown process is generating a sequence of symbols, drawn from an alphabet, A. Given an initi... more An unknown process is generating a sequence of symbols, drawn from an alphabet, A. Given an initial segment of the sequence, how can one predict the next symbol? Ray Solomono↵'s theory of in-ductive reasoning rests on the idea that a useful estimate of a sequence's true probability of being outputted by the unknown process is provided by its algorithmic probability (its probability of being outputted by a species of probabilistic Turing machine). However algorithmic probability is a " semimeasure " : i.e., the sum, over all x's that are members of A, of the conditional algorithmic probabilities of the next symbol being x, may be less than 1. Solomonoff thought that algorithmic probability must be normalized, to eradicate this semimeasure property, before it can yield acceptable probability estimates. This paper argues, to the contrary, that the semimea-sure property contributes substantially, in its own right, to the power of an algorithmic-probability-based theory of induction, and that normal-ization is unnecessary.
In Radicalizing Enactivism, D. D. Hutto and E. Myin develop a theory of mind they call ‘Radical E... more In Radicalizing Enactivism, D. D. Hutto and E. Myin develop a theory of mind they call ‘Radical Enactive (or Embodied) Cognition’ (REC). They argue that extant enactivist and embodied theories of mind are, although pretty radical, not radical enough, because such theories buy into the representationalist doctrine that perceptual experience (along with other forms of ‘basic’ mentality) possesses representational content. REC denies this doctrine. It implies that perceptual experience lacks reference, truth conditions, accuracy conditions, or conditions of satisfaction. In this review I summarise their anti-representationalist argument and show that it has at least three major weaknesses.
The Foundational Debate, 1995
Cristian Calude Douglas I. Campbell Karl Svozil doru § tefanescu Strong Determinism vs. Computabi... more Cristian Calude Douglas I. Campbell Karl Svozil doru § tefanescu Strong Determinism vs. Computability Those who most ignore, least escape. David Hawkins I. Introduction Penrose [40](see also [41]) has discussed a new point of view concerning the na-ture of physics that might ...
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Papers by Douglas I Campbell