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ARTES SCIENTIA VERITAS

Classical Series

THE MENO OF PLATO

 THE

MENO OF PLATO

104969
.

EDITED

WITH INTRODUCTION, NOTES, AND EXCURSUSES

BY

E. SEYMER THOMPSON, M.A. (CAMB. AND LOND . )

FELLOW AND LATE TUTOR OF CHRIST'S COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE

London
MACMILLAN AND CO. , LIMITED
NEW YORK : THE MACMILLAN COMPANY
1901

All rights reserved

888

P5m

747

ΘΗΣΕΥΣ
ὦ πόλλ᾽ ἁμαρτάνοντες ἄνθρωποι μάτην,
τί δὴ τέχνας μὲν μυρίας διδάσκετε
καὶ πάντα μηχανᾶσθε κἀξευρίσκετε,
ἓν δ᾽ οὐκ ἐπίστασθ᾽ οὐδ᾽ ἐθηράσασθέ πω,
φρονεῖν διδάσκειν οἷσιν οὐκ ἔνεστι νοῦς ;
ΙΠΠΟΛΥΤΟΣ
δεινὸν σοφιστὴν εἶπας, ὅστις εὖ φρονεῖν
τοὺς μὴ φρονοῦντας δυνατός ἐστ᾽ ἀναγκάσαι.
EURIPIDES.
pica
02-1
JUD 5-33

PREFACE

THIS book might possibly have been better if

less time had been spent over it. Worked at
with interruptions during a period of more than
twelve years it is at last, I fear, something of a
farrago. I have done my best to put myself on a
level with the times in regard to the study of Plato ;
but I cannot pretend to have assimilated all the
results of foreign scholarship ; at the same time
silence with regard to a work must not always
be taken as implying ignorance of it. I have
found Fritzsche's recension of Stallbaum an
admirable sub-structure for work on the dialogue.
But it is to scholars of my own country that
I have to express the greatest obligations. The
number of references to the work of Dr. W. H.
Thompson, Professor Campbell, R. D. Archer-
Hind and J. Adam, will show how much I
have derived from them. Above all I cannot
vi MENO

over-estimate my debt to Dr. Henry Jackson as

a great pioneer in true methods of investigation
in Ancient Philosophy. If I had ventured to
dedicate this work to any one, it is certainly his
name that I should have wished to prefix to it.
My sincere thanks are due to my friend
H. Rackham, Classical Tutor of Christ's College,
Cambridge, for looking through the proof-sheets,
and offering many useful suggestions.
The greater part of the work I have done
alone, and I have not availed myself of the
counsel of friends so fully as doubtless I might
have done with profit. One who attempts to
interpret Plato may fairly ask to be judged in
the spirit of the words : πάντα ἄνδρα χρὴ ἀγα-
πᾶν, ὅστις καὶ ὁτιοῦν λέγει ἐχόμενον φρονήσεως
πρᾶγμα καὶ ἀνδρείως ἐπεξιὼν διαπονείται.

EWHURST, September 21, 1900.

 CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION- PAGE
§ 1. Plato's place in Greek philosophy ix
§ 2. Form of Plato's works, and especially of the Meno X
§ 3. Socrates in the Meno xi
§ 4. Meno's life · xii
§ 5. Meno's character xviii
§ 6. Anytus • xxi
§ 7. The Slave xxiv
§ 8. Assumed date of the dialogue . xxiv
§ 9. Genuineness of the Meno XXV
§ 10. Structure of the Meno xxvi
§ 11. 6 Is Virtue xxviii
teachable ? '
§ 12. Problem of the order of Plato's works • xxix
§ 13. Plato's life and the main grouping of the
dialogues . xxxi
§ 14. The educational ' dialogues xxxix
§ 15. The Protagoras xli
§ 16. The Gorgias • xlii
§ 17. The Phaedrus xliii
§ 18. The Euthydemus 1
§ 19. The Republic . li
§ 20. The Symposium and the Phaedo lii
viii MENO
PAGE
§ 21. The doctrine of Immortality in the above
dialogues liii
§ 22. The Theaetetus lv
§ 23. Probable occasion and date of the Meno . lvi
§ 24. The Method of Stylometry lvii
§ 25. Verdict of Stylometry as to the Meno lx
Editions of the Meno lxv
Explanation of some References lxvi
TEXT
COMMENTARY 57
APPENDIX ON THE TEXT 233
EXCURSUSES-
Exc. I. Ovoía as a philosophical term in Plato 255
Exc. II. Εἴπερ and εἴ γε 258
Exc. III. On ἀλλὰ γάρ . 264
Exc. IV. El with the fut. indic. 270
Exc. V. On Eristic · 272
Exc. VI . The Doctrine of Transmigration in Plato 286
Exc. VII. Δόξα and ἐπιστήμη . 298
INDEX I. Greek Words 307
INDEX II. Subject Matter 313
 INTRODUCTION

§ 1. In the history of Greek philosophy we may

recognize three main stages. The earliest of these
may be called the Poetical . Early speculation was
aroused by Wonder ; it was but to a small extent self-
critical, and there was occasionally present in its
expounders as is likely to be the case with those
conscious of some superiority among primitive peoples
-a vein of charlatanry. Even its literary form was
in some cases (as with Parmenides and Empedocles)
poetical ; when it was clothed in prose, this sometimes
had a prophetic tinge, as in the ' dark sayings ' of
Heraclitus.
This was the childhood of philosophy. Then came
the time of adolescence, the period of questioning.
Among the influences that led in the new phase
we recognize as distinctly the most important the
figure of Socrates. But that we must not assign to
Socrates the undivided responsibility for the transition,
is obvious enough . If we knew more about Zeno of
Elea we should probably see more clearly than we do
how important was the part he played. As it is, Grote
(196) is certainly right in naming him with Socrates
x MENO

as the great agencies in bringing about the transi-

tion to the second, or Dialectic, stage of Philosophy.
(Cp. the phrases from Aristotle's Metaph. which Grote
there quotes : A. vI 7 = 987 b 32 oi yàp πроτероν
διαλεκτικῆς οὐ μετεῖχον, Μ. ιν 4 = 1078 b 25 διαλεκ
Tuần nào có xis on TÓT . Diog. L. Ix 25 quotes
Aristotle as saying that Zeno was ' the discoverer
of dialectic .' As to the term dialektiký he says it
was introduced by Plato, III 24.)
The third stage is the Expository. A thinker
having succeeded in framing a system that satisfies
him, assuming the attitude of a teacher propounds it in
a consecutive treatise. This stage really commences
with its greatest representative, Aristotle. But the
surpassing interest of Plato lies in the fact that in
him we have the bridge from the second stage to the
third. Beginning as critic and investigator, he ends
as an expositor.
§ 2. The form of Plato's compositions -the dialogue
is the natural outcome of his place in the history of
philosophy (Zeller p. 153 foll.; Grote 239 foll . ).
One great characteristic of it is its elasticity. It
ranges from a vivid reflexion of Socratic converse, with
constant inquiry and criticism, chiefly in the earlier
dialogues, to a thin, though not altogether purposeless,
veil of consecutive exposition in the later. Plato was
not indeed the inventor of this form : Diog. L. III 47,
8 says that some attribute the introduction of it to
Zeno of Elea ; but that Aristotle awards it to a
certain Alexamenus, of whom we know nothing. He
sensibly adds, however, δοκεῖ δέ μοι Πλάτων, ἀκριβώσας
τὸ εἶδος, καὶ τὰ πρωτεῖα δικαίως ἂν ὥσπερ τοῦ κάλλους
 INTRODUCTION xi

οὕτω τῆς εὑρέσεως ἀποφέρεσθαι. Contrast the spiteful

denial of Plato's priority in Ath. x1 505 c.
There are obviously two forms in which a dialogue
may be written . Either the words uttered may be set
down, the several speakers being merely indicated ; or
the whole dialogue may be reported by one of the
interlocutors, or some one present. Both methods
have their advantages and disadvantages. The method
of reporting involves the wearisome repetition ‘ said I '
and ‘ said he,' which induced Plato to abandon it in
the Theaetetus (see 143 c). On the other hand the
direct method precluded to a Greek anything like
' stage-directions ' or comment. This no doubt was
the consideration that led Plato to prefer the other in
the Republic. But for this we should not have known,
for instance, that at 350D Thrasymachus blushed.
Nowhere do we get the 00s of Socrates impressed upon
us more strongly than in the dialogues where, as in
the Republic and Protagoras, he reports his own
conversations (see Zeller, 109, 110) .
The Meno, in which the accessory furniture is
very simple, is written in the direct form. Con-
sequently we do not know, and can only conjecture,
at what point Anytus joins the party (see on 89 E 34).
On the other hand much adroitness is shown by
the way in which the actual words of the speakers
illustrate the circumstances of the dialogue. For
instance, Socrates' first answer serves as an introduc-
tion to the person Meno.
§ 3. The persons of the dialogue are four, Socrates,
Meno, Anytus and the Slave.
The personality of Socrates is brought before us
xii MENO

remarkably vividly. We have indications of his

irony ( 71 C 19 ov távv eiµì μvýµwv, 96 D 22
κινδυνεύομεν, ὦ Μένων, ἐγώ τε καὶ σὺ φαῦλοί τινες
εἶναι ἄνδρες, καὶ σέ τε Γοργίας οὐχ ἱκανῶς πεπαιδευκέναι
καὶ ἐμὲ Πρόδικος), his unfailing good temper and
courtesy (79 Α 5 εἶτα, ὦ Μένων, παίζεις πρός με, 86 D
10 ἀλλ᾽ εἰ μὲν ἐγὼ ἦρχον κτέ. , 95 Α 5 ἀλλ᾽ οὗτος μὲν
ἐάν ποτε γνῷ, οἷόν ἐστιν τὸ κακῶς λέγειν, παύσεται
Xaλeπαívov KTE. ), his erotic tendencies (76 C 15) :
Meno's simile of the vápкn 80 A not only strongly
brings before us the effect of Socrates' discourse, but
gives us a glimpse of Socrates' personal appearance.
§ 4. Meno is a Thessalian, young, rich, and well-born.
At the time when the Meno was written Thessaly was
looked upon as semi-barbarous. "The abundance of
corn and cattle from the neighbouring plains sustained
in these cities a numerous population, and above all
a proud and disorderly noblesse, whose manners bore
much resemblance to those of the heroic times. They
were violent in their behaviour, eager in armed feud,
but unaccustomed to political discussion or com-
promise ; faithless as to obligations, yet at the same
time generous in their hospitalities, and much given
to the enjoyments of the table ' (Grote Hist. of Greece
Part II. ch. 3, cp. Liv. xxxiv. 51 ) . It is to Thessaly
that Crito, in the dialogue called after him, 45 c,
proposes to smuggle away Socrates out of prison.
Subsequently (53 D foll. ) the Laws, in their imaginary
speech, tell Socrates to what a disorderly place he
will go if he accepts the invitation —ἐκεῖ γὰρ δὴ
πλείστη ἀταξία καὶ ἀκολασία— and how the gentle-
men there, far from being shocked at his breaking
 INTRODUCTION xiii

prison, will laugh at the story of his undignified escape.

Compare Xen. Mem. I ii 24 καὶ Κριτίας δὴ καὶ ᾿Αλκι
βιάδης, ἕως μὲν Σωκράτει συνήστην, ἐδυνάσθην ἐκείνῳ
χρωμένω συμμάχῳ τῶν μὴ καλῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν κρατεῖν ·
ἐκείνου δ᾽ ἀπαλλαχθέντε, Κριτίας μὲν φυγων εἰς
Θετταλίαν ἐκεῖ συνῆν ἀνθρώποις ἀνομίᾳ μᾶλλον ἢ
δικαιοσύνῃ χρωμένοις.
Some ten years after the probable date of the
composition of the Meno Thessaly assumed a pro-
minence in Grecian affairs such as it had never enjoyed
before. It was in the year 374 B.C. that Polydamas
of Pharsalus came to Sparta asking help against
Jason of Pherae, the Tagus of Thessaly. Under
Jason there was a brief chance that Thessaly might
play in regard to Greece a part similar to that
played later by Macedon under Philip. But at the
time of Meno's assumed visit to Athens .- about
402 B.C. -there was no thought of this. As late as
382 B.C. the Spartans passed through Thessaly on
their way against Olynthus without let or hindrance.
Meno in Athens is something like a Russian prince in
Paris during the eighteenth century.
A short disquisition on the life of Meno, by Gedike,
is prefixed to Buttmann's edition. Fritzsche in his
prolegomena, pp. 24 foll ., has given a very thorough
treatment of the subject. Meno's father's name
was Alexidemus (76 E 47). His town was probably
Pharsalus, the town of Polydamas, the most luxurious
town in Thessaly according to Theopompus (see on
70 B 7). Diog. L. 11 50 calls Meno Paporáλios, whereas
Diodorus XIV 19 calls him Aapuaîos. It is hard to
see what can have made Diogenes call him a
xiv MENO

' Pharsalian ' except a true tradition ; on the other

hand Diodorus may easily have been led into his
statement by a careless inference from 70 B 7. On
this Fritzsche well remarks ' immo potius cum Socrates
dicat οἱ τοῦ σοῦ ἑταίρου Αριστίππου πολῖται (Larisaei),
verisimilius est Menonem ipsum non fuisse Larisaeum .'
(The fact that Aapioaíov in our text there is probably
spurious, makes no difference, as it is otherwise
known that Aristippus was a Larisaean. )
It is probable then that our Meno belonged to the
same family as the Meno of Pharsalus, who in the
year 476 B.C. when Cimon was besieging Eion aided
him with twelve talents and 300 horsemen, his own
retainers. For this the Athenians granted him the
citizenship, as we read in Demosthenes Aristocr. (23)
199. (The author of the compilation περὶ συντάξεως
(† Dem. (13 ) 23) diminishes these statements ; Meno
found 200 horsemen and only got áréλeta. ) Thucydides
(II 22) names ' Meno of Pharsalus ' as one of the leaders
of a body of Thessalian cavalry who came to assist
the Athenians κατὰ τὸ παλαιὸν συμμαχικόν in the
first year of the Peloponnesian War (431 B.c. ). The
distance of time makes it improbable that these two
Menos were identical (though Westermann on Dem.
Aristocr. 1.c. thinks they were) ; but they may well
have been related.
The name Meno was not uncommon at Athens.
Plutarch Per. 31 tells us of a statuary Meno who
accused Phidias ; and Alc. 22. 5 of a Meno, father of
the priestess Theano. These two may be identical.
Meno is the name of the archon of 473 B.C. There
was also a Meno who was sent as general to the
 INTRODUCTION XV

Hellespont in 361 B.C. (Dem. Polycl. (50) 12) and again

to Euboea in 357 B.C. (CIA. 11 64 , Hicks 104).
Xenophon Hell. v iv 55 mentions a Meno of Thespiae.
Lastly, there is another important Meno of Pharsalus
who took a prominent part in the Lamian War (Plut.
Phoc. 25) and was, through his daughter Phthia, the
grandfather of Pyrrhus of Epirus.
There is no reason for thinking that the Meno of
our dialogue enjoyed the Athenian franchise. He was
united by hereditary ties of hospitality to Anytus (see
on 90 B 2 ). He was also the Tатρiкòs ¿évos of the
Persian king (78 D 28, where see note).
Meno is represented by Plato as young, though no
longer very young (76 B 11 ). He has had a good
education ; he knows the poets, Simonides (?) 77 B 12,
and Theognis (95 D), something of the physics of
Empedocles, and something of geometry. His great
teacher and light has been Gorgias of Leontini, the
rhetorician, who spent the last years of his long life
in Thessaly. Thus he may be regarded as a product
of fashionable or ' sophistic ' education, but with
everything to learn in dialectics ; even the grasping of
a general definition is at first quite beyond him.
Meno is chiefly known for the part he took in the
expedition of Cyrus against Artaxerxes. It was owing
to his favour with Aristippus that he obtained a com-
mand over a division of the Greek mercenaries : Tαρà
Αριστίππῳ ἔτι ὡραῖος ὢν στρατηγεῖν διεπράξατο τῶν
¿évov (Xen. Anab. II vi 28). We may think, if we please,
that it was this business that obliged him to return
home, and curtailed his stay at Athens (76 E, see
also on 76 B 11 ). Meno did not start from Sardis
xvi MENO

with the force of Cyrus, but joined it with his con-

tingent at Colossae (Xen. Anab . 1 ii 6 ) . Xenophon
makes no secret of his hatred of Meno (cp. Diog. L. 11
50). This may have arisen from a rivalry between
Meno and Xenophon's friend and hero, Clearchus.
He accuses Meno of dishonourably overreaching his
colleagues at the time when Cyrus was debating with
his officers about crossing the Euphrates. Meno
urged his own men to anticipate the decision by
crossing : so, if it was decided to cross, they would
have the credit of setting the example ; if it was
decided not to cross and they had to retreat again,
Cyrus would in future give them the preference as
having shown themselves the most zealous in his
service. 'Such breach of communion and avidity for
separate gain, at a time when it vitally concerned all
Greek soldiers to act in harmony with each other,
was a step suitable to the selfish and treacherous
character of Meno ' (Grote Hist. ch. 69).
Not long afterwards at a place called Charmande
a fracas occurred between the troops of Meno and
those of Clearchus. The outbreak was only quelled
by the personal intervention of Cyrus (Xen. Anab. I v 10
foll. ). At the battle of Cunaxa Clearchus commanded
the right, Meno the left, wing of the Greeks. This
means that under Cyrus Clearchus had the first
command, Meno the second. This is hardly consistent
with the words of Ctesias (Persica 58) who says that
Clearchus and Meno ἀεὶ διάφοροι ἀλλήλοις ἐτύγχανον
διότι τῷ μὲν Κλεάρχῳ ἅπαντα ὁ Κῦρος συνεβούλευε,
τοῦ δὲ Μένωνος λόγος οὐδεὶς ἦν. Meno was also
connected by a tie of friendship with Ariaeus, the
 INTRODUCTION xvii

commander of Cyrus' Asiatic troops, and after the

death of Cyrus in the battle Meno was sent at his
own desire among the embassy to Ariaeus to offer him
the crown (ibid. It i 5 ). When the rest of the em-
bassy returned, Meno remained with Ariaeus ( II ii 1 ).
Ariaeus had declined the crown and seemed to
be playing false with the Greeks. So Meno incurred
the suspicion of Clearchus ; (πΙ ν 28) υπώπτευε δὲ εἶναι
τὸν διαβάλλοντα Μένωνα , εἰδὼς αὐτὸν καὶ συγγεγενη-
μένον Τισσαφέρνει μετ' Αριαίου καὶ στασιάζοντα αὐτῷ
(i.e. Κλεάρχῳ) καὶ ἐπιβουλεύοντα ὅπως τὸ στράτευμα
ἅπαν πρὸς ἑαυτὸν λαβὼν φίλος ᾖ Τισσαφέρνει. Sub-
sequently Meno, like the other generals, went for a
colloquy to the tent of Tissaphernes ; and was there
seized . At this point there is a discrepancy in the
accounts, which are practically two, that of Xenophon
and that of Ctesias. The story of Ctesias is preserved
in Photius' summary of his Persica, and on it is
largely based the account in Plutarch's Artaxerxes,
and in Diodorus. That the Greek generals, including
Meno, were seized and sent to the King at Babylon,
all agree. Xenophon (r vi 29) says of Meno ἀποθνῄ-
σκόντων δὲ τῶν συστρατηγῶν ὅτι ἐστράτευσαν ἐπὶ
βασιλέα σὺν Κύρῳ, ταὐτὰ πεποιηκὼς οὐκ ἀπέθανε, μετὰ
δὲ τὸν τῶν ἄλλων θάνατον στρατηγῶν τιμωρηθεὶς ὑπὸ
βασιλέως ἀπέθανεν, οὐχ ὥσπερ Κλέαρχος καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι
στρατηγοὶ ἀποτμηθέντες τὰς κεφαλάς, ὅσπερ τάχιστος
θάνατος δοκεῖ εἶναι, ἀλλὰ ζῶν αἰκισθεὶς ἐνιαυτὸν ὡς
πονηρὸς λέγεται τῆς τελευτῆς τυχεῖν. But Ctesias
(Persica 60, cp. Plut. Art. 18, Diod . xiv 27 ) says that
it was by Meno's agency that the other generals were
entrapped into the tent of Tissaphernes and that
xviii MENO

for this service Meno was released . (Diodorus says

Τισσαφέρνης δὲ τοὺς στρατηγοὺς δήσας ἀπέστειλε πρὸς
Αρταξέρξην · ἐκεῖνος δὲ τοὺς μὲν ἄλλους ἀνεῖλε, Μένωνα
δὲ μόνον ἀφῆκεν · ἐδόκει γὰρ μόνος οὗτος στασιάζων πρὸς
τοὺς συμμάχους προδώσειν τοὺς Ἕλληνας, where the
word πpodúσew , if sound, would seem to indicate that
future services were expected of Meno. ) It is note-
worthy that Meno's enemy Xenophon says nothing
about any treachery of Meno towards the other
generals, though he gloats over his miserable death .
Of course it is quite possible that Meno was treacherous
to his comrades and yet was punished at the Persian
court. Grote (Hist. ch. 70) thinks he did betray
them, or took credit for doing so, and perished
through the agency of Parysatis, ever ready to take
vengeance on any who had wronged her darling son
Cyrus, or his friends.
.
§ 5. Xenophon in giving the characters of the slain
generals reserves Meno for the last, and paints him
in very dark colours . His greed of gain was un-
disguised ; and to increase his gains he was greedy of
rule and honour. He truckled to the powerful to
secure a screen for his acts of injustice. Perjury and
falsehood he regarded as the quickest way to the
consummation of his desires ; simplicity and truth
were mere folly. He loved no one ; with him pro-
fessions of friendship were but the signal of an attack.
He treated no foe with scorn ; but always assumed a
scornful air in talking with allies. To attack the
guarded possessions of enemies was too much trouble ;
the defenceless possessions of friends he made his prey.
He gloried in treachery, falsehood and mockery of
 INTRODUCTION xix

friends, as much as others in piety, truth and justice.

He thought the best tie of discipline for soldiers was a
partnership in crime. He considered himself as
having conferred a boon if he associated with any one
without ruining him. All this, says Xenophon, is
notorious ; as to still darker stories about him there
may be some untruth (Anab. II vi 21–28) .
Is the portrait that we get in Plato inconsistent
with this ? Jowett (Meno Introd . p. 265) says ' The
character of Meno, like that of Critias, has no relation
to the actual circumstances of his life. Plato is silent
about his treachery to the ten thousand Greeks, which
Xenophon has recorded, ¹ as he is also silent about the
crimes of Critias. He is a Thessalian Alcibiades.'
Again, p. 266, he speaks of Plato as ' regardless of the
historical truth of the characters of his dialogue as in
the case of Meno and Critias ' : cp. p. 268. This seems
to me to go too far.
There is no real inconsistency between Plato's
picture and that of Xenophon . Athenaeus is stupidly
wrong when he says (505 B) that Plato éуkúpa avтoû
(scil. Mévwvos) dueέépxerai, as a counterblast, forsooth,
to Xenophon, who had vilified him ; and (506 B) that
Plato disparages the great men of Athens, Mévwva d'
ἐπαινεῖ τὸν τοὺς Ἕλληνας προδόντα. It is quite clear,
at least to one who reads between the lines, that
Plato regards Meno as by no means an exemplary
person. His arrogance (ὑβριστής γ᾽ εἶ, ὦ Μένων κτέ.
76 Α), self-esteem (καίτοι μυριάκις γε περὶ ἀρετῆς
παμπόλλους λόγους εἴρηκα καὶ πρὸς πολλούς, καὶ πάνυ
1 Jowett here falls into an error, perhaps based on Athenaeus
XI 505 A. Xenophon does not impute this treachery to Meno.
b
XX MENO

εὖ, ὥς γε ἐμαυτῷ ἐδόκουν 80 Β), vanity (γιγνώσκω οὗ

ἕνεκά με ᾤκασας κτέ. 80 C) , want of self-control (ἐπειδὴ
δὲ σὺ σαυτοῦ μὲν οὐδ᾽ ἐπιχειρεῖς ἄρχειν, ἵνα δὴ
¿λeúОepos is 86 D) are clearly indicated.¹ The charges
are made quite good-humouredly, it is true, but they
are perfectly serious. Perhaps we may add that at
74 A Meno omits oσiórηs from the list of virtues, and
remark the parenthesis 81 Β δεϊν δὴ διὰ ταῦτα ὡς
ὁσιώτατα διαβιῶναι τὸν βίον κτέ , the intention
of which becomes much more obvious if it is intended
for Meno's personal benefit. In Meno's favour it may
be said that he is always deferential to Socrates, and
he respects conventions (78 D 33).
Plato was, of course, not indifferent to common
morality. The bad behaviour of some of his pupils
no doubt gave occasion to some of his enemies to
assert that he was. (Cp. Ath. 508 D wσжEρ kai oi
πολλοὶ τῶν μαθητῶν αὐτοῦ τυραννικοί τινες καὶ διάβολοι
yevóμevoi. Much of Athenaeus' material is derived
from Theopompus, a pupil of Plato's rival, Isocrates. )
But Meno's character was not Plato's subject. He
may have been a bad man- -that was a matter of
comparative indifference ; he certainly was a bad
pupil-that is a point of cardinal importance.
Compare Meno with the types of the good pupil—with
Glaucon and Adimantus, with Simmias and Cebes,
and above all with Theaetetus, and it is seen how
appropriately he is selected as the respondent in a
dialogue that is meant to show that a partial and
premature attack on the fortress of the Nature of
Virtue must be fruitless.
1 See too the note on the text of 72 A 20.
 INTRODUCTION xxi

§ 6. Anytus is the well-known accuser of Socrates.

This should be placed beyond doubt by his parting
threat at 94 E ; besides the hint at 99 E TOÚTY μév,
ὦ Μένων, καὶ αὖθις διαλεξόμεθα and the concluding
words of the whole dialogue ὡς ἐὰν πείσῃς τοῦτον,
ἔστιν ὅ τι καὶ ᾿Αθηναίους ὀνήσεις. Moreover the name
Anthemion, as in our dialogue, is given to the father
of Socrates' accuser in the scholium on Apol. 18 B,
presently quoted. The same name is given by
Plutarch in two places to the father of an Anytus
of whom he tells a story about his infatuation for
Alcibiades (Alc. 4. 5 ; Amat. § 27 p. 762 D ; cp.
Satyrus in Ath. x11 534 E, Zeller Socr. p. 172 note) ;
so also it is given in two places to the father of the
Anytus of whom the story goes that he was the first
to bribe judges (Plut . Coriol. 14. 4 ; Diod . XIII 64 ; cp.
Arist. ' A0. IIo . ch. 27 and see on 95 A 5) . True or
false, both these stories must refer to the same man,
the personage in the Meno and the accuser of Socrates.
There may be more doubt about the Anytus who is
said (Plut. de malign. Herod. § 6 p. 862 в) to have
proposed a vote of ten talents to Herodotus, where
the father's name is not given. Some information as
to Anytus will be found in the notes on 90 B 46 and
95 A 5, and this I proceed to supplement, referring
among modern works to Grote Hist. ch. 68 ; Zeller
Socrates pp. 162, 172-74 ; Riddell Apology Introd.
pp. ii-iv ; Fr. Introd. 29, 30.
The scholium on Plato Apol. 18 в begins oûтOS ỏ
*Ανυτος ᾿Ανθεμίωνος ἦν υἱός, Αθηναῖος γένος, Αλκιβι
άδου ἐραστής, πλούσιος ἐκ βυρσοδεψικῆς. He was a
prominent democrat in the time of the Peloponnesian
xxii MENO

War ; in 404 B.C. he was exiled by the Thirty (Xen. Hell.

II iii 42, 44), and in the next year he aided Thrasybulus
to expel them and restore the democracy. ' Anytus was
a man of strong political convictions : he had lost a
fortune through his fidelity to the cause of freedom '
(Riddell Introd. p. xxviii, cp. Isocr. 18. 23 Opaσúßov-
λος καὶ ῎Ανυτος μέγιστον μὲν δυνάμενοι τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει,
πολλῶν δ᾽ ἀπεστερημένοι χρημάτων). Anytus however
appears not to have been an extreme democrat ; the
Aristotelian ' A◊. Пoλ. ch. 34 names him as a member
of the ' middle party ' of which Theramenes was the head.
When we read of a man πλούσιος ἐκ βυρσοδε-
Yks, who is at the same time (with whatever
qualifications) a democrat, our thoughts naturally
turn to Cleon. Because Socrates and the democrats
were both attacked by Aristophanes, we are apt to
suppose that they were in the same camp. But in
the case of Anytus this is clearly not the case. The
key of Anytus' character is his conversation. ' Anytus
is the type of the narrow-minded man of the world,
who is indignant at innovation, and equally detests
the popular teacher and the true philosopher ' (Jowett
Meno, Introd. p . 266) . At the time of Socrates' trial
(399 B.C. ) it was the oligarchs who were the innovators ;
democracy was the established constitution. Though
it was little more than a century old, if reckoned from
Clisthenes, and much less if reckoned from Ephialtes
and Pericles, prescription had won for it veneration.
This found its expression in the watchword Tátριos
TOATEía, which certainly meant democracy of some
kind, though how strong or how diluted might be a
matter of individual taste.
 INTRODUCTION xxiii

In the Apology 23 E Socrates represents each of his

three accusers as taking up the cudgels against him
to avenge the insults to his own class ; Meletus
for the poets, Lycon for the orators, "AVUтos dè
ὑπὲρ τῶν δημιουργῶν καὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν. But there
is reason to think that Anytus had further some
private grounds for his animosity. We may well
disregard the stories of his jealousy of Socrates in
regard to Alcibiades ; but there is a fairly well
authenticated story that would assign to Anytus a
motive against Socrates, which, though private, was
but a particular instance of a public grievance. One
of the commonest accusations against the new
teaching, whether of Socrates or the sophists,'
was its interference between parent and son (see on
92 A 3) . Just such a case of interference had Anytus
to resent from Socrates.1 In Xenophon's Apologia
Socratis (which is not, like Plato's, a speech supposed
to be addressed by Socrates to his judges) we read
$ 29 foll. how Socrates, seeing Anytus passing,
observes that Anytus is much puffed up at having
got him condemned because he said Anytus ought
not to bring up his son to his own trade. Socrates
has met the son and formed a high opinion of his
abilities ; his mind, he told Anytus, will want a
larger scope than leather-dealing affords, and if he
does not get it he will fall into bad habits. So it
turned out ; the son took to drinking, and Anytus even
after his death was in ill repute owing to his bad
training of his son. We know nothing certain of the
end of Anytus ; on which matter, as Fritzsche says,
1 See J. S. Mill Dissertations iii. 310.
xxiv MENO

'neque inter se congruentia neque omnino probabilia

memoriae produntur.' Later writers indulge in various
stories of the Nemesis that overtook him. Diog.
L. (II 43) says that of Socrates' accusers the Athenians
exiled some, and put Meletus to death ; that the men
of Heraclea ejected Anytus on the very day on which
he arrived there ; (vi 9) that Antisthenes was the
reputed author of the decree condemning Anytus to
exile and Meletus to death. Diodorus XIV 37 says
that the accusers of Socrates were put to death with-
out trial (äkpiro ) ; Plut. de invidia 6 p. 558 A says
they were subjected to so rigorous a ' boycott '
that they hanged themselves. (See Zeller Socr. 202. )
We may probably assume that Anytus was dead at
the time when the Meno was written.
Meno and Anytus supplement one another. They
are products of the two forces which Plato, standing as
it were between two fires, was continually combating,
the false teachers on the one hand, the philistines
(μvoλóyo ) on the other (Fritzsche Intr. p. 19 note 8).
§ 7. As to the Slave, Fritzsche says quamquam de
servuli aetate nihil injicitur, tamen quanto provectiorem
sumis aetate, tantum demis loco venustatis. He is not
a character, but an abstraction, a typical blank mind .
§ 8. The assumed date of the dialogue depends on
two considerations. Firstly, Meno is no longer very
young, and he was still comparatively young when he
started on the expedition of Cyrus (see § 4). This
makes it difficult to interpose a long time between
the dialogue and the expedition. Secondly, the
nearer the time of the dialogue is placed to that of
Socrates' trial, the more point there is in Anytus'
 INTRODUCTION XXV

threat at 94 E. We may then assign the year 402

B.C. as probable. There is at least one anachronism
in the dialogue, the mention of Ismenias at 90 A.
§ 9. The genuineness of the Meno was assailed by
those two ' qui non ita multos Platonis libros de
supplicio exemerunt, Ast et Schaarschmidt ' (Fritzsche).
But that was in unregenerate days. Ueberweg at one
time doubted its genuineness, but ended by believing
in it. The Meno can in fact say with not many
degrees less right than the Phaedo

εἴ με Πλάτων οὐ γράψε, δύω ἐγένοντο Πλάτωνες ·

Σωκρατικῶν ὀάρων ἄνθεα πάντα φέρω.
(Anth. Pal. Ix 358. )
' In the Menon more that is characteristic of
Plato is brought together in a smaller space than in
any other dialogue ; if the Phaedon and the Gorgias
are noble statues, the Menon is a gem ' (J. S. Mill
Dissertations III 350) . And Mr. Walter Pater in his
Plato and Platonism, p. 52, does justice to ' that most
characteristic dialogue, the Meno.'
Besides internal evidence, the Meno is protected by
an unmistakeable reference in the Phaedo 72 E (see on
81 E 12), and a probable one in the Republic 506 c
to Meno 97 B, to say nothing of other possibilities.
Aristotle twice cites the Meno by name ; Anal. pr. II
21. 7 = 67 a
& 21 ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ὁ ἐν τῷ Μένωνι λόγος, ὅτι
μáðnois váμvnois (81 D) and Anal. post. 1 1. 7 =
71 a 29 referring to the άrópημa at 80 D 1 (where see
the note). It is true that Aristotle does not mention
Plato as the author ; but in similar style he cites the
Phaedo, Phaedrus, Symposium, Gorgias and Hippias
xxvi MENO

Minor. Further, though the Meno is not named,

there is a probable reference to it in Arist. Pol. 1 xiii,
for which see on 71 E 7.
§ 10. Hardly any dialogue of Plato is so clear-cut
and simple in its construction as the Meno. The
argument falls into five divisions, which correspond
pretty nearly to the five scenes of which the dialogue
consists.
The first scene (70 A-80 D cc. i-xiii) is between
Meno and Socrates. Meno assails Socrates with the
stock question ' Can Virtue be taught ? ' Socrates
characteristically retorts by asking for a definition of
Virtue, which Meno fails to give.
The second division extends from 80 D to 86 C
(cc. xiv-xxi). The speakers are Socrates, Meno and
the Slave. Meno, sore with his failure, and perhaps
hoping to shelve the inquiry as to the definition of
Virtue to which Socrates invites him, propounds a
sceptical quibble that would imply the impossibility
of a genesis of Knowledge, and consequently the
futility of inquiry. Socrates by an experiment with
the Slave shows that Knowledge is subject to a
genesis, that its raw material is Opinion, and that we
owe our power of recovering it to Reminiscence from
a previous state of Existence.
The third scene, between Socrates and Meno, ex-
tends from 86 C to 90 B (cc. xxii - xxvi). Meno's
objection being thus overthrown he is again invited
to the inquiry ' What is Virtue ? ' But Meno, who no
doubt regards that question as merely academic and
uninteresting, would much rather attack the practical
question ' Is Virtue teachable ? ' Socrates will meet
 INTRODUCTION xxvii

him half-way. They must approach the question ' Is

Virtue teachable ? ' from a hypothesis as to what Virtue
is. If Virtue is Knowledge it will be teachable, and
if not, not. But will this hypothesis stand ? Yes,
theoretically ; for Virtue, like everything good and
beneficial, may be ultimately reduced to Knowledge
or Wisdom. But on the practical side a difficulty
remains. Where are the teachers ?
At this point Anytus, as a man of experience, is
invited into the discussion, and in the fourth scene
(90 B-95 A, cc. xxvii-xxxiv) he and Socrates are the
interlocutors. Socrates begins by ironically assuming
that just as for teaching in a special art we should go
to a professional teacher, so for άperý we should go to
the Expert Teachers - the sophists . This excites
Anytus' disgust. But when, like his colleague Meletus
in the Apology (24 E), he says that any good citizen
is capable of instilling Virtue, he is soon faced with
a number of conspicuous instances of failure.
Anytus having departed in dudgeon, the final
scene (95 A- 100 B, cc. xxxv-xlii) is left to Socrates
and Meno. This paradox about Virtue is not confined
to one place or time : he who has it for the most part
cannot impart it : he who professes to impart it for
the most part does not possess it. The only solution
is that Virtue, as we see it in the world, is not the
product of Knowledge, but of something like Know-
ledge, that is, of half-knowledge or Opinion. Opinion
may simulate the results of Knowledge ; but the
possessor of it has not the root of the matter in him,
his hold on Virtue is precarious, and not communicable.
Perhaps some day there may arise a man or men
xxviii MENO

whose Virtue is rooted in Knowledge, and then we

shall see great things. But we shall get no satis-
factory result till we attack the problem What Virtue is.
§ 11. As to Meno's , inquiry, Jowett (Meno Intr.
p. 262) says ' No one would either ask or answer such
a question in modern times.' This is hardly the place
for considering why the inquiry has been superseded
in modern times, if indeed this be the case. But at
the end of the fifth century B.C. certain phenomena
forced the matter on the consideration of the Greeks,
not as a mere academic problem, but as an urgent
practical question. These phenomena were mainly
two. In the first place there was the obvious fact
that parents failed to influence their children . Great
fathers sometimes had feeble sons, good fathers
vicious sons, wise fathers silly sons. With regard to
the ordinary arts there did appear to be a certain
power of communication ; but as to the inner quality
ȧperý, that vaguely-apprehended something that made
one man count for more than another, the best wishes
of parents and trainers seemed almost powerless.
Just at this time arose a class of men who did
profess to fill the gap that home-training obviously
left the sophists. Were they public benefactors or
were they frauds ? Many of the young men said the
former ; most of the old men said the latter. If the
sophists were unsuccessful, it might either be because
they were attempting something in itself impossible,
or because they were attempting a possible task in the
wrong way. Thus the question ' Is Virtue teachable ?'
was one to interest everybody.¹
1 The two divisions of Socrates ' argument in the Protagoras
 INTRODUCTION xxix

$ 12 . What place does the Meno take in the order of

Plato's writings ? In regard to any Platonic dialogue
this is at once the most important and the most difficult
question that we have to answer. It results from the
place of Plato in the history of philosophy that it is
precisely the development of his views that forms the
chief point of interest in them.
To Grote the question of the order of the Platonic
writings seemed an unprofitable maze (see for instance
his note at II 16, about the Meno ; and II 120 on
the question whether the Protagoras or the Gorgias is
prior). The dialogues he regarded as pictures in a
kaleidoscope, each fascinating in itself but quite dis-
continuous from anything before or after. I wish to
speak with the utmost veneration of the work of
Grote. The ' provocative shock ' he gave to the study
of Plato is something almost comparable in its kind
with the work of Socrates. We stand on his shoulders,
and how much we are thereby raised we have not
to-day full means of judging. Before he wrote, all
Plato's works were supposed to be parts of a finished
and co-ordinated system. Inconsistencies were either
ignored, or got rid of by the simple surgery of lopping
off the offending dialogue from the Platonic canon .
But since Grote cleared the air, much has been done,
largely by British scholars, to bring the comprehension
of Plato nearer than it has ever been before. Though
with regard to the order of the dialogues we shall

319 A foll. (cp. on 93 B 17, 94 E 14) correspond, in inverse order,

with the above-mentioned two sides from which the question
was presented. So also do the two divisions of Socrates'
discussion with Anytus.
XXX MENO

always have to speak ὡς οὐκ εἰδότες ἀλλὰ ὡς εἰκάζοντες,

we must not listen to the apyòs lóyos that any
attempt on the problem is futile. Olympiodorus at
the end of his life of Plato tells how Plato on his death-
bed dreamed that he was a swan pursued in vain by
işevraí ; which Simmias explained to be the interpreters
who should in vain endeavour to catch his thoughts.
If the bird is not yet in our hands we may at any
rate claim that we have closed in round it and are
now able to watch its movements at closer quarters.
One great assistance to a better view of Plato's
work is that it has come to be increasingly recognized
that we must regard Plato not merely as a tran-
scendental philosopher, but as a man living amongst
men, with human preferences and antipathies, and
undergoing human vicissitudes. The old spirit in
regard to Plato finds fine expression in the words of
Goethe (Ueberweg § 39, Grote 1 201 ) ' Plato's rela-
tion to the world is that of a superior spirit whose
good pleasure it is to dwell in it for a time. It is
not so much his concern to become acquainted with it
-for the world and its nature are things which he
presupposes (schon voraussetzt) · as kindly to com-
municate to it that which he brings with him, and of
which it stands in so great need. ' It was his strong
desire to get at Plato the man that made Grote cling
so strongly to the authenticity of the Platonic Epistles,
as ' the only occasions on which we have experience of
Plato as speaking in his own person ' (Grote 1 219, cp.
216 note). We have had to give up the notion that in
the Epistles we have a self-revelation of Plato ; though
we may still gather from them some statements as to
 INTRODUCTION xxxi

his life, of various degrees of trustworthiness. It is

hard that the very time that has shown us the im-
portance of understanding Plato's career should also
have shown us how very slender are our materials for
constructing it. The fact is that the tradition is not only
scanty but corrupt, and appears to have been corrupted
at a very early time. Diog. L. III 2 gives the name
of Plato's nephew Speusippus, among others, as an
authority for a miraculous story about Plato's birth.
§ 13. According to the most probable date of Plato's
birth, the year 427 B.C. , he was 28 years of age when
in 399 B.C. his master Socrates was put to death.
He had thus passed what has been for many great
men the blossoming period of the mind. And yet his
work was not begun. I think Grote's arguments ( 1 196
foll.) ought to be conclusive that Plato published no
dialogues before the death of Socrates. Nor is it
fatal to their cogency that the genuineness of the
Platonic Epistles, on which Grote relied, must be
given up. For the conception of the Socrates of the
dialogues a certain mythical atmosphere is required ,
which readily gathered at no long interval after
his death, but which would have been as impossible
during his life-time as the appearance of his ghost.
We must beware then of expecting to find, or of
thinking we detect, marks of juvenility ' in any
work of Plato. Yet it must be remembered that
precocity was rare in Greek literary genius. Aristo-
phanes is of course an instance, though his precocity
has been exaggerated . We may be almost certain
that Plato originally intended himself for public life,
and that it was circumstances that forced him into
xxxii MENO

philosophy. For an Athenian in Plato's position to

take up philosophy as a career in the fifth century
would seem quite derogatory, and there was indeed
no precedent for it. It was as if the eldest son of a
peer should come out as a professional violinist.
For public life he had indeed one disadvantage
from the start : ioxvópovos v says Diog. L. (III 5 cp.
Grote I 118 ). But the execution of Socrates decided
the matter ; it was the first great turning-point in his
life. The signs of the times seemed to show that it
was unsafe for Socrates' pupils to remain at Athens ;
Plato with others withdrew to Megara and thence
made travels. During the next years of his life we
may suppose the chief influences affecting his mind
to have been, firstly, a strong antipathy to the
democracy, with a feeling that he himself as far as
politics were concerned could but bide his time :
secondly, a strong desire to make himself the inter-
preter of his Master, and to present to his countrymen
his Master's thoughts more or less recast by his own
mind.
During this period he was, as to politics, in the
position of a statesman whose party is ' out ' ; as to
philosophy he was still an amateur ; that is, he held
no professional position. When he returned to
Athens we do not know ; the extent of his travels at
this time has probably been much exaggerated and
we need not suppose his absence to have extended over
more than two or three years.¹ The dialogues that
1 Cp. Grote I 121 ; Karsten de Platonis quae feruntur
epistolis pp. 164 foll .; Ueberweg-Heinze p. 142. Zeller p. 17
says ' there is great probability, and even some external evidence,
 INTRODUCTION xxxiii

belong to this period it is most reasonable to suppose

were written at Athens. His antagonists, as far as
there are any, are the old (in most cases dead) antago-
nists of Socrates. The dialogues that compose this,
the 'Socratic,' series
A are the Apology, Crito, Charmides,
Laches, Lysis, Hippias major, Hippias minor, Io and
Euthyphro. (I lay no stress on the order, and I
regard both the Alcibiades dialogues as spurious. )
During the later years of this period were probably
written two other dialogues, the Protagoras and the
Gorgias, though these rather belong to the next group
of works .
Meanwhile a change was coming over the scene.
Pupils of Socrates, Euclides at Megara, Antisthenes at
Athens, had set up as heads of philosophic schools ;
Isocrates was winning a great position as an educator
in rhetoric . The thought must have pressed itself
more and more strongly on Plato that he should
emulate them and finally cast in his lot with philo-
sophy. It was not without a struggle that he gave
up politics : τὸ πρῶτον πολλῆς μεστὸν ὄντα ὁρμῆς ἐπὶ
τὸ πράττειν τὰ κοινά, says the author of the seventh

that long before this journey ' (of 388 B.C. ) ‘ Plato had settled
in Athens, and there worked as teacher and author ; even
granting that at this period his instructions were confined to a
select few.'
Dr. Thompson Gorgias Introd . p. xvi note derides the
' fabulous extent and duration assigned to Plato's travels ' ;
Plato's return ' according to more than one witness must have
taken place about four years after the death of Socrates, that
is to say about 395 B.C. Corinth is one of the places where,
according to Aristoxenus in Diog. L. III 8, Plato bore arms
for his country. Probably this was at the battle of 394 B. C.
xxxiv ΜΕΝΟ

letter, using words which Plato certainly might have

applied to himself (cp. Diog. L. III 23 : after Plato's
third return from Sicily πολιτείας μὲν οὐχ ἥψατο,
καίτοι πολιτικὸς ὢν ἐξ ὧν ἔγραψεν).
This brings us to what may be considered the
second important moment in Plato's life ; his first
journey to Sicily and his starting as Principal of the
Academy in Athens. The seventh letter (324 a) says
that Plato first went to Syracuse σχεδὸν ἔτη τεττα-
pákovтa yeyovás- that is about 387 B.C. The date
of the opening of the Academy by Plato is given as
387 or 386 B.C. (Ueb. - Heinze p. 138) . Lists of the
oxolápɣaι or Heads were preserved, and these lists
were embodied in diadoxaí published by later authors,
of whom the earliest appears to have been Sotion, a
Peripatetic who lived at the beginning of the second
century B.C. (Ueb. -Heinze 26, 255 ; R. & P. 4 a).
There is a good deal of doubt and discrepancy
about this journey of Plato's as well as about his
travels after Socrates' death. I think we may draw
one conclusion about it with a fair amount of certainty,
namely that its object was not political. It is true
that the seventh letter (326 в foll. ) does attribute to
Plato political objects even in his first journey to
Sicily ; but what could he expect to effect during the
tyranny of the elder Dionysius ? Olympiodorus in
his life says that he went to Italy on this occasion to
see the Pythagoreans, especially Archytas of Tarentum,
and to Sicily θεασόμενος τοὺς κρατῆρας τοῦ πυρὸς τοὺς
ev Αἴτνῃ.
ἐν Arvy. The descriptions in Phaedo 111 E, 113 B,
make it reasonable to suppose that Plato did take
some interest in volcanic phenomena. To the same
 INTRODUCTION XXXV

effect Diog. L. III 18 : τρὶς δὲ πέπλευκεν εἰς Σικελίαν ·

πρῶτον μὲν κατὰ θέαν τῆς νήσου καὶ τῶν κρατήρων, ὅτε
καὶ Διονύσιος ὁ Ερμοκράτους τύραννος ὢν ἠνάγκασεν
ὥστε συμμίξαι αὐτῷ. Then comes the story how he
quarreled with Dionysius, who dismissed him abruptly ;
and how he was sold into slavery, but ransomed by
Anniceris of Cyrene and so reached Athens in safety
again (Grote I 121 , Zeller p. 24). The story of the
selling into slavery has been doubted by many. If
the incident occurred , it certainly made little im-
pression on Plato's mind ; no sign of an allusion to it
can be traced anywhere in his writings ; even the
seventh letter is silent about it. Perhaps its chief
importance is the tradition that Anniceris, refusing
to accept the sum he had paid for Plato, which his
friends wished to refund, bought with it for Plato's
use the garden in the Academy. This serves to
connect this voyage of Plato with the commencement
of his school.1
Among the travels of Plato after Socrates' death
Diogenes (116) includes a journey to Italy to visit
the Pythagoreans Philolaus and Eurytus. Neither
he nor any one else says anything about a visit to
Sicily at this time, so that we may safely assume that
Plato's visit to the island in 388 B.C. was- as Diogenes
III 18 says his first. But it is quite possible that
Diogenes is wrong about an earlier visit to Italy, and
that his visit in 388 B.C. was his first to that country

1 Diog. L. III 8 says that the original form of the name

Ακαδημία was ἑκαδημία—in which there lurks perhaps a fanciful
etymology from èκàs dýμov. (But he there makes Plato teach
in the Academy after his first return to Athens. )
C
xxxvi MENO

also. This is rather more probable as Diogenes inter-

polates this alleged earlier journey to Italy between
Cyrene and Egypt. It is surely more probable that
Plato in his first tour confined his travels to Africa,
leaving the West for a future time.¹ The matter is
not of great importance ; but his sojourn with the
Italian Pythagoreans in 388 B.C. becomes more im-
portant if it appears that this was his first personal
interview with them. Not that by any means we
need conclude that Plato was ignorant of Pythago-
reanism before this ; see Zeller p. 20, who in a note
gives the stories about the purchase of Pythagorean
books by Plato. But whatever these stories may be
worth, no one who considers Plato's temperament will
doubt that the cosmic imagery which was the glory of
Pythagoreanism would receive new vividness in Plato's
mind by intercourse with the leading spirits of that
sect.
I conceive that Plato's travels in his fortieth year
were directly connected with his resolution to start
a school ; whether it were that before beginning he
wished to supplement his knowledge and experience
in certain particular directions, or that being about to
tie himself to Athens more closely, he wished to enjoy
a spell of freedom while it was still open to him.
With regard to the Gorgias, both Cope (Intr. p.
lxxiv) and Dr. Thompson (Intr. p. xvi) place it in the
interval between Plato's return to Athens after his first
travels, and his first Sicilian journey. They both re-
cognize in it a certain buoyancy and comic spirit that
imply that the writer was comparatively young. This
¹ To this view Zeller seems to incline : p. 16 note, and p. 19.
 INTRODUCTION xxxvii

is combined with sternness and even bitterness on certain

points. Plato, when he wrote the Gorgias, was disgusted
with politics, but he was not disgusted with life. Dr.
Thompson inclines to the conjecture that the Gorgias
was the first work, or one of the first, written by
Plato after his first return to Athens. To this the
chief objection I have to offer is that sufficient
time is not thus allowed for the earlier dialogues, all
written (I believe) after Socrates' death. It seems to
me much more probable that the Gorgias was the
last dialogue written before Plato's departure on his
travels to Italy and Sicily with a fixed resolve as to
his future career. He bids good-bye to Athens-for
a time ; and good-bye-probably for ever-to politics.
For this last step itis the Απολογία Πλάτωνος.
To make clear Plato's procedure and attitude
when he returned again to Athens, I cannot do better
than borrow the words of the article ' Sophists ' in the
Encyc. Brit. p. 268 b (by ' H. J. '), only premising that
I am inclined to refer the Protagoras and Gorgias to
a time when Plato was in intention, though not yet
in fact, Head of the Academy. ' It may be imagined
further that when Plato established himself at the
Academy, his first care was to draw up a scheme of
education, including arithmetic, geometry (plane and
solid), astronomy, harmonics and dialectic, and that
it was not until he had arranged for the carrying out
of this programme that he devoted himself to the
special functions of professor of philosophy. However
this may be, we find among his writings, -intermediate,
as it would seem, between the Socratic conversations
of his first period, and the metaphysical disquisitions
xxxviii MENO

of a later time-a series of dialogues, which, however

varied their ostensible subjects, agree in having a
direct bearing upon education. Thus the Protagoras
brings the educational theory of Protagoras and the
sophists of culture face to face with the educational
theory of Socrates, so as to expose the limitations of
both ; the Gorgias deals with the moral aspect of the
teaching of the forensic rhetorician Gorgias and the
political rhetorician Isocrates ; and the intellectual
aspect of their respective theories of education is
handled in the Phaedrus ; the Meno on the one hand
exhibits the strength and the weakness of the teaching
of Socrates, and on the other brings into view the
makeshift methods of those who, despising systematic
teaching, regard the practical politician as the true
educator ; the Euthydemus has for its subject the
eristical method ; finally, having in these dialogues
characterized the current theories of education , Plato
proceeds in the Republic to develop an original
scheme.'
Side by side with this should be put the summary
which the same author has appended to the last of
his papers on ' Plato's Later Theory of Ideas, ' namely
that on the Politicus, in J.P. xv 302 foll.
'In short, I think we may distinguish four stages
or periods of Plato's literary career, and designate
them as :
(1) Socratic, of which the Euthyphro is typical ;
(2) educational - including the Protagoras, the
Gorgias, the Phaedrus, the Meno, the Euthydemus,
the Republic, the Phaedo ;
(3) philosophical - including the Philebus, the
 INTRODUCTION xxxix

Parmenides, the Theaetetus, the Sophist, the Politicus,

the Timaeus ;
(4) political- including the Laws.'
(The list does not contain all the dialogues. )
It may be observed that in group ( 1 ) the persons
criticized are mainly antagonists of Socrates ; in
group (2) they are Plato's rivals, but often also
Socrates himself ; in group (3 ) they are Plato's rivals,
Socrates, and also Plato himself at an earlier stage.
In the last stage of all, the Laws, Plato returns in a
manner à ses premiers amours, politics. It is out of
the question for him now to take an active part in
Athenian affairs ; but he so far returns to ' practical '
politics as to consider in the Laws the best amend-
ments on existing institutions. Plato's second and
third journeys to Sicily, the second in 367 B.C. when
he was sixty years old, the third later, were under-
taken in the vain hope of putting his political theories
in practice .
§ 14. We are immediately concerned with the
second or ' educational ' group of dialogues, to which
the Meno belongs. We may assume that Plato after
he became Head of the Academy at once began to
prepare for writing his great educational work, the
Republic, and that he would not allow more time
than he could help to elapse between the starting of
the Academy and its publication.
Of the other dialogues of this group there are
considerable grounds for placing the Phaedo later
than the Republic (see H. Jackson in J.P. xv 303).
The rest are all earlier than the Republic, and more or
less intended to lead up to it. Assuming then that
xl MENO

the Protagoras and Gorgias were written before the first

journey to Sicily, we have to fit in the Phaedrus,
Euthydemus and Meno between Plato's return to
Athens and the publication of the Republic. The
Menexenus and the fragmentary Clitophon also belong
to this time (see Grote III pp. 8, 25) . (The Symposium
is reserved for subsequent consideration. )
As to the date of the Republic, almost the only
reference to external events that we have to guide
us is the mention of Ismenias of Thebes (Rep. 1 336 a).
In the note on 90 A 40 I have given reasons for
thinking that this passage was written not long
before Ismenias' death, which took place probably
towards the end of 382 B.c.1 We may then con-
jecturally assign to 381 , or the earlier part of 382 B.C. ,
the publication of bk. I of the Republic. Probably
some further portion was published with it ; but the
question in what instalments the work was presented
cannot be discussed here.
Can we go any farther, and, assuming that the
Phaedrus, Meno and Euthydemus were all written

¹ As to Plato's practice in regard to naming his contem-

poraries, see Dr. Thompson in J. P. VIII 307 note (cp. x1 2 note) :
' This reticence, of which it is not difficult to divine the motives,
is most carefully practised in the case of the living celebrities
who claimed like himself to be disciples of Socrates, such as
Euclides, Aristippus and Antisthenes. A cursory reader of
Plato has no idea that such men existed as the heads of rival
sects with which the Platonists of the Academy were engaged
in perpetual controversy. On the other hand Plato never
scruples to name the dead, nor perhaps those living personages
with whom he stood in no relation of common pursuits or com-
mon friendships, e.g. Lysias, Gorgias, etc.'
 INTRODUCTION xli

between 387 and 382 B. C., ascertain the order in

which they came ? Here our conclusions can only be
tentative. Perhaps the best method will be to take
all the educational dialogues in order, and briefly
consider their relations to the Meno.
§ 15. The Protagoras. The main subject of the
Protagoras is the same as that of the Meno ' Is Virtue
teachable ?' It brings out the looseness of popular
views of Virtue, and the futility of attempting the
position from the side that naturally presented itself
-the practical side -before mastering the meta-
physical key to it, the nature of Virtue. 'The issue
of our conversation ' says Socrates ' renders both of
us ridiculous. For I, who denied virtue to be teach-
able, have shown that it consists altogether in
knowledge, which is the most teachable of all things :
while Protagoras, who affirmed that it was teachable,
has tried to show that it consisted in everything
rather than knowledge :-on which supposition it
would hardly be teachable at all. I therefore, seeing
all these questions sadly confused and turned upside
down, am beyond measure anxious to clear them up ;
and should be glad, conjointly with you, to go through
the whole investigation-first, what Virtue is, next,
whether it is teachable or not ' (Grote II 69 ; cp. Fr.
Intr. p. 14).
The expectation here raised is to some extent
fulfilled in the Meno. Notthat the Meno is by any
means final ; but certain important steps forward are
made. There are, to begin with, some attempts at
actually defining Virtue. These attempts though
abortive serve to illustrate the nature of the problem.
xlii ΜΕΝΟ

The fourth section of the dialogue- the dialogue with

Anytus (cc. xxvii-xxxiv) -goes largely over ground
already traversed in the Protagoras (see § 11 above).
But in the Protagoras the question whether after all
there is an týµn åpetîs is not faced ¹ ; nor is there
any trace of the doctrine of dóέa, by which a solution
is offered of the paradox that although Virtue is of
the nature of Knowledge, yet the possessors of Virtue
are for the most part unable to impart it, nor of the
allied topic of ' demotic virtue ' (see on 100 A 6).
There is much ground for supposing that of the
' Educational ' dialogues the Protagoras is the earliest.
The argument is almost purely Socratic. In par-
ticular there is the well-known identification of the
Pleasant and the Good. Virtue is represented in the
Protagoras as a calculus of Pleasures. From this
outcome of Socratic teaching, which was developed by
Aristippus and the Cyrenaics, Plato shortly afterwards
strongly separated himself, and he criticizes it in the
Gorgias. (See Grote II 60, 78, 119 foll.; J. & A. M.
Adam's Introd. to Prot. pp. xxix foll .)
§ 16. The Gorgias. The main point of advance
in the Gorgias is the strong assertion of the intrinsic
difference between Pleasure and Good (Zeller p. 121 ) .
It is true that as Grote says (11 105) ' Plato does not
here tell us clearly what he himself means by Good
and Evil : he specifies no objective or external mark by
which we may know it : we learn only that Good is a
mental perfection, Evil a mental taint, answering to

1 ' Plato Menone hanc quaestionem , num veritatis omnino

cognitio sit, primum tractavit, qua in Protagora supersederat '
Hermann Gesch. u. Syst. 1 483 (quoted by Fr. )..
 INTRODUCTION xliii

indescribable but characteristic sentiments in Plato's

own mind, and only negatively determined by this
circumstance, that they have no reference either to
pleasure or pain.' But we could hardly expect from
Plato at this stage a full and complete utterance on a
point about which he perhaps never more than half
satisfied himself.
The comparative slenderness of the metaphysical
basis in the Gorgias, and the simplicity of the mythical
materials (Exc. VI p. 289), point to a comparatively
early date for its composition. As I have already said
(§ 13) I should place it as the last dialogue written before
Plato's first Sicilian journey. The Pythagorean passage
492 E foll . furnishes no argument against this view.
Another argument for placing the Gorgias before
the Meno is the fact that the term dóga, later so
closely connected by Plato with the province of
rhetoric, is in the Gorgias conspicuous by its absence
(see Exc. VII pp. 299, 300).
Further, the summary treatment of Gorgias'
position and of the relations of rhetoric to sophistry
in the Meno implies the thorough discussion of these
points in the Gorgias. See on 95 C 23.
It is also just possible that in Meno 71 C the
reference to Socrates' meeting with Gorgias may be a
covert allusion to the earlier dialogue (cp. Exc. V p . 282).
§ 17. The Phaedrus I believe to have been written
by Plato soon after his return from his first Sicilian
journey, and to have been his first publication as
Head of the Academy.' I lay some stress in regard
1 This was the view taken by C. F. Hermann and others.
Grote I 178, 561 , etc. , Zeller p. 104 note.
xliv MENO

to this on the tradition that the Phaedrus was the

earliest of all Plato's compositions.¹ The tradition is
preserved by Diog. L. III 38 λόγος δὲ πρῶτον γράψαι
αὐτὸν τὸν Φαῖδρον, by Olympiodorus in his life of
Plato ch. 3 (Teubner text vi p. 192) őτɩ dè TOùs
διθυράμβους ὁ Πλάτων ἤσκητο δῆλον ἐκ τοῦ Φαίδρου,
τοῦ διαλόγου πάνυ πνέοντος τοῦ διθυραμβώδους χαρακ-
τῆρος, ἅτε τοῦ Πλάτωνος τοῦτον πρῶτον γράψαντος
διάλογον, ὡς λέγεται, and lastly in the Προλεγόμενα τῆς
IIλátwvos piλoσopías (Teubner text vi p. 217). The
reasons assigned for giving the first place to the
Phaedrus are different in each of these works and in
each case somewhat frivolous ; but perhaps the very
inadequacy of the grounds alleged points to some real
fact at the back of the tradition. If in the Academic
records account was only taken of the writings of the
Head in his official position, then the earlier writings
of Plato would be ignored, and the Phaedrus would
be set down as his first utterance.
In the Phaedrus the additional territory that Plato
has added to his domain of thought is wide and
diversified . I think most of these accessions may be
connected with the new facts of his life, namely (1)
his westward journey, (2) his professional position. The
results of the first have two aspects, which are how-
ever closely connected . Plato's new intercourse with
leading Pythagoreans I believe to have been in the
first place the main source from which he drew the
mass of mythical material with which is associated
his teaching on Transmigration and Immortality (Exc.
1 This view was taken by Schleiermacher : Grote i 172, etc. ,
Zeller pp. 129 foll.
 INTRODUCTION xlv

VII p. 296 ). Further, I believe that from the same

source fell the spark that kindled into life Plato's first
theory of Ideas. From an early time Plato felt that to
the Universal attached a Reality that did not belong
to the particulars . Perhaps the passage most clearly
showing this is Euthyphro 6 D ékeîvo avrò td eldos, &
πάντα τὰ ὅσια ὅσιά ἐστιν ; ἔφησθα γάρ που μιᾷ ἰδέᾳ τά
τε ἀνόσια ἀνόσια εἶναι καὶ τὰ ὅσια ὅσια ( cp. 5 D).
' Similar passages , in which the expressions which
were afterwards used in connexion with the theory
of ideas occur in speaking of the Socratic λóyoɩ, are far
from rare in the Socratic dialogue ' (J. Adam Euthy-
phro, Introd. p. xxviii : see also on 73 D 5, cp. Zeller
p. 120 note). But what sort of independent existence
of the Ideas was conceivable ? Surely the Other
World to which the Soul departed after its commerce
with earth was the natural home for those Existences
that were then the objects of its cognition. It is
true that in the Phaedrus we are not very explicitly
told what the Realities are on which the Soul gazes ;
only that it sees the very Justice, the very Temperance,
the very Knowledge, οὐχ ᾗ γένεσις πρόσεστιν , οὐδ᾽ ἡ
ἐστί που ἑτέρα ἐν ἑτέρῳ οὖσα ὧν ἡμεῖς νῦν ὄντων καλοῦ-
μεν, ἀλλὰ τὴν ἐν τῷ ὅ ἐστιν ὂν ὄντως ἐπιστήμην οὖσαν.
But that corresponding to every General Name there
is an independently-existing Idea Plato probably first
expressly said, or at least wrote, in Rep. x 596 A eldos
γάρ πού τι ἓν ἕκαστον εἰώθαμεν τίθεσθαι περὶ ἕκαστα
τὰ πολλὰ οἷς ταὐτὸν ὄνομα ἐπιφέρομεν ( see H. Jackson
in J.P. x 254 foll. ) . But it was in the Phaedrus that
the Universals were ' hypostatized ' and the Ideal
Theory developed . Possibly we have a hint of this in
xlvi MENO

the words (247 c) that no poet has yet hymned the

VжEроνρávιos тÓTOS. But the separate existence of
the Ideas could only be described by borrowing the
language of Sense (see on 72 C 2) ; indeed the mind
refused to grasp them except as a kind of sensible.¹
And thus the Ideas in receiving ' a local habitation
and a name ' received their death-blow ; the Ideal Man,
existing apart from particular men, was after all but One
More, so that a new Idea was needed embodying the
common qualities he had with the rest (Grote II 271 ).
The new aspects in the Phaedrus that may be
connected with Plato's new position consists in its
polemical character. In the earlier dialogues there is
very little polemic against living individuals. Plato
is still a free-lance among philosophers ; his sympathies
and antipathies to other teachers are determined
mainly by loyalty to Socrates, and are very little
personal. It is absurd to suppose that the Protagoras
and Gorgias are attacks on the distinguished men
whose names they bear. In the Gorgias there is, it is
true, earnest denunciation of popular Statecraft and
of oratory as her handmaiden.

1 The Platonic Ideas are nothing more ' (than ' first efforts ') ;
' but of all theories that have arisen in ingenious minds from
an imperfect conception of the processes of abstraction and
generalization, they are surely among the most plausible
as well as beautiful ' J. S. Mill Dissertations III 348. [The
sequel shows admirably how the Ideal theory was arrived at. ]
Cp. J. Adam in C.R. XII 222 : The doctrine of transcendent
self-existent Ideas is a creation of the poet Plato, and has a
permanent poetical if not philosophical value. It is the most
powerful stimulus to the artistic imagination which Philosophy
has ever supplied ' (see Exc. VI p. 296).
 INTRODUCTION xlvii

In the Phaedrus the point of view is greatly

changed. There is an attack upon Lysias- who is
δεινότατος τῶν νῦν γράφειν (228 A) and therefore
selected for the purpose-but the attack upon him is
not because he teaches rhetoric, but because he
teaches it in the wrong way. There are in the Phae-
drus references to the view of rhetoric taken in the
Gorgias, and something amounting to a recantation
of it (see 260 D foll. ἆρ᾽ οὖν, ὦ γαθέ, ἀγροικότερον τοῦ
δέοντος λελοιδορήκαμεν τὴν λόγων τέχνην ;). Rhetoric
is introduced speaking in her own defence ; without
me, she says, however much a man may know the
Truth, the Art of Persuasion will not be his. Yes,
she may be answered, but there is just the question ;
ὥσπερ γὰρ ἀκούειν δοκῶ τινῶν προσιόντων καὶ διαμαρτυ-
ρομένων λόγων ὅτι ψεύδεται καὶ οὐκ ἔστι τέχνη ἀλλ᾽
ἄτεχνος τριβή. Again 269 Β οὐ χρὴ χαλεπαίνειν εἴ
τινες μὴ ἐπιστάμενοι διαλέγεσθαι ἀδύνατοι ἐγένοντο
ὁρίσασθαι τί ποτ᾽ ἐστι ῥητορική κτέ “ This reads like
a good-humoured apology for past severities ' observes
Dr. Thompson, Introd. p. iv. The ' faulty classifica-
tion ' is the analogy drawn in the Gorgias between
Rhetoric and Confectionery. Presently this is repudi-
ated, and for it is substituted an analogy between
Rhetoric and Medicine (270 B). Pericles, who in the
Gorgias is involved with other statesmen in a
common censure, is here praised because his oratory
was founded on a basis of scientific knowledge. A
large part of the Phaedrus (from 259 onwards) is an
attempt to construct a true or philosophic Rhetoric.
This is to be founded firstly on Dialectic, that is, on
proper methods of Collection and Division (265 D foll. ,
xlviii MENO

cp. 273 D foll. ) ; secondly on Psychology, just as

Medicine depends on a proper knowledge of the body.
(For Plato's new conception of a Rhetoric see Dr.
Thompson's Introd . pp. xvi–xviii). When Plato
wrote the Phaedrus he held that there was room
for an Art of Expression, and possibly even intended
to fit it into the curriculum of his Academy.
All this tends to show that the Phaedrus is later
than the Gorgias ; at the same time the westward
journey furnishes the sort of interval necessary to
explain the transit from the old point of view to the
new. A further question may be put : was not the
new view the direct outcome of a visit to the birth-
land of Greek Rhetoric, the home of Corax and Tisias ?
To this I can only say that I know of no one living
in Sicily at the time, who is likely to have impressed
Plato in this direction ; and I think his new position
in Athens may have been alone the determining cause ;
but other speculations are not excluded .
It is in the Phaedrus that we find the first reference
to Plato's rival at Athens, Isocrates (278 E foll.) .
The reference is friendly, and perhaps shows that
Plato then really hoped to find in the ' philosophic '
rhetoric Isocrates professed to furnish, an article
superior to that supplied elsewhere.¹ If this be so,
the spirit of professional rivalry embittered in the
1 An approximation to Isocrates in the Phaedrus is notice-
able in the tendency towards the Isocratean principle of
avoiding hiatus. This appears especially in the dialogue
portions the proportion being less than half what is found in
the Symposium and the Republic (Blass Att. Bered. II 426).
For the early friendship of Plato and Isocrates see Diog. L.
III 8.
 INTRODUCTION xlix

following years the good relations with which they

started. In the Euthydemus there is a distinct note
of antagonism (Dr. Thompson's Phaedrus pp. 179 foll. )
and a still stronger one in the Republic, if we are to
recognize in the picture (495 E) of the bald-headed
tinker, who, having made some money, goes to the
bath and washes himself, puts on a wedding garment,
and proposes to marry his master's daughter, now
that she is poor and desolate,' Isocrates with his
patronage of poor forlorn Philosophy (Teichmüller
Literarische Fehden pp. 103-105, 1881 , cp. H. Jackson
Proc. of the Cambridge Philol. Society 1882, pp. 13
and 41 ). Plato is rarely so acrimonious as this.¹
The date here assumed for the composition of the
Phaedrus-say 386 B.C.-is merely part of a hypothesis
which must stand or fall according as it is found to
fit or not to fit the view of Plato's career which
increased enlightenment shall show to be a reason-
able one . Dr. Thompson (Introd . pp. xix , xx) argues
against the view of C. F. Hermann that I have here
adopted, and would place it later. So would Mr. J. B.
Bury (J.P. xv 83 foll. ) . On the other hand Zeller
p. 134 (see the other passages there referred to, and
the note on p. 399) argues for a comparatively early
1 See Jebb Attic Orators Introd. p. cxx ' Nothing more
distinguishes Plato from later satirists of like keenness
than his manner of hinting the redeeming points of the person
under dissection ; and whenever Gorgias comes in- whether
in the dialogue that bears his name or elsewhere— it may be
discerned (I venture to think) that Plato's purpose was to
bring out an aspect of the man-that aspect which he con-
sidered most important-but that he allowed, and was writing
for those who knew, that there was another side to the picture.'
1 ΜΕΝΟ

date of the Phaedrus. It must be allowed that on

the view here taken the amount of new material in
the Phaedrus is very large, and these advances
cannot all be connected with the external circum-
stances above considered. I will mention three :
the tripartite division of the Soul ; the method of
συναγωγή and διαίρεσις, and the recognition of two
distinct grades below the φιλόσοφος corresponding
respectively with the φιλότιμος and the φιλοχρήματος
(see Exc. VI p. 295. In the Phaedo the φιλοσώματος
is recognized as another stage below these three.
§ 18. The next dialogue to be considered is the
Euthydemus. Both it and the Meno I regard as pre-
ceding the Republic ; but which of the two is prior is
extremely hard to say. On the whole I think it
probable that the Meno is later. The topic of the ascend-
ency of φρόνησις is treated elaborately in the Euthy-
demus, more succinctly in the Meno. See on 88 A 7.
On the other hand, the great question of the Meno
receives summary treatment in the Euthydemus
(282 ) εἰ ἔστι γε, ὦ Κλεινία, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, ἡ σοφία
διδακτόν, ἀλλὰ μὴ ἀπὸ ταὐτομάτου παραγίγνεται τοῖς
ἀνθρώποις · τοῦτο γὰρ ἡμῖν ἔτι ἄσκεπτον καὶ οὔπω
διωμολογημένον ἐμοί τε καὶ σοί. Αλλ' ἔμοιγε, ἔφη, ὦ
Σώκρατες, διδακτὸν εἶναι δοκεῖ. καὶ ἐγὼ ἡσθεὶς εἶπον ·
Η καλώς λέγεις, ὦ ἄριστε ἀνδρῶν, καὶ εὖ ἐποίησας
ἀπαλλάξας με σκέψεως πολλῆς περὶ τούτου αὐτοῦ,
πότερον διδακτὸν ἢ οὐ διδακτὸν ἡ σοφία. (The shifting
of the subject of the question from ἀρετή to σοφία is
not important. ) It seems to me that we have here not
so much a reference back to a previous discussion, as
a shelving of the question at present for convenience.
 INTRODUCTION li

Plato had moreover already treated the question ' Is

Virtue teachable ? ' in the Protagoras. (For views as
to the date of the Euthydemus see Grote I1 561 note ;
II 243 note, where Grote agrees with Ueberweg that
the Euthydemus is later than the Phaedrus : Zeller p.
84 note, p. 119, and p. 126 note 80, where it is argued
that the Ideal theory is implied in the Euthydemus.)
§ 19. If the views just put forward be accepted, the
Meno may be regarded as the immediate prelude to the
Republic. Some corroboration is to be found in the
close analogy between the end of the Meno and the
end of Book I of the Republic. In both Socrates is
dissatisfied ; he has been led off on side issues from
the pursuit of the main problem. ' I have not been
well entertained,' he tells Thrasymachus, but that
was my own fault and not yours : for as your
gourmands seize upon every new dish as it goes round,
and taste its contents before they have had a reason-
able enjoyment of its predecessor, so I seem to myself
to have left the question we were at first examining,
concerning the real nature of Justice, before we had
found out the answer to it · . so that at present the
result of our conversation is that I know nothing for
while I do not know what Justice is, I am little likely
to know whether it is in fact a virtue or not, or
whether its owner is happy or unhappy ' (Davies'
and Vaughan's translation).
The transference of the subject of investigation
from Virtue in the Meno to Justice in the Republic is
characteristic. In the Republic we have an important
development of the Socratic doctrine that Virtue is
One. The cardinal virtues are now regarded as
d
lii MENO

'broken lights ' of the One Virtue, and the grounds on

which their difference depends are examined. This
analysis finds no place in the Meno, nor in Book 1 of
the Republic (Zeller, pp. 451 foll. ).
The treatment of dóέa in the Republic carries on
that in the Meno : in Rep. 506 c we have what looks
like a verbal reference to Meno 97 A. Further, Meno
89 B contemplates an Ideal State, such as the Republic,
at 99 A we get a glimpse of the notion that the Man
is the microcosm of the State, and at 100 A we have
a foreshadowing of the simile of the Cave in Rep. vii.
§ 20. The next dialogues to be considered in
relation to the Meno are the Symposium and the
Phaedo. Both of these I regard as later than the
Republic, and a fortiori later than the Meno. In spite
of their great difference they have this in common,
that both present an idealized picture of Socrates more
full and vivid than any to be found elsewhere (cp.
Grote 11 227) ; also that Plato rises in them to what
is absolutely his highest point of poetical beauty, both
in imagination and in diction. One strong reason for
thinking them later than the Republic is that in
assigning the Phaedrus, Euthydemus and Meno (with
the Menexenus and Clitophon) to the years 386-383
B.C. - during all which time Plato must have been
working at his chef d'oeuvre-we are sufficiently filling
up his time. In the case of the Symposium there
is nothing that may not have been subsequent to the
Republic, whereas in the Phaedo there are things we
may almost say must have been so (cp. p. xxxix
and presently p. liv).
The main point of contact between the Meno and
 INTRODUCTION liii

the Symposium is in the development of the doctrine

of Sóέa contained in the latter. It is possible that at
202 A (quoted on 97 B 17) we have a reference not
merely to the doctrine of the Meno but the actual
treatise.1 Whereas in the Phaedrus Eros is a god,
the son of Aphrodite, in the Symposium he is relegated
to the sphere of intermediary powers, and is not a god
but a Saíuwv. Thus he is brought nearer to men
(Grote II 216 ).
The Phaedo is connected with the Meno by the
doctrine of áváμvnois. The Meno is unmistakeably
referred to, and its doctrine receives a further develop-
ment (see on 81 D 12 and § 9 above).
§21 . A question may be raised as to the development
of the doctrine of Immortality in Plato. In five of the
dialogues that have now been considered this doctrine
appears. These dialogues come, on the hypothesis
adopted, in the order, Phaedrus, Meno, Republic,
Symposium, Phaedo. Is this order consistent with a
probable view of the development of Plato's views on
this subject ? The main difficulty is the position of
the Symposium. Whereas in the Phaedrus, the Meno,
and the Republic we have proofs offered of the im-
mortality of the soul (though that in the Meno is a
partial and abbreviated one, in which the argument
and myth of the Phaedrus is probably presumed), in
1 Grote (II 232, note) points out that the Symposium must
have been written between 385 B.C. -the date of the dioikiσis of
Mantinea -and 370 B. C. when it was re - established. Zeller
p. 133 couples it with the Phaedo as belonging ' to a time when
the philosophy of Plato, and also his artistic power, had reached
full maturity.' ' Teichmüller has shown that the Phaedo is
later than the Symposium ' : see C.R. x 41 .
liv MENO

the Symposium only a ' metaphorical immortality ' is

asserted : ' the soul yearns for, but is forbidden to
reach, immortality : or at least can only reach im-
mortality in a metaphorical sense, by its prolific
operation- by generating in itself as long as it lasts,
and in other minds who will survive it, a self-renewing
series of noble thoughts and feelings-by leaving a
name and reputation to survive in the memory of
others ' (Grote II 223) .
In the Phaedo the question is faced with all the
solemnity and earnestness of which Plato is capable.
It is the sort of work that one might expect from a
man who had just gone through a serious illness or a
great trouble. I believe that Archer - Hind is quite
right in upholding (Phaedo Intr. p. 21 foll. ) that
Plato did in the Phaedo maintain ' the immortality of
particular souls as distinct from the eternity of the
universal soul .' Not but that it is possible to exag-
gerate the importance attached by Plato to individual
immortality (see on 86 A 8).
The explanation is probably this. Plato did offer
in the Phaedrus a very general proof of the immortality
of soul (245 c). Some few years later he offered in
the Republic another proof (Bk. x 608 D- 611 A). This
proof is different from that in the Phaedrus, to which,
so far as I can see, no allusion is made. In the Phaedo
again there is neither resumption of, nor reference to,
the arguments of the Phaedrus and the Republic. It
would seem that Plato after writing the Republic
became conscious that his arguments, so far at least
as personal immortality is concerned, were un-
satisfactory. It is strange, at any rate, that the only
 INTRODUCTION lv

reference in the Phaedo to any previous treatment of

the subject should be to the half-demonstration in the
Meno. After writing the Symposium, circumstances,
we know not what, brought Plato round to renew his
assault on the great problem. The result remains in
the Phaedo as his final achievement in this direction.
§ 22. I will not enter on the difficult question
of the date of the Theaetetus. On arriving at
this dialogue we leave the stage of the ' educational '
dialogues, and enter on the ' philosophic.'¹ The
Theaetetus must be later than the Meno, containing, as
it does, an important development of the doctrine of
Sóέa. At the same time it contains in matters of
detail some curious parallels to the Meno.
(1 ) The story of Theaetetus' attempts to define
Knowledge is very like that of Meno's attempts to
define Virtue (see on 71 E 1 ).
(2) There is a kinship between the mathematical
passage at Theaet. 147 D foll. and the problem the
solution of which Socrates elicits from the slave. In
the Theaetetus, it is upon surds and square numbers
that Theodorus has been lecturing, and he stops at the
number 16. Now it is sixteen feet that the figure in
the Meno 83 C contains.
(3) The contrast between Theaetetus and Meno is
pointed. Meno is fair in body, but not in mind ;
Theaetetus is just the reverse. Meno is exactly

1 Zeller, I think, is certainly wrong (pp. 125 sqq. ) in group-

ing the Theaetetus with the Gorgias, Meno and Euthydemus.
For the hypothesis that the Theaetetus as we have it is an
enlarged edition of an earlier work, see H. Jackson in J.P. XIII
244 note ; Archer-Hind Timaeus Intr. p. 21, note.
lvi ΜΕΝΟ

described in Theaet. 150 E foll. (cp. 177 B). Theaetetus

wonders but is not disconcerted .
(4) The simile of the vάρêη, applied by Meno to
Socrates, is paralleled by that of the μaía, applied by
Socrates to himself.
(5) The allusion to xp@μa and the theory of vision
in 153 D and 156 may be set beside Meno 76.
(6) The reference to pioтiký 154 D, 164, 165 , is
just in the spirit of the Meno.
(7) The departure of Socrates at the end of the
Theaetetus εἰς τὴν τοῦ βασιλέως στοὰν ἐπὶ τὴν Μελήτου
ypadny is balanced by Anytus' threat in the Meno.
§ 23. Thus the dialogues form a series, each linked
.
to others before and after. When we have a promise
of an intended work we may presume that the con-
tents of the intended work were to some extent in the
author's mind at the time of his making the promise,
though his views would shape and develop themselves
in the process of execution. So Plato had much of
the Republic in his head when he wrote the Meno.
We shall not be more than a year or so out if we
assign the Meno to 384 B.C. At that time Plato was
forty-three years of age and Socrates had been dead
1
for fifteen years. I proceed on the assumption that
1 Schleiermacher thought that the Meno was written thirteen
years after the death of Socrates. See his views , Grote II 16
note. While dissenting on some points I find it rather remark-
able that in so many I coincide with a writer who has pursued
his investigations on such very different principles. Rudolf
Hirzel ( Rhein. Mus. XLII 249) suggests that the Meno (especially
the Anytus episode) was called forth by the publication of the
κατηγορία Σωκράτους by the sophist Polycrates. This was a
feigned speech, put into the mouth of Anytus, which led to
 INTRODUCTION lvii

the works which, after Plato's second return to Athens,

preceded the Republic, he produced because he saw
some special reason for doing so. In the Phaedrus he
sets forth his new view of intellectual concepts, and
puts himself right as to the function of Rhetoric ; the
Euthydemus has for its chief object the depressing of
his professional rivals Antisthenes and Isocrates ; the
writing of the Meno may have been forced upon him
by impatient and impertinent people who pressed him
for an answer on the question of the day : ' Can you
teach Virtue ? What do you profess ? ' The Meno is
thus rather satirical than polemical. It is a continua-
tion of the discussion with Protagoras, though it is
not with Protagoras that the discussion is continued.
For the rôle of respondent in the new discussion Plato
found no one so suitable as the spoiled and arrogant
young Thessalian, who, it was recorded, had once met
Socrates. That Meno is a pupil of Gorgias is a mere
accident. The Meno is in no sense an attack on
Gorgias. ' Let us leave him out of the question,' says
Socrates (71 D), ' as after all he is not here ' : and the
explanation of Gorgias ' position, that he teaches not
Virtue, but the Art of Speaking, is received without a
word of comment.
§ 24. It has come to be recognized of late years
that an important aid to the determination of the
order of Plato's works may be afforded by investigation

the later belief that it was the speech Anytus used at the trial
(cp. Isocr. Bus. § 5 ; Diog. L. II 38 ; Them. Or. 23, p. 296 c ;
Quint. II 174). Hirzel's case as to the Meno is weak, and I
cannot believe that the purpose of that dialogue is a defence
of Socrates.
lviii MENO

of points of style -points mostly so minute as to

represent half-unconscious habits of the author's mind,
and therefore likely to furnish a trustworthy clue to
what we may call its stratification .' Opinions differ
a good deal as to the degree of importance to be
attached to this evidence. Still it is true to say that
in 'Stylometry ' has been found an occasionally useful
adjunct to the old method of ' Hylometry ' (if we
may so call it).
It is as confirmatory evidence with regard to the
main groups of Plato's writings that Stylometry is of
most service. On the evidence of style alone it might
be asserted that the Meno belongs to a different period
from the Philebus. But it affords but little help as to
the order of dialogues within one group ; it does not
help us to discover whether the Meno or the Euthy-
demus is prior.
All discussions of the order of Plato's writings
based upon style (and to a less extent those based on
other considerations) depend on the assumption that
Plato after once issuing a work left it unaltered.
May we assume this ? A certain passage in Dionysius
of Halicarnassus would make the assumption appear
entirely unwarranted. Plato continued up to his
eightieth year, he tells us, τοὺς ἑαυτοῦ διαλόγους
κτενίζων καὶ βοστρυχίζων καὶ πάντα τρόπον ἀναπλέκων
(de compos. verborum ch. xxv p. 208 ; see Jebb Att.
Or. Intr. p. lxxiv, R. & P. 243). Then follows the
story about the tablet which, they say, was found
after his death, with the first words of the Republic-
κατέβην χθὲς εἰς Πειραιά μετὰ Γλαύκωνος τοῦ ᾿Αρί-
σTOVOS-arranged in several different orders.
 INTRODUCTION lix

We may well accept the view, which Dionysius is

here supporting, of Plato's industry and fastidiousness
in his literary work, and yet believe that Plato for the
most part after publishing a dialogue regarded that
edition as final. There was certainly no such general
revision of his works as would have reduced them all to
the level of one style, that of his later years. Con-
spicuous differences of style among the dialogues are
obvious. With regard to subject matter the same is
clear : there are abundant instances of inconsistency,
development and self- criticism. I think, too, that
Plato's mind was too active to allow him to spend any
large amount of time in ' touching-up and titivating '
published works, to say nothing of the inconvenience
of having different editions in circulation at the same
time.
The truth about the story appears to be this. Plato
lived during a period when Attic prose was undergoing
a great revolution. Beginning with a natural order,
in which words were set down in the arrangement
their mere sense would dictate, with little or no
attention to euphonious combination, Attic writers
ended with a style in which the arrangement of words
was almost as severely conditioned as in verse ; and
this in regard to two things mainly, the collision of
vowel sounds and rhythm. Plato was not a leader in
this movement ; it proceeded from the orators. But
Plato had an exquisite ear for prose rhythm, and he
could not be deaf to the effects the innovators
produced. Moreover he was an experimenter in style.
In the Phaedrus the influence of Isocrates is traceable ;
the Menexenus is an attempt to rival Lysias ; in the
lx MENO

Symposium there is a succession of parodies of leading

stylists. As time went on he elaborated more and
more the order of words, and in particular became
more and more sparing of hiatus.
We notice in Plato a growing tendency to fall in
with the new taste in prose ; but this tendency is
broken by occasional experiments. This is a disturb-
ing element that must always be taken into account
when applying the stylometric method to Plato. Many
writers indeed are liable to get a particular phrase or
trick of style running in their head, an affection that
disappears as unaccountably as it came. Such a
trick we have in the use of εἰ ὅτι μάλιστα eight times
in the Charmides (see on 80 D 4) .
§ 25. The verdict of Stylometry as regards the Meno
fortunately agrees pretty well with that which would
be given on other grounds. It is marked as not
belonging to the later dialogues by the comparative
indifference to hiatus (see on 77 A 5, 98 C 13 ) and
the general simplicity of the order of words (see on
89 E 26).
Prof. Lewis Campbell in C.R. III 28 gives a review
of an important essay in the new method of ‘ quan-
titative criticism ' ; namely Constantin Ritter's Die
Echtheit und Chronologie der platonischen Schriften
(Stuttgardt 1888). Prof. Campbell had himself done.
most important work in this direction in his General
Introduction to the Sophistes and Politicus (1867).
Among foreign scholars W. Dittenberger led the way
in 1881 by publishing in Hermes XVI pp. 321–345 his
Sprachliche Kriterien für die Chronologie der plato-
nischen Dialoge. Having learned that the particle
 INTRODUCTION lxi

μýv, for example, was rarely or never used by the

earlier Attic prose-writers, he read through Plato with
this in view, and found that the familiar formula tí
unv; was entirely absent from about two-thirds of the
whole number of the generally acknowledged dialogues,
and that in about half ye uv was nowhere to be
found, while on the other hand in the remaining
works more than a hundred instances of Tí µýv ; and
about sixty of ye µýv appeared .' (Neither Tí μýv ; nor
γε μήν are found in the Meno, but ἀλλὰ μήν and καὶ μήν
both occur. ) The line of investigation thus marked
out by Dittenberger has since been pursued by many
scholars, of whom M. Schanz is much the most
significant name. His paper in Hermes XXI pp. 439–
459' (zur Entwickelung des platonischen Stils, 1886)
'has given fresh importance to this whole inquiry.
The number of test-formulae has rapidly grown, and
the many paths of observation successively opened
show a remarkable amount of convergence.'
Among small immaterial points in which it is
thought that the workings of half-conscious habit may
be traced, a very large number of facts are furnished
by the formulae of answer. Ritter after investigating
these says that in the Meno out of 182 instances of
answer-formulae, 42, or 23 per cent, take the form
ἔγωγε, ἔμοιγε οι δοκεί μοι. This form is characteristic
of the ' first group ' (including Phaedo and Symposium) ;
is less common in the ' second group ' (Rep., Phaedr.,
Theaet., and perhaps Parm . ), and is rare in the last
group (Soph., Polit., Phil., Tim., Crit. , Laws). I
quote some results at which he arrives in regard to
the Meno and six other dialogues.
lxii MENO

Philebus
Euthyd

Meno

Laws
Prot

Gorg
.

. p
Re
.

20

64
δῆλον ὅτι . 15 12 47 16

er
∞
δῆλον ὡς . 15 11 2 14

σχεδόν τι (or 3 2 2 1 12 0 2
separated)
σχεδόν 0 0 3 0 7 14 122

37
70

11

50

45
ὡς ἔλεγον impf. 4 7 19 43
ὡς εἶπον aor. 0 24

12
πότερον before 18 13 13 4 27 21 36
vowels

13
πότερον before 8 15 16 8 17 0
conson.
2

πότερα before 0 0 6 7
conson.
πότερα οι πότερ' 1 0 0 0 1 1 (50D) 1
before vowels
33-0

639
89

ὥσπερ 68 30 69 21 212 24
καθάπερ 0 1 1 0 6 27 148

μῶν 2 3 0 3 3 10 29
(rare in
early
dialogues)
δέ γε 3 6 25 12 67 27 31

forms ofanswer 50 107 336 182 1260 314 568

ἔγωγε, ἔμοιγε,
117

69
225
9 6

31

δοκεῖ μοι, etc. 19 49 42 69 3

=% 17 15 23 51 1
40

74
30

60

22
60

ἀληθῆ λέγεις 5 9
ἀληθῆ 29

ἀληθῆ, ἀλ. λέγεις,

10

ὀρθῶς λ. 5 5 48 6 22
ἀληθέστατα, etc.,
22

superl. 0 0 0 40 22 36
 Philebus
INTRODUCTION lxiii

Euthyd

Laws
Meno
Prot

Gorg

Rep
.
.

.
Repetition of
words from

3202
5000
2015

8158

6927
questions 22 28 16 218 35

021
with yàp ovv 0 12 10

སྨཌ
39 γάρ .

༄
」
ཱ
99 δῆτα 988
23

75
πάνυ γε 3 20 48 27 9
∞

πάνυ μὲν οὖν 7 21 49

These figures show in a general way a kinship

between the Meno and the group Protagoras, Euthyd .,
Gorgias and Republic ; from which the Philebus is
removed and the Laws yet more removed. Some of the
other results at which he arrives, however, diverge
considerably from the views adopted in the present
work.
Ritter argues that for determining the order of
the dialogues language is the only test : doctrinal
content, allusions from one work to another, historical
references, are all illusory or insufficient.
The stylometric method has been disparaged by
Ferdinand Horn (Platonstudien, Vienna, 1893) ¹ ; also
by Zeller in the 4th (German) edition of his History
of Ancient Philosophy and in two papers.
But the writer who has been most prominent in
recent years in regard to this kind of research is
W. Lutoslavski. A paper of his was read before the
1 In an Appendix (pp. 343-358) he gives an analysis and
criticism of the Meno, which he believes to have been written
later than the Protagoras, but earlier than the Gorgias.
lxiv MENO

Oxford Philological Society on 21st May, 1897, of

which a review is given in C.R. XI 284 : ' Great
numbers of stylistical peculiarities are required for
correct inferences. C. Ritter investigated only forty
peculiarities of style, and many other inquirers have
drawn inferences from a single occurrence of a single
peculiarity. The chronological conclusions drawn by
Lutoslavski are based on the comparison of five
hundred peculiarities representing fifty-eight thousand
observations made by various investigators.' His
method has been, assuming that the latest work of all
is the Laws, to group in order of their approximation
to this the other ' late ' dialogues, Soph., Polit., Phil.,
and Timaeus. Then these dialogues, with the Laws,
are taken as the standard of comparison for the
remaining works.
So far as the earlier dialogues are concerned, his
conclusions are as follows :-
( 1) Gorgias is later than Meno, Euthydemus,
Protagoras, and all Socratic dialogues.
(2) Cratylus, Symposium, Phaedo form a group
later than the Gorgias, and were written probably in
the order here mentioned .
(3) Republic Bks . II-X were written in a few years,
and are later than the Phaedo. The composition of
this work was not interrupted by other labours ; only
Bk. I is very much earlier, probably written between
Gorgias and Cratylus.
(4) Phaedrus was written about 379 B.C. and after
the Republic.
In 1897 Lutoslavski's main work The Origin and
Growth of Plato's Logic was published in English.
 INTRODUCTION lxv

A careful and elaborate review of it, by J. Adam,

appears in C.R. xII 218 foll. The work falls into two
parts ; the first ' stylometric ' (of which a part of the
results have just been given), the second dealing
with the contents and teaching of the dialogues. The
reviewer has some excellent observations on the
limitations of the method of Stylometry. Lutoslavski
says the method of his book is a result of the
author's previous study of natural sciences and
mathematics.' He has applied the methods there
appropriate too rigidly to the workings of a human
mind.

Editions ofthe Meno

Platonis dialogi IV Meno, Crito, Alcibiades uterque cum
adnotatione critica et exegetica. Curavit Ph. Buttmannus (Ed .
Iv 1822, Ed. v 1830). This work was based on the work of
F. E. Biester, who published an edition of these four dialogues
in the year 1780, in accordance with a decree of Frederick the
Great, issued in the previous year, to promote the better editing
of Latin and Greek works for the use of schools, and the
publishing of German translations of the same.
Vier platonische Gespräche, Menon, Kriton, der erste und
zweite Alkibiades, Deutsch mit Anmerkungen etc. , by F. Ullrich
(Ed. I 1821 ) . This was based on a translation by F. Gedike
issued in 1780 as part of the scheme referred to above.
Stallbaum published an edition of the Meno in 1827 , and
again in 1836 as part of his complete edition of Plato's works.
On this is based, but with great additions and improvements,
the work of R. Fritzsche (Leipzig 1885).
The Meno of Plato, with Introduction and Notes, by St.
George Stock, M. A. , Pembroke College, Oxford (Clarendon
Press 1891 ). [This I believe is the only edition with English
notes hitherto published . ]
lxvi ΜΕΝΟ

Explanation of some References

'Grote ' Plato and the other companions of Socrates, by
George Grote, F.R.S. (Ed. II 1867). (When Grote's History
of Greece is indicated it is referred to specifically. Unfor-
tunately the paging differs so much in the different editions
that it has only been possible to refer to the chapters. )
' Zeller ' = Plato and the Older Academy, translated with
the Author's sanction from the German of Dr. Eduard Zeller
by Sarah Frances Alleyne and Alfred Goodwin, M.A. (new
ed. 1888). (When translations of other parts of Zeller's work
are referred to, they are specially indicated. In the case of the
vol. on Socrates, reference is made to the 3rd ed. 1885. )
' Kühner ' = Ausführliche Grammatik der griechischen Sprache
von Dr. Raphael Kühner. Reference has unavoidably been
made to the second edition ( 1870) by sections (§ ) and paragraphs.
The numbering of the sections corresponds generally with that
of the new (revised ) edition.
' Jelf' Jelf's Greek Grammar (3rd ed. 1861 ).
' Riddell ' = Digest of Idioms, forming Appendix B to the
edition of the Apology of Plato with Introduction and Notes,
by the Rev. James Riddell, M.A. (Clarendon Press 1867).
' Goodwin M. T.' (or ' Goodwin ' ) = Syntax of the Moods and
Tenses of the Greek Verb, by Dr. W. W. Goodwin (enlarged
edition 1897 ).
' F.E.T. ' A Syntax ofAttic Greek, by F. E. Thompson , M.A.
1883.
' C.R.' Classical Review.
'J.P.' = Journal of Philology.
' R. & P. ' Ritter and Preller Historia philosophiae, etc.
ed . 7, 1888.
'Ueb. -Heinze ' Ueberweg Grundriss der Gesch. d. Phil.
ed. 8, 1894, re-edited by Heinze.
' J.H.S.' Journal of the Hellenic Society.
' Fr.'= Fritzsche's edition (mentioned above).
' Sch. ' M. Schanz's edition of the text.
)(=distinguished from.
A mark is affixed to the name of any work that is
regarded as spurious.
The old Latin translation of Plato by Ficinus was published
in 1532 ( and the following years) and that by Cornarius at
Basel in 1561.
 ΜΕΝΩΝ

ἢ περὶ ἀρετῆς [πειραστικός]

ΤΑ ΤΟΥ ΔΙΑΛΟΓΟΥ ΠΡΟΣΩΠΑ

ΜΕΝΩΝ, ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ, ΠΑΙΣ ΜΕΝΩΝΟΣ, ΑΝΥΤΟΣ

I. Ἔχεις μοι εἰπεῖν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἆρα διδα- St. II.

κτὸν ἡ ἀρετή ; ἢ οὐ διδακτὸν ἀλλ᾽ ἀσκητόν ; ἢ Ρ. 70
οὔτε ἀσκητὸν οὔτε μαθητόν, ἀλλὰ φύσει παρα-
γίγνεται τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἢ ἄλλῳ τινὶ τρόπῳ ;
5 ΣΩ . Ὦ Μένων, πρὸ τοῦ μὲν Θετταλοὶ εὐ-
δόκιμοι ἦσαν ἐν τοῖς Ἕλλησιν καὶ ἐθαυμάζοντο
ἐφ᾽ ἱππικῇ τε καὶ πλούτῳ, νῦν δέ, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, Β
καὶ ἐπὶ σοφίᾳ, καὶ οὐχ ἥκιστα οἱ τοῦ σοῦ ἑταίρου
Αριστίππου πολῖται [ Λαρισαίου]. τούτου δὲ
ὑμῖν αἴτιός ἐστι Γοργίας · ἀφικόμενος γὰρ εἰς τὴν
πόλιν ἐραστὰς ἐπὶ σοφίᾳ εἴληφεν ᾿Αλευαδῶν τε
τοὺς πρώτους, ὧν ὁ σὸς ἐραστής ἐστιν ᾿Αρί-
στιππος, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων Θετταλῶν · καὶ δὴ καὶ
τοῦτο τὸ ἔθος ὑμᾶς εἴθικεν, ἀφόβως τε καὶ μεγα-
15 λοπρεπῶς ἀποκρίνεσθαι, ἐάν τίς τι ἔρηται, ὥσπερ
εἰκὸς τοὺς εἰδότας, ἅτε καὶ αὐτὸς παρέχων αὑτὸν C
ἐρωτῶν τῶν Ἑλλήνων τῷ βουλομένῳ ὅ τι ἄν τις
B
 2 ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ 170 €

βούληται, καὶ οὐδενὶ ὅτῳ οὐκ ἀποκρινόμενος.

ἐνθάδε δέ, ὦ φίλε Μένων, τὸ ἐναντίον περι-
71 έστηκεν · ὥσπερ αὐχμός τις τῆς σοφίας γέγονεν, 20
καὶ κινδυνεύει ἐκ τῶνδε τῶν τόπων παρ᾽ ὑμᾶς
οἴχεσθαι ἡ σοφία. εἰ γοῦν τινα ἐθέλεις οὕτως
ἐρέσθαι τῶν ἐνθάδε, οὐδεὶς ὅστις οὐ γελάσεται
καὶ ἐρεῖ · ὦ ξένε, κινδυνεύω σοι δοκεῖν μακάριός
τις εἶναι [ἀρετὴν γοῦν εἴτε διδακτὸν εἴθ᾽ ὅτῳ 25
τρόπῳ παραγίγνεται εἰδέναι] · ἐγὼ δὲ τοσούτου
δέω εἴτε διδακτὸν εἴτε μὴ διδακτὸν εἰδέναι, ὡς
οὐδὲ αὐτό, ὅ τι ποτ᾽ ἐστὶ τὸ παράπαν ἀρετή,
τυγχάνω εἰδώς.
Β II. Ἐγὼ οὖν καὶ αὐτός, ὦ Μένων, οὕτως ἔχω·
συμπένομαι τοῖς πολίταις τούτου τοῦ πράγματος,
καὶ ἐμαυτὸν καταμέμφομαι ὡς οὐκ εἰδὼς περὶ
ἀρετῆς τὸ παράπαν · ὃ δὲ μὴ οἶδα τί ἐστιν, πῶς
ἂν ὁποῖον γέ τί < ἐστιν > εἰδείην ; ἢ δοκεῖ σοι 5
οἷόν τε εἶναι, ὅστις Μένωνα μὴ γιγνώσκει τὸ
παράπαν ὅστις ἐστίν, τοῦτον εἰδέναι εἴτε καλὸς
εἴτε πλούσιος εἴτε καὶ γενναῖος ἐστιν, εἴτε καὶ
τἀναντία τούτων ; δοκεῖ σοι οἷόν τ' είναι ;
C ΜΕΝ. Οὐκ ἔμοιγε. ἀλλὰ σύ, ὦ Σώκρατες, 10
ἀληθῶς οὐδ᾽ ὅ τι ἀρετή ἐστιν οἶσθα, ἀλλὰ ταῦτα
περὶ σοῦ καὶ οἴκαδε ἀπαγγέλλωμεν ;
ΣΩ. Μὴ μόνον γε, ὦ ἑταῖρε, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅτι
οὐδ᾽ ἄλλῳ πω ἐνέτυχον εἰδότι, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκῶ.
ΜΕΝ. Τί δέ ; Γοργία οὐκ ἐνέτυχες ὅτε 15
ἐνθάδε ἦν ;
ΣΩ. Ἔγωγε.
ΜΕΝ. Εἶτα οὐκ ἐδόκει σοι εἰδέναι ;
 III 72 A ΜΕΝΩΝ 3

ΣΩ. Οὐ πάνυ εἰμὶ μνήμων, ὦ Μένων, ὥστε

20 οὐκ ἔχω εἰπεῖν ἐν τῷ παρόντι , πῶς μοι τότε
ἔδοξεν. ἀλλ᾽ ἴσως ἐκεῖνός τε οἶδεν, καὶ σὺ & D
ἐκεῖνος ἔλεγεν · ἀνάμνησον οὖν με, πῶς ἔλεγεν .
εἰ δὲ βούλει, αὐτὸς εἰπέ · δοκεῖ γὰρ δή που σοὶ
ἅπερ ἐκείνῳ.
25 ΜΕΝ. Ἔμοιγε.
ΣΩ. Ἐκεῖνον μὲν τοίνυν ἐῶμεν, ἐπειδὴ καὶ
ἄπεστιν · σὺ δὲ αὐτός, ὦ πρὸς θεῶν, Μένων, τί
φῂς ἀρετὴν εἶναι ; εἶπον καὶ μὴ φθονήσῃς, ἵνα
εὐτυχέστατον ψεῦσμα ἐψευσμένος ὦ, ἂν φανῇς
30 σὺ μὲν εἰδὼς καὶ Γοργίας, ἐγὼ δὲ εἰρηκὼς μηδενὶ
πώποτε εἰδότι ἐντετυχηκέναι .
III. MEN. ᾿Αλλ᾽ οὐ χαλεπόν, ὦ Σώκρατες, Ε
εἰπεῖν . πρῶτον μέν, εἰ βούλει ἀνδρὸς ἀρετήν,
ῥᾴδιον, ὅτι αὕτη ἐστὶν ἀνδρὸς ἀρετή, ἱκανὸν εἶναι
τὰ τῆς πόλεως πράττειν, καὶ πράττοντα τοὺς
5 μὲν φίλους εὖ ποιεῖν, τοὺς δ᾽ ἐχθροὺς κακῶς, καὶ
αὐτὸν εὐλαβεῖσθαι μηδὲν τοιοῦτον παθεῖν . εἰ δὲ
βούλει γυναικὸς ἀρετήν, οὐ χαλεπὸν διελθεῖν,
ὅτι δεῖ αὐτὴν τὴν οἰκίαν εὖ οἰκεῖν, σῴζουσάν τε
τὰ ἔνδον καὶ κατήκοον οὖσαν τοῦ ἀνδρός. καὶ
ΙΟ ἄλλη
το ἐστὶν παιδὸς ἀρετή, καὶ θηλείας καὶ
ἄρρενος, καὶ πρεσβυτέρου ἀνδρός, εἰ μὲν βούλει,
ἐλευθέρου, εἰ δὲ βούλει, δούλου. καὶ ἄλλαι πάμ- 72
πολλαι ἀρεταί εἰσιν, ὥστε οὐκ ἀπορία εἰπεῖν
ἀρετῆς πέρι ὅ τι ἔστιν · καθ᾿ ἑκάστην γὰρ τῶν
15 πράξεων καὶ τῶν ἡλικιῶν πρὸς ἕκαστον ἔργον
ἑκάστῳ ἡμῶν ἡ ἀρετή ἐστιν · ὡσαύτως δέ, οἶμαι ,
ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ ἡ κακία.
 ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ III 72 A

ΣΩ. Πολλῇ γέ τινι εὐτυχίᾳ ἔοικα κεχρῆσθαι,

ὦ Μένων, εἰ μίαν ζητῶν ἀρετὴν σμηνός τι ἀνηύ-
ρηκα ἀρετῶν παρὰ σοὶ κειμένων . ἀτάρ, ὦ 20
Β Μένων, κατὰ ταύτην τὴν εἰκόνα τὴν περὶ τὰ
σμήνη , εἴ μου ἐρομένου μελίττης περὶ οὐσίας ὅ
τί ποτ᾽ ἔστιν, πολλὰς καὶ παντοδαπὰς ἔλεγες
αὐτὰς εἶναι, τί ἂν ἀπεκρίνω μοι, εἴ σε ἠρόμην ·
ἆρα τούτῳ φῂς πολλὰς καὶ παντοδαπὰς εἶναι καὶ 25
διαφερούσας ἀλλήλων, τῷ μελίττας εἶναι ; ἢ
τούτῳ μὲν οὐδὲν διαφέρουσιν, ἄλλῳ δέ τῳ, οἷον
ἢ κάλλει ἢ μεγέθει ἢ ἄλλῳ τῳ τῶν τοιούτων ;
εἰπέ, τί ἂν ἀπεκρίνω οὕτως ἐρωτηθείς ;
ΜΕΝ. Τοῦτ᾽ ἔγωγε, ὅτι οὐδὲν διαφέρουσιν , ᾗ 30
μέλιτται εἰσίν, ἡ ἑτέρα τῆς ἑτέρας.
C ΣΩ. Εἰ οὖν εἶπον μετὰ ταῦτα · τοῦτο τοίνυν
μοι αὐτὸ εἰπέ, ὦ Μένων, ᾧ οὐδὲν διαφέρουσιν
ἀλλὰ ταὐτόν εἰσιν ἅπασαι · τί τοῦτο φῂς εἶναι ;
εἶχες δήπου ἂν τί μοι εἰπεῖν ; 35
ΜΕΝ. Ἔγωγε .
IV. ΣΩ. Οὕτω δὴ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἀρετῶν · κἂν
εἰ πολλαὶ καὶ παντοδαπαί εἰσιν, ἕν γέ τι εἶδος
ταὐτὸν ἅπασαι ἔχουσιν, δι᾿ ὃ εἰσὶν ἀρεταί, εἰς ὃ
καλῶς που ἔχει ἀποβλέψαντα τὸν ἀποκρινάμενον
D τῷ ἐρωτήσαντι ἐκεῖνο δηλῶσαι , ὃ τυγχάνει οὖσα 5
ἀρετή · ἢ οὐ μανθάνεις ὅ τι λέγω ;
ΜΕΝ. Δοκώ γέ μοι μανθάνειν · οὐ μέντοι ὡς
βούλομαί γέ πω κατέχω τὸ ἐρωτώμενον.
ΣΩ. Πότερον δὲ περὶ ἀρετῆς μόνον σοι οὕτω
δοκεῖ, ὦ Μένων, ἄλλη μὲν ἀνδρὸς εἶναι, ἄλλη ΙΟ
δὲ γυναικὸς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων , ἢ καὶ περὶ ὑγιείας
 IV 73 B ΜΕΝΩΝ 5

καὶ περὶ μεγέθους καὶ περὶ ἰσχύος ὡσαύτως ;

ἄλλη μὲν ἀνδρὸς δοκεῖ σοι εἶναι ὑγίεια , ἄλλη δὲ
γυναικός ; ἢ ταὐτὸν πανταχοῦ εἶδός ἐστιν, ἐάν
15 περ ὑγίεια ᾖ, ἐάν τε ἐν ἀνδρὶ ἐάν τε ἐν ἄλλῳ Ε
ὁτῳοῦν ᾖ ;
ΜΕΝ. Ἡ αὐτή μοι δοκεῖ ὑγίειά γε εἶναι καὶ
ἀνδρὸς καὶ γυναικός.
ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ μέγεθος καὶ ἰσχύς ; ἐάν περ
20 ἰσχυρὰ γυνὴ ᾖ, τῷ αὐτῷ εἴδει καὶ τῇ αὐτῇ ἰσχύϊ
ἰσχυρὰ ἔσται ; τὸ γὰρ τῇ αὐτῇ τοῦτο λέγω ·
οὐδὲν διαφέρει πρὸς τὸ ἰσχὺς εἶναι ἡ ἰσχύς, ἐάν
τε ἐν ἀνδρὶ ᾖ ἐάν τε ἐν γυναικί · ἢ δοκεῖ τί σοι
διαφέρειν ;
25 ΜΕΝ. Οὐκ ἔμοιγε.
ΣΩ. Ἡ δὲ ἀρετὴ πρὸς τὸ ἀρετὴ εἶναι διοίσει 73
τι, ἐάν τε ἐν παιδὶ ᾖ ἐάν τε ἐν πρεσβύτῃ, ἐάν τε
ἐν γυναικὶ ἐάν τε ἐν ἀνδρί ;
ΜΕΝ. Ἔμοιγέ πως δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοῦτο
30 οὐκέτι ὁμοῖον εἶναι τοῖς ἄλλοις τούτοις.
ΣΩ. Τί δέ ; οὐκ ἀνδρὸς μὲν ἀρετὴν ἔλεγες
πόλιν εὖ διοικεῖν , γυναικὸς δὲ οἰκίαν ;
ΜΕΝ. Ἔγωγε.
ΣΩ. ᾿Αρ᾽ οὖν οἷόν τε εὖ διοικεῖν ἢ πόλιν ἢ
35 οἰκίαν ἢ ἄλλο ὁτιοῦν, μὴ σωφρόνως καὶ δικαίως
διοικοῦντα ;
ΜΕΝ. Οὐ δῆτα. B
ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἄν περ δικαίως καὶ σωφρόνως
διοικῶσιν, δικαιοσύνῃ καὶ σωφροσύνῃ διοική
40 σουσιν ;
ΜΕΝ . 'Ανάγκη .
 6 ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ IV 73 B

ΣΩ. Τῶν αὐτῶν ἄρα ἀμφότεροι δέονται , εἴπερ

μέλλουσιν ἀγαθοὶ εἶναι, καὶ ἡ γυνὴ καὶ ὁ ἀνήρ,
δικαιοσύνης καὶ σωφροσύνης .
ΜΕΝ . Φαίνονται. 45
ΣΩ. Τί δέ ; παῖς καὶ πρεσβύτης μῶν ἀκόλα-
στοι ὄντες καὶ ἄδικοι ἀγαθοὶ ἄν ποτε γένοιντο ;
ΜΕΝ. Οὐ δῆτα .
ΣΩ. ᾿Αλλὰ σώφρονες καὶ δίκαιοι ;
ΜΕΝ. Ναί. 50
C ΣΩ. Πάντες ἄρ᾽ ἄνθρωποι τῷ αὐτῷ τρόπῳ
ἀγαθοί εἰσιν · τῶν αὐτῶν γὰρ τυχόντες ἀγαθοὶ
γίγνονται .
ΜΕΝ. Εοικεν.
ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἂν δήπου, εἴ γε μὴ ἡ αὐτὴ ἀρετὴ 55
ἦν αὐτῶν, τῷ αὐτῷ ἂν τρόπῳ ἀγαθοὶ ἦσαν.
ΜΕΝ. Οὐ δῆτα.
V. ΣΩ. Ἐπειδὴ τοίνυν ἡ αὐτὴ ἀρετὴ πάντων
ἐστιν, πειρῶ εἰπεῖν καὶ ἀναμνησθῆναι, τί αὐτό
φησι Γοργίας εἶναι καὶ σὺ μετ᾿ ἐκείνου .
ΜΕΝ. Τί ἄλλο γ' ἢ ἄρχειν οἷόν τ᾽ εἶναι
D τῶν ἀνθρώπων ; εἴπερ ἕν γέ τι ζητεῖς κατὰ 5
πάντων.
ΣΩ. ᾿Αλλὰ μὴν ζητῶ γε. ἀλλ᾽ ἆρα καὶ
παιδὸς ἡ αὐτὴ ἀρετή, ὦ Μένων, καὶ δούλου,
ἄρχειν οἷόν τε εἶναι τοῦ δεσπότου, καὶ δοκεῖ
σοι ἔτι ἂν δοῦλος εἶναι ὁ ἄρχων ; ΙΟ
ΜΕΝ. Οὐ πάνυ μοι δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες.
ΣΩ. Οὐ γὰρ εἰκός, ὦ ἄριστε . ἔτι δὲ καὶ
τόδε σκόπει · ἄρχειν φῂς οἷόν τ᾽ εἶναι · οὐ προσ-
θήσομεν αὐτόσε τὸ δικαίως, ἀδίκως δὲ μή ;
 VI 74 B ΜΕΝΩΝ 7

15 ΜΕΝ. Οἶμαι ἔγωγε ἡ γὰρ δικαιοσύνη, ὦ

Σώκρατες, ἀρετή ἐστιν.
ΣΩ. Πότερον ἀρετή, ὦ Μένων, ἢ ἀρετή τις E
ΜΕΝ. Πῶς τοῦτο λέγεις ;
ΣΩ. Ως περὶ ἄλλου ὁτουοῦν . οἷον, εἰ βού
20 λει, στρογγυλότητος πέρι εἴποιμ᾽ ἂν ἔγωγε, ὅτι
σχῆμά τί ἐστιν, οὐχ οὕτως ἁπλῶς ὅτι σχῆμα .
διὰ ταῦτα δὲ οὕτως ἂν εἴποιμι, ὅτι καὶ ἄλλα
ἔστι σχήματα .
ΜΕΝ. Ὀρθῶς γε λέγων σύ, ἐπεὶ καὶ ἐγὼ
25 λέγω οὐ μόνον δικαιοσύνην ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλλας εἶναι
ἀρετάς.
ΣΩ. Τίνας ταύτας ; εἰπέ · οἷον καὶ ἐγὼ σοὶ 74
εἴποιμι ἂν καὶ ἄλλα σχήματα, εἴ με κελεύοις ·
καὶ σὺ οὖν ἐμοὶ εἰπὲ ἄλλας ἀρετάς .
30 ΜΕΝ. Ἡ ἀνδρεία τοίνυν ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ ἀρετὴ
εἶναι καὶ σωφροσύνη καὶ σοφία καὶ μεγαλοπρέ-
πεια καὶ ἄλλαι πάμπολλαι .
ΣΩ. Πάλιν, ὦ Μένων, ταὐτὸν πεπόνθαμεν ·
πολλὰς αὖ ηὑρήκαμεν ἀρετὰς μίαν ζητοῦντες,
35 ἄλλον τρόπον ἢ νυνδή · τὴν δὲ μίαν, ἢ διὰ πάντων
τούτων ἐστίν, οὐ δυνάμεθα ἀνευρεῖν.
VI. MEN . Οὐ γὰρ δύναμαί πω, ὦ Σώκρατες, Β
ὡς σὺ ζητεῖς, μίαν ἀρετὴν λαβεῖν κατὰ πάντων,
ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις.
ΣΩ. Εἰκότως γε · ἀλλ᾽ ἐγὼ προθυμήσομαι,
5 ἐὰν οἷός τ᾽ ὦ, ἡμᾶς προβιβάσαι . μανθάνεις γάρ
που ὅτι οὕτωσὶ ἔχει περὶ παντός · εἴ τίς σε
ἀνέροιτο τοῦτο, ὃ νυν δὴ ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, τί ἐστιν
σχῆμα, ὦ Μένων ; εἰ αὐτῷ εἶπες ὅτι στρογγυ
 8 ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ VI 74 B

λότης, εἴ σοι εἶπεν ἅπερ ἐγώ, πότερον σχῆμα

ἡ στρογγυλότης ἐστὶν ἢ σχῆμά τι ; είπες δήπου ΙΟ
το
ἂν ὅτι σχῆμά τι.
ΜΕΝ . Πάνυ γε.
C ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν διὰ ταῦτα , ὅτι καὶ ἄλλα ἔστιν

σχήματα ;
ΜΕΝ. Ναί. 15
ΣΩ. Καὶ εἴ γε προσανηρώτα σε ὁποῖα, ἔλεγες
ἄν ;
ΜΕΝ. Ἔγωγε.
ΣΩ. Καὶ αὖ εἰ περὶ χρώματος ὡσαύτως
ἀνήρετο ὅ τι ἔστιν, καὶ εἰπόντος σου, ὅτι τὸ 20
λευκόν, μετὰ ταῦτα ὑπέλαβεν ὁ ἐρωτῶν, πότερον
τὸ λευκὸν χρῶμά ἐστιν ἢ χρῶμά τι ; εἶπες ἂν
ὅτι χρῶμά τι, διότι καὶ ἄλλα τυγχάνει ὄντα ;
ΜΕΝ. Ἔγωγε.
D ΣΩ. Καὶ εἴ γέ σε ἐκέλευε λέγειν ἄλλα χρώ- 25
ματα, ἔλεγες ἂν ἄλλα, ἃ οὐδὲν ἧττον τυγχάνει
ὄντα χρώματα τοῦ λευκοῦ ;
ΜΕΝ. Ναί.
ΣΩ . Εἰ οὖν ὥσπερ ἐγὼ μετῄει τὸν λόγον, καὶ
ἔλεγεν ὅτι ἀεὶ εἰς πολλὰ ἀφικνούμεθα, ἀλλὰ μή 30
μοι οὕτως, ἀλλ᾽ ἐπειδὴ τὰ πολλὰ ταῦτα ἑνί τινι
προσαγορεύεις ὀνόματι, καὶ φῂς οὐδὲν αὐτῶν ὅ τι
οὐ σχῆμα εἶναι, καὶ ταῦτα καὶ ἐναντία ὄντα
ἀλλήλοις, τί ἔστιν τοῦτο , ὃ οὐδὲν ἧττον κατέχει
τὸ στρογγύλον ἢ τὸ εὐθύ, ὃ δὴ ὀνομάζεις σχῆμα 35
Ε καὶ οὐδὲν μᾶλλον φῂς τὸ στρογγύλον σχῆμα
εἶναι ἢ τὸ εὐθύ ; ἢ οὐχ οὕτω λέγεις ;
ΜΕΝ. Ἔγωγε.
 VII 75 B ΜΕΝΩΝ

ΣΩ. Αρ' οὖν, ὅταν οὕτω λέγῃς , τότε οὐδὲν

4ο μᾶλλον φῂς τὸ στρογγύλον εἶναι στρογγύλον ἢ
εὐθύ, οὐδὲ τὸ εὐθὺ εὐθὺ ἡ στρογγύλον ;
ΜΕΝ. Οὐ δήπου, ὦ Σώκρατες .
ΣΩ. ᾿Αλλὰ μὴν σχῆμά γε οὐδὲν μᾶλλον φῂς
εἶναι τὸ στρογγύλον τοῦ εὐθέος, οὐδὲ τὸ ἕτερον
45 τοῦ ἑτέρου.
ΜΕΝ. ᾿Αληθή λέγεις.
VII. ΣΩ. Τί ποτε οὖν τοῦτο , οὗ τοῦτο ὄνομά
ἐστιν τὸ σχῆμα ; πειρῶ λέγειν . εἰ οὖν τῷ
ἐρωτῶντι οὕτως ἢ περὶ σχήματος ἢ χρώματος το .
εἶπες ὅτι ἀλλ᾽ οὐδὲ μανθάνω ἔγωγε ὅ τι βούλει ,
5 ὦ ἄνθρωπε, οὐδὲ οἶδα ὅ τι λέγεις · ἴσως ἂν ἐθαύ
μασε καὶ εἶπεν · οὐ μανθάνεις , ὅτι ζητῶ τὸ ἐπὶ
πᾶσιν τούτοις ταὐτόν ; ἢ οὐδὲ ἐπὶ τούτοις, ὦ
Μένων, ἔχοις ἂν εἰπεῖν, εἴ τις ἐρωτῴη · τί ἐστιν
ἐπὶ τῷ στρογγύλῳ καὶ εὐθεῖ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις,
το ἃ δὴ σχήματα καλεῖς, ταὐτὸν ἐπὶ πᾶσιν ; πειρῶ
εἰπεῖν, ἵνα καὶ γένηταί σοι μελέτη πρὸς τὴν περὶ
τῆς ἀρετῆς ἀπόκρισιν.
ΜΕΝ. Μή, ἀλλὰ σύ, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰπέ. B
ΣΩ. Βούλει σοι χαρίσωμαι ;
15 ΜΕΝ. Πάνυ γε.
ΣΩ. Ἐθελήσεις οὖν καὶ σὺ ἐμοὶ εἰπεῖν περὶ
τῆς ἀρετῆς ;
ΜΕΝ. Ἔγωγε.
ΣΩ. Προθυμητέον τοίνυν · ἄξιον γάρ.
20 ΜΕΝ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
ΣΩ. Φέρε δή, πειρῶμαί σοι εἰπεῖν, τί ἐστιν
σχῆμα. σκόπει οὖν εἰ τόδε ἀποδέχει αὐτὸ εἶναι ·
 10 ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ VII 75 B

ἔστω γὰρ δὴ ἡμῖν τοῦτο σχῆμα , ὃ μόνον τῶν ὄντων

Ο τυγχάνει χρώματι ἀεὶ ἑπόμενον . ἱκανῶς σοι, ἢ
ἄλλως πως ζητεῖς ; ἐγὼ γὰρ κἂν οὕτως ἀγαπῴην 25
εἴ μοι ἀρετὴν εἴποις.
ΜΕΝ. ᾿Αλλὰ τοῦτό γε εὔηθες, ὦ Σώκρατες .
ΣΩ. Πῶς λέγεις ;
ΜΕΝ. Ὅτι σχῆμά πού ἐστιν κατὰ τὸν σὸν
λόγον, ὃ ἀεὶ χρόᾳ ἕπεται . εἶεν · εἰ δὲ δὴ τὴν χρόαν 30
τις μὴ φαίη εἰδέναι, ἀλλὰ ὡσαύτως ἀποροὶ ὥσπερ
περὶ τοῦ σχήματος, τί ἂν οἴει σοι ἀποκεκρίσθαι ;
VIII. ΣΩ. Τἀληθῆ ἔγωγε · καὶ εἰ μέν γε τῶν
σοφῶν τις εἴη καὶ ἐριστικῶν τε καὶ ἀγωνιστικῶν
ὁ ἐρόμενος , εἴποιμ᾽ ἂν αὐτῷ ὅτι ἐμοὶ μὲν εἴρηται ·
D εἰ δὲ μὴ ὀρθῶς λέγω, σὸν ἔργον λαμβάνειν λόγον
καὶ ἐλέγχειν . εἰ δὲ ὥσπερ ἐγώ τε καὶ σὺ νυνὶ 5
φίλοι ὄντες βούλοιντο ἀλλήλοις διαλέγεσθαι, δεῖ
δὴ πραότερόν πως καὶ διαλεκτικώτερον ἀποκρί-
νεσθαι. ἔστι δὲ ἴσως τὸ διαλεκτικώτερον μὴ
μόνον τἀληθῆ ἀποκρίνεσθαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ δι᾽ ἐκείνων
ὧν ἂν προομολογῇ εἰδέναι ὁ ἐρωτῶν. πειράσομαι 10
Ε δὴ καὶ ἐγώ σοι οὕτως εἰπεῖν . λέγε γάρ μοι ·
τελευτὴν καλεῖς τι ; τοιόνδε λέγω οἷον πέρας καὶ
ἔσχατον · πάντα ταῦτα ταὐτόν τι λέγω · ἴσως δ᾽
ἂν ἡμῖν Πρόδικος διαφέροιτο · ἀλλὰ σύ γέ που
καλεῖς πεπεράνθαι τι καὶ τετελευτηκέναι · τὸ 1515
τοιοῦτον βούλομαι λέγειν , οὐδὲν ποικίλον.
ΜΕΝ . ᾿Αλλὰ καλῶ, καὶ οἶμαι μανθάνειν ὃ
λέγεις,
76 ΣΩ. Τί δ' ; ἐπίπεδον καλεῖς τι , καὶ ἕτερον αὖ
στερεόν, οἷον ταῦτα τὰ ἐν ταῖς γεωμετρίαις ; 20
 IX 76 c ΜΕΝΩΝ 11

ΜΕΝ. Ἔγωγε καλῶ.

ΣΩ. Ἤδη τοίνυν ἂν μάθοις μου ἐκ τούτων,
σχῆμα ὃ λέγω. κατὰ γὰρ παντὸς σχήματος
τοῦτο λέγω, εἰς ὃ τὸ στερεὸν περαίνει , τοῦτ᾽ εἶναι
25 σχῆμα · ὅπερ ἂν συλλαβὼν εἴποιμι στερεοῦ
πέρας σχῆμα εἶναι .
ΙΧ. ΜΕΝ. Τὸ δὲ χρῶμα τί λέγεις, ὦ Σώ
κρατες ;
ΣΩ. Ὑβριστής γ᾽ εἶ, ὦ Μένων · ἀνδρὶ πρε-
σβύτῃ πράγματα προστάττεις ἀποκρίνεσθαι,
5 αὐτὸς δὲ οὐκ ἐθέλεις ἀναμνησθεὶς εἰπεῖν, ὅ τι Β
ποτε λέγει Γοργίας ἀρετὴν εἶναι.
ΜΕΝ. ᾿Αλλ' ἐπειδάν μοι σὺ τοῦτ᾽ εἴπῃς, ὦ
Σώκρατες , ἐρῶ σοι .
ΣΩ. Κἂν κατακεκαλυμμένος τις γνοίη, ὦ
10 Μένων , διαλεγομένου σου, ὅτι καλὸς εἶ καὶ
ἐρασταί σοι ἔτι εἰσίν .
ΜΕΝ. Τί δή ;
ΣΩ. Ὅτι οὐδὲν ἀλλ᾽ ἢ ἐπιτάττεις ἐν τοῖς
λόγοις· ὅπερ ποιοῦσιν οἱ τρυφῶντες , ἅτε τυραν
15 νεύοντες , ἕως ἂν ἐν ὥρα ὦσιν. καὶ ἅμα ἐμοῦ ε
ἴσως κατέγνωκας, ὅτι εἰμὶ ἥττων τῶν καλῶν.
χαριοῦμαι οὖν σοι καὶ ἀποκρινοῦμαι .
ΜΕΝ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν χάρισαι .
ΣΩ. Βούλει οὖν σοι κατὰ Γοργίαν ἀποκρίνω-
20 μαι, ᾗ ἂν σὺ μάλιστα ἀκολουθήσαις ;
ΜΕΝ. Βούλομαι · πῶς γὰρ οὔ ;
ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν λέγετε ἀπορροάς τινας τῶν ὄντων
κατὰ Ἐμπεδοκλέα ;
ΜΕΝ. Σφόδρα γε.
 12 ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ IX 76 c

ΣΩ. Καὶ πόρους, εἰς οὓς καὶ δι᾽ ὧν αἱ ἀπορ- 25

ροαὶ πορεύονται ;
ΜΕΝ. Πάνυ γε.
ΣΩ. Καὶ τῶν ἀπορροῶν τὰς μὲν ἁρμόττειν ἐνί-
D οις τῶν πόρων, τὰς δὲ ἐλάττους ἢ μείζους εἶναι ;
ΜΕΝ . Ἔστι ταῦτα. 30
ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ὄψιν καλεῖς τι ;
ΜΕΝ. Ἔγωγε.
ΣΩ. Ἐκ τούτων δὴ σύνες ὅ τοι λέγω, ἔφη
Πίνδαρος, ἔστιν γὰρ χρόα ἀπορροὴ σχημάτων
ὄψει σύμμετρος καὶ αἰσθητός. 35
ΜΕΝ. "Αριστά μοι δοκεῖς, ὦ Σώκρατες, ταύ-
την τὴν ἀπόκρισιν εἰρηκέναι .
ΣΩ. Ἴσως γάρ σοι κατὰ συνήθειαν εἴρηται ·
καὶ ἅμα, οἶμαι, ἐννοεῖς, ὅτι ἔχοις ἂν ἐξ αὐτῆς
Ε εἰπεῖν καὶ φωνήν, ὃ ἔστι, καὶ ὀσμὴν καὶ ἄλλα 40
πολλὰ τῶν τοιούτων.
ΜΕΝ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν .
ΣΩ. Τραγικὴ γάρ ἐστιν, ὦ Μένων, ἡ ἀπό-
κρισις, ὥστε ἀρέσκει σοι μᾶλλον ἢ ἡ περὶ τοῦ
σχήματος. 45
ΜΕΝ. Ἔμοιγε.
ΣΩ. Αλλ᾽ οὐκ ἔστιν, ὦ παῖ ᾿Αλεξιδήμου , ὡς
ἐγὼ ἐμαυτὸν πείθω, ἀλλ᾽ ἐκείνη, βελτίων · οἶμαι
δὲ οὐδ᾽ ἂν σοὶ δόξαι, εἰ μή, ὥσπερ χθὲς ἔλεγες,
ἀναγκαῖόν σοι ἀπιέναι πρὸ τῶν μυστηρίων, ἀλλ᾽ 50
εἰ περιμείναις τε καὶ μυηθείης.
77 ΜΕΝ. ᾿Αλλὰ περιμένοιμ' ἄν, ὦ Σώκρατες , εἴ
μοι πολλὰ τοιαῦτα λέγοις.
Χ. ΣΩ. ᾿Αλλὰ μὴν προθυμίας γε οὐδὲν ἀπο-
 X 77 c ΜΕΝΩΝ 13

λείψω, καὶ σοῦ ἕνεκα καὶ ἐμαυτοῦ, λέγων τοιαῦτα ·

ἀλλ᾽ ὅπως μὴ οὐχ οἷός τ᾽ ἔσομαι πολλὰ τοιαῦτα
λέγειν. ἀλλ᾽ ἴθι δὴ πειρῶ καὶ σὺ ἐμοὶ τὴν
5 ὑπόσχεσιν ἀποδοῦναι, κατὰ ὅλου εἰπὼν ἀρετῆς
πέρι , ὅ τι ἔστιν, καὶ παῦσαι πολλὰ ποιῶν ἐκ
τοῦ ἑνός, ὅπερ φασὶ τοὺς συντρίβοντας τι ἑκά-
στοτε οἱ σκώπτοντες, ἀλλὰ ἐάσας ὅλην καὶ ὑγιῆ
εἰπὲ τί ἐστιν ἀρετή, τὰ δέ γε παραδείγματα Β
το παρ᾿ ἐμοῦ εἴληφας.
ΜΕΝ. Δοκεῖ τοίνυν μοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀρετὴ
εἶναι, καθάπερ ὁ ποιητὴς λέγει, χαίρειν τε
καλοῖσι καὶ δύνασθαι · καὶ ἐγὼ τοῦτο λέγω
ἀρετήν, ἐπιθυμοῦντα τῶν καλῶν δυνατὸν εἶναι
15 πορίζεσθαι.
ΣΩ. Αρα λέγεις τὸν τῶν καλῶν ἐπιθυμοῦντα
ἀγαθῶν ἐπιθυμητὴν εἶναι ;
ΜΕΝ. Μάλιστά γε.
ΣΩ. Αρα ὡς ὄντων τινῶν οἳ τῶν κακῶν ἐπι-
20
2ο θυμοῦσιν, ἑτέρων δὲ οἱ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ; οὐ πάντες, C
ὤριστε, δοκοῦσί σοι τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἐπιθυμεῖν ;
ΜΕΝ. Οὐκ ἔμοιγε.
ΣΩ. Αλλά τινες τῶν κακῶν ;
ΜΕΝ. Ναί.
25 ΣΩ. Οἰόμενοι τὰ κακὰ ἀγαθὰ εἶναι , λέγεις ,
ἢ καὶ γιγνώσκοντες, ὅτι κακά ἐστιν, ὅμως ἐπι-
θυμοῦσιν αὐτῶν ;
ΜΕΝ. Αμφότερα ἔμοιγε δοκεί.
ΣΩ. Η γὰρ δοκεῖ τίς σοι, ὦ Μένων, γιγνώσκων
30 τὰ κακὰ ὅτι κακά ἐστιν ὅμως ἐπιθυμεῖν αὐτῶν ;
ΜΕΝ. Μάλιστα.
 14 ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ X 77 c

ΣΩ. Τί ἐπιθυμεῖν λέγεις ; ἢ γενέσθαι αὑτῷ ;

D ΜΕΝ. Γενέσθαι · τί γὰρ ἄλλο ;
ΣΩ. Πότερον ἡγούμενος τὰ κακὰ ὠφελεῖν
ἐκεῖνον ᾧ ἂν γένηται, ἢ γιγνώσκων τὰ κακὰ ὅτι 35
βλάπτει ᾧ ἂν παρῇ ;
ΜΕΝ. Εἰσὶ μὲν οἳ ἡγούμενοι τὰ κακὰ ὠφε-
λεῖν , εἰσὶν δὲ καὶ οἳ γιγνώσκοντες ὅτι βλάπτει .
ΣΩ. Η καὶ δοκοῦσί σοι γιγνώσκειν τὰ κακά,
ὅτι κακά ἐστιν, οἱ ἡγούμενοι τὰ κακὰ ὠφελεῖν ; 40
ΜΕΝ. Οὐ πάνυ μοι δοκεῖ τοῦτό γε.
ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν δῆλον ὅτι οὗτοι μὲν οὐ τῶν
Ε κακῶν ἐπιθυμοῦσιν, [οἱ ἀγνοοῦντες αὐτά,] ἀλλὰ
ἐκείνων, ἃ ᾤοντο ἀγαθὰ εἶναι, ἔστιν δὲ ταῦτά γε
κακά · ὥστε οἱ ἀγνοοῦντες αὐτὰ καὶ οἰόμενοι 45
ἀγαθὰ εἶναι δῆλον ὅτι τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἐπιθυμοῦσιν.
ἢ οὔ ;
ΜΕΝ. Κινδυνεύουσιν οὗτοί γε.
ΣΩ . Τί δέ ; οἱ τῶν κακῶν μὲν ἐπιθυμοῦντες,
ὡς φῂς σύ, ἡγούμενοι δὲ τὰ κακὰ βλάπτειν 50
ἐκεῖνον, ᾧ ἂν γίγνηται, γιγνώσκουσιν δήπου ὅτι
βλαβήσονται ὑπ᾽ αὐτῶν ;
ΜΕΝ. 'Ανάγκη.
78 ΣΩ. ᾿Αλλὰ τοὺς βλαπτομένους οὗτοι οὐκ οἴον-
ται ἀθλίους εἶναι καθ᾽ ὅσον βλάπτονται ; 55
ΜΕΝ. Καὶ τοῦτο ἀνάγκη.
ΣΩ. Τοὺς δὲ ἀθλίους οὐ κακοδαίμονας ;
ΜΕΝ. Οἶμαι ἔγωγε.
ΣΩ. Ἔστιν οὖν ὅστις βούλεται ἄθλιος καὶ
κακοδαίμων είναι ; 60
ΜΕΝ. Οὔ μοι δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες .
 ΧΙ 78 € ΜΕΝΩΝ 15

ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄρα βούλεται , ὦ Μένων, τὰ κακὰ

οὐδείς, εἴπερ μὴ βούλεται τοιοῦτος εἶναι . τί γὰρ
ἄλλο ἐστὶν ἄθλιον εἶναι , ἢ ἐπιθυμεῖν τε τῶν
65 κακῶν καὶ κτᾶσθαι ;
ΜΕΝ. Κινδυνεύεις ἀληθῆ λέγειν, ὦ Σώ- Β
κρατες · καὶ οὐδεὶς βούλεσθαι τὰ κακά.
ΧΙ. ΣΩ . Οὐκοῦν νυνδὴ ἔλεγες, ὅτι ἔστιν ἡ
ἀρετὴ βούλεσθαί τε τἀγαθὰ καὶ δύνασθαι ;
ΜΕΝ . Εἶπον γάρ.
ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τοῦ λεχθέντος τὸ μὲν βούλεσθαι
5 πᾶσιν ὑπάρχει, καὶ ταύτῃ γε οὐδὲν ὁ ἕτερος τοῦ
ἑτέρου βελτίων ;
ΜΕΝ. Φαίνεται.
ΣΩ. ᾿Αλλὰ δῆλον ὅτι, εἴπερ ἐστὶ βελτίων
ἄλλος ἄλλου, κατὰ τὸ δύνασθαι ἂν εἴη ἀμείνων.
IO ΜΕΝ. Πάνυ γε.
ΣΩ. Τοῦτ᾽ ἔστιν ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικε, κατὰ τὸν σὸν
λόγον ἀρετή, δύναμις τοῦ πορίζεσθαι τἀγαθά.
ΜΕΝ. Παντάπασί μοι δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες,
οὕτως ἔχειν, ὡς σὺ νῦν ὑπολαμβάνεις.
15 ΣΩ. Ἴδωμεν δὴ καὶ τοῦτο εἰ ἀληθὲς λέγεις ·
ἴσως γὰρ ἂν εὖ λέγοις. τἀγαθὰ φῂς οἷόν τ᾽ εἶναι
πορίζεσθαι ἀρετὴν εἶναιι ;
ΜΕΝ. Ἔγωγε.
ΣΩ. ᾿Αγαθὰ δὲ καλεῖς οὐχὶ οἷον ὑγίειάν τε
20 καὶ πλοῦτον ;
ΜΕΝ. Καὶ χρυσίον λέγω καὶ ἀργύριον κτᾶ-
σθαι καὶ τιμὰς ἐν πόλει καὶ ἀρχάς.
ΣΩ. Μὴ ἄλλ᾽ ἄττα λέγεις τἀγαθὰ ἢ τὰ
τοιαῦτα ;
 16 ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ ΧΙ 78 €

ΜΕΝ. Οὔκ, ἀλλὰ πάντα λέγω τὰ τοιαῦτα . 25

D ΣΩ. Εἶεν · χρυσίον δὲ δὴ καὶ ἀργύριον
πορίζεσθαι ἀρετή ἐστιν, ὥς φησι Μένων ὁ τοῦ
μεγάλου βασιλέως πατρικὸς ξένος. πότερον
προστιθεῖς τούτῳ τῷ πόρῳ, ὦ Μένων, τὸ
δικαίως καὶ ὁσίως , ἢ οὐδέν σοι διαφέρει, ἀλλὰ 30
κἂν ἀδίκως τις αὐτὰ πορίζηται, ὁμοίως σὺ αὐτο
ἀρετὴν καλεῖς ;
ΜΕΝ. Οὐ δήπου, ὦ Σώκρατες .
ΣΩ. ᾿Αλλὰ κακίαν ;
ΜΕΝ. Πάντως δήπου. 35
ΣΩ. Δεῖ ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικε, τούτῳ τῷ πόρῳ
δικαιοσύνην ἢ σωφροσύνην ἢ ὁσιότητα προσεῖναι ,
Ε ἢ ἄλλο τι μόριον ἀρετῆς · εἰ δὲ μή, οὐκ ἔσται
ἀρετή, καίπερ ἐκπορίζουσα τἀγαθά.
ΜΕΝ. Πῶς γὰρ ἄνευ τούτων ἀρετὴ γένοιτ' 40
ἄν ;
ΣΩ. Τὸ δὲ μὴ ἐκπορίζειν χρυσίον καὶ ἀργύ
ριον, ὅταν μὴ δίκαιον ᾖ, μήτε αὑτῷ μήτε ἄλλῳ,
οὐκ ἀρετὴ καὶ αὕτη ἐστὶν ἡ ἀπορία ;
ΜΕΝ. Φαίνεται. 45
ΣΩ. Οὐδὲν ἄρα μᾶλλον ὁ πόρος τῶν τοιούτων
ἀγαθῶν ἢ ἡ ἀπορία ἀρετὴ ἂν εἴη, ἀλλά, ὡς
ἔοικεν, ὃ μὲν ἂν μετὰ δικαιοσύνης γίγνηται,
79 ἀρετὴ ἔσται, ὃ δ᾽ ἂν ἄνευ πάντων τῶν τοιούτων,
κακία. 50
ΜΕΝ. Δοκεί μοι ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι ὡς λέγεις.
ΧΙΙ. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τούτων ἕκαστον ὀλίγον
πρότερον μόριον ἀρετῆς ἔφαμεν εἶναι, τὴν δικαιο-
σύνην καὶ σωφροσύνην καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα ;
 XII 79 c ΜΕΝΩΝ 17

ΜΕΝ . Ναί.
ΣΩ. Εἶτα, ὦ Μένων , παίζεις πρός με ;
ΜΕΝ. Τί δή, ὦ Σώκρατες ;
ΣΩ. Ὅτι ἄρτι ἐμοῦ δεηθέντος σου μὴ κατ
αγνύναι μηδὲ κερματίζειν τὴν ἀρετήν, καὶ δόντος
παραδείγματα καθ᾽ ἃ δέοι ἀποκρίνεσθαι , τούτου
το μὲν ἠμέλησας, λέγεις δέ μοι, ὅτι ἀρετή ἐστιν Β
οἷόν τ᾽ εἶναι τἀγαθὰ πορίζεσθαι μετὰ δικαιοσύ
νης · τοῦτο δὲ φῂς μόριον ἀρετῆς εἶναι ;
ΜΕΝ . Ἔγωγε.
ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν συμβαίνει ἐξ ὧν σὺ ὁμολογεῖς,
15 τὸ μετὰ μορίου ἀρετῆς πράττειν, ὅ τι ἂν πράττῃ,
τοῦτο ἀρετὴν εἶναι · τὴν γὰρ δικαιοσύνην μόριον
φῂς ἀρετῆς εἶναι, καὶ ἕκαστα τούτων.
ΜΕΝ. Τί οὖν δή ;
ΣΩ. Τοῦτο λέγω, ὅτι ἐμοῦ δεηθέντος ὅλον
20 εἰπεῖν τὴν ἀρετήν, αὐτὴν μὲν πολλοῦ δεῖς εἰπεῖν
ὅ τι ἔστιν, πᾶσαν δὲ φῂς πρᾶξιν ἀρετὴν εἶναι,
ἐάνπερ μετὰ μορίου ἀρετῆς πράττηται, ὥσπερ
εἰρηκὼς ὅ τι ἀρετή ἐστιν τὸ ὅλον καὶ ἤδη γνω-
σομένου ἐμοῦ, καὶ ἐὰν σὺ κατακερματίζῃς αὐτὴν
25 κατὰ μόρια. δεῖται οὖν σοι πάλιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς, ὡς
ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, τῆς αὐτῆς ἐρωτήσεως, ὦ φίλε Μένων,
τί ἐστιν ἀρετή, εἰ μετὰ μορίου ἀρετῆς πᾶσα
πρᾶξις ἀρετὴ ἂν εἴη ; [τοῦτο γάρ ἐστιν λέγειν,
ὅταν λέγῃ τις, ὅτι πᾶσα ἡ μετὰ δικαιοσύνης
30 πρᾶξις ἀρετή ἐστιν .] ἢ οὐ δοκεῖ σοι πάλιν
δεῖσθαι τῆς αὐτῆς ἐρωτήσεως, ἀλλ᾽ οἴει τινὰ
εἰδέναι μόριον ἀρετῆς ὅ τι ἔστιν , αὐτὴν μὴ
εἰδότα ;
C
 18 ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ XII 79 c

· ΜΕΝ . Οὐκ ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.

D ΣΩ. Εἰ γὰρ καὶ μέμνησαι, ὅτ᾽ ἐγώ σοι ἀπ- 35
εκρινάμην περὶ τοῦ σχήματος , ἀπεβαλλομέν που
τὴν τοιαύτην ἀπόκρισιν τὴν διὰ τῶν ἔτι ζητου-
μένων καὶ μήπω ὡμολογημένων ἐπιχειροῦσαν
ἀποκρίνεσθαι .
ΜΕΝ. Καὶ ὀρθῶς γε ἀπεβάλλομεν, ὦ Σώ- 40
κρατες .
ΣΩ. Μὴ τοίνυν, ὦ ἄριστε , μηδὲ σὺ ἔτι ζητου-
μένης ἀρετῆς ὅλης ὅ τι ἔστιν οἴου διὰ τῶν ταύτης
Ε μορίων ἀποκρινόμενος δηλώσειν αὐτὴν ὁτῳοῦν, ἢ
ἄλλο ὁτιοῦν τούτῳ τῷ αὐτῷ τρόπῳ λέγων, ἀλλὰ 45
πάλιν τῆς αὐτῆς δεήσεσθαι ἐρωτήσεως, τίνος
ὄντος ἀρετῆς λέγεις ἃ λέγεις · ἢ οὐδέν σοι δοκῶ
λέγειν ;
ΜΕΝ. Ἔμοιγε δοκεῖς ὀρθῶς λέγειν.
XIII. ΣΩ. ᾿Απόκριναι τοίνυν πάλιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ·
τί φῂς ἀρετὴν εἶναι καὶ σὺ καὶ ὁ ἑταῖρός σου ;
ΜΕΝ. Ω Σώκρατες , ἤκουον μὲν ἔγωγε πρὶν
80 καὶ συγγενέσθαι σοι , ὅτι σὺ οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἡ αὐτός
τε ἀπορεῖς καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ποιεῖς ἀπορεῖν · καὶ ς
νῦν, ὥς γέ μοι δοκεῖς, γοητεύεις με καὶ φαρμάττεις
καὶ ἀτεχνῶς κατεπᾴδεις, ὥστε μεστὸν ἀπορίας
γεγονέναι. καὶ δοκεῖς μοι παντελῶς, εἰ δεῖ τι καὶ
σκώψαι , ὁμοιότατος εἶναι τό τε εἶδος καὶ τἆλλα
ταύτῃ τῇ πλατείᾳ νάρκῃ τῇ θαλαττίᾳ, καὶ γὰρ το
αὕτη τὸν ἀεὶ πλησιάζοντα καὶ ἁπτόμενον ναρκᾶν
ποιεῖ καὶ σὺ δοκεῖς μοι νῦν ἐμὲ τοιοῦτόν τι
Β πεποιηκέναι [ναρκᾶν] . ἀληθῶς γὰρ ἔγωγε καὶ
τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ τὸ στόμα ναρκῶ, καὶ οὐκ ἔχω ὅ
 XIV 80 D ΜΕΝΩΝ 19

15 τι ἀποκρίνωμαί σοι. καίτοι μυριάκις γε περὶ

ἀρετῆς παμπόλλους λόγους εἴρηκα καὶ πρὸς
πολλούς, καὶ πάνυ εὖ, ὥς γε ἐμαυτῷ ἐδόκουν
el
νῦν δὲ οὐδ᾽ ὅ τι ἔστιν τὸ παράπαν ἔχω εἰπεῖν.
καί μοι δοκεῖς εὖ βουλεύεσθαι οὐκ ἐκπλέων
20 ἐνθένδε οὐδ᾽ ἀποδημῶν · εἰ γὰρ ξένος ἐν ἄλλῃ
πόλει τοιαῦτα ποιοῖς, τάχ᾽ ἂν ὡς γόης ἀπαχ
θείης.
ΣΩ . Πανούργος εἶ, ὦ Μένων, καὶ ὀλίγου
ἐξηπάτησάς με.
25 ΜΕΝ. Τί μάλιστα, ὦ Σώκρατες ;
ΣΩ. Γιγνώσκω οὗ ἕνεκά με ᾔκασας.
ΜΕΝ. Τίνος δὴ οἴει ;
ΣΩ. Ἵνα σε ἀντεικάσω . ἐγὼ δὲ τοῦτο οἶδα
περὶ πάντων τῶν καλῶν, ὅτι χαίρουσιν εἰκαζό-
30 μενοι. λυσιτελεῖ γὰρ αὐτοῖς · καλαὶ γάρ, οἶμαι,
τῶν καλῶν καὶ αἱ εἰκόνες . ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ ἀντεικά-
σομαί σε. ἐγὼ δέ, εἰ μὲν ἡ νάρκη αὐτὴ ναρκῶσα
οὕτω καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ποιεῖ ναρκᾶν, ἔοικα αὐτῇ ·
εἰ δὲ μή, οὔ. οὐ γὰρ εὐπορῶν αὐτὸς τοὺς ἄλλους
35 ποιῶ ἀπορεῖν, ἀλλὰ παντὸς μᾶλλον αὐτὸς ἀπορῶν
οὕτως καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ποιῶ ἀπορεῖν. καὶ νῦν D
περὶ ἀρετῆς, ὁ ἔστιν, ἐγὼ μὲν οὐκ οἶδα, σὺ κέντοι
ἴσως πρότερον μὲν ᾔδησθα πρὶν ἐμοῦ ἅψασθαι,
νῦν μέντοι ὁμοῖος εἶ οὐκ εἰδότι. ὅμως δὲ ἐθέλω
40 μετὰ σοῦ σκέψασθαι καὶ συζητῆσαι ὅ τί ποτε
ἔστιν.
XIV. MEN. Καὶ τίνα τρόπον ζητήσεις, ὦ
Σώκρατες, τοῦτο, ὁ μὴ οἶσθα τὸ παράπαν ὅ τι
ἔστιν ; ποῖον γὰρ ὧν οὐκ οἶσθα προθέμενος
 20 ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ XIV 80 D

ζητήσεις ; ἢ εἰ καὶ ὅ τι μάλιστα ἐντύχοις αὐτῷ,

πῶς εἴσει ὅτι τοῦτό ἐστιν, ὃ σὺ οὐκ ᾔδησθα ; 5
E ΣΩ. Μανθάνω οἷον βούλει λέγειν, ὦ Μένων.
ὁρᾷς τοῦτον ὡς ἐριστικὸν λόγον † κατάγεις,† ὡς οὐκ
ἄρα ἔστιν ζητεῖν ἀνθρώπῳ οὔτε ὁ οἶδεν οὔτε ὁ μὴ
οἶδεν ; οὔτε γὰρ ἄν γε ὁ οἶδεν ζητοῖ · οἶδεν γάρ,
καὶ οὐδὲν δεῖ τῷ γε τοιούτῳ ζητήσεως · οὔτε ὁ μὴ ΙΟ
οἶδεν · οὐδὲ γὰρ οἶδεν ὅ τι ζητήσει.
81 ΜΕΝ . Οὐκοῦν καλῶς σοι δοκεῖ λέγεσθαι ὁ
λόγος οὗτος, ὦ Σώκρατες ;
ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἔμοιγε.
ΜΕΝ. Ἔχεις λέγειν ὅπῃ ; 15
ΣΩ. Ἔγωγε · ἀκήκοα γὰρ ἀνδρῶν τε καὶ
γυναικῶν σοφῶν περὶ τὰ θεῖα πράγματα
ΜΕΝ. Τίνα λόγον λεγόντων ;
ΣΩ. Αληθῆ, ἔμοιγε δοκεῖν, καὶ καλόν.
ΜΕΝ. Τίνα τοῦτον, καὶ τίνες οἱ λέγοντες ; 20
ΣΩ. Οἱ μὲν λέγοντές εἰσι τῶν ἱερέων τε καὶ
τῶν ἱερειῶν ὅσοις μεμέληκε περὶ ὧν μεταχειρί
Β ζονται λόγον οἵοις τ᾽ εἶναι διδόναι · λέγει δὲ καὶ
Πίνδαρος καὶ ἄλλοι πολλοὶ τῶν ποιητῶν, ὅσοι
θεῖοί εἰσιν. ἃ δὲ λέγουσι, ταυτί ἐστιν · ἀλλὰ 25
σκόπει, εἴ σοι δοκοῦσιν ἀληθῆ λέγειν. φασὶ γὰρ
τὴν ψυχὴν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου εἶναι ἀθάνατον, καὶ
τοτὲ μὲν τελευτᾶν, ὃ δὴ ἀποθνῄσκειν καλοῦσι,
τοτὲ δὲ πάλιν γίγνεσθαι, ἀπόλλυσθαι δ᾽ οὐδέ-
ποτε · δεῖν δὴ διὰ ταῦτα ὡς ὁσιώτατα διαβιώναι 30
τὸν βίον ·
οἷσι γὰρ ἂν Φερσεφόνα ποινὰν παλαιοῦ πένθεος
δέξεται, εἰς τὸν ὕπερθεν ἅλιον κείνων ἐνάτῳ ἔτει
 XV 82 A ΜΕΝΩΝ 21

ἀνδιδοῖ ψυχὰς πάλιν,

ἐκ τῶν βασιλῆες ἀγαυοὶ καὶ σθένει κραιπνοὶ σοφίᾳ C
35 τε μέγιστοι
ἄνδρες αὔξοντ᾽ · ἐς δὲ τὸν λοιπὸν χρόνον ἥρωες ἁγ-
νοὶ πρὸς ἀνθρώπων καλεῦνται .

XV. "Ατε οὖν ἡ ψυχὴ ἀθάνατός τε οὖσα καὶ

πολλάκις γεγονυία, καὶ ἑωρακυῖα καὶ τὰ ἐνθάδε
καὶ τὰ ἐν "Αιδου καὶ πάντα χρήματα, οὐκ ἔστιν
ὅ τι οὐ μεμάθηκεν · ὥστε οὐδὲν θαυμαστὸν καὶ
5 περὶ ἀρετῆς καὶ περὶ ἄλλων οἷόν τ᾽ εἶναι αὐτὴν
ἀναμνησθῆναι, ἅ γε καὶ πρότερον ἠπίστατο.
ἅτε γὰρ τῆς φύσεως ἁπάσης συγγενοῦς οὔσης, D
καὶ μεμαθηκυίας τῆς ψυχῆς ἅπαντα, οὐδὲν κωλύει
ἓν μόνον ἀναμνησθέντα, ὃ δὴ μάθησιν καλοῦσιν
ΙΟ ἄνθρωποι, τἆλλα πάντα αὐτὸν ἀνευρεῖν, ἐάν τις
ἀνδρεῖος ᾖ καὶ μὴ ἀποκάμνῃ ζητῶν· τὸ γὰρ
ζητεῖν ἄρα καὶ τὸ μανθάνειν ἀνάμνησις ὅλον
ἐστίν. οὔκουν δεῖ πείθεσθαι τούτῳ τῷ ἐριστικῷ
λόγῳ · οὗτος μὲν γὰρ ἂν ἡμᾶς ἀργοὺς ποιήσειεν
15 καὶ ἔστιν τοῖς μαλακοῖς τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἡδὺς
ἀκοῦσαι, ὅδε δὲ ἐργαστικούς τε καὶ ζητητικοὺς
ποιεῖ · ᾧ ἐγὼ πιστεύων ἀληθεῖ εἶναι ἐθέλω μετὰ Ε
σοῦ ζητεῖν ἀρετὴ ὅ τι ἔστιν.
ΜΕΝ. Ναί, ὦ Σώκρατες · ἀλλὰ πῶς λέγεις
20
2ο τοῦτο, ὅτι οὐ μανθάνομεν, ἀλλὰ ἣν καλοῦμεν
μάθησιν ἀνάμνησίς ἐστιν ; ἔχεις με τοῦτο διδάξαι
ὡς οὕτως ἔχει ;
ΣΩ. Καὶ ἄρτι εἶπον,
εἶπον, ὦ Μένων, ὅτι
πανοῦργος εἶ · καὶ νῦν ἐρωτᾷς εἰ ἔχω σε 82
25 διδάξαι, ὃς οὔ φημι διδαχὴν εἶναι ἀλλ᾽
 22
22 ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ XV 82 A

ἀνάμνησιν, ἵνα δὴ εὐθὺς φαίνωμαι αὐτὸς

ἐμαυτῷ τἀναντία λέγων.
ΜΕΝ. Οὐ μὰ τὸν Δία, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐ πρὸς
τοῦτο βλέψας εἶπον, ἀλλ᾽ ὑπὸ τοῦ ἔθους · ἀλλ᾽
εἴ πώς μοι ἔχεις ἐνδείξασθαι, ὅτι ἔχει ὥσπερ 30
λέγεις, ἔνδειξαι.
ΣΩ. Αλλ ' ἔστι μὲν οὐ ῥᾴδιον, ὅμως δὲ ἐθέλω
προθυμηθῆναι σοῦ ἕνεκα. ἀλλά μοι προσ-
κάλεσον τῶν πολλῶν ἀκολούθων τουτωνὶ τῶν
Β σαυτοῦ ἕνα, ὅντινα βούλει, ἵνα ἐν τούτῳ σοι 35
ἐπιδείξωμαι .
ΜΕΝ. Πάνυ γε. δεῦρο πρόσελθε.
ΣΩ. Ἕλλην μέν ἐστι καὶ ἑλληνίζει ;
ΜΕΝ. Πάνυ γε σφόδρα, οἰκογενής.
ΣΩ. Πρόσεχε δὴ τὸν νοῦν, ὁπότερ᾽ ἄν σοι 40
φαίνηται, εἰ ἀναμιμνησκόμενος ἢ μανθάνων παρ᾽
ἐμοῦ.
ΜΕΝ. ᾿Αλλὰ προσέξω.
XVI . ΣΩ. Εἰπὲ δή μοι, ὦ παί, γιγνώσκεις
τετράγωνον χωρίον ὅτι τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν ;
ΠΑΙ . Ἔγωγε.
C ΣΩ. Ἔστιν οὖν τετράγωνον χωρίον ἴσας ἔχον
τὰς γραμμὰς ταύτας πάσας, τέτταρας οὔσας ; 5
ΠΑΙ . Πάνυ γε.
ΣΩ. Οὐ καὶ ταυτασὶ τὰς διὰ μέσου ἐστὶν
ἴσας ἔχον ;
ΠΑΙ. Ναί.
ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν εἴη ἂν τοιοῦτον χωρίον καὶ μεῖζον το
καὶ ἔλαττον ;
ΠΑΙ. Πάνυ γε.
 XVI 82 E ΜΕΝΩΝ 23

ΣΩ. Εἰ οὖν εἴη αὕτη ἡ πλευρὰ δυοῖν ποδοῖν

καὶ αὕτη δυοῖν, πόσων ἂν εἴη ποδῶν τὸ ὅλον ;
15 ὧδε δὲ σκόπει · εἰ ἦν ταύτῃ δυοῖν ποδοῖν, ταύτῃ
δὲ ἑνὸς ποδὸς μόνον, ἄλλο τι ἅπαξ ἂν ἦν δυοῖν
ποδοῖν τὸ χωρίον ;
ΠΑΙ . Ναί.
ΣΩ. Ἐπειδὴ δὲ δυοῖν ποδοῖν καὶ ταύτῃ, ἄλλο D
20 τι ἢ δὶς δυοῖν γίγνεται ;
ΠΑΙ. Γίγνεται .
ΣΩ. Δυοῖν ἄρα δὶς γίγνεται ποδῶν ;
ΠΑΙ . Ναί.
ΣΩ. Πόσοι οὖν εἰσιν οἱ δύο δις πόδες ;:
25 λογισάμενος εἰπέ.
ΠΑΙ . Τέτταρες, ὦ Σώκρατες .
ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν γένοιτ᾽ ἂν τούτου τοῦ χωρίου
ἕτερον διπλάσιον , τοιοῦτον δέ, ἴσας ἔχον πάσας
τὰς γραμμὰς ὥσπερ τοῦτο ;
30 ΠΑΙ. Ναί.
ΣΩ. Πόσων οὖν ἔσται ποδῶν ;
ΠΑΙ . Οκτώ.
ΣΩ. Φέρε δή, πειρῶ μοι εἰπεῖν πηλίκη τις
ἔσται ἐκείνου ἡ γραμμὴ ἑκάστη ; ἡ μὲν γὰρ Ε
35 τοῦδε δυοῖν ποδοῖν · τί δὲ ἡ ἑκείνου τοῦ διπλασίου ;
ΠΑΙ. Δῆλον δή, ὦ Σώκρατες , ὅτι διπλασία .
ΣΩ. Ὁρᾷς, ὦ Μένων, ὡς ἐγὼ τοῦτον οὐδὲν
διδάσκω, ἀλλ᾽ ἐρωτῶ πάντα ; καὶ νῦν οὗτος
οἴεται εἰδέναι, ὁποία ἐστὶν ἀφ᾽ ἧς τὸ ὀκτώπουν
40 χωρίον γενήσεται · ἢ οὐ δοκεῖ σοι ;
4ο
ΜΕΝ. Ἔμοιγε.
ΣΩ. Οἶδεν οὖν ;
 24 ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ XVI 82 E

ΜΕΝ. Οὐ δῆτα.
ΣΩ. Οἴεται δέ γε ἀπὸ τῆς διπλασίας ;
ΜΕΝ. Ναί. 45
XVII. ΣΩ. Θεῶ δὴ αὐτὸν ἀναμιμνησκόμενον
ἐφεξῆς, ὡς δεῖ ἀναμιμνῄσκεσθαι . σὺ δέ μοι λέγε·
ἀπὸ τῆς διπλασίας γραμμῆς φῂς τὸ διπλάσιον
83 χωρίον γίγνεσθαι ; τοιόνδε λέγω, μὴ ταύτῃ μὲν
μακρόν, τῇ δὲ βραχύ, ἀλλὰ ἴσον πανταχῇ ἔστω 5
ὥσπερ τουτί, διπλάσιον δὲ τούτου, ὀκτώπουν ·
ἀλλὰ ὅρα, εἰ ἔτι σοι ἀπὸ τῆς διπλασίας δοκεῖ
ἔσεσθαι.
ΠΑΙ . Ἔμοιγε.
ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν διπλασία αὕτη ταύτης γίγνεται, το
ἂν ἑτέραν τοσαύτην προσθῶμεν ἐνθένδε ;
ΠΑΙ. Πάνυ γε .
ΣΩ. ᾿Απὸ ταύτης δή, φής, ἔσται τὸ ὀκτώπουν
χωρίον, ἂν τέτταρες τοσαῦται γένωνται ;
ΠΑΙ. Ναί. 15
B ΣΩ. ᾿Αναγραψώμεθα δὴ ἀπ' αὐτῆς ἴσας
τέτταρας. ἄλλο τι ἢ τουτὶ ἂν εἴη ὃ φῂς τὸ
ὀκτώπουν εἶναιι ;;
ΠΑΙ . Πάνυ γε.
ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἐν αὐτῷ ἐστιν ταυτὶ τέτταρα, 20
ὧν ἕκαστον ἴσον τούτῳ ἐστὶν τῷ τετράποδι ;
ΠΑΙ . Ναί.
ΣΩ. Πόσον οὖν γίγνεται ; οὐ τετράκις τοσοῦ-
τον ;
ΠΑΙ. Πῶς δ᾽ οὔ ; 25
ΣΩ. Διπλάσιον οὖν ἐστιν τὸ τετράκις τοσοῦ-
τον ;
 25
XVII 83 D ΜΕΝΩΝ 25

ΠΑΙ . Οὐ μὰ Δία.
ΣΩ. ᾿Αλλὰ ποσαπλάσιον ;
30 ΠΑΙ . Τετραπλάσιον.
ΣΩ. ᾿Απὸ τῆς διπλασίας ἄρα, ὦ παῖ, οὐ
διπλάσιον ἀλλὰ τετραπλάσιον γίγνεται χωρίον.
ΠΑΙ. ᾿Αληθῆ λέγεις.
ΣΩ. Τεττάρων γὰρ τετράκις ἐστὶν ἑκκαίδεκα.
35 οὐχί ;
ΠΑΙ . Ναί.
ΣΩ. Οκτώπουν δ᾽ ἀπὸ ποίας γραμμῆς ; οὐχὶ
ἀπὸ μὲν ταύτης τετραπλάσιον ;
ΠΑΙ . Φημί.
40 ΣΩ. Τετράπουν δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς ἡμισέας ταυτησὶ
τουτί ;
ΠΑΙ. Ναί.
ΣΩ. Εἶεν · τὸ δὲ ὀκτώπουν οὐ τοῦδε μὲν
διπλάσιόν ἐστιν, τούτου δὲ ἥμισυ ;
45 ΠΑΙ. < Ναί.
ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἀπὸ μὲν μείζονος ἔσται ἢ τοσαύ- D
της γραμμής, ἀπὸ ἐλάττονος δὲ ἡ τοσησδί ;
ἢ οὔ ;
ΠΑΙ. Ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ οὕτω .
50 ΣΩ. Καλῶς · τὸ γάρ σοι δοκοῦν τοῦτο ἀπο-
κρίνου. καί μοι λέγε · οὐχ ἥδε μὲν δυοῖν ποδοῖν
ἦν, ἡ δὲ τεττάρων ;
ΠΑΙ. Ναί.
ΣΩ. Δεῖ ἄρα τὴν τοῦ ὀκτώποδος χωριου
55 γραμμὴν μείζω μὲν εἶναι τῆσδε τῆς δίποδος,
ἐλάττω δὲ τῆς τετράποδος .
ΠΑΙ . Δεῖ.
 26 ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ XVII 83 E

E ΣΩ. Πειρῶ δὴ λέγειν πηλίκην τινὰ φῂς

αὐτὴν εἶναι.
ΠΑΙ. Τρίποδα. 60
ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἄνπερ τρίπους ᾖ, τὸ ἥμισυ
ταύτης προσληψόμεθα καὶ ἔσται τρίπους ; δύο
μὲν γὰρ οἵδε, ὁ δὲ εἷς · καὶ ἐνθένδε ὡσαύτως
δύο μὲν οἵδε, ὁ δὲ εἷς · καὶ γίγνεται τοῦτο τὸ
χωρίον ὃ φῄς. 65
ΠΑΙ. Ναί.
ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἂν ᾖ τῇδε τριῶν καὶ τῇδε τριῶν ,
τὸ ὅλον χωρίον τριῶν τρὶς ποδῶν γίγνεται ;
ΠΑΙ. Φαίνεται.
ΣΩ. Τρεῖς δὲ τρὶς πόσοι εἰσὶ πόδες ; 70
ΠΑΙ. Εννέα.
ΣΩ. Ἔδει δὲ τὸ διπλάσιον πόσων είναι
ποδῶν ;
ΠΑΙ. Οκτώ.
ΣΩ. Οὐδ᾽ ἄρ᾽ ἀπὸ τῆς τρίποδός πω τὸ ὀκτώ- 75
πουν χωρίον γίγνεται .
ΠΑΙ. Οὐ δῆτα.
ΣΩ. Αλλ' ἀπὸ ποίας ; πειρῶ ἡμῖν εἰπεῖν
ἀκριβῶς · καὶ εἰ μὴ βούλει ἀριθμεῖν, ἀλλὰ
84 δεῖξον ἀπὸ ποίας. 80
ΠΑΙ. ᾿Αλλὰ μὲ τὸν Δία, ὦ Σώκρατες , ἔγωγε
οὐκ οἶδα.
XVIII. ΣΩ. Εννοεῖς αὖ, ὦ Μένων, οὗ ἐστιν
ἤδη βαδίζων ὅδε τοῦ ἀναμιμνῄσκεσθαι ; ὅτι τὸ
μὲν πρῶτον ᾔδει μὲν οὔ, ἥ τις ἔστιν ἡ τοῦ
ὀκτώποδος χωρίου γραμμή, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ νῦν πω
οἶδεν , ἀλλ᾽ οὖν ᾤετό γ᾽ αὐτὴν τότε εἰδέναι, καὶ 5
 XVIII 84 D ΜΕΝΩΝ 27

θαρραλέως ἀπεκρίνετο ὡς εἰδώς, καὶ οὐχ ἡγεῖτο

ἀπορεῖν · νῦν δὲ ἡγεῖται ἀπορεῖν ἤδη , καὶ ὥσπερ Β
οὐκ οἶδεν, οὐδ᾽ οἴεται εἰδέναι.
ΜΕΝ . ᾿Αληθή λέγεις .
ΤΟ ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν νῦν βέλτιον ἔχει περὶ τὸ
πρᾶγμα ὃ οὐκ ᾔδει ;
ΜΕΝ. Καὶ τοῦτό μοι δοκεῖ.
ΣΩ. ᾿Απορεῖν οὖν αὐτὸν ποιήσαντες καὶ
ναρκᾶν ὥσπερ ἡ νάρκη, μῶν τι ἐβλάψαμεν ;
15 ΜΕΝ. Οὐκ ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.
ΣΩ. Προὔργου γοῦν τι πεποιήκαμεν, ὡς
ἔοικε, πρὸς τὸ ἐξευρεῖν ὅπῃ ἔχει · νῦν μὲν γὰρ
καὶ ζητήσειεν ἂν ἡδέως οὐκ εἰδώς, τότε δὲ α
ῥᾳδίως ἂν καὶ πρὸς πολλοὺς καὶ πολλάκις
20 ᾤετ᾽ ἂν εὖ λέγειν περὶ τοῦ διπλασίου
χωρίου, ὡς δεῖ διπλασίαν τὴν γραμμὴν ἔχειν
μήκει.
ΜΕΝ. Ἔοικεν.
ΣΩ. Οἴει οὖν ἂν αὐτὸν πρότερον ἐπιχειρῆσαι
25 ζητεῖν ἢ μανθάνειν τοῦτο, ὃ ᾤετο εἰδέναι οὐκ
εἰδώς, πρὶν εἰς ἀπορίαν κατέπεσεν ἡγησάμενος
μὴ εἰδέναι, καὶ ἐπόθησεν τὸ εἰδέναι ;
ΜΕΝ. Οὔ O μοι δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες.
ΣΩ. Ωνητο ἄρα ναρκήσας ;
30 ΜΕΝ. Δοκεῖ μοι .
ΣΩ. Σκέψαι δὴ ἐκ ταύτης τῆς ἀπορίας ὅ D
τι καὶ ἀνευρήσει ζητῶν μετ᾿ ἐμοῦ, οὐδὲν ἀλλ᾽ ἢ
ἐρωτῶντος ἐμοῦ καὶ οὐ διδάσκοντος · φύλαττε δὲ
ἄν που εὕρῃς με διδάσκοντα καὶ διεξιόντα αὐτῷ,
35 ἀλλὰ μὴ τὰς τούτου δόξας ἀνερωτῶντα .
 28 ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ XIX 84 D

ΧΙΧ. Λέγε γάρ μοι σύ · οὐ τὸ μὲν τετράπουν

τοῦτο ἡμῖν ἐστι χωρίον ; μανθάνεις ;
ΠΑΙ. Ἔγωγε .
ΣΩ. Ἕτερον δὲ αὐτῷ προσθεῖμεν ἂν τουτὶ
ἴσον ; 5
ΠΑΙ. Ναί.
ΣΩ. Καὶ τρίτον τόδε ἴσον ἑκατέρῳ τούτων ;
ΠΑΙ. Ναί.
ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν προσαναπληρωσαίμεθ᾽ ἂν τὸ ἐν
τῇ γωνίᾳ τόδε ; 10
ΠΑΙ. Πάνυ γε.
ΣΩ. Αλλο τι οὖν γένοιτ᾽ ἂν τέτταρα ἴσα
χωρία τάδε ;
E ΠΑΙ. Ναί.
ΣΩ. Τί οὖν ; τὸ ὅλον τόδε ποσαπλάσιον τοῦδε 15
γίγνεται ;
ΠΑΙ. Τετραπλάσιον.
ΣΩ. Ἔδει δὲ διπλάσιον ἡμῖν γενέσθαι · ἢ οὐ
μέμνησαι ;
ΠΑΙ . Πάνυ γε. 20
ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἐστιν αὕτη γραμμὴ ἐκ γωνίας
85 εἰς γωνίαν τείνουσα, τέμνουσα δίχα ἕκαστον
τούτων τῶν χωρίων ;
ΠΑΙ. Ναί.
ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τέτταρες αὗται γίγνονται γραμ- 25
μαὶ ἴσαι, περιέχουσαι τουτὶ τὸ χωρίον ;
ΠΑΙ. Γίγνονται.
ΣΩ. Σκόπει δή · πηλίκον τί ἐστιν τοῦτο τὸ
χωρίον ;
ΠΑΙ. Οὐ μανθάνω. 30
 XX 85 c ΜΕΝΩΝ 29

ΣΩ. Οὐχὶ τεττάρων ὄντων τούτων ἥμισυ

ἑκάστου ἑκάστη ἡ γραμμὴ ἀποτέτμηκεν ἐντός ;
ἢ οὔ ;
ΠΑΙ. Ναί.
35 ΣΩ. Πόσα οὖν τηλικαῦτα ἐν τούτῳ ἔνεστιν ;
ΠΑΙ . Τέτταρα.
ΣΩ. Πόσα δὲ ἐν τῷδε ;
ΠΑΙ. Δύο.
ΣΩ. Τὰ δὲ τέτταρα τοῖν δυοῖν τί ἐστιν ;
40 ΠΑΙ. Διπλάσια.
ΣΩ. Τόδε οὖν ποσάπουν γίγνεται ; B
ΠΑΙ. Οκτώπουν.
ΣΩ. ᾿Απὸ ποίας γραμμής ;
ΠΑΙ. ᾿Απὸ ταύτης .
45 ΣΩ. ᾿Απὸ τῆς ἐκ γωνίας εἰς γωνίαν τεινούσης
τοῦ τετράποδος ;
ΠΑΙ. Ναί.
ΣΩ. Καλοῦσιν δέ γε ταύτην διάμετρον οἱ
σοφισταί· ὥστ᾽ εἰ ταύτῃ διάμετρος ὄνομα, ἀπὸ
5ο τῆς διαμέτρου ἄν, ὡς σὺ φῄς, ὦ παῖ Μένωνος,
γίγνοιτ᾽ ἂν τὸ διπλάσιον χωρίον .
ΠΑΙ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ὦ Σώκρατες.
ΧΧ. ΣΩ. Τί σοι δοκεῖ, ώ Μένων ; ἔστιν
ἥντινα δόξαν οὐχ αὑτοῦ οὗτος ἀπεκρίνατο ;
ΜΕΝ. Οὔκ, ἀλλ᾽ ἑαυτοῦ.
ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν οὐκ ᾔδει γε, ὡς ἔφαμεν ὀλίγον
5 πρότερον.
ΜΕΝ. ᾿Αληθῆ λέγεις.
ΣΩ. Ἐνῆσαν δέ γε αὐτῷ αὑται αἱ δόξαι ·
ἢ οὔ ;
 30 ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ XX 85 c

ΜΕΝ. Ναί.
ΣΩ. Τῷ οὐκ εἰδότι ἄρα περὶ ὧν ἂν μὴ εἰδῇ ΙΟ
ἔνεισιν ἀληθεῖς δόξαι περὶ τούτων ὧν οὐκ
οἶδε ;
ΜΕΝ . Φαίνεται.
ΣΩ. Καὶ νῦν μέν γε αὐτῷ ὥσπερ ὄναρ ἄρτι
ἀνακεκίνηνται αἱ δόξαι αὗται · εἰ δὲ αὐτόν τις 15
ἀνερήσεται πολλάκις τὰ αὐτὰ ταῦτα καὶ πολ-
λαχῇ, οἶσθ᾽ ὅτι τελευτῶν οὐδενὸς ἧττον ἀκριβῶς
ἐπιστήσεται περὶ τούτων.
D ΜΕΝ. Ἔοικεν.
ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν οὐδενὸς διδάξαντος ἀλλ᾽ ἐρωτή- 20
σαντος ἐπιστήσεται, ἀναλαβὼν αὐτὸς ἐξ αὑτοῦ
τὴν ἐπιστήμην ;
ΜΕΝ. Ναί.
ΣΩ . Τὸ δὲ ἀναλαμβάνειν αὐτὸν ἐν αὑτῷ
ἐπιστήμην οὐκ ἀναμιμνῄσκεσθαί ἐστιν ; 25
ΜΕΝ. Πάνυ γε.
ΣΩ. Αρ' οὖν οὐ τὴν ἐπιστήμην, ἣν νῦν
οὗτος ἔχει, ἤτοι ἔλαβέν ποτε ἢ ἀεὶ εἶχεν ;
ΜΕΝ. Ναί.
ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν εἰ μὲν ἀεὶ εἶχεν, ἀεὶ καὶ ἦν 30
ἐπιστήμων · εἰ δὲ ἔλαβέν ποτε, οὐκ ἂν ἔν γε
Ετῷ νῦν βίῳ εἰληφὼς εἴη. ἢ δεδίδαχέν τις
τοῦτον γεωμετρεῖν ; οὗτος γὰρ ποιήσει περὶ
πάσης γεωμετρίας ταὐτὰ ταῦτα , καὶ τῶν ἄλλων
μαθημάτων ἁπάντων. ἔστιν οὖν ὅστις τοῦτον 35
πάντα δεδίδαχεν ; δίκαιος γάρ που εἶ εἰδέναι,
ἄλλως τε ἐπειδὴ ἐν τῇ σῇ οἰκίᾳ γέγονεν καὶ
τέθραπται.
 XXI 86 B ΜΕΝΩΝ 31

ΜΕΝ . ᾿Αλλ᾽ οἶδα ἔγωγε ὅτι οὐδεὶς πώποτε

40 ἐδίδαξεν.
ΣΩ. Ἔχει δὲ ταύτας τὰς δόξας, ἢ οὐχί ;
ΜΕΝ. ᾿Ανάγκη, ὦ Σώκρατες, φαίνεται .
ΧΧΙ. ΣΩ. Εἰ δὲ μὴ ἐν τῷ νῦν βίῳ λαβών, οὐκ
ἤδη τοῦτο δῆλον, ὅτι ἐν ἄλλῳ τινὶ χρόνῳ εἶχε 86
καὶ ἐμεμαθήκει ;
ΜΕΝ. Φαίνεται.
5 ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν οὗτός γέ ἐστιν ὁ χρόνος, ὅτ᾽
οὐκ ἦν ἄνθρωπος ;
ΜΕΝ. Ναί.
ΣΩ. Εἰ οὖν ὅν τ᾽ ἂν ᾖ χρόνον καὶ ὃν ἂν
μὴ ᾖ ἄνθρωπος, ἐνέσονται αὐτῷ ἀληθεῖς δόξαι ,
το αἱ ἐρωτήσει ἐπεγερθεῖσαι ἐπιστῆμαι γίγνονται ,
ἆρ᾽ οὐ τὸν ἀεὶ χρόνον μεμαθηκυῖα ἔσται ἡ
ψυχὴ αὐτοῦ ; δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι τὸν πάντα χρόνον
ἔστιν ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν ἄνθρωπος .
ΜΕΝ. Φαίνεται .
15 ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν εἰ ἀεὶ ἡ ἀλήθεια ἡμῖν τῶν ὄντων Β
ἐστὶν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, ἀθάνατος ἂν ἡ ψυχὴ εἴη,
ὥστε θαρροῦντα χρή, ὃ μὴ τυγχάνεις ἐπιστά-
μενος νῦν, τοῦτο δ᾽ ἐστὶν ὃ μὴ μεμνημένος,
ἐπιχειρεῖν ζητεῖν καὶ ἀναμιμνῄσκεσθαι ;
20 ΜΕΝ. Εν μοι δοκεῖς λέγειν, ὦ Σώκρατες,
οὐκ οἶδ' ὅπως.
ΣΩ. Καὶ γὰρ ἐγὼ ἐμοί, ὦ Μένων . καὶ τὰ
μέν γε ἄλλα οὐκ ἂν πάνυ ὑπὲρ τοῦ λόγου
διισχυρισαίμην · ὅτι δ᾽ οἰόμενοι δεῖν ζητεῖν , ἃ
25 μή τις οἶδεν, βελτίους ἂν εἶμεν καὶ ἀνδρικώτεροι
καὶ ἧττον ἀργοὶ ἢ εἰ οἰοίμεθα, ἃ μὴ ἐπιστάμεθα,
 32 ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ XXI 86 c

C μηδὲ δυνατὸν εἶναι εὑρεῖν μηδὲ δεῖν ζητεῖν, περὶ

τούτου πάνυ ἂν διαμαχοίμην , εἰ οἷός τε εἴην,
καὶ λόγῳ καὶ ἔργῳ .
ΜΕΝ. Καὶ τοῦτο μέν γε δοκεῖς μοι εὖ λέγειν, 30
ὦ Σώκρατες.
XXII. ΣΩ . Βούλει οὖν, ἐπειδὴ ὁμονοοῦμεν,
ὅτι ζητητέον περὶ οὗ μή τις οἶδεν, ἐπιχειρή-
σωμεν κοινῇ ζητεῖν τί ποτ᾽ ἔστιν ἀρετή ;
ΜΕΝ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. οὐ μέντοι, ὦ Σώ
κρατες, ἀλλ᾽ ἔγωγε ἐκεῖνο ἂν ἥδιστα , ὅπερ ς
ἠρόμην τὸ πρῶτον, καὶ σκεψαίμην καὶ ἀκούσαιμι ,
D πότερον ὡς διδακτῷ ὄντι αὐτῷ δεῖ ἐπιχειρεῖν, ἢ
ὡς φύσει ἢ ὡς τίνι ποτὲ τρόπῳ παραγιγνομένης
τοῖς ἀνθρώποις τῆς ἀρετῆς.
ΣΩ . Αλλ' εἰ μὲν ἐγὼ ἦρχον, ὦ Μένων, μὴ ΤΟ
μόνον ἐμαυτοῦ ἀλλὰ καὶ σοῦ, οὐκ ἂν ἐσκεψάμεθα
πρότερον εἴτε διδακτὸν εἴτε οὐ διδακτὸν ἡ ἀρετή,
πρὶν ὅ τι ἔστιν πρῶτον ἐζητήσαμεν αὐτό · ἐπειδὴ
δὲ σὺ σαυτοῦ μὲν οὐδ᾽ ἐπιχειρεῖς ἄρχειν , ἵνα δὴ
ἐλεύθερος ᾖς, ἐμοῦ δὲ ἐπιχειρεῖς τε ἄρχειν καὶ 15
ἄρχεις, συγχωρήσομαί σοι · τί γὰρ χρὴ ποιεῖν ;
Ε ἔοικεν οὖν σκεπτέον εἶναι, ποῖόν τί ἐστιν ὃ μήπω
ἴσμεν ὅ τι ἔστιν. εἰ μή τι οὖν ἀλλὰ σμικρόν
γέ μοι τῆς ἀρχῆς χάλασον, καὶ συγχώρησον ἐξ
ὑποθέσεως αὐτὸ σκοπεῖσθαι, εἴτε διδακτόν ἐστιν 20
εἴτε ὁπωσοῦν. λέγω δὲ τὸ ἐξ ὑποθέσεως ὧδε,
ὥσπερ οἱ γεωμέτραι πολλάκις σκοποῦνται,
ἐπειδάν τις ἔρηται αὐτούς, οἷον περὶ χωρίου, εἰ
87 οἷόν τε ἐς τόνδε τὸν κύκλον τόδε τὸ χωρίον
τρίγωνον ἐνταθῆναι, εἴποι ἄν τις ὅτι οὔπω οἶδα 25
 XXIII 87 c ΜΕΝΩΝ 33

εἰ ἔστιν τοῦτο τοιοῦτον, ἀλλ᾿ ὥσπερ μέν τινα

ὑπόθεσιν προὔργου οἶμαι ἔχειν πρὸς τὸ πρᾶγμα
τοιάνδε · εἰ μέν ἐστιν τοῦτο τὸ χωρίον τοιοῦτον,
οἷον παρὰ τὴν δοθεῖσαν αὐτοῦ γραμμὴν παρα-
30 τείναντα ἐλλείπειν τοιούτῳ χωρίῳ, οἷον ἂν αὐτὸ
τὸ παρατεταμένον ᾖ, ἄλλο τι συμβαίνειν μοι
δοκεῖ, καὶ ἄλλο αὖ, εἰ ἀδύνατόν ἐστιν ταῦτα
παθεῖν · ὑποθέμενος οὖν ἐθέλω εἰπεῖν σοι τὸ
συμβαῖνον περὶ τῆς ἐντάσεως αὐτοῦ εἰς τὸν Β
35 κύκλον, εἴτε ἀδύνατον εἴτε μή.
XXIII. Οὕτω δὴ καὶ περὶ ἀρετῆς ἡμεῖς, ἐπειδὴ
οὐκ ἴσμεν οὔθ᾽ ὅ τί ἐστιν οὔθ᾽ ὁποῖόν τι, ὑποθέ
μενοι αὐτὸ σκοπῶμεν εἴτε διδακτὸν εἴτε οὐ
διδακτόν ἐστιν, ὧδε λέγοντες · εἰ ποῖόν τί ἐστι
5 τῶν περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ὄντων ἀρετή, διδακτὸν ἂν
εἴη ἢ οὐ διδακτόν ; πρῶτον μὲν εἰ ἔστιν ἀλλοῖον
ἢ οἷον ἐπιστήμη, ἆρα διδακτὸν ἢ οὐ ; ἢ ὁ
νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν, ἀναμνηστόν ; διαφερέτω δὲ
μηδὲν ἡμῖν ὁποτέρῳ ἂν τῷ ὀνόματι χρώμεθα ·
το ἀλλ᾽ ἆρα διδακτόν ; ἢ τοῦτό γε παντὶ δῆλον, ο
ὅτι οὐδὲν ἄλλο διδάσκεται ἄνθρωπος ἢ ἐπι-
στήμην ;
ΜΕΝ. Ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.
ΣΩ. Εἰ δέ γ' ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμη τις ἡ ἀρετή,
15 δῆλον ὅτι διδακτὸν ἂν εἴη.
ΜΕΝ. Πῶς γὰρ οὔ ;
ΣΩ. Τούτου μὲν ἄρα ταχὺ ἀπηλλάγμεθα, ὅτι
τοιοῦδε μὲν ὄντος διδακτόν, τοιοῦδε δ᾽ οὔ.
ΜΕΝ. Πάνυ γε.
20 ΣΩ. Τὸ δὴ μετὰ τοῦτο , ὡς ἔοικε , δεῖ σκέ-
D
 34 ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ XXIII 87 c

ψασθαι, πότερόν ἐστιν ἐπιστήμη ἡ ἀρετὴ ἢ

ἀλλοῖον ἐπιστήμης.
D ΜΕΝ. Ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ τοῦτο μετὰ τοῦτο σκεπ
τέον εἶναι.
ΣΩ. Τί δὲ δή ; ἄλλο τι ἢ ἀγαθὸν αὐτό φαμεν 25
εἶναι τὴν ἀρετήν, καὶ αὕτη ἡ ὑπόθεσις μένει
ἡμῖν, ἀγαθὸν αὐτὸ εἶναι ;
ΜΕΝ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν εἰ μέν τί ἐστιν ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἄλλο
χωριζόμενον ἐπιστήμης, τάχ᾽ ἂν εἴη ἡ ἀρετὴ οὐκ 30
ἐπιστήμη τις · εἰ δὲ μηδέν ἐστιν ἀγαθόν, ὃ οὐκ
ἐπιστήμη περιέχει, ἐπιστήμην ἄν τιν αὐτὸ
ὑποπτεύοντες εἶναι ὀρθῶς ὑποπτεύοιμεν .
ΜΕΝ. Ἔστι ταῦτα.
ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν ἀρετῇ γ᾽ ἐσμὲν ἀγαθοί ; 35
ΜΕΝ. Ναί.
E ΣΩ. Εἰ δὲ ἀγαθοί, ωφέλιμοι · πάντα γὰρ
τἀγαθὰ ὠφέλιμα. οὐχί ;
ΜΕΝ. Ναί.
ΣΩ. Καὶ ἡ ἀρετὴ δὴ ὠφέλιμόν ἐστιν ; 40
ΜΕΝ. 'Ανάγκη ἐκ τῶν ὡμολογημένων .
XXIV. ΣΩ. Σκεψώμεθα δὴ καθ᾽ ἕκαστον
ἀναλαμβάνοντες, ποιά ἐστιν ἃ ἡμᾶς ὠφελεῖ.
ὑγίεια, φαμέν, καὶ ἰσχὺς καὶ κάλλος καὶ πλοῦτος
δή · ταῦτα λέγομεν καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ὠφέλιμα.
οὐχί ; 5
ΜΕΝ . Ναί.
88 ΣΩ. Ταὐτὰ δὲ ταῦτά φαμεν ἐνίοτε καὶ
βλάπτειν · ἢ σὺ ἄλλως φῂς ἢ οὕτως ;
ΜΕΝ. Οὔκ, ἀλλ᾽ οὕτως.
 335
XXIV 88 c ΜΕΝΩΝ 35

ΙΟ ΣΩ. Σκόπει δή, ὅταν τί ἑκάστου τούτων

ἡγῆται, ὠφελεῖ ἡμᾶς, καὶ ὅταν τί, βλάπτει ; ἆρ᾽
οὐχ ὅταν μὲν ὀρθὴ χρῆσις, ὠφελεῖ, ὅταν δὲ μή,
βλάπτει ;
ΜΕΝ. Πάνυ γε.
15 ΣΩ. Ἔτι τοίνυν καὶ τὰ κατὰ τὴν ψυχὴν
σκεψώμεθα. σωφροσύνην τι καλεῖς καὶ δικαιο-
σύνην καὶ ἀνδρείαν καὶ εὐμαθίαν καὶ μνήμην καὶ
μεγαλοπρέπειαν καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα ;
ΜΕΝ. Ἔγωγε. B
20 ΣΩ. Σκόπει δή, τούτων ἅττα σοι δοκεῖ μὴ
ἐπιστήμη εἶναι ἀλλ᾽ ἄλλο ἐπιστήμης, εἰ οὐχὶ
τοτὲ μὲν βλάπτει, τοτὲ δὲ ὠφελεῖ ; οἷον ἀνδρεία,
εἰ μὴ ἔστι φρόνησις ἡ ἀνδρεία ἀλλ᾽ οἷον θάρρος
τι · οὐχ ὅταν μὲν ἄνευ νοῦ θαρρῇ ἄνθρωπος,
25 βλάπτεται, ὅταν δὲ σὺν νῷ, ὠφελεῖται ;
ΜΕΝ. Ναί.
ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ σωφροσύνη ὡσαύτως καὶ
εὐμαθία · < πάντα > μετὰ μὲν νοῦ καὶ μανθανό
μενα καὶ καταρτυόμενα ὠφέλιμα, ἄνευ δὲ νοῦ
30 βλαβερά ;
ΜΕΝ. Πάνυ σφόδρα.
ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν συλλήβδην πάντα τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς
ἐπιχειρήματα καὶ καρτερήματα ἡγουμένης μὲν
φρονήσεως εἰς εὐδαιμονίαν τελευτᾷ, ἀφροσύνης
35 δ᾽ εἰς τοὐναντίον ;
ΜΕΝ. Εοικεν.
ΣΩ. Εἰ ἄρα ἀρετὴ τῶν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ τί ἐστιν
καὶ ἀναγκαῖον αὐτῷ ὠφελίμῳ εἶναι, φρόνησιν
αὐτὸ δεῖ εἶναι, ἐπειδήπερ πάντα τὰ κατὰ τὴν
 36 ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ XXIV 88 c

ψυχὴν αὐτὰ μὲν καθ᾽ αὑτὰ οὔτε ὠφέλιμα 40

οὔτε βλαβερά ἐστιν, προσγενομένης δὲ φρονή-
D σεως ἢ ἀφροσύνης βλαβερά τε καὶ ὠφέλιμα
γίγνεται. κατὰ δὴ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον ὠφέλιμόν
γε οὖσαν τὴν ἀρετὴν φρόνησιν δεῖ τιν
εἶναι. 45
ΜΕΝ. Ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.
XXV. ΣΩ. Καὶ μὲν δὴ καὶ τἆλλα, ἃ νυνδὴ
ἐλέγομεν, πλοῦτόν τε καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα , τοτὲ μὲν
ἀγαθὰ τοτὲ δὲ βλαβερὰ εἶναι, άρα οὐχ ὥσπερ
τῇ ἄλλῃ ψυχῇ ἡ φρόνησις ἡγουμένη ὠφέλιμα τὰ
τῆς ψυχῆς ἐποίει, ἡ δὲ ἀφροσύνη βλαβερά, 5
Ε οὕτως αὖ καὶ τούτοις ἡ ψυχὴ ὀρθῶς μὲν
χρωμένη καὶ ἡγουμένη ὠφέλιμα αὐτὰ ποιεῖ, μὴ
ὀρθῶς δὲ βλαβερά ;
ΜΕΝ. Πάνυ γε.
ΣΩ. Ὀρθῶς δέ γε ἡ ἔμφρων ἡγεῖται , ἡμαρτη- ΙΟ
μένως δ᾽ ἡ ἄφρων ;
ΜΕΝ. Ἔστι ταῦτα.
ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν οὕτω δὴ κατὰ πάντων εἰπεῖν
ἔστιν, τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ τὰ μὲν ἄλλα πάντα εἰς τὴν
89 ψυχὴν ἀνηρτῆσθαι, τὰ δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς αὐτῆς εἰς 15
φρόνησιν, εἰ μέλλει ἀγαθὰ εἶναι · καὶ τούτῳ τῷ
λόγῳ φρόνησις ἂν εἴη τὸ ὠφέλιμον · φαμὲν δὲ
τὴν ἀρετὴν ὠφέλιμον εἶναι ;
ΜΕΝ. Πάνυ γε.
ΣΩ. Φρόνησιν ἄρα φαμὲν ἀρετὴν εἶναι, ἤτοι 20
ξύμπασαν ἢ μέρος τι ;
ΜΕΝ. Δοκεί μοι καλῶς λέγεσθαι, ὦ Σώ
κρατες, τὰ λεγόμενα.
 XXVI 89 D ΜΕΝΩΝ 37

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν εἰ ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχει , οὐκ ἂν εἶεν

25 φύσει οἱ ἀγαθοί.
ΜΕΝ. Οὔ μοι δοκεῖ.
ΣΩ. Καὶ γὰρ ἄν που καὶ τόδ᾽ ἦν · εἰ φύσει Β
οἱ ἀγαθοὶ ἐγίγνοντο, σάν που ἂν ἡμῖν οἳ
ἐγίγνωσκον τῶν νέων τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς τὰς φύσεις,
30 οὓς ἡμεῖς ἂν παραλαβόντες ἐκείνων ἀποφη
νάντων ἐφυλάττομεν ἐν ἀκροπόλει, κατασημηνά-
μενοι πολὺ μᾶλλον ἢ τὸ χρυσίον, ἵνα μηδεὶς
αὐτοὺς διέφθειρεν, ἀλλ᾽ ἐπειδὴ ἀφίκοιντο εἰς
τὴν ἡλικίαν, χρήσιμοι γίγνοιντο ταῖς πόλεσιν.
35 ΜΕΝ. Εἰκός γέ τοι, ὦ Σώκρατες.
XXVI. ΣΩ. Αρ' οὖν ἐπειδὴ οὐ φύσει οἱ
ἀγαθοὶ ἀγαθοὶ γίγονται , ἆρα μαθήσει ;
ΜΕΝ. Δοκεί μοι ἤδη ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι · καὶ
δῆλον, ὦ Σώκρατες, κατὰ τὴν ὑπόθεσιν, εἴπερ
5 ἐπιστήμη ἐστὶν ἀρετή, ὅτι διδακτόν ἐστιν.
ΣΩ. Ἴσως νὴ Δία · ἀλλὰ μὴ τοῦτο οὐ καλῶς
ὡμολογήσαμεν.
ΜΕΝ. Καὶ μὴν ἐδόκει μὲν ἄρτι καλῶς λέγε-
σθαι.
10 ΣΩ. ᾿Αλλὰ μὴ οὐκ ἐν τῷ ἄρτι μόνον δέῃ
αὐτὸ δοκεῖν καλῶς λέγεσθαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν τῷ νῦν
καὶ ἐν τῷ ἔπειτα, εἰ μέλλει τι αὐτοῦ ὑγιὲς εἶναι.
ΜΕΝ. Τί οὖν δή ; πρὸς τί βλέπων δυσχεραί- D
νεις αὐτὸ καὶ ἀπιστεῖς μὴ οὐκ ἐπιστήμη ᾖ ἡ
15 ἀρετή ;
ΣΩ. Εγώ σοι ἐρῶ, ὦ Μένων. τὸ μὲν γὰρ
διδακτὸν αὐτὸ εἶναι, εἴπερ ἐπιστήμη ἐστίν, οὐκ
ἀνατίθεμαι μὴ οὐ καλῶς λέγεσθαι · ὅτι δὲ οὐκ
 38 ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ XXVI 89 D

ἔστιν ἐπιστήμη, σκέψαι ἐάν σοι δοκῶ εἰκότως

ἀπιστεῖν. τόδε γάρ μοι εἰπέ· εἰ ἔστιν διδακτὸν 20
ὁτιοῦν πρᾶγμα, μὴ μόνον ἀρετή, οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον
αὐτοῦ καὶ διδασκάλους καὶ μαθητὰς εἶναι ;
E ΜΕΝ. Ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.
ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τοὐναντίον αὖ, οὗ μήτε διδά-
σκαλοι μήτε μαθηταὶ εἶεν, καλῶς ἂν αὐτὸ εἰκά- 25
ζοντες εἰκάζοιμεν μὴ διδακτὸν εἶναι ;
ΜΕΝ. Ἔστι ταῦτα · ἀλλ᾽ ἀρετῆς διδάσκαλοι
οὐ δοκοῦσί σοι εἶναι ;
ΣΩ . Πολλάκις γοῦν ζητῶν , εἴ τινες εἶεν
αὐτῆς διδάσκαλοι , πάντα ποιῶν οὐ δύναμαι 30
εὑρεῖν . καίτοι μετὰ πολλῶν γε ζητῶ καὶ τούτων
μάλιστα, οὓς ἂν οἴωμαι ἐμπειροτάτους εἶναι τοῦ
πράγματος. καὶ δὴ καὶ νῦν, ὦ Μένων, εἰς
καλὸν ἡμῖν "Ανυτος ὅδε παρεκαθέζετο, ᾧ μετα-
δῶμεν τῆς ζητήσεως . εἰκότως δ᾽ ἂν μεταδοῖμεν · 35
90 Ανυτος γὰρ ὅδε πρῶτον μέν ἐστι πατρὸς πλου-
σίου τε καὶ σοφοῦ ᾿Ανθεμίωνος, ὃς ἐγένετο
πλούσιος οὐκ ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομάτου οὐδὲ δόντος
τινός, ὥσπερ ὁ νῦν νεωστὶ εἰληφὼς τὰ Πολυκρά-
τους χρήματα Ἰσμηνίας ὁ Θηβαῖος, ἀλλὰ τῇ 40
αὑτοῦ σοφίᾳ κτησάμενος καὶ ἐπιμελείᾳ, ἔπειτα
καὶ τὰ ἄλλα οὐχ ὑπερήφανος δοκῶν εἶναι πολίτης
Β οὐδὲ ὀγκώδης τε καὶ ἐπαχθής , ἀλλὰ κόσμιος καὶ
εὐσταλὴς ἀνήρ · ἔπειτα τοῦτον εὖ ἔθρεψεν καὶ
ἐπαίδευσεν, ὡς δοκεῖ Αθηναίων τῷ πλήθει · 45
αἱροῦνται γοῦν αὐτὸν ἐπὶ τὰς μεγίστας ἀρχάς.
δίκαιον δὴ μετὰ τοιούτων ζητεῖν ἀρετῆς πέρι
διδασκάλους, εἴτ᾽ εἰσὶν εἴτε μή, καὶ οἵτινες .
 XXVII 90 Ε ΜΕΝΩΝ 39

XXVII. Σὺ οὖν ἡμῖν, ὦ "Ανυτε, συζήτησον,

ἐμοί τε καὶ τῷ σαυτοῦ ξένῳ Μένωνι τῷδε, περὶ
τούτου τοῦ πράγματος, τίνες ἂν εἶεν διδάσκαλοι .
ὧδε δὲ σκέψαι · εἰ βουλοίμεθα Μένωνα τόνδε
5 ἀγαθὸν ἰατρὸν γενέσθαι, παρὰ τίνας ἂν αὐτὸν
πέμποιμεν διδασκάλους ; ἆρ᾽ οὐ παρὰ τοὺς σ
ἰατρούς ;
ΑΝ . Πάνυ γε.
ΣΩ. Τί δ᾽ εἰ σκυτοτόμον ἀγαθὸν βουλοίμεθα
το γενέσθαι, ἆρ᾽ οὐ παρὰ τοὺς σκυτοτόμους ;
ΑΝ. Ναί.
ΣΩ. Καὶ τἆλλα οὕτως ;
ΑΝ. Πάνυ γε.
ΣΩ. Ωδε δή μοι πάλιν περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν εἰπέ.
15 παρὰ τοὺς ἰατρούς, φαμέν, πέμποντες τόνδε
καλῶς ἂν ἐπέμπομεν, βουλόμενοι ἰατρὸν γενέ-
σθαι · ἆρ᾽ ὅταν τοῦτο λέγωμεν, τόδε λέγομεν, ὅτι D
παρὰ τούτους πέμποντες αὐτὸν σωφρονοῦμεν ἄν,
τοὺς ἀντιποιουμένους τε τῆς τέχνης μᾶλλον ἢ
20 τοὺς μή, καὶ τοὺς μισθὸν πραττομένους ἐπ᾿ αὐτῷ
τούτῳ, ἀποφήναντας αὑτοὺς διδασκάλους τοῦ
βουλομένου ἰέναι τε καὶ μανθάνειν ; ἆρ᾽ οὐ πρὸς
ταῦτα βλέψαντες καλῶς ἂν πέμποιμεν ;
ΑΝ. Ναί.
25 ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ περὶ αὐλήσεως καὶ τῶν
ἄλλων τὰ αὐτὰ ταῦτα ; πολλὴ ἄνοιά ἐστι Ε
βουλομένους αὐλητήν τινα ποιῆσαι παρὰ μὲν
τοὺς ὑπισχνουμένους διδάξειν τὴν τέχνην καὶ
μισθὸν πραττομένους μὴ ἐθέλειν πέμπειν, ἄλλοις
30 δέ τισιν πράγματα παρέχειν [ ζητοῦντα μανθάνειν
 40 ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ XXVII 90 Ε

παρὰ τούτων] οἳ μήτε προσποιοῦνται διδάσκαλοι

εἶναι μήτ᾽ ἔστιν αὐτῶν μαθητὴς μηδεὶς τούτου τοῦ
μαθήματος, ὁ ἡμεῖς ἀξιοῦμεν μανθάνειν παρ᾽ αὐτῶν
ὃν ἂν πέμπωμεν . οὐ πολλή σοι δοκεῖ ἀλογία
εἶναι ; 35
ΑΝ. Ναὶ μὲ Δία ἔμοιγε, καὶ ἀμαθία γε πρός.
91 XXVIII . ΣΩ . Καλῶς λέγεις. νῦν τοίνυν
ἔξεστί σε μετ᾿ ἐμοῦ κοινῇ βουλεύεσθαι περὶ τοῦ
ξένου τουτουῒ Μένωνος . οὗτος γάρ, ὦ Ανυτε,
πάλαι λέγει πρός με , ὅτι ἐπιθυμεῖ ταύτης τῆς
σοφίας καὶ ἀρετῆς, ᾗ οἱ ἄνθρωποι τάς τε οἰκίας 5
καὶ τὰς πόλεις καλῶς διοικοῦσι, καὶ τοὺς γονέας
τοὺς αὑτῶν θεραπεύουσι, καὶ πολίτας καὶ ξένους
ὑποδέξασθαί τε καὶ ἀποπέμψαι ἐπίστανται ἀξίως
Β ἀνδρὸς ἀγαθοῦ. ταύτην οὖν τὴν ἀρετὴν . . .
σκόπει παρὰ τίνας ἂν πέμποντες αὐτὸν ὀρθῶς ΙΟ
πέμποιμεν. ἢ δῆλον δὴ κατὰ τὸν ἄρτι λόγον,
ὅτι παρὰ τούτους τοὺς ὑπισχνουμένους ἀρετῆς
διδασκάλους εἶναι καὶ ἀποφήναντας αὑτοὺς
κοινοὺς τῶν Ἑλλήνων τῷ βουλομένῳ μανθάνειν,
μισθὸν τούτου ταξαμένους τε καὶ πραττομένους ; 15
ΑΝ. Καὶ τίνας λέγεις τούτους, ὦ Σώκρατες ;
ΣΩ. Οἶσθα δήπου καὶ σύ, ὅτι οὗτοί εἰσιν οὓς
C οἱ ἄνθρωποι καλοῦσι σοφιστάς.
ΑΝ. Ηράκλεις, εὐφήμει, ὦ Σώκρατες . μηδένα
τῶν συγγενῶν μηδὲ οἰκείων μηδὲ φίλων, μήτε 20
ἀστὸν μήτε ξένον, τοιαύτη μανία λάβοι, ὥστε
παρὰ τούτους ἐλθόντα λωβηθῆναι, ἐπεὶ οὗτοί γε
φανερά ἐστι λώβη τε καὶ διαφθορὰ τῶν συγγιγνο-
μένων.
 XXIX 92 A ΜΕΝΩΝ 41

ΧΧΙΧ. ΣΩ . Πῶς λέγεις, ὦ ῎Ανυτε ; οὗτοι

ἄρα μόνοι τῶν ἀντιποιουμένων τι ἐπίστασθαι
εὐεργετεῖν τοσοῦτον τῶν ἄλλων διαφέρουσιν, ὅσον
οὐ μόνον οὐκ ὠφελοῦσιν, ὥσπερ οἱ ἄλλοι, ὅ τι ἂν
5 τις αὐτοῖς παραδῷ, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ ἐναντίον διαφθεί-
ρουσιν ; καὶ τούτων φανερῶς χρήματα ἀξιοῦσι D
πράττεσθαι ; ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἔχω ὅπως σοι
πιστεύσω · οἶδα γὰρ ἄνδρα ἕνα Πρωταγόραν
πλείω χρήματα κτησάμενον ἀπὸ ταύτης τῆς
10 σοφίας ἢ Φειδίαν τε, ὃς οὕτως περιφανῶς καλὰ
ἔργα εἰργάζετο, καὶ ἄλλους δέκα τῶν ἀνδριαντο-
ποιῶν · καίτοι τέρας λέγεις, εἰ οἱ μὲν τὰ ὑποδή-
ματα ἐργαζόμενοι τὰ παλαιὰ καὶ τὰ ἱμάτια ἐξα-
κούμενοι οὐκ ἂν δύναιντο λαθεῖν τριάκονθ᾽ ἡμέρας Ε
15 μοχθηρότερα ἀποδιδόντες ἢ παρέλαβον τὰ ἱμάτιά
τε καὶ ὑποδήματα , ἀλλ᾽ εἰ τοιαῦτα ποιοῖεν, ταχὺ
ἂν τῷ λιμῷ ἀποθάνοιεν, Πρωταγόρας δὲ ἄρα ὅλην
τὴν Ἑλλάδα ἐλάνθανεν διαφθείρων τοὺς συγγι
γνομένους καὶ μοχθηροτέρους ἀποπέμπων ἢ παρ-
20 ελάμβανεν πλέον ἢ τετταράκοντα ἔτη· οἶμαι γὰρ
αὐτὸν ἀποθανεῖν ἐγγὺς καὶ ἑβδομήκοντα ἔτη γεγο-
νότα, τετταράκοντα δὲ ἐν τῇ τέχνῃ ὄντα · καὶ
ἐν ἅπαντι τῷ χρόνῳ τούτῳ ἔτι εἰς τὴν ἡμέραν
ταυτηνὶ εὐδοκιμῶν οὐδὲν πέπαυται · καὶ οὐ
25 μόνον Πρωταγόρας, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλλοι πάμ- 92
ἄλλοι
πολλοι, οἱ μὲν πρότερον γεγονότες ἐκείνου,
οἱ δὲ καὶ νῦν ἔτι ὄντες. πότερον δὴ οὖν
φῶμεν κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον εἰδότας αὐτοὺς
ἐξαπατῶν καὶ λωβᾶσθαι τοὺς νέους, ἢ λελη-
30 θέναι καὶ ἑαυτούς ;
3ο καὶ οὕτω μαίνεσθαι ἀξιώ-
 42 ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ XXIX 92 A

σωμεν τούτους, οὓς ἔνιοί φασι σοφωτάτους

ἀνθρώπων εἶναι ;
ΧΧΧ. ΑΝ. Πολλοῦ γε δέουσι μαίνεσθαι, ὦ
Σώκρατες, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον οἱ τούτοις διδόντες
ἀργύριον τῶν νέων · τούτων δ᾽ ἔτι μᾶλλον οἱ
Β τούτοις ἐπιτρέποντες, οἱ προσήκοντες · πολὺ δὲ
μάλιστα πάντων αἱ πόλεις , ἐῶσαι αὐτοὺς εἰσαφ- 5
ικνείσθαι καὶ οὐκ ἐξελαύνουσαι, εἴτε τις ξένος
ἐπιχειρεῖ τοιοῦτόν τι ποιεῖν εἴτε ἀστός .
ΣΩ. Πότερον δέ, ὦ Ανυτε, ἠδίκηκέ τίς σε
τῶν σοφιστῶν, ἢ τί οὕτως αὐτοῖς χαλεπὸς
εἶ ; ΙΟ
ΑΝ. Οὐδὲ μὲ Δία ἔγωγε συγγέγονα πώποτε
αὐτῶν οὐδενί, οὐδ᾽ ἂν ἄλλον ἐάσαιμι τῶν ἐμῶν
οὐδένα.
ΣΩ. "Απειρος ἄρ᾽ εἶ παντάπασι τῶν ἀνδρῶν ;
ΑΝ. Καὶ εἴην γε. 15
ΣΩ. Πῶς οὖν ἄν, ὦ δαιμόνιε, εἰδείης περὶ
τούτου τοῦ πράγματος, εἴτε τι ἀγαθὸν ἔχει < ἐν >
ἑαυτῷ εἴτε φλαῦρον, οὗ παντάπασιν ἄπειρος εἴης ;
ΑΝ. Ῥαδίως · τούτους γοῦν οἶδα οἵ εἰσιν,
εἴτ᾿ οὖν ἄπειρος αὐτῶν εἰμὶ εἴτε μή. 20
ΣΩ. Μάντις εἰ ἴσως, ὦ ῎Ανυτε · ἐπεὶ ὅπως γε
ἄλλως οἶσθα τούτων πέρι, ἐξ ὧν αὐτὸς λέγεις
θαυμάζοιμ' ἄν. ἀλλὰ γὰρ οὐ τούτους ἐζήτουμεν
τίνες εἰσίν, παρ' οὓς ἂν Μένων ἀφικόμενος μοχ
D θηρὸς γένοιτο · οὗτοι μὲν γάρ, εἰ σὺ βούλει , 25
ἔστων οἱ σοφισταί · ἀλλὰ δὴ ἐκείνους εἰπὲ ἡμῖν,
καὶ τὸν πατρικὸν τόνδε ἑταῖρον εὐεργέτησον ,
φράσας αὐτῷ, παρὰ τίνας ἀφικόμενος ἐν τοσαύτῃ
 XXXI 93 B ΜΕΝΩΝ 43

πόλει τὴν ἀρετὴν ἣν νυνδὴ ἐγὼ διῆλθον γένοιτ'

30 ἂν ἄξιος λόγου.
ΑΝ. Τί δὲ αὐτῷ οὐ σὺ ἔφρασας ;
ΣΩ. Αλλ' οὓς μὲν ἐγὼ ᾤμην διδασκάλους
τούτων εἶναι, εἶπον, ἀλλὰ τυγχάνω οὐδὲν λέγων,
ὡς σὺ φῄς · καὶ ἴσως τὶ λέγεις. ἀλλὰ σὺ δὴ ἐν Ε
35 τῷ μέρει αὐτῷ εἰπὲ παρὰ τίνας ἔλθῃ Αθηναίων ·
εἰπὲ ὄνομα ὅτου βούλει .
ΑΝ. Τί δὲ ἑνὸς ἀνθρώπου ὄνομα δεῖ ἀκοῦσαι ;
ὅτῳ γὰρ ἂν ἐντύχῃ ᾿Αθηναίων τῶν καλῶν κἀγα-
θῶν, οὐδεὶς ἔστιν ὃς οὐ βελτίω αὐτὸν ποιήσει ἢ
40 οἱ σοφισταί, ἐάν περ ἐθέλῃ πείθεσθαι .
ΧΧΧΙ. ΣΩ. Πότερον δὲ οὗτοι οἱ καλοὶ κἀγα-
θοὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομάτου ἐγένοντο τοιοῦτοι, παρ᾽
οὐδενὸς μαθόντες ὅμως μέντοι ἄλλους διδάσκειν
οἷοί τε ὄντες ταῦτα, ἃ αὐτοὶ οὐκ ἔμαθον ; 93
5 ΑΝ. Καὶ τούτους ἔγωγε ἀξιῶ παρὰ τῶν προ-
τέρων μαθεῖν, ὄντων καλῶν κἀγαθῶν · ἢ οὐ δοκοῦσι
σοι πολλοὶ καὶ ἀγαθοὶ γεγονέναι ἐν τῇδε τῇ πόλει
ἄνδρες ;
ΣΩ. Ἔμοιγε, ὦ Ανντε, καὶ εἶναι δοκοῦσιν
το ἐνθάδε ἀγαθοὶ τὰ πολιτικά, καὶ γεγονέναι ἔτι
οὐχ ἧττον ἢ εἶναι · ἀλλὰ μῶν καὶ διδάσκαλοι
ἀγαθοὶ γεγόνασιν τῆς αὑτῶν ἀρετῆς ; τοῦτο γάρ
ἐστιν περὶ οὗ ὁ λόγος ἡμῖν τυγχάνει ὤν · οὐκ εἰ
εἰσὶν ἀγαθοὶ ἢ μὴ ἄνδρες ἐνθάδε, οὐδ᾽ εἰ γεγόνασιν
15 ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν, ἀλλ᾽ εἰ διδακτόν ἐστιν ἀρετὴ πάλαι Β
σκοποῦμεν. τοῦτο δὲ σκοποῦντες τόδε σκοποῦ-
μεν, ἆρα οἱ ἀγαθοὶ ἄνδρες καὶ τῶν νῦν καὶ τῶν
προτέρων ταύτην τὴν ἀρετήν, ἣν αὐτοὶ ἀγαθοὶ
 44 ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ XXXI 93B

ἦσαν, ἠπίσταντο καὶ ἄλλῳ παραδοῦναι, ἢ οὐ

παραδοτὸν τοῦτο ἀνθρώπῳ οὐδὲ παραληπτὸν 20
ἄλλῳ παρ᾽ ἄλλου · τοῦτ᾽ ἔστιν ὃ πάλαι ζητοῦμεν
ἐγώ τε καὶ Μένων.
ΧΧΧΙΙ. Ωδε οὖν σκόπει ἐκ τοῦ σαυτοῦ
Ο λόγου · Θεμιστοκλέα οὐκ ἀγαθὸν ἂν φαίης ἄνδρα
γεγονέναι ;
ΑΝ. Ἔγωγε, πάντων γε μάλιστα.
ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ διδάσκαλον ἀγαθόν, εἴπερ ς
τις ἄλλος τῆς αὑτοῦ ἀρετῆς διδάσκαλος ἦν,
κἀκεῖνον εἶναι ;
ΑΝ. Οἶμαι ἔγωγε, εἴπερ ἐβούλετό γε.
ΣΩ. Αλλ', οἴει, οὐκ ἂν ἐβουλήθη ἄλλους τέ
τινας καλοὺς κἀγαθοὺς γενέσθαι, μάλιστα δέ που το
τὸν ὑὸν τὸν αὐτοῦ ; ἢ οἴει αὐτὸν φθονεῖν αὐτῷ
D καὶ ἐξεπίτηδες οὐ παραδιδόναι τὴν ἀρετήν, ἣν
αὐτὸς ἀγαθὸς ἦν ; ἢ οὐκ ἀκήκοας, ὅτι Θεμιστο
κλῆς Κλεόφαντον τὸν ὑὸν ἱππέα μὲν ἐδιδάξατο
ἀγαθόν ; ἐπέμενεν γοῦν ἐπὶ τῶν ἵππων ὀρθὸς 15
ἑστηκώς, καὶ ἠκόντιζεν ἀπὸ τῶν ἵππων ὀρθός,
καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ καὶ θαυμαστὰ εἰργάζετο, ἃ
ἐκεῖνος αὐτὸν ἐπαιδεύσατο καὶ ἐποίησε σοφόν,
ὅσα διδασκάλων ἀγαθῶν εἴχετο . ἢ ταῦτα οὐκ
ἀκήκοας τῶν πρεσβυτέρων ; 20
ΑΝ. ᾿Ακήκοα.
ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἂν ἄρα τήν γε φύσιν τοῦ ὑέος αὐτοῦ
ᾐτιάσατ᾽ ἄν τις εἶναι κακήν .
E ΑΝ. Ἴσως οὐκ ἄν.
ΣΩ. Τί δὲ τόδε ὡς Κλεόφαντος ὁ Θεμιστο- 25
κλέους ἀνὴρ ἀγαθὸς καὶ σοφὸς ἐγένετο ἅπερ ὁ
 XXXIII 94 C ΜΕΝΩΝ 45

πατὴρ αὐτοῦ, ἤδη του ἀκήκοας ἢ νεωτέρου ἢ

πρεσβυτέρου ;
ΑΝ. Οὐ δῆτα .
30 ΣΩ. Αρ' οὖν ταῦτα μὲν οἰόμεθα βούλεσθαι
αὐτὸν τὸν αὑτοῦ ὑὸν παιδεῦσαι, ἣν δὲ αὐτὸς σοφίαν
ἦν σοφός, οὐδὲν τῶν γειτόνων βελτίω ποιῆσαι,
εἴπερ ἦν γε διδακτὸν ἡ ἀρετή ;
ΑΝ. Ἴσως μά Δί' οὔ.
XXXIII. ΣΩ. Οὗτος μὲν δή σοι τοιοῦτος
διδάσκαλος ἀρετῆς, ὃν καὶ σὺ ὁμολογεῖς ἐν τοῖς 94
ἄριστον τῶν προτέρων εἶναι · ἄλλον δὲ δὴ
σκεψώμεθα, ᾿Αριστείδην τὸν Λυσιμάχου · ἢ τοῦ
5 τον οὐχ ὁμολογεῖς ἀγαθὸν γεγονέναι ;
ΑΝ. Ἔγωγε, πάντως δήπου.
ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ οὗτος · τὸν ὑὸν τὸν αὑτοῦ
Λυσίμαχον, ὅσα μὲν διδασκάλων εἴχετο, κάλλιστα
Αθηναίων ἐπαίδευσεν, ἄνδρα δὲ βελτίω δοκεῖ σοι
το ὁτουοῦν πεποιηκέναι ; τούτῳ γάρ που καὶ συγγέ-
γονας καὶ ὁρᾷς οἷός ἐστιν . εἰ δὲ βούλει, Περι- Β
κλέα, οὕτως μεγαλοπρεπῶς σοφὸν ἄνδρα, οἶσθ᾽
ὅτι δύο ὑεῖς ἔθρεψε, Πάραλον καὶ Ξάνθιππον ;
ΑΝ. Ἔγωγε .
15 ΣΩ. Τούτους μέντοι , ὡς οἶσθα καὶ σύ, ἱππέας
μὲν ἐδίδαξεν οὐδενὸς χείρους Αθηναίων, καὶ
μουσικὴν καὶ ἀγωνίαν καὶ τἆλλα ἐπαίδευσεν,
ὅσα τέχνης ἔχεται, οὐδενὸς χείρους · ἀγαθοὺς δὲ
ἄρα ἄνδρας οὐκ ἐβούλετο ποιῆσαι ; δοκῶ μέν,
20 ἐβούλετο, ἀλλὰ μὴ οὐκ ἦ διδακτόν. ἵνα δὲ μὴ
ὀλίγους οἴῃ καὶ τοὺς φαυλοτάτους Αθηναίων
ἀδυνάτους γεγονέναι τοῦτο τὸ πρᾶγμα, ἐνθυμήθητι ε
 46 ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ XXXIII 94 C

ὅτι Θουκυδίδης αὖ δύο ὑεῖς ἔθρεψεν, Μελησίαν

καὶ Στέφανον, καὶ τούτους ἐπαίδευσεν τά τε ἄλλα
εὖ καὶ ἐπάλαισαν κάλλιστα ᾿Αθηναίων · τὸν μὲν 25
γὰρ Ξανθίᾳ ἔδωκε, τὸν δὲ Εὐδώρῳ · οὗτοι δέ που
ἐδόκουν τῶν τότε κάλλιστα παλαίειν · ἢ οὐ μέ-
μνησαι ;
ΑΝ. Ἔγωγε, ἀκοῇ.
XXXIV. ΣΩ . Οὐκοῦν δῆλον ὅτι οὗτος οὐκ
D ἄν ποτε, οὗ μὲν ἔδει δαπανώμενον διδάσκειν,
ταῦτα μὲν ἐδίδαξε τοὺς παῖδας τοὺς αὑτοῦ, οὗ
δὲ οὐδὲν ἔδει ἀναλώσαντα ἀγαθοὺς ἄνδρας ποιη-
σαι , τοῦτο δὲ οὐκ ἐδίδαξεν , εἰ διδακτὸν ἦν ; 5
ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἴσως ὁ Θουκυδίδης φαῦλος ἦν, καὶ
οὐκ ἦσαν αὐτῷ πλεῖστοι φίλοι ᾿Αθηναίων καὶ
τῶν συμμάχων ; · καὶ οἰκίας μεγάλης ἦν καὶ
ἐδύνατο μέγα ἐν τῇ πόλει καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις
Ἕλλησιν, ὥστε εἴπερ ἦν τοῦτο διδακτόν, ἐξευρεῖν ΙΟ
ἂν ὅστις ἔμελλεν αὐτοῦ τοὺς ὑεῖς ἀγαθοὺς ποιή-
Ε σειν, ἢ τῶν ἐπιχωρίων τις ἢ τῶν ξένων, εἰ αὐτὸς
μὴ ἐσχόλαζεν διὰ τὴν τῆς πόλεως ἐπιμέλειαν .
ἀλλὰ γάρ, ὦ ἑταῖρε ῎Ανυτε, μὴ οὐκ ᾖ διδακτὸν
ἀρετή. 15
ΑΝ. Ω Σώκρατες, ῥᾳδίως μοι δοκεῖς κακῶς
λέγειν ἀνθρώπους. ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν ἄν σοι συμβου-
λεύσαιμι, εἰ ἐθέλεις ἐμοὶ πείθεσθαι , εὐλαβεῖσθαι ·
ὡς ἴσως μὲν καὶ ἐν ἄλλῃ πόλει ῥᾷόν ἐστιν κακῶς
95 ποιεῖν ἀνθρώπους ἢ εὖ, ἐν τῇδε δὲ καὶ πάνυ · τ
οἶμαι δὲ σὲ καὶ αὐτὸν εἰδέναι.
XXXV. ΣΩ. Ὦ Μένων, Ανυτος μέν μοι
δοκεῖ χαλεπαίνειν · καὶ οὐδὲν θαυμάζω · οἴεται
 XXXV 95 C ΜΕΝΩΝ 47

γάρ με πρῶτον μὲν κακηγορεῖν τούτους τοὺς

ἄνδρας, ἔπειτα ἡγεῖται καὶ αὐτὸς εἶναι εἰς τού
5 των. ἀλλ᾽ οὗτος μὲν ἐάν ποτε γνῷ, οἷόν ἐστιν
τὸ κακῶς λέγειν, παύσεται χαλεπαίνων, νῦν δὲ
ἀγνοεῖ· σὺ δέ μοι εἰπέ, οὐ καὶ παρ᾽ ὑμῖν εἰσὶν
καλοὶ κἀγαθοὶ ἄνδρες ;
ΜΕΝ. Πάνυ γε.
10 ΣΩ. Τί οὖν ; ἐθέλουσιν οὗτοι παρέχειν αὑτοὺς Β
διδασκάλους τοῖς νέοις, καὶ ὁμολογεῖν διδάσκαλοί
τε εἶναι ἢ διδακτὸν ἀρετήν ;
ΜΕΝ. Οὐ μὰ τὸν Δία, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλὰ
τοτὲ μὲν ἂν αὐτῶν ἀκούσαις ὡς διδακτόν, τοτὲ δὲ
15 ὡς οὔ.
ΣΩ. Φῶμεν οὖν τούτους διδασκάλους εἶναι
τούτου τοῦ πράγματος, οἷς μηδὲ αὐτὸ τοῦτο
ὁμολογεῖται ;
ΜΕΝ. Οὔ μοι δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες.
20 ΣΩ. Τί δὲ δή ; οἱ σοφισταί σοι οὗτοι , οἵπερ
μόνοι ἐπαγγέλλονται, δοκοῦσι διδάσκαλοι εἶναι C
ἀρετῆς ;
ΜΕΝ. Καὶ Γοργίου μάλιστα, ὦ Σώκρατες,
ταῦτα ἄγαμαι, ὅτι οὐκ ἄν ποτε αὐτοῦ τοῦτο
25 ἀκούσαις ὑπισχνουμένου, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων
καταγελᾷ, ὅταν ἀκούσῃ ὑπισχνουμένων · ἀλλὰ
λέγειν οἴεται δεῖν ποιεῖν δεινούς.
ΣΩ. Οὐδ᾽ ἄρα σοὶ δοκοῦσιν οἱ σοφισταί
διδάσκαλοι είναι ;
30 ΜΕΝ . Οὐκ ἔχω λέγειν, ὦ Σώκρατες. καὶ
γὰρ αὐτὸς ὅπερ οἱ πολλοὶ πέπονθα · τοτὲ μέν μοι
δοκοῦσιν, τοτὲ δὲ οὔ.
 48 ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ XXXV 95 D

D ΣΩ. Οἶσθα δὲ ὅτι οὐ μόνον σοι τε καὶ τοῖς

ἄλλοις τοῖς πολιτικοῖς τοῦτο δοκεῖ τοτὲ μὲν
εἶναι διδακτόν, τοτὲ δ᾽ οὔ, ἀλλὰ καὶ Θέογνιν τὸν 35
ποιητὴν οἶσθ᾽ ὅτι ταὐτὰ ταῦτα λέγει ;
ΜΕΝ. Ἐν ποίοις ἔπεσιν ;
XXXVI. ΣΩ. Ἐν τοῖς ἐλεγείοις οὗ λέγει
καὶ παρὰ τοῖσιν πᾶνε καὶ ἔσθιε, καὶ μετὰ τοῖσιν
ἵζε, καὶ ἅνδανε τοῖς, ὧν μεγάλη δύναμις.
ἐσθλῶν μὲν γὰρ ἄπ᾽ ἐσθλὰ διδάξεαι · ἢν δὲ κακοῖσιν
E συμμίσγῃς, ἀπολεῖς καὶ τὸν ἔόντα νόον. 5

οἶσθ᾽ ὅτι ἐν τούτοις μὲν ὡς διδακτοῦ οὔσης τῆς

ἀρετῆς λέγει ;
ΜΕΝ. Φαίνεταί γε.
ΣΩ. Ἐν ἄλλοις δέ γε ὀλίγον μεταβάς,
εἰ δ᾽ ἦν ποιητόν, φησί, καὶ ἔνθετον ἀνδρὶ νόημα, ΙΟ

λέγει πως ὅτι

πολλοὺς ἂν μισθοὺς καὶ μεγάλους ἔφερον
οἱ δυνάμενοι τοῦτο ποιεῖν, καὶ
οὔ ποτ᾽ ἂν ἐξ ἀγαθοῦ πατρὸς ἔγεντο κακός,
96 πειθόμενος μύθοισι σαόφροσιν. ἀλλὰ διδάσκων 15
οὔ ποτε ποιήσεις τὸν κακὸν ἄνδρ' ἀγαθόν.
ἐννοεῖς ὅτι αὐτὸς αὑτῷ πάλιν περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν
τἀναντία λέγει ;
ΜΕΝ. Φαίνεται.
ΣΩ. Ἔχεις οὖν εἰπεῖν ἄλλου ὁτουοῦν πράγ- 20
ματος, οὗ οἱ μὲν φάσκοντες διδάσκαλοι εἶναι οὐχ
ὅπως ἄλλων διδάσκαλοι ὁμολογοῦνται , ἀλλὰ
Β οὐδ᾽ αὐτοὶ ἐπίστασθαι, ἀλλὰ πονηροὶ εἶναι περὶ
αὐτὸ τοῦτο τὸ πρᾶγμα οὗ φασὶ διδάσκαλοι εἶναι ,
 XXXVII 96 D ΜΕΝΩΝ 49

35 οἱ δὲ ὁμολογούμενοι αὐτοὶ καλοὶ κἀγαθοὶ τοτὲ

κέν φασιν αὐτὸ διδακτὸν εἶναι, τοτὲ δὲ οὔ ; τοὺς
οὖν οὕτω τεταραγμένους περὶ ὁτουοῦν φαίης ἂν
σὺ κυρίως διδασκάλους εἶναι ;
ΜΕΝ. Μὰ Δί᾽ οὐκ ἔγωγε.
XXXVII. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν εἰ μήτε οἱ σοφισταί
μήτε οἱ αὐτοὶ καλοὶ κἀγαθοὶ ὄντες διδάσκαλοί
εἰσι τοῦ πράγματος, δῆλον ὅτι οὐκ ἂν ἄλλοι γε ;
ΜΕΝ. Οὔ μοι δοκεῖ.
5 ΣΩ. Εἰ δέ γε μὴ διδάσκαλοι , οὐδὲ μαθηταί ; c
ΜΕΝ. Δοκεί μοι ἔχειν ὡς λέγεις.
ΣΩ. Ωμολογήκαμεν δέ γε, πράγματος οὗ
μήτε διδάσκαλοι μήτε μαθηταὶ εἶεν, τοῦτο μηδὲ
διδακτὸν εἶναι ;
10 ΜΕΝ. Ωμολογήκαμεν.
ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἀρετῆς οὐδαμοῦ φαίνονται διδά-
σκαλοι ;
ΜΕΝ. Ἔστι ταῦτα.
ΣΩ. Εἰ δέ γε μὴ διδάσκαλοι , οὐδὲ μαθηταί ;
15 ΜΕΝ. Φαίνεται οὕτως .
ΣΩ. ᾿Αρετὴ ἄρα οὐκ ἂν εἴη διδακτόν ;
ΜΕΝ. Οὐκ ἔοικεν , εἴπερ ὀρθῶς ἡμεῖς ἐσκέμ- D
μεθα. ὥστε καὶ θαυμάζω δή, ὦ Σώκρατες,
πότερόν ποτε οὐδ᾽ εἰσὶν ἀγαθοὶ ἄνδρες, ἢ τίς ἂν
20 εἴη τρόπος τῆς γενέσεως τῶν ἀγαθῶν γιγνο-
μένων.
ΣΩ. Κινδυνεύομεν, ὦ Μένων, ἐγώ τε καὶ σὺ
φαῦλοί τινες εἶναι ἄνδρες, καὶ σέ τε Γοργίας οὐχ
ἱκανῶς πεπαιδευκέναι καὶ ἐμὲ Πρόδικος. παντὸς
25 μᾶλλον οὖν προσεκτέον τὸν νοῦν ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς, καὶ
E
 50 ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ XXXVII 96 D

ζητητέον ὅστις ἡμᾶς ἑνί γέ τῷ τρόπῳ βελτίους

Ε ποιήσει · λέγω δὲ ταῦτα ἀποβλέψας πρὸς τὴν
ἄρτι ζήτησιν, ὡς ἡμᾶς ἔλαθεν καταγελάστως, ὅτι
οὐ μόνον ἐπιστήμης ἡγουμένης ὀρθῶς τε καὶ εὖ
τοῖς ἀνθρώποις πράττεται τὰ πράγματα, ᾗ ἴσως 30
καὶ διαφεύγει ἡμᾶς τὸ γνῶναι, τίνα ποτὲ τρόπον
γίγνονται οἱ ἀγαθοὶ ἄνδρες.
ΜΕΝ. Πῶς τοῦτο λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες ;
XXXVIII. ΣΩ . Ὧδε · ὅτι μὲν τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς
ἄνδρας δεῖ ὠφελίμους εἶναι, ὀρθῶς ὡμολογήκαμεν
97 τοῦτό γε, ὅτι οὐκ ἂν ἄλλως ἔχοι · ἦ γάρ ;
ΜΕΝ. Ναί.
ΣΩ. Καὶ ὅτι γε ὠφέλιμοι ἔσονται, ἂν ὀρθῶς 5
ἡμῖν ἡγῶνται τῶν πραγμάτων, καὶ τοῦτό που
καλῶς ὁμολογοῦμεν ;
ΜΕΝ. Ναί.
ΣΩ. Ὅτι δ᾽ οὐκ ἔστιν ὀρθῶς ἡγεῖσθαι, ἐὰν
μὴ φρόνιμος ᾖ, τοῦτο ὁμοῖοι ἐσμεν οὐκ ὀρθῶς ΙΟ
ὡμολογηκόσιν.
ΜΕΝ. Πῶς δὴ [ὀρθῶς] λέγεις ;
ΣΩ. Ἐγὼ ἐρῶ. <εἴ> τις εἰδὼς τὴν ὁδὸν τὴν
εἰς Λάρισαν ἢ ὅποι βούλει ἄλλοσε βαδίζοι καὶ
ἄλλοις ἡγοῖτο, ἄλλο τι ὀρθῶς ἂν καὶ εὖ ἡγοῖτο ; 15
ΜΕΝ. Πάνυ γε.
B ΣΩ. Τί δ᾽ εἴ τις ὀρθῶς μὲν δοξάζων, ἥτις
ἐστὶν ἡ ὁδός, ἐληλυθὼς δὲ μὴ μηδ' ἐπιστάμενος,
οὐ καὶ οὗτος ἂν ὀρθῶς ἡγοῖτο ;
ΜΕΝ. Πάνυ γε. 20
ΣΩ. Καὶ ἕως γ᾽ ἄν που ὀρθὴν δόξαν ἔχῃ
περὶ ὧν ὁ ἕτερος ἐπιστήμην, οὐδὲν χείρων
 XXXIX 97 D ΜΕΝΩΝ 51

ἡγεμὼν ἔσται, οἰόμενος μὲν ἀληθῆ, φρονῶν δὲ

μή, τοῦ τοῦτο φρονοῦντος .
25 ΜΕΝ. Οὐδὲν γάρ.
ΣΩ. Δόξα ἄρα ἀληθὴς πρὸς ὀρθότητα πρά-
ξεως οὐδὲν χείρων ἡγεμὼν φρονήσεως · καὶ τοῦτό
ἐστιν ὁ νυνδὴ παρελείπομεν ἐν τῇ περὶ τῆς
ἀρετῆς σκέψει, ὁποῖόν τι εἴη, λέγοντες ὅτι C
30 φρόνησις μόνον ἡγεῖται τοῦ ὀρθῶς πράττειν · τὸ
δὲ ἄρα καὶ δόξα ἦν ἀληθής.
ΜΕΝ. Ἔοικέ γε.
ΣΩ. Οὐδὲν ἄρα ἧττον ὠφέλιμόν ἐστιν ὀρθὴ
δόξα ἐπιστήμης.
35 ΜΕΝ. Τοσούτῳ γε, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅτι ὁ μὲν
τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἔχων ἀεὶ ἂν ἐπιτυγχάνοι, ὁ δὲ τὴν
ὀρθὴν δόξαν τοτὲ μὲν ἂν τυγχάνοι, τοτὲ δ᾽ οὔ.
XXXIX. ΣΩ. Πῶς λέγεις ; ὁ ἀεὶ ἔχων
ὀρθὴν δόξαν οὐκ < ἂν > ἀεὶ τυγχάνοι, ἕωσπερ
ὀρθὰ δοξάζοι ;
ΜΕΝ. 'Ανάγκη μοι φαίνεται · ὥστε θαυμάζω,
5 ὦ Σώκρατες, τούτου οὕτως ἔχοντος , ὅ τι δή ποτε D
πολὺ τιμιωτέρα ἡ ἐπιστήμη τῆς ὀρθῆς δόξης,
καὶ δι᾽ ὅ τι τὸ μὲν ἕτερον, τὸ δὲ ἕτερόν ἐστιν
αὐτῶν.
ΣΩ. Οἶσθα οὖν δι᾽ ὅ τι θαυμάζεις , ἢ ἐγώ σοι
ΙΟ εἴπω ;
ΜΕΝ. Πάνυ γ' εἰπέ.
ΣΩ. Ὅτι τοῖς Δαιδάλου ἀγάλμασιν οὐ προσ-
έσχηκας τὸν νοῦν · ἴσως δὲ οὐδ᾽ ἔστιν παρ'
ὑμῖν.
15 ΜΕΝ. Πρὸς τί δὲ δὴ τοῦτο λέγεις ;
 52 ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ XXXIX 97 D

ΣΩ. Ὅτι καὶ ταῦτα, ἐὰν μὲν μὴ δεδεμένα ᾖ,

ἀποδιδράσκει καὶ δραπετεύει, ἐὰν δὲ δεδεμένα,
παραμένει.
E ΜΕΝ. Τί οὖν δή ;
ΣΩ. Τῶν ἐκείνου ποιημάτων λελυμένον μὲν 20
ἐκτῆσθαι οὐ πολλῆς τινος ἄξιόν ἐστι τιμῆς,
ὥσπερ δραπέτην ἄνθρωπον · οὐ γὰρ παραμένει ·
δεδεμένον δὲ πολλοῦ ἄξιον · πάνυ γὰρ καλὰ τὰ
ἔργα ἐστίν. πρὸς τί οὖν δὴ λέγω ταῦτα ; πρὸς
τὰς δόξας τὰς ἀληθεῖς. καὶ γὰρ αἱ δόξαι αἱ 25
ἀληθεῖς, ὅσον μὲν ἂν χρόνον παραμένωσιν, καλὸν
τὸ χρῆμα καὶ πάντα τἀγαθὰ ἐργάζονται · πολὺν
98 δὲ χρόνον οὐκ ἐθέλουσι παραμένειν, ἀλλὰ δραπε-
τεύουσιν ἐκ τῆς ψυχῆς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, ὥστε οὐ
πολλοῦ ἄξιαί εἰσιν, ἕως ἄν τις αὐτὰς δήσῃ αἰτίας 30
λογισμῷ. τοῦτο δ᾽ ἐστίν, < ὦ > [Μένων] ἑταῖρε,
ἀνάμνησις, ὡς ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν ἡμῖν ὡμολόγηται.
ἐπειδὰν δὲ δεθῶσιν, πρῶτον μὲν ἐπιστῆμαι
γίγνονται, ἔπειτα μόνιμοι · καὶ διὰ ταῦτα δὴ
τιμιώτερον ἐπιστήμη ὀρθῆς δόξης ἐστίν, καὶ 35
διαφέρει δεσμῷ ἐπιστήμη ὀρθῆς δόξης.
ΜΕΝ. Νὴ τὸν Δία, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔοικεν
τοιούτῳ τινί.
B XL. ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν καὶ ἐγὼ ὡς οὐκ εἰδὼς
λέγω, ἀλλὰ εἰκάζων · ὅτι δέ ἐστίν τι ἀλλοῖον
ὀρθὴ δόξα καὶ ἐπιστήμη, < οὐ > πάνυ μοι δοκῶ
τοῦτο εἰκάζειν, ἀλλ᾽ εἴπερ τι ἄλλο φαίην ἂν
εἰδέναι, ὀλίγα δ᾽ ἂν φαίην, ἓν δ᾽ οὖν καὶ τοῦτο 5
ἐκείνων θείην ἂν ὧν οἶδα.
ΜΕΝ. Καὶ ὀρθῶς γε, ὦ Σώκρατες, λέγεις.
 XL 98 D ΜΕΝΩΝ 53

ΣΩ. Τί δέ ; τόδε οὐκ ὀρθῶς, ὅτι ἀληθὴς δόξα

ἡγουμένη τὸ ἔργον ἑκάστης τῆς πράξεως οὐδὲν
το χεῖρον ἀπεργάζεται ἢ ἐπιστήμη ;
ΜΕΝ. Καὶ τοῦτο δοκεῖς μοι ἀληθῆ λέγειν.
ΣΩ. Οὐδὲν ἄρα ὀρθὴ δόξα ἐπιστήμης χεῖρον
οὐδὲ ἧττον ὠφελίμη ἔσται εἰς τὰς πράξεις, οὐδὲ
ἁνὴρ ὁ ἔχων ὀρθὴν δόξαν ἢ ὁ ἐπιστήμην.
15 ΜΕΝ. Ἔστι ταῦτα.
ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν ὅ γε ἀγαθὸς ἀνὴρ ὠφέλιμος
ἡμῖν ὡμολόγηται εἶναι.
ΜΕΝ. Ναί.
ΣΩ. Ἐπειδὴ τοίνυν οὐ μόνον δι᾽ ἐπιστήμην
20 ἀγαθοὶ ἄνδρες ἂν εἶεν καὶ ὠφέλιμοι ταῖς πόλεσιν,
εἴπερ εἶεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ δι᾽ ὀρθὴν δόξαν, τούτοιν δὲ
οὐδέτερον φύσει ἐστὶν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, οὔτε ἐπι-
στήμη οὔτε δόξα ἀληθής, [οὔτ᾽ ἐπίκτητα]—ἢ D
δοκεῖ σοι φύσει ὁποτερονοῦν αὐτοῖν εἶναι ;
25 ΜΕΝ . Οὐκ ἔμοιγε.
ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἐπειδὴ οὐ φύσει, οὐδὲ οἱ ἀγαθοὶ
φύσει εἶεν ἄν.
ΜΕΝ. Οὐ δῆτα.
ΣΩ. Ἐπειδὴ δέ γε οὐ φύσει, ἐσκοποῦμεν τὸ
30 μετὰ τοῦτο, εἰ διδακτόν ἐστιν.
ΜΕΝ. Ναί.
ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν διδακτὸν ἔδοξεν εἶναι, εἰ φρό-
νησις ἡ ἀρετή ;
ΜΕΝ. Ναί.
35 ΣΩ. Κἂν εἴ γε διδακτὸν εἴη, φρόνησις ἂν
είναι ;
ΜΕΝ. Πάνυ γε.
 54 ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ XL 98 E

E ΣΩ. Καὶ εἰ μέν γε διδάσκαλοι εἶεν, διδακτὸν

ἂν εἶναι , μὴ ὄντων δὲ οὐ διδακτόν ;
ΜΕΝ. Οὕτως. 40
ΣΩ. ᾿Αλλὰ μὴν ὡμολογήκαμεν μὴ εἶναι αὐτοῦ
διδασκάλους ;
ΜΕΝ. Ἔστι ταῦτα.
ΣΩ. Ωμολογήκαμεν ἄρα μήτε διδακτὸν αὐτὸ
μήτε φρόνησιν εἶναι ; 45
ΜΕΝ. Πάνυ γε .
ΣΩ. ᾿Αλλὰ μὴν ἀγαθόν γε αὐτὸ ὁμολογοῦμεν
εἶναι ;
ΜΕΝ. Ναί.
ΣΩ. Ωφέλιμον δὲ καὶ ἀγαθὸν εἶναι τὸ ὀρθῶς 50
ἡγούμενον ;
ΜΕΝ. Πάνυ γε.
99
ΣΩ. Ὀρθῶς δέ γε ἡγεῖσθαι δύο ὄντα ταῦτα
μόνα, δόξαν τε ἀληθῆ καὶ ἐπιστήμην, ἃ ἔχων
ἄνθρωπος ὀρθῶς ἡγεῖται. τὰ γὰρ ἀπὸ τύχης 55
γιγνόμενα οὐκ ἀνθρωπίνῃ ἡγεμονίᾳ γίγνεται · ᾧ
δὲ ἄνθρωπος ἡγεμών ἐστιν ἐπὶ τὸ ὀρθόν, δύο
ταῦτα, δόξα ἀληθὴς καὶ ἐπιστήμη.
ΜΕΝ. Δοκεί μοι οὕτως.
XII. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἐπειδὴ οὐ διδακτόν ἐστιν,
οὐδ᾽ ἐπιστήμη δὴ ἔτι γίγνεται ἡ ἀρετή ;
ΜΕΝ. Οὐ φαίνεται.
B ΣΩ. Δυοῖν ἄρα ὄντοιν ἀγαθοῖν καὶ ὠφελίμοιν
τὸ μὲν ἕτερον ἀπολέλυται, καὶ οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἐν 5
πολιτικῇ πράξει ἐπιστήμη ἡγεμών.
ΜΕΝ. ΟὔO μοι δοκεῖ.
ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄρα σοφίᾳ τινὶ οὐδὲ σοφοὶ ὄντες οἱ
 XLI 99 D ΜΕΝΩΝ 55

τοιοῦτοι ἄνδρες ἡγοῦντο ταῖς πόλεσιν, οἱ ἀμφὶ

ΙΟ Θεμιστοκλέα τε καὶ οὓς ἄρτι ῎Ανυτος ὅδε ἔλεγεν ·
διὸ καὶ οὐχ οἷοί τε ἄλλους ποιεῖν τοιούτους οἷοι
αὐτοί εἰσιν, ἅτε οὐ δι᾽ ἐπιστήμην ὄντες τοιοῦτοι.
ΜΕΝ. Ἔοικεν οὕτως ἔχειν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὡς
λέγεις.
15 ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν εἰ μὴ ἐπιστήμη, εὐδοξία δὴ τὸ
λοιπὸν γίγνεται, ᾗ οἱ πολιτικοὶ ἄνδρες χρώμενοι C
τὰς πόλεις ὀρθοῦσιν, οὐδὲν διαφερόντως ἔχοντες
πρὸς τὸ φρονεῖν ἢ οἱ χρησμῳδοί τε καὶ οἱ θεο-
μάντεις · καὶ γὰρ οὗτοι λέγουσιν μὲν ἀληθῆ καὶ
20 πολλά, ἴσασι δὲ οὐδὲν ὧν λέγουσιν.
ΜΕΝ. Κινδυνεύει οὕτως ἔχειν.
ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν, ὦ Μένων, ἄξιον τούτους θείους
καλεῖν τοὺς ἄνδρας, οἵτινες νοῦν μὴ ἔχοντες πολλὰ
καὶ μεγάλα κατορθοῦσιν ὧν πράττουσιν καὶ
25 λέγουσι ;
ΜΕΝ. Πάνυ γε.
ΣΩ. Ὀρθῶς ἂν καλοῖμεν θείους τε, οὓς νυνδὴ
ἐλέγομεν χρησμῳδοὺς καὶ μάντεις καὶ τοὺς D
ποιητικοὺς ἅπαντας · καὶ τοὺς πολιτικοὺς οὐχ
30 ἥκιστα τούτων φαῖμεν ἂν θείους τε εἶναι καὶ
ἐνθουσιάζειν, ἐπίπνους ὄντας καὶ κατεχομένους
ἐκ τοῦ θεοῦ, ὅταν κατορθῶσι λέγοντες πολλὰ καὶ
μεγάλα πράγματα, μηδὲν εἰδότες ὧν λέγουσιν .
ΜΕΝ. Πάνυ γε.
35 ΣΩ. Καὶ αἵ γε γυναῖκες δήπου, ὦ Μένων,
τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς ἄνδρας θείους καλοῦσι · καὶ οἱ
Λάκωνες ὅταν τινὰ ἐγκωμιάζωσιν ἀγαθὸν ἄνδρα,
θεῖος ἀνήρ, φασίν, οὗτος.
 56 ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ ΜΕΝΩΝ XLI 99 E

E ΜΕΝ. Καὶ φαίνονταί γε, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὀρθῶς

λέγειν. καίτοι ἴσως ῎Ανυτος ὅδε σοι ἄχθεται 40
λέγοντι.
XLII. ΣΩ. Οὐδὲν μέλει ἔμοιγε. τούτῳ μέν,
ὦ Μένων, καὶ αὖθις διαλεξόμεθα · εἰ δὲ νῦν ἡμεῖς
ἐν παντὶ τῷ λόγῳ τούτῳ καλῶς ἐζητήσαμέν τε
καὶ ἐλέγομεν, ἀρετὴ ἂν εἴη οὔτε φύσει οὔτε
διδακτόν, ἀλλὰ θείᾳ μοίρᾳ παραγιγνομένη ἄνευ 5
100 νοῦ, οἷς ἂν παραγίγνηται , εἰ μή τις εἴη τοιοῦτος
τῶν πολιτικῶν ἀνδρῶν, οἷος καὶ ἄλλον ποιῆσαι
πολιτικόν. εἰ δὲ εἴη, σχεδὸν ἄν τι οὗτος λέγοιτο
τοιοῦτος ἐν τοῖς ζῶσιν, οἷον ἔφη Ὅμηρος ἐν τοῖς
τεθνεῶσιν τὸν Τειρεσίαν εἶναι, λέγων περὶ αὐτοῦ, το
ὅτι οἷος πέπνυται τῶν ἐν "Αιδου, τοὶ δὲ σκιαί
ἀΐσσουσι. ταὐτὸν ἂν καὶ εὐθὺς τοιοῦτος ὥσπερ
παρὰ σκιὰς ἀληθὲς ἂν πρᾶγμα εἴη πρὸς ἀρετήν .
B ΜΕΝ. Κάλλιστα δοκεῖς μοι λέγειν, ὦ Σώ
κρατες. 15
ΣΩ. Ἐκ μὲν τοίνυν τούτου τοῦ λογισμοῦ, ὦ
Μένων, θεία μοίρᾳ ἡμῖν φαίνεται παραγιγνομένη
ἡ ἀρετὴ οἷς παραγίγνεται · τὸ δὲ σαφὲς περὶ
αὐτοῦ εἰσόμεθα τότε, ὅταν πρὶν ᾧτινι τρόπῳ τοῖς
ἀνθρώποις παραγίγνεται ἀρετή, πρότερον ἐπι- 20
χειρήσωμεν αὐτὸ καθ᾽ αὑτὸ ζητεῖν τί ποτ᾽ ἔστιν
ἀρετή. νῦν δ᾽ ἐμοὶ μὲν ὥρα ποι ἰέναι, σὺ δὲ
ταῦτα ἅπερ αὐτὸς πέπεισαι πεῖθε καὶ τὸν ξένον
Ο τόνδε ῎Ανυτον, ἵνα πραότερος ᾖ · ὡς ἐὰν πείσῃς
τοῦτον, ἔστιν ὅ τι καὶ ᾿Αθηναίους ὀνήσεις . 25
 COMMENTARY

Chapters I, II (70 A-71 D). MENO. Can Virtue be taught?

SOCRATES. I do not even know what Virtue is, much less
whether it can be taught. What is more, I never met any
one who did know what Virtue is. MENO. Have you never
met Gorgias? SOCRATES. Yes, but I do not clearly re-
member what he said. Try and tell me yourself.
The first division of the dialogue extends to the end of
chap. xiii. (80 D). The speakers are Meno and Socrates. Meno
attempts to frame a definition of Virtue, and confesses himself
beaten.
1. apа Sidaктový åperý : for the philosophical import of this 70 A
question see Introd. § 11. It had already been made the
main subject of the dialogue Protagoras, at the end of which
(361 A B) it appears that Socrates, in arguing that Virtue is
émioτýμn, has been implicitly arguing that Virtue may be
taught, though explicitly this is the position he has denied.
The converse paradox turns out to be the position of Protagoras.
He, as his profession demanded, asserted that Virtue was teach-
able ; but by denying that Virtue was Knowledge, he has
implicitly contradicted himself. In the Euthydemus (282 B c)
the question occurs again, though here copía is substituted for
ἀρετή. Socrates says εἰ ἔστι γε, ὦ Κλεινία, ἡ σοφία διδακτόν,
ἀλλὰ μὴ ἀπὸ ταὐτομάτου παραγίγνεται τοῖς ἀνθρώποις. Cleinias
eagerly accepts the former alternative ; Socrates applauds him,
saying εὖ ἐποίησας ἀπαλλάξας με σκέψεως πολλῆς περὶ τούτου
αὐτοῦ, πότερον διδακτὸν ἢ οὐ διδακτὸν ἡ σοφία. Cp. also Clitophon
407 B. (This dialogue, if genuine, as it probably is, must be
regarded as an introduction to the Republic, left for some
reason unfinished. As the Meno is also in a manner intro-
ductory to the Republic, correspondencies between the Clitophon
and the Meno are worth noting. ) In Clit. 1.c. we read Tŵv d'
58 ΜΕΝΟ 170 Α

ὑέων ἀμελεῖτε, καὶ οὔτε διδασκάλους αὐτοῖς εὑρίσκετε τῆς δικαιο-

σύνης, εἴπερ μαθητόν · εἰ δὲ μελετητόν τε καὶ ἀσκητόν, οἵτινες
ἐξασκήσουσι καὶ ἐκμελετήσουσιν ἱκανῶς. In the spurious dialogue
περὶ ἀρετῆς (Teubner text vol. vi pp. 86-91), which consists of
little more than excerpts from the Meno, Socrates opens with
the question "Αρα διδακτόν ἐστιν ἡ ἀρετή ; ἢ οὐ διδακτόν, ἀλλὰ
φύσει οἱ ἀγαθοὶ γίγνονται ἄνδρες, ἢ ἄλλῳ τινὶ τρόπῳ ; Xen.
Symp. ii 6 exhibits it as a theme of debate in a genteel assembly :
καὶ ὁ μέν τις αὐτῶν εἶπε, Ποῦ οὖν εὑρήσεις τούτου [sc. τῆς
καλοκαγαθίας] διδάσκαλον ; ὁ δέ τις ὡς οὐδὲ διδακτὸν τοῦτο εἴη,
ἕτερος δέ τις ὡς εἴπερ τι καὶ ἄλλο καὶ τοῦτο μαθητόν. The problem
is referred to by Aristotle NE. I x (ix ) 1 ὅθεν καὶ ἀπορεῖται
πότερόν ἐστι μαθητὸν [sc. ἡ ἀρετὴ] ἢ ἐθιστὸν ἢ ἄλλως πως ἀσκητόν,
ἢ κατά τινα θείαν μοῖραν ἢ καὶ διὰ τύχην παραγίγνεται. It is
probable (especially from the use of the words ἀσκητόν and
θείαν μοῖραν) that there is here a definite reference to the Meno.
Cp. ibid . xix 6 γίνεσθαι δ᾽ ἀγαθοὺς οἴονται οἱ μὲν φύσει , οἱ δ᾽
ἔθει, οἱ δὲ διδαχῇ. τὸ μὲν οὖν τῆς φύσεως δῆλον ὡς οὐκ ἐφ' ἡμῖν
ὑπάρχει, ἀλλὰ διά τινος θείας αἰτίας τοῖς ὡς ἀληθῶς εὐτυχέσιν
ὑπάρχει · ὁ δὲ λόγος καὶ ἡ διδαχὴ μήποτ᾽ οὐκ ἐν ἅπασιν ἰσχύῃ,
ἀλλὰ δέῃ προδιείργασθαι τοῖς ἔθεσι τὴν τοῦ ἀκροατοῦ ψυχὴν πρὸς
τὸ καλῶς χαίρειν καὶ μισεῖν. Antisthenes the Cynic, as a
follower of Socrates, διδακτὴν ἀπεδείκνυε τὴν ἀρετήν (Diog. L.
vi 10). On the other hand, Isocrates does not believe in any
τέχνη to make men virtuous ; Antidosis ( 15) 274, ep. in
Soph. (13) 21. Quaestio tota antiquitate non desita est
disceptari ' : Fr. Prol. p. 12 note 6, who refers to Diog. L.
II 121, 122 for tracts on the subject by Crito and Simo, pupils
of Socrates. Cp. the words quoted from the μέγας λόγος of
Protagoras (Zeller pre- Socr. II 471 note) φύσεως καὶ ἀσκήσεως
διδασκαλία δεῖται.
2. ἀσκητόν, ‘quod exercitatione comparatur Ast. The word
appears to occur in this sense only here and in Clit. 1.c. , Arist.
NE. 1. c. and Xenophon Mem. I ii 23 πάντα ἐμοίγε δοκεῖ τὰ καλὰ
καὶ τἀγαθὰ ἀσκητὰ εἶναι — the only places in which the word is
used by Plato, Xenophon, or Aristotle. The word is used by
other writers in physical senses related to physical meanings of
ἀσκέω. ἀσκέω ‘ I work up ' or ' elaborate may be used intransi-
tively (Plato Rep. 389 c etc. ' I go into training ' ), or with an
acc. of the result produced, or with one of the material worked
upon, or with both (Xen. Cyr. VIII vi 10 ἀσκεῖν αὑτὸν καὶ τοὺς
σὺν ἑαυτῷ τὰ πολεμικά) . The sense of ἀσκητός in the passage
before us is related to dokéw with an acc. of the result produced.
The other sense quoted by L. & S. , of persons ( ' practised in '),
is related to ȧokéw with an acc. of the subject worked upon ;
but Plut. Lyc. 30. 2 ἀνδρὸς ἀσκητοῦ καὶ σοφοῦ is perhaps to be
I 70 B NOTES 63
referred to ἀσκητής rather than ἀσκητός. The wor
ἄσκησις, ἀσκητικός we find applied first to the pursuit
profession or art (specially gymnastics), next to the disciture
of some philosophical school, and lastly, in Christian theolog
to the ascetic ' life.
Practice is here distinguished from Knowledge as an avenue
to Virtue. In Plato it is represented as conferring an inferior
kind of Virtue : Phaedo 82 Β δημοτικὴν καὶ πολιτικὴν ἀρετὴν .
ἐξ ἔθους τε καὶ μελέτης γεγονυίαν ἄνευ φιλοσοφίας τε καὶ νοῦ.
In Rep. 619 c an evil fate awaits one who has trusted too much
to this, ἔθει ἄνευ φιλοσοφίας ἀρετῆς μετειληφότα. Socrates drew
no such sharp distinction ; and the Cynics when they spoke of
' learning virtue ' ' understood moral exercise rather than intel-
lectual research ' (Zeller Socr. p. 313) . Cp. Xen. Mem. I ii
19-23 (referred to above), also the fragment of Critias (Bergk
F.L. G. 4 II p. 282) ἐκ μελετῆς πλείους ἢ φύσεως ἀγαθοί. Note that
the alternative άσкηтóν does not meet us again in this dialogue.
In ȧσкητós, used as it is here, the suffix -70s has the sense of
the Latin termination -bilis ; attainable ' rather than ' at-
tained. A large number of Greek verbal adjectives in -Tos have
this sense, e.g. in this dialogue didakтóv (often) , μаlητóv, ȧva-
μνηστόν (87 Β), παραδοτόν and παραληπτών ( 93 Β), ποιητόν and
ἔνθετον in Theognis quoted 95 Ε, μελετητόν and ἐθιστόν, in
Plato Clitophon and Aristotle NE. quoted above ; further,
γνωστόν, νοητόν, αἰσθητόν, καταληπτόν (comprehensibile Cicero
Ac. I 41 ) ; likewise ктηTÓν, TрWTÓν and many others (Kühner
§ 332. 6). This sense arises simply from a tendency to ignore
the difference between the actual and the possible . This differ-
ence in the case of negative verbals amounts to very little, and
it is to negative adjectives that this use of the corresponding
Latin forms in -tus is mainly confined, e.g. invictus, immensus ;
but not entirely, e.g. conspectus (Forbiger ad Verg. Georg. 1 206).
Riddell takes a different view, § 88.
4. ἢ ἄλλῳ τινὶ τρόπῳ anticipates the result (θείᾳ μοίρᾳ)
actually arrived at (99 E).
5. OETTAλol : for the omission of the article see Phaedo 57 A
and Archer-Hind there : the article is continually omitted
before national names by all Attic writers. '
7. ¿ ' iππikĤ : Thessalian horses and horsemanship were B
a commonplace with writers from Homer downward , Il. 2. 202,
Hdt. VII 196. Plato Hipp. maj. 284 Α ὁ οὖν κάλλιστ᾽ ἐπιστά-
μενος ἱππικὴν παραδιδόναι ἆρ᾽ οὐκ ἂν ἐν τῇ Θετταλίᾳ τῆς Ἑλλάδος
μάλιστα τιμῷτο καὶ πλεῖστα χρήματα λαμβάνοι ; Laws 625 Α,
Xen. Hell. Iv iii 9 (Fr. ) ; also Athen. vII 278 E ÚTоTIÉμEVOS
αὐτοῖς κατὰ τὴν Πυθίαν ζητεῖν
 58 MENO I 70 B
ὑέων ἀμελεῖον Θεσσαλικόν, Λακεδαιμονίην τε γυναῖκα,
σύνης, ´ ἄνδρας δ᾽ οἳ πίνουσιν ὕδωρ καλῆς ᾿Αρεθούσης.
éta Polit. 264 c, Isocr. Antid. ( 15) 298. Alexander's Bucephalas
Jame from Thessaly (Plut. Alex. 6). The coins of Thessalian
towns often show a horse ; see P. Gardner Types of Greek Coins,
plate VII figs. 3 and 40 (Larisa) ; fig. 6 ( Pharsalus).
Kai TλOUTŲ : Isocrates Antidosis ( 15) 155 says that when
Gorgias, who made more money than any other sophist, went
to Thessaly, the Thessalians were the wealthiest of the Greeks.
For their luxury and hospitality cp. Theopompus apud
Athenaeum XII p. 527 a (he gives the palm for luxury to the
Pharsalians). Again, Theopompus (apud Athenaeum VI 260 B)
says that Philip of Macedon won over the Thessalians by boon
companionship. Xen. Hell. VI i 3 says of Polydamas of
Pharsalus ἦν δὲ καὶ ἄλλως φιλόξενός τε καὶ μεγαλοπρεπὴς τὸν
Θετταλικὸν τρόπον . Cp. on 74 Α 30.
9. 'AрισTíππоν : see Introd. § 4. ' Aristippus, Gorgiae
fautor, non confundendus ille cum Aristippo Cyrenaico Socratis
discipulo, dynastes erat Larisaeus ex gente Aleudarum, quam
rei equestris studiosissimum fuisse testatur Athen. XII 534 B
ἱπποτροφῶν καὶ ἡνιοχῶν τῶν ᾿Αλευαδῶν ἱππικώτερος. Huic Cyrus
quattuor milia conducticiorum et sex mensum aera militaria
dedit ad coercendam popularium seditionem. Xen. An. I i 10 '
(Fr. ). See also Xen. An. II vi 28. Besides Aristippus and
Meno, another leader in the expedition of Cyrus was a pupil
of Gorgias, Proxenus the Boeotian, Xen. An. II vi 16.
Tоλîтα , ' fellow-citizens. ' So often with a genitive or a
possessive pronoun ; Prot. 339 Ε ὦ Πρόδικε, σὸς μέντοι Σιμω
vions Tolirns, 315 c, Laws 629 A, 630 A etc. The word συμ-
TONITηs is condemned, Rutherford New Phrynichus p. 255.
Latin usage is similar : éµòs Toλírns, meus civis, ' my fellow-
citizen ' ; quòs puλérns, meus tribulis, my fellow - tribesman ' ;
Euòs ônμórns, meus popularis, ' my fellow-demesman.' Cf. below
71 Β 2 συμπένομαι τοῖς πολίταις.
10. Topyías : see on 76 C 22, 95 C 23. For Gorgias' life in
Thessaly see Cicero Orator § 176, Quint. III i 8. He is said
to have lived to the age of 109.
С
11. ἐραστὰς ἐπὶ σοφίᾳ, persons who run after him for his
wisdom .' Cp. Prot. 317 c : Protagoras appeared to boast ŎTɩ
ἐρασταὶ αὐτοῦ ἀφιγμένοι εἶμεν : Euthyd. 276 D οἱ ἐρασταὶ τοῖν
ávdpoîv : Phaedr. 257 B. For the transference of amatory
phrases to spiritual aspirations see Dr. Thompson's Phaedrus
App. I (especially pp . 152-3) , and App. III. This is most
characteristic of Plato ; see especially Symp. 184 c sqq.
I 70 c NOTES 61

Olympiodorus in his life of Plato, near the end (rubner text

vol. vi p. 194), says of Plato himself πολλοὺς ἐραστὰς αὑτοῦ
καταστήσας. The contrast between ἐραστὰς ἐπὶ σοφίᾳ and ισὸς
épaorýs is intentional. For ènì copia cp. Rep. 600 D (Protagora.
and Prodicus) ἐπὶ ταύτῃ τῇ σοφίᾳ οὕτω σφόδρα φιλοῦνται ὥστε
· μόνον οὐκ ἐπὶ ταῖς κεφαλαῖς περιφέρουσιν αὐτοὺς οἱ ἑταῖροι, Ηipp.
maj. 300 D ἀνδρὶ πλεῖστον ἀργύριον εἰργασμένῳ τῶν νῦν ἐπὶ σοφίᾳ,
also 281 c ; Symp. 206 c ; Theaet. 161c ; Hipp. min. 372 B ;
Xen. Mem. IV ii 1, 3 ; Isocr. 13. 2 ; 15. 111 etc.
'Aλevadŵv : these were the oligarchic caste at Larisa.
Similar power was wielded by the Scopadae at Crannon, Hdt.
VI 127 (Holm History of Greece (E. T. ) 1 p. 224). The vacillat-
ing policy of the Thessalians is to be accounted for to a great
extent byhostility between the common people and the duvaσrcial.
Hdt. vii 172, Thuc. Iv 78. See Whibley Greek Oligarchies
p. 117 note 3.
14. ἀφόβως καὶ μεγαλοπρεπῶς ἀποκρίνεσθαι : this was the
profession Gorgias made himself ; Gorg. 447 E Einé μo , ŵ Topyía,
ἀληθῆ λέγει Καλλικλῆς ὅδε, ὅτι ἀπαγγέλλει ἀποκρίνεσθαι ὅ τι ἄν
τίς σε ἐρωτᾷ ; ΓΟΡ. ᾿Αληθῆ, ὦ Χαιρεφῶν · καὶ γὰρ νῦν δὴ αὐτὰ
ἐπηγγελλόμην, καὶ λέγω ὅτι οὐδείς μέ πω ἠρώτηκε καινὸν οὐδὲν
πολλῶν ἐτῶν. His pupil Polus is not less confident, ib.
462 A. Cp. Cic. fin. II § 1 , de orat. I § 103, Quint. II 21, 21,
XII 11 , 21 (Gedike).
16. παρέχων αὑτὸν ἐρωτῶν : infinitives like ερωταν— epexe- C
getical, supplementary, prolate, or whatever else they may be
called - illustrate the dative origin of the Greek infinitive. ' I
give myself up for questioning. The dative is one of purpose
or ' work contemplated . ' See Gorg. 456 в ovxì éléλovтa † teµeîv
κаûσαι πаρаσxeîv тŵ iaтpŵ, 475 D (see Dr. Thompson's note),
480 c, Prot. 348 A (in all which places rapéxe is intransi-
tive), Phaedr. 228 Ε ἐμαυτόν σοι ἐμμελετᾶν παρέχειν οὐ πάνυ
dédoктaι, and especially Apol. 33 B, where Socrates is contrast-
ing his procedure with that of Gorgias, ὁμοίως καὶ πλουσίῳ καὶ
πένητι παρέχω ἐμαυτὸν ἐρωτᾶν. Also Xen. Mem. 1 ii 54, Anab.
VI vi 18. Cp. Gorg. 497 в (VπÓσXES). [ Riddell § 230 brings
these instances under ' Binary Structure, ' certain idioms which
' are the grammatical result of expressing in two parts a con-
ception which exists in the speaker's mind as one ' (ib. § 204).
But the infinitive hardly amounts to a separate clause. ]
For the dative origin of the infinitive see Goodwin Moods
and Tenses § 742. The grammarians (Kühner § 473. 7, Jelf
§ 669. 2, Goodwin MT. § 770, F. E. Thompson § 146, Hadley
§ 951, Krüger 55. 3. 20, 21 ) distinguish instances where the
infinitive appears as a necessary completion of the sense of a
 62 ΜΕΝΟ I 70 c
verb ( e.g. verb of command) from the looser use with verbs
and ad
ma jectives, as here, where the infinitive appears to add
somathing extra to the sense. But the two classes are separated
y no firm line.
The active (or middle) infinitive after Tapéxw and the like is
by far commoner than the passive. Cp. Phaedo 102 D TOû μèv
τῷ μεγέθει ὑπερέχειν τὴν σμικρότητα ὑπέχων, τῷ δὲ τὸ μέγεθος
τῆς σμικρότητος παρέχων> ὑπερέχον, where Madvig translates
ὑπερέχειν ‘ superandam, ὑπερέχον superantem . So in Latin
tradit diffundere ventis ; and we say a sight to remember,' ´
house to let. ' Logically the passive infinitive would be equally
possible. Whether the active or passive view be taken will
depend on the presence or absence in the context of a prominent
noun that may be taken as a subject to the notion of the
infinitive. If there is such a noun, the active construction is
preferred in Greek. Such a noun is often provided, as here,
by a dependent dative. Gorgias lends himself τ ẞovλoμévw for
him to ask. In the exceptional place Charm. 157 в òs åv µǹ
τὴν ψυχὴν παράσχῃ τῇ ἐπῳδῇ ὑπὸ σοῦ θεραπευθῆναι, the dative
erwon is not a person and cannot well be conceived as a subject ;
hence the passive construction is preferred. So Kühner, who
also (§ 473. Anm. 4) , quotes Isocr. 12. 156 Tonσoμai тǹv åpжǹv
τῶν λεχθησομένων ἀκοῦσαι μὲν ἴσως τισὶν ἀηδῆ, ῥηθῆναι δ᾽
οὐκ ἀσύμφορον, where the passive ῥηθῆναι can be seen to be
necessary, the active being impossible unless a subject were
expressed with it.
17. T@ Boulou €v : see on 90 D 21 .
18. οὐδενὶ ὅτῳ οὐκ : this is a case of inverse attraction.
Hadley § 1003, Riddell § 199. See 71 A 23, 74 D 32 ; also on
96 C 7.
71 A 20. σTEр, ' as it were.' This use of woπep, standing out
of construction, is common in Plato : 87 A 26, Phaedr. 260 E
ὥσπερ γὰρ ἀκούειν δοκῶ τινῶν προσιόντων λόγων, 270 D, Phaedo
77 c, 88 D, Crat. 384 c etc. (see Ast) ; also in Aristophanes :
Clouds 1276 τὸν ἐγκέφαλον ὥσπερ σεσεῖσθαί μοι δοκεῖς, Wasps
395, 713, Peace 234.
22. ei yoûv, ' I only know that if.'
25. ἀρετὴν γοῦν : ἀρετήν is not strictly object to εἰδέναι, but
is put by prolepsis ' (Hadley §878) or ' antiptosis ' (F.E.Thompson
§ 330) for aper as subject to didakтóv. This idiom, perpetually
occurring in Greek, and frequent in this dialogue (e.g. 71 B 6
ὅστις Μένωνα μὴ γιγνώσκει ὅστις ἐστίν), is brought by Riddell
§ 226 under the general head of ' Binary Structure.'
26. Toσoútov Séw : see App. on the text.
II 71 B NOTES 63
69
27. εἴτε μὴ διδακτόν : see on 86 D 12.
28. ὅ τι ποτ᾽ ἐστὶ . . ἀρετή : i.e. the real essence or nature
of Virtue. This dialogue, the main purpose of which is not
metaphysical but ethical, leaves the question open how Plato
here regards the ' essence ' of Virtue, whether as a mere logical
concept, or as having a substantial separate existence. In
other words, the Meno contains nothing explicitly showing that
when it was written the theory of Ideas (of the Phaedrus
and Republic) was full-blown in Plato's mind. But there is
nothing to indicate that it was not, and the theory of Ideas
is really implicitly involved in the theory of ȧváμvnois. See
on 81 D 12.

CHAPTER II
2. συμπένομαι occurs nowhere else. Where σuv is com- B
pounded with an intransitive verb, the preposition naturally
qualifies the subject ; e.g. the present phrase = ¿yw σùv Tols
πολίταις πένομαι. But where σύν is compounded with a transi-
tive verb, the preposition generally affects the object, such con-
structions as συνεξαιρεῖ αὐτοῖς Σελλασίαν (Xen. Hell. VII iv 12)
being less common. Cp. 80 D 40. See Jowett on Thuc. VIII
46 (σvykaтadovλoûv) and Jebb on Soph. Ajax 229 and 361 .
3. εἰδὼς περὶ ἀρετῆς, eadem structura verbi εἰδέναι 85 C 10,
92 C (add 80 D 37), éπíoraolai 85 D 18 ' ( Fr. ) . Cp. 72 A 14, B 22.
See on 90 B 47.
4. δ δὲ μὴ οἶδα τί ἐστιν, πῶς ἂν ὁποῖόν γέ τί <ἐστιν >
eideíny ; We have here a very pronounced distinction between
the essential and non - essential attributes of a thing. The
' Definition ' or Móyos of a class - name, as presented in this
dialogue, is no longer the definition obtained by a simple com-
parison of a number of particulars. It is one which consists
in referring a class to a higher genus and then marking the
specific difference (definitio per genus et differentiam). The
attributes forming the Essence or Species of a thing may thus
be divided into those contained in the Genus and those con-
tained in the Difference. The doctrine of the Predicables, as de-
veloped by the school of Aristotle, recognised besides ' Essential '
attributes others that were classed either as Property (Proprium)
or as Accident. The distinction generally drawn between these
was that a Property was deducible from the essential attributes,
an Accident not so. In the present instance òroîóv Ti repre-
sents Property rather than Accident ; for the attribute didakтóv
turns out to be one deducible from the Essence of Virtue. See,
for the Predicables, Jevons's Elementary Lessons in Logic pp.
64 ΜΕΝΟ II 71 B

98 foll. , Bain's Logic 1 73. See also Mill's Logic bk. I ch. vi
§§ 1 , 2 with ch. vii §§ 2, 3 , 5 , 6, 7 and 8, for a criticism of
the doctrine : where it is shown that in the more elastic view
which modern Logic takes of the General Notion , the distinction
between essential and non-essential attributes tends to disappear.
The phraseology Tí and oπоîóv Tɩ to express the distinction
between Essence and non-essential attribute is repeated at
86 E 17, 87 B 2. See Zeller Plato p. 200 note 79. It appears
in the Gorgias 448 E. Polus has been asked what the art of
Gorgias is. He replies by a eulogy of it. Socrates says he
has not answered the question.
ΠΩΛ. Τί δή, ὦ Σώκρατες ;
ΣΩ. "Οτι, ὦ Πῶλε, ἐρομένου Χαιρεφῶντος τίνος Γοργίας ἐπι
στήμων τέχνης, ἐγκωμιάζεις μὲν αὐτοῦ τὴν τέχνην ὥσπερ τινὸς
ψέγοντος, ἥτις δέ ἐστιν οὐκ ἀπεκρίνω.
ΠΩΛ. Οὐ γὰρ ἀπεκρινάμην ὅτι εἴη ἡ καλλίστη ;
ΣΩ. Καὶ μάλα · ἀλλ᾽ οὐδεὶς ἠρώτα ποία τις εἴη ἡ Γοργίου
τέχνη, ἀλλὰ τίς (cp. 462 c foll. where the question is answered).
See also Philebus 37 c ‘ Opinion (δόξα), besides being
Opinion per se, may be further qualified as true or false καὶ
ἐγένετ᾽ οὐ μόνον δόξα ἀλλὰ καὶ ποιά τις ἑκατέρα. We must
further consider ' says Socrates ' whether, while Opinion is
subject to qualification , Pleasure and Pain are not ' (ei kai тà
μέν [sc. δόξαι] ἐστι ποί᾽ ἄττα, ἡδονὴ δὲ καὶ λύπη μόνον ἅπερ
ἐστι, ποίω τινε δ᾽ οὐ γίγνεσθον). Socrates proceeds ἀλλ᾽ οὐδὲν
τοῦτό γε χαλεπὸν ἰδεῖν ὅτι καὶ ποίω τινε. πάλαι γὰρ εἴπομεν
ὅτι μεγάλαι τε καὶ σμικραὶ κτέ.
Something similar may be seen in Symp. 201 D foll. ‘ I must
explain says Socrates “ τίς ἐστιν ὁ Ἔρως, καὶ ποῖός τις, ἔπειτα
τὰ ἔργα αὐτοῦ. The three points are dealt with successively :
( 1) 202 E foll. Ἔρως is a δαίμων, the son of Πενία and Πόρος ;
(2) 203 c foll. he is poor, and not tender or beautiful , as people
think ; (3) 206 B foll. his ἔργον is described.
But the terminology is not fixed or technical. ποῖος, οι ποιός,
often implies an added attribute, whereby a smaller class is
carved out of a larger. In this sense it will correspond with
Difference (in the language of the Predicables). Thus Gorg.
453 , 454 Α, 463 c ὁποῖον μόριον, Euthyphro 12 D ποῖον μέρος,
Laches 194 D E. See especially Rep. 438 B-E ' If A be relative
to B, then A qualified by some differentia will be relative to
B qualified by a corresponding differentia (ὅσα γ᾽ ἐστὶ τοιαῦτα
οἷα εἶναί του, τὰ μὲν ποιὰ ἄττα ποιοῦ τινός ἐστιν κτέ.). If
knowledge is related to an object, a particular kind of know-
ledge will be related to a particular kind of object (ἐπιστήμη
μὲν αὐτὴ μαθήματος αὐτοῦ ἐπιστήμη ἐστίν, ἐπιστήμη δέ τις καὶ
ποιά τις ποιοῦ τινὸς καὶ τινός) . So Charmides 159 Α ὅ τι ἐστιν
II 71 B NOTES 65

καὶ ὁποῖόν τι ἡ σωφροσύνη, though we cannot be sure here that

a formal definition per Genus et Differentiam is expected. Cp.
87 Β 4 εἰ ποῖόν τί ἐστι τῶν περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ὄντων ἀρετή, and (more
loosely) Euthyphro 5c ποῖόν τι τὸ εὐσεβές φῂς εἶναι. So
Aristotle NE. II vi l ὅ τι μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ τῷ γένει ἡ ἀρετή, εἴρηται ·
δεῖ δὲ μὴ μόνον οὕτως εἰπεῖν, ὅτι ἕξις, ἀλλὰ καὶ ποία τις : Rhet.
I ii 7 τί δὲ ἕκαστόν ἐστιν τῶν παθῶν καὶ ποῖόν τι, etc. [At Theaet.
152 D the difference of T and oπolovoûÛV T seems to be that
between a Concrete term and a Quality. ]
A word is needed on the curious antithesis ov and Toîóv Tɩ in
+ Ep. vii 342 E and 343 B. For an account of the passage see
Grote (1 pp. 224-5) , who believes in the genuineness of the
letter, and Karsten (de Platonis quae feruntur epistolis pp. 182
foll. and 197) who does not. The antithesis here, as Grote
says, is between the quid or Essence (of the class ) which we
are searching for, and the quale or Accidents (seemingly of the
particulars) which we are not searching for : dvoîv övтol , Toû Te
ὄντος καὶ τοῦ ποιοῦ τινός, οὐ τὸ ποιόν τι, τὸ δὲ τί ζητούσης εἰδέναι
τῆς ψυχῆς κτέ. [An attack on the genuineness of the seventh
epistle should be now superfluous. See C. R. XIV, especially
p. 337 b foll. It is hard to believe Plato to have been guilty of
the sentence from which the above words are quoted, with its
horrible accumulation of participles, almost defying disentangle-
ment of subject and object. Many will find additional evidence
of spuriousness in the fact that a document professing to be
written late in Plato's life recognizes Ideas not merely of kúkλos
but περὶ σώματος ἅπαντος σκευαστοῦ τε καὶ κατὰ φύσιν γεγονότος
πυρὸς ὕδατός τε καὶ τῶν τοιούτων πάντων ( 342 D ). See on 72 B 21.]
The distinction between Essence and Non-essential is other-
wise expressed in the Euthyphro, 11 a namely by the antithesis
ovoía and Tálos (see J. Adam's Introduction p. xx, and below
on 72 B 22). In Hipp. maj. 300 E foll. we have the pairs
εἶναι and πεπονθέναι, οὐσία and πάθος, though the ground of
the antithesis is not dwelt on. In Plato we see philosophic
terminology in the making, but the process of crystallization is
not complete.
For the thought cp. 86 D. That Metaphysic, a knowledge
of Being, should come before Practice and lie at the root of it,
is the text on which is based much of the Republic. See also
Laches 190 Α Β εἰ γάρ που μηδ᾽ ἀρετὴν εἰδεῖμεν τὸ παράπαν ὅ τί
ποτε τυγχάνει ὄν, τίν᾽ ἂν τρόπον τούτου σύμβουλοι γενοίμεθα
ὁτῳοῦν, ὅπως ἂν αὐτὸ κάλλιστα κτήσαιτο ;
6. ὅστις Μένωνα μὴ γιγνώσκει ὅστις ἐστίν : the difer-
ence in the mode of existence of the individual Meno
on the one hand and the class Virtue on the other is not
here for Plato's purpose important. There are many passages
F
 89
66 ΜΕΝΟ II 71 B

in Plato in which he illustrates the definition of a class

by the definition (or identification) of an individual, such as
is afforded by a postal address or legal description. In the
Theaetetus 208 c foll . , where λόγος is treated as a knowledge
of differences (σημεῖον ᾧ τῶν ἁπάντων διαφέρει τὸ ἐρωτηθέν),
the two examples taken for illustration are both individuals,
namely the Sun, which is defined as λαμπρότατον τῶν κατὰ τὸν
οὐρανὸν ἰόντων περὶ γῆν, and next Theaetetus himself, 209 Α-C.
In Symp. 201 D the first question raised and answered about
Ἔρως is τίς ἐστι ; In Gorg. 453 c we have a question about
the definition of an individual which in its form recalls some
of the questions about class-definition in this dialogue (72 B 22)
ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ ἐτύγχανόν σε ἐρωτῶν τίς ἐστι τῶν ζωγράφων Ζεύξις,
εἴ μοι εἶπες ὅτι ὁ τὰ ζῷα γράφων, ἆρ᾽ οὐκ ἂν δικαίως σε ἠρόμην ὁ
τὰ ποῖα τῶν ζῴων γράφων ; Again compare Phaedo 102 c τούτῳ
τῳ Σιμμίαν είναι with τῷ μελίττας είναι at 72 Β 26. Cp. on 97 A
13. See Whately's Logic II . v. § 6. For ὅστις ἔστιν see on 92 C 18.
8. εἴτε καὶ γενναῖος εἴτε καὶ τἀναντία : καί accentuates
the word that follows it, in the general sense ' even . ' Riddell
Digest § 132. It is here put with γενναῖος as that marks the
climax of the three alternatives enumerated. It is put with
τἀναντία as that marks the more emphatic alternative ; more
emphatic because more surprising. Cp. Tim . 21 Β εἴτε δὴ δοκοῦν ·
αὐτῷ τότε εἴτε καὶ χάριν τινὰ τῷ Κριτίᾳ φέρων. Ast, under εἴτε,
supplies other instances. For kai emphasizing one member of
a contrast see Clit. 406 Α τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἔγωγε οὐκ ἐπῄνουν σε, τὰ δὲ
καὶ ἐπῄνουν, 410 Ε τὰ μὲν ἐπαινῶ σε, τὰ δέ τι καὶ ψέγω. Crat.
440 D ἴσως μὲν οὕτως ἔχει, ἴσως δὲ καὶ ( after all ' ) οὔ. See notes
on C 12 καὶ οἴκαδε, also on D 26 ἐπειδὴ καὶ ἄπεστιν : 75 Α 11,
79 D 35, and 84 D 32. Kühner § 541. Anm. 2.
C 10. ἀλλὰ σὺ οὐδ᾽ οἶσθα . . ἀλλὰ ταῦτα ἀπαγγέλλωμεν ;
the uses of aλά in the two instances will be felt to be different.
Sentences of similar form, but not interrogative, occur 76 E 47
ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ ἔστιν, ἀλλ᾽ ἐκείνη, βελτίων, Euthyphro 3 c ἀλλ' οὐδὲν
αὐτῶν χρὴ φροντίζειν, ἀλλ᾽ ὁμόσε ἰέναι, Theaet. 146 Β ἀλλ᾿ ὥσπερ
ἤρξω μὴ ἀφίεσο Θεαιτήτου, ἀλλ' ἐρώτα. Cp. 74 D 30 ἀλλὰ μή μοι
οὕτως, ἀλλὰ κτέ. The first and second uses in each of these
places are respectively typical of two uses of ἀλλά, namely :
(a) To effect a transition to a fresh subject, often with a
special appeal to the person addressed . This use occurs in state-
ments, commands (Symp. 199 c ἀλλὰ παρίημι, ἀλλ᾽ ἐρώτα), and
questions (as here). In this use the matter with which ἀλλά
is contrasted, is not definitely expressed.
(β) Το introduce the second half of a statement which supple-
ments the first half by either affirming something opposed to
II 71 c NOTES 67

what has been denied, or denying something opposed to what

has been affirmed. Here the matter with which aλá is con-
trasted is definitely expressed. Thus we have-
(1) οὐ Θεαίτητός ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ Θεόδωρος.
(2) Θεόδωρός έστιν, ἀλλ᾽ οὐ Θεαίτητος.
In these cases the real antithesis between the two halves of
the sentence is slight. Where the sentence consists of a state-
ment followed by the denial of its opposite, the antithesis sinks
to nil ; and even where this is not so clear, the first half is
very little ' limited ' by the second : we have rather the same
fact viewed in two different aspects. In (1 ) we should either
translate άá ' but ' ; or we should leave it untranslated : ' it
is not Theaetetus, it is Theodorus. ' In (2) we should translate
¿ ' o ' and not ' rather than ' but not' ; or again we might leave
ἀλλά untranslated . In sentences of this form ἀλλ᾽ οὐ may be
replaced by kal où, ovdé (in verse), and (for emphasis) the simple
οὐ (Soph. OC. 1368 αΐδ᾽ ἄνδρες, οὐ γυναῖκες, not uncommon in
orators, Dem. de Cor. ( 18 ) 89 , Aristocr. ( 23) 25). Instances of
sentences of forms ( 1 ) and ( 2) occur perpetually ; see the open-
ing of this dialogue, then 72 C 33, 73 B 46 (which in a
continuous sentence would be οὐκ ἀκόλαστοι ἀγαθοὶ ἂν γένοιντο,
ἀλλὰ σώφρονες καὶ δίκαιοι) , 84 D 35, 85 D 20 (which = οὐ διδά-
ξαντος ἀλλ᾽ ἐρωτήσαντός τινος), 89 Β 32, Rep. 354 Α Β οὐ μέντοι
καλῶς γ' εἱστίαμαι · δι᾿ ἐμαυτὸν ἀλλ᾽ οὐ διά σε · ἀλλ᾿ ὥσπερ οἱ λίχνοι
κτέ.
[ Where both clauses are affirmative, or both negative, the
adversative force is stronger. The first half has then a
concessive force, the latter a limiting. The former may be
strengthened with μέν (Xen. Cyr. vii i 16 τὰ μὲν καθ᾿ ἡμᾶς
ἐμοίγε δοκεῖ καλῶς ἔχειν, ἀλλὰ τὰ πλάγια λυπεί με), the latter
with ὅμως (Euthyphro 3 c οὐδὲν ὅ τι οὐκ ἀληθὲς εἴρηκα, ἀλλ᾽ ὅμως
φθονοῦσιν ἡμῖν). ]
But we have this ' complementary ' use (cp. Riddell § 249 ) of
άλλá not merely in statements, but also in commands (illus-
trated above) and in questions ; thus
(3) ἆρ᾽ οὐ Θεαίτητός ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ Θεόδωρος) ;
(4) ἆρα (Θεόδωρός ἐστιν, ἀλλ᾽ οὐ Θεαίτητος) ;
The brackets here show that the interrogative refers to the
sentence as a whole. In (3) où does not go with apa, which
would make the first part an affirmative question. The
whole is one neutral question. This is the form of the place
before us. It may be granted that the two halves of the
question here are not precise counterparts, but the transition is
slight. dá is ' and.' ' Do you really not know, Socrates,
and are we to carry this report of you even to Thessaly ? ' Cp.
68 MENO II 71 C

78 D 30, 79 C 30, Phaedo 58 € ἢ οὐκ εἴων οἱ ἄρχοντες παρεῖναι,

ἀλλ᾽ ἔρημος ἐτελεύτα φίλων ; Symp. 205 B etc.
(4) may be illustrated by Rep. 344 Eσμкрòv olei èπixeɩpeîv
πρᾶγμα διορίζεσθαι, ἀλλ᾽ οὐ βίου διαγωγήν ; Rep. 366 Β τίς μηχανὴ
(τὸν τοιοῦτον) δικαιοσύνην τιμᾶν ἐθέλειν, ἀλλὰ μὴ γελᾶν ἐπαινου
μévηs ȧкоúοvтa ; Here too aλá is ' and ' rather than ' but.'
See Kühner § 535. 2, 3.
[The use of dé for åλλá in such constructions is character-
istic of the Laws ( Riddell § 161 A) . Cp. † Ep. vii 343 B quoted
on 71 B 4. ]
12. καὶ οἴκαδε ἀπαγγέλλωμεν, do you wish this repute of
you to be carried even to Thessaly ? '-where it would of course
spoil Socrates' reputation and chance of success. The verb is
treated as one of motion, hence olkade. Hesiod has (0. et D.
611) πάντας ἀπόδρεπε οἴκαδε βότρυς.
The confusion between expressions of rest and motion is
very easy ; cp. our ' where ' for ' whither, ' and ( conversely)
Tot ' whither ? ' originally locative. Phaedo 57 a Þλiaoíwv ovdeìs
ἐπιχωριάζει τὰ νῦν ᾿Αθήναζε.
The plural is used because Meno is speaking for himself and
his party.
13. µǹ µóvov ye . ἀλλά : from the use of ἀλλά following a
negative clause to which it gives the affirmative counterpart
(see note on line 10) arise a number of phrases in which the
preceding negative clause is elliptical (Riddell § 158) :
(a) ovк ȧλá 85 C 3, 88 A 9, Prot. 343 D, Rep. 475 E, Euthyd.
277 B, Soph. 263 D, Phaedr. 236 D ΣΩ. μηδαμῶς τοίνυν εἴπῃς.
ΦΑΙ . οὐκ, ἀλλὰ καὶ δὴ λέγω, etc. , Dem . Phil. § 27. μὴ ἀλλά
75 Β 13, μή μοι οὕτως, ἀλλά 74 D 30, οὐδαμῶς, ἀλλά Rep. 475 Ε,
Theaet. 201 B, etc.; undaµws ảλλá Gorg. 497 B, etc. Riddell
§ 250.
(B) oủ yàp ảììá Euthyd. 286 c, 305 E, Aristoph. Frogs 58,
498, Eur. Bacch. 785. Riddell § 156.
(Y) OÙX ÖTɩ . . ảλλá Xen. Mem. II ix 8. Perhaps never in
Plato at Symp. 179 в the reading is doubtful. µǹ örɩ .. ¿λλá
often in Plato, Apol. 40 D μὴ ὅτι ἰδιώτην τινα ἀλλὰ τὸν μέγαν
Baoiλéa : Ep. vii 329 E. Riddell § 154.
( δ) οὐχ ὅπως . ἀλλά 96 Α 22 etc. μὴ ὅπως . · ἀλλά Xen.
Cyr. I iii 10. Riddell § 152 .
(ε) οὐ μόνον γε αλλά Phaedo 107 Β. μὴ μόνον γε ἀλλά ( that
is, μὴ ταῦτα μόνον ἀπάγγελλε ἀλλά) here, Euthyphro 6 c.
Riddell §§ 151 , 157.
(S) où µǹv ảλλá Gorg. 449 c etc.
(n) où μévтoi ȧMλá 86 C 4, Phaedo 62 B (twice), Symp. 173 B.
Riddell § 155.
II 71 c NOTES 69

(θ) μή τι πάσας τὰς ἡδονάς, ἀλλά Hipp. maj . 297 Ε. εἰ μή

Tɩ, áλλá 86 E 18 is different. )
(ι) οὐ (μή, οὐδέν, μηδέν) ἀλλ᾽ ἤ, 76 Β 13 , 84 D 32. Riddell
§ 148.
( κ) οὔπω γι' ἀλλά Phaedr. 260 Β.
14. ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκῶ : the personal use of δοκεῖν is far more
common in Plato than the impersonal. Apol. 36 A MéλnTOV
μὲν οὖν, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκῶ, καὶ νῦν ἀποπέφευγα. So the 2nd person
is yé μoi dokeîs 80 A 6. See Sidgwick on ' Personalisation , ' Class.
Rev. III 148, Hadley § 944, F. E. T. p. 159.
15. Topуía ouk évéTUXES : Gorgias first visited Athens in
427 B.C. at the head of an embassy sent from his town Leontini
in Sicily to ask aid against Syracuse. In the dialogue Gorgias
there are passages (as the beginning, where Gorgias is clearly a
new attraction, and 503 c Περικλέα τουτονὶ τὸν νεωστὶ τετελευτη-
KÓTα) which look as if Plato meant to refer the dramatic date of
the dialogue to Gorgias ' visit of 427 B. C. Some later historical
allusions suggest that Plato may have intended a later dramatic
date, perhaps a subsequent visit of Gorgias. Anachronisms are,
however, a feature very natural in fictitious dialogue, where
the author is constantly tempted to introduce relevant matter
within his own knowledge (see on 90 A 40). At any rate the
dramatic date of the Gorgias is earlier than that of the Meno.
It is not necessary to suppose a reference here to the dialogue
Gorgias ; but I am strongly disposed to think there is one.
I have given reasons (Introd. §§ 13, 16) for believing that the
Gorgias was written before the Meno.
18. eira : as it were ' after all this, ' cum admiratione. 79 A 5,
Apol. 28 B, and often.
19. où Távu : this phrase means originally, as we should
expect, ' not altogether, ' and is a weak negative. So Plato
uses it perpetually, as here, ' I have not the best of memories,'
77 D 41 , 86 B 23, etc. Where it has the force of a strong
negative ( as 73 D 11 , 98 B 3, etc. ), this is due to ' litotes, ' the
irony whereby the point of some truth is increased by under-
statement. English colloquialisms will supply many parallels :
rather ! ' (strong affirmation), not much (strong negative).
Cp. Munro on Lucr. III 361, Riddell § 139, Dr. Thompson
on Gorg. 457 E ; also Apol. 19 A, Theaet. 150 c eiµì ôǹ ovv AUTÒS
οὐ πάνυ τι σοφός, Rep. 419 Α μὴ πάνυ τι εὐδαίμονας ποιεῖν. The
point was cleared up by Cope, Translation of Plato's Gorgias
App. C. The strongest instance of pathetic irony is Soph. O. C.
144, where Oedipus speaks of himself as οὐ πάνυ μοίρας εὐδαι
 70 MENO II 71 c

µovíσai πpúтns —the only instance of the phrase in tragedy. Cp.

οὐ σφόδρα Phaedo 100 A.
οὐ πάνυ εἰμὶ μνήμων : in these words, and the similar passage
Prot. 334 c ν ὦ Πρωταγόρα, ἐγὼ τυγχάνω ἐπιλήσμων τις ὢν ἄνθρω-
TOS KTE. , Plato has no doubt preserved a trick of the historic
Socrates for inveigling his interlocutor into the wiles of his
elenchus. It is all the more noticeable because the Greeks
attached great importance to a good memory, as was natural
with people who depended so little on writing. Plato himself
makes it an essential requisite for the philosopher, Rep. 486 c D,
Gorg. 466 A. At 88 A 17 μvýμn stands in the list of the
virtues. In Aristoph. Clouds 482 foll . Strepsiades' memory is
tested, and in 629 he is taunted as ériλńoµwv. The ' short
memory ' of the Spartans (Hdt. III 46 ) had, like that of
Socrates, its diplomatic object.
D 26. ἐκεῖνον μὲν τοίνυν ἐῶμεν, ἐπειδὴ καὶ ἄπεστιν : the absent
authority and the speechless book are on the same level of use-
lessness for the purpose of debate. Cp. Phaedrus 274 B-276 B
(Grote II 239 and 256 foll. ). In the same way consecutive
oratory is unsatisfactory ; Prot. 329 A (if you ask a point of
Pericles or any orator he will make you a speech) ei dè éπaVÉ-
ροιτό τινά τι, ὥσπερ βιβλία οὐδὲν ἔχουσι οὔτε ἀποκρίνασθαι οὔτε
avтol épéσlaι, ib. 347 E (rational beings need not resort to
citations from poets for topics of conversation) oûs oŰтe åveρéσ0αι
οἷόν τ᾽ ἐστὶν περὶ ὧν λέγουσιν, ἐπαγόμενοί τε αὐτοὺς οἱ πολλοὶ ἐν
τοῖς λόγοις οἱ μὲν ταῦτα φασὶν τὸν ποιητὴν νοεῖν οἱ δ᾽ ἕτερα.
Add Hipp. min. 365 D, quoted below. Plato's disparagement
of writing, which diminished with advancing years, was grossly
exaggerated by the writers of the second and seventh epistles
(312 D foll. , 341 в foll . ) , who for their own purposes tried to
make out that the true Platonic teaching was an esoteric
mystery only communicated orally. Grote, who accepts the
epistles as genuine, overstates Plato's position ( 1 pp. 221 foll . ) ;
for a juster view see Zeller p. 89 note ; see also on 77 B 12.
étteldη kal άTEσTIV, ' since, after all, he is not here ' ; see
on 71 B 8. Cp. the similar passage Hipp. min. 365 D Tòv µèv
Ομηρον τοίνυν εάσωμεν ἐπειδὴ καὶ ἀδύνατον ἐπανερέσθαι τί ποτε
νοῶν ταῦτα ἐποίησεν.
27. σὺ δὲ αὐτὸς Tips : Riddell § 309 ' Interrogation
emerging late in the sentence. By this arrangement, so
common in Plato, the sentence generally gains animation, and
its emphatic part is distinctly indicated.' Cp. 78 C 19, 86 D 8.
28. Tov : the 2nd sing. 1st aor. imperat. eirov (so accen-
tuated, not elóv, see Buttmann, Excursus I ) is rare in good
II 71 D NOTES 71

Attic, never occurring in tragedy. In the two instances in

which it occurs in Attic prose, here and Xen. Mem. III vi 3
πρὸς θεῶν, ἔφη, μὴ τοίνυν ἀποκρύψῃ, ἀλλ᾽ εἶπον ἡμῖν, it is
used in a solemn adjuration , probably for its heavier sound.
See App. on the text.
καὶ μὴ φθονήσῃς : it is a strong note of Platonic dialectic,
borrowed from Socrates, that a man's intellectual powers ought
to be freely at the service of his fellows for the discovery of
truth. All vulgar póvos is out of place among philosophers,
as it is in the circle of the gods (Phaedr. 247 A, Tim. 29 E).
The writer of the seventh epistle takes up the note, 344 B
ἄνευ φθόνων ἐρωτήσεσι καὶ ἀποκρίσεσι χρωμένων. See on 91 Β 14.
29. eûσμa : a rare word , nowhere else in Plato.
ἐψευσμένος ὦ : the middle and passive tenses of this verb
afford a curious study in the Greek voices. ψεύδομαι (the
moral connotation of which is much feebler than the English
' lie, ' see e.g. Rep. 338 B) means either (middle ?) I speak
wrongly ,' 'I utter a lie, ' or (passive ?) ' I am wrong.' In the
former case it is opposed to aλn@evei (Hipp. min. 366 E foll. ,
Euthyd. 284 A, Crat. 431 B). In the latter it is opposed to
τἀληθὲς δοξάζειν ( Theaet. 194 c). Sometimes the ' middle ' is
used transitively, Xen. Hell. III i 25 yeúderaí σe oûros. Perhaps
there is no instance in Plato of the present middle used
transitively ; but we have the aor. in Laws 921 a thy tiμnv
τῶν ἔργων ὀφειλέτω ὧν ἂν τὸν ἐκδόντα ψεύσηται ' of which he
has cheated the person who gave the contract. ' Cp. Rep. 331 B
τὸ μηδὲ ἄκοντά τινα ἐξαπατῆσαι ἢ ψεύσασθαι, where τινα is object.
On the other hand it seems difficult to find the present
Yeúdoμaι in any author as a distinct passive with an expressed
agent (ψεύδομαι ὑπό τινος) .
The meanings of eyevoμai exactly follow the meanings of
Veúdoua -namely, ' I have uttered a lie ' (middle), ' I harbour
a lie or error ' = ȧualns eiu (passive). But it would be hard
to find an instance either of eyevouac transitive, or on the other
hand of eyevoua distinctly passive with agent expressed . It
is not clear here whether the meaning is ' have made a wrong
statement ' or ' have been deceived. ' Such was the temper of
the Greek mind, or such the freakish development of the Greek
verb, that they expressed by the same form ' I am under a
delusion ' and I deceive (perhaps wilfully) another.' And so
we get the extraordinary juggle in Rep. 11 382 A-C, where it is
argued that gods cannot deceive, because to deceive must imply
the harbouring of error : τῇ ψυχῇ ψεύδεσθαί τε καὶ ἐψεῦσθαι
καὶ ἀμαθῆ εἶναι πάντες ἥκιστα ἂν δέξαιντο : ep. ibid . 535 E.
ἂν φανῇς σὺ μὲν εἰδὼς . . ἐγὼ δὲ εἰρηκώς, ‘ if it turns out
 72 MENO II 71 D

that you and Gorgias know, though I said etc. ' (parataxis).
Kühner § 518. 6 draws a distinction between ' natural ' and
' artificial ' or ' rhetorical ' parataxis. The former is the
primitive simplicity of language, before the mechanism of
the subordinate clause has developed ; the latter is a conscious
retention or revival of the primitive form for special effect.
He admits that no firm line can be drawn between the two
classes. Cases like the present he would consider ' artificial '
(§ 518. 9) . Cp. Dem. de Cor. ( 18 ) 160 aioxpóv ẻotw ei ¿yw µèv
τοὺς πόνους, ὑμεῖς δὲ μηδὲ τοὺς λόγους αὐτῶν ἀνέξεσθε.

Chapters III, IV (71 D- 73 C). MENO. There are all kinds of

Virtue, suitable to different persons and circumstances.
SOCRATES. But there must be something in common that
makes all these actions Virtue. I want to get at that.
MENO. I do not see that Virtue is in all cases one and
the same ----as, for instance, Health is. SOCRATES. But
it is by possession of the same qualities that persons exhibit
Virtue in all cases. MENO. Yes.

E 1. ἀλλ᾽ οὐ χαλεπόν : Meno at first naturally does not

realise the difficulty of the task, and speaks with the con-
fidence of ignorance : so presently ouк άπоpía eiπeîv, where the
word ȧopía is ominous. Meno's first answer shows that as yet
he does not grasp the notion of logical definition at all. His
later attempts are more or less definitions in form , though
faulty. For the present, instead of giving the contents of the
notion, he gives an enumeration of instances. His answer
refers to the extension of the term rather than its intension.
In many of Plato's dialogues where a definition is proposed,
the first stage is devoted to exemplifying and clearing up this
difficulty (Fr. Introd. p. 21 note 6).
(1) Hipp. maj. 286 E What is Beauty ? (rò κaλóv).
Hippias, quite as confident as Meno in his mastery of
the subject, gives in succession three answers, each of which
is shown to be a mere exemplification of Beauty, not a general
definition at all. Afterwards Socrates suggests ( professedly at
second6 - hand) three definitions, which are so far definitions
that they keep in the region of abstractions, and seek to
discover some more general concept, of which the Beautiful is
only a derivative or a modification ' (Grote I 379). But they
each fail to satisfy the examination to which Socrates subjects
them .
(2) Euthyphro 5 c What is Piety ? Euthyphro. To do as I
am now doing : to prosecute guilty people, even if the culprit
III 71 E NOTES 73
is your father. Socrates (6 D). That is not an answer : other
things are holy too. Euthyphro's next answer (TÒ TOîs Deoîs
poopiλés ) is a definition in form, though unsatisfactory . Grote
I 317, 8.
(3) Laches 191 D What is Courage ? Laches. There is no
difficulty in telling you that. Whoever keeps his place in the
rank, repels the enemy, and does not run away, is a courageous
man (Grote 1473). Socrates. ' But sometimes he that fights
and runs away - like the Scythian horseman - is courageous.
Yours is no definition . ' Socrates then gives a sample definition
of Swiftness. Laches then gives a definition of Courage, ex-
pressed in general terms ; but it turns out too large. Subse-
quently Nikias proposes a definition which, though on strictly
Socratic lines, still leaves some difficulties unsolved . See on
88 B 23.
(4) Lastly, in the Theaetetus, Socr. asks What is Know-
ledge ? (146 c). Theaetetus. Geometry and the other things that
Theodorus teaches ; and again, shoemaking and practical arts.
Socrates. γενναίως γε καὶ φιλοδώρως, ὦ φίλε, ἓν αἰτηθεὶς πολλὰ
δίδως καὶ ποικίλα ἀντὶ ἁπλοῦ. Socrates then gives a model
definition of Clay (vî vypŵ pupaleîoa ) 147 D, after which Theae-
tetus shows that he at any rate grasps what is meant by a class-
notion. Grote II 320.
This list of dialogues might be increased . The language in
the various passages deserves careful comparison. Plato laboured
hard to bring out the point, then a new one, for the elucidation
of which little apparatus of philosophic terms was yet provided.
2. εἰ βούλει : this phrase (also εἰ βούλεται, εἰ βούλεσθε etc. )
is used in various elliptic constructions (Ullrich on 71 D 23).
We may distinguish according as there is, or is not, an
expressed apodosis. In the first two sentences of Meno's
speech we may fairly say there is an apodosis : εἰ βούλει (με
eiπeîv) åvôpòs åpetýv, pádiov (eiteîv) ktẻ. εἰ δὲ βούλει (με εἰπεῖν)
γυναικὸς ἀρετήν, οὐ χαλεπὸν διελθεῖν κτέ. In the later instance
εἰ μὲν βούλει, ἐλευθέρου, εἰ δὲ βούλει, δούλου, the words ἐλευθέρου
and doulou are no doubt each the relic of an apodosis, but it
has practically disappeared, and εἰ μὲν βούλει, εἰ δὲ βούλει are
little more than εἴτε . . εἴτε.
The protasis in all these cases is incomplete, there being no
infinitive dependent on Boule . At Symp. 177 в we have a
complete protasis : εἰ δὲ βούλει αὖ σκέψασθαι τοὺς χρηστοὺς
σοφιστάς, (οὐ δεινὸν) Ηρακλέους μὲν καὶ ἄλλων ἐπαίνους καταλο-
γάδην συγγράφειν ;
Above at 71 D 23 we have an instance with a real apodosis.
In the following instances we have ei dè ẞoúλei (or the like)
74 MENO III 71 E
6
without ei uèv Boule preceding, the meaning being or again ' :
94 B 11 , Prot. 320 A, Hipp. maj. 282 c, Theaet. 196 E, Crat.
392 A, Phaedr. 230 c. In these cases there is a verbal clause
succeeding, but it is not a real apodosis. Similar is 73 E 19
οἷον, εἰ βούλει . . εἴποιμ᾽ ἄν . In the following there is no verb
succeeding : Symp. 220 D ei dè Boúλeσbe èv тaîs μaxaîs ' again,
take his conduct in battle, ' ib. 209 D, Hipp. maj. 301 A, Rep.
425 D, Laches 188 c, Theaet. 183 A. In the last two places the
meaning is ' or rather.'
Where εἰ μὲν βούλει or εἰ μὲν βούλεται precedes, βούλει or
Boulera after ei dé is commonly omitted (Riddell § 253) .
Symp. 212 c τοῦτον οὖν τὸν λόγον , εἰ μὲν βούλει , ὡς ἐγκώμιον
εἰς ῎Ερωτα νόμισον εἰρῆσθαι · εἰ δέ, ὅ τι καὶ ὅπῃ χαίρεις όνο-
μάζων, τοῦτο ὀνόμαζε, Euthyd. 285 c εἰ μὲν βούλεται, ἑψέτω, εἰ
δ᾽, ὅ τι βούλεται, τοῦτο ποιείτω , Laws 688 B, Crat. 407 D, + Alc.
i 114 B. Riddell compares the case of ei dé without a verb in
Homer. This is due in Homer to the original interjectional
force of ei. In the cases before us there is a distinct ellipsis,
and they should hardly be regarded as cases of survival. Note
that in Symp. 212 c and Euthyd. 285 c, the relative clauses
introduced by 8 T take the place of Boule and Boúlerai respect-
ively, and would make the insertion of these words awkward.
We find a fuller constrution Gorg. 472 A B éàv Boúλŋ . . ¿àv
μὲν βούλῃ • ἐὰν δὲ βούλῃ : Rep. 432 Α εἰ μὲν βούλει, φρονήσει,
εἰ δὲ βούλει, ἰσχύϊ, εἰ δέ, καὶ πλήθει ἢ χρήμασιν κτέ. Cp. also
Prot. 342 A. See Appendix on the text, 72 A 12.
ἀνδρὸς ἀρετήν : the ἀρετὴ ἀνδρός here set forth is the
vulgar notion of civic excellence. See on 91 A 4. άperý came
to mean anything that conduced to pre-eminence , anything
by which one could show one's self ' the better man, ' even the
miserable art of quibbling taught by Euthydemus and his
friend, Euthyd. 273 D. When Thuc. (VIII 68) says Antiphon
was ἀνὴρ 'Αθηναίων τῶν καθ᾿ ἑαυτὸν ἀρετῇ οὐδενὸς δεύτερος, this
need not be read as a testimony to moral character.
4. τοὺς μὲν φίλους εὖ ποιεῖν, τοὺς δὲ ἐχθροὺς κακῶς :
this is the usual pre- Christian standard . ἠκούσατε ὅτι ἐρρέθη
ἀγαπήσεις τὸν πλήσιόν σου, καὶ μισήσεις τὸν ἐχθρόν σου. ἐγὼ
δὲ λέγω ὑμῖν, ἀγαπᾶτε τοὺς ἐχθροὺς ὑμῶν, Εv. Matth. v 43, 44.
The view is often given by Plato as the current one, but
never by him accepted . See Rep. 332 A B, criticised 334 B
foll. , Clit. 410 A, Crito 49 B (where see J. Adam's note). The
teaching of the Gorgias, κρεῖττον ἀδικεῖσθαι ἢ ἀδικεῖν is directed
against it. Whether Socrates took the same enlightened view
is more doubtful. Bernays Phokion und seine neueren Beurtheiler
pp. 46 foll. argues that Socrates acquiesced in the current view.
J. Adam (note on Crito 1.c. and Introd. p. xii) replies to his
III 72 A NOTES 75

arguments, I think successfully. But what he says of Socrates

is also true of Plato ; where Plato impugns the current doctrine
it is not from an altruistic standpoint, but from a self-regarding
one, the welfare and dignity of the agent's own soul (Grote II
82 and 123, J. S. Mill Diss. III 342 foll. , Zeller 182 and 454).
It must be said in defence of the popular view that if it
preaches the duty of revenge it also rates very highly the
obligations of friendship. Even Callicles (Gorg. 473 B) repre-
sents as part of the misery of the man without power in the
state, that he not merely cannot take his own part, but that
he cannot do a good turn for a friend .
7. yuvaιkòs ȧperýv : this also is the conventional view.
One of the strongest practical results of the Socratic- Platonic
theory that Virtue is One, is the ignoring of any distinction in
the special excellence or moral function of the sexes. See Rep.
451 foll. , Zeller p. 448, Socr. p. 121. Xenophon, Symp. ii 9,
appears to report the Socratic view ; but adheres to the popular
view, Oec. vii §§ 22-27 . Antisthenes said ȧvôpòs кal yvvaιKos
ʼn avτǹ ȧperý : Diog. L. vI § 12. Aristotle, as we might expect,
is on the side of ' common sense ' : Pol. 1 13 óμoiws ToivVv
ἀναγκαῖον ἔχειν καὶ περὶ τὰς ἠθικὰς ἀρετάς · ὑποληπτέον δεῖν
μὲν μετέχειν πάντας, ἀλλ᾽ οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον , ἀλλ᾽ ὅσον ἑκάστῳ
πρὸς τὸ αὑτοῦ ἔργον . ὥστε φανερὸν ὅτι ἐστὶν ἠθικὴ ἀρετὴ τῶν
εἰρημένων πάντων, καὶ οὐχ ἡ αὐτὴ σωφροσύνη γυναικὸς καὶ ἀνδρός,
οὐδ᾽ ἀνδρία καὶ δικαιοσύνη , καθάπερ ᾤετο Σωκράτης πολὺ γὰρ
ἄμεινον λέγουσιν οἱ ἐξαριθμοῦντες τὰς ἀρετὰς ὥσπερ Γοργίας.
The fact that Meno is here ' enumerating ' virtues makes
it highly probable that Aristotle is referring to the present
passage, and attributing the views Meno here expresses to his
master. Whether Aristotle had access to any deliverance of
Gorgias himself on the subject is very doubtful (Dr. Thompson
Gorgias p. 181 , Zeller pre- Socr. II 472).
Fr. well points out that the use of ȧperý = ' special excellence
or function ' naturally led the way to such a recognition of
various forms of Virtue. This use of ȧperý is prominent in
Plato himself. Rep. 353 B foll . oùкoûv кai ȧpeтǹ dokεî σoι eivai
ἑκάστῳ, ᾧπερ καὶ ἔργον τι προστέτακται ; κτέ. , ib. 601 D οὐκοῦν
ἀρετὴ καὶ κάλλος καὶ ὀρθότης ἑκάστου σκεύους καὶ ζῴου καὶ
πράξεως οὐ πρὸς ἄλλο τι ἢ τὴν χρείαν ἐστί, πρὸς ἣν ἂν ἕκαστον
ῇ πεποιημένον ἢ πεφυκός ; Cp. Arist. NE. i vi 2. See the
words translated below.
14. καθ᾿ ἑκάστην κτλ. , ' for corresponding to our several 72 Α
occupations and ages in regard to each of our functions there is
for each of us a Virtue ; and in like manner, I think, Socrates,
a Vice.'
 76 MENO III 72 A

The style of Meno's answer is verbose and bombastic ; but

it is hard to detect in it any traits that can be set down
distinctly as ' Gorgianisms. ' See on 76 E 43 : Blass Attische
Beredsamkeit 1 58 foll. Agathon's speech in the Symposium
(194 foll. ) is full of Gorgianisms ; cp. 198 c. See too Xen.
Symp. ii 26, Zeller pre - Socr. II 492. When the rhetorician
Hermogenes censures ' Polus and Gorgias and Menon ' (Dr.
Thompson's Gorgias p. 175) for their pompous and pretentious
way of writing, he probably bases his criticism of Meno on
slender grounds, as there is no reason to believe that the real
Meno left any literary relics.
18. πολλῇ γέ τινι εὐτυχίᾳ κτλ. : cp. the ironical con-
gratulation to Theaetetus 146 D (quoted on 71 E 1 ).
19. σμήνος ἀρετῶν : the word σμήνος is frequently used
metaphorically, Crat. 401 E ouĥvos σopias, Rep. 574 D ndovŵv
σμῆκος, Aristoph. Clouds 297 σμήνος ἀοιδῆς. Cp. Rep. 450 Β ὅσον
éσμòv λóywν ÉTTEуeiρeтe. Plutarch Virt. Mor. 2 borrows hence
the expression σuvos aperŵv to ridicule Chrysippus' long list
of virtues. ( Zeller Stoics p. 244 note 1. ) A similar expression,
'a mob of virtues, ' was applied to Aristotle's list by Schleier-
macher (Whewell Additional Lectures on Moral Philosophy p. 18 ).
B 21. κατὰ ταύτην τὴν εἰκόνα, ‘ apropos of this metaphor of the
hive.' Many uses of kará with acc. come from the notion of
following down (we say ' following up ' ) a suggestion. Hdt.
VII 142 οἱ μὲν δὴ κατὰ τὸν φραγμὸν συνεβάλλοντο τοῦτο τὸ
ξύλινον τεῖχος εἶναι “ following up the notion of the stockade,
Aristoph. Clouds 534 νῦν οὖν Ηλέκτραν κατ᾽ ἐκείνην ἥδ᾽ ἡ κωμῳδία
ζητοῦσ᾽ ἦλθ᾽, Theaet. 179 E (the Herakliteans) ἀτεχνῶς κατὰ τὰ
συγγράμματα φέρονται ‘ are9 in the state of instability appro-
priate to their writings, Rep. 576c ὅ γε τυραννικὸς κατὰ
τὴν τυραννουμένην πόλιν ἂν εἴη ὁμοιότητι. Cp. 76 C 19, 23..
The mention of the hive suggests to Socrates the bee as a
subject for definition. It is clear that Plato devoted much
attention to zoological and botanical classification . We have
elaborate examples of the former, Soph. 220 A B, Politicus 261 B
-267 c, especially 266 E. It is true that these classifications
stand apart from the main subject of these dialogues ; but it
would be a mistake to deny them intrinsic importance.
Aristotle seriously criticises Plato's zoology (Part. An. I
chaps. ii and iii, especially I ii §§ 2, 3, 1 iii §§ 12, 13 ) . See
W. H. T. in JP. vol. vIII p. 294 ; also p. 315, where he quotes
the satire of the comic poet Epicrates on the proceedings of the
Academy, who are represented as occupied in determining the
genus and species of a pumpkin. See also H. Jackson in JP.
vol. XIII pp. 38 , 243, and Archer- Hind , Timaeus Introd . pp.
III 72 B NOTES 77

31-35, JP. vol. XXIV p. 52, who show that in Plato's later
viewthe only Ideas are those corresponding to the Natural Kinds ;
mainly, that is, those of plants and animals. At the time when
he wrote the Meno Plato had not arrived at this stage ; but as
suggestive problems in classification the species of plants and
animals must have interested him at an early stage. These
species furnish the chief instances of Natural Kinds, as they were
called by Mill, that is , Kinds separated from others that stand
near them not by a known limited number of differences, but
by an unlimited number — as, for instance, the differences
between a bee and a wasp. The selection of the most suitable
differences on which to ground a system of classification is
the problem botanists and zoologists have to face. (See Mill
Logic 1 vii § 4, Iv vi § 4, Iv vii §§ 2, 4 ; Bain Logic vol. I
p. 63 ; Jevons Elem. Lessons p. 294. )
22. εἴ μου ἐρομένου κτλ. : the protasis is really triple, but
one member of it appears in a participial form (μου ἐρομένου).
This becomes clear by comparing the sentence with two ana-
logous ones at 74 B and C.
72 B 74 B 74 C
(α) μου ἐρομένου εἴ τίς σε ἀνέροιτο εἰ ἀνήρετο
(β) εἰ ἔλεγες εἰ αὐτῷ εἶπες εἰπόντος σου
(γ) εἴ σε ήρόμην εἴ σοι εἶπεν καὶ (εἰ) ὑπέλαβεν
The variety is characteristic of Plato.
Sentences with a double protasis, especially as here in sum-
marising a supposed dialogue, are frequent in Plato.
Hipp. maj. 289 c εἴ σε ἠρόμην—εἴ μοι ἀπεκρίνω— ὀρθῶς ἂν
ἀπεκέκρισο.
Prot. 311 Β ε εἰ ἐπενόεις —εἴ τίς σε ἤρετο—τί ἂν ἀπεκρίνω ; (bis).
Gorg. 453 c εἰ ἐτύγχανόν σε ἐρωτῶν— εἴ μοι εἶπες—οὐκ ἂν
δικαίως σε ἠρόμην ;
Theaet. 147 Α εἴ τις ἔροιτοεἰ ἀποκριναίμεθα—οὐκ ἂν γελοῖοι
εἶμεν ;
† Theages 123 Β εἰ ἐπεθύμεις— καὶ ἐγώ σε ἐτύγχανον ἀνερωτῶν—
τί ἂν ἀπεκρίνω ;
In Euthyphro 10 E we have a double protasis, but the second
is bifurcated, each half having a separate apodosis.
In Clit. 408 E we have an elaborate sentence with a triple
protasis, εἴ τις ἡμᾶς προὔτρεπε—καὶ ἔπειτα ὠνείδιζε- εἰ δ᾽ ἐπανηρό-
μεθα—εἶπεν ἄν. In all these instances the protases are separate
and co-ordinate ; in translation they might be linked together
by ' and. ' A more elaborate form occurs Phaedo 67 E ei yàp
διαβέβληνται κτέ. Kühner § 578. 9, Goodwin MΤ. § 510.
' Hic et in proximis mirum in modum alternant imperfecta
cum aoristis, ἔλεγες, ἀπεκρίνω, ἠρόμην, ἀπεκρίνω 72 Β, εἶπον ,
 78 ΜΕΝΟ III 72 B

είχες 73 D, ήρχον ἐπεσκεψάμεθα 86 D. Heind. ad Gorg. 447 E

εἰ ἐτύγχανεν ὢν ὑποδημάτων δημιούργος, ἀπεκρίνατο ἄν, 514 D
κἂν εἰ ἐπιχειρήσαντες δημοσιεύειν παρεκαλοῦμεν ἀλλήλους ὡς
ἱκανοὶ ἰατροὶ ὄντες, ἐπεσκεψάμεθα δήπου ἄν, omnia tamen in
verbis hisce loquendi, respondendi, inquirendi ' (Buttmann).
Heind. refers inter alia to Prot. 311 Β (quoted above) . Fr. notes
74 CD, Euthyphro 12v εἰ ἠρώτας εἶπον ἄν ; add 99 Ε 3,
Gorg. 453 c, Ion 540 D εἰ ἐτύγχανες ἱππικὸς ὢν ἔγνως ἄν,
Symp. 199 D εἰ ἠρώτων εἶπες ἄν, Prot. 313 Α εἰ τὸ σῶμα
ἐπιτρέπειν ἔδει τῳ — πολλὰ ἂν περιεσκέψω— καὶ τοὺς φίλους ἂν
παρεκάλεις : Goodwin MT. § 414, Hadley 875. 6. In many of
these cases the ground of difference in the tenses comes out
clearly : thus ἠρώτων refers to a process of questioning, ἠρόμην
to a single question (see App. on text, 72 C 4). But certain
aorists and certain imperfects seem to be favoured , Theaet.
144 Ε πότερον εὐθὺς ἂν ἐπιστεύομεν ἢ ἐπεσκεψάμεθα ;
μελίττης περὶ οὐσίας ὅ τί ποτ᾽ ἔστιν : see Exc. I.
26. τῷ μελίττας εἶναι, ‘ in their essential nature as bees,
i.e. τῇ μελιττῶν οὐσίᾳ. Ηipp. maj. 292 D τὸ καλὸν αὐτό, ὃ
παντὶ ᾧ ἂν προσγένηται, ὑπάρχει ἐκείνῳ καλῷ εἶναι, 299 D ἆρ᾽
οὖν ἡδὺ ἡδέος ὁτιοῦν ὁτονοῦν διαφέρει τούτῳ τῷ ἡδὺ εἶναι ; Lysis
217 Β σῶμά που κατὰ τὸ σῶμα εἶναι οὔτ᾽ ἀγαθὸν οὔτε κακόν,
Phaedo 102 ο οὐ γὰρ Σιμμίαν (Σωκράτους) ὑπερέχειν τούτῳ τῷ
Σιμμίαν εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τῷ μεγέθει ( see on 71 Β 6), 72 Ε 22 πρὸς
τὸ ἰσχὺς εἶναι, 73 Α 26.
30. ᾗ μέλιτται εἰσίν : this somewhat more technical ex-
pression is substituted for τῷ μελίττας εἶναι above. Cp. Parm .
145 Ε ᾗ μὲν ἄρα τὸ ἓν ὅλον, ἐν ἄλλῳ ἐστίν · ᾗ δὲ τὰ πάντα μέρη
ὄντα τυγχάνει, αὐτὸ ἐν ἑαυτῷ. The use becomes stereotyped in
Aristotle, and is represented by the scholastic qua.
C 36. ywye : Plato spares us Meno's attempt at defining a
bee. It would be interesting to see what Plato's own would
have been.

CHAPTER IV
1. κἂν εἰ . . εἰσιν ἔχουσιν : in this construction the
av originally belonged to the apodosis. It has got drawn
forward and attached to kai, mainly owing to the desire to
mark the conditional character of the sentence at the start,
but perhaps partly from the wish to avoid the hiatus καὶ εἰ.
The origin of the idiom is seen by comparing such a sentence
as 75 C 25 ἐγὼ γὰρ κἂν οὕτως ἀγαπῴην εἴ μοι ἀρετὴν εἴποις, which
might have been written ἐγὼ γὰρ κἂν εἴ μοι οὕτως ἀρετὴν εἴποις,
IV 72 c NOTES 79
6
ȧyarýny. But the av has become consopitum , ' and is used
often where there is no apodosis that admits of av, as here,
Soph. 267 D (προσείπωμεν), Rep. 477 A (ἔχομεν), 579 D ἔστιν
ἄρα, κἂν εἰ μή τῳ δοκεῖ (cp. 473 A ) , Prot. 328 Α κἂν εἰ ὀλίγον
ἔστι τις ὅστις διαφέρει . . ἀγαπητόν, Symp. 185 € κἂν εἴ τις
ἐξαπατηθείη ὅμως καλὴ ἡ ἀπατή, † Theages 121 Α , 130 D. In
some cases there is neither an apodosis corresponding to av nor
a verb with ei : the words av and ei then are the relics of a
vanished apodosis and protasis, and are almost otiose, käv
el being little more than kai ' even, ' Soph. 247 E κàv ei μóvov
εἰσάπαξ, Polit. 308 c εἴ τις πρᾶγμα ὁτιοῦν . . κἂν εἰ τὸ φαυλότατον,
συνίστησιν. In cases where av retains its force, and the
apodosis contains a suitable finite verb, Plato generally repeats
ἄν : Soph. 256 Β κἂν εἴ πῃ μετελάμβανεν . . οὐδὲν ἂν ἄτοπον ἦν,
Gorg. 514 D quoted on B 22, Phaedo 72 c kav ei σvyкρívοTO TаXÙ
ἂν τὸ τοῦ ᾿Αναξ. γεγονὸς εἴη : ep. Prot. 318 B, 353 D, Menex. 236 c
ὥστε κἂν ὀλίγου, εἴ με κελεύοις ἀποδύντα ὀρχήσασθαι, χαρισαί-
uŋv äv (where, however, Sch. brackets the last two words).
[ But where the apodosis is an inf. or ptcp. Plato usually
does not repeat av : Rep. 408 A, 473 A, 612c : Phaedo 71 B :
Phil. 58 c. ]
In most of the above cases κal goes with ei, in the sense
' even, ' the sentence being concessive (see on 98 D 35).
On ka ei see Kühner § 398. 4, Riddell § 255, Goodwin MT.
§ 195, F. E. T. § 190, Buttmann note here and on Dem. Meid.
§ 51, Heindorf on Soph. 247 E, Jebb on Soph. El. 1483, Aj.
1078, Cope on Aristot. Rhet. 1 i5. The account of woep av ei
is analogous to that of κἂν εἰ.
2. Ev Yé Tɩ eldos : here we have another word which Plato
moulded to philosophical usage. The meanings before Plato
are ( 1 ) form,' ' physical appearance, ' and (2) ' sort, ' ' kind '
(see L. & S. ). The former meaning is frequent in Plato, e.g.
80 Α 9, Rep. 402 D ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ καὶ ἐν τῷ εἴδει, Symp. 210 Β εἰ δεῖ
διώκειν τὸ ἐπ᾽ εἴδει καλόν ( so Hug, I think rightly, but there
may be a play on two senses of eidos). The second meaning
differs but little from one of the philosophical meanings in
Plato ; you can hardly separate maiɣviewv rà eidea (Hdt. 1 94)
from Rep. 363 Ε ἄλλο αὖ εἶδος λόγων, 424 c εἶδος καινὸν μουσικῆς
(cр. троπоν ons véov just above). See CR. XII 223.
The philosophical meanings of eîdos in Plato we may thus
distinguish :
A. (metaphysical) : the Form which makes a given Class
what it is, whether by infusing its being into it (Participa-
tion), or by serving as an exemplar ( Imitation ). Phaedo 102 B
ὡμολογεῖτο εἶναί τι ἕκαστον τῶν εἰδῶν καὶ τούτων τἆλλα μετα-
λαμβάνοντα αὐτῶν τούτων τὴν ἐπωνυμίαν ἴσχειν, Rep. 597 Α (ὁ
80 ΜΕΝΟ IV 72 c

κλινοποιός) οὐ τὸ εἶδος ποιεῖ, ὃ δή φαμεν εἶναι ὃ ἔστι κλίνη, ἀλλὰ

κλίνην τινά, Parm. 129 A -135 c, especially 132.
[ In the passages hitherto quoted some definite metaphysical
theory or other is implied as to the relation of the eidos to the
particulars. Of the following places in earlier dialogues, as of
this place (and D, E presently) in the Meno, this can hardly be
said : Euthyphro 6 D ἐκεῖνο αὐτὸ τὸ εἶδος, ᾧ πάντα τὰ ὅσια ὅσιά
ἐστιν, ἔφησθα γάρ που μιᾷ ἰδέᾳ τά τε ἀνόσια ἀνόσια εἶναι καὶ τὰ ὅσια
ὅσια (ep. 5 D and see on 72 B 22 above) , Hipp. maj. 289 D αὐτὸ τὸ
καλόν, ᾧ καὶ τἆλλα πάντα κοσμεῖται καὶ καλὰ φαίνεται, ἐπειδὰν
προσγένηται ἐκεῖνο τὸ εἶδος. At Gorg. 503 E the meaning is
'visible form ' ; but not without suggestion of a mental type to
be realised : (the true orator) οὐκ εἰκῇ ἐρεῖ, ἀλλ᾽ ἀποβλέπων πρός
τι · ὥσπερ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι δημιουργοὶ βλέποντες πρὸς τὸ αὑτῶν ἔργον
ἕκαστος . "" ὅπως ἂν εἶδός τι αὐτῷ σχῇ τοῦτο δ ἐργάζεται. ]
B. (logical) ( a) a genus contrasted with a smaller species, or
with particulars, Theaet. 178 Α εἰ περὶ παντός τις τοῦ εἴδους
ἐρωτῴη, ἐν ᾧ καὶ τὸ ὠφέλιμον τυγχάνει ὄν, 148D ὥσπερ ταύτας
πολλὰς οὔσας ἑνὶ εἴδει περιέλαβες.
(β) a species contrasted with a larger genus, Symp. 205 Β
ἀφελόντες γὰρ τοῦ ἔρωτός τι εἶδος ὀνομάζομεν, τὸ τοῦ ὅλου ἐπι-
τιθέντες ὄνομα, ἔρωτα, Rep . 357 c, Polit. 258 Ε, 263 B, etc.
[There is also a periphrastic use, Rep. 389 Β ὡς ἐν φαρμάκου
elde ' by way of medicine ' (see L. & S. ), with which cp. Hipp.
maj. 297 Β ἐν πατρός τινος ἰδέᾳ εἶναι τὸ καλὸν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, Laws
918 Ε ἐν μητρὸς καὶ τροφοῦ σχήματι. So ἐν μέρει τινος (L. & S.
IV 3 ), ἐν ἀνδρὸς λόγῳ Hdt. III 120. ]
Whether there is any consistent distinction in Plato's usage
of eidos and idéa has been debated. Zeller (notes pp. 207 and
238) denies any such difference, and I think he is right. On
the other hand see Campbell Theaet. App. C, and L. & S. s. v.
ἰδέα. But είδος has in Plato all the meanings of ἰδέα. The
history of the two words is precisely similar. idéa had before
Plato the same two meanings as eldos, ' physical appearance ' and
'sort.' Both words occur in Hipp. maj. , eidos in a philo-
sophical sense, ἰδέα only in the phrase ἐν πατρὸς ἰδέᾳ (289 D
and 297 Β quoted above). Both occur in Euthyphro in a
philosophical sense, idéa 5 D, eidos and idéa 6 D. On the latter
passage J. Adam says ' eidos and idéa are here practically
synonymous : the only difference is that eidos views the thing
in question more as to its content, idéa more as to its form."
Cp. Fr. Introd. to Euthyphro p. 150 note 6. On Phaedo 103 Ε
Archer- Hind observes, In fact μορφή, εἶδος and ἰδέα are in the
present passage interchangeable words. ' In Rep. 596 there is
little change of meaning between eîdos at A and idéa (thrice) at B.
'We assign one cidos to each class of particulars : and so there are
IV 72 D NOTES 81

ιδέαι of the bed and of the table, which the δημιουργός copies.
The key of the Ideal Theory (of the Rep. ) is the representation
of Intellectual processes by metaphors drawn from the world
of Sense. Perhaps associations of Sense adhere rather more
strongly to ιδέα than to εἶδος. In Parm. 132 A I can distinguish
no difference of meaning : Οἶμαί σε ἐκ τοῦ τοιοῦδε ἓν ἕκαστον
εἶδος οἴεσθαι εἶναι · ὅταν πόλλ᾽ ἄττα μεγάλα σοι δόξῃ εἶναι, μία
τις ἴσως δοκεῖ ἰδέα ἡ αὐτὴ εἶναι ἐπὶ πάντα ἰδόντι, ὅθεν ἓν τὸ
μέγα ἡγεῖ εἶναι, nor ib. c Οὐχ ἑνός τινος, ὃ ἐπὶ πᾶσιν ἐκεῖνο
τὸ νόημα ἐπὸν νοεῖ, μίαν τινὰ οὖσαν ἰδέαν ; Ναί. Εἶτα οὐκ
εἶδος ἔσται τοῦτο τὸ νοούμενον ἓν εἶναι, ἀεὶ ἂν τὸ αὐτὸ ἐπὶ πᾶσιν ;
Cp. 135 A. Again ep. Phaedr. 249 Β δεῖ γὰρ ἄνθρωπον συνιέναι
κατ' εἶδος λεγόμενον, ἐκ πολλῶν ἰόντ᾽ αἰσθήσεων εἰς ἓν λογισμῷ
ξυναιρούμενον with 265 D εἰς μίαν ἰδέαν συνορῶντα ἄγειν τὰ πολ-
λαχῇ διεσπαρμένα : also Polit. 258 €, 262 Β.
ἰδέα nowhere occurs in the Meno. Diog. L. III 64 says
of Plato πολλάκις δὲ καὶ διαφέρουσιν ὀνόμασιν ἐπὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ
σημαινομένου χρῆται · τὴν οὖν ἰδέαν καὶ εἶδος ὀνομάζει καὶ γένος καὶ
παράδειγμα καὶ ἀρχὴν καὶ αἴτιον. Plato saw that the formation
of philosophic habits of thought must precede the fixing of a
philosophical nomenclature : Theaet. 184 c τὸ δὲ εὐχερὲς τῶν
ὀνομάτων τε καὶ ῥημάτων καὶ μὴ δι᾿ ἀκριβείας ἐξεταζόμενον τὰ μὲν
πολλὰ οὐκ ἀγεννές, κτέ. , Polit. 261 Ε κἂν διαφυλάξῃς τὸ μὴ
σπουδάζειν ἐπὶ τοῖς ὀνόμασι, πλουσιώτερος εἰς τὸ γῆρας ἀναφανήσει
φρονήσεως : Rep . 533 D ἔστι δ' , ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, οὐ περὶ ὀνόματος
ἀμφισβήτησις, οἷς τοσούτων πέρι σκέψις ὅσων ἡμῖν πρόκειται.
Hostility to the word- catching methods of Eristic contributed
to this feeling in him. See Campbell General Introd. to Soph.
and Polit. p. xxiv, who, after quoting from Cope's Pref. to his
Translation of the Gorgias ( p . xi) : one of the most striking
peculiarities of Plato's philosophical writings is the almost
entire absence of any scientific terminology, ' shows that in the
later dialogues, from the Theaetetus onwards, the tendency
to technicalities considerably increases.
3. εἰς ὃ ἀποβλέψαντα : ep. Euthyphro Ε ταύτην τοίνυν
με αὐτὴν δίδαξον τὴν ἰδέαν, τίς ποτέ ἐστιν , ἵνα εἰς ἐκείνην
ἀποβλέπων καὶ χρώμενος αὐτῇ παραδείγματι , ὃ μὲν ἂν τοιοῦτον
ᾖ . . φῶ ὅσιον εἶναι : Gorg. 503 E (quoted above) ; Rep. 501 B etc.
4. που, opinor, 74 Β 6 , 75 Ε 14, 89 B 27, 28, 97 Β 6. Cp.
75 C 29 (Fr. ).
8. τὸ ἐρωτώμενον, “ the point of your present inquiry ' ; D
not τὸ ἐρωτηθέν, because he is not referring exclusively to
Socrates' last question.
9. οὕτω δοκεῖ . . ἄλλη μέν : there is a seeming anacoluthon
here, dokeî giving the impression of an impersonal use, whereas
G
 82 ΜΕΝΟ IV 72 D

a subject is subsequently supplied. Fr. quotes Rep. 334 Β τοῦτο

ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ὠφελεῖν μὲν τοὺς φίλους ἡ δικαιοσύνη (where the
transition is rather stronger, as TOûTO gives the impression of
being subject to δοκεϊ), Apol. 25 B ( see Stallbaum) ἢ καὶ περὶ
ἵππους οὕτω σοι δοκεῖ ἔχειν · οἱ μὲν βελτίους ποιοῦντες αὐτοὺς
πάντες ἄνθρωποι εἶναι, where δοκοῦσι has to be substituted for
δοκεῖ in the second clause. See on 71 C 14 ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκώ.
E 20. τῷ αὐτῷ εἴδει, ‘ by something generically the same.
Plato leads up to this by the phrases C 2 ταὐτὸν εἶδος ἅπασαι
ἔχουσιν, D 14 ταὐτὸν πανταχοῦ εἶδός ἐστιν, and for it he sub-
stitutes at 73 C 51 τῷ αὐτῷ τρόπῳ. Cp. Euthyphr. 6 D ( quoted,
Intr. p. xlv).
""
21. τὸ γὰρ τῇ αὐτῇ τοῦτο λέγω, “ by the words “ the same
I mean this. λέγω = ‘ I mean generally has two accusatives :
Gorg. 489 D (twice), 491 A, etc.
22. πρὸς τὸ ἰσχὺς εἶναι : ep. πρὸς τὸ ἀρετὴ εἶναι just
below. The attraction into the nom. is quite regular in
Greek. Prot. 341 Α διὰ τὸ μαθητὴς εἶναι. Cp. Roby Latin
Grammar II p. xxiii. See on 72 B 26.
73 A 29. τοῦτο οὐκέτι ὁμοῖον, “ hoc non jam simile ; the same
sense would be given by τοῦτ᾽ ἤδη ἀνόμοιον hoc jam dissimile.
Cp. Soph. 247 Β τοῦτο οὐκέτι κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἀποκρίνονται : Gorg. 503 A
Οὐχ ἁπλοῦν ἔτι τοῦτο ἐρωτᾷς : 99 Α 2. See on 83 D 52.
31. ἔλεγες : ubi verba dicendi vel sentiendi (ἐδόκει 89 C 8)
ad superiora referuntur imperfectum usu venit. Ita νῦν δὴ
ἔλεγον 74 Β 7, 76 Ε 49 , 78 Β 1, ἀπεβάλλομεν 79 D 36 , ἐλέγομεν
87 Β 8, 88 D 2, 99 D 28, ώμολογοῦμεν 97 Α 7 ' (Fr. ). But see
Intr. p. lxii. ( ἐποίει at 88 D 5 is somewhat different. )
35. σωφρόνως καὶ δικαίως : these are the two virtues that
constitute ordinary civil virtue. Phaedo 82 Β τὴν δημοτικὴν
καὶ πολιτικὴν ἀρετήν, ἣν δὴ καλοῦσι σωφροσύνην τε καὶ δικαιο-
σύνην (see Archer- Hind's note and his App. I), Symp. 209 Α
πολὺ δὲ μεγίστη καὶ καλλίστη τῆς φρονήσεως ἡ περὶ τὰς τῶν
πόλεών τε καὶ οἰκήσεων διακοσμήσεις, ᾗ δὴ ὄνομά ἐστι σωφροσύνη
καὶ δικαιοσύνη ( see Hug's note) ; at Prot. 325 Α τὸ ὅσιον εἶναι
is added. Zeller pp. 449 foll. Xenophon represents Justice
and Temperance as the common ground of the sexes, Oec.
vii 27 .
B 42. ἄρα in conclusionibus 73 C 51 , 78 Α 62, 82 D 22,
83 C D E al . , aliter ad 80 E 8, 81 D 12, 97 C 33 ' ( Fr. ) : also
91 C 2. See on 80 E 8.
46. μῶν is rare in the early dialogues : see the table quoted
from Constantin Ritter, Intr. p. lxii . It occurs thrice in the
Meno ; here, 84 B 14 and 93 A 11 .
V 73D NOTES 83

49. åλλà σúþрoves : the dλλá is ' complemental ' : see on

71 C 10.
55. εἴ γε μὴ ἡ αὐτὴ ἀρετὴ ἢν : see Exc. II .

Chapter V (73 C–74 A). MENO. Virtue is the power to rule.

SOCRATES. But this does not suit the case of all men- slaves
and children, for instance. Moreover, to make rule virtuous
it must be exercised with certain characteristics- Justice, for
instance. These characteristics are several species of Virtue.
We have not got Virtue as a Whole yet.
Meno's second definition has at least the semblance of unity.
But how has he arrived at it ? He has simply taken out of the
" swarm of Virtues above the one that fills the largest place in
his mind, the ȧvôpòs ȧperý , and ignored all the rest. Socrates
shows, first, that the definition is much too narrow ; next, that
no progress is made so long as we still regard the term Virtue
in its Extension. If we take a class of external acts, as those
of a virtuous Ruler, we find they are virtuous because they
manifest various qualities, Justice for instance. As these
qualities are many, Virtue again, from a new point of view,
appears as plural.
With Socrates' criticism here must be carefully compared
that which he makes on the third definition subsequently,
77 B foll. Meno's ready assent that Rule must be Just to be
virtuous, is parallel with his similar assent about Acquisition
at 78 D 33.
5. Kатà TáνTwv : it is worth while to notice the different D
prepositional and other phrases used by Plato to denote the
relation of the Universal to the Particulars, during the period
of his philosophy while he either had framed no metaphysical
theory of this relation, or still regarded the Idea as ' immanent
in the particulars ' and not, as in his later stage, merely as an
exemplar. (See H. Jackson in JP. vol. x pp. 295–6, x1 p. 297,
Archer-Hind Phaedo Intr. pp. 34, 35. )
Kатà TáνтWV here : 74 B 2, 88 E 13 ; cp. 76 A 23, etc.
διὰ πάντων 74 Α 35 : Laches 192 Β εἰ τό γε διὰ πάντων
πεφυκὸς δεῖ εἰπεῖν. ΣΩ. ᾿Αλλὰ μὴν δεῖ, εἴ γε τὸ ἐρωτώμενον
ἀποκρινούμεθα. Soph. 240 Α τὸ διὰ πάντων τούτων , ἃ πολλὰ
εἰπὼν ἠξίωσας ἑνὶ προσειπεῖν ὀνόματι, φθεγξάμενος εἴδωλον ἐπὶ
πᾶσιν ὡς ἓν ὄν.
ẻπì πâσɩ 75 A 6 : Soph. 240 ▲ (just quoted), Theaet. 185 c Tó
τ᾽ ἐπὶ πᾶσι κοινὸν καὶ τὸ ἐπὶ τούτοις, Symp. 210 Β τὸ ἐπὶ πᾶσιν
τοῖς σώμασι κάλλος. The metaphor implied in the use of the
preposition érí to express this relation, and the difficulties
 84 MENO V 73 D

involved in it, are brought out in Parm . 131 Býdéws, ŵ Zwkpates,

ἓν ταὐτὸν ἅμα πολλαχοῦ ποιεῖς, οἷον εἰ ἱστίῳ καταπετάσας πολλοὺς
ἀνθρώπους φαίης ἓν ἐπὶ πολλοῖς εἶναι ὅλον : ep. 132 c. See
JP. XI pp. 289–291 .
ἐν πᾶσι : Lach. 191 Ε πειρῶ εἰπεῖν ἀνδρείαν, τί ὃν ἐν πᾶσι
τούτοις ταὐτόν ἐστιν.
Lastly, at 74 D 34 the Universal Kaтéxe the Particulars.
Cp. Phaedo 104 D ; see also note on 73 E 17.
The references to the Sophistes come from a portion of that
dialogue where the ' Sophist ' is made to assume the mantle of
Socrates himself, and to ask for a definition in language which,
as H. Jackson has shown (JP. XIV pp. 189, 190), ' is the very
echo of that of the Meno.'
7. áλλà µǹv yηr ye, ' yes, that is just what I am seeking
for. For dλà µǹv . ye used in repeating with emphasis a
word from a previous speaker cp. Euthyphro 6 E ei oürw
βούλει . ᾿Αλλὰ μὴν βούλομαί γε, ' yes, that is just what I do
wish, ' Lach. 193 c elπep oloiтó ye. ᾿Αλλὰ μὴν οἶμαί γε, and
192 c (quoted above). (Cp. Gorg. 466 в ei Tò dúvaolai ye Xéyeis
ἀγαθόν τι εἶναι τῷ δυναμένῳ. ΣΩ . ᾿Αλλὰ μὲν δὴ λέγω γε. ) Other
uses of the combination occur 74 E 43, 77 A 1 , 98 E 47, cp. 41.
10. ἔτι ἂν δοῦλος εἶναι, do you think the ruler would be a
slave then ?'
11. οὐ πάνυ μοι δοκεῖ : see on 71 C 19.
12. où yàp cikós, ' I should rather think not.'
& aptσte implies no estimate of the character of the person
addressed, any more than does my dear sir ' (used in expostula-
tion) or ' my good fellow ' (used with contempt). See Campbell
Theaetetus App. D. Cp. Carlyle Sartor bk. i ch. 3 ' but I,
mein Werther, sit above it all ; I am alone with the stars '
and Sheridan's Rivals, where Fag profoundly observes that ' one
always says " honest " to one's inferiors. ' Cp. 92 C 16 ŵ daiμóvie.
13. προσθήσομεν αὐτόσε : cp. Rep. 369 D.
E 17. ἢ ἀρετή τις ; so σχήμα and σχῆμά τι presently express
respectively the Universal and the Particular. A similar relation
is expressed by тò kaλóv and kaλóv in Hipp. maj. 287 D.
19. εἰ βούλει : see on 71 E 2.
21. oŰтws άπλŵs, ' just simply, ' without qualification. Ast
S.V. ȧTλ@s quotes many examples, either word preceding in-
differently. Prot. 351 c etc.
74 A 29. καὶ σὺ οὖν : οὖν resumes εἰπέ in the line above. For οὖν
VI 74 B NOTES 85

resumptive see Apol. 28 D, Symp. 201 D, Euthyd. 285 B. $ Velut

ipse dicerem .... sijuberes, ita tu quoque dic.'
30. Meno here gives the four ' cardinal ' virtues ; but shows
that this is no philosophical classification by adding μeyaλo-
πрéπеια (' pars civilis virtutis quam intellegebat Meno Fr. ), xal
ἄλλαι πάμπολλα . The Thessalian Admetus is markedly μεγαλο-
TрETS ( Eur. Alc. 858 cp. on 70 A 7) . Perhaps it is also
characteristic of Meno that he leaves out dolóтns, which Socrates
introduces at 78 D 30.
It may be noted that μeyaλoπρέreia , though not standing on
the same footing as dikatoσúvn, is mentioned as one of the
qualities of the true philosopher, Rep. 486 A. His character is
summed up at 487 A ; he must be μνήμων, εὐμαθής, μεγαλο-
πρεπής, εὔχαρις, φίλος τε καὶ ξυγγενὴς ἀληθείας, δικαιοσύνης,
avopeías, owppooúvns. Cp. on 88 A 16 and 91 A 4, 8. Cp. Ar.
Rhet. I vi 9-1362 b 13, 1 ix 5 , 12-1366 b 2, 18 ; N.E. II vii
6 and IV ii.

Chapters VI- IX (74 A−77 A). Socrates helps Meno by giving

sample definitions-first, two of Figure, the former of which
is rejected as involving terms with which the respondent has
not assured himself that the other is familiar. After the
second and scientific definition of Figure, Socrates gives in
addition a definition of Colour, hailed with acclamation by
Meno, but less scientific because it rests on a hypothesis not
universally admitted.
6. εἴ τίς σε ἀνέροιτο κτέ. : see on 72 Β 22. The triple B
protasis is expressed by thrice-repeated ei -a rare combination.
The change of mood (ávépoтo, elTes) is a change from a vague
future supposition (Goodwin MT. § 455) to a present unreal
supposition. It is important to notice that the unreal sup-
position, though expressed by aorists, is present, not past. For
the change of mood, cp. 90 B 5 av Téμπoμev, followed by C 16
àv étéμπoμev, †Theages 125 B-D where the main problem is put
in the optative (εἰ ἔροιτο τί ἂν φαίη ;), the intervening
illustrations in the aor. indic. (εἰ ἠρόμεθα . . τί ἂν ἀπεκρίνατο ;) :
see Kühner § 576 Anm. 9, Goodwin MT. § 414. Cp. et σe пpoun
72 B 24. See also 76 E 49.
As to the present passage, Kühner § 577. 9 says that the first
member, el rís σe ȧvéporo, is really protasis to the second, ei
αὐτῷ εἶπες, the third member , εἴ σοι εἶπεν, being the real
protasis to εἶπες δήπου ἄν . ‘ If in a certain case you would
answer so-and-so , to a further question you would answer so-
and-so. ' Goodwin (MT. § 510) , on the other hand , appears to
 86 MENO VI 74 B

regard the first member as ' the leading condition , to which the
rest of the sentence (including the other conditions) is the con-
clusion. ' ' If any one should ask you " What is Figure ? " you
would-under certain further conditions-make such and such
an answer. ' Grammatically the three protases are co-ordinate,
and might conceivably be so translated : ' suppose—and suppose
-and suppose-what then ? '
7. 8 vûv dì èyà λeyov : for the impf. see on 73 A 31 .
с 19. εἰ περὶ χρώματος ὡσαύτως ἀνήρετο κτέ. : see on 72 Β 22.
D 29. εἰ οὖν . • μετῄει : the complex protasis is in this
instance interrupted . It is resumed at E 2, εἰ οὖν . . εἶπες, and
the apodosis finally comes at 75 A 5 lows äv élaúμaσe (Struve,
quoted by Fr. ).
30. λeyev örɩ for or redundant in introducing a quotation
see 75 A 4, C 3, 87 A 25, Prot. 356 A, Rep. 453 в etc., and
Riddell §§ 279, 280.
ἀλλὰ μή μοι οὕτως, ἀλλά : ἀλλά transitional followed by ἀλλά
complemental. See on 71 C 10 and 13, Prot. 318 в (Heind . ).
The ellipsis with un ourws in these places is λéye or the like. In
Ηipp. maj. 299 D μὴ γὰρ εἰ μείζων τις ἡδονὴ ἀλλ᾽ εἴ τις αὐτῷ
τούτῳ διαφέρει we must understand σκόπει or the like with both
members.
33. καὶ ταῦτα καὶ ἐναντία ὄντα ἀλλήλοις : it is obvious to
us that one class may contain under it two things not merely
different but opposite. The subject has been approached in the
Protagoras c. xix (330 E foll. ). It is asked ' How can Virtue be
One, and yet the parts of Virtue (uópia ȧperns) different from
each other ? ' Protagoras, in setting forth his view, says that
opposites have a common point ( 331 D) , τὸ γὰρ λευκὸν τῷ μέλανι
ἔστιν ὅπῃ προσέοικε, καὶ τὸ σκληρὸν τῷ μαλακῷ, καὶ τἆλλα &
δοκεῖ ἐναντιώτατα εἶναι ἀλλήλοις. Cp. Phil. 12 F. καὶ γὰρ χρῶμα,
ὦ δαιμόνιε, χρώματι κατά γε αὐτὸ τοῦτ᾽ οὐδὲν διοίσει τὸ χρῶμα
εἶναι πᾶν , τό γε μὴν μέλαν τῷ λευκῷ πάντες γιγνώσκομεν ὡς πρὸς
τὸ διάφορον εἶναι καὶ ἐναντιώτατον ὂν τυγχάνει · καὶ δὴ καὶ σχῆμα
σχήματι κατὰ ταὐτόν κτέ. In Phaedo 104 A B it appears that
ἀριθμός comprises the opposites ἄρτιον and περιττόν.
The passage above quoted from the Philebus opens up other
kindred matters, about which see H. Jackson's paper in JP.
X pp. 263 foll. In the Philebus we are confronted by the old
difficulty of seeing how a thing can be at once One and Many.
How can One thing (e.g. Pleasure) be Many things (e.g. good
and bad) ? (This was one source from which sprang Antisthenes'
denial of the possibility of predication . ) Philebus cannot see
how Pleasure can be of different kinds. They may have
VI 74 D NOTES 87

different or opposite origins, but in as far as they are Pleasure,

they must be One and the same ( 12D εἰσὶ μὲν γὰρ ἀπ' ἐναντίων,
ὦ Σώκρατες, αὗται πραγμάτων , οὐ μὴν αὐταί γε ἀλλήλαις ἐναντίαι.
πῶς γὰρ ἡδονή γε ἡδονῇ μὴ οὐχ ὁμοιότατον ἂν εἴη ;) . Socrates
shows that the paradox that a thing is both One and Many
appears under several aspects. He ( Philebus 14c foll . ) recognises
identification of ev and Toλλá in three distinct senses : (1) the
identification of the One particular and its Many qualities, (2)
the identification of the One particular and its Many parts, (3)
the identification of the One idea and its Many particulars.
In the sequel the article proceeds to show that between the
earlier dialogues and the Philebus the interest has shifted from
the first two problems to the last. The first problem is really
that of Classification , which fills so large a space in the Meno
and kindred dialogues ; for each of the Many qualities is a
Class notion. But in the Philebus the first two problems are
accounted trivial and uninteresting (dednμevueva, played out,'
14 D) ; though in Rep. 523 A- 526 в they are made the bases
of a dialectical course. [So at Phil. 13 E Socrates says he
would be a poor creature if he were not equal to seeing that one
class may embrace not only dissimilars but opposites : Mal
τε αἱ ξυνάπασαι ἐπιστῆμαι δόξουσιν εἶναι καὶ ἀνόμοιοί τινες αὐτῶν
ἀλλήλαις · εἰ δὲ καὶ ἐναντίαι πῃ γίγνονταί τινες, ἆρα ἄξιος ἂν
εἴην τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι νῦν, εἰ φοβηθεὶς τοῦτο αὐτὸ μηδεμίαν ἀνόμοιον
φαίην ἐπιστήμην ἐπιστήμῃ γίγνεσθαι , κτέ . ] Similarly in the
Phaedo 102 B - 103 A the first identification is discussed - in
regard to the tallness and shortness simultaneously discover-
able in Simmias-at a length for which Socrates thinks it
necessary to make a sort of apology 102 D, while the simul-
taneous appearance of αὐτὸ τὸ μέγεθος and τὸ ἐν ἡμῖν μέγεθος, οι
the separately existent idea and the same idea distributed
among its particulars-a case of the third identification of
ev and Toλá - is assumed without a word of explanation '
(note on p. 264 ) . ' If again we turn to Meno 73 c sqq. we
remark at once a similarity and a dissimilarity to Phil. 12D
sqq. Meno's inability to regard Virtue as a év, and Protarchus'
inability to regard Pleasure as a πоλλά , have a common origin,
and Socrates in his answer to Meno takes the same sort of line,
and employs the same examples (σχήματα and χρώματα), as in
his answer to Protarchus. On the other hand there is nothing
in the Meno to correspond to Phil. 14 B-15 c. The ontological
difficulty insisted upon in the latter has not in the former made
its appearance. ' The Meno contents itself with the attempt to
grasp the General Notion ; in the Philebus that stage is
passed ; but the problem remains, ' how does the Idea enter
into the Particulars ?'
 88 MENO VI 74 D

καὶ ταῦτα καί, ' and that too though, L. & S. οὗτος C 1x 2.
34. κατέχει : see on 73 D 5.
6
35. ὃ δὴ ὀνομάζεις κτλ. , which you call Figure, allowing the
name Figure both to curved and straight. ' This is hardly
an instance of the ordinary transition from the relative to the
demonstrative construction . This transition mostly occurs
where the relative if repeated in the second clause would be in
a different case. Where the relative would be in the same
case, it is naturally understood in the second clause. But even
under these circumstances the transition to the demonstrative
sometimes occurs ( Kühner § 561. 1 ), Xen. An. III iii 16 Ροδίους,
ὧν τοὺς πολλούς φασιν ἐπίστασθαι σφενδονᾶν καὶ τὸ βέλος αὐτῶν
καὶ διπλάσιον φέρεσθαι τῶν Περσικῶν σφενδονῶν. In the present
place it looks at first sight as if Plato might have left out the
second σχῆμα, writing δ δὴ ὀνομάζεις σχῆμα καὶ οὐδὲν μᾶλλον
φῂς τὸ στρογγύλον εἶναι ἢ τὸ εὐθύ. But there would then have
been the danger that his reader, instead of supplying 8 in the
second clause as predicate, might take eiva in the sense ' exist.'
Cp. 77 Ε 44 & ᾤοντο ἀγαθὰ εἶναι, ἔστιν δὲ ταῦτά γε κακά, 93 D
17 ἃ ἐκεῖνος αὐτὸν ἐπαιδεύσατο, καὶ ἐποίησε σοφὸν ὅσα διδασκά
λων ἀγαθῶν εἴχετο : Theaet. 192 Α δ μέν τις οἶδε . . αἰσθάνεται
δὲ αὐτὸ μή. See on 90 E 32.
E 39. ἆρ᾽ οὖν, ὅταν οὕτω λέγῃς, Gam I to understand that
when you speak thus you mean that curved is no more curved
than it is straight, or that straight is no more straight than it
is curved ? ' Dr. Jowett's translation (2nd ed. ) , by twice giving
' any more ' instead of ' no more, ' makes nonsense of this
passage.

CHAPTER VII
1. τοῦτο is followed by τὸ σχῆμα epexegetically. Riddell
§ 214.
75 A 4. εἶπες ὅτι : see on 74 D 30.
οὐδὲ μανθάνω- οὐδὲ οἶδα : οὐδὲ . . οὐδέ are never (in Attic
Greek) correlated (' neither . . nor ') ; when they occur they
mean not even . nor yet,' Hadley § 1005. Cp. Lysis 210 c
νῦν ἄρα οὐδὲ σὲ ὁ πατὴρ οὐδὲ ἄλλος ἄλλον οὐδένα φιλεῖ καθ᾽
ὅσον ἂν ᾖ ἄχρηστος, Rep. 391 c, Xen. An. III i 27 σύ γε οὐδὲ
ὁρῶν γινώσκεις οὐδὲ ἀκούων μέμνησαι, ne videns quidem cernis,
neque audiens meministi (Kühner § 537. 2) . Cp. 92 B 11.
7. ἐπὶ τούτοις, Fon these terms ' : note the difference from
the neighbouring uses of èπí with the dative, and see on 90 D 20.
VII 75 c NOTES 89

But the use before us has grown out of the local use, ¿Tì TOÚTOS
being simply ' on this basis, ' ' on this understanding. ’
11. Iva Kal yévηTaι : see on 71 B 8. This intensive kai is
not uncommon in final clauses. Lach. 194 A kai nueîs èπì TÎ
ζητήσει καρτερήσωμεν ἵνα καὶ μὴ ἡμῶν αὐτὴ ἡ ἀνδρεία καταγελάση :
Rep. 346 Α μὴ παρὰ δόξαν ἀποκρίνου ἵνα τι καὶ περαίνωμεν : Lys.
204 B, Gorg. 467 c, Apol. 22 A B, Theact. 163 c, Soph. 250 A etc.
13. un deprecatory. Riddell § 136, Gorg. 497 в undauŵs, B
ὦ Κ. , ἀλλ᾽ ἀποκρίνου καὶ ἡμῶν ἕνεκα. See on 71 C 13, and ep.
74 D 30.
14. βούλει χαρίσωμαι ; cp. 76 C 19, 86 C 1 . Goodwin MT.
§ 287. He quotes Rep. 372 Ε εἰ δ᾽ αὖ βούλεσθε καὶ φλεγμαί
νουσαν πόλιν θεωρήσωμεν, οὐδὲν ἀποκωλύει to show that in Attic
Greek the subjunctive was felt as dependent upon the part of
Bouloual, not as independent. (See on the other hand Kühner
§ 394. 5. )
24. χρώματι ἑπόμενον : Colour is an attribute of matter
much less constant, much more dependent on the state of the
percipient, than is Form. Form is ranked by Locke among the
primary ' qualities of matter, Colour among the ' secondary'
a distinction which goes back to Democritus. ( Zeller pre-
Socratics II 231 ; Sir Wm . Hamilton, Reid's Works, ' Note D,
and index ' Qualities . ') We have then here the fallacy of de-
fining ignotum per ignotius (Jevons Elem. Lessons pp. 110 and
114). The juxtaposition of oxyμa and xpŵμa is very frequent
in Plato ; see Phil. 12 E, quoted on 74 D 33, and many places
quoted by Ast s.v. χρώμα.
25. Käν ouтws ȧyaπýŋν : cp. on 72 C 1. Here the usual C
hyperbaton of av is avoided. But another is introduced , for
οὕτως really belongs to εἴποις.
29. Tov, ' if I understand ' ; a variety of the usual sense of
TOV (opinor), in which ' it is added when with some hesitation
we repeat the words of another ' (Buttmann Index). Fr. quotes
79 D 36, 94 C 26 for the same sense.
30. εἶεν : ‘ συγκατάθεσις μὲν τῶν εἰρημένων, συναφὴ δὲ πρὸς τὰ
μέλλοντα Tim . lex, Fr. Cp. †Alc. i 106 Α εἶεν · εἰ δὲ δὴ ὅ τι
μάλιστα ταῦτα διανενόημαι κτέ. See J. Adam on Prot. 311 c,
357 A.
32. άπокEкρíoba : this tense is used as deponent and as
passive by Plato with about equal frequency ; passive , as here,
Gorg. 453 D, where see Heindorf.
 90 ΜΕΝΟ VIII 75 c

CHAPTER VIII
2. ἐριστικῶν καὶ ἀγωνιστικῶν : see Excursus V and on 83 D
50. Cp. Theaet. 154 D.
3. ὅτι : see on 74 D 30.
D 4. λαμβάνειν λόγον, ‘ to examine the statement. The
phrase in this sense occurs Rep. 337 E, Soph. 246 c etc.; and in
the same sense δέχεσθαι λόγον, Prot. 336 c, Rep. 531 E. It is
opposed to διδόναι λόγον, ‘ to stand an examination, 81 Β 23,
Prot. 336 c, Rep. 531 E (ὑπέχειν, παρέχειν λόγον, Prot. 338 D ,
Rep. 344 D) . The phrases express the respective positions of
the ' opposer ' and maintainer ' of a thesis. The metaphor
is probably taken from an audit of accounts ; ep. Laws 774 Β ἐν
ταῖς εὐθύναις τοῦ τοιούτου λόγον ὑπεχέτω. The phrases λαμβάνειν
and διδόναι δίκην furnish fairly close parallels. We have also
the phrase λόγον ἑαυτῷ δοῦναι ( Soph. 230 A, often in Hdt. ) ‘ to
give an account to one's self, ' or sometimes to reconcile some-
thing with one's conscience. ' But λαμβάνειν λόγον has another
sense in Plato, not connected with personal debate, viz. ‘ to
grasp the λόγος or true definition of something, Rep. 402 Α,
Theaet. 148 D περὶ ἐπιστήμης λαβεῖν λόγον, τί ποτε τυγχάνει ὄν.
Corresponding with this we have a second sense of the phrase
διδόναι λόγον ' to furnish such a definition, Phaedo 76 Β (see
Archer - Hind), 78 D , Rep. 534 Β ἢ καὶ διαλεκτικὸν καλεῖς τὸν
λόγον ἑκάστου λαμβάνοντα τῆς οὐσίας ; καὶ τὸν μὴ ἔχοντα, καθ᾿
ὅσον ἂν μὴ ἔχῃ λόγον αὑτῷ τε καὶ ἄλλῳ δοῦναι , κατὰ τοσοῦτον
νοῦν περὶ τούτου οὐ φήσεις ἔχειν ; ep. Gorg. 501 A (the Art
ἰατρικὴ) τούτου οὗ θεραπεύει καὶ τὴν φύσιν ἔσκεπται καὶ τὴν αἰτίαν
ὧν πράττει, καὶ λόγον ἔχει τούτων ἑκάστου δοῦναι. Stallb. and
others at the present place translate λαμβάνειν λόγον loquentis
partes suscipere.' This view is rightly opposed by Fr. It is
true that δοῦναι λόγον in Xen. Hell. v ii 20 does mean to
give opportunity for speech,' but λóyov in these combinations
in Plato always means more than ' speech. ' At Phil. 11 A C
δέχεσθαι λόγον means to undertake a thesis committed to one.
6. βούλοιντο : the mention of the present conversers (ἐγώ
τε καὶ σύ) naturally introduces a transition to the plural.
7. διαλεκτικώτερον : it is characteristic of the διαλεκτικός
to be able διδόναι καὶ λαμβάνειν λόγον (in both the Platonic
senses), Rep. 531 E, 534 B (quoted above) ; cp. Crat. 390 c,
Phaedr. 266 Β. See Grote 1 267, Archer-Hind on Phaedo 75 D.
On the procedure here recommended see Xen. Mem. Iv vi 15
ὁπότε δὲ αὐτός (ὁ Σωκράτης) τι τῷ λόγῳ διεξίοι, διὰ τῶν μάλιστα
ὁμολογουμένων ἐπορεύετο, νομίζων ταύτην ἀσφάλειαν εἶναι λόγου :
VIII 75 E NOTES 91

R. & P. 194 B, Zeller p. 201, Aristot. An . Pr. 11 16 1 = 64 b 36

ὅταν τὸ μὴ δι᾽ αὑτοῦ γνωστὸν δι᾽ αὑτοῦ τις ἐπιχειρῇ δεικνύναι,
τότ᾽ αἰτεῖται τὸ ἐξ ἀρχῆς. Cp. on 76 E 43 and 79 D 36.
10. Teрáσоμаi Sn : here on has the force of igitur ' accord-
ingly ' (Hadley 1037. 4 a). In this use it does not refer to a
word, but to a clause, and is practically a connecting particle.
Ast (s.v. on p. 447 bottom) quotes some instances in Plato
amongst innumerable ' others. See Kühner § 500. 4. δή is in
origin a temporal particle, connected with on, F. W. Thomas in
JP. XXIII pp. 89 foll. The temporal force has to a great extent
disappeared in Attic. ' Now, ' which has undergone a similar
widening of meaning, or ' well now, ' will often serve as a
translation ; as here, Rep. 366 в, 368 à doкeîte dý µoi ws åλŋ0ŵs
où πeñεîσdαι ' well now, I really think you are not convinced, '
494 A, Phaedr. 248 E etc. Where the result of an exposition
is summed up with emphasis, dý = ' in fact, ' ' in a word ' ;
Rep. 361 в ȧpaipetéov dǹ tò dokεîv, 486 в etc. Cp. on 81 B 30.
12. τελευτὴν καλεῖς τι ; This is the form in which the recog- E
nition of the terms to be employed is always secured, cp.
76 A 19, 88 A 16 etc. An affirmative answer to it implies a
recognition not merely of the name, but of the reality of the
thing corresponding to it. The phrase already occurs Hdt. 11 2
Ψαμμίτιχος ἐπυνθάνετο οἵτινες ἀνθρώπων βεκός τι καλέουσιν . Fr.
refers to Xen. Mem. II ii 1 , Iv ii 22, to show that such a
question was part of the procedure of Socrates. Cp. Phaedr.
237 c.
13. ἴσως δ᾽ ἂν ἡμῖν Πρόδικος διαφέροιτο, • Prodicus might
perhaps quarrel with us on the point,' namely of our nomen-
clature. For the life of Prodicus the ' sophist ' of Ceos see Zeller
Pre- Socratics vol. II pp. 416-420 ; for his treatise or lecture
(ἐπίδειξις Crat. 384 Β) περὶ ὀνομάτων ὀρθότητος ibid. pp. 489-491.
Prodicus drew distinctions between words popularly used as
synonymous. To this we have many allusions in Plato. In
Charm. 163 D Socrates says he grasps the difference between
ποίησις and πρᾶξις, καὶ γὰρ Προδίκου μυρία τινὰ ἀκήκοα περὶ
Óvoμáтwv diαιρoûVTOS. In Lach. 197 D Socrates says that Prodicus
δοκεῖ τῶν σοφιστῶν κάλλιστα τὰ τοιαῦτα ὀνόματα διαιρεῖν. In
Protagoras 314 c he is one of the sophists in the house of Callias
with Protagoras ; at 337 A foll. a speech is put into his mouth
exemplifying, or caricaturing, his method , cp. 339 A foll.; and
at 358 A he is requested for the moment to waive his insistence
on verbal niceties, somewhat as here in the Meno. In Euthyd.
277 E Socrates in consoling the puzzled Clinias says πрŵтоV
γάρ, ὥς φησι Πρόδικος, περὶ ὀνομάτων ὀρθότητος μαθεῖν δεῖ.
We know that Protagoras as well as Prodicus speculated on
 92 MENO VIII 75 E
¿vομáтwv дρlóтns (Phaedr. 267 c, Crat. 391 c). None of the early
philosophers were specialists. Prodicus' teaching was by no
means confined to questions of language. He had at least some
views on rhetoric ( Phaedr. 267 B), and wrote on ethics and
religion (Zeller pre - Socr. 11 473, 482-3, 486 ; see his ' Choice
of Heracles, ' Xen. Mem. II i 21) . For Socrates' debt to him
see on 96 D 23.
15. καλεῖς πεπεράνθαι τι, i.e. 6' πεπεράνθαι καλεῖς τι.
17. ἀλλὰ καλῶ : complemental ἀλλά after an ellipsis
suggested by ovdèv Tolkiλov : ' I make no refinements, I accept
your term. Cp. Rep. 437 Β πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν ἐναντίων ἂν
ἀλλήλοις θείης εἴτε ποιημάτων εἴτε παθημάτων ; οὐδὲν γὰρ ταύτῃ
διοίσει. ἀλλ᾽, ἢ δ᾽ ὅς, τῶν ἐναντίων.
76 A 20. οἷον ταῦτα τὰ ἐν ταῖς γεωμετρίαις, ‘ the well- known terms,
you know, used in geometrical problems. " olov velut, as 72 B 27,
74 A 27, 86 E 23, etc. , Riddell § 16.
Yewμeтplaι : Rep. 510 c, 511 B, 533 c, 536 D in the same sense.
The plural, as often in the case of abstracts, expresses separate
instances of the quality, or manifestations of the faculty : cp.
ETIσTĥμαι 86 A 10, vyliai Prot. 354 B, evyéveiαι Euthyd. 279 B,
Rep. 618 D ( Kühner § 348. 3, Hadley § 636 ).
24. Tepalve intransitive : see L. & S. IV, under which read
this place should be quoted.
25. σTEρEOû TÉρas : a model definition, épas expressing the
Genus and σTepeoù the Differentia.

CHAPTER IX
B 9. κατακεκαλυμμένος, ‘ blindfold. ”
11. éri elolv : cp. Xen. An. 11 vi 28 ëтi wpaîos &v. This passage,
as showing that Meno was no longer very young, indicates that
the dramatic date of the dialogue is shortly before the starting
of Cyrus' expedition ( Intr. p. xxiv).
12. T Sń ; ' how so, pray ? ' (with surprise). This form (cp.
79 A 6, Gorg. 486 E) must be distinguished from ri dé ; (71 C 15,
73 A 31 , B 46, etc. ) or ( less correctly, see Fr. prol. pp. 46, 47)
Tí dai ; which simply draws attention to a coming question.
13. οὐδὲν ἀλλ᾽ ἢ ἐπιτάττεις, ‘ you do nothing but lay
down the law. ' We must understand Toets with ovdév. See
on 71 C 13. Should we regard dλλ' in this usage as representing
ἀλλά οι ἄλλο ? L. & S. explain ἀλλ᾽ ἤ as always arising from
IX 76 c NOTES 93
333
ἄλλο ἤ, the accent on ἄλλο having been lost. Ast (s. v. ἄλλος
p. 108) thinks that both here and at 84D 31 we have aλo, and he
writes a ' (with the accent) in both places. This the MSS.
do not confirm . Against the view of L. & S. may be urged
(1) that in many instances of d \' we have aXXo already
expressed earlier in the sentence : e.g. Phaedo 81 B (where
Geddes remarks that in these combinations aλλá is properly
dependent on uŋdév and ½ on äλλo) , ib. 97 D, Rep. 429 B, 553 D:
(2) that in many places aλo is not the part of aλos that
would be required, e.g. Prot. 334 c un xpñolai éλaíw ảλλ'î
ὅτι σμικροτάτῳ, 356 A, Apol. 34 Β τίνα λόγον ἀλλ᾽ ἢ τὸν ὀρθόν ;
Phaedr. 258 E, Phaedo 83 A, Rep. 427 c. I believe that in
Plato where aλo is intended it is always written in full (as
80 A 4, Theaet. 195 E, Crat. 412 D, Euthyd. 277 E), and that
where we have ἀλλ' the first word is always ἀλλά. (But
ἄλλ᾽ ἤ is ἄλλα
" ἤ, as Phaed. 91 D. ) The ἤ gives ἀλλά additional
point ; than,' which comes naturally after äλos, is used
with ἀλλά, though it is no longer felt as a case of ἄλλος.
Kühner § 535, 6 ( = Jelf § 773 Obs. 1 ) says that the form arises
from the merging together of two constructions, ovdèv äλλo . .
ἀλλά and οὐδὲν ἄλλο . . ἤ, ἀλλά and ἤ nearly agreeing in
meaning. See also Riddell § 148, Hadley 1046 c. The is
not indispensable, Laws 710 c εὐτυχής μὴ κατ᾽ ἄλλο, ἀλλά κτέ.
In Prot. 354 c and Symp. 181 D after άXX' has been introduced
against the MSS. We have the same variation in the inter-
rogative formula ἄλλο τι ; or ἄλλο τι ή ;
"
14. οἱ τρυφῶντες, spoiled children. τρυφῶ is from a
lengthened form of the stem of7pu-w, which again is a lengthened
form of the stem of τείρω. θρύπτω is a further formation from
the stem of τρυφῶ. The meanings of τρυφῶ, θρύπτομαι, διαθρύ
TTOμа are nearly parallel, and should be compared. The
original meaning is broken up, ' ' soft. ' For the transition to
the moral meaning cp. Latin fractus, de-lic-atus. The notion
here is slackness combined with pride, ' to be exacting, ' ' to
expect too much from others. ' So Euthyphro 11 E, 12 a тpupậs
ὑπὸ πλούτου τῆς σοφίας. ἀλλ᾽ ὦ μακάριε ξύντεινε σαυτόν ‘ you
are playing with the matter ; pull yourself together. ' Cp. +Alc.
i 114 A. A slightly different shade is ' to be hard to please,'
fastidire, Prot. 327 Ε νῦν δὲ τρυφᾷς, ὦ Σώκρατες, διότι πάντες
διδάσκαλοί εἰσιν ἀρετῆς : Xen. Mem. III xi 10 τὸν ἐντρυφῶντα
'the disdainful.'
15. éµοû kaтéуvwкas, öтɩ : the regular constr. of this verb in C
this sense, gen. of person, acc. of charge. F. E. T. § 102, Hadley
§ 752, Phaedo 116 c, Xen. Mem. I iii 10, etc.
16. εἰμὶ ἥττων τῶν καλῶν : there is no doubt that Plato
94 ΜΕΝΟ IX 76 c

here preserves a trait of the historic Socrates, to whom similar

expressions are attributed by Xenophon : Symp. viii 2 ¿yw yàp
οὐκ ἔχω χρόνον ἐν ᾧ οὐκ ἐρῶν τινὸς διατελῶ. Cp. Mem . ut vi 28
ἴσως δ᾽ ἄν τί σοι κἀγὼ συλλαβεῖν ἔχοιμι διὰ τὸ ἐρωτικὸς εἶναι , IV i 2
πολλάκις γὰρ ἔφη μὲν ἄν τινος ἐρᾶν, φανερὸς δ᾽ ἦν οὐ τῶν τὰ
σώματα πρὸς ὥραν, ἀλλὰ τῶν τὰς ψυχὰς πρὸς ἀρετὴν εὖ πεφυκό-
Twv èpiéµevos. This is richly illustrated by Plato in such passages
as Charm. 154 B, 155 D, Lys. 204 B. See Grote I 352, note.
In Phaedrus 227 c Phaedrus tells Socrates that the discourse
he has been listening to is especially suited to Socrates, as the
subject happened to be Love. Cp. 257 A. In Symp. 177 D
Socrates is very ready to discourse on Love, ὃς οὐδὲν φημὶ ἐπίστα-
σθαι ἢ τὰ ἐρωτικά : and ib. 216D Alcibiades says ὁρᾶτε γὰρ ὅτι
Σ. ἐρωτικῶς διάκειται τῶν καλῶν καὶ ἀεὶ περὶ τούτους ἐστι καὶ
ÉKTTÉTλNKTAL, Euthyphr. 14c, Theages 128 B. See Zeller
Socrates pp. 71 foll . , 127, 165, Dr. Thompson's Phaedrus
App. I p. 152, Hug Symp. pp. xviii foll. Now though in
many of these passages (as certainly in the present and 86 D)
a strong tinge of irony is to be observed, it would be
a great mistake to suppose that the language is purely meta-
phorical, and to ignore the physical attraction out of which it
grew. The story of the judgment passed by the physiognomist
Zopyrus on the character of Socrates, with the latter's explana-
tion, may have a basis of genuine tradition. Cic. Tusc. IV 80
cum multa in conventu vitia collegisset in eum Zopyrus, qui se
naturam cujusque ex forma perspicere profitebatur, derisus est a
ceteris qui illa in Socrate vitia non agnoscerent ; ab ipso autem
Socrate sublevatus, cum illa sibi insita sed ratione a se dejecta
diceret. Cp. de Fato § 10. The words of Thoreau (Walden ,
Higher Laws ' ) may be quoted : ' the generative energy which
when we are loose dissipates and makes us unclean, when we
are continent invigorates and inspires us.' This is the truth
underlying Aristotle's representation of owoporúvn as a mean
between ἀκολασία and ἀναισθησία.
This is not the place for a full discussion of the erotic philo-
sophy of Plato. (Grote II pp. 206-210, Zeller pp. 455 foll. )
But it is closely connected with the point just mentioned.
As the dialectic method of Plato was grounded on the dialectic
of Socrates, similarly his erotic philosophy had a root in the
emotional side of his master's character. In the Symposium
198 D Socrates, who earlier had professed himself to know
nothing but the lore of love, recants and declares himself
unable to pronounce a suitable eulogy. All that he knows of
any value was communicated to him by the gifted Diotima.
Thus the erotic Socrates passes into the exponent of the erotic
doctrine of Plato.
 35
IX 76 c NOTES 95

The point is the more relevant because there is a close

analogy between doğa, the main subject of the Meno and epws.
(Exc. vII p. 301 ). To Plato these two things are the great
mediators between the world of Being and the world of Sense.
To express the state of emotional exaltation that appeared to
Plato to be (for mortals) the indispensable condition in any
attempt to pierce the Veil, he found no language so apt as that
drawn from physical love.
19. βούλει ἀποκρίνωμαι : see on 75 Β 14 .
22. ἀπορροάς τινας τῶν ὄντων κατὰ Εμπ. : Empedocles, of
Acragas in Sicily, explained sensation by the hypothesis that
material objects gave off films adapted to the several channels
of sense. See Zeller pre- Socratics 11 165-6 ; cp. pp. 133-4 ;
R. & P. § 139, especially note d ; Grote 1 47. The most important
places in ancient writers on the point are Emped . line v 337
(Mullach) γνῶθ᾽ ὅτι πάντων εἰσὶν ἀπορροαὶ ὅσσ᾽ ἐγένοντο, Theophr.
de sensu § 7 Εμπ. φησὶ τῷ ἐναρμόττειν (τὰς ἀπορροὰς) εἰς τοὺς
πόρους τοὺς ἑκάστης ( αἰσθήσεως ) αἰσθάνεσθαι, Aristotle de gen.
et corr. 1 8 = 324 b 26 foll . Cp. Rep. 530D Kivduveúel, ëøny, ws
πρὸς ἀστρονομίαν ὄμματα πέπηγεν , ὡς πρὸς ἐναρμόνιον φορὰν
ὦτα παγῆναι and Soph. Ο.Τ. 1387 εἰ τῆς ἀκουούσης ἔτ᾽ ἦν
πηγῆς δι᾽ ὤτων φραγμός, where πηγή is much the same as
Tópos see Verrall on S. c. T. 571. We seem to have a filtration
of the same doctrine put into the mouth of Euripides by
Aristoph. Thesm. 16 foll.
ᾧ μὲν βλέπειν χρὴ πρῶτ᾽ ἐμηχανήσατο
ὀφθαλμὸν ἀντίμιμον ἡλίου τρόχῳ
δίκην δὲ χοάνης ὦτα διετετρήματο.
Zeller pre- Socratics II p. 166 note 3 (cp. Plato p. 428 ) says that
Plato's explanation of sight in the Theaetetus ( 153 D, 156 B-E)
and Timaeus was the same as that of Empedocles ; but
Archer- Hind in his note on Timaeus 45 D shows that there are
considerable differences. We have the same doctrine indicated
in the Phaedr. 251 Β δεξάμενος τοῦ κάλλους τὴν ἀπορροὴν διὰ τῶν
ὀμμάτων.
A similar view of sensation was taken by Democritus and
the Atomists (Zeller pre- Socratics 11 230, Grote 1 80). The
Atomists were driven to some such view by their assumption
that all influence of one thing upon another implies mechanical
contact. From Democritus it was adopted by Epicurus, and we
find it reproduced in Lucretius IV 42-6 :
dico igitur rerum effigias tenuisque figuras
mittier ab rebus summo de corpore rerum etc.
Diogenes Laertius VIII 58 quotes from Satyrus a statement
 96 MENO IX 76 c

that Gorgias was a pupil of Empedocles. They were probably

contemporaries, as Diogenes (ib. 74) tells us that Empedocles
flourished in the 84th Olympiad ( 444 B.C. ). Some writers
appear to have confused Empedocles the philosopher with his
grandfather of the same name. Quint. III i 8 says of Gorgias
Empedoclis, ut traditur, discipulus, cum aequalis fere esset et
potiusfamiliaris. See R. & P. § 167 note d, § 190 note a. Words
denoting ' pupil ' are sometimes interchanged with éraîpos ( Zeller
ore-Socratics 11 211 note) or yvwpiuos ( Müller FHG. II p. 159).
Cp. 79 E 2. Whether strictly a pupil or not, Gorgias could
hardly fail to be influenced by his great compatriot. But
Gorgias probably cared little for scientific research (Zeller pre-
Socratics II 460).
28. ápμóтTEL : Empedocles' doctrine of sensation postulated
a certain homogeneity between the perceived object and the
perceiving organ. For sensation implies intermixture, and like
seeks to mingle with like. The extreme form of this doctrine
he expressed in the verses-
γαίῃ μὲν γὰρ γαῖαν ἐπώπαμεν, ὕδατι δ᾽ ὕδωρ,
αἰθέρι δ᾽ αἰθέρα δῖον, ἄταρ πυρὶ πῦρ ἀΐδηλον.
Of course the words in the present passage do not imply so
much as this.
D 33. σúves Ŏ TO Aéyw, please take my meaning ' : these
words, used by Pindar (fr. 82 Bergk) to prefer a modest request
-on behalf of another - became a catchword. Aristophanes
(Birds 945) puts them into the mouth of the poet, who, having
got the jerkin, delicately hints that he would like the cloak as
well. Plato here and Phaedr. 236 D uses the words without
reference to their original association.
éon IIívsapos : for this form of quotation - without ws-
cp. Prot. 315 в on "Oμnpos. So onoi Phaedr. 260 E, Theaet.
170 E, paoiv Hipp. maj. 301 c, pain av Phaedo 115 A, paîev äv
+ Alc. i 120 B. Cp. Ar. Wasps 1183 ; Lucian Dem. Enc. § 13
φησὶν ὁ τραγικός ; Diog. L. III 47 Γλαῦκα γὰρ εἰς ᾿Αθήνας, φάσιν.
34. ἔστιν γὰρ χρόα : Gedike observes that this is nearly the
same definition as Plato gives in Tim. 67 c. But there the
definition is part of a reasoned system ; it no longer rests on
an isolated hypothesis.
36. áρiσтá μo Sokeîs : contrast Meno's enthusiasm here
with his silence after the definition of σxâμa 76 A.
E 43. Tрayik , high - flown. ' Does the epithet refer to the
language or to the matter of the definition ? The former may
be credited mainly to Gorgias, the latter to Empedocles. Both
IX 76 E NOTES 97

these Sicilians in different ways were infected with the rpayıκds

Túpos (cp. Diog. L. VIII 70). As to the style, possibly an echo
of Gorgias may be detected in the ring σύμμετρος καὶ αἰσθητός.
(Cp. Hug's note at the beginning of Agathon's speech, Symp.
194 E, and on 72 A 14. ) But it is to the matter of the definition
that the epithet is chiefly directed . It is a definition in regular
form, like that of Figure, ἀπορροὴ σχημάτων being Genus, ὄψει
σύμμετρος καὶ αἰσθητός Differentia (ὄψει goes with both adjec-
tives). But the terms of the definition, though accepted by
ò éρwτŵv (see on 75 D 7), are not accepted universally. The
definition assumes an unproved hypothesis ; it is thus a defini-
tion for the Few. Tрayikh is opposed to ' popular. ' Cp . Heind.
ad Crat. 414 ‘ Μox τραγῳδεῖν τὰ ὀνόματα est σεμνότερα καὶ
θαυμαστότερα ποιεῖν ut 418 D τετραγῳδημένον. Unde explicanda
illa in Menone 76 E et Rep. 413 B.'
47. ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ ἔστιν . • άλλ' : see on 71 C 10.
οὐκ ἔστιν : I have put a comma before βελτίων, making that
predicate to ἔστιν. Buttmann says that in that case you would
need aurn to contrast with ékeivη. I cannot think it indis-
pensable, as the new definition is so prominent in thought.
This course seems preferable to leaving σTV without a
predicate.
ὦ παῖ ᾿Αλεξιδήμου : this form of address (πατρόθεν) is solemn
and impressive. See Thuc. VII 69, where, before the final sea-
fight in the harbour of Syracuse, Nikias goes round encouraging
each Athenian , πατρόθεν ὀνομάζων. So Plut. Pelop. 28, 4. Its
mock solemnity is well suited to the character of Socrates, who
often is made to use it ; Hipp. min. 373 A, Charm. 158 B,
Euthyd. 278 E, 279 D, Prot. 328 D, 335 D, Symp. 198 A, Rep. ii
368 A ở TCCS ĖKEVOU TOU &vôpós, t4le. i at the beginning,
+ Theag. 128 c, Lysis 204 B, with the youth's name added for
special effect, παῖ Ιερωνύμου Ιππόθαλες : ib. 204 Ε (a rather
different use) we are told that Lysis is still called ' Democrates'
son, διὰ τὸ σφόδρα τὸν πατέρα γιγνώσκεσθαι αὐτοῦ. The style
was also official, Xen. Oec. vii 3. So Socrates impressively
addresses Meno's slave , & aî Mévwvos 85 B 50. So Lysimachus
addresses Socrates, Laches 180 D.
49. οὐδ᾽ ἂν σοὶ δόξαι, εἰ μὴ ἀναγκαῖον : the infinitive ἂν
δόξαι represents δόξειεν ἄν, and with ἀναγκαῖον must be supplied
v. The present of eiuí is usually omitted with expressions of
necessity and duty, and here this is extended to the impf. ,
though otherwise the ellipsis of is rare (Kühner § 354,
Anm. 2 ; Jelf § 376 b, and Obs. 1 ). For the change of mood
see on 74 B 6.
H
98 MENO IX 76 E

50. πρὸ τῶν μυστηρίων : Meno is on his way back to

Thessaly, 71 C 12. There are many passages in Plato in which
he applies the phraseology of the mysteries to initiation in
philosophy ; Diotima uses it of her erotic doctrine, Symp. 209 E
ταῦτα μὲν οὖν τὰ ἐρωτικὰ ἴσως, ὦ Σώκρατες, κἂν σὺ μυηθείης ·
τὰ δὲ τέλεα καὶ ἐποπτικά , οὐκ οἶδ᾽ εἰ οἷός τ᾽ ἂν εἴης, Gorg.
497 c εὐδαίμων εἶ, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ὅτι τὰ μεγάλα μεμύησαι πρὶν
тà σμкρά. In Theaet. 155 Ethe materialists are spoken of as
ȧuúnto . In Euthyd. 277 E the triumph of the two sophists over
Clinias is compared to a Corybantic dance around the neophyte.
With bitter irony in Rep. 560 E the language of initiation is
applied to the process by which the soul is purged of all its
better elements to form the δημοκρατικὸς ἀνήρ. In the present
passage the literal meaning is combined with a metaphorical.
Plato seems to have entertained respect for at any rate certain
of the mystic rituals (Phaedo 69 c and Archer -Hind's note,
cp. Gorg. 493 A). But he often uses language in which the
regeneration thus wrought is held up as something superficial
and imperfect in comparison with that effected by philosophy
(Phaedo 81 A, Phaedrus 248 B, 249 C, 250 BC).

Chapters X-XII (77 A–79 E). MENO. Virtue is the love of

what is noble, conjoined with Power. SOCRATES. But
every one loves the Noble, desires the Good : that we may
eliminate. May we say Virtue is the power of securing
Good Things ? MENO. Yes. SOCRATES. Well ; but if
you mean Material Goods, Power will not be Virtue unless
it is exercised in accordance with certain personal character-
istics, Justice, Temperance etc. , as we saw with Rule just
now. We still have not the one thing that lies at the root
of these characteristics.
We here have Meno's third attempt at a definition, if we
may count as one the statement at 77 B 12 and its amended
form at 78 C 12. The original form is loose and poetical. It
leads to an interesting parenthetic exposition of the doctrine
οὐδεὶς ἑκὼν κακός— a doctrine so closely connected with the
identification of Virtue and Knowledge that some reference
to it in this dialogue was necessary. The amended definition ,
δύναμις τοῦ πορίζεσθαι ἀγαθά ( which Socrates suggests), is
far nearer the mark than anything yet put forward. ' Hanc
definitionem, ' says Fr. (intr. p. 16), ' Meno, si tenuisset veram
et sinceram boni notionem, valenti argumentatione defendisset. '
But Meno is thinking of external goods ; and to obtain these
virtuously the ' members of Virtue ' (uópia ȧperĥs ) have again
to be called in, as with the second definition at 73 C.
X 77 A NOTES 99

1. προθυμίας γε οὐδὲν ἀπολείψω, I shall not fail for want 77 Α

of goodwill. ' So Symp. 210 A, Rep. 533 A, Laws 961 c, Tim.
20 € οὔτε ἐλλείψομεν προθυμίας οὐδέν : cp. Aesch. P.V. 341
προθυμίας γὰρ οὐδὲν ἐλλείπεις. Cp. further Rep. 602 D γοητείας
οὐδὲν ἀπολείπει : Phaedo 69 D οὐδὲν ἀπέλιπον . • ἀλλὰ παντὶ
τρόπῳ προεθυμήθην.
3. ὅπως μὴ οὐχ οἷός τ᾽ ἔσομαι : ὅπως μή is often used to
introduce some idea that is repelled . The word denoting fear
or prevention on which it depends may either be expressed ,
or, as here, understood . The repulsion to the idea may be
weakened to mere caution6 in the entertainment of it, as here,
where the meaning is perhaps I shall not be able. ' (Contrast
Phil. 48 D οὐ μὴ δυνατός ὦ, I certainly shall not be able. ')
Where the word on which ows un depends is expressed , it will
determine whether prevention, fear, or mere caution is ex-
pressed. (See Kühner § 552. Anm. 6 ; Jelf § 812 , 2 ; Goodwin
§§ 271-83, especially § 278 , also § 370 ; F. E. T. §§ 234, 235 ;
Riddell § 59 ; see also notes on 89 C 6 and 10. )
We have oπws μn with fut. ind. after puλárte Gorg. 480 A,
Rep. 421 E ; after evλaßeîolai Gorg. 487 D, Rep. 564 c ; after
ȧVTITEίVELV Phaed. 91c ; after póßos éoтív Symp. 193 A ; cp.
also Gorg. 513 A. Without any governing verb, we have at
Rep. 506 D the same phrase as here : Menex. 236 c àλλ' öπws µń
μοι χαλεπανεῖ ἡ διδάσκαλος, ἂν ἐξενέγκω αὐτῆς τὸν λόγον : Prot.
313 c. Plato often has oπws un with 2nd person of this tense
as a gentle prohibition, Rep. 336 D, 337 B, Gorg. 489 A, Menex.
249 E, Hipp. maj. 286 B ; but apparently never ows without
un as a gentle command, like Aristophanes etc.
( In some of the above cases the MSS give the 1st aor. subj. ,
which recent editors mostly agree in correcting to the fut. ind.,
in accordance with the Canon Davesianus : see Kühner § 553.
Anm . 5 ; Jelf § 812, 1 ; Goodwin § 364 ; F. E. T. § 239. We
have a 2nd aor. ἐπαναστῇ . after ὅπως μή depending on παρα-
φυλάττοντες at Laws 715 B. )
With the pres. subj. we have oπws μn after poßeî Euthyphr.
4 E ; after evéoтηKEV Phaed. 77 B ; after oкeywμela denoting
cautious entertainment of an idea, Crat. 439 B ; and without
σKeywμelα, in just the same sense, Crat. 430 D.
Both fut. ind. and pres. subj. are thus capable of various
shades of meaning in this construction, and no general difference
of meaning between the uses of the two moods can be traced.
6. πολλὰ ποιῶν : cf. 79 A 7 μὴ καταγνύναι μηδὲ κερματίζειν.
8. KάπTOVTES : there seems to be reference to a similar
joke in Rep. 422 Ε ἑκάστη γὰρ αὐτῶν πόλεις εἰσὶ πάμπολλαι, ἀλλ᾿
οὐ πόλις, τὸ τῶν παιζόντων. The scholiast and many modern
 100 MENO X 77 A

interpreters of that passage held there was a reference to the

game Пóleis. The President of Magdalen and Mr. J. A. Stewart
(CR. VII 359) oppose this view, thinking that тò тŵv παιšóvтwV
is simply an equivalent to oкTTOVTES here. Prof. Ridgeway,
however (JHS. XVI 288), believes there is a reference to the
game roles, and I incline to agree with him. It is difficult
to see the point of the word Tóλis if it does not come from the
game. If the πόλις was an invulnerable combination of πεττοί,
which lost its virtue when disintegrated , the gibe is an obvious
one.
áoas : for the aor. ptcp. see 92 D 27.
vyin: Gorg. 493 D Tilo vyleîs, quibus opponuntur ȧyyeîa
τετρημένα (Fr. ). Cp. Crat. 440c ὡς οὐδὲν ὑγιὲς οὐδενὸς ἀλλὰ
πάνтa wσTEP кepáµa peî. L. & S. quote other applications of the
word to inanimate things- Lys. †Or. 6 § 12 of the Hermae ' un-
mutilated ' ; Thuc. VIII 107 of ships ' undamaged . ' Cp . 89 C 12.
B 12. χαίρειν τε καλοῖσι καὶ δύνασθαι : the citation of the
author as ò TonTýs would imply that he is some one of
eminence. Simonides of Ceos is probably the man. (See Fr.
on Euthyphr. 12 A. ) He was much connected with Thessaly,
and the poem of his discussed in the Protagoras was addressed to
a Thessalian prince. See Cic. de or. 11 §§ 352–3 and J. & A. M.
Adam's note on Prot. 339 A, where it is shown as probable
that besides Rep. 338 E ( where Plato quotes Simonides by name)
there are two other passages in the Republic where Plato quotes,
without naming, him. See on 87 E 2.
4
For the quotation see Bergk fragm. adespota 130 (vol. III
p. 729) . I do not think there is any allusion to it in Aristotle
Pol. v 5 1339 b 1. The metre suggests that it came from a
scolion, such as-
[οὐδὲν φέρτερόν ἐστιν ἀνδρὶ θνητῳ
ἢ] χαίρειν τε καλοῖσι καὶ δύνασθαι.
Meno in going to a poet for a definition is yielding to a
tendency, common in many ages, to regard the works of eminent
poets as of oracular authority (cp. Ov. Am. III ix 18 sunt
etiam qui nos numen habere putent). Against this spirit of
bibliolatry the Platonic Socrates often protests. See Prot. 347 c
foll. (Grote II 57-8) , Hipp. min. 365 c (Grote 1 388), Phaedr.
274 B foll. (Grote II 239-240), and Butcher Some Aspects of
the Greek Genius : ' The Written and Spoken Word ' pp. 184,
188, 197, 203 ; see also note on 71 D 26. The dead book, at the
absent master, is a poor substitute for the friction of living
minds.
Plato, however, so far gives in to the notion that poets are
X 77 B NOTES 101

oracular, that he regards them as the inspired mouthpieces

of words the true significance of which they know not (Apol.
22 B C, Io passim ; see on 95 D 35 and 99 D 28). This must be
Plato's excuse for the great latitude he allows himself in the
interpretation of poets ; see Socrates ' exposition of Simonides'
poem Prot. 342 A foll. Other instances of arbitrary interpreta-
tions of poets in Plato are found Lach. 191 B, Lys. 212 E ,
+Alc. ii 147 D. In the present instance the violence done to
the poet is slight. By dúvao@au the poet was thinking of
political power, having before his mind the position of some
prince or despot of cultured tastes. For δύνασθαι absolute
(= dνvaσтevel ) see L. & S. s. v. 1 1. Meno gives it a different
tinge by accepting Socrates interpretation, δυνατὸν εἶναι πορί-
ζεσθαι τἀγαθά.
The word dúvao@ai recalls two kindred passages. One is Gorg.
466 B foll. , where Polus says that orators μéya dúvavтai, and
is shown by an argument, parallel to the one here beginning,
that the only true Power is Knowledge. The other is Hipp.
maj. 295 E, where Hippias eagerly assents to Socrates ' suggestion
δύναμις μὲν ἄρα καλόν, ἀδυναμία δὲ αἰσχρόν ; and is met by a
similar argument (note égaμaprávovσi äкovтes at 296 c in regard
to a point presently discussed). A third passage closely bear-
ing on the present is Prot. 351 в foll. Socrates puts before
Protagoras the position : τὸ μὲν ἄρα ἡδέως ζῆν ἀγαθόν, τὸ δὲ
ἀηδῶς κακόν. Το this Protagoras answers : εἴπερ τοῖς καλοῖς
γε ζῴη ἡδόμενος. The reservation here made by Protagoras
is parallel with the xaipeiv kaλoîot of Meno. The nullity of
the reservation is brought out in a long argument, in the
course of which (352 c) Protagoras admits Kaλóv Te eîvai
ἡ ἐπιστήμη καὶ οἷον ἄρχειν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, καὶ ἐάνπερ γιγνώσκη
τις τἀγαθὰ καὶ τὰ κακὰ μὴ ἂν κρατηθῆναι ὑπὸ μηδένος, ὥστε
ἄλλ᾽ ἄττα πράττειν ἢ ἃ ἂν ἡ ἐπιστήμη κελεύῃ, ἀλλ᾽ ἱκανὴν εἶναι
τὴν φρόνησιν βοηθεῖν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ.
The doctrine enunciated in what now follows is often
labelled with the phrase οὐδεὶς ἑκὼν κακός. It is in its origin
a corollary from the doctrine that identifies Virtue and Know-
ledge, and is Socratic (Xen. Mem. III ix 4 ; IV vi 6). For an
exposition of the view as it presented itself to Socrates see
J. Adam's edition of the Apology Intr. p. xi ; Zeller Socrates
143. The view was one to which Plato adhered (with modifica-
tions) at all stages of his career. For the proof of this see
Cope, Translation of Plato's Gorgias Intr. p. xli and pp. lxiv
foll. It underlies the words of the Apology 26 A dλov yap
ὅτι, ἐὰν μάθω, παύσομαι ὅ γε ἄκων ποιῶ. Another side of the
same doctrine appears in the paradox of the Hippias minor
that it is better to do wrong voluntarily than involuntarily.
102 MENO X 77 B

In the Protagoras Socrates assumes the doctrine in criticising

the poem of Simonides (345 D E) ; it forms the basis of the
long discussion beginning 351 B (referred to above ), of which the
result appears at 357 C D and 358 C D äλλo Tɩ oûv ẻπi ye тà Kakà
ovdels ÈKWV ëρXETαι KTE. In the Gorgias it appears especially 467 c
(where see Dr. Thompson's note) and 468 c ovк äρa σþáttεLV
βουλόμεθα οὐδ᾽ ἐκβάλλειν ἐκ τῶν πόλεων οὐδὲ χρήματα ἀφαιρεῖσθαι
ἁπλῶς οὕτως, ἀλλ᾽ ἐὰν μὲν ὠφέλιμα ᾗ ταῦτα, βουλόμεθα πράττειν
αὐτά, βλαβερὰ δὲ ὄντα οὐ βουλόμεθα ; also 509 E, where the
meaning of δύναμις and δύνασθαι in the context should be
noted. In Symp. 205 A foll. we find again a clear statement,
πάντας τἀγαθὰ βούλεσθαι. In the second book of the Republic
the doctrine occurs repeatedly (see especially 358 c, 360 c,
364 A, 366 C D), chiefly as a contradiction of the sophistic '
view οὐδεὶς ἑκὼν δίκαιος—the view that Justice is artificially
forced upon man against the dictates of his nature (see Prot.
337 D, Gorg. 483 foll. , etc. ). At 438 A and 589 c passing references
take the doctrine for granted. Among the later dialogues it is
found in the Philebus 22 B (all must choose the Good) ei dé TIS
ἄλλα ᾑρεῖθ᾽ ἡμῶν, παρὰ φύσιν ἂν τὴν τοῦ ἀληθῶς αἱρετοῦ ἐλάμβανεν
ἄκων ἐξ ἀγνοίας ἤ τινος ἀνάγκης οὐκ εὐδαίμονος . The notion that
Vice is Ignorance seems also involved in the doctrine of False
Pleasures 41 A foll. In the Sophistes 230 A foll. , on the assump-
tion πᾶσαν ἀμαθίαν ἀκούσιον εἶναι, Education, especially in the
form of the exos, is held up as a higher purificatory agent
than vovéтnois. Again, Tim. 86D foll. Kai σxedòv dǹ távтa,
ὅποσα ἡδονῶν ἀκράτεια καὶ ὄνειδος ὡς ἑκόντων λέγεται τῶν κακῶν,
οὐκ ὀρθῶς ὀνειδίζεται · κακὸς μὲν γὰρ ἑκὼν οὐδείς, διὰ δὲ πονηρὰν
ἕξιν τινα τοῦ σώματος καὶ ἀπαίδευτον τροφὴν ὁ κακὸς γίγνεται
KaKÓS KTE. (See Archer - Hind's note). Lastly Cope refers to
Laws 731 c, 734 B, 860 D ; to which 689 A foll. may be added .
The maxim, especially in its earlier and more Socratic
aspect, was assailed by Aristotle. In Met. A 29 p. 1025 a 9
he attacks specifically the position of the Hippias minor.
Socrates, says Aristotle, overlooked the freedom of the will ;
the ȧpxn of moral action resides in ourselves ; not till the
habit of Virtue is confirmed does Vice become involuntary
(Grote I 399). The doctrine is also attacked, with apparent
reference to the Protagoras, in NE. vII 2 = p. 1145 b 24, vII 3
= p. 1147 b 15 (Grote II 62). See also for Boúλnois Aristot.
Rhet. I x 8, with Cope's note. (Zeller p. 420. )
16. apa λéуels KTλ.: the argument here, as elsewhere in
Plato, depends on successive substitutions of nearly synonymous
words. The first step is to substitute ȧyaðά for kaλá ( so , less
explicitly, at Prot. 351 c ). Thus any poetic tinsel adhering
to the word κаλá is removed. Then the position Kaк@v
X 77 B NOTES 103

ἐπιθυμοῦσί τινες is undermined piecemeal by the following

division :-:--
κακῶν ἐπιθυμοῦσιν

Α οἰόμενοι τὰ κακὰ ἀγαθὰ Β τὰ κακὰ γιγνώσκοντες

είναι ὅτι κακά έστιν

Β (1) ἡγούμενοι τὰ κακὰ Β (2) γιγνώσκοντες ὅτι τὰ

ὠφελεῖν κακὰ βλάπτει
Though in general terms Meno has asserted the existence of
B, yet when it is pointed out that κakóν must be regarded
in relation to one's self (which is done first by the phrase γενέσθαι
αὑτῷ and then by the introduction of the antithesis ὠφελεῖν
βλάπτειν) he is shaken, and confesses that B ( 1 ) must either
disappear or be merged in A (77 D) . It remains to dispose
of B (2). Meno is led on by a series of quasi- synonyms
(βλάπτεσθαι-βλαβήσονται—ἄθλιος εἶναι— κακοδαίμων είναι) until
in ‘ κακοδαίμων he meets with a term from which he definitely
recoils. Thus Meno is led to give up B altogether.
Examples of somewhat similar procedure occur several times
in the Gorgias, 474 c - 479 E ( see Grote II 90-101 ; Bonitz
Platonische Studien p. 21 ), 495 c-497 D, 506 D-507 c, where the
numerous steps include the not infrequent play on the double
meaning of εὖ πράττειν.
The first book of the Republic furnishes other examples :
the argument at 348 B foll. to show that Injustice is not profit-
able, culminating in the phrase θεοῖς ἐχθρός at 352B ; again
353 E foll. : the soul in which its special ἀρετή ( δικαιοσύνη)
resides εὖ ἀπεργάσεται τὰ αὑτῆς ἔργα—εὖ πράττει—εν βιώσεται—
ἔσται μακαρία καὶ εὐδαίμων —hence δικαιοσύνη λυσιτελεῖ. See
also Prot. 3331) , Euthyd. 281 в C, Hipp. min. 365 D E, † Alc. i
116 B foll. , and J. Adam on Euthyphr. 12 B and Crito 47 Β.
Such verbal arguments are often, as Dr. Thompson says (in
his note on Gorg. 497 Α οὐκ οἶδ᾽ ἅττα σοφίζει, ὦ Σώκρατες),
' rather unconvincing than illogical. ' Something of this Plato
must have felt when at Rep. 487 A he makes Adimantus say
ὦ Σώκρατες, πρὸς μὲν ταῦτά σοι οὐδεὶς ἂν οἷός τ᾽ εἴη ἀντειπεῖν ·
ἀλλὰ γὰρ τοιόνδε τι πάσχουσιν οἱ ἀκούοντες ἑκάστοτε ἃ νῦν λέγεις ·
ἡγοῦνται δι᾽ ἀπειρίαν τοῦ ἐρωτῶν καὶ ἀποκρίνεσθαι ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου
παρ' ἕκαστον τὸ ἐρώτημα σμικρὸν παραγόμενοι, ἀθροι·
σθέντων τῶν σμικρῶν ἐπὶ τελευτῆς τῶν λόγων μέγα τὸ σφάλμα
καὶ ἐναντίον τοῖς πρώτοις ἀναφαίνεσθαι κτέ. Cp. Phaedr. 261 Ε
foll.
 104 ΜΕΝΟ X 77 c
C 26. γιγνώσκοντες : ep. Prot . 353 c γιγνώσκοντες ὅτι πονηρά
ἐστιν, ὅμως αὐτὰ πράττειν.
32. τί ἐπιθυμεῖν λέγεις ; ἢ γενέσθαι αὑτῷ ; cp. Symp. 204 D E
ὁ ἐρῶν τῶν καλῶν τί ἐρᾷ ; Γενέσθαι αὑτῷ, and presently ὁ ἐρῶν
τῶν ἀγαθῶν τί ἐρᾷ ; Γενέσθαι αὑτῷ. κτήσει γὰρ ἀγαθῶν οἱ
εὐδαίμονες εὐδαίμονες. Cp. also the analysis of ἐπιθυμία Rep.
iv 437 C, ἀεὶ τὴν τοῦ ἐπιθυμοῦντος ψυχὴν οὐχὶ ἤτοι ἐφίεσθαι
φήσεις ἐκείνου οὗ ἂν ἐπιθυμῇ, ἢ προσάγεσθαι τοῦτο ὃ ἂν βούληταί
οἱ γενέσθαι, ἢ αὖ, καθ᾽ ὅσον ἐθέλει τί οἱ πορισθῆναι, ἐπινεύειν
τοῦτο πρὸς αὑτὴν ὥσπερ τινὸς ἐρωτῶντος, ἐπορεγομένην αὐτοῦ τῆς
γενέσεως ;
D 34. ὠφελεῖν ἐκεῖνον : the step taken by the introduction of
the word wpeλeîv is practically what Aristotle would have
expressed as that from the ἀγαθόν in itself to the ἀγαθὸν πρὸς
ἡμᾶς. Sometimes the distinction between ὠφέλιμον and ἀγαθόν
sinks to nothing, as at Prot. 358 B ; so at Gorg. 474 E, 477 a
ὠφέλιμον is ranked with ἀγαθόν as opposed to ἡδύ, the former re-
presenting the permanent, the latter the transient object of desire
(Grote II 105, 127-29). See too Gorg. 468 c. At Crat. 419 A we
have ὠφέλιμον, ἀγαθόν, and other words grouped together aspracti-
cally synonymous, there being no object in drawing distinctions.
But with most synonyms there remains a latent possibility
of drawing distinctions when that is to the purpose. The
following passages may show the relation of the two terms when
not synonymous. In Prot. 333 D foll. it is agreed that all
ἀγαθά are ὠφέλιμα to something ; ep. Xen. Mem. IV vi 8 τὸ ἄρα
ὠφέλιμον ἀγαθόν ἐστιν ὅτῳ ἂν ὠφέλιμον ᾖ. Here ὠφέλιμον
appears as a relative notion. So Euthyd. 280 Β ἆρ᾽ οὖν εὐδαι
μονοῖεν ἂν διὰ τὰ παρόντα ἀγαθά, εἰ μηδὲν ἡμᾶς ὠφελοῖ, ἢ εἰ
ὠφελοῖ ; εἰ ὠφελοῖ, ἔφη. ἆρ᾽ οὖν ἄν τι ὠφελοῖ, εἰ εἴη μόνον
ἡμῖν, χρώμεθα δ᾽ αὐτοῖς μή; Gorg. 499 » ΣΩ. Αρ' οὖν ἀγαθαὶ μὲν
αἱ ὠφέλιμοι (τῶν ἡδονῶν) , κακαὶ δὲ αἱ βλαβεραί ; ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ γε.
ΣΩ. Ωφέλιμοι δέ γε αἱ ἀγαθόν τι ποιοῦσαι, κακαί ( so the texts,
but ? βλαβεραὶ δὲ αἱ κακόν τι ; Rep. 379 Β τὸ ἀγαθόν is ὠφέλιμον
and αἴτιον εὐπραγίας. Cp. 608 E. We may say that in the
order of Nature ἀγαθόν is prior to ὠφέλιμον and is the cause
of it. But from our point of view ὠφέλιμον appears as the
cause why we regard something as ἀγαθόν. So Hipp. maj.
296 Ε ἀλλὰ μὴν τό γε ὠφέλιμον τὸ ποιοῦν ἀγαθόν ἐστιν, ep. ibid.
303 E. From these places, perhaps, the compiler of the Platonic
῞Οροι 414 Ε drew his definition : ὠφέλιμον · τὸ αἴτιον τοῦ εὐ
πάσχειν · τὸ αἴτιον τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ. Cp. 87 E 36 and 96 E 2.
E 44. ᾤοντο : ‘ ubi compotes fiunt, error demitur. Fr. Cp.
a somewhat similar use of the impf. Phaedr. 256 Β μακάριον
τὸν βίον διάγουσιν . . δουλωσάμενοι ᾧ κακία ψυχῆς ἐνεγίγνετο,
XI 78 C NOTES 105

i.e. was growing, before its subjection ; Rep. 352c dîλov öтɩ
ἐνῆν τις αὐτοῖς δικαιοσύνη.
ἔστιν δὲ ταῦτά γε κακά : ep . on 74 D 35, 90 E 32.
55. The word aλios has strong associations. It is intro- 78 A
duced with solemnity Gorg. 469 A, 507 C Tòv dè πоvηpòv Kai
κακῶς πράττοντα ἄθλιον : cp. Aristoph. Plut. 118 ἄνθρωπος οὗτός
ἐστιν ἄθλιος φύσει.
57. Kakodaíμovas : this word, like our ' God-forsaken, ' though
vulgarly abused, was capable on occasion of carrying the full
weight of an awful meaning. The Greeks were apt to regard
crime and madness alike as visitations of the higher Powers,
Aristoph. Plut. 501.
67. οὐδεὶς βούλεσθαι : of course κινδυνεύει is understood . Β
Similarly at 96 D 23.

CHAPTER XI
1. Xeyes : see on 73 A 31. But the answer has είπον.
' Were you not saying just now ? ' ' Yes, I did say so. ’
3. elπov уáp : cp 97 B 25 and Exc. III .
19. ὑγίειάν τε καὶ πλοῦτον : see 87 E 2 and note there. We C
here have the types of two great classes of bona, corporeal and
external goods. The word λovovyícia as a synonym for ' all
earthly blessings ' occurs thrice in Aristophanes : Knights
1054, Wasps 667, Birds 731. We may be surprised at the
prominence given to health by a people we are apt to picture
to ourselves as hardly knowing illness. Cp. Rep . 583 c. Note
' interrogation emerging late in the sentence, ' Riddell § 309.
21. καὶ χρυσίον λέγω καὶ ἀργύριον κτᾶσθαι καὶ τιμὰς ἐν
Tóλel kal ápɣás : the first and third κaí serve to couple, and at
the same time to distinguish, the two things, wealth and
political power, each of which is denoted by a pair of nouns
coupled by καί. Meno regards TXOÛTOs as insufficiently re-
presenting external goods, and adds to it the objects of political
ambition. By so doing he raises himself a stage above the
lowest grade ( στάτην ἡδονὴν δὴ τοῦ φιλοκερδοῦς Rep. ix 583 A),
and shows that in him the piλoxphμatos is combined with the
piλóriuos (Phaedo 68 c, 82 c). At Apol. 29 D E we have the
same scale : χρημάτων μὲν οὐκ αἰσχύνει ἐπιμελούμενος . . καὶ δόξης
καὶ τιμῆς, φρονήσεως δὲ καὶ ἀληθείας, καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς ὅπως βελτίστη
ἔσται οὐκ ἐπιμελεῖ ; In the enumeration at 87 Ε πλοῦτος remains
 106 MENO XI78 C

the single representative of the external goods, while in the

corporeal goods ισχύs and κάλλος are added to υγίεια.
23. μὴ ἀλλ᾽ ἄττα : μή (num ) puts the matter tentatively.
Meno is given a last chance of amending his conception of
Goods. Tayalá is subject of the dependent statement : ‘ I
suppose there are no things of a different class that your list
of Goods includes ?'
25. οὔκ, ἀλλὰ πάντα : ἀλλά here should not be translated
(see on 71 C 10). For though Meno says ' I do not include
any other class, but I do include the whole of the class I have
indicated, ' there is little emphasis on the affirmative half of
the statement. ' No, I mean everything of this sort. '
D 26. εἶεν · χρυσίον δὲ δή : cp. 75 C 30. The de succeeding
the interjection elev is of the same nature as the dé succeeding
other interjections, e.g. vocatives. Here, as Stallbaum points
out, we have a paratactic variant for the conditional con-
struction that might seem more natural : εἶεν · εἰ δὲ δὴ χρυσίον
πορίζεσθαι ἀρετή ἐστι, πότερον προστιθεῖς κτλ.
27. ȧPETý čσTI : not necessarily the whole of Virtue, but
an instance of it, which is all S. wants for his argument.
Tôi peyarov Bariés : ep. Apol . 40 D, Euthyd . 274 A ,
Gorg. 470 E, Soph. 230 D. The proverbial illustration passed
into Latin : Persarum vigui rege beatior, Hor. Od. III 9. 4.
28. TатρIкòs évos : Gedike suggests that the ancestors
of Meno may have entered into a league of friendship with
Xerxes at the time of his invasion, as the Aleuadae did
( Hdt. VII 6). As the tie was with the royal house, it hardly
implies treachery in Meno that he should help Cyrus against
his brother, the reigning king. But Xenophon represents
Meno as the personal friend rather of Ariaeus than of Cyrus
himself (Anab. II i 5 etc. ), whereas Aristippus is the friend
of Cyrus (ibid. 1 i 10) .
πότερον προστιθεῖς κτέ. : the argument which here begins
partially anticipates that at 87 E foll. showing that except opó-
vnois no good is Good per se, all other goods being merely
contingent.
29. τῷ πόρῳ : for τῷ πορίζεσθαι or τῷ πορισμῷ the concrete
word is substituted ; so lines 36, E46 below. Similarly we have
at E 44 ἀπορία for τὸ μὴ πορίζεσθαι, 98 Α 36 δεσμῷ for τῷ δεδέ-
σθαι, 99 Β 15 εὐδοξία for τὸ εὖ δοξάζειν. See on 99 B 15.
τὸ δικαίως καὶ ὁσίως : ὁσιότης had been omitted by Meno
in his enumeration of the virtues at 74 A. Now we have
ὁσίως put on an equal footing with δικαίως. Are we to suppose
XII 79 B NOTES .107

that the Meno belongs to the dialogues written before the con-
ception of the Four cardinal ' Virtues-without doorns - was
forined by Plato ? Those who think so hold that Meno was
written earlier than Euthyphro, the latter being the dialogue in
which oσtórns as a separate virtue is eliminated. The question
is argued by J. Adam in the introduction to his edition of
the Euthyphro pp. xxxii , xxxiii (see also his and A. M. Adam's
introduction to the Protagoras p. xxxiv). His conclusion , in
support of which he quotes Bonitz Plat. Stud. p. 234, is that
there is no reason to suppose the Euthyphro later than other
dialogues, where Plato , adopting the popular view, mentions
Piety among the other virtues. Such is the case in the
Protagoras, where at 325 A, 329 B, 349 в dσιórns is included in
the list ofvirtues . See also Zeller p. 451 n. 47. Cp. Laws 860 b.
33. οὐ δήπου, ὦ Σώκρατες : Meno shows no disposition to
revolt against current notions of morality, and is thus on a
par with another pupil of Gorgias, Polus, who is only partially
emancipated ( ' Polus, the half-thinker ' Cope calls him, Gorg.
Intr. p. xl) as distinct from the more thorough- going Callicles
(see Callicles' speech in the Gorgias at 482 D).
38. μópιov aperĥs : this expression is used of the several
virtues Prot. 329 C D ; cp. Laws 696 в ȧvdpeía пoν μópiov
ἀρετῆς ἕν.
44. ǹ ȧπopía : see above, D 29. Here the etymological E
meaning of dropía is helped out by the fact that the word has
for one of its senses ' need, poverty ' (see L. & S. ) , much as we
talk about being in difficulties. ' We have the word played
on Apol. 38 D ἀλλ᾽ ἀπορίᾳ ἑάλωκα, οὐ μέντοι λόγων ἀλλὰ τόλμης
καὶ ἀναισχυντίας. Other examples of negative words used by
Plato in an unusual sense are avónros, used simply as the
opposite of νοητός Phaedo 80 B, ἀπίθανος Parm . 133 c, ἀσήμαντος
Phaedr. 250 c.

CHAPTER XII
5. Elтa : see on 71 C 18. 79 A
7. ἄρτι : viz. at 77 Α. For κερματίζειν of breaking up a
class-entity, cp. Rep. 525 E. Το κατακερματίζειν below, C24.
15. 8 Tι av πράTT after an infinitive of which the subject B
is indefinite (as Tрáттew here) Greek prefers the third person
singular, Latin the second. Sometimes Tis is inserted, but
often, as here, it is omitted. Many of the instances are sub-
junctives used with the relative and äv : Euthyd. 289 B éπiotýµns
 108 ΜΕΝΟ XII 79 B

δεῖ, ἐν ᾗ συμπέπτωκεν ἅμα τό τε ποιεῖν καὶ τὸ ἐπίστασθαι χρῆσθαι

τούτῳ ὃ ἂν ποιῇ, Lys. 212 Β οὐκ ἔστιν φιλοῦντα μὴ ἀντιφιλεῖσθαι
ὑπὸ τούτου ὃν ἂν φιλῇ ; Crito 49 c οὐκ ἄρα ἀνταδικεῖν δεῖ
οὐδένα ἀνθρώπων, οὐδ᾽ ἂν ὁτιοῦν πάσχῃ ὑπὸ τούτων. Cp.
97 Α 9, Ηίρρ. maj. 304 B, Laws 661 B. With indicatives :
Charm. 167 Β εἰ δυνατόν ἐστιν τοῦτ᾽ εἶναι ἢ οὔ, τὸ ἃ οἶδεν καὶ
ἃ μὴ οἶδεν εἰδέναι ὅτι < οἶδε καὶ ὅτι > οὐκ οἶδεν, Αpol. 29 Α τὸ γὰρ
θάνατον δεδιέναι δοκεῖν εἰδέναι ἐστὶν ἃ οὐκ οἶδεν , Gorg. 456 n,
505 A. The use of the third person singular without subject
expressed is considerably wider in Aristotle, e.g. προῄδει Anal.
Post. I 1, quoted on 80 D 1. See Kühner § 352 g, Jelf 373. 6.
18. τί οὖν δή ; ' well, and what then ? ' cp. 89 D 13 , 97 Ε 19,
Crat. 398 A, Gorg. 497 D, in all which places the meaning of the
combination is the same.
20. πολλοῦ δεῖς : A. Sidgwick ( CR. III 148 b) gires this use
of déw ( ' I lack ') entirely confined to quantities and numbers,'
as an example of Personalization. See on 92 A 1.
C 22. ὥσπερ εἰρηκώς : the fallacy of which Meno has been
convicted is what logicians call ' circulus in definiendo, ' when
the term to be defined is itself introduced in the definition
(Jevons Elem. Lessons in Logic pp. 110, 114) .
25. πάλιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς, ' making a fresh start. So El and often.
27. Of the instances of el with av and the optative in Plato,
three occur in the Meno. Besides the present place ( 1 ) we
have (2) 91 D 12 τέρας λέγεις εἰ —οὐκ ἂν δύναιντο λαθεῖν : (3)
98 Β 4 ἀλλ᾽ εἴπερ τι ἄλλο φαίην ἂν εἰδέναι, ἓν δ᾽ οὖν καὶ τοῦτο
θείην ἂν ὧν οἶδα. Other instances are : (4) Lach. 200 D ἀλλ᾽
ὅρα, ὦ Λυσίμαχε, εἴ τι σοῦ ἂν μᾶλλον ὑπακούοι Σωκράτης :
(5) Prot. 329 Β ἐγὼ εἴπερ ἄλλῳ τῳ ἀνθρώπων πειθοίμην ἄν,
καὶ σοὶ πείθομαι : (6) Phil. 58 D διερευνησάμενοι —εἰ φαῖμεν ἄν :
(7) Crat. 398 Ε οὐδ᾽ εἴ τι οἷός τ᾽ ἂν εἴην εὑρεῖν, οὐ συντείνω : (8)
Laus 905 D εἰ δ᾽ ἐπιδεὴς ἔτι λόγου τινος ἂν εἴης, λεγόντων ἡμῶν
ἐπάκουε.
These instances do not all stand in the same position. In
(1 ) , (2), and (4) el does not introduce a real condition. In
( 1 ) εἰ = ἐπεί. See Kühner § 577. 1 and ep. Xen. Mem. I v 3
εἴ γε μηδὲ δοῦλον ἀκρατῆ δεξαίμεθ᾽ ἄν, πῶς οὐκ ἄξιον αὐτόν γε
φυλάξασθαι τοιοῦτον γενέσθαι ; Dem. 23 (Aristocr. ) § 141 δίκην
δόντ᾽ ἂν δικαίως τὴν μεγίστην, εἴπερ οἱ κακόνοι καὶ φενακίζοντες
ὑμᾶς κολάζοιντ᾽ ἂν δικαίως. In (2) εἰ = ὅτι, as often after words
of strong feeling, Kühner $ 551. 8 ; Xen . Cyr. III iii 37. In
(4) and (6) ei ' whether, ' in an oblique question ; Kühner
§ 396. 5.
In (3), ( 5), (7), and ( 8), however, εἰ introduces a really
XIII 79 NOTES 109
conditional clause. But the condition is itself conditional ; it
depends on an unexpressed protasis which av represents. Thus
in (3) elrep paínv av is ' if I should say, if asked ' ; in ( 5 ) etπeρ
Telolunv av is if I should believe, if he told me.' These two
instances are noticeably parallel ; they differ, however, in that
(3) has for its apodosis an optative with av, while (5) has,
less regularly, an indicative, Tε0оíμηv av being equivalent
to μέλλω πείσεσθαι. We may translate (7) ' no, even though
I might, if I tried, discover something, I refuse to make the
effort. ' See Kühner § 577. 1, Goodwin § 506, F. E.T. § 186,
who quote Dem. IV (Phil. 1 ) § 18 οὐδ᾽ εἰ μὴ ποιήσαιτ᾽ ἂν τοῦτο
ὡς ἔγω γέ φημι δεῖν, εὐκαταφρόνητόν ἐστιν.
I have left out of account +Alc. i 124 Β ὧν ἄλλῳ μὲν οὐδ᾽ ἂν
ἑνὶ περιγενοίμεθα, εἰ μή περ ἐπιμελείᾳ τε ἂν καὶ τέχνῃ and † Alc.
ii 144 Β εἰ ἀγνοήσαις τε καὶ οἰηθείης ἄν , in both which places
Sch. removes äv. See Appendix on the text.
30. ἢ οὐ . áλλ oleɩ : àλλá complemental : see on 71 C 10.
35. ei yàp kai µéµvŋoaɩ , ‘ if you do but remember . ' Cp. D
80 A 8.
36. ȧπeкρiváμην : viz. at 75 C. The aor. because it was a single
answer (App. on text on 72 C 4). åπeßáλλoμev : impf. , see on
73 A 31. But we have aor. succeeded by impf. also at 99 E 3
ἐζητήσαμεν καὶ ἐλέγομεν. See on 72 B 22.
περὶ τοῦ σχήματος : the article recalls the particular instance
of discussion ; "about that matter, colour. '
Tоν: cр. on 75 C 29.
38. μý : see on 90 E 31.
(
46. τίνος ὄντος ἀρετῆς κτέ , what is this virtue about E
which you speak as you do ? ' ' Egregia graeci sermonis
brevitas ' Gedike. Cp. 86 D 8.

Chapter XIII (79 E-80 D). MENO. You stupefy and benumb
me, Socrates. I thought I understood the matter well
enough, but in your hands I am helpless. SOCRATES. If
you think it is any superior knowledge in me that benumbs
you, you are much mistaken. But I am willing to go into
partnership with you in the quest.
Meno has now had his ' three falls ' (cp. Euthyd. 277 c),
and confesses himself beaten. He is thus reduced to ἀπορία
(contrast 72 A 13), the consciousness of ignorance which is
the first real step to knowledge. The situation is parallel to
 110 ΜΕΝΟ XIII 79 E
others in Plato. In Euthyphro 11 B and Theaet. 148 F the
speakers whose names these dialogues respectively bear make
a similar confession. In each case the confession is followed
by a half- serious simile ; in the Euthyphro Socrates introduces
the comparison of the images of Daedalus (cp. 97 D) ; in the
Theaetetus he compares himself to a midwife (uaîa) who, child-
less herself, can bring to birth the thoughts of others. Here,
however, it is not Socrates but Meno who makes the com-
parison. ' Nowhere in the Platonic dialogues is this provocative
shock ' (of the Socratic elenchus) ' more vividly illustrated
than in the Menon, by the simile of the electrical fish ' Grote
II 15. Cp. also Lach. 194 Β καὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἀγανακτῶ, εἰ οὑτωσὶ ἃ
νοῦ μὴ οἷός τ᾽ εἰμὶ εἰπεῖν. νοεῖν μὲν γὰρ ἐμοίγε δοκῶ περὶ ἀνδρείας
ὅ τι ἔστιν, οὐκ οἶδα δ᾽ ὅπῃ με ἄρτι διέφυγεν.
80 A 4. οὐδὲν ἄλλο ή : see on 76 B 13.
5. τοὺς ἄλλους ποιεῖς ἀπορεῖν : so Socrates ( Theaet. 149 A )
answers ' people do not credit me with the maieutic art, but
say ὅτι ἀτοπώτατός εἰμὶ καὶ ποιῶ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἀπορεῖν.
7. μεστὸν ἀπορίας, ‘ one mass of confusion. Cp. Rep.
556 D, Soph. 236 E, Theaet. 151 A ἀπορίας ἐμπίμπλανται.
8. δεῖ ριο πρέπει vel ἔστι modeste, nam animo obversatur
οὐ δεῖ. Hdt. 1x 65 δοκέω δέ, εἴ τι περὶ τῶν θείων δοκέειν δέει :
Aristoph. Lys. 1132 (πόσους | εἴποιμ᾽ ἂν ἄλλους εἴ με μηκύνειν
δέοι ;) Fr. Cp. the phrase εἰ δεῖ τἀληθὲς εἰπεῖν.
εἰ δεῖ τι καὶ σκῶψαι, ‘ if I may e'en have my joke : καί
accentuates σκώψαι. See on 71 Β 8 and 79 D 35.
9. τό τε εἶδος : the comparison is to Socrates' face, which
was broad and flat (σιμός). Cp. Theaet. 143 E : Theodorus says
to Socrates that Theaetetus οὐκ ἔστι καλός, προσέοικε δὲ σοὶ τὴν
τε σιμότητα καὶ τὸ ἔξω τῶν ὀμμάτων ; so πλατείᾳ here. It was
likened by Alcibiades to Silenus or the satyr Marsyas (Symp.
215 A B, Xen. Symp. 4. 19, Zeller Socrates p. 79). See on
76 C 16.
10. ταύτῃ : ‘ notae illi : ep. 76 Α 20 ’ Fr.
τῇ πλατεία νάρκη : the electric ray (torpedo) : a fish
allied to the skate. Fr. says that it often occurs in Greek
vase- paintings. He quotes Aristot. Hist. An. Ix 37. 3 ή τε
νάρκη ναρκᾶν ποιοῦσα ὧν ἂν κρατήσειν μέλλει ἰχθύων . . τρέφεται
τούτοις · κατακρύπτεται δ᾽ εἰς τὸν ἄμμον καὶ πηλόν, λαμβάνει δὲ
τὰ ἐπινέοντα, ὅσα ἂν ναρκήσῃ ἐπιφερόμενα τῶν ἰχθύων. Plut.
de Sollertia An. 27. 2 τῆς δὲ νάρκης ἴστε που τὴν δύναμιν, οὐ
μόνον τοὺς θιγόντας αὐτῆς ἐπιπηγνύουσαν , ἀλλὰ καὶ διὰ τῆς
σαγήνης βαρύτητα ναρκώδη ταῖς χερσὶ τῶν ἀντιλαμβανομένων
XIII 80 B NOTES 111

éμπоLoûσav. Pliny Nat. Hist. XXXII 2 ' etiam procul et ex

longinquo vel si hasta virgave attingatur (torpedo) quamvis
praevalidos lacertos torpescere, quemlibet ad cursum veloces
alligari pedes. ' Add Claudian Idyll 3. Aristoph. Wasps 713
ὥσπερ νάρκη κατὰ χειρός μου καταχεῖται. It was used for food ;
see Athenaeus VII 314 A, who quotes from a comedian, váρên
γὰρ ἐφθὴ βρῶμα χαρίεν γίγνεται. Fishes of this tribe have
furnished other opportunities for caricature. 'Perhaps the
reader may remember Hogarth's " Gate of Calais, " where a
fisherwoman has upon her knees a huge skate, into whose
face the painter has wickedly infused an expression precisely.
like that of the weather-beaten, withered old dame who holds
it ' (J. G. Wood Common Objects of the Sea Shore).
19. oúk éktλéwv évoévde : the stay-at-home habits of Socrates B
(who has been compared in this respect and in some others with
Dr. Johnson) are well known, Crito 52 B oυT' ¿πì dewρíav πwπOT'
ἐκ τῆς πόλεως ἐξῆλθες, οὔτ᾽ ἀλλόσε οὐδαμόσε, εἰ μή ποι στρατευ
σόμενος, οὔτ᾽ ἄλλην ἀποδημίαν ἐποιήσω πώποτε, ὥσπερ οἱ ἄλλοι
avoрwo : Phaedr. 230 c (Phaedrus to Socrates) άтexvŵs yàp
ξεναγουμένῳ τινὶ καὶ οὐκ ἐπιχωρίῳ ἔοικας · οὕτως ἐκ τοῦ ἄστεος
οὔτ᾽ εἰς τὴν ὑπερορίαν ἀποδημεῖς, οὔτ᾽ ἔξω τείχους ἔμοιγε δοκεῖς
τὸ παράπαν ἐξιέναι.
21. ὡς γόης ἀπαχθείης : ἀπάγειν, ἀπαγωγή, the regular
phrases for summary arrest, a process resorted to when the
facts were patent or notorious. Buttmann quotes Gorg. 486 A
εἴ τις εἰς τὸ δεσμωτήριον ἀπαγάγοι : ep. Apol. 32 Β ἑτοίμων ὄντων
ἐνδεικνύναι με καὶ ἀπάγειν τῶν ῥητόρων. For the process see
Dem. 22 (Androt. ) § 26, and the commentators.
The context of the passage just quoted from the Crito, as
well as the pathetic passage in the Apology 37 C D, in which
Socrates urges the impossibility of his proposing exile for himself
as an alternative penalty, not only shows Socrates' love for his
own city, but makes it probable that in any other he would
have fared even worse. This passage receives illustration from
the subsequent interlude in which Anytus plays a part ; see
especially 91 C 19 (note) and 94 E. Cp. Gorg. 522 B C.
23. ¿λíyou, ' almost. ' The idiom is best explained by suppos-
ing an ellipsis of deî (or dev), Hadley 743 b, F. E. Thompson
§ 95, Goodwin MT. § 779 ( b), Krüger § 47 , 16. 6, and is therefore
a gen. of want ; Apol. ad init. ὀλίγου ἐμαυτοῦ ἐπελαθόμην.
(Kühner § 418. 6 explains it as a gen. of price. ) It is fairly
common in Plato, though he never has the Aristophanic Tou
' exceedingly, ' without deîv. (For πολλοῦ δέω see 79 Β 20,
92 A 1.) Nor has he σμικροῦ, μικροῦ in sense of ὀλίγου, like
Xenophon and Demosthenes.
 112 ΜΕΝΟ XIII 80 B

25. τί μάλιστα ; accuratius inquirit et cum admiratione

Fr.; ‘ and pray why, Socrates ? ' ep . Gorg. 448 D.
C 28. ἵνα σε ἀντεικά : such εικασίαι were a fashiona
at Greek soσci
ω gat bl
amuseme
nt al herings . Walz Rhet. Gr. VIIIe
γ. 789 τὸ εἴκασμά ἐστι σκῶμμα κατ᾿ ὁμοιότητα , ὡς ἔχει τὸ παρ'
Εὐπόλιδι
κατεικάζουσιν ἡμᾶς ἰσχάδι.
See Hug's introduction to Plato's Symposium pp. xiv and xxv
Aristophanes gives us examples of it : Wasps 1308 foll.
εἶτ᾽ αὐτὸν ὡς εἶδ᾽ ἤκασεν Λυσίστρατος ·
“ ἔοικας, ὦ πρεσβῦτα, νεοπλούτῳ τρυγί""
κλητῆρί τ᾽ εἰς ἀχυρμὸν ἀποδεδρακότι.
ὁ δ᾽ ἀνακραγὼν ἀντῄκασ᾽ αὐτὸν πάρνοπι
τὰ θρῖα τοῦ τρίβωνος ἀποβεβληκότι,
Σθενέλῳ τε τὰ σκευάρια διακεκαρμένῳ.
Birds 804 foll.-
ΠΕΙΣΘ. οἶσθ᾽ ᾧ μάλιστ᾽ ἔοικας ἐπτερωμένος ;
εἰς εὐτέλειαν χηνὶ συγγεγραμμένῳ.
ΕΥΕΛΠ. σὺ δὲ κοψίχῳ γε σκάφιον ἀποτετιλμένῳ.
So in Plato's Symposium 215 A Alcibiades says he will praise
Socrates δι' εἰκόνων. In the Republic 487 E Socrates says he
can explain the position of philosophers in existing states only
δι᾿ εἰκόνος. Adimantus rejoins ironically σὺ δέ γε οἶμαι οὐκ
εἴωθας δι᾿ εἰκόνων λέγειν. Socrates, parrying the raillery, says
ἄκουε δ᾽ οὖν τῆς εἰκόνος, ἵν᾿ ἔτι μᾶλλον ἴδῃς ὡς γλίσχρως ( in
what a laboured style ”) εἰκάζω.
Hor. Satt. I v 56 would suggest that the same sort of thing
was current in Italy.
It may be paralleled by the modern diversion ' what is my
thought like ? ' that led to Lord Byron's well-known comparison
of Lord Castlereagh to a pump.
29. εἰκαζόμενοι is probably middle : they like engaging
in a game of εικασίαι, for they get the best of it.
34. οὐ γὰρ εὐπορῶν αὐτός : εὐπορῶν is simply the opposite
to ἀπορῶν, ep. Theaet. 150 c ἐπεὶ τόδε γε καὶ ἐμοὶ ὑπάρχει ὅπερ
ταῖς μαίαις · ἄγονός εἰμι σοφίας. Meno had allowed (80 A 4)
that Socrates himself ἀπορεῖ.
35. παντὸς μᾶλλον, ' most assuredly. See on 96 D 24.
D 37. περὶ ἀρετῆς ὃ ἔστιν : cp. 71 Β 4. Note that we have
here ὃ ἔστιν (not ὅ τι ἔστιν as at 72 A 14). This therefore is an
instance of ő in the sense of olov. See on 92 C 19.
XIV 80 D NOTES 113

39. ὁμοῖος εἶ οὐκ εἰδότι, ‘ γου look very much like not
knowing.' This perhaps is Socrates' dvтeikaσía of Meno,
notwithstanding that he has just said he does not intend to
attempt one. For the expression cp. 97 Α 10 τοῦτο ὁμοῖοί ἐσμεν
ovк opeŵs wμoλoynкóσw . The dat. ptcp. is a common construc-
tion with čoika, especially in Plato and Xenophon . See Heind .
on Crat. 416 Α (καὶ ἔοικάς γε ὀρθῶς λέγοντι).

Chapters XIV, XV (80 D-82 B). MENO. But how can you
search for a thing of which you know nothing ? How will
you know you have the thing for which you are searching
even when you get it ? SoCR. This is a well-known catch
of the Eristics. I should explain the process of acquiring
Knowledge by supposing that the soul of each of us had
infinite experience before entering on its present life, and
that what we call the acquisition of Knowledge is really
merely the revival of it. I can perhaps show you this by
an experiment.
We here enter upon the second of the five divisions (or acts)
of which the Meno consists, extending to the end of chap. xxi
(86 C). In this, which deals with the genesis of Knowledge,
we have presented to us an account of the relation of Know-
ledge (érioτnun) to Opinion ( dóga). As the upshot of the whole
dialogue is that ' popular ' Virtue depends rather on Opinion
than on Knowledge, it is clear that this ' episode ' (as it at first
seems) is really most intimately connected with the main
discussion. ' Neque igitur casu quodam, ut Plato rem finxit,
aut solum ad refutandum eristicum argumentum forte in-
jectum, sed necessaria sua progressione quaestio devenit ad
examinandam scientiae naturam et condicionem ; qui locus
tantum abest ut forte tractetur, ut caput contra et janua
universae quaestionis putandus sit.'- Fr. Intr. p. 16. See
Excursus VII.

CHAPTER XIV

1. Kal Tívα Tрóжоν KтÉ. , ' why, Socrates, how will you
search for a thing when you are totally unable to say what
it is ? What kind of thing that you know not can you set
before yourself as the object of your search ? ' (kaí admirantis).
The first two puzzles brought forward in the Euthydemus are
closely connected with the present εριστικός λόγος, namely
(275D) πότεροί εἰσι τῶν ἀνθρώπων οἱ μανθάνοντες, οἱ σοφοὶ ἢ οἱ
ἀμαθεῖς ; and (276 D) πότερον οἱ μανθάνοντες μανθάνουσιν ἃ
I
114 MENO XIV 80 D

ÉπíσTavтαι à µǹ éπloтavтaι ; Socrates ( 277 E foll . ) explains

the puzzles as merely verbal : Prodicus, he says, would remind
us that the word μavoável is used in two senses, firstly in
the sense of acquiring knowledge, secondly as a synonym for
συνιέναι. ' All this, ' adds Socrates, ' is a mere game of words ' :
παιδιὰν δὲ λέγω διὰ ταῦτα, ὅτι, εἰ καὶ πολλά τις ἢ καὶ πάντα τὰ
τοιαῦτα μάθοι, τὰ μὲν πράγματα οὐδὲν ἂν μᾶλλον εἰδείη πῇ
ἔχει.
A similar treatment of the quibble is given by Aristot. Soph.
El. ch . iv. §§ 1 , 2 εἰσὶ δὲ παρὰ μὲν ὁμωνυμίαν οἱ τοιοίδε τῶν
λόγων, οἷον ὅτι μανθάνουσιν οἱ ἐπιστάμενοι . . τὸ γὰρ μανθάνειν
ὁμώνυμον, τό τε ξυνιέναι χρώμενον τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ καὶ τὸ λαμβάνειν
Eπιoтýμηv. Сp. Zeller pre - Socr. 11 465.
It is clear, however, that the explanation which dealt
with the problem as merely verbal is a partial one, and
that there underlay it a problem dealing with πрáyμатa.
ÉTIOTηun was regarded as something complete, final, and
not admitting of degrees. How then could it admit of
γένεσις ? There is thus a certain analogy between the
question of the origin of Knowledge, and that of the
possibility of Motion (Zeller Socr. p. 270). These problems
turn on the conception of the nature of Becoming. Difficulties
in the notion of partial Knowledge give rise to many of the
Megarian puzzles, especially those attributed to Eubulides :
ὁ διαλανθάνων, Ηλέκτρα, ἐγκεκαλυμμένος, which as R. & P. say
(226 c) are eadem argumenta diversis nominibus. Cp. Grote
III 482, Zeller Socr. p. 268.
In the spurious Platonic dialogue † Sisyphus 388 B-E, Socrates
asks ζητοῦσι δ' οἱ ἄνθρωποι πότερον ἃ ἂν ἐπιστῶνται τῶν πραγμάτων,
kai à åν µǹ Éπισтŵvтaι ; ' Both. ' ' You mean, for instance,
that one may know who Callistratus is, but not know where he
is, so that searching for him is searching for something partly
known, partly unknown ? ' ' Yes. ' ' But so far as search is con-
cerned it is only the unknown part that is the object of it.
If this argument appears to you to be eristic, and not brought
forward τοῦ πράγματος ἕνεκα, says Socrates, ‘ take another
instance. Geometers do not inquire what a diameter is ; they
know that well enough ; ἀλλ' ὁπόση τίς ἐστι μέτρῳ πρὸς τὰς
πλευρὰς τῶν χωρίων ὧν ἂν διατέμνῃ. ἆρ᾽ οὐ τοῦτό ἐστιν αὐτὸ τὸ
ζητούμενον περὶ αὐτῆς ; The reference to the problem of the
diagonal (see 82 B foll. ) makes it probable that the writer had
the Meno in his thought.
In the Theaetetus ( 165 в) Socrates asks what he calls
· δεινότατον ἐρώτημα. Αρα οἷόν τε τὸν αὐτὸν εἰδότα τι τοῦτο
oldev µǹ eidévai ; ' Impossible, ' Theaetetus answers. The answer
is used to show that Knowledge must be different from Per-
XIV 80 D NOTES 115

ception ; for partial Perception is possible ; we can see and

not see a thing at the same time, if one eye be closed ; but
partial Knowledge is impossible. Cp. ib. 188 A and see Grote
II 368.
Plato solves the problem of the origin of Knowledge by
calling in doğa as a mediate term between Ignorance and
Knowledge ; Aristotle, by denying the simplicity and finality
of Knowledge ; see Posterior Analytics (ad init.) : mâσa dida-
σκαλία καὶ πᾶσα μάθησις διανοητικὴ ἐκ προϋπαρχούσης γίνεται
yvúσews KTÉ.: Knowledge is not simple ; there are various modes
of it, and Knowledge in one mode may be increased and supple-
mented by Knowledge in another mode. Among the illustra-
tions given we have one that bears on the problem dealt with
by Mill (Logic bk. ii cc. 2 and 3) : whether a syllogistic
argument implies an addition to Knowledge. 'Some Know-
ledge, ' says Aristotle, ' is simply the recalling of previous
Knowledge ; sometimes Knowledge arises from an act of
Perception, as when you recognize that a certain particular
falls under a class you know : ὅτι μὲν γὰρ πᾶν τρίγωνον ἔχει
δυσὶν ὀρθαῖς ἴσας προῄδει · ὅτι δὲ τόδε [τὸ ἐν τῷ ἡμικυκλίῳ]
τρίγωνόν ἐστιν ἅμα ἐπαγόμενος ἐγνώρισεν . πρὶν δ᾽ ἐπαχθῆναι ἢ
λαβεῖν συλλογισμὸν τρόπον μέν τινα ἴσως φατέον ἐπίστασθαι, τρόπον
δ᾽ ἄλλον οὔ. He may know that the angles in ABC are equal to
two right angles, in so far as he knows the proposition generally
(kalóλov) ; but if he does not know that ABC is a triangle he
cannot be said to know it absolutely (ἁπλῶς) . εἰ δὲ μή, τὸ ἐν
τῷ Μένωνι ἀπόρημα συμβήσεται · ἢ γὰρ οὐδὲν μαθήσεται ἢ ἃ
oldev.' See Grote Aristotle pp. 211-214. Another passage
bearing on the same subject, where again there is a reference
to the Meno, is Anal. pr. II xxi 7 = 67 a 19, for which see
Grote Aristotle p. 183.
In his review of this passage in the Meno Grote says (Plato
etc. , vol. II p. 16 note) : If the Sophists were the first to raise
this question, I think that by doing so they rendered service to
the interests of philosophy. The question is among the first
which ought to be thoroughly debated and sifted if we are to
have a body of " reasoned truth " called philosophy. ' To
1 It is very difficult to see any point in the words τὸ ἐν τῷ ἡμικυκλίῳ.
What is important is simply the recognition that the figure before us is a
triangle. Either the words are an interpolation, or else there must be a
reference to the figure of some well-known proposition, e.g. to the proof
that the angle in a semicircle is a right angle. Thales, we are told, busied
himself with the problem of inscribing a right-angled triangle in a circle,
and thought the solution of such importance that he sacrificed an ox on
accomplishing it. It became a hackneyed problem, so that to put it
forward was to show one's self behind the times : Procl. II 23 WσTE EL
τις προβληματικῶς σχηματίσας εἴποι εἰς ἡμικύκλιον ὀρθὴν ἐντεῖναι γωνίαν,
ȧуewμетρýтоν dó§av ávaλáßoi (Schultz in Jahrb. für Philol. 1882 p. 27).
116 MENO XIV 80 D

estimate justly our debt to the persons, whoever they were,

who first raised the point, we should know to what extent they
apprehended the full bearings of their problem, and their
objects in raising it. It is clear that it was capable of being
treated on two different planes, as a verbal quibble tending to
stultify philosophy, or as an inquiry into the origin of Know-
ledge. In what spirit the ' sophists ' really approached it we
cannot be sure. Plato gives us to understand that the former
and lower, the ' eristic ' object, was theirs. In that case, though
our debt to them may be great, it will be similar to that we owe
to the poets and soothsayers, who prophesy they know not what.
3. ποῖον γὰρ ὧν οὐκ οἶσθα ; to what extent does the
interrogative Tolov here imply feeling ? The word belongs to
a class used (a) with weaker accent in indefinite sense, (8) with
stronger accent in exclamatory or interrogative sense. This
distinction, we are told, goes back to Indo- European times
(Brugmann in I. M.'s Handbuch vol. 11 §191 ). With regard
to (3) it seems probable that the interrogative sense developed
from the exclamatory. Exclamations may be used to provoke
an answer. Totos in Homer generally expresses surprise and
anger ( L. & S. s. v. ). The more the word is used bona fide expect-
ing information, the less will be the amount of feeling attaching
to it. In Attic writers the exclamatory force of woîos ; is
strongest where it is used in repartees, picking up a word or
phrase used by the previous speaker. This is common in
Aristophanes, and in Plato : Euthyd. 290 E Tоîos KτýσιππOS ;
304 E Tolov Xapíev ; Gorg. 490 D ; Theaet. 180 в ; Hipp. maj.
285 D ; Charm. 174 B ; Lach. 194 D E doкeî åvǹp σopíav tɩvà tǹv
ἀνδρείαν λέγειν. ΛΑ. Ποίαν, ὦ Σώκρατες, σοφίαν ; (ironical).
ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τόνδε τοῦτο ἐρωτᾷς ; ΛΑ. Εγωγε. ΣΩ. Ιθι δή, αὐτῷ
εἶπε, ὦ Νικία, ποία σοφία ἀνδρεία ἂν εἴη κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον (α
real question ). In Polit. 280 Β πολλῶν δὲ ἑτέρων ξυγγενῶν
ἀπεμερίσθη. ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Ποίων, εἰπέ, ξυγγενῶν ; the word εἰπέ
shows that we have here a genuine question, and there is little,
if any, feeling. In repartees of the kind just mentioned the
word repeated is generally a noun or adjective ; but in Rep.
330 Α πότερον ὢν κέκτησαι τὰ πλέω παρέλαβες ἢ ἐπεκτήσω ; ποῖ
ἐπεκτησάμην ; ἔφη, it is a verb. πόθεν and πῶς are similarly
capable of being used in repartees : Lysis 208 B Kav ei Boúλolo
λαβὼν τὴν μάστιγα τύπτειν, ἐῷεν ἄν. Πόθεν, ἢ δ᾽ ὅς, ἐῷεν ; ibid .
α ἢ οὐδὲ τοῦτο ἐπιτρέπουσί σοι ; πῶς γάρ, ἔφη, ἐπιτρέπουσιν ;
Crat. 398 E ἢ σὺ ἔχεις εἰπεῖν ; ΕΡΜ . Πόθεν , ἀγαθέ, ἔχω ; Πόθεν ;
is also used by itself as a scornful denial.
The prefixing of the article to Toîos does not necessarily
reduce it to a colourless interrogative. The article occurs with
Totos in repartee in Theocr. 5. 5 тàν πоíαν σúрiyya ; See Soph.
XIV 80 E NOTES 117

O.C. 1415 and Jebb's note ; also Heind. on Soph. 240 a. When
on is added to πoîos ; it implies not so much surprise as interest
in the question : Lach. 194 c Toiw on, & Nikia ; Rep. 377 C D
Tolovs dý (µúlovs) ; and pray what stories ? ' ; Hipp. maj. 285 B
ἐπαινοῦσι δὲ δή σε πρὸς θεῶν ἀκούοντες ποῖα ; Theaet. 147 D, etc.
The addition of the enclitic Tes to Toîos generally shows that no
feeling is implied ; Cobet Nov. Lect. 276 says always ; but see
Phaedr. 260 ε ποιόν τινα οἴει μετὰ ταῦτα τὴν ῥητορικὴν καρπὸν
ὧν ἔσπειρε θερίζειν ;
The question whether Totos is a pure interrogative, or
whether some exclamatory force still attaches to it, can often
only be determined by the context. Thus in Gorg. 483 D éπel
ποίῳ χρώμενος δικαίῳ Ξέρξης ἐπὶ τὴν Ελλαδα ἐστράτευσεν ; it is
clear that the question is merely rhetorical. Alc. i 110c év
ποίῳ χρόνῳ ἐξευρών ; is a somewhat doubtful case. In Aesch. Ag.
278 ποίου χρόνου δὲ καὶ πεπόρθηται πόλις ; I think that Verrall
is right in thinking that Tolov ; ' gives the question the air of
incredulous wonder,' though Shilleto in his note on Dem. F.L.
§ 257 quotes this as a colourless question on the ground that
the kai is suffixed, not prefixed. In the present place Meno's
whole speech is scornful and sceptical. Replies are hardly
expected. Cp. 95 D 37 ἐν ποίοις ἔπεσιν ;
προθέμενος ζητήσεις : see on 94 D 2.
C The phrase also
4. εἰ ὅ τι μάλιστα, however much.
occurs Rep. 450c ; Euthyphr. 4D , 9c ; Parm. 135 A ; Crat.
435 B, and no less than eight times in the Charmides. Madvig
(who only counts seven of these, omitting 167 B), thinks this
frequency a ground for suspecting the genuineness of the
Charmides (adv. Crit. vol. 1 p. 402 note 2). The expression ,
however, springs naturally from the a fortiori line of argument
that plays a great part in that dialogue.
7. ἐριστικόν : see Excursus V. E
KaтáуELS : see App. on the text.
ὡς οὐκ ἄρα ἔστιν : the ordinary use of ἄρα is simply to
mark an inference. But if the inference be one from a state-
ment we have not fully examined, it may cause surprise ; or if
it be from a statement for which we do not vouch, it may be
expressed with doubt or irony. ( In the strongest case, where a
false position is exposed by a reductio ad absurdum, ' äpa is
generally preceded by dé (see on 91 E 17). So Dr. Thompson
on Gorg. 493 A kal тоûто äра тis μveoλoyŵv says : " The particle
apa frequently denotes an inference false but specious.' Often,
as here, some particle like us shows that it is a case ' ubi aliquis
non suis verbis utitur ' Fr. See Kühner § 509. 3, Jelf § 788.
 118 MENO XIV 81 A

4, 5. Cp. 91 C 2 oûтoi äpа µóvo , 81 D 12 , 97 C 33 ; Apol. 26 c

ὦ θαυμάσιε Μέλητε, οὐδὲ ἥλιον οὐδὲ σελήνην ἄρα νομίζω θεοὺς
εἶναι ; Theaet. 171 εἰκός γε ἄρα ἐκεῖνον πρεσβύτερον ὄντα
σоpúтeρov nμŵv elvai ; Rep. 358 c, 375 D , 595 c ; Clit. 408 A
δούλῳ ἄμεινον ἢ ἐλευθέρῳ διάγειν τῷ τοιούτῳ τὸν βίον ἐστὶν ἄρα ;
Gorg. 508 B C (thrice) ; Prot. 331 A B. With us, Apol. 40 E,
Euthyphr. 11 c lows av µe étéoкWπTTES ÉS Äρа кTÈ., Phaedr. 245 A
πεισθεὶς ὡς ἄρα ἐκ τέχνης ἱκανὸς ποιητὴς ἐσόμενος, 249 Ε, Ηίρρ.
maj. 289 A, Rep. 468 E, Parm. 127 E, Laws 822 A, etc.
81 A 17. περὶ τὰ θεῖα πράγματα : Socrates is speaking slowly
and impressively, and here pauses to excite attention. The
device is fairly common in Plato. Cp. Phaedr. 273 c ảτáp, ŵ
ἑταῖρε, τούτῳ ἡμεῖς πότερον λέγωμεν ἢ μή— ΦΑΙ . τὸ ποῖον ;
277 D, Rep. 609 D, Soph. 265 c, Polit. 277 E, Phil. 57 D, 59 E,
Laws 861 A, etc. Instances seem to be rare in the earliest
dialogues.
Dr. Abbott (How to write clearly p. 30) quotes from Hamlet
in illustration of a similar point :
Ghost. If thou didst ever thy dear father love—
Hamlet. O God !
Ghost. Revenge his foul and most unnatural murder.
It has also its use in comedy : Ar. Eccl. 865-
Α . ἐπὶ ταῖς θύραις ἑστώς Β. τί δράσεις ; εἰπέ μοι . Cp. Wasps
1443.
21. τῶν ἱερέων τε καὶ τῶν ἱερειῶν : there was in Greece
no priestly caste - a point in which Greece is broadly and
strongly distinguished from Egypt and other Eastern nations.
The fact is used by Zeller (pre - Socratics I p. 56 note) to
show the improbability of any considerable Oriental influence
on Greek religious thought. Certain families in Greece were
no doubt associated with certain religious cults. It is to be
noted, however, that Plato does not refer to priests and
priestesses as a class, but to those of them who have been
led by the accident of their position to speculate on the
meaning of the rites they performed, and give an account
(Móyov didóval) of their practice.
It is now established that the ritual with which these
speculations were associated was, chiefly if not entirely, the
Orphic. The Orphic cult in Greece is at least as old as the
sixth century B.C. (Zeller pre- Socratics 1 62). It was closely
connected with the worship of Bacchus. Herodotus II 81 uses
the names ' Bacchic ' and ' Orphic ' as interchangeable. This
worship was imported into Greece from Thrace, a country
whose people were specially susceptible to the quasi-mesmeric
influences of worship of the kind to which the name ' orgiastic '
XIV 81 B NOTES 119

has been given. This stands quite aloof from the national
Greek religions , of which the chief characteristic , as with their
Art and Literature, was balance, dignity, and self-restraint.
The importance of the ecstatic Bacchus-worship imported into
Greece in promoting the idea of immortality has been elaborated
by Rohde in his work Psyche. (See a notice of this by Miss
Jane Harrison in the Classical Review, vol. vIII p. 165. )
It was by a kind of inspired assault that the Greeks first
attempted, so to speak, to carry the heights of heaven. Το
this Plato superadded a more scientific investment by process
of Reason ; but even with him the mystic element is by no
means superseded , and some appeal, though with varying
prominence , is still made to the forces of divine intoxication
or 6 divine madness.' See Excursus VI.
23. λέγει δὲ καὶ Πίνδαρος : ‘ there is no evidence in any B
Greek poet before Pindar of the hope of a future life ' (Zeller
pre-Socratics vol. 1 p. 127). It seems probable that Pindar
derived these doctrines, not from the Pythagoreans, but directly
from the Bacchic and Orphic cult, of which Thebes was a seat
( Zeller 1.c. p. 71 ). The passages in Pindar referring to a future
life are chiefly to be found in the fragments of the Opvoɩ
or Dirges.
24. ἄλλοι πολλοὶ τῶν ποιητῶν : Empedocles is chiefly
meant. See on 76 C 22. The dates of his life are uncertain ,
but he was somewhat junior to Pindar. He was a member of
the Pythagorean brotherhood as was also Aeschylus (Cic. Tusc.
D. II § 23). After them many others took up the tale.
ὅσοι θεῖοί εἰσιν : see on 99 C 22. Socrates intends the
word to be taken in its colloquial sense, ' gifted , ' ' distinguished ,'
though for him it has a deeper meaning.
28. τοτὲ μὲν τελευτᾶν : the best commentary on this is the
Phaedo 70 c foll. The moment of death is not identical with
the moment of re-birth. Between the two intervenes a period
in which the soul is ékeî, ' yonder, ' in Hades. During this it
is in a state of ' death,' which is the correlative and antithesis
to the state of ' life. ' Cp. also Pindar Ol. 2. 69 where èкaтéрWOL
means ' in our world and in the Other World. ' On this view
life and death are alternative modes of the soul's existence, so
that we may say with Euripides :
τίς δ᾽ οἶδεν εἰ τὸ ζῆν μέν ἐστι κατθανεῖν,
τὸ κατθανεῖν δὲ ζῆν ; ( Gorg. 492 Ε).
Cp. Soph. Ant. 560—
ἡ δ᾽ ἐμὴ ψυχὴ πάλαι
τέθνηκεν ὥστε τοῖς θανοῦσιν ὠφελεῖν.
120 MENO XIV 81 B

Symp. 192 E KOLV TEOVEŵTE of lovers united in Death ; Ar.

Frogs 868-
ὅτι ἡ ποίησις οὐχὶ συντέθνηκέ μοι,
τούτῳ δὲ συντέθνηκεν ὥσθ᾽ ἕξει λέγειν.
The doctrine comes from Heraclitus, in whose philosophy the
resolution of Existence into a contrast of Opposites plays a
great part. See Dr. Thompson's note on the passage in the
Gorgias ; R. & P. §§ 38, 39 ; Zeller pre- Socratics II p. 84
and notes.
29. máλiv уlyveola : ' Servius ad Virg. Aen. III 68 : Pytha-
goras non μετεμψύχωσιν, sed παλιγγενεσίαν esse dicit Fr.
30. Sev Sn from these words to the end of the quotation
must be regarded as a parenthesis. It has nothing to do
immediately with the point under discussion : How is learning
possible ? ' But it has a very important bearing on the final
result of the dialogue. The hint is expressed so briefly that it
may easily elude notice. Virtue comes to a man θείᾳ μοίρα
(99 E) ; but the divine apportionment ' is determined by the
soul's previous history. We have then here at least the germs
of the theory elaborated in the Republic and Phaedo. dý here
is equivalent to nota bene, by the way ' ; not a common use.
Cp. use with relatives, line 28 above : Clitophon 408 в Tηv Tŵv
ἀνθρώπων κυβερνητικήν , ἣν δὴ σὺ πολιτικήν , ὦ Σώκρατες, πολλάκις
ἐπονομάζεις : Prot. 328 Β ὧν δὴ ἐγὼ οἶμαι εἷς εἶναι : also the
constant use of διὸ δή : Gorg. 518 Α διὸ δὴ καὶ ταύτας (τὰς
τέχνας) δουλοπρεπεῖς εἶναι : Symp. 203 c διὸ δὴ καὶ τῆς ᾿Αφροδίτης
ἀκόλουθος γέγονεν ὁ Ερως : Phaedr. 249 c διὸ δὴ μόνη πτεροῦται ἡ
τοῦ φιλοσόφου διάνοια.
32. οἷσι γὰρ ἄν κτέ , ‘ for from whomsoever Persephone
hath accepted the atonement for the ancient evil , of all these
in the ninth year she sends back the souls to the upper Sun
again. From these grow up glorious kings, and men of mighty
strength, and men surpassing in wisdom ; and for all future
time they are called holy heroes among men.'
This fragment is referred to one of Pindar's Opôvoɩ (Bergk 4
fr. 133). The rhythm appears to be this :-

PEEPITEER PIPERPIPERI
οἷσι γὰρ ἂν Φερσεφόνα ποινὰν παλαιοῦ Tév0eos (4 bars)

PEEP E DIPER´CIPPT CEPEPI

δέξεται, εἰς τὸν ὕπερθεν ἅλιον κείνων ἐνάτῳ ἔτει ( 4 bars)
XIV 81 B NOTES 121

PEPPIPERI
ἀνδιδοῖ ψυχὰς πάλιν, ( 2 bars)

PIP CEPEEPPT BIPP PCCIPCEPTI

ἐκ τῶν βασιλῆες ἀγαυοὶ καὶ σθένει κραιπνοὶ σο- φί- ᾳ τε μέγιστοι
(4 bars)

IPCC PIPEFI
ἄνδρες αὔξοντ᾽ · ἐς δὲ τὸν λοιπὸν χρόνον ἥρωες ἁγ- (4 bars)

νοὶ πρὸς ἀνθρώπων καλεῦνται (2 bars).

οἷσι : this construction with δέχομαι occurs in Homer Il. I

186 δέξατό οἱ ( from him ) σκῆπτρον, xv 87 Θεμίστι δὲ καλλι-
παρήῳ δέκτο δέπας. See Kühner § 423, 24, Leaf on Il. 1 596, and
elsewhere in Pindar, Ol. 13. 29, Pyth. 4. 23, ibid . 8. 5, Isth.
5. 4. Porson on Eur. Hec. 533 déçai xoás μoi collects a
number of instances. It is not clear whether it arises from the
locative dative (cp. the Scottish ' to ask at him ' ) or from
the true dative of the indirect object, of which the dativus
commodi is a development. The present instance rather
favours the latter view.
Tаλαιοû Tévbeos, ' the ancient trouble, ' 6 original sin.'
πένθος is in origin a by-form of πάθος, just as βένθος of βάθος.
Thus Tévoos is an affliction . ' From this meaning it passed, by
an euphemism characteristic of the Greeks, to the meaning ' sin. '
Cp. the history of the word συμφορά. Stallbaum is wrong
6
in saying that Tévoos here means culpa in mortali corpore
contracta.' It means rather the sin, or fall, ' by which the
soul, originally free, was doomed to be enchained in a mortal
body. This notion of an ' ante-natal lapse ' arose naturally out
of the pessimistic view, to be found in Greek literature from
Homer downward, that life is an evil. See Clem. Alex. Strom.
III ch. 3. It was easy to infer from this that life is a punish-
ment (see Exc. VI. ) . Perhaps we may compare William
Blake ::-
Didst close my tongue in senseless clay,
And me to mortal life betray.
See Rep. 612 Ε τῷ δὲ θεοφιλεῖ οὐχ ὁμολογήσομεν, ὅσα γε ἀπὸ θεῶν
122 ΜΕΝΟ XIV 81 B

γίγνεται, πάντα γίγνεσθαι ὡς οἷόν τε ἄριστα, εἰ μή τι ἀναγκαῖον

αὐτῷ κακὸν ἐκ προτέρας ἁμαρτίας ὑπῆρχεν ;
33. Segeraι is aor. subjunctive.
The exact meaning of these words by no means lies on the
surface. We must remember that no interpretation of the
passage is satisfactory that does not find in it an argument
grounding the position δεῖν δὴ ὡς ὁσιώτατα διαβιῶναι τὸν βίον.
We must further remember that if we had the context of the
quotation its applicability might be much more obvious than it is
at present. Lastly, that we may indeed expect from Pindar a
hint or illuminating vision, but hardly a complete or consistent
scheme. ' Pindar's eschatology follows no fixed type ' (Zeller
pre-Socratics 1 70 note).
In considering ancient views as to man's spiritual history,
we have to take into account two causes. First, there is the
ante-natal lapse-a matter standing so remote from positive
experience that it has almost the character of an external or
fatal force, a character which is definitely given to it in the
Timaeus (41 E ; see Zeller Plato p. 391 ). Besides this we have
to recognise as a second cause acts due to the soul's own
initiative or ' free-will. ' These are the sins, and virtuous deeds,
' done in the body.' The notion that for these there is a
retribution after death is one that appeared very early in
Greece. The soul's history is thus doubly conditioned . First,
there is the struggle of Soul with Matter due to the ante-natal
lapse : this must end logically in the eventual re - emergence
of the Soul in purity. Besides this there is the moral effect of
each particular life. ( See Exc. VI for further treatment. ) One
hypothesis favoured by Plato is that the time for the restitution
of the Soul to its primeval state is fixed . There is a cycle of
years-9000 in the Phaedrus-and the restitution of the Soul
after this time is as much a matter of fate as the original lapse.
This cycle includes a certain number of lives, and the same
number of intervals, or ' deaths, ' that follow between each life
and the next. The ' death ' following each life furnishes the
retribution for the deeds done in that life. Strictly speaking,
according to this view the effects of each life will not extend
beyond the subsequent death, ' and will not have any bearing
on any further life. It seems clear that this is not the view
that Plato takes here. For we have here no hint of punishment
as a ground for living a holy life. We have instead a clear
suggestion that the most desirable lives on earth are those that
have been earned by good conduct in previous lives, that the
élite of earth are those who, having practically squared their
account, are passing through a last earthly life before the final
release of their souls. Cp. the Buddhist doctrine of Karma
XIV 81 c NOTES 123

'We are born as we deserve to be born ' (Kidd Social Evolution

p. 111). According to this view, conduct in any life will have
its chief effect by influencing further lives, and perhaps also by
hastening or retarding the time of the soul's final restitution.
On this view the idea of a period of retribution following each
life becomes possibly superfluous. But it is not necessarily ex-
cluded. See Laws 870 DE, where we have the view, drawn
from the Mysteries, that murderers are not only punished in
Hades, but are doomed in their next life to suffer the fate they
have inflicted. The mention of the alternative states of death
and life in the context, and the words éváry ëтei (see subsequent
note), make it probable that such periods of retribution are
contemplated here.
εἰς τὸν ὕπερθεν ἅλιον : this implies another sun in the
nether world. Plutarch cons. ad Apoll. c. 35 120 c quotes
4
Pindar (Bergk fr. 129) as saying of the righteous in Hades-
τοῖσι λάμπει μὲν μένος ἀελίου τὰν ἐνθάδε νύκτα κάτω κτέ.
So the chorus of the Initiated in Aristoph. Frogs 454 sing-
μόνοις γὰρ ἡμῖν ἥλιος καὶ φέγγος ἱλαρόν ἐστιν.
Cp. Verg. Aen. VI 641 solemque suum, sua sidera norunt.
ẻvárų ěra : the words raise two questions : ' What is the
meaning of the number ? ' and ' From what point is the time
counted ? ' The number nine has a sacred character : it was
di évátov ëTous that Minos sought the instruction of Zeus ( Laws
624 B). But there may possibly be here a more definite
reference. According to the view in the Phaedrus (249 A B)
the period from birth to re-birth is 1000 years. This includes
the period of life and that of purgation. The time of purgation
is thus something over 900 years. (On the other hand , in Rep.
615 A B the 1000 years, the period of ' wandering ' for the soul,
is exclusive of the period of life, and this Vergil follows, Aen.
VI 748 :-
has omnis, ubi mille rotam volvere per annos,
Lethaeum ad fluvium deus evocat ordine magno.)
If, then, the normal period of purgation was 900 years, it seems
possible the notion was that in the case of spirits on the eve of
their last incarnation the 900 years was reduced to nine. But
perhaps this is refining over-much.
35. βασιλῆες ἀγαυοί κτέ. : there are three classes of heroes C
here recognised : ( 1 ) Kings, (2) Warriors or Athletes, (3)
Philosophers and Poets. With the passage should be compared
Empedocles, quoted by Clem. Alex. Strom. IV ch. xxiii pñoì dǹ
124 ΜΕΝΟ XIV 81 c

καὶ Εμπεδοκλῆς τῶν σοφῶν τὰς ψυχὰς θεοὺς γινέσθαι, ὧδέ πως
γράφων,
εἰς δὲ τέλος μάντεις τε καὶ ὑμνόπολοι καὶ ἰητροὶ
καὶ πρόμοι ἀνθρώποισιν ἐπιχθονίοισι πέλονται,
ἔνθεν ἀναβλαστοῦσι θεοὶ τιμῇσι φέριστοι.
Here Empedocles is speaking of souls who have reached their
last stage before final restitution to the circle of the gods.
36. ἐς δὲ τὸν λοιπὸν χρόνον : ‘ tempore post mortem
futuro Fr. , referring to Rep. 469 Α καὶ τὸν λοιπὸν δὴ χρόνον
ὡς δαιμόνων θεραπεύσομεν αὐτῶν τὰς θηκάς, and Phaedo 81 A
ὥσπερ δὲ λέγεται κατὰ τῶν μεμνημένων ὡς ἀληθῶς τὸν λοιπὸν
χρόνον μετὰ τῶν θεῶν διαγούσῃ. The words ὡς ἀληθῶς look as if
the phrase that follows had associations with mystic ritual.
(Cp. on 76 E 50. )
ἥρωες ἁγνοί : the term ἥρωες is used here practically as
a synonym for δαίμονες. The ἥρως and the δαίμων are both on
the same plane, intermediate between man and God. They
are bracketed Rep. 392 Α περὶ γὰρ θεῶν ὡς δεῖ λέγεσθαι εἴρηται,
καὶ περὶ δαιμόνων τε καὶ ἡρώων καὶ τῶν ἐν Αΐδου. Cp. Crat.
397 D. But in Laws 717 в we have a distinction : after
sacrificing to the gods ỏ čµopwv will sacrifice to the daemons,
next to the heroes. Cp. 738 D. But the term ἥρως necessarily
refers to an incarnation on earth ; the recognition of a deceased
mortal as a daiμwv amounts to a sort of canonization. Thus
the chorus speak of Alcestis ( 995 foll. ) :
μηδὲ νεκρῶν ὡς φθιμένων χῶμα νομιζέσθω
τύμβος σᾶς ἀλόχου, θεοῖσι δ᾽ ὁμοίως
τιμάσθω, σέβας ἐμπόρων.
καί τις δοχμίαν κέλευθον
ἐμβαίνων τόδ᾽ ἐρεῖ·
αΰτα ποτὲ προὔθαν᾽ ἀνδρός,
νῦν δ᾽ ἐστὶ μάκαιρα δαίμων ·
χαῖρ᾽ ὦ πότνι' εὖ δὲ δοίης.
Cp. with this Rep. 540 B c ; we are to assign sacrifices to men
who have served their city well, ἐὰν καὶ ἡ Πυθίη ξυναναιρῇ, ὡς
δαίμοσιν, εἰ δὲ μὴ ὡς εὐδαίμοσί τε καὶ θείοις. The word ἁγνοί
recalls Hesiod O. et D. 121 foll . about the Golden Age :-
:-
αὐτὰρ ἐπειδὴ τοῦτο γένος κατὰ μοῖρ᾽ ἐκάλυψεν,
οἱ μὲν δαίμονες ἁγνοὶ ἐπιχθόνιοι καλέονται
ἐσθλοί, ἀλεξίκακοι, φύλακες μερόπων ἀνθρώπων.
The upshot of the teaching which Plato here derives from
Pindar is this : the θεῖος ἀνήρ is the Soul in its last incarnation,
XV 81 D NOTES 125

before it rejoins the gods. After death he is regarded as a pws

οι δαίμων.

CHAPTER XV
6. & ye, ' quippe quae. ' ' ye indicat rei rationem afferri ' Fr.
Stallbaum on Euthyphr. 4A quotes many instances, including
Gorg. 471 Α πῶς οὐκ ἄδικος, ῳ γε προσῆκε μὲν τῆς ἀρχῆς οὐδέν,
KTE.; ibid. B, Phaedo 96 E, Crat. 403 E.
7. ἅτε γὰρ τῆς φύσεως ἁπάσης συγγενούς οὔσης, ‘ as the D
whole of nature is bound by a tie of kinship.' It seems clear
that this doctrine is stated by Plato not as something original,
but as one already current. It in fact stands in much the same
position as the utterances of the ' priests and priestesses ' above,
from which it is separated by the parenthesis deîv dý ktẻ. That
the doctrine was Pythagorean we may be pretty sure. It is
really implied in the doctrine of Transmigration. A fragment
attributed to Philolaus (Stob. Ecl. 1 420 R. & P. § 57) speaks of
the universe as εἷς ἐὼν καὶ συνεχὴς καὶ φύσι διαπνεύμενος καὶ
περιαγόμενος ἐξ ἀρχᾶς ἀιδίου. This fragment shares the suspicion
that attaches to all the remains attributed to Philolaus, and
even in a greater degree than some. But the view stated
follows directly from the doctrine ev râv held by Xenophanes
(Plato Soph. 242 D) and after him by Parmenides (line 81 Tậ
ξυνεχὲς πᾶν ἐστιν , ἐὰν γὰρ ἐόντι πελάζει R. & P. 96 ). There
is evidence of connexion between Parmenides and the Pytha-
goreans, R. & P. 91.
The present passage represents no further stage than had
already been reached by Plato's predecessors. But the doctrine
is one that was subsequently developed into something that
formed the very centre of Plato's system. His doctrine of the
World- Soul is elaborated in the Timaeus. 'The Timaeus sums
up the result of its whole cosmogony in the concept of the
world as the perfect (@ov ' (Zeller p. 386 ). Note the emphatic
concluding words : θνητὰ γὰρ καὶ ἀθάνατα ζῷα λαβὼν καὶ
ξυμπληρωθεὶς ὅδε ὁ κόσμος οὕτω , ζῷον ὁρατὸν τὰ ὁρατὰ περιέχον,
εἰκὼν τοῦ ποιητοῦ, θεὸς αἰσθητός, μέγιστος καὶ ἄριστος κάλλιστός τε
καὶ τελεώτατος γέγονεν, εἷς οὐρανὸς ὅδε μονογενὴς ὤν. Having
received all mortal and immortal creatures, and being there-
withal replenished, this universe hath thus come into being,
living andvisible; containing all things that are visible, the image
of its maker, a god perceptible, most mighty and good, most
fair and perfect, even this one and only-begotten world that
is ' (Archer-Hind's translation) . Cp. ibid. 36 E.
Important also is Phil. 30 A EN. Τὸ παρ' ἡμῖν σῶμα ἆρ᾽ οὐ
126 ΜΕΝΟ XV 81 D

ψυχὴν φήσομεν ἔχειν ; ΠΡΩ. Δῆλον ὅτι φήσομεν. ΣΩ. Πόθεν

ὦ φίλε Πρώταρχε, λαβόν, εἴπερ μὴ τό γε τοῦ παντὸς σῶμα ἔμψυχον
ὃν ἐτύγχανε, ταὐτά γε ἔχον τούτῳ καὶ ἔτι πάντῃ καλλίονα . See
Zeller p. 345.
Later the doctrine passed into the common heritage of the
Academic and Stoic schools ; see Cic. Div. II 33, 34, Acad. I 28 ;
also Vergil Georg. Iv 220 foll . :-
:-
deum namque ire per omnes
terrasque tractusque maris caelumque profundum, etc.
and Aen. VI 724 foll. :-
principio caelum ac terras camposque liquentes
lucentemque globum Lunae, Titaniaque astra
spiritus intus alit, etc.
See Grote II 17 note, and II 202 note.
11. τὸ γὰρ ζητεῖν ἄρα : see on 80 E 8. The combination
γὰρ ἄρα occurs in Plato, either in juxtaposition (Prot. 315 D,
Gorg. 469 D, Rep. 438 A, Laws 698 D) or separated, as here,
Rep. 358 c. [At Symp. 199 A and 205 B Herm. and Sch.
follow B in omitting apa . ] In some cases the reference is to
a particular statement, as Prot. 315 D ἐπεδήμει γὰρ ἄρα Πρόδικος
ὁ Κεῖος ‘ for P. was in town, as I had expected ' : cp. 314 c.
In Gorg. 469 D ἐὰν γὰρ ἄρα ἐμοὶ δόξῃ, the ἄρα marks a parody of
Polus' boasts, such as at 466 c. Here apa marks a fresh link
in a chain of argument that all hangs from borrowed
premises.
12. ἀνάμνησις : for references to the principal places in Plato
bearing on this doctrine see R. & P. 266 c. The first to be
noticed is Phaedr. 249 Β : οὐ γὰρ ἤ γε μή ποτε ἰδοῦσα τὴν
ἀλήθειαν εἰς τόδε ( ἀνθρωπεῖον) ἥξει τὸ σχῆμα. δεῖ γὰρ ἄνθρωπον
ξυνιέναι τὸ κατ᾽ εἶδος λεγόμενον ἐκ πολλῶν ἰόντ᾽ αἰσθήσεων εἰς ἓν
λογισμῷ ξυναιρούμενον · τοῦτο δ᾽ ἐστιν ἀνάμνησις ἐκείνων, ἅ ποτ᾽
εἶδεν ἡμῶν ἡ ψυχὴ συμπορευθεῖσα θεῷ καὶ ὑπεριδοῦσα νῦν εἶναί
φαμεν καὶ ἀνακύψασα εἰς τὸ ὂν ὄντως. See on this Grote II 218.
In Phaedo 72 Ε foll. we have an elaborate account of ἀνάμνησις,
which opens with a direct reference back to the Meno : Καὶ
μήν, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης ὑπολαβών, καὶ κατ' ἐκεῖνόν γε τὸν λόγον, ὦ
Σώκρατες, εἰ ἀληθής ἐστιν, ὃν σὺ εἴωθας θαμὰ λέγειν, ὅτι ἡμῖν ἡ
μάθησις οὐκ ἄλλο τι ἢ ἀνάμνησις τυγχάνει οὖσα , καὶ κατὰ τοῦτον
ἀνάγκη που ἡμᾶς ἐν προτέρῳ τινὶ χρόνῳ μεμαθηκέναι ἃ νῦν ἀναμιμνη-
σκόμεθα· τοῦτο δὲ ἀδύνατον, εἰ μὴ ἦν που ἡμῖν ἡ ψυχὴ πρὶν ἐν
τῷδε τῷ ἀνθρωπίνῳ εἴδει γενέσθαι · ὥστε καὶ ταύτῃ ἀθάνατον ἡ
ψυχή τι ἔοικεν εἶναι. ᾿Αλλά, ὦ Κέβης, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας ὑπολαβών,
ποῖαι τούτων αἱ ἀποδείξεις ; ὑπόμνησόν με · οὐ γὰρ σφόδρα ἐν τῷ
παρόντι μέμνημαι. Ενὶ μὲν λόγῳ, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης, καλλίστῳ, ὅτι
XV 81 D NOTES 127

ἐρωτώμενοι οἱ ἄνθρωποι ἐάν τις καλῶς ἐρωτᾷ, αὐτοὶ λέγουσιν

πάντα ᾗ ἔχει · καίτοι εἰ μὴ ἐτύγχανεν αὐτοῖς ἐπιστήμη ἐνοῦσα καὶ
ὀρθὸς λόγος, οὐκ ἂν οἷοί τ᾽ ἦσαν τοῦτο ποιῆσαι. ἔπειτα ἐάν τις ἐπὶ
τὰ διαγράμματα ἄγῃ ἢ ἄλλο τι τῶν τοιούτων, ἐνταῦθα σαφέστατα
κατηγορεῖ ὅτι τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχει. Socrates carries on the further
exposition from 73 в (Zeller p. 83 note), and in the sequel we
have an important supplement to the argument in the Meno.
Plato defines ἀνάμνησις below 85 D 24 : τὸ ἀναλαμβάνειν αὐτὸν
ἐν αὑτῷ ἐπιστήμην. It is distinguished from μvýun, Phil. 34 B C.
μνήμη is σωτηρία αἰσθήσεως : when the soul without the body
recovers some previous impression this is ȧváμvnois. Cp. Laws
732 Β ἀνάμνησις δ᾽ ἐστὶν ἐπιρροὴ φρονήσεως ἀπολειπούσης.
Does the doctrine of áváμvnois, as propounded in the Meno,
necessarily involve the Ideal theory ? Grote II 17 remarks that
in the Phaedo pre-natal experience is restricted to commerce
with the substantial, intelligible Ideas, which are not men-
tioned in the Menon. ' J. S. Mill, however, makes it clear that the
doctrine of Recollection does imply the knowledge of separate
Universals in a previous state (Dissertations III 351 ) . Cp. Zeller's
valuable note 82 on p. 126 : It seems equally clear to me that
the doctrine of Reminiscence really supposes that of the Ideas.
The objects of reminiscence can only be the universal concepts
-the sensuous forms of which meet us in individual things-
not individual presentations which we have experienced in our
former lives.' See too p. 395 : ' How could sensible things
remind us of universal concepts if the latter were not known to
us independently ofthe former ? ' and p. 406 foll.: ' Reminiscence
is in Plato's opinion the only explanation of the possibility of
thought transcending sensuous perception. ' If all our previous
lives were on a level with the present, the problem of the origin
of Knowledge would not be solved, but only thrown back.
Cp. J. B. Bury in JP. xv 81 note : The argument of the
Phaidon shows (cp. Mr. Archer- Hind's preface) that ȧváμvnois
was to Plato merely the defective way in which the imagination
represents the kinship of the soul to the ideas. ' See on 86B 15.
Whether the Ideal theory had actually found expression at
the time when the Meno was written is another question. See
Intr. § 17.
14. οὗτος μὲν γὰρ ἂν ἡμᾶς ἀργοὺς ποιήσειεν (cp. 86 Β 24 ) :
in these words we see indicated the radical vice of Eristic.
It is a cheap substitute for Philosophy. Its votaries are like
Formalist and Hypocrisy in the Pilgrim's Progress, who come
' tumbling over the wall, ' and so, by a short cut, put them-
selves on a level with those who have borne the burden and
heat of the day. For he who can show the futility of Reason
may appear as good a man as he who has attained it.
 128 ΜΕΝΟ XV 81 D

The spirit of the philosopher in regard to the duty of inquiry

has never found more perfect expression than in the words of
Simmias (Phaedo 85 c D) : ἐμοὶ γὰρ δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες, περὶ τῶν
τοιούτων ἴσως ὥσπερ καὶ σοὶ τὸ μὲν σαφὲς εἰδέναι ἐν τῷ νῦν βίῳ
ἢ ἀδύνατον εἶναι ἢ παγχάλεπόν τι, τὸ μέντοι αὖ τὰ λεγόμενα περὶ
αὐτῶν μὴ οὐχὶ παντὶ τρόπῳ ἐλέγχειν καὶ μὴ προαφίστασθαι, πρὶν
ἂν πανταχῇ σκοπῶν ἀπείπῃ τις, πάνυ μαλθακοῦ εἶναι ἀνδρός ·
δεῖν γὰρ περὶ αὐτὰ ἕν γέ τι τούτων διαπράξασθαι, ἢ μαθεῖν ὅπῃ
ἔχει ἢ εὑρεῖν ἤ, εἰ ταῦτα ἀδύνατον, τὸν γοῦν βέλτιστον τῶν ἀνθρω-
πίνων λόγων λαβόντα καὶ δυσεξελεγκτότατον, ἐπὶ τούτου ὀχούμενον
ὥσπερ ἐπὶ σχεδίας κινδυνεύοντα διαπλεῦσαι τὸν βίον, εἰ μή τις
δύναιτο ἀσφαλέστερον καὶ ἀκινδυνότερον ἐπὶ βεβαιοτέρου ὀχήματος,
λόγου θείου τινός, διαπορευθῆναι. As a strong contrast to
this may be quoted the cynical epigram (Anth. Pal. x 118) :-
πῶς γενόμην ; πόθεν εἰμί ; τίνος χάριν ἦλθον ; ἀπελθεῖν.
πῶς δύναμαί τι μαθεῖν μηδὲν ἐπιστάμενος ;
οὐδὲν ἐὼν γενόμην · πάλιν ἔσσομαι ὡς πάρος θα ·
οὐδὲν καὶ μηδὲν τῶν μερόπων τὸ γένος.
ἀλλ᾽ ἄγε μοι Βάκχοιο φιλήδονον ἔντυε νᾶμα ·
τοῦτο γάρ ἐστι κακῶν φάρμακον ἀντίδοτον.
The analogous fatalistic argument, that would stultify all
action, was definitely labelled ἀργὸς λόγος ( ‘ ignava ratio Cic.
defato § 28).
E 17. ᾧ ἐγὼ πιστεύων ἀληθεῖ εἶναι : ‘ Notanda constructio
composita e duabus aliis πιστεύω τούτῳ et πιστεύω τοῦτον εἶναι
ἀληθῆ (Buttmann). Cp. Phaedo 90 B ; contrast Gorg. 524 Α.
18. ζητεῖν ἀρετὴ ὅ τι ἔστιν : the nom . is much rarer than
the acc. in similar combinations. See on 71 A 25. Heindorf
on Phaedr. 271 D εἰδέναι ψυχὴ ὅσα εἴδη ἔχει quotes Laches 1995
οὐκ ἄρα εὑρήκαμεν ἀνδρεία ὅ τι ἔστιν.
23. ἄρτι : 80 Β 23.
82 A 25. ὃς οὐ φημι, ' though I deny. Instances where, as here,
the relative introduces what is practically an adversative clause
are rare. Kühner § 561 c quotes + Isocr. 17. 47 åλX' eis ȧyŵva
καταστὰς ᾤμην καὶ παρὰ τὸ δίκαιον πλέον ἕξειν Πασίωνος παρ᾽
ὑμῖν ; ὃς οὐδὲ μένειν ἐνθάδε παρεσκευαζόμην : ' on the contrary, I
did not even intend to remain here.'
26. ἵνα δή : see on 86 D 14.
29. ὑπὸ τοῦ ἔθους : Simmias in the Phaedo 73 B is more
wary : αὐτὸ δὲ τοῦτο, ἔφη, δέομαι παθεῖν περὶ οὗ ὁ λόγος,
ἀναμνησθῆναι. See on 91 E 17.
33. προσκάλεσον : perhaps the choice of the active instead
XV 82 B NOTES 129

of the more usual middle of this verb is due to the fact that
Socrates means not ' call him to yourself,' but ' call him
before me.'
34. τῶν πολλῶν ἀκολούθων : ‘ Vox propria de servis qui
dominos honoris causa in publico comitabantur : Charm .
155 A, Symp. 217 A, Laws 845 A ' (Fr. ). ' Retainers . '
35. övтiva Boúλe : Stallbaum says that this allusion to B
the numerous slaves in attendance is intended to illustrate con-
spicuously the wealth and nobility of Meno. In my judgment
it is rather intended to illustrate the operation of pure accident
-the perfectly ordinary character of the mind worked upon. '
Grote II 19 note. See Intr. §7.
38. Ελλην μέν ἐστι : ‘ μέν in questions implies that if
assent is not given the conversation cannot be proceeded with ,'
Verrall on Eur. Med. 676. Other examples in Plato are :
Charm. 153 c παρεγένου μέν, ἢ δ᾽ ὅς , τῇ μάχῃ ; παρεγενόμην :
' I believe I may assume ' ; Theaet. 161 E. It is not uncommon
in Euripides : Med. 676, 1129 ; Hipp. 316 ; Alc. 146 ; Ion 520.
See also Aristoph. Birds 1214.
39. oikoyevńs, verna, not bought or captured . He was
probably one of the Thessalian serfs or πενεσταί. Schömann
Antiquities of Greece E.T. p. 132.
41. εἰ ἀναμιμνησκόμενος ἢ μανθάνων : see App . on the
text.
43. ἀλλὰ προσέξω : the negative clause to which ἀλλά is
opposed is suppressed , and ¿λλά has little force. ' Very well ;
I will attend. Cp. 75 E 17.

Chapters XVI to XIX (82 B-85 B). Socrates puts a series of

questions to a Slave of Meno's, who has never been taught
geometry, the answers to which show that there exist latent
in the slave's mind the materials for solving a geometrical
problem, namely, the construction of a square which shall be
double a given square.
The dialogue with the Slave is a perfect model of Socratic
procedure. It copies on a small scale the discussion with
Meno himself. It consists of two parts, negative (chaps. xvi
and xvii) and positive (chap. xix). These two parts are
separated by an interlude between Meno and Socrates (chap.
xviii) . The negative portion again may be divided into two
parts (1) chap. xvi, where the slave starting full of confidence
K
 130 ΜΕΝΟ XV 82 B

gives an answer hopelessly wrong ; (a word or two between Meno

and Socrates intervenes) ; (2) chap. xvii, where the Slave is
shown the error of the first answer, and reaches what may be
called the stage of partial disillusionment. He amends his
answer. When the amended answer too has been shown wrong
he is completely disillusioned, and is ready for the constructive
process to begin. Grote I 530 D compares the Slave to Clinias
in the Euthydemus ; each is supposed to be quickened by the
interrogatory of Socrates into a manifestation of knowledge
noway expected, nor traceable to any teaching. '
The scene attracted attention in antiquity. It is alluded to
by Cicero Tusc. D. 1 § 57 ; by Arnobius adv. gentes 11 ch. 24.
Socrates makes his figures on the sand or dust-the black-
board of antiquity.

CHAPTER XVI
1. γιγνώσκεις τετράγωνον χωρίον κτέ. : ‘ You recognize that
a square is a thing like this. ' This is the usual prefatory agree-
ment as to the use of terms. See on 75 E 12.
с 4. ἔστιν οὖν τετράγωνον κτέ , there exists then a square
having all these four sides equal, ' the definition being ac-
companied by an assertion of the reality of the thing defined.
Three lines below éoriv is merely a copula. For or as simple
auxiliary with present participle see 84 A 1, E 21 ; Phaedr. 249 D
ἔστιν δὴ οὖν ὁ πᾶς δεῦρο ἥκων λόγος, Gorg. 500 € καὶ τί ποτ᾽
ἐστὶν οὗτος ἐκείνου διαφέρων ; Soph. 267 Ε εἴτε διπλόην ἔτ᾽ ἔχων
Tivá čσTIV, cp. 99 E 5 : for other instances see Campbell, General
Introd. to Soph. and Polit. p. xxxiv. The square is of course
not sufficiently defined by specifying that its sides are equal,
for a rhombus also has four equal sides. If, indeed, the lines
Sià pérov presently mentioned (C 7) were diagonals, we should
have the conditions of a square sufficiently expressed ; for a
square is the only figure that has all its four sides equal and
its diagonals equal ; though the definition would be a clumsy
one. The lines dià μéσov, however, are not diagonals, but
lines parallel to the side, and so help not at all in differentiat-
ing the square from the rhombus. That the figure is rect-
angular is assumed. The Greeks were so much accustomed
to regard superficial measure as the simple product of the two
linear dimensions, that it was natural to them to assume that
they were dealing with rectangular figures in default of notice
otherwise (see on 87 A 24). The diagonals (diáμeтpoi) are first
mentioned at 85 B 48.
7. TAUTαol Tas Sià μéσov : the lines EG, FH. The lines
XVI 82 E NOTES 131

are wanted presently to show that the square on a side of two

feet contains four square feet.
H

10. TOLOÛTOV Xwplov, ‘ a similar figure ' ; cp. D 28 ; note

that τοιοῦτον refers to shape, τοσοῦτον, πηλικόν (85 Α 28) , ποσάπουν
(85 B 41 ) to size. See on 87 A 30.
13. εἰ οὖν εἴη . . . πόσων ἂν εἴη ποδῶν ; εἰ ἦν . . . ἄλλο
τι ἂν ἦν ; a good opportunity of comparing two different
classes of conditional sentences. The first is indefinite ; the
length has not been measured : ' say that this is two feet, of
how many square feet will the whole be ? ' The latter is an
instance of an unreal supposition.
14. Tóσwν Todŵv : the same expressions are used in Greek
for linear and superficial measure. You have to judge by the
context whether Toús means a linear foot or a square foot. See
Theaet. 147 D and Campbell's note there.
15. εἰ ἦν ταύτῃ (ΑΒ) δυοῖν ποδοῖν, ταύτῃ δὲ (ΑΕ) ἑνὸς
ποδός.
16. ἄλλο τι, ‘ nonne. The full and original form was do
Tɩ , ' is aught else the case than ? ' which is kept at D 19 just
below, 83 B 17, and often in Plato (see Ast 1 107). λo T is an
irrational abbreviated form , which occurs again in this dialogue
84 D 12, 97 A 15, and very often elsewhere. Fr. compares the
irrational abbreviation ἄλλως τε for ἄλλως τε καί at 85 Ε 37.
See Kühner § 587. 17 and J. & A. M. Adam's note on Prot. 353 c.
ἅπαξ ἂν ἦν δυοῖν ποδοῖν : the genitive is an attributive
genitive, and is not grammatically affected by äπağ : ' the space
would be one of once-two-feet.' But διπλάσιον, ποσαπλάσιον
(84 E 15), μov, etc. do ' govern ' genitives.
34. ἡ μὲν γὰρ τοῦδε : the exposition is a good deal helped E
by the fact that the feminine gender can always stand for
Ypaμun, the neuter for xwpiov, while at 83 E 62 the masculine
οἵδε can only refer to πόδες.
36. Sλov Sý : the boy answers with confidence, a character-
istic of the state of complete ignorance. This corresponds to
Meno's answer 71 E 1 ἀλλ᾽ οὐ χαλεπόν, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰπεῖν.
132 MENO XVI 82 E

37. oúdèv didáσkw : it was noted by Schleiermacher (quoted

by Fr. on 84 A) that the questions put by Socrates are in large
proportion leading questions, so that it is hardly fair to regard the
Slave as the parent of the notions brought to light by Socrates'
aid. Schleiermacher adds that this is not fatal to Socrates'
present purpose, which is merely to show, from the ease with
which the notions are grasped by the Slave, that they are not
now for the first time implanted in his mind. Grote (II 19),
after quoting Schleiermacher's criticism, observes that the
theory of avάuvnois ' is in a great degree true. Not all
learning, but an important part of learning, consists in
reminiscence-not indeed of acquisitions made in an antecedent
life, but of past experience and judgments in this life .' Grote,
however, makes in these words no concession whatever to the
Platonic doctrine of ȧváμvnois, the essence of which is that
all knowledge of Universals depends upon reminiscence of
experience that is both ante - natal and generically different
from sense-experience. It was on this point that, for a long
period in the history of philosophy, raged the controversy about
Innate Ideas (see Bain Mental and Moral Science App. B). Is
all our knowledge ultimately rooted in sense-experience ? Or
is the soul furnished at birth with certain notions inherent in
it ? The position of the one party was given in the formula :
' Nihil est in intellectu quod non prius fuerit in sensu.' This
Leibnitz amended by adding the words ' nisi intellectus ipse.'
It must be understood that the partisans of experience '
limited their view of it to sense-experience within the present
life, as Grote does in the passage just quoted. Since Grote
wrote the problem has entered on a new phase by a recognition
of the fact that a great deal of our mental furniture is inherited.
The opponents of ' Innate Ideas ' have had to enlarge their
notion of ' experience,' and to admit that the sense-experience
of the present life is not adequate to account for the phenomena
of mental development. But the doctrine of heredity does not
assume any previous experience generically different from the
sense-experience of the present life, and the necessity for
assuming anything of the sort has by the admission of
heredity been very considerably lessened.
Grote (II 20) quotes in illustration of the doctrine of
áváμvnois Wordsworth's ode, ' Our birth is but a sleep and a
forgetting, ' etc. But J. S. Mill, Diss. 111 351 , points out a funda-
mental opposition between the two utterances. Cp. A.-H. on
Phaedo 76 D, ' According to Wordsworth we are born with the
ante-natal radiance clinging about us, and spend our lives in
gradually losing it ; according to Plato we lose the vision at
birth and spend our lives in gradually recovering it.'
XVII 83 B NOTES 133

38. ἀλλ᾽ ἐρωτῶ : see on 71 C 10.

39. oteral : of mere opinion, as below, 44. Cp. 97 B 23.
ὁποία ἐστίν : we might have expected πηλική οι ὁπόση.
But as lines have, for the purpose in hand, no property but
length, the distinction between owolɑ and òwóσn disappears.
Cp. 83 C 37 ἀπὸ ποίας γραμμής, Ε 77, 84 Δ 79 , 85 Β 43.
Similarly we have moîos used of time, which has no ' quality ' :
Aesch. Αg. 278 ποίου χρόνου δὲ καὶ πεπόρθηται πόλις, Eur.
†I. A. 815, Aristoph. Birds 920 [see L. & S. 1 ]. In some of
these cases ' feeling ' may be intended ; but we might similarly
say 'what sort of time ?' ' what sort of distance ? ' See on 80 D 3.
44. oleraι Sé ye : the ye has its separate force and emphasises
oleral. Cp. 95 E 9 and note there.

CHAPTER XVII
2. ἐφεξῆς ὡς δεῖ ἀναμ. : see on 86 Α 10.
10. αὕτη (ΑΚ), ταύτης (ΑΒ) , ἑτέραν τοσαύτην (ΒΚ) : see on 83 Δ
82 E 34.
M

E G

A B R K

13. ἀπὸ ταύτης : ΑΚ.

16. lσas TÉTTapas : ' this is speaking inclusively, as the B
line AK itself is one of the four ' -Stocks.
17. TOUT : the space AKLM.
 134 ΜΕΝΟ XVII 83 B

20. ταυτὶ τέτταρα : Socrates has drawn the lines CP, CQ,
showing that the large square divides into four squares of the
original size.
26. διπλάσιον οὖν κτέ. : the steps here are very minute.
But it cannot be brought out too clearly that we have not got
what we wanted.
C 34. τεττάρων : in full , (χωρίον) γὰρ τετράκις τεττάρων (ποδῶν)
ἐστὶ (χωρίον) εκκαίδεκα (ποδῶν) . τετράκις cannot govern a
genitive any more than ἅπαξ at 82C 16. In the Theaetetus
(147 D) we are told that Theodorus has carried his analysis of
numbers into those which are perfect squares and those that are
not, up to sixteen ; and that there he stopped. Perhaps some
diagram like the present illustrated his discourse. Intr. § 22.
40. ταυτησί τουτί : the deictic forms imply that he here
points to the line AB and the square ABCD, whereas in the
sentence before he referred to the line AK and the square
AKLM. In the next sentence Toûde is the square ABCD,
τούτου the square AKLM. The Greek wealth of pronouns
dispenses with lettering.
D 50. τὸ γὰρ δοκοῦν τοῦτο ἀποκρίνου : the present imperative
makes the injunction refer to a habit, not to a particular
answer. See Appendix on the Text on 72 C 4. The injunction
is an important point in Socratic procedure, as distinguished
from Eristic (see Excursus V). Perhaps the best illustrative
passage is Theaet. 154cD ὦ Θεαίτητε, ἔσθ' ὅπως τι μεῖζον ἢ
πλέον γίγνεται ἄλλως ἢ αὐξηθέν ; τί ἀποκρινεῖ ; ΘΕΑΙ . Ἐὰν
μέν, ὦ Σώκρατες , τὸ δοκοῦν πρὸς τὴν νῦν ἐρώτησιν ἀποκρίνωμαι,
ὅτι οὐκ ἐστίν · ἐὰν δὲ πρὸς τὴν προτέραν, φυλάττων μὴ ἐναντία
εἴπω, ὅτι ἔστιν κτέ. In the conversation with Thrasymachus
(Republic bk. i) the point appears : 337 c (the respondent must
be left free :) ἧττόν τι αὐτὸν οἴει ἀποκρινεῖσθαι τὸ φαινόμενον ἑαυτῷ
ἐάν τε ἡμεῖς ἀπαγορεύωμεν ἐάν τε μή ; ( see the context) : 346 Α
καὶ ὦ μακάριε μὴ παρὰ δόξαν ἀποκρίνου ἵνα τι καὶ περαίνωμεν.
Cp. 350 E. The passage at 349 B affords no real exception.
Thrasymachus (unlike the waverers Polus and Meno) has not
scrupled to call injustice καλὸν καὶ ἰσχυρόν. Socrates compli-
ments him on now speaking his mind sincerely. Thrasymachus
rejoins τί δέ σοι τοῦτο διαφέρει , εἴτε μοι δοκεῖ εἴτε μή, ἀλλ' οὐ τὸν
λόγον ἐλέγχεις ; Socrates answers Οὐδέν · ἀλλὰ τόδε μοι πειρῶ ἔτι
πρὸς τούτοις ἀποκρίνασθαι. Here the “ οὐδέν ” is ironical ; cp.
Prot. 333 c. To the same effect as the present passage are
Crito 49 D, Lach. 193 c, Prot. 331 c , Gorg. 495 A, 500 в, Phil. 14 a.
The importance of getting at genuine doğaι appears at 85 C,
where we see that doğa are the raw material from which
Knowledge is evolved.
XVII 83 D NOTES 135

52. v, ' is, as we agreed. ' The source of this idiom, which
is of frequent occurrence, is a transference of the time of our
thought about a fact to the fact itself. It occurs most
frequently in the imperfect tense : Phaedr. 230 A ȧp' où тóde
ἦν τὸ δένδρον ἐφ' ὅπερ ἦγες ἡμᾶς ; the existence of the tree is
thought of relatively to the time when they began to approach
it. This imperfect often appears, by a sort of attraction, of
things permanently existing, mentioned in a narrative of past
events : thus we have oσa didaσкáλwv € Ïxeто 93 D 19, 94 A 8 :
ep. Xen. Anab. II iv 12 ἀφίκοντο πρὸς τὸ Μηδίας καλούμενον
τεῖχος · ἀπεῖχε δὲ Βαβύλωνος οὐ πολύ. So often in referring to
past points in a discussion, where the imperfect is equivalent
to the present with ὥσπερ ἐλέγομεν, ὥσπερ ᾠόμεθα, or the like.
It is sometimes called the ' philosophic imperfect ' . (Goodwin
MT. § 40). See Kühner § 383. 5, Jelf § 398. 4. The imperfect
most common is hy, as Polit. 264 A : Rep. 407 ▲ åpa ὅτι
ἦν τι αὐτῷ ἔργον , δ εἰ μὴ πράττοι οὐκ ἐλυσιτέλει ζῆν ; ibid .
436 c, 441 D, 477 A, 522 A, 609 в : Gorg. 478 c, 507 A (see Dr.
Thompson's note) : Charm. 159 D : Soph. 267 E (ò yàp σOPLOTÈS
OVK EV TOîs Eldbow v) : Crat. 387 c : Phil. 41 c, 55 A. Other
imperfects : 88D 5 ὥσπερ ή φρόνησις ἐποίει, i.e. ποιεῖ, ὡς ἐλέγο-
μεν : Crito 47 D ἐκεῖνο ὁ τῷ μὲν δικαίῳ βέλτιον ἐγίγνετο, τῷ δ᾽
ἀδίκῳ ἀπώλλυτο (for γίγνεσθαι, ἀπόλλυσθαι, ἐλέγετο) : Euthyd.
289 € ἆρά ἐστιν αὕτη ἣν ἔδει κεκτημένους ἡμᾶς εὐδαίμονας εἶναι ;
Prot. 356 D ή αὕτη μὲν ἡμᾶς ἐπλάνα καὶ ἐποίει ἄνω τε καὶ
κάτω πολλάκις μεταλαμβάνειν ταὐτά ; Rep. 490 Α ἡγεῖτο, 614 Α
Tаρeixeто. We have a similar idiom in future time : 98 C 13,
Gorg. 475 Β ἤτοι λύπῃ ἢ κακῷ ὑπερβάλλον αἴσχιον ἔσται ‘ will
be found to be. ' Certain uses of temporal particles as Tw
(ovd' apа πw yiyveral, presently at E75) and ĕri (73 A 29,
99 A 2, where see notes) are to be explained on the same
general principle. The idiom occurs in various languages,
including our own. We might translate here was not this
the square of two feet ?' So in Latin, Cic. Acad. I § 23
(repeatedly), § 30 tertia philosophiae pars quae erat in ratione
et in disserendo : Livy vii 1 hic annus erit memorabilis, ' we
shall find this year memorable. '
(We may separate from these cases : (a) the imperfects dealt
with on 77 E 44 ; (8) the imperfect with &pa, as at 97 C 31 ;
(7) the curious use of at Theaet. 156 A (ws Tò Tâν Kivηois
v), Charm. 174 B, Rep. 505 E, Laws 628 c, which is allied
to (B) ; for, as Campbell says, ' What a thing proves to be
when an inquiry is finished , that it was before the inquiry
began. ' We may connect with this the Aristotelian Tò Tí v
eival, and the Aristophanic TOUTì Ti ; ( Wasps 183). Cp.
Isaeus 11 § 17 8 συγγενέστατον μὲν ἦν τῇ φύσει πάντων, and
 136 MENO XVII 83 E

Jebb's note on the passage in his Selections from the Attic

Orators.)
E 60. Tpíroda : this of course is a mere ' shot. ' It does not
follow that because four is too much and two too little, that
three is right (cp. Aristot. NE. 11 vi 7). We have here the
second stage, that of partial disillusionment. The difficulty is
partially grasped , and the confidence is less.
61. τὸ ἥμισυ ταύτης (ΑΒ ) προσληψόμεθα καὶ ἔσται τρίπους
(AR) ; δύο μὲν γὰρ οἵδε (ΑΒ), ὁ δὲ εἰς (BR) · καὶ ἐνθένδε ( ΑΤ)
woaúτws : for oïde (wódes being understood) see on 81 E 34.
75. Tw refers to time of thought (see on D52). 'We have
not yet got the square containing eight feet from the three-foot
base.' (Beware of translating ' the square of eight feet, ' which
would be at least ambiguous . )
79. εἰ μὴ βούλει ἀριθμεῖν : not without some ironical point ;
an exact arithmetical answer being impossible, as 2 is
incommensurable with 1. Socrates himself does not give the
measure of the line ; he only deiкvvov. 'The side and the
diagonal represented the type of incommensurable magnitude
among the ancient reasoners ' (Grote III 356 note).
áλλà Seîgov, at any rate.' Instances of ảλλá in the
sense ' saltem,' with an imperative, after a conditional clause,
are not very common. But see below 86 Ε 18 εἰ μή τι οὖν ἀλλὰ
σμικρὸν χάλασον ; Ιαως 860 c εἰ δ᾽ οὖν μὴ πρότερον, ἀλλὰ
νῦν ὡς λέγοντά με τίθετε ; †Ηipparchus 231 A εἰ δ᾽ αὖ μὴ αὐτὸς
ἔχεις ἀποκρίνασθαι, ἀλλ᾿ ἐμοῦ λέγοντος σκόπει. This use of ἀλλά
with imperatives may be classed with the appealing ' force,
for which see Jebb on Soph. El. 337, also L. & S. dáλλá 1 2.
They quote Soph. Εl. 411 ὦ θεοὶ πατρῷοι συγγένεσθέ γ᾽ ἀλλὰ
νῦν. See Aristoph. Clouds 1364, 1369 for åλλá with an indirect
command.
84 A 81. ἔγωγε οὐκ οἶδα, ‘ I don't know. The emphasis in
ywye logically belongs not so much to the pronoun as to the
denial. A good example of false emphasis on a pronoun is
Soph. Phil. 910 foll.-
ΦΙ. ἁνὴρ ὅδ' , εἰ μὴ ' γὼ κακὸς γνώμην ἔφυν
προδούς μ᾿ ἔοικε κἀκλιπὼν τὸν πλοῦν στελεῖν.
ΝΕ. λιπὼν μὲν οὐκ ἔγωγε, λυπηρῶς δὲ μὴ
πέμπω σε μᾶλλον, τοῦτ᾽ ἀνιῶμαι πάλαι.
See Postgate in CR. XI 21 : kalŵs σù πoiŵv, and you were
right.'
This marks the completion of the process of disillusionment ;
the destructive process is ended ; the false conceit of knowledge
XVIII 84 c NOTES 137

is eradicated. The situation is parallel to chap. xiii 79 E-80 D.

Meno does not indeed there say ễywye oʊk oîda, but Socrates can
say of him ὅμοιος εἶ οὐκ εἰδότι. Meno somewhat resents the
treatinent ; the Slave of course does not ; and Meno is able to
see (84 B) that in the case of the Slave the torpedo-shock is not
unattended with good.

CHAPTER XVIII
1. οὗ ἐστιν ἤδη βαδίζων ὅδε τοῦ ἀναμιμνῄσκεσθαι, “ what
point on the track of reminiscence he has now reached . ' Cp.
Lysis 204 Β πόρρω ἤδη εἰ πορευόμενος τοῦ ἔρωτος. ( In these cases
the use of eiui with the present participle serves to bring out
the continuous force of the tense ; cp. 82 C 4. ) Fr. compares
Rep. 445 C ἐνταῦθα ἀναβεβήκαμεν τοῦ λόγου and Euthyphr. 4 Β
πόρρω σοφίας ἐλαύνοντος. The genitives are ' partitive. '
Wayte on Dem. 22 (Andr. ) § 16 εἰς τοῦτ᾽ ἐλήλυθε τοῦ νομίζειν
points out that a genitive infin. is rare in this construction, and
quotes the present passage.
5. In the combination ἀλλ᾽ οὖν γε, οὖν has the force
' however that may be, ' as in d'ouv ; ye at once emphasises and
limits the word to which it belongs. The combination often
introduces an apodosis after ei un (Phaedo 91 B, Soph. 254 c,
Laws 885 E). In Prot. 327 € ἀλλ᾽ οὖν αὐληταί γ᾽ ἂν πάντες
hoav, as here, the construction is coordinate.
7. ὥσπερ οὐκ οἶδεν κτέ , ut nescit ita se scire ne putat
quidem.'
18. TÓTE Sè padíws KTẻ. : Socrates caricatures Meno's C
language at 80 B 15. Geometry, to be sure, offers less temp-
tation to rhetoric than ethics, so ignorance of it is more easily
detected, and is less dangerous.
26. πρiν κаTÉTEσEV : Goodwin MT. § 637 : ' When the
clause introduced by πpív, until, refers to a result not attained
in past time in consequence of the non-fulfilment of some
condition, it takes a past tense of the indicative. ' Cp. 86 D 13,
Theaet. 165 D E. See F. E. T. § 218. The question here is
equivalent to οὐκ ἂν ἐπεχείρησεν.
31. 8 TI Kai ȧveupýσel : see on 71 B 8. Here the force of
the kai is, ' see, what after all (in spite of his bewilderment),
he will discover. ' So Euthyd. 272 iva eidû ö тɩ каì µаlŋσóμelα ;
Euthyphr. 3 Α λέγε τι καὶ ποιοῦντά σέ φησι διαφθείρειν τοὺς νέους ;
Aristoph. Clouds 1344 καὶ μὴν ὅ τι καὶ λέξεις ἀκοῦσαι βούλομαι ;
Eccl. 946.
 138 MENO XVIII 84 D

D 32. oúdèv áλλ' : see on 76 B 13.

33. φύλαττε δέ κτέ. : see on 82 Ε 37.
35. ἀλλὰ μή : see on 71 C 10.

CHAPTER XIX
1. At this point all the figures are rubbed out, and a fresh
start is made. The four squares, each containing four feet, are
M

A B
successively constructed ; first ABCD (TOûTO line 2), then BKPC
(ETEρov line 4) ; then DCQM (Tρíтov line 7), then CPLQ (Tò ÉV
τῇ γωνίᾳ τόδε line 9) .
E 12. aλλo Tɩ : see on 82 C 16.
85 A 21. ἐστιν αὕτη γραμμή : DB . See on 82 C 4.
22. τείνουσα, τέμνουσα : see Appendix on the Text.
25. TÉTTAPES Aûтaι : BP, PQ, QD, DB.
26. toa : Euclid would have thought it necessary to prove
the equality of the diagonals. TOUTÌ TÒ XWρlov , BPQD.
31. τούτων, the four squares ; ἑκάστη ἡ γραμμή, the four
diagonals.
35. тηλɩkaûтa, the triangles ; èv roúrw, the sq. BPQD.
37. év Tode, the sq. ABCD.
Б 41. Tóse, the sq. BPQD. The step taken here is a com-
paratively long one. This led Schleiermacher to think that
XIX 85 B NOTES 139

something has fallen out in the text, which he reconstructs

thus :-
ΣΩ. Τόδε οὖν < ποσαπλάσιον γίγνεται τούτου (scil. ABCD).
ΠΑΙ. Διπλάσιον.
ΣΩ. Τοῦτο δὲ πηλικὸν ἦν ;
ΠΑΙ. Τετράπουν.
ΣΩ. Τόδε οὖν > ποσάπουν γίγνεται ;
But perhaps the Slave's mind is supposed to have become more
agile. Campbell Intr. Soph. etc. p. 15 points out the greater
conciseness of Plato's later dialogues.
48. Stáμeтpos : the word is used elsewhere in Plato of the
diagonal of a square : Polit. 266 A B where there seems a fantastic
reference to the present problem ; †Sisyphus 388 E (quoted
on 80 D 1 ) ; Rep. 510 D of a rectangle (where there may be a
reference to the present problem) ; Tim. 54 D E of a trapezium.
The word dayvios is much later. Of course yрaμμn is to be
understood with either word.
oi σopɩσraí, ‘ the Professors .' The word is used here in
its original sense, entirely without odious signification . It
implies little more than the Expert, contrasted with the idirns.
This is the usual signification of the word in the poets : Pind.
Isthm. v 28 ; Diog. L. prooem. § 12 says Kai Kparîvos ev
᾿Αρχιλόχῳ τοὺς περὶ Ομηρον καὶ Ἡσίοδον ἐπαινῶν οὕτως καλεῖ ;
Eur. Hipp. 916 δεινὸν λέγεις σοφιστήν κτέ.
In Plato the word is used colourlessly as here Lys. 204 A
οὐ φαῦλός γε ἀνήρ, ἀλλ᾽ ἱκανὸς σοφιστής : Crat. 403 Ε οὕτω καλούς
τινας, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐπίσταται λόγους λέγειν ὁ ῞Αιδης καὶ ἔστιν . ὁ
θεὸς τέλεος σοφιστής τε καὶ μέγας εὐεργέτης τῶν παρ' αὐτῷ :
+Minos 319 c, Zeus, the trainer of Minos, is a great ooporns.
The only other place in the Meno where the word occurs is 91 C
18 ; and there it is clear that the word, to some ears at least,
excites odium. See the note there.
50. as où ons : the Slave has found the materials for the
conclusion-a point presently developed.
& Tаî Mévwvos : see on 76 E 48.

Chapters XX, XXI (85 B-86 C). SOCR. Observe that all the
Opinions to which he has given utterance are his own. Bythe
calling up in order of these Opinions he has recovered latent
Knowledge. This Knowledge he did not acquire in this life.
Therefore he must have acquired it in a previous state of
existence. The soul's possession ofKnowledge is thus proved
to be independent of its connexion with the humanform, and
 140 MENO XX 85 c

so independent of death. However, this is rather by the

way. I have shown practically that the transition from
seeming Ignorance to Knowledge is possible ; and I insist
most strongly that we shall be better men if we regard
research as part of our duty.
C 3. οὔκ, ἀλλ᾽ ἑαυτοῦ : see on 71 C 13.
4. ὡς ἔφαμεν ὀλίγον πρότερον : 82 Ε.
10. To ovк eidótɩ KTέ.: see App. on the text.
14. καὶ νῦν μέν γε κτέ , at present these opinions have
just been conjured up in him like a dream ' : that is, they are
still fluid and insecure. Cp. Symp. 175 E, where Agathon says
that his own wisdom, compared with that of Socrates, is paúλn
καὶ ἀμφισβητήσιμος, ὥσπερ ὄναρ οὖσα. Similarly the metaphor
of rap and ovap is used to express the contrast between real
Knowledge ( of Universals) and mere Sense - experience or
Opinion : Rep. 476 D ; cp. 533 c, 534 c, and Laws 969 B, quoted
on 100 A 9.
15. But if some one shall question him again often and in
different ways about these same things, you know that finally
he will understand these matters as well as any one. ' For the
future condition see note on 86 A 8 and Exc. IV.
The doğal now arrived at need to be clinched by repetitions of
the dialectic process. For the relation of δόξα to ἐπιστήμη see
97 B 17, with note, and Exc. VII. The intimate bearing ofthis
discussion upon the main subject of the dialogue has been already
pointed out in the note on the summary of chaps . xiv, xv. dóğa
is a sort of half- way house on the road from Ignorance to
Knowledge.
D 20. ἀλλ᾽ ἐρωτήσαντος : see on 71 C 10. Fr. observes that
¿λλá cancels the negative in the preceding ovdels, and compares
Rep. 366 D, Phaedr. 260 D, Symp. 192 E.
24. Tò Sè ávaλaµßáveɩv kтé.: see on 81 D 12. Cp. Phaedo
75 Ε εἰ δέ γε, οἶμαι, λαβόντες πρὶν γενέσθαι γιγνόμενοι ἀπωλέσαμεν,
ὕστερον δὲ ταῖς αἰσθήσεσι χρώμενοι περὶ ταῦτα ἐκείνας ἀναλαμ-
βάνομεν τὰς ἐπιστήμας, ἅς ποτε καὶ πρὶν εἴχομεν, ἆρ᾽ οὐχ δ καλοῦμεν
μανθάνειν οἰκείαν ἐπιστήμην ἀναλαμβάνειν ἂν εἴη ;
28. ἤτοι ἔλαβέν ποτε ἢ ἀεὶ εἶχεν : the addition of rol to the
former accentuates the contrast between the two alternatives
offered (Kühner § 540, 5. Pindar Nem. 6. 5 appears to be
the only place where . ἤτοι occurs. To without occurs
in Plato Rep. 344 E, 400 c, 433 A) . The particle To implies
a personal appeal. The effect of it is not to press the accept-
ance of the member to which it happens to be attached, but
XX 85 E NOTES 141

to press the choice between the alternatives, which often in-

volves a dilemma. It cannot be made out that ro is attached
to the member the speaker desires to have accepted. At 89 A 20,
the other place in which the combination occurs, Plato leaves
it an open question whether opóvnois is the whole of ȧperý or a
μέρος of it. Cp. Phaedo 76 Α ἤτοι ἐπιστάμενοί γε αὐτὰ γεγόναμεν
καὶ ἐπιστάμεθα διὰ βίου πάντες, ἢ ὕστερον, οὕς φαμεν μανθάνειν,
οὐδὲν ἀλλ᾽ ἢ ἀναμιμνήσκονται οὗτοι . Other passages are : Apol.
27 D τοὺς δὲ δαίμονας οὐχὶ ἤτοι θεούς γε ἡγούμεθα ἢ θεῶν παῖδας ;
Prot. 341 Α : Gorg. 460 A ἀνάγκη αὐτὸν εἰδέναι τὰ δίκαια καὶ τὰ
ἄδικα ἤτοι πρότερόν γε ἢ ὕστερον μαθόντα παρὰ σοῦ, ibid. 467 Ε,
474 , 475 Α, 478 B : Rep. 453D ἤτοι δελφινά τινα ἐλπίζοντας
ἡμᾶς ὑπολαβεῖν ἂν ἤ τινα ἄλλην ἄπορον σωτηρίαν ; ibid . 330 Ε,
437 c: Phaedo 68 c : Parm. 131 A : Laws 898 c : Soph. Antig.
1181-
ἐκ δὲ δωμάτων
ἤτοι κλύουσα παιδὸς η τύχῃ πάρα ;
Hdt. I 11 ἀλλ᾽ ἤτοι ἐκεῖνόν γε δεῖ ἀπόλλυσθαι ἢ σέ : Thuc. νι
34. 2, 38. 2, 40. 1 , etc.
30. εἰ μὲν ἀεὶ εἶχεν, ἀεὶ καὶ ἦν ἐπιστήμων : Socrates propounds
a dilemma. If the slave always had this Knowledge, then he
always existed as an intelligent being. But to say that the
Slave del v πLOтhμwv may be going too far. The knowledge may
be there but latent or potential. Knowledge admits of genesis.
But this admission does not destroy the tie to a past existence.
If this genesis took place it was not confined to this life. Part
of the work was done before. The doğa remain as permanent
relics of previous μáonois, and are capable of being reconverted
into knowledge. Plato held that the soul has no beginning.
In the Phaedrus (245 CD) we read that as the soul is ever in
motion and is the first beginning of all motion, it must be
indestructible as well as underived, ' Zeller p. 398 ; cp. 405.
32. eiλnows ein : simple perfects optative are rare, save in
a few perfects used in present sense, as πεποιθοίην, τεθνήκοιμι.
Plato also has periphrastic forms for the plqpf. active : Phaedo
76 Β εἰληφότες ἦμεν, Euthyd. 273 Α περιεληλυθότε ἤστην.
36. Síkalos el : the usual ' personalisation . ' See A. Sidgwick E
in CR. III pp. 147 foll.
37. aλλws Te : the omission of kai is remarkable, as it was
from the force of kai that the formula äλλws Te Kaí derived its
sense ( otherwise in general and particularly ' ). Like aλo T
for ǎo Tit comes under the head of irrationally abbreviated"
phrases. So Buttmann, who in his note quotes Xen. Mem. I
ii 59, Isoc. 2 (ad Nicocl. ) § 51 , and Soph. O.T. 1114—
 142 MENO XX 85 E

ἄλλως τε τοὺς ἄγοντας ὥσπερ οἰκέτας

ἔγνωκ᾿ ἐμαυτοῦ,
on which Jebb quotes Hdt. vIII 142 ( Kühner § 522. 4). In the
present place some (not the best) MSS. add kai, which was to be
expected. Cp. Hipp. min. 363 A-perhaps the only other place
in Plato.

CHAPTER XXI
86 A 5. ὅτ᾽ οὐκ ἦν ἄνθρωπος, before he entered into the human
shape. ' For full explanation of the import of this, chap. xix of
the Phaedo must be consulted, especially the end 75 B : πρÒ TOû
ἄρα ἄρξασθαι ἡμᾶς ὁρᾶν καὶ ἀκούειν καὶ τἆλλα αἰσθάνεσθαι τυχεῖν
ἔδει που εἰληφότας ἐπιστήμην αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἴσου ὅ τι ἔστιν and c πρὶν
γενέσθαι ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἀνάγκη ἡμῖν αὐτὴν τὴν τοῦ ἴσου ἐπι-
στήμην) εἰληφέναι.
8. ei oûv KTẻ. , ‘ if then, alike during the time when he is,
and in that when he is not, a man, true opinions are to exist
in him, which when awakened by questioning become matters
of knowledge, must not his soul be for all time in the possession
of them? (lit. ' be in a condition of having learnt ' : cp.
éμeμalýкeι above). For it is clear that for all time he either is
or is not a man.
The argument here is commonly regarded as fallacious
(Zeller p. 127 note, p. 405 note ; cp. Fr. ). It is certainly
highly compressed and somewhat ambiguous. It is not clear
how much Plato conceives that he has proved. The argument
seems to be this : The human form is not essential to the
soul's existence. It existed apart from the human form before.
It made its way into the human form without losing hold of its
heritage of Ideas. ' So much may be said to follow fairly from
the premises. But Plato has cast the argument in such a form
as to suggest a larger conclusion. The tenses ὅν τ᾽ ἂν ᾖ χρόνον
kal dv av uǹ refer to indefinite future time. The implied
argument is that, as the soul has safely passed the gate Birth
into the human form, so she may be expected to pass the other
gate Death, which, as the Phaedo explains, is its correlative.
This, even if a probable surmise, has not been proved ; and so
we find in the Phaedo (77 c) that Kebes treats the argument for
immortality drawn from ἀνάμνησις as imperfect : φαίνεται γὰρ
ὥσπερ ἥμισυ ἀποδεδεῖχθαι οὗ δεῖ, ὅτι πρὶν γενέσθαι ἡμᾶς ἦν ἡμῶν
ἡ ψυχή· δεῖ δὲ προσαποδεῖξαι ὅτι καὶ ἐπειδὰν ἀποθάνωμεν οὐδὲν
ἧττον ἔσται ἢ πρὶν γενέσθαι, εἰ μέλλει τέλος ἡ ἀπόδειξις ἔχειν.
It must be remembered that the argument for immortality
here is merely by the way. There is no reference to the general
XXI 86 B NOTES 143

argument given in the Phaedrus 245 c (Zeller 398). Indeed it

is noticeable that the words ἀθάνατος ἂν ἡ ψυχὴ εἴη, ὥστε might
be omitted without obvious loss to the argument. • Perhaps
Plato's only object in referring to future immortality here is to
be found in the hint at 81 B. Plato did not regard immortality
as an end in itself ; see Euthyd. 289 в ovdé ye el TIS ĔOTIV
ἐπιστήμη, ὥστε ἀθανάτους ποιεῖν ἄνευ τοῦ ἐπίστασθαι τῇ ἀθανασίᾳ
χρῆσθαι, οὐδὲ ταύτης ἔοικεν ὄφελος οὐδὲν εἶναι and Laws 661 B C.
ei évéσovraι : this is not a real future condition. It is, as
Fr. says, equivalent to eveîvai phooμev, which is pretty much
what Kühner (§ 573 a ; cp. § 387 , 4) calls a modal signification.
It thus belongs to the class of idioms treated on 83 D 52. This
sense of the future is common in Plato, especially after ei ; but
see also 78 E 38 where οὐκ ἔσται ἀρετή means εὑρήσομεν μὴ εἶναι
ȧperýv. Cp. Parm. 134 D, etc. Contrast 85 C 15 εἰ ἀνερήσεται,
where we have a real future condition. The two classes may
be thus distinguished. In the ' modal ' condition the pres.
indic., in the ' real future ' condition the subjunctive (with
eáv) or the optative, may be substituted for the fut. indic. in
the protasis with little change of meaning. Here, for instance,
we might have had εἰ ἔνεισιν • μεμαθηκυῖα ἐστιν. For in the
apodosis the time is not really future, and the fact that we
might in English translate μεμαθηκυῖα ἔσται ‘ will not his soul
be in possession ? ' only shows that we can use our auxiliary
' will ' modally. But it is possible that Plato has, somewhat
sophistically, used the future forms here to help the leap to
álávaτos in the next sentence. See Excursus IV.
10. éρwrησel Teɣepleîσaɩ : cp. Phaedo 73 A quoted on 81 D
12. This art of questioning is the μaieutikǹ Téxvn, the positive
side of Socrates' work (Theaet. 149 A-151 c ; art. ' Socrates '
Encycl. Brit. p. 236). Plato, while giving abundant examples
of this art, nowhere attempts a detailed analysis of it. Note
that in Rep. 532 E Socrates when asked to give an account of
dialectic says that the time has not yet come. For the plural
Éπιστîμαι cp. 98 A 33, Symp. 207 E, etc.
11. μeμаlηкvîа oral : the fut. perf. active is not common,
but cp. Charm. 174 D ảπоλeλoπòs eσтai ; Rep. 582 D yeyovis
ἔσται.
15. ἡ ἀλήθεια ἡμῖν τῶν ὄντων : this can only mean the B
world of Ideas. Cp. Phaedr. 249 в où yàp yε μỶ Tотe idoûσa
τὴν ἀλήθειαν εἰς τόδε ἥξει τὸ σχῆμα (the human form ) ; ibid . D
τοῦ ἀληθοῦς ἀναμιμνησκόμενοs and 247 c. See note on 81 D 12.
The same is implied at Phaedo 73 c ὁμολογοῦμεν γὰρ δήπου, εἴ
τίς τι ἀναμνησθήσεται, δεῖν αὐτὸν τοῦτο πρότερόν ποτε ἐπίστα-
σθαι.
144 MENO XXI 86 B

17. ὥστε θαρροῦντα χρή κτέ : it should be noted that to

support this conclusion it is not in the least necessary that the
future inmortality of the soul should have been proved. All
that is wanted is the admission of the soul's previous converse
with truth, and consequent power of recovering it. Even so
much of the metaphysical basis as remains is presently repre-
sented as less essential than the recognition of the moral duty
of research. See on 81 D 14.
20. MEN. eu poɩ Sokeîs кté. : Meno - ' I like what you are
saying, Socrates -I hardly know why. ' Socr.-' Yes, Meno,
and Ilike what I am saying. '
21. οὐκ οἶδ᾽ ὅπως : Meno's δόξαι are still unsettled . Cp.
95 C 31. So Callicles in the Gorgias 513 с oùк old' övтivá μo
τρόπον δοκεῖς εὖ λέγειν, ὦ Σώκρατες. πέπονθα δὲ τὸ τῶν πολλῶν
πάθος · οὐ πάνυ σοι πείθομαι.
23. ouk av Táνu : see on 71 C 19 ; cp. Gorg. 513 c just quoted
and Phaedo 63 c quoted below.
6
ἂν . . . διισχυρισαίμην, asseveraverim. The word occurs
in two passages of the Phaedo of similar tendency : 63 c vûv
δὲ εὖ ἴστε ὅτι παρ᾽ ἄνδρας τε ἐλπίζω ἀφίξεσθαι ἀγαθούς · καὶ
τοῦτο μὲν οὐκ ἂν πάνυ διισχυρισαίμην · ὅτι μέντοι παρὰ θεοὺς
δεσπότας πάνυ ἀγαθούς, εὖ ἴστε ὅτι, εἴπερ τι ἄλλο τῶν τοιούτων,
διισχυρισαίμην ἂν καὶ τοῦτο ; also 114D τὸ μὲν οὖν τοιαῦτα
διισχυρίσασθαι οὕτως ἔχειν ὡς ἐγὼ διελήλυθα, οὐ πρέπει νοῦν
ἔχοντι ἀνδρί κτέ. Cp. also Rep. 533 A. For the attitude of
Plato towards ' myths ' see Zeller 396. Plato ' clearly asserts
that these myths were viewed by him not as mere myths, but
also as hints of the truth worth serious consideration ; and he
therefore combines with them moral exhortations which he
never would have grounded on uncertain fables. It is difficult,
however, to make out precisely where that which is intended to
be dogmatic ends, and that which is mythical begins. Plato
himself was manifestly in uncertainty, and for that very
reason betakes himself to the myth. ' See ibid . pp. 160-3.
24. ὅτι δ' οἰόμενοι δεῖν ζητεῖν : we here revert to the point
taken at 81 D 14.

Chapters XXII , XXIII (86 C-87 C 18 πávu ye). SOCR. Shall

we then resume the inquiry what Virtue is? MENO. I
would rather put the question as I did before, ' Is Virtue
teachable ?' SOCR. Well, if you must have your own
way, we may consider this point on a hypothesis as to the
nature of Virtue. If Virtue is Knowledge it will be teach-
able, and if not, not. MENO. Certainly.
XXII 86 D NOTES 145

Here begins the third section of the dialogue (chaps. xxii-

XXV). Reason is shown for connecting Virtue with Knowledge
(89 Α. 20 φρόνησιν ἄρα φαμὲν ἀρετὴν εἶναι, ἤτοι ξύμπασαν ἢ μέρος τι).
1. βούλει ἐπιχειρήσωμεν : see on 75 Β 14.
4. οὐ μέντοι . . ἀλλ', ‘ not but that. " See on 71 C 13.
7. πότερον ὡς διδακτῷ ὄντι αὐτῷ : we have here a dative D
depending on ἐπιχειρεῖν, followed by a genitive absolute clause,
ὡς παραγιγνομένης τῆς ἀρετῆς. Fr. refers to 79 E 47, 87 C 18,
etc. , for ὄντι αὐτῷ, referring to ἀρετή, but attracted into the
gender of the predicate.
8. τίνι ποτὲ τρόπῳ : note the facility with which the Greek
language introduces direct interrogatives in adverbial clauses,
and cp. 79 E 46, 87 B 4, and 88 A 10. Cp. Symp. 206 Β τῶν
τίνα τρόπον διωκόντων αὐτὸ ἡ σπουδὴ ἔρως ἂν καλοῖτο ; See on
71 D 27.
12. εἴτε οὐ διδακτόν : it is very difficult to draw any
distinction between the use of où and µn in the second half of
an indirect disjunctive question. We have où here and 87 B 3 ;
but in at 71 A 27, 87 B 35, 92 C 20, 93 A 14. μή predomi-
nates where the predicate is not repeated (as in the last two
instances). Kühner § 513 Anm . 1 says that μή always stands
in cases where the distinction is between what is and what
is not, if the predicate has to be understood in the second
clause. This rule seems to be infringed by Phaedo 70 c
σκεψώμεθα εἴτ᾿ ἄρα ἐν "Αιδου εἰσὶν αἱ ψυχαὶ τελευτησάντων τῶν
ἀνθρώπων εἴτε καὶ οὔ. Where où stands alone the predicate to
be supplied with it will generally be one that readily forms
with it a privative notion ; e.g. οὔ above = οὐκ εἰσιν, Rep. 387 D
σκόπει δὴ εἰ ὀρθῶς ἐξαιρήσομεν ἢ οὐ ( = οὐκ ὀρθῶς). See Jebb's
notes on Soph. Ajax 7 (who there quotes for alternative
questions Crat. 425 Β μή, Rep. 451D ού) , and on Antiphon
περὶ τοῦ ῾Ηρώδου φόνου § 14 (Selections from the Attic Orators
p. 161 ) ; F. E. T. p. 357 ; Hadley § 1022.
13. πρὶν . • ἐζητήσαμεν : see on 84 C 26.
αὐτό, ‘ the main point. It refers not to the thing ἀρετή,
but to the question ὅ τι ἐστίν. Cp . 71 Α 28 , 100 Β 21 .
14. σὺ σαυτοῦ μὲν οὐδ ἐπιχειρεῖς ἄρχειν : the irony is best
illustrated by Gorg. 491 D. Callicles says τὸ δίκαιον τοῦτ᾽
ἔστιν, πλέον ἔχειν τούτους τῶν ἄλλων, τοὺς ἄρχοντας τῶν ἀρχομένων.
Socr. τί δὲ αὑτῶν, ὦ ἑταῖρε ; [so Schanz, rightly]. Cal. πῶς
λέγεις ; Socr. ἕνα ἕκαστον λέγω αὐτὸν ἑαυτοῦ ἄρχοντα. ἢ τοῦτο
μὲν οὐδὲν δεῖ, αὐτὸν ἑαυτοῦ ἄρχειν, τῶν δὲ ἄλλων ;
ἵνα δή : the δή marks that the expectation is illusory. Cp.
L
 146 MENO XXII 86 D

Rep. 420 Ε ἵνα δὴ ὅλη ἡ πόλις εὐδαιμονῇ ; ibid . 563 B, 610 ,

Gorg. 495 A, Theaet. 183 Α ἵνα δὴ μὴ ἀναγκάζηται ἀθανάτους τὰς
ψυχὰς ὁμολογεῖν, Polit. 264 A , etc. : 82 A 26.
15. ἐλεύθερος : Fr. quotes Rep. 576 Α ελευθερίας • • τυραν
νικὴ φύσις ἀεὶ ἄγευστος.
E 17. ποιόν τι : cp. 71 Β 4 and note there.
18. εἰ μή τι οὖν ἀλλά, ‘ if you will not do more, at least,
etc. Riddell $ 20. The άá here is not parallel to the uses
given on 71C 13. It belongs to the appealing ' use, with
the imperative, dealt with on 83 E 79. Cp. Rep. 509 c καὶ
μηδαμῶς γ᾽, ἔφη, παύσῃ, εἰ μή τι ἀλλὰ τὴν περὶ τὸν ἥλιον
ὁμοιότητα αὖ διεξιών. Nearly akin is the phrase in Symp.
222 Ε ἀλλ᾽ εἰ μή τι ἄλλο, ὦ θαυμάσιε, ἐν μέσῳ ἡμῶν ἔα ᾿Αγάθωνα
κατακεῖσθαι.
19. ἐξ ὑποθέσεως : the word ὑπόθεσις6 was familiar in Plato's
time in the ordinary scientific sense an assumption .' L. & S.
quote it from Hippocrates. Plato often so uses it. Thus, the
principle of Parmenides, Existence is One, is a ὑπόθεσις.
When this was attacked, " Zeno defended it by showing that
the opposite hypothesis, Existence is manifold, ' led to more
absurd results than any that could be deduced from the prin-
ciple of Parmenides (Parm. 128 D). To Zeno Plato attributes the
method of investigation that consists in tracing not merely
the consequences of a hypothesis, but also those of its con-
tradictory : Parm . 135 Ε χρὴ δὲ καὶ τόδε ἔτι πρὸς τούτῳ ποιεῖν, μὴ
μόνον εἰ ἔστιν ἕκαστον ὑποτιθέμενον σκοπεῖν τὰ συμβαίνοντα ἐκ τῆς
ὑποθέσεως, ἀλλὰ καὶ εἰ μὴ ἔστι τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦτο ὑποτίθεσθαι. Cp.
160 B, 161 B ; also Soph. 244 c ; Theaet. 183 в the maxim of the
Heracliteans πάντα ῥεῖ is a ὑπόθεσις ; Phaedo 92D the position
μάθησις ἀνάμνησις rests on a ὑπόθεσις ἀξία ἀποδέξασθαι ; ibid.
94 B the surmise that the soul is a harmony is a ὑπόθεσις to be
discarded. [We see how the meaning ' title, ' ' argument, '
" summary, was arrived at, from Parm. 127 D κελεῦσαι τὴν
πρώτην ὑπόθεσιν τοῦ πρώτου λόγου ἀναγνῶναι. So the Platonic
Όροι (415 B) give, besides the
66 first definition of ὑπόθεσις ( “ ' ἀρχὴ
ἀναπόδεικτος ”), a second, συγκεφαλαίωσις λόγου. ”]
The physical meaning ' base, ' ' pedestal ' seems never to
occur, but it is played upon Euthyphr. 11 c. Euthyphron's
definition of holiness has proved unsound. Socrates says that
if it had been his own definition that had slipped away, he
would have been reminded of his ancestor Daedalus (see on
97 D 12) νῦν δέ, σαὶ γὰρ αἱ ὑποθέσεις εἰσίν, ἄλλου δή τινος δεῖ
σκώμματος. So too Rep. 511 Β τῷ ὄντι ὑποθέσεις , οἷον ἐπιβάσεις
τε καὶ ὁρμάς, ‘ standing-ground in the literal sense, as it were
foot- holds and starting-points. '
XXII 86 E NOTES 147

There is a special Platonic usage of the term, to indicate a

provisional definition of a common term or concept. This usage
goes back to Socrates. His effort was by a comparison of
particulars to find the common point in a general term. Xen.
Mem. Iv 6, 13 (quoted by R. & P. 194 B) ei dé TIS AUTÊ TEρÍ TOV
ἀντιλέγοι μηδὲν ἔχων σαφὲς λέγειν , ἀλλ᾽ ἄνευ ἀποδείξεως ἤτοι
σοφώτερον φάσκων εἶναι ἂν αὐτὸς λέγοι ἢ πολιτικώτερον ἢ
ἀνδρειότερον ἢ ἄλλο τι τῶν τοιούτων, ἐπὶ τὴν ὑπόθεσιν ἐπανῆγεν ἂν
πάντα τὸν λόγον ὧδέ πως, “ he led the discourse inductively up
to the formation of the concept, ' namely ofthe TOMTIKós, the
ȧvôpeios, or whatever it might be. So in Gorg. 454 c iva où rà
σαυτοῦ κατὰ τὴν ὑπόθεσιν ὅπως ἂν βούλῃ περαίνῃς, the ὑπόθεσις is
Gorgias' definition of rhetoric.
The passages which deal with vπoléσes in this sense are (1 )
Rep. 510 B-511 D (further explained by 532 A B, 533 B-D) , (2)
Phaedo 99 E - 101 E. See by all means H. Jackson in J.P. x
pp. 145, 6, XIII pp. 263, 4, and A. -H.'s notes on the Phaedo,
ad loc. The ὑποθέσεις (or λόγοι) of universals, whether
gathered from observed particulars, or by class-division, are
provisional and precarious. A full knowledge of any universal
would imply an a priori derivation of its Idea from the original
and central Idea of the Good. 'In other words, Plato conceives
that whenever we can draw up a scheme of voléσes culminat-
ing in the άyalov, so as to show that the supposed system of
ŎVTWS ÖVTα is the best that intelligence working to an end could
devise, we may be sure that our Móyo , though originally
derived from the inspection of particulars, are accurate re-
presentations of Ideas. The moment we pass from ὑποθέσεις
to the ἀγαθόν, our λόγοι will thereby receive the attestation
which they have hitherto lacked, and will be converted from
ὑποθέσεις into ἀρχαί, whence we may descend to conclusions
(τελευταί) as much more certain than the τελευταί of the
geometer, as certified apxai are more certain than uncertified
ὑποθέσεις ” (Η. J. J.P. x). 'When dialectic is made perfect,
λόγοι will be exchanged for ιδέαι, ὑποθέσεις for ἀρχαί (Α.-H.
on Phaedo 100 B). Plato looked forward to a great deductive
scheme by which the Universe should be justified. This he
attempted in the Timaeus. In the places of the Republic a
broad distinction is drawn between the methods of dialectic
and geometry. The method of dialectic is what has been
indicated. In geometry, on the other hand, the voléσels
(namely the axioms, definitions, etc. ) are arbitrary. They are
never verified, or shown to be necessary, by reference to the
fountainhead of the ȧya@ov ; moreover, the reasoning is carried
on by means of Sense-representations.
Here the word vπóleois, as applied to the geometrical illustra-
148 MENO XXII 86 E

tion, has its ordinary scientific sense ; as applied to the thing

illustrated, Virtue, it means a ' provisional definition. '
23. ἐπειδάν τις ἔρηται αὐτούς κτέ. : the geometrical problem
here may claim a second place to that of the Nuptial
Number in Rep. VIII 546 for exercising the ingenuity of
commentators. A difference, however, may be noted. In the
Republic certain words (545 E) do at least give a shadow of
excuse for the view that the problem is not to be taken
seriously. There is nothing of the sort here, and the fact that
we have here undoubtedly to deal with a seriously intended
problem gives support to those who take a similar view of that
in the Pepublic.
' Virorum doctorum XXII diversas de hoc loco sententias et
conjecturas congessit Patze, comm. de loco math. in Pl. Menone,
Susati 1832 ; recentiores enumerat Schultz, Jahrb. f. Philol.
1882, p. 19 sqq.'-Fr. See Addendum I p. 232.
I follow the interpretation put forward by Prof. Butcher
J.P. XVII pp. 219 foll. ( 1888 ) , and render thus :
'When any one asks for instance with regard to a rect-
angle, whether it is possible for this rectangle to be distributed
as a triangle within this circle, one might say, " I do not
know yet whether it has the required property ; but I think,
if I may so put it, that I have a certain serviceable hypothesis
of the following nature : if the rectangle be such that when
you extend it along the given line (i.e. the diameter) of the
circle, it is defective by another rectangle similar to the

original one, then one result follows ; if not, there is a different

result. " 2 "In other words ' (here, and in the notes that follow,
quotation-marks indicate that I borrow Prof. Butcher's words)
' if, when you apply the given rectangle ABCD to the diameter
BH of the circle, it falls short of the completed rectangle ABHG
upon the diameter by a rectangle DCHG similar to the original
XXII 87 A NOTES 149

rectangle, then a triangle BDF may be inscribed in the circle

whose diameter is BH, which triangle is equal in area to the
original rectangle.
Since the rectangles ABCD and DCHG are similar, it
follows that BC : CD :: CD : CH ;
the point D lies on the circle whose diameter is BH
(BDH being a rt. 4).
' If DC is produced till CF = DC, the point F will also be on
the circle.'
(The triangle BDF consists of the two triangles BDC and
BCF, which are obviously equal to the two triangles BDC,
ADB, of which the rectangle ABCD is composed. )
' It is worth observing that the above solution depends on
CD being a mean proportional between the segments of the
diameter, and that mean proportionals were among the subjects
of chief interest in mathematics in Plato's time.'
24. τόδε τὸ χωρίον : that χωρίον may here be taken for a 87 Α
rectangle is shown by Benecke ( Elbing 1867). Cp. Butcher :
' The technical MeíTe here suggests reference to a parallelo-
gram, and in geometrical problems dealing with parallelograms
the right angle was constantly assumed. ' See on 82 C 4.
25. τρίγωνον ἐνταθῆναι : τρίγωνον must be taken adverbially.
See on 30. The problem cannot be whether a triangle equal to
a given area can be inscribed in a given circle ; for this can
always be done provided that the given area is not greater
than that of the equilateral triangle, i.e. the maximum triangle,
which can be inscribed in the given circle. ' Some such limita-
tion of the problem as that adopted in the rendering given above
must be assumed. With this limitation the converse hypothesis
will also hold ; if the rectangle DCHG is not similar, the required
distribution cannot take place. And it is necessary that the
converse hypothesis should also hold, if the illustration is to be
an apt one for Plato's purpose.
Plato's geometrical terminology is loose ; but the brief and
imperfect expression here is, perhaps, partly due to the fact
that he is presenting a well-known problem.
The regular word for ' inscribing, ' e.g. a triangle in a circle,
is ἐγγράφειν, used by Hippocrates. ἐντείνειν after the present
passage entirely drops out of geometrical language, so far as
recorded, until we come to Proclus in the fifth century A. D.
(See E. F. August Zur Kenntnis der geometrischen Methode der
Alten in besonderer Beziehung aufdie platonische Stelle in Meno,
Berlin 1844. ) In Proclus it occurs twice in one passage, of
which a part is quoted on 80 D 1 (footnote), but the passage
does not help us to the exact meaning here.
150 ΜΕΝΟ XXII 87 A

26. ὥσπερ : for this parenthetic use of ὥσπερ see 71 Α 20

and note.
μέν : Madvig adv. crit. I 413 proposed μέντοι, needlessly.
For μέν with ἀλλά, not answered by δέ, see Crito 43D, Prot.
344 A. The antithesis to μév is anticipated in the negative
clause which precedes ȧXXά . (It is just possible we should
read ὥσπερ μέ τινα. )
27. προύργου · ἔχειν : ‘ i.e. ἀνυσίμως ἔχειν Fr. But I can
find no instance of προύργου adv. with ἔχειν = εἶναι; and should
rather take ὑπόθεσιν as object of ἔχειν = have, and προὔργου,
indecl. adj. , as oblique predicate.
29. οἷον : Fr. says οἷον = ὥστε, quoting 100 A 7 (τοιοῦτος οἷος
ποιῆσαι), and Euthyphr. 11 A ἔστιν οἷον φιλεῖσθαι.
παρὰ τὴν δοθεῖσαν αὐτοῦ γραμμήν : Here αὐτοῦ might
at first be supposed to refer to χωρίον and not to κύκλος. But
the sense requires the reference to κύκλος ; otherwise there is no
mention of the circle in this clause, which defines the relations
that must exist between the circle and the χωρίον. αὐτοῦ can
hardly in any case refer to χωρίον ; you can get no sense out of
' applying a figure to a given side of itself. ') ' The reference of
αὐτοῦ το κύκλος is less harsh if we bear in mind that the cases
of aurós are capable of a vague use which no English pronoun
can bear.' Cp. , e.g. , αὐτοῦ at Β 34. “ The γραμμή of the
circle will denote its diameter in precisely a similar way, as the
side of the square is repeatedly called the ypaμun of the square
(e.g. 82 E, etc. ). ' Buttmann, however (Excursus II), thought
that there was a lacuna, which he supplied by reading παρὰ τὴν
δοθεῖσαν < τοῦ κύκλου διάμετρον κατὰ τὴν δοθεῖσαν > αὐτοῦ
γραμμήν κτέ.
παρατείναντα ἐλλείπειν : the only other place in any
classical author where παρατείνειν occurs as a geometrical term
is in Rep. 527 Α. It is noteworthy that Plato there includes
it among the terms in vogue in the utilitarian geometry which
he disparages, perhaps not without reference to the present
problem. The usual phrase is παραβάλλειν, which Euclid uses
i 44, etc. , and vi 27 , 28, 29 , where the problems are similar to
the present. παρατείνειν was thought to have disappeared
entirely from the geometrical vocabulary after Plato, till
August found it in some scholia on Euclid in a Munich MS. ,
from which he restored it almost with certainty in Proclus'
commentary on Euclid I 44 : ἔστι γὰρ ἀρχαῖα, φασὶν οἱ περὶ τὸν
Εὔδημον, καὶ τῆς τῶν Πυθαγορείων μούσης εὑρήματα ταῦτα, ἥ τε
παραβολὴ τῶν χωρίων, καὶ ἡ ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἡ ἔλλειψις. ὅταν γὰρ
εὐθείας ἐκκειμένης τὸ δοθὲν χωρίον πάσῃ τῇ εὐθείᾳ συμπαρα-
< τείνηται, τότε παρα- > βάλλειν ἐκεῖνο τὸ χωρίον φασίν κτέ.
XXII 87 A NOTES 151

August holds that this place in Proclus shows that Tapaтelvev

and rapaẞáe are synonymous ; and this may be accepted.
(See Allman Greek Geometryfrom Thales to Euclid p. 25 note e. )
Next, as to the case of Tapaтeivavra. If the accusative is
retained , elTew must be taken with a personal subject,
'you have a deficiency.' In Euclid (vi 28, etc. ) it is always
the area that is said λeíπew . But, in other senses than the
geometrical, Meiπw is constantly used with a personal subject :
Polybius, for instance, says 'Αννίβας ἐνέλειπε τοῖς ἱππικοῖς (χν
3. 5). By a similar personalization ' we say ' I am short of
money.' This view is taken by Buttmann, who translates ' Si
est ejusmodi ut qui illud applicaverit deficiat. ' Benecke
follows him, observing that if Plato had written olov . .
παρατεταμένον ἐλλείπειν the construction would have been
smooth enough, but he wanted Tаρатeтаµévov in the next line,
and desired to avoid repeating the word. Plato therefore
changed the construction to the active. I believe Plato chose
the acc. rather than the dat. or gen. because it was distinctly
masculine, and could by no possibility be taken as agreeing
with any other word in the sentence. We have here a principle
that may be called ' dissimilation of cases, ' which Prof. Jebb
well illustrates by his note on Soph . Ant. 546—
μηδ᾽ ἃ μὴ ᾽θιγες
ποιοῦ σεαυτῆς.
He explains the unusual acc. with Ayyavw by saying that v
would have been intolerable on account of the second gen. after
TOLOU. Cp. Aesch. P.V. 233. I think then we may hesitate
to change raparεívavтa, especially in a passage whose expression
still leaves much uncertain. Serranus (followed by Mollweide)
read παρατείναντι, Wex παρατείναντος. Another possibility is
that a word has fallen out, as παρατείναντα < εὑρεῖν > ἐλλείπειν.
Herm. , Sch. , Fr. all keep арareivavтa , the last remarking that
as Plato uses vπeрßáλew in both constructions (impersonal and
personal), so he may possibly have used eiπeV.
30. As to the problem in general, little space can be given
to the discussion of other proposed solutions. Mollweide,
whose explanation Buttmann gives in his Excursus II, saw
that the key to it is the fact that a right-angled triangle can be
cut up into two similar triangles. But he made the mistake of
translating εἰ οἷόν τε τόδε τὸ χωρίον τρίγωνον ἐνταθῆναι ‘ if this
triangular figure can be inscribed.' Buttmann, who criticises
Mollweide's solution, takes the words in the same way. But
see on 25 and Addendum II p. 232.
Other solutions take the xwpía to be squares ; some of the
critics supposing that the squares already drawn for the previous
152 ΜΕΝΟ XXII 87 A

problem are used for the purpose. Such are Benecke's solution
(quoted by Prof. Butcher) and that of Schultze, adopted by Fr.
with the somewhat premature eulogy palmaris interpretatio.'
Schultze takes avтoû ( line 29) of the side of the square, making
the square to be applied to a side of itself. One objection to
making the problem refer to squares is that it then could only
refer to the size of the given squares and you would expect
τοσοῦτον ὅσον and τοσούτῳ ὅσον rather than τοιοῦτον οἷον and
TOLOÚTY Olov in lines 28 and 30. Moreover, the vπólεσis would
then cease to have any general character. Buttmann objects to
taking TOLOÛTOV Olov of similar figures, observing that the Greek
for this is oμoîov. No doubt it is in Euclid, but is it in Plato ?
See on 82 C 10.
There may possibly be an allusion to our problem in Aristot.
Anal. Post. I i 4 quoted on 80 D 1.
The chief criticism to which the solution adopted is open, is
that it seems a rather roundabout way of ascertaining a very
simple point. Apply the side BC of the rectangle to the
diameter BH of the circle ; then if the point D falls on the
circle the required condition is satisfied ; if not, not. What
need of the intermediate vπóleσis at all ? We can only suppose
that Plato regarded the direct application to the circle as im-
practicable, and the length of the diameter (Tǹv dobeîoav
Ypaμun ) as the only real datum .
But if we further ask whether the geometrical illustration
really helps us, or casts a light on the hypothetical method ,'
we shall be obliged to say, ' Very little. ' The passage, like the
more formidable one on the Nuptial Number, is simply an
excrescence. Dr. Gow (History of Greek Mathematics p. 175)
quotes from Hankel, who says that the text is unnecessarily
difficult for describing so simple a fact, and adds, " I am inclined
to think that Plato was fond of showing off his mathematics. '
In fact, Plato was rather an enthusiast for mathematics than a
mathematician. His vivid mind was no doubt impressed, to
an extent excessive even among Greeks, by the amazing cunning
manifested in the properties of space and number. He wrote,
as we are told, over the door of the Academy, µndeis åɣew-
μέτρητος εἰσίτω, thus exacting an entrance examination in
geometry from all the alumni of his University. But his
direct services to geometry (or mathematics generally) were
small. Dr. Allman (Greek Geometry p. 215) quotes from the
summary of Eudemus ' History ofGeometry, preserved in Proclus :
Πλάτων δ' ἐπὶ τούτοις (viz. Hippocrates of Chios and Theodorus
of Cyrene) γενόμενος, μεγίστην ἐποίησεν ἐπίδοσιν τά τε ἄλλα
μαθήματα καὶ τὴν γεωμετρίαν λαβεῖν διὰ τὴν περὶ αὐτὰ σπουδήν,
ὅς που δῆλός ἐστι καὶ τὰ συγγράμματα τοῖς μαθηματικοῖς λόγοις
XXIII 87 c NOTES 153

καταπυκνώσας ( ‘ cramming ) καὶ πανταχοῦ τὸ περὶ αὐτὰ θαῦμα

τῶν φιλοσοφίας ἀντεχομένων ἐπεγείρων. Dr. Allman adds, The
way in which Plato is here spoken of is in striking contrast to
that in which Eudemus has in his summary written of the
promoters of geometry. ' Cp. Grote I 219 note.
33. τὸ συμβαῖνον · eľte ádúvatov : note the ' prolepsis ' ;
see on 71 A 25.
35. ETE μn : see on 86 D 12. Buttmann thinks that un here B
is due to the fact that elTe .. ElTe here is an alternative
condition (sive . sive), not a double question (utrum . . . an).
This can hardly be maintained.

CHAPTER XXIII
1. What follows exemplifies the process described in Phaedo
101 D E. Here the vπóleois as to Virtue is that it comes under
the genus Knowledge. The consequence of this róleσis is
stated ; in this case it must be didaкTÓV. Then at C 19 the
Tóleσis itself is investigated, by being referred to a higher
Vπóleσis, ' Virtue is good." (Cp. Phaedo 101 D äλλýν aû úπóðεσLV
ὑποθέμενος, ἥτις τῶν ἄνωθεν βελτίστη φαίνοιτο ἕως ἐπί τι ἱκανὸν
ἔλθοις. ) This ὑπόθεσις μένει ἡμῖν (D 25).
3. εἴτε οὐ διδακτόν ἐστιν : see on 86 D 12.
4. εἰ ποιόν τί ἐστι : see on 86 D 8. Stallb. quotes Hipp.
maj. 288 Α εἰ τί ἐστιν αὐτὸ τὸ καλόν, ταῦτ᾽ ἂν εἴη καλά ;
'Under what class of mental attributes must Virtue fall for
it to be teachable, and under what for it to be otherwise ? '
Note the elasticity of phrase. Here we have TŵY TEρÌ THY
Yuxu (cp. Rep. 618 D), at 88 A, С тà KаTà тǹν xý , at 88 C
τῶν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ. The prepositions represent a series of metaphors
by which Plato expresses his meaning ; cp. on 73 D 5. The
later phraseology of the Philebus (11 D), ë§iv ¥vxês kaì diáßeσi ,
is more abstract and technical, and so nearer to modern idiom .
6. πρŵтоν μÉV KTẻ. , ' to begin with, if it be of a class different
from Knowledge will it be teachable or not ? ' Cp. C 21 .
8. åvaµvηotóv, ' capable of being acquired by reminiscence.'
The word does not occur elsewhere, but is formed on the analogy
of διδακτόν, etc. See on 70 A 2.
διαφερέτω δὲ μηδέν : Plato attends to one thing at a time.
10. The hypothesis is a double one : if it is émotýμn it is C
didakтóv ; if not, not. See on A 25, 98 D 35. For ἐπιστήμη
TIS see 73 E 17 and D 30, 31 below, and cp. 89 A 20.
 154 MENO XXIII 87 c

17. τούτου μὲν ἄρα κτέ , ‘ we have quickly disposed of this

stage.'
18. τοιοῦδε . • τοιούδε : a few inferior MSS. put in μή
before the second τοιούδε. 'Sedulo in proximis quoque cavere
videtur Plato, ne distinguat inter ἐπιστήμην et οὐκ ἐπιστήμην,
cujus loco ponit ἀλλοῖον ἐπιστήμης. Itaque hic etiam non dicit
μὴ τοιοῦδε, sed bis τοιούδε, ut species positione notionis servetur
in utroque. ' Buttm .

Chapters XXIII (87 C 19 ) to XXV (89 B). SOCR. But is

Virtue Knowledge ? We may find sure ground in the
position that Virtue is good and beneficial, that is, good
to us. Now as to goods of the body and external goods,
we see they only become good to us when the mind uses them
rightly; as to goods of the mind, they are only beneficial
when under the conduct of Wisdom. We may conclude,
then, that Virtue is Wisdom (Þpóvnois), or a branch of it.
This leads to the corollary that Virtue is not inborn in men.
D 23. τοῦτο μετὰ τοῦτο σκεπτέον εἶναι : Riddell § 18. Prot.
323 c τοῦτό σοι μετὰ τοῦτο πειράσομαι ἀποδεῖξαι. Laws 658 D
τίς οὖν ὀρθῶς νενικηκὼς εἴη ; τοῦτο μετὰ τοῦτο : ' this is the next
question.'
25. αὐτὸ εἶναι τὴν ἀρετήν : Riddell § 215. Prot. 360 E Ti
ποτ᾽ ἐστὶν αὐτό, ἡ ἀρετή, etc. Cp. 73 C 2.
29. The phraseology here is very careful, and should be
compared with 89 D and 99 A, where the position that ȧpeTŃ
is ἐπιστήμη is modified.
35. κal μýv clearly marks a fresh stage in the argument.
E 37. εἰ δὲ ἀγαθοί, ὠφέλιμοι : see on 77 D 35.
πάντα γὰρ τἀγαθὰ ὠφέλιμα : ' probandi negotio Plato h.l.
supersedet, quia Prot. 333 D sqq. hic locus copiose tractatus
est ' Fr. See especially Prot. 334 A-c.
40. kal ʼn åpeτn dǹ wþ.: dý, ´of course. '

CHAPTER XXIV
2. ποιά ἐστιν ἃ ἡμᾶς ὠφελεϊ : Dr. Reid in his note on
Cic. Acad. I § 19 says that the τρίας οι τριλογία τῶν ἀγαθῶν
i.e. the division of goods into mental, bodily, and external, in
the distinct shape which it assumed in later Greek philosophy,
is foreign both to Plato and Aristotle. Here the bodily and
XXIV 87 E NOTES 155
external bona are first mentioned ; the bona mentis appear
presently at 88 A 15, kept separate from the others for a reason
which appears at 88 E 14. The distinction between bona
corporis and bona externa is not emphasised, but both classes
are represented, as at 78 B, C, where the bona mentis are
conspicuous by their absence. We have similar popular views
of bona, confined to bona corporis and externa, Gorg. 451 Ε,
based on the scolion attributed to Simonides :
ὑγιαίνειν μὲν ἄριστον ἀνδρὶ θνατῷ,
δεύτερον δὲ φυὰν καλὸν γενέσθαι,
τὸ τρίτον δὲ πλουτεῖν ἀδόλως
καὶ τὸ τέταρτον ἡβᾶν μετὰ τῶν φίλων.
Here we have health and beauty (bona corporis) ; wealth and
friends (externa). Cp. Laws 661Α τὰ γὰρ ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν
λεγόμενα ἀγαθὰ οὐκ ὀρθῶς λέγεται. λέγεται γὰρ ὡς ἄριστον μὲν
ὑγιαίνειν, δεύτερον δὲ κάλλος, τρίτον δὲ πλοῦτος, μύρια δὲ ἄλλα
ἀγαθὰ λέγεται. ( See for the sequel note on 88 Α 7. ) Cp . Ηipp.
maj. 291 D.
At Gorg. 467 Ε οὐκοῦν λέγεις ἀγαθὸν μὲν σοφίαν τε καὶ
ὑγίειαν καὶ πλοῦτον καὶ τἄλλα τὰ τοιαῦτα, we have samples of
each of the three classes. At Euthyd. 279 A-C in answer to
6
the question What things are good to us ? ' first is suggested
τὸ πλουτεῖν. Next τὸ ὑγιαίνειν καὶ τὸ καλὸν εἶναι καὶ τἄλλα
κατὰ τὸ σῶμα ἱκανῶς παρεσκευάσθαι. Then we return to externa,
εὐγένειαί τε καὶ δυνάμεις καὶ τιμαὶ ἐν τῇ ἑαυτοῦ. ' What yet
remains ?' says Socrates. ‘ Why, τὸ σώφρονά τε εἶναι καὶ
δίκαιον καὶ ἀνδρεῖον. ” Then, last but not least, comes σοφία.
Socrates mischievously pretends that evruxia has been for-
gotten, but shows that its addition is unnecessary.
One of the most elaborate enumerations of ȧya@á in Plato
is in Laws 631 B foll. , where the division is twofold, not
threefold, though bona corporis and externa are both
represented : διπλᾶ δὲ ἀγαθά ἐστι, τὰ μὲν ἀνθρώπινα, τὰ δὲ
θεῖα, ἤρτηται δ᾽ ἐκ τῶν θείων θάτερα · καὶ ἐὰν μὲν δέχηταί
τις τὰ μείζονα πόλις, κτᾶται καὶ τὰ ἐλάττονα, εἰ δὲ μή, στέρεται
ἀμφοῖν. ἔστι δὲ τὰ μὲν ἐλάττονα ὧν ἡγεῖται μὲν υγίεια,
κάλλος δὲ δεύτερον, τὸ δὲ τρίτον ἰσχὺς εἴς τε δρόμον καὶ
εἰς τὰς ἄλλας πάσας κινήσεις τῷ σώματι , τέταρτον δὲ δὴ
πλοῦτος οὐ τυφλὸς ἀλλ᾽ ὀξὺ βλέπων, ἄνπερ ἅμ᾽ ἕπηται φρονήσει ·
8 δὴ πρῶτον αὖ τῶν θείων ἡγεμονοῦν ἐστὶν ἀγαθῶν, ἡ
φρόνησις, δεύτερον δὲ μετὰ νοῦν σώφρων ψυχῆς ἕξις, ἐκ δὲ
τούτων μετ᾿ ἀνδρείας κραθέντων τρίτον ἂν εἴη δικαιοσύνη,
τέταρτον δὲ ἀνδρεία.
Ibid . 697 A B we have a recognition of three grades of
honour among ἀγαθά : ἔστι δὲ ὀρθῶς ἄρα τιμιώτατα μὲν καὶ
 156 ΜΕΝΟ XXIV 87 E

πρῶτα τὰ περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ἀγαθὰ κεῖσθαι, σωφροσύνης ὑπαρχούσης

αὐτῇ, δεύτερα δὲ τὰ περὶ τὸ σῶμα καλὰ καὶ ἀγαθά, καὶ τρίτα
τὰ περὶ τὴν οὐσίαν καὶ χρήματα λεγόμενα. Cp. 743 E and Ep.
viii 355 B. See the list of ἀγαθά in Aristot. Rhet. I vi §§ 8–16 ,
and II xxi 5 (with Cope's note).
The distinction between bona mentis and other bona is far
more important than the subdivision of the latter. Plato's
view, which really rests on a dichotomy,
Bona

bona mentis cetera bona

bona corporis bona externa

is more philosophical than the later τριλογία, which made the

three classes co -ordinate. Diog. Laertius III 80 quotes Aristotle
as ascribing to Plato the statement τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἐστὶ τὰ μὲν ἐν
ψυχῇ, τὰ δὲ ἐν σώματι, τὰ δὲ ἐκτός. Plato's writings, as has been
seen, give some colour to this statement, which nevertheless
does not accurately represent his position.
3. καὶ πλοῦτος δή, ' and wealth of course : ‘ καὶ— δή seriem
aliquam claudit cum vi. ' Buttmann on Dem. Mid. (21 ) § 20.
88 A 7. ἐνίοτε καὶ βλάπτειν, ‘ are sometimes positively in-
jurious. ' Cp. Hipp. maj. 284 D τίθεται μέν, οἶμαι , ὠφελίας
ἕνεκα, ἐνίοτε δὲ καὶ βλάπτει, ἐὰν κακῶς τεθῇ ὁ νόμος. Cp. on
71 B 8.
Of the argument that follows, showing the sovereignty of
φρόνησις, we have already had a hint at 78 C foll. See Phaedo
69 A for a strong statement of the doctrine ; also Hipp. maj.
295 F foll., already referred to on 77 Β 12. Cp. Xen. Oec.
I§§ 12-14. The argument is developed in the most elaborate
form in the Euthydemus cc. viii-x (278 E-282 E) and cc. xvii-xix
( 288 Α-293 Α) . Fr. quotes 281 D κινδυνεύει σύμπαντα, ἃ τὸ πρῶ-
τον ἔφαμεν ἀγαθὰ εἶναι· . ἐὰν μὲν αὐτῶν ἡγῆται ἀμαθία, μείζω
κακὰ εἶναι τῶν ἐναντίων ὅσῳ δυνατώτερα ὑπηρετεῖν τῷ ἡγουμένῳ
κακῷ ὄντι · ἐὰν δὲ φρόνησίς τε καὶ σοφία, μείζω ἀγαθά · αὐτὰ δὲ
καθ᾽ αὑτὰ οὐδέτερα αὐτῶν οὐδενὸς ἄξια εἶναι. Note 280 De,
and 288 E foll. , where it is shown that Wealth is not a Good
per se ; if we possessed the secret of turning mountains into
gold it would not advantage us if we did not know how to
use the gold ; and the same is true of immortality : see on
86 A 8. Cp. Laws 661Bc (after the popular enumeration
XXIV 88 B NOTES 157

of bona corporis and externa) ὑμεῖς δὲ καὶ ἐγώ που τάδε λέγομεν,
ὡς ταῦτά ἐστι ξύμπαντα δικαίοις μὲν καὶ ὁσίοις ἀνδράσιν ἄριστα
κτήματα, ἀδίκοις δὲ κάκιστα ξύμπαντα, ἀρξάμενα ἀπὸ τῆς ὑγιείας
κτέ. See on C 32.
The very full treatment of the subject given in the
Euthydemus, set beside the concise, though not immature,
treatment here, suggests the view that the Euthydemus was
published before the Meno, on the principle adduced by Dr.
Thompson on Gorg. 467 E : Plato will often be found to take
for granted in a later what he has been at great pains to prove
in an earlier dialogue. ' See Intr. § 18.
.
10. ὅταν τί ἡγῆται : see on 86 D 8.
16. σωφροσύνην τι καλεῖς : see on 75E 12. The list of
bona mentis here differs from that at 74 A in that evμalía and
μνήμη are added, representing the διανοητικαὶ ἀρεταί of Aristotle,
distinguished from the ἠθικαὶ ἀρεταί (NE. I xiii 20) ; σοφία is
omitted, to be introduced presently, on a different level from
the other virtues, as ἐπιστήμη, φρόνησις or νοῦς.
22. olov avspeía : this is an instance of ' Binary Structure ' ; B
it was only necessary to have ȧvôpeía once, as the subject of
φρόνησίς ἐστι ; as it is, we have for the sake of emphasis oἷον
avopeía (scil. éσTí), a part of the thought put forward intro-
ductory of the rest. Fr. quotes Euthyd. 301 E " olov Boûs kal
πρόβατα, ἆρ᾽ ἂν ἡγοῖο ταῦτα σὰ εἶναι ; For oἷον, velut, see on
76 A 20.
23. εἰ μὴ ἔστι φρόνησις ἡ ἀνδρεία : the doctrine that
avopeía, like other Virtues, may be reduced to opóvnois, is
Socratic (Zeller Socr. p. 144) . Xen. Mem. IV 6. 11 oi μèv
ἄρα ἐπιστάμενοι τοῖς δεινοῖς τε καὶ ἐπικινδύνοις καλῶς χρῆσθαι
ἀνδρεῖοί εἰσιν, οἱ δὲ διαμαρτάνοντες τούτου δειλοί. In several
of Plato's earlier dialogues the same view is taken. In Apol.
29 A B a particular kind of Cowardice, the fear of Death, is
shown to spring from a certain kind of ἀμαθία. In the
Protagoras the doctrine ' Virtue is Knowledge ' is defended all
round. Courage, which seems to give most difficulty to the
thesis, is dealt with first in ch. xxxiv ( 349 E-350 c) but in a
way that arouses objection from Protagoras, and is clearly
not intended to be satisfactory. The final proof comes in
ch. xxxix, the conclusion being reached at 360 D, σopía
ἄρα τῶν δεινῶν καὶ μὴ δεινῶν ἀνδρεία ἐστίν. Neither the brave
man nor the coward goes to meet what he believes to be rà
devά ; but the brave man knows what really are devá, the
coward does not. To that exposition the present passage of
the Meno looks back. The dialogue Laches, which must
probably be regarded as earlier than the Protagoras, is devoted
158 ΜΕΝΟ XXIV 88 B

to an examination of the virtue Courage. (Note the similarity

of illustration at Lach. 193 BC and Prot. 350 A. ) Laches, who
is no philosopher (see on 71 E 1 ), at 192 B gives as a definition
of Courage καρτερία τις τῆς ψυχῆς. But, says Socrates, καρτερία
μετ᾿ ἀφροσύνης is βλαβερὰ καὶ κακοῦργος. We must amend
the definition by saying φρόνιμος καρτερία. Then the question
comes ἡ εἰς τί φρόνιμος ; Mere technical intelligence as to the
conditions of the combat it cannot be ; for the man who fights
knowing he is at a disadvantage is the braver. Laches is at
fault. Nikias is appealed to. He has already imbibed some-
thing of Socrates' teaching, and, objecting to Laches ' definition,
says to Socrates ( 194 D ) πολλάκις ἀκήκοά σου λέγοντος, ὅτι
ταῦτα ἀγαθὸς ἕκαστος ἡμῶν ἅπερ σοφός, ἃ δὲ ἀμαθής, ταῦτα
δὲ κακός. He presently defines Courage as τὴν τῶν δεινῶν
καὶ θαρραλέων ἐπιστήμην. Nikias may be taken as representing
the actual position of Socrates. He soon shows (195 c D)
that he sees the knowledge that constitutes Courage to be
something much more than the mere technical knowledge of
arms, etc. The final and most important argument comes in
cc. xxvii-xxix (198 A- 199 E). (We often find Plato making his
ideal Socrates criticise the views the real Socrates held. See
Intr. p. xxxix. ) In these chapters we are led up to a conception
of the Supreme Art, the knowledge of Good and Evil, through
which all other Arts and Virtues are made beneficial. (This
is the Kingly Art of Euthydemus 291 в foll. where, however, a
further problem is raised . ) Courage then (199 C D) becomes
οὐ μόνον δεινῶν καὶ θαρραλέων ἐπιστήμη ἀλλὰ σχεδόν
τι ἡ περὶ πάντων ἀγαθῶν τε καὶ κακῶν καὶ πάντως ἐχόντων.
' But a man who knows thus much ' (so Grote summarises the
sequel), 6 cannot be destitute of any part of Virtue. He must
possess Temperance and Justice as well as Courage. Courage
therefore, according to your definition , is not a part of Virtue,
it is the whole.' A solution of the problem on what the
differentiation of the Virtues rests is first offered by Plato in
the Republic.
From this point till 89 c for Thun we find substituted the
term opóvŋois, the mental faculty correlative to it.
οἷον θάρρος τι : for the relation of ἀνδρεία to θάρρος see
Prot. ch. xxxiv ; the conclusion οὐ ταὐτὸν εἶναι θάρσος καὶ
ȧvôpelav is enunciated by Protagoras (351 a). θάρσος οι θάρρος
(which of course must be carefully distinguished from Opáσos and
θρασύτης) differ from ἀνδρεία by being a mere emotion without
rational basis. Oápoos is the antithesis of póẞos (rather than
déos : see Prot. 358 E with J. & A. M. Adam's note there) and
so is coupled with it ( Tim. 69 D) in the list of passions, táppos
καὶ φόβον, ἄφρονε ξυμβούλω.
XXIV 88 c NOTES 159

27. οὐκοῦν καὶ σωφροσύνη ὡσαύτως καὶ εὐμαθία : the

rest of the Virtues are not treated seriatim.
As to σωφροσύνη we are told of Socrates by Xenophon (Mem. III
9. 4) σοφίαν δὲ καὶ σωφροσύνην οὐ διώριζεν, ἀλλὰ τῷ τὰ μὲν καλά
τε καὶ ἀγαθὰ γιγνώσκοντα χρῆσθαι αὐτοῖς, καὶ τῷ τὰ αἰσχρὰ εἰδότα
εὐλαβεῖσθαι σοφόν τε καὶ σώφρονα ἔκρινε. The earlier treatment
οι σωφροσύνη to which the present passage looks back is chiefly
to be found in the Protagoras. In ch. xx (332 A- 333 B) we
have the identity of σοφία and σωφροσύνη grounded on the
argument that they both have the same opposite, ἀφροσύνη.
But this merely verbal argument is subsidiary to the more
general one in cc. xxxV, xxxvi, xxxvii (351 Β-357 Ε), already
referred to on 77 Β 12 as illustrating the doctrine οὐδεὶς ἑκὼν
κακός. It is a mistake to talk of a man as ' overcome by
pleasure.' Say rather that he mistakes in the measuring or
valuing of different pleasures and pains.
The dialogue Charmides is devoted to an examination of the
Virtue Temperance, in some respects analogous to the treatment
of Courage in the Laches. The criticism of the first two
definitions of Temperance as ( 1 ) ήσυχιότης τις 159 3, ( 2) αιδώς
160 E, go chiefly to show that Temperance is not a merely
negative notion. See on 76 C 16. (It is unnecessary to
suppose that the criticism of the first definition is directed
against the view of the Gorgias that makes кóσμos an element
in σωφροσύνη. See Dr. Thompson's note on 507 Α . ) The
remaining definitions, τὸ τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν, τὸ γνῶναι ἑαυτόν
κτέ. , which emanate from Critias, are near akin to the Socratic
view. The most important part of the criticism, which is very
elaborate, is reached at 173 D : if σωφροσύνη be identified with
ἐπιστήμη we have yet to find the link connecting it with the
Beneficial and the Good : ὅτι δ᾽ ἐπιστημόνως ἂν πράττοντες εὖ ἂν
πράττοιμεν καὶ εὐδαιμονοῦμεν, τοῦτο δὲ οὔπω δυνάμεθα μαθεῖν, ὦ
φίλε Κριτία. We are thus again led to the question, ' What
knowledge constitutes the Master-art ? ' ' Knowledge of Good
and Evil, says Critias. " Ω μιαρε, ἔφην εγώ, πάλαι με περιέλκεις
κύκλῳ, ἀποκρυπτόμενος ὅτι οὐ τὸ ἐπιστημόνως ἢν ζῆν τὸ εὖ πράττειν
τε καὶ εὐδαιμονεῖν ποιοῦν, οὐδὲ ξυμπασῶν τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιστημῶν, ἀλλὰ
μιᾶς οὔσης ταύτης μόνον τῆς περὶ τὸ ἀγαθόν τε καὶ κακόν ( 174 Β).
28. See Appendix on the text. The order σωφροσύνη—
εὐμαθία — μανθανόμενα — καταρτνόμενα is chiastic. The only
other place in Plato where καταρτύειν ( ‘ discipline ' or ' regulate )
occurs is Laws 808 D παῖς ἔχει πηγὴν τοῦ φρονεῖν μήπω κατηρτυ-
μένην. The word is rather poetical.
33. ἐπιχειρήματα και καρτερήματα, ' active and passive C
effort. ' The words do not correspond with μανθανόμενα and
 160 ΜΕΝΟ XXIV 88 c

καταρτνόμενα, but are a general and exhaustive division of moral

energy. The word καρτέρημα appears to be coined for the
occasion.
ἡγουμένης μὲν φρονήσεως : ep. Prot. 352B δοκεῖ δὲ τοῖς
πολλοῖς περὶ ἐπιστήμης τοιοῦτόν τι, οὐκ ἰσχυρὸν οὐδ᾽ ἡγεμονικόν,
οὐδ᾽ ἀρχικὸν εἶναι. With the Stoics τὸ ἡγεμονικόν became the
technical term for Reason. Cp. also the simile in Phaedr.
246 A foll. , where Reason is the ἡνίοχος and Courage and
Appetite the steeds. In the list of the virtues that constitute
the philosophic character (Rep. 485 B foll. ) first comes the love
of Eternal Truth, that is, σοφία : from this we deduce the
other virtues (τὸν ἄλλον τῆς φιλοσόφου φύσεως χόρον 490 c) in
orderly sequence . μή πῃ δοκοῦμέν σοι οὐκ ἀναγκαῖα ἕκαστα
διεληλυθέναι καὶ ἑπόμενα ἀλλήλοις ; says Socrates (486 E) after
the enumeration. The list corresponds very nearly to that
at 88 A 16. See on A 7.
38. ἀναγκαῖον αὐτῷ ὠφελίμῳ εἶναι : the dative ὠφελίμῳ is
due to Attraction ' ; cp. Ηipp. maj. 2943 ἀνάγκη αὐτοῖς
μεγάλοις εἶναι. — Rid. § 183. Cp. 81 E 17.

CHAPTER XXV
D 2. πλοῦτόν τε καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα : these words are introduced
to explain τἆλλα, namely, the bona corporis and bona externa
which he has dealt with at 87 E foll. They interrupt the
construction, but there is no reason to follow Hirschig in
bracketing the words τοτὲ μὲν ἀγαθὰ τοτὲ δὲ βλαβερὰ εἶναι.
5. ἐποίει, ' makes, as we saw ' ; see on 83 D 52.
E 13. κατὰ πάντων : see on 73 D 5.
14. εἰς τὴν ψυχὴν ἀνηρτῆσθαι : literally dependere ' ; for
the word cp. Menex. 247 E ; for the matter Laws 631 в (quoted
on 87 E 2) and 963 Α ΚΛ. Τὴν δέ γε ἀρετὴν τέτταρα ἔθεμέν που.
ΑΘ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. ΚΛ. Νοῦν δέ γε τούτων πάντων ἡγεμόνα
πρὸς ὃν δὴ τά τε ἄλλα πάντα καὶ τούτων τὰ τρία δεῖ βλέπειν. For
the supremacy of yuxń generally over things of the Body, etc.
see Gorg. 465 c ; the true and false arts of the Body are easily
distinguished ; those of the Soul are not so : if the Soul did
not provide a Court of Appeal in the case of arts of the Body
(εἰ μὴ ἡ ψυχὴ τῷ σώματι ἐπεστάτει) discrimination there would
be impossible. Cp. Phaedo 79 Ε ἐπειδὰν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ὦσι ψυχὴ
καὶ σῶμα, τῷ μὲν δουλεύειν καὶ ἄρχεσθαι ἡ φύσις προστάττει,
τῇ δὲ ἄρχειν καὶ δεσπόζειν.
89 A 17. φρόνησις is predicate.
XXV 89 A NOTES 161

20. φρόνησιν again is predicate. The argument in bare

syllogistic form is
All ὠφέλιμον is φρόνησις.
All ἀρετή is ὠφέλιμον.
Α11 ἀρετή is φρόνησις.
With ξύμπασαν supply ἀρετήν ; and with μέρος τι, ἀρετῆς.
Wherever Virtue is found φρόνησις is found. But the notion
Virtue may include other elements (μέρη) besides φρόνησις.
24. οὐκ ἂν εἶεν φύσει οἱ ἀγαθοί : the form of the apodosis
ἂν εἶεν is only a polite modification of the indicative. For this
form of the conditional sentence ep. Apol. 25 Β πολλὴ γὰρ ἂν
εὐδαιμονία εἴη περὶ τοὺς νέους εἰ εἰς μὲν μόνος αὐτοὺς διαφθείρει.
Goodwin § 403. See Appendix on the text. For the abbreviated
predicate see Kühner §§ 597 f. and ep. Prot. 325 Β σκέψαι ὡς
θαυμασίως γίγνονται οἱ ἀγαθοί ( so the MSS. ), and 344 D τῷ δὲ
κακῷ οὐκ ἐγχωρεῖ γενέσθαι ( scil. κακῷ).
The point now arrived at should be compared with the
original statement of the problem at 70 A. There the alterna-
tives as to the origin of ἀρετή were threefold ; it is either
(I) acquired, and that (α) by teaching (διδακτόν), or (6) by
practice and example (ἀσκητόν ) ; or
(II) native ; or
(III) given ἄλλῳ τινὶ τρόπῳ.
Here alternative II ( φύσει) is eliminated , and we hear no
more of ἀσκητόν, I (6). In the final result ( 98 C D and 99 E) we
have φύσει again discarded as an alternative. For the relation
of φύσις to θεία μοίρα see article • Δύναμις and Φύσις in Plato ' by
R. G. Bury (CR. VIII 300 ) : “ Φύσις may denote what is independent
of human effort or volition ; so φύσει is opposed to νόμῳ (Prot.
337 c, Gorg. 482 E, etc. ), to τέχνη (Rep. 381 Α ) , to διδακτόν
(Prot. 323 c), to σοφίᾳ (Apol. 22 €). So it indicates what is
innate, instinctive—the inherited, permanent, and transmissible
characteristics as opposed to the acquired and artificial.' It is
opposed to ἐπίκτητον Rep. 618 D.
In the Protagoras (323 c) the sophist is made to say ὅτι δὲ
αὐτὴν (τὴν πολιτικὴν ἀρετὴν) οὐ φύσει ἡγοῦνται εἶναι οὐδ᾽ ἀπὸ τοῦ
αὐτομάτου, ἀλλὰ διδακτόν τε καὶ ἐξ ἐπιμελείας παραγίγνεσθαι ᾧ ἂν
παραγίγνηται, τοῦτό σοι πειράσομαι ἀποδεῖξαι . ὅσα γὰρ ἡγοῦνται
ἀλλήλους κακὰ ἔχειν ἄνθρωποι φύσει ἢ τύχῃ, οὐδεὶς θυμοῦται
οὐδὲ νουθετεῖ οὐδὲ διδάσκει οὐδὲ κολάζει . ἀλλ᾽ ἐλεοῦσιν. At
Apol. 22 c it is noticeable that pure is used as equivalent to
θείᾳ μοίρᾳ : ἔγνων οὖν καὶ περὶ τῶν ποιητῶν, ὅτι οὐ σοφίᾳ ποιοῖεν,
ἃ ποιοῖεν, ἀλλὰ φύσει τινὶ καὶ ἐνθουσιάζοντες , ὥσπερ οἱ θεομάντεις
M
 162 ΜΕΝΟ XXV 89 B

κτέ. We appear to have a similar identification in the difficult

passage Laws 642 c : μόνοι γὰρ ( 'Αθηναῖοι) ἄνευ ἀνάγκης αὐτο-
φυῶς θείᾳ μοίρᾳ ἀληθῶς καὶ οὐ πλαστῶς εἰσιν ἀγαθοί, for which
see Archer-Hind's Phaedo p. 184 note. Sch. , however, cuts
out θείᾳ μοίρᾳ. See on 98 D 24 and 99 E 5.
B 28. οἱ ἐγίγνωσκον : ‘ when a conditional relative clause
depends on a past tense of the indicative implying the non-
fulfilment of a condition , it regularly takes a past tense of the
indicative by assimilation, ' Goodwin § 559 ; cp. § 528. Here
the relative depends on the apodosis of a conditional clause.
So in Charm. 171 Ε οὔτε γὰρ ἂν αὐτοὶ ἐπεχειροῦμεν πράττειν ἃ μὴ
ἠπιστάμεθα κτέ. Kühner § 399, 6 a. Such temporal sentences
introduced by πρίν as occur at 84 C 25, 86 D 13, are analogous.
31. ἐν ἀκροπόλει : as the treasury of the city. So at the
end of the Laws ( 969 c) of ideal guardians of the city : ἐὰν ἄρα
οἵ τε ἄνδρες ἀκριβῶς ἐκλεχθῶσι, παιδευθῶσί τε προσηκόντως,
παιδευθέντες τε ἐν ἀκροπόλει τῆς χώρας κατοικήσαντες
φύλακες ἀποτελεσθῶσιν.
κατασημηνάμενοι : the allusion, as Buttmann pointed out,
is not to minting, but to the putting a seal on a door,
such as that of the Οπισθόδομος, containing valuables, to mark
them as public property. He refers to Boeckh Public Economy
of Athens (p. 442 Ε.Τ. ) . See Hicks Hist. Inscr. 37 Α $ 6 =
C.I.A. 1 32 : καὶ (οἱ ταμίαι τῶν θεῶν) συνοιγόντων καὶ συγκλειόντων
τὰς θύρας τοῦ ὀπισθοδόμου καὶ συσσημαινέσθων τοῖς τῶν τῆς
᾿Αθηναίας ταμίαις. Xen. Hell. III i 27 ὁ δ᾽ ἐπεὶ εἶδε πάντα,
κατέκλεισεν αὐτὰ καὶ κατεσημήνατο καὶ φύλακας κατέστησεν.
Ueberweg (Untersuchungen p. 294) points out that 100 Α
contemplates an Ideal State, such as that of the Republic. Dr.
Henry Jackson has pointed out to me that this might still
more be said of the present passage ; cp. Rep. 415 A. In the
Meno the Gold is used as a simile ; in the Republic it has
developed into a pious fraud : ἐστὲ μὲν γὰρ δὴ πάντες οἱ ἐν τῇ
πόλει ἀδελφοί, ὡς φήσομεν πρὸς αὐτοὺς μυθολογοῦντες, ἀλλ᾽ ὁ
θεὸς πλάττων, ὅσοι μὲν ὑμῶν ἱκανοὶ ἄρχειν, χρυσὸν ἐν τῇ γενέσει
συνέμιξεν αὐτοῖς, κτέ. Cp. Crat. 398 A.
32. ἵνα μηδεὶς αὐτοὺς διέφθειρεν : “ in Attic Greek the second-
ary tenses of the indicative are used in final clauses to denote that
the purpose is dependent upon some unaccomplished action or
unfulfilled condition, and therefore is not or was not attained, '
Goodwin MT. § 333, Kühner § 553. 7, Hadley § 884, F.E.T.
§ 230 ; Crito 44D εἰ γὰρ ὠφελον οἷοί τ᾽ εἶναι τὰ μέγιστα κακὰ
ἐξεργάζεσθαι, ἵνα οἷοί τ᾽ ἦσαν αὖ καὶ ἀγαθὰ τὰ μέγιστα, Prot.
335 c, Symp. 181 D, etc. See App. on the text.
 XXVI 89 c NOTES 163

33. ἀλλ᾽ ἐπειδὴ ἀφίκοιντο . γίγνοιντο : ‘ if the purpose

is future, at the time of speaking, or if it is left uncertain
whether the object is or was attained, it must be expressed in
the ordinary way by the subjunctive or optative, " Goodwin
MT. § 336. He quotes our passage, translating and comment-
ing : we should guard (in that case) in the Acropolis, that no
1 one might corrupt them (as some now corrupt them), and that
when in the future they should become of age they might
become useful to their states. (Here it is not implied that
they never become useful, this depending partly on the future. ) '
The change from ἵνα διέφθειρεν to ἵνα γίγνοιντο marks a change
from an unrealized supposition to a vague future supposition.
[Cp. Kühner § 399. Anm. 4. ]
eis Tηv Ĥλɩkíav, ' of age. ' ' Etiam eis nλiklav ( Theaet. 142 D)
per eminentiam de juvenili aetate : Liv. xlii 34 cum primum in
aetatem veni pater mihi uxorem dedit.' Fr.

Chapter XXVI (89 B-90 B). SOCR. It seems then that Virtue
is a matter of teaching. But a very serious difficulty
remains. Where are the teachers ? I have often tried to
find them without success. Let us invite Anytus here to
share the quest. He appears to be an example of successful
education himself, and ought to be able to help us.
This chapter forms a transition to the fourth section.
6. μὴ τοῦτο οὐ καλῶς ὡμολογήσαμεν : this passage and the C
sequel furnish an interesting collection of usages of un ov. We
have :-
(a ) the present passage (un où with indic. , dependent on
no word expressed) :
(β) μὴ οὐκ ἐν τῷ ἄρτι μόνον δέῃ δοκεῖν (μὴ οὐ with subj. ,
dependent on no word expressed) C 10 :
( γ) ἀπιστεῖς μὴ οὐκ ἐπιστήμη ᾖ (μὴ οὐ with subj., dependent
on ἀπιστεῖς) D 14 :
(δ) οὐκ ἀνατίθεμαι μὴ οὐ καλῶς λέγεσθαι (μὴ οὐ with infin.,
dependent on οὐκ ἀνατίθεμαι) D 18.
With these may be considered D 18 or oỦк σTIV , de-
pendent on ἀπιστεῖν.
In (a) and (B) it is clear that un ou expresses the opposite
of what would be expressed by un alone, and où can be
connected closely with some word in the context : (a) où κaλŵs,
(B) où μovov. In these cases, then, the où needs no explanation.
Three uses of un with the indicative mood must be dis-
tinguished.
164 ΜΕΝΟ XXVI 89 c

(I ) In a direct question, where un, like num, expects a

negative answer (Kühner § 587. 11 , Jelf § 873. 4, § 741 c d,
Hadley § 1015). This usage appears first in Aesch. (P. V. 247 un
πού τι προὔβης τῶνδε καὶ περαιτέρῳ ; 962 μή τί σοι δοκῶ ταρβεῖν ;
Pers. 344). This usage is common in Plato ; one has occurred
at 78 C 23. The negative expectancy is stronger with uŵv
( = µǹ ovv, see 73 B 46). μn is sometimes qualified by ŋ : Prot.
356 c, Rep. 442 D, 466 A, 486 E.
Though un in this use ' expects ' a negative answer, the
expectation is sometimes not justified or ironical (78 C 23, Crito
44 Ε ΚΡ. Αρά γε μὴ ἐμοῦ προμηθεῖ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιτηδείων ;
ΣΩ. Καὶ ταῦτα προμηθοῦμαι, ὦ Κρίτων , καὶ ἄλλα πολλά, Rep. 552 Ε
μὴ οὖν οἰόμεθα καὶ κακούργους πολλοὺς ἐν ταῖς ὀλιγαρχουμέναις
πόλεσιν εἶναι κέντρα ἔχοντας ; οἰόμεθα μὲν οὖν). This is one
difficulty in the discrimination between this class and (III).
(II) un dependent on a word expressing fear, caution, etc.
The verb is most frequently in the subjunctive mood ; but
occasionally in the future indicative (Goodwin § 367), and not
uncommonly in present or past tenses of the indicative, when
the object of fear is supposed to be happening now (present),
or to have happened (perf. ), or to have been happening (imp. ).
No instance of the aor. indic. is given in Attic Greek, but see
Od. v. 300 (Goodwin § 369, Kühner § 589. 6, Jelf § 814 a,
F.E.T. § 238, cp. § 300). Good instances for comparison of
the moods are furnished by Soph. El. 580 8ра μǹ πñμа σаνтη
καὶ μετάγνοιαν τίθης (referring to the future) and 584 ἀλλ᾿
εἰσόρα μὴ σκῆψιν οὐκ οὖσαν τίθης, ‘ see that you are not making
a false excuse ' (she is actually making one). See Jebb's note
on 580. This usage goes back to Homer. We may say that uń
introduces the idea repudiated , or the fear entertained. Cp. on
77 A 3.
(III) A usage probably developed from (II) : μn is used,
not dependent on any word, in ' cautious assertions ' (Goodwin
§ 269 ; presumptive use, ' Riddell § 59). The subjunctive is
common ; instances of the indicative are few (Kühner § 394.
Anm. 5 ; § 589. Anm. 5) . μn with a past tense of the indicative
(like μolonoaμεv) expresses a suspicion about a past fact.
Another (probable) instance of the aor. indic. in this con-
struction is Euthyd. 291 ▲ (quoted below). Buttmann , asserting
that the perfect was the only tense quoted in this use from prose
authors, and noting that wuoloуýkaμev is the tense used at 96 E
2 and 98 E, etc. , says that one might be tempted to alter the
aorist here to the perfect, but adds : aptior tamen hic videtur
aoristus in re praeterita quidem sed quae non firma maneat. '
This use of un with the indic. does not appear before Plato.
The use of unотe ' perhaps, ' common in Aristotle and later
XXVI 89 c NOTES 165

writers, does not occur in Plato. In Phaedo 78 D μήποτε is a

question with negative tendency, and falls under (I). The
difference between this usage and (I) is parallel to the difference
between où in statements and in questions ; only with un the
contrast is less strong, and the tendencies are reversed. Thus :
οὐ τοῦτό ἐστιν is a negative assertion : οὐ τοῦτό ἐστιν ; is a
question with strong affirmative tendency. But μὴ τοῦτό ἐστιν
is a cautious affirmative assertion : μή τοῦτό ἐστιν ; is a question
with negative tendency.
In some of the examples that follow it is not easy to dis-
tinguish whether we have a ' cautious assertion ' (III) or an
ironical question, i.e. one not really expecting a negative
answer (I).
Prot. 312 A ἀλλ᾽ ἄρα μὴ οὐ τοιαύτην ὑπολαμβάνεις σου τὴν
μάθησιν ἔσεσθαι. Most editors print this as an interrogation
J. and A. M. Adam, however, quoting this place in the Meno and
others, rightly say that in all of these passages it is better to
take un as ' perhaps ' than as an equivalent to Latin num ?
Gorg. 512 D ὅρα μὴ ἄλλο τι τὸ γενναῖον καὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ᾖ ἢ τὸ
σῴζειν τε καὶ σῴζεσθαι. μὴ γὰρ τοῦτο μέν, τὸ ζῆν ὁπόσον δὴ
χρόνον, τόν γε ὡς ἀληθῶς ἄνδρα ἐατέον ἐστὶν καὶ οὐ φιλοψυχητέον.
(So the MSS. Sch. writes ή γάρ for μὴ γάρ, and the passage has
been otherwise altered, unnecessarily. )
Lys. 220 A ἀλλὰ μὴ οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον οὕτω τό γε ἀληθὲς ἔχῃ ·
ἀλλ᾽ ἐκεῖνό ἐστιν δ περὶ παντὸς ποιούμεθα. (Here it is not
certain that the second clause is still under the influence of μή. )
Euthyd. 290 Ε ἀλλ᾽ ἄρα, ὦ πρὸς Διός, μὴ ὁ Κτήσιππος ἦν ὁ
τοιαῦτα εἰπών.
Ibid . 291 A ἀλλ᾽ , ὦ δαιμόνιε Κρίτων , μή τις τῶν κρειττόνων
παρὼν αὐτὰ ἐφθέγξατο. Heind. Herm. Sch. all print the last
two as questions.
Ibid. 298 - μὴ γάρ, ὦ Εὐθύδημε, τὸ λεγόμενον , οὐ λίνον λίνῳ
συνάπτεις. (So Heind . ) I think you are weaving fax with
not-flax,' i.e. not arguing in pari materia. ( Herm . and Sch.
punctuate μὴ γάρ, ὦ Εὐθύδημε · κτέ , μή thus being deprecatory
as at 75 Β 13. )
Apol. 25 Α ἀλλ᾽ ἄρα, ὦ Μέλητε, μὴ οἱ ἐν τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ
διαφθείρουσι τοὺς νεωτέρους · ἢ κἀκεῖνοι βελτίους ποιοῦσιν ἅπαντες ;
(Kühner § 589. Anm. 5, I think rightly, regards this as a
cautious assertion, followed by a question. Most editors put
note of interrogation after νεωτέρους) .
As to the present passage in the Meno, Kühner (§ 394. Anm. 5)
and Ast (s.v. un p. 335) both regard it as a ' cautious assertion ' ;
so does Goodwin , § 269, adding, however, that ' it may be
interrogative.' I take the former view, and have therefore,
166 MENO XXVI 89 c

following Buttmann, printed it without a mark of interrogation,

which Herm. Sch. and Fr. all add.
In Lys. 213D ἆρα μή, ὦ Μενέξενε, τὸ παράπαν οὐκ ὀρθῶς
ESTOûμev ; the apa clearly marks the sentence as interrogative,
and it furnishes a good example of the ironical class of direct
questions with un6 spoken of above (I) . For though the sentence
pretends to say can it be we were not right ? ' i.e. ' surely we
were right, ' the answer is ouк polye dokeî, I think not. '
10. ἀλλὰ μὴ οὐκ ἐν τῷ ἄρτι μόνον δέῃ : there are large
classes of cases, corresponding to the indicative uses ( II ) and
(III) above, where un is used with the subjunctive either, like
(II), dependent on a word expressive of fear, caution, etc.
(Goodwin § 365, Kühner § 589. 2, Jelf § 814, F.E.T. § 237), or,
like (III), independently, as a ' cautious assertion ' (Goodwin
§ 265, Kühner § 394. 6, F.E.T. § 300). Of the latter class
Goodwin 1.c. gives many instances from Plato, with whom it is
a favourite construction. See 94 B 20, E 14. The only real ex-
ample before Plato is Hdt. v 79 ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον μὴ οὐ τοῦτο ᾖ τὸ
Mavrov. The instances from Homer given by Kühner (cp. F. E.T.
§ 309) are a somewhat different class, of the nature of wishes
(Goodwin § 261). Probably the ' cautious assertion ' was a
later development from a construction dependent on a verb of
fearing, after this had been stereotyped, whereas the dependent
construction was itself developed from an original parataxis
or co-ordination of two independent sentences, ' namely an
expression of fear (deidw) followed by a repudiation of an idea
(µǹ vñas ëλwoi) (Goodwin §§ 307-309 , cp. §§ 262, 366). Goodwin
(§ 268) further recognizes a small class corresponding to (I)
above ; instances of ' un with the subjunctive in a cautious
question, with a negative answer implied. ' Three instances are
quoted from Plato, besides a doubtful one from the † Sisyphus.
Rep. 603 c μή τι ἄλλο ᾗ παρὰ ταῦτα ; οὐδέν.
Parm. 163 c τὸ δὲ γίγνεσθαι μή τι ἄλλο ᾖ ἢ οὐσίας μετα-
λαμβάνειν ; οὐδὲν ἄλλο. (The MSS. give . Heindorf sub-
stituted . Herm. and Waddell keep y. )
Phaedo 64 ἆρα μὴ ἄλλο τι ῇ ὁ θάνατος ἢ τοῦτο ; οὔκ,
ἀλλὰ τοῦτο. (Bekker, Sch. Archer-Hind excise . Heind.
Herm . Wohlrab, Geddes retain it. ) Kühner § 587. 14.
With these may be ranked two places in Xenophon, Mem.
Iv ii 12 μὴ οὖν οὐ δύνωμαι ἐγὼ τὰ τῆς δικαιοσύνης ἔργα
ἐξηγήσασθαι ; Oec. iv 4 ἆρα μὴ αἰσχυνθῶμεν τὸν Περσῶν
Baoiλéa μμhoaolai ; These, although in the first person, are
not ' deliberative ' questions, and in both un = num. In the
real deliberative question (Goodwin § 287) un either is nonne
(see especially Rep. 337 Β μὴ ἀποκρίνωμαι ὧν προεῖπες μηδέν ;
and 554 Β μὴ φῶμεν ; καὶ μάλ᾽, ἔφη) or is indifferent.
XXVI 89. D NOTES 167

οὐκ ἐν τῷ ἄρτι μόνον : this is characteristic of the Socratic

temper as distinguished from the ' Eristic, ' at least as cari-
catured by Plato. See Zeller pre- Socratics 11 464, who quotes
Euthyd. 287 Β εἶτ᾽ , ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὁ Διονυσόδωρος ὑπολαβών,
οὕτως εἰ Κρόνος, ὥστε ἃ τὸ πρῶτον εἴπομεν νῦν ἀναμιμνῄσκει, καὶ εἴ
τι πέρυσιν εἶπον, τοῖς δ᾽ ἐν τῷ παρόντι λεγομένοις λόγοις οὐχ ἕξεις
ὅ τι χρῇ ;
12. vylés (see on 77 A 8) : a very favourite with word Plato.
14. ἀπιστεῖς μὴ οὐκ ἐπιστήμη ᾖ : in such a verb as ἀπιστῶ D
we have two notions combined , namely of denial or disbelief
and of fear or misgiving. From the former point of view it
will be followed by an infin. or örɩ with an indic.; from the
latter by un with the subjunctive. Phaedo 91 c Zipμías μèv
γάρ, ὡς ἐγᾦμαι, ἀπιστεῖ τε καὶ φοβεῖται μὴ ἡ ψυχὴ προαπολλύηται.
Cp. ibid. 91 D and 70 A, Xen. Symp. viii 14 dokoûσi d'eμLYE
ἀπιστοῦσιν ἐοικέναι μὴ χωρίς γενόμενοι οὐκ ἀποτελῶσι τὰ τῶν
ἀγαθῶν ἀνδρῶν ἔργα. μή introduces the idea warded off, which
is a negative one : You have a misgiving lest (un) it be not
knowledge ” ( οὐκ ἐπιστήμη).
17. ovк ȧvaтíleμau : the metaphor is from revoking a move
in a game : ἀπὸ τῶν πεττευόντων καὶ τὰς κεκινημένας ἤδη
ψήφους διορθούντων Harpocration : Phaedo 87 Α οὐκ ἀνατίθεμαι
μὴ οὐχὶ πάνυ χαριέντως ἀποδεδεῖχθαι : Charm . 164 c ἐκείνων ἄν
τι ἔγωγε μᾶλλον ἀναθείμην (note the active ἀναθέντι = dedicanti
in the immediate sequel) : Prot. 355 ▲ ảλX' ễTɩ kaÌ vûv
ἀναθέσθαι ἔξεστιν : Gorg. 462 Α. But in Gorg. 461 D and
+ Hipparchus 229 E the meaning of åvaléolai is to give a
move back.
18. μὴ οὐ καλῶς λέγεσθαι : ' after a principal sentence con-
taining verbs and expressions of denying, hindering, forbidding,
and avoiding un is used with the infin., where in English we
use no negative ' F. E.T. § 298, cp. § 308 ; Hadley 1029 ; Kühner
§ 516. 3. See also on 90 E 26.
The explanation of the difference between the Greek and
English use is that the object of these verbs may be looked
upon from two different points of view. It may be either
expressive of the thing denied or prevented (external object) , or
expressive of the upshot of the denial or prevention (internal
object). English leans to the former use, Greek to the latter.
There are instances in Greek where the μn is omitted, and the
infinitive put positively as an external object ( F.E. T. pp. 366
note 2, p. 369, 1 ; Goodwin §§ 807, 811 ; Kühner § 516. Anm. 9a ;
Jelf 749. 1 ). This is chiefly with verbs of prevention, etc.; the
omission of un after verbs of denial is very rare. Jebb on
168 ΜΕΝΟ XXVI 89 D

Soph. Ant. 442 says that after åpveîolai, when it means to deny,
un regularly precedes the dependent inf. , but not when it means
to refuse.
The ambiguity may be paralleled by a similar one in the
word ' doubt.' We say 'I doubt if he is dead ' or ' I doubt his
being dead, ' where the clause ' if he is dead ' or the noun-phrase
' his being dead ' are external objects to the verb ' doubt. ' But
an old writer, or a North-country man now, would say ' I doubt
he is dead,' where the clause ' he is dead ' is really an internal
object of the word ' doubt, ' and expresses the opinion held.
When the verb of denial, etc. is itself negatived, then if the
dependent infinitive is to remain an internal object, i.e. to
express the upshot of the state of mind, or state of fact, the
ordinary μn will have to be reversed, which is effected by ou.
Thus the meaning here is ' I do not revoke my position, the
net result being that there was no mistake. ' Cp. Phaedo 87 A
(quoted above) ; Gorg. 461 c Tívα oleι ȧτaρvýσeodaι (i.e. ev
οἶσθα οὐδένα ἀπαρνησόμενον) μὴ οὐχὶ καὶ αὐτὸν ἐπίστασθαι τὰ
δίκαια ;
There is however considerable variety of construction
possible. But after a verb of denial negatived, un où with the
infin. is much the most common construction ( Kühner § 516. 4,
Hadley § 1034, Goodwin §§ 807 , 815 ). Instances of the simple
infin. however occur (Kühner § 516. Anm. 9 b, F.E.T. pp. 368 , 9) :
Aesch. Εum. 611 δρᾶσαι γὰρ ὥσπερ ἐστὶν οὐκ ἀρνούμεθα ;
Aeschines 3 § 250 ταῦτα οὐκ ἐξαρνοῦνται πράττειν. Twice in
Soph. (Aj. 96, Ant. 443) we have ойк ȧтаρνоûμαι тò μý (Goodwin
§ 812). (We have in Plato Phaedr. 256 ▲ µǹ av åтаvηñaι
χαρίσασθαι, and Rep. 468 c μηδενὶ ἐξεῖναι ἀπαρνηθῆναι ὃν ἂν
βούληται φιλεῖν. But in both these places ἀπαρνεῖσθαι means
' refuse, ' not deny.')
Metrical considerations sometimes led to μn rather than
un où in Soph O.T. 1388, Ar. Peace 315 after a negative verb
of hindrance we have the initial vowel of the infinitive cut off
after un, so that un ou would have been impracticable ; but this
does not apply at Soph. Phil. 349, when un ou might have been
expected.
ὅτι δ᾽ οὐκ ἔστιν ἐπιστήμη : Kühner § 516. 3 b, Jelf 749. 2.
άTIOт regarded as a ' verbum sentiendi vel declarandi ' may be
followed by an infinitive with un, or by örɩ with ou and a finite
verb. See on D 14 above. The explanation of the negatives is
similar to that in the case of ἀνατίθεμαι. The clause ὅτι οὐκ
EσTW KTĚ. is of the nature of an ' internal object. ' μή with
the infin. after åπioTev is fairly common ; Thuc. IV 40 ríoтOVV
μὴ εἶναι τοὺς τὰ ὅπλα παραδόντας τοῖς τεθνεῶσιν ὁμοίους, ‘ they
did not believe that those who had given up their arms were
XXVI 89 E NOTES 169

like those who had fallen ' ; also i 10, 11 101 ; Hdt. 1 68 (but
III 66 an infin. of the thing disbelieved, without μή) ; Rep.
555 A, Polit. 301 c ; after passive, Charm. 168 E, Laws 839 c.
ὅτι οὐ after verbs of this class is very rare, and I can find no
other instance of it after ἀπιστῶ. We have is without où Rep.
450 € D καὶ γὰρ ὡς δυνατὰ λέγεται ἀπιστοῖτ᾽ ἄν, καὶ ὡς ἄριστα ἂν
εἴη ἀπιστήσεται, and ὡς οὐ after some similar words, as ἐξελεγκτέος,
Gorg. 508 B. Cp. Euthyphr. 8 B, etc. (ἀπιστῶ is also treated
as a verb of inquiry : Phaedo 73 Β ἀπιστεῖς πῶς μάθησις ἀνά-
μνησίς ἐστιν. )
24. οὗ μήτε διδάσκαλοι μήτε μαθηταὶ εἶεν : the relative E
clause represents a conditional clause of the same kind (ei -
εἶεν) : ‘ a future condition of the less vivid form, Goodwin
§ 531 ; cp. F. E.T. pp. 201 , 202, Hadley § 917. (These examples
must be distinguished from the optative ' of indefinite fre-
quency ' in relative clauses referring to past time, ' when
the verb in the antecedent clause denotes a customary or
repeated action or a general truth ' Goodwin § 532 ; e.g.
Thuc. II 52 οἱ δέ, καιομένου ἄλλου, ἐπιβαλόντες ὃν φέροιεν,
ἀπῄεσαν. ) Cp. 96 C 8 and see on 92C 18. Other places in
Plato similar to the present are Phaedr. 276 Β ὁ νοῦν ἔχων
γέωργος ὧν σπερμάτων κήδοιτο καὶ ἔγκαρπα βούλοιτο γενέσθαι
πότερα σπουδῇ· ἂν θέρους εἰς ᾿Αδώνιδος κήπους ἀρῶν χαίροι ;
Euthyd. 302 Α ἆρ᾽ ἂν ἡγοῖο ταῦτα σὰ εἶναι , ἅ σοι ἐξείη καὶ
ἀποδόσθαι καὶ δοῦναι καὶ θῦσαι ὅτῳ βούλοιο θεῶν ; Lys. 2141 8
εἴη, 214 Ε ἢ τί ἂν παθεῖν, ὃ μὴ καὶ ὑφ᾽ αὑτοῦ πάθοι ; 215 A ὃ δὲ
μὴ ἀγαπῷτο πῶς φίλον ( scil . ἂν εἴη) ; 215 Β ὃ μὴ ἀγαπῴη (but
Sch. ὁ μὴ ἀγαπῶν ) ; 219 Ε ; Hipp. maj. 284 Α, 296 B ; Rep.
412 D, 549 B, 557 B. In all these cases the relative clause
depends upon an optative (or infinitive representing an op-
tative) with av, i.e. upon an apodosis. Instances where the
relative depends on ei with the optative (a protasis) are much
rarer. See + Erastae 136 c εἰ τύχοις ἢ αὐτὸς ἀσθενήσας ἢ τῶν
φίλων τις τῶν σῶν περὶ οὗ σὺ σπουδὴν μεγάλην ἔχοις, πότερον τὸν
φιλόσοφον εἰσάγοις ἂν ἢ τὸν ἰατρὸν λάβοις ;
25. καλῶς ἂν αὐτὸ εἰκάζοντες εἰκάζοιμεν μὴ διδακτὸν εἶναι :
αὐτό is here transferred from its natural place after εἰκάζοιμεν
by hyperbaton ' (Riddell §§ 287 foll . , F. E.T. p. 418, Hadley
§ 1062). The usual object of hyperbaton is, by changing the
common order, to get, besides the direct meaning given by the
syntax of the words, an additional meaning suggested by their
collocation, Here the impression is for a moment left on the
mind that αὐτό is governed by εἰκάζοντες used in a transitive
sense, as at 80 C 26. See too on 98 B 2. (An occasional
object of hyperbaton is to avoid the juxtaposition of like cases.
170 MENO XXVI 89 E

This I think is exemplified by Euthyd. 275 E wσтe ovdè Taρа-

κελεύσασθαί μοι ἐξεγένετο εὐλαβηθῆναι τῷ μειρακίῳ, where τῷ
μειρακίῳ, dependent on παρακελεύσασθαι, is kept well apart
from μοι . )
Riddell's elaborate list of examples of hyperbaton in Plato
is far from exhaustive. The present example, which he
omits, would seemingly come in § 289. Add Euthyphr. 11 c
τὸ γὰρ περιιέναι τούτοις τοῦτο καὶ μὴ μένειν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ οὐκ ἐγώ
eiμi ó évτileis, where see Fr.'s. note. He quotes inter alia
Phaedr. 239 Α τοσούτων κακῶν ... ἐραστὴν ἐρωμένῳ ἀνάγκη
γιγνομένων τε καὶ φύσει ἐνόντων, τῶν μὲν ἥδεσθαι, τὰ δὲ παρα-
OkevάŠEL . The tendency to elaborate the order of words grew
on Plato.
26. μη Sidakтòv elva : cp. the reference to this passage at
96 C 8, where we have μηδὲ διδακτὸν εἶναι. We need not infer
(with Buttm. ) that undé should be read here.
29. el elev : indirect question ; the optative being used
because Tv is here imperfect .
33. els кaλóν, ' opportune, ut sescenties ' Stallbaum. See
Hipp. maj. 286 CD ; eis káλλɩorov Euthyd. 275 B.
34. Ast regards the forms ἐκαθεζόμην, παρεκαθεζόμην as always
aorists in Plato ; I believe rightly. No present indic. κa@ésoμaι
Οι παρακαθέζομαι occurs in Plato. (The simple ἕζομαι in all
its forms is foreign to Attic prose. ) The apparent exception
Axiochus 371 с κaléšovтαι dikaσTai is significant. Nor
does the imperative or infinitive occur, in which the accent
would discriminate. I know of no instance in Plato where the
sense would require ἐκαθεζόμην οι παρεκαθεζόμην or the corre-
sponding participles to be impf.; and in all cases the aorist
sense is better. Thus, here Anytus has just sat down ' ; he
has not been sitting ' for some time, for it would have
been difficult to ignore him, and the share he takes presently
suggests no acquaintance with the previous dialogue (Fr. p. 23).
Cp. Charm. 153 c δεῦρο καθεζόμενος ἡμῖν διήγησαι, 6 come and
sit down here, and tell me all about it ' ; ibid . Tаpaкalejóμevos ;
ibid. 155 € καθέζοιτο, ἐκαθέζετο ; Lys. 206 c ἂν γὰρ εἰσέλθῃς καὶ
καθεζόμενος διαλέγῃ if you go in and take a seat and6 engage
in talk ' ; ibid. 207 Α έκαθεζόμεθα καὶ διελεγόμεθα, we had
seated ourselves, and were in conversation ' ; Euthyd. 274 B
ἔτυχε πόρρω καθεζόμενος τοῦ Κλεινίου, ‘ happened to have taken
a seat at some distance from C. ' ; Phaedo 61 с ка0ĥке тà OKÉλN
ἐπὶ τὴν γῆν καὶ καθεζόμενος ( ‘ assuming a sitting posture ” ) οὕτως
ἤδη τὰ λοιπὰ διελέγετο. Cp. Χen. Μem. IV ii 8 παρακαθεζομένου.
μerad@μev : the relative here has a definite antecedent,
XXVI 90 A NOTES 171

and so has no effect on the mood of the following verb ; the

subjunctive is hortatory. Goodwin § 519. Buttm. strangely
regards it as final : see Goodwin § 572.
36. "AVUTOS yàp 88e : for Anytus see Introd. § 6. 90 A
37. 'Avdeμíwvos : we know nothing of him beyond what
we read here. Plato's object in eulogizing him is not, as Cobet
thought (Coll. crit. p. 47), merely to furnish a foil to the faults
of his son, but also to give another instance of the truth set
forth cc. xxxii-xxxiv (93 B foll. ) that even the best of fathers
cannot communicate virtue to their children.
39. τὰ Πολυκράτους χρήματα : the name of Polycrates,
the tyrant of Samos in the sixth century B.C. , whose history is
given by Herodotus in his third book, is here used proverbially
as a type of wealth. We generally use the name of Croesus in
this connexion. Fr. quotes other instances ; тà Tavтáλov
τάλαντα Euthyphr. 11 E. Cp. Laws 660 Ε ἐὰν δὲ ἄρα πλουτῇ
Κινύρα τε καὶ Μίδα μᾶλλον .
40. Ισμηνίας ὁ Θηβαῖος : this important man was a leader
of the democratic or anti-Spartan party at Thebes. We find
him in the year 403 B. C. helping the exiled Athenian democrats,
Thrasybulus, Anytus, etc. , to return. Justin v 9 itaque
Ismenias Thebanorum princeps etsi publicis non poterat,
privatis tamen viribus adjuvabat. In 395 B.C. Tithraustes, the
successor of Tissaphernes, irritated by Agesilaus' successes in
Asia Minor, sent over Timocrates the Rhodian to Greece with
thirty talents to bribe the leaders in various states to make war
against Sparta. Xenophon (Hell. III v 1) mentions as recipients
of this money Androcleidas, Ismenias, and Galaxidorus at Thebes,
two men at Corinth, and ' Cylon and his friends ' at Argos (Grote
Hist. ch. lxxiv). The share that would thus fall to Ismenias
could only be described as τὰ Πολ. χρήματα by a hyperbole.
Fr. as to this shrewdly observes that nothing is more liable to
exaggeration than wealth. But it is not at all necessary to
suppose that the money brought by Timocrates was the only
instance in which Ismenias received gifts of this kind. Believ-
ing, as I do, that the Meno was not written till at least ten
years after 395, I think Plato may well have had later instances
in his mind. Reference to these gifts from Persia is made in
the words oude dovтos Tivós just above ; Anthemion's wealth
was not, like that of Ismenias , the result of bribery. Plato in
one other place (Rep. 1 336 A) refers to Ismenias , whom he
evidently disliked . The Meno has points of kinship with the
first book of the Republic, the composition of which probably
followed it at no long interval ( Introd . § 19). Socrates there
 172 MENO XXVI 90 A

thinks the definition of Justice 'to benefit one's friends

and harm one's foes Περιάνδρου εἶναι ἢ Περδίκκου ἢ Ξέρξου ἢ
Ἰσμηνίου τοῦ Θηβαίου ἤ τινος ἄλλου μέγα οἰομένου δύνασθαι
πλουσίου ἀνδρός. The collocation of names is not without
irony, but the mention of Ismenias is made appropriate by the
fact that he distinctly used his wealth as a political engine-to
' help his friends and harm his foes. ' Ismenias was put to
death in 382 B.C. by the Spartans after they had obtained
control of Thebes by seizing the Cadmea. Xen. Hell. v ii 35
τότε δὴ κατηγορεῖτο τοῦ Ἰσμηνίου καὶ ὡς βαρβαρίζοι καὶ ὡς ξένος
τῷ Πέρσῃ ἐπ᾿ οὐδενὶ ἀγαθῷ τῆς Ἑλλάδος γεγενημένος εἴη καὶ ὡς
τῶν παρὰ βασιλέως χρημάτων μετειληφὼς εἴη καὶ ὅτι τῆς ἐν τῇ
Ελλάδι ταραχῆς πάσης ἐκεῖνός τε καὶ ᾿Ανδροκλείδας αἰτιώτατοι
elev. (See Grote Hist. ch. lxxvi. )
Were the passages in the Meno and the Republic written
after the death of Ismenias ? Plato very rarely mentions by
name a person living at the time of his writing. But this rule
is not universal. Isocrates certainly, and Lysias probably,
were living at the time when the Phaedrus was written.
Moreover, the Meno and the first book of the Republic can
hardly have been written long after 382, and it is not likely
that such references to Ismenias should be made immediately
after his death. I think both passages were written while
Ismenias was still powerful at Thebes, that is, before the end of
382 B.C., but probably not much before (Intr. §14).
We have here one of several anachronisms in which Plato
introduces in dialogues where Socrates is present mention of
events that happened after Socrates' death. Cp. Symp. 193 ▲,
where allusion is made to the breaking-up of Mantinea by the
Spartans in 385 B.C.; Menex. 244 D foll.
The Ismenias here mentioned must not be confused with
his son Ismenias, who in 367 accompanied Pelopidas to the
court of the Great King (Plut. Artox. 22).
42. Soкav elva : the editors note the anacoluthon . You
would expect δοκοῦντος. But the structure of the whole
sentence is loose. The Tртov μév at line 36 referring to
Anytus is not answered by either the Tera at line 41, or
that at 44, both of which refer to Anthemion. After the
introduction of the relative sentence ds éyévETO, Anthemion
becomes the main subject, and the participle dokŵv naturally
follows the case of κτησάμενος.
B 43. ỏуkádŋs : lit. ' bloated . ' The word occurs nowhere else
in Plato ; and is very rare in this sense elsewhere. But oyKOS
occurs often in the tragedians in the sense ' dignity, ' ' self-
importance.' So ỏykoûμaι, as Aristoph. Frogs 703.
XXVI 90 B NOTES 173

ἐπαχθής = odiosus often in Plato, as Phaedo 87 A ei un

ἐπαχθές ἐστιν εἰπεῖν. Cp. Thuc. vi 54 ἐπαχθὴς ἦν ἐς τοὺς
πολλούς.
44. Evσraλýs : not elsewhere in Plato ; lit. ' well braced, '
' compact, ' the opposite of dyкwons. L. & S. quote Plut. Marius
34 εὐσταλὴς τὸν ὄγκον.
46. αἱροῦνται γοῦν : ' Xen. Αpol. 29 ("Ανυτον) τῶν μεγίστων
ὑπὸ τῆς πόλεως ὁρῶν ἀξιούμενον. Creatus est σιτοφύλαξ (Lys.
XXII 8) et σтрaтnyós (a. Chr. 409, Diod. Sic. XIII 64 [ Grote
Hist. ch. lxiii], et a. Chr. 403, Lys. XIII 78) ; Theramenes apud
Xen. Hell. II iii 42 tres principes enumerat Thrasybulum
Anytum Alcibiadem ; post expulsos tyrannos, quorum inter
audaces fuerat oppugnatores (Lys. XIII 78) [Grote Hist. ch.
lxv], magna florebat gratia et potestate (Isocr. XVIII 23) ' Fr.
He was one of the most important men in Athens in the years
succeeding 403 B.C. He is undoubtedly ' (Jebb Att. Or. 1 117)
the Anytus who was called on the defence in the trial of Ando-
cides in the same year as that of Socrates. See de Myst. ad fin.;
Holm History of Greece E.T. III 26.
47. ἀρετῆς πέρι διδασκάλους : Stallbaum quotes for words of
learning and teaching with Tepi and the gen. of the thing
learnt or taught Lach. 186 c διδάσκαλός μοι οὐ γέγονε τούτου
πέρι, ibid. E, Menex. 235 Ε διδάσκαλος οὖσα οὐ πάνυ φαύλη περὶ
inTopiкns, Phaedr. 265 D, Crat. 413 c. Cp. presently περὶ τούτου
τοῦ πράγματος : also εἰδὼς περί at 71 B 3 and note there. See
Cope on Aristot. Rhet. I ix 14 περὶ δὲ τῶν ἄλλων οὐ χαλεπὸν
ideiv. He observes that the substitution of a prep. with its case
for a simpler construction (e.g. the object of a verb) is character-
istic of fourth- century, as distinguished from earlier, writers.
Among other places he quotes Phaedr. 250 c, where πeρì κάλλovs
stands for subject, Rep. 427 Α εἶδος νόμων πέρι καὶ πολιτείας,
where Tepi with its case stands, as here, for the simple gen.
after a noun. For the structure ζητεῖν διδασκάλους εἴτ᾽ εἰσίν
see on 71 A 25. 'Prolepsis ' often occurs after verbs of inquiry ;
see 92 C 22 οὐ τούτους ἐζητοῦμεν τίνες εἰσίν.

Chapters XXVII (90 B) to XXX ( 92 C 20 ) .— SOCR. Suppose we

wanted to make Meno a shoemaker, or a physician, or a
flute-player, we should send him to a professional teacher?
ANYTUS. Naturally. SOCR. But, as it is, what Meno
desires is political Virtue and Wisdom. I suppose we ought
to send him to the paid and accredited teachers of this-I
mean, ofcourse, the Sophists. ANYTUS. Don't name them :
they do infinite mischief. SOCR. Strange that they should be
174 ΜΕΝΟ XXVII 90 B

so successful. No other craftsmen could succeed in imposing

on the public so long. Or do they impose upon themselves as
well ? ANYTUS. Certainly not. They are a designing set
that ought to be turned out of every respectable city. I have
never had anything to do with them, and do not wish to, but
I know all about them.
Here begins the fourth section of the dialogue, extending to
the end of ch. xxxiv.

CHAPTER XXVII
2. τῷ σαυτοῦ ξένῳ : cp. 92 D 26 τὸν πατρικὸν τόνδε ἑταῖρον.
Fr. (Introd. p. 24 note 2) makes it appear probable that this
Cevia was inaugurated between Anthemion and the Meno who
helped Athens at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war
(Thuc. II 22, 2) . This Meno cannot have been the father of
the Meno of our dialogue, whose father's name was Alexidemus
(76 Ε 48) : he may have been his grandfather. Fr.'s reason for
thinking that the gevía between the families did not go back
farther than Anthemion is that the latter had made his money
himself, so that his ancestors were probably not so wealthy or
prominent as to enter into such a relation.
περὶ τούτου τοῦ πράγματος : these words do not depend on
συζήτησον, but on διδάσκαλοι , as just above. But here, for the
sake of variety, we do not have the prolepsis διδασκάλους,
τίνες ἂν εἶεν.
5. ἀγαθὸν ἰατρὸν γενέσθαι : we have here one aspect of the
standing paradox as to the difference of Virtue from the special
Arts. See Prot. 311 B foll. Of the special arts there are
special and accepted teachers. Of Virtue, or the Political art,
the only visible teachers are the people called Sophists. But
whereas the doctor makes you a doctor, the Sophist makes you,
not a Sophist, but what ? εἰπέ μοι, ἔφην ἐγώ, ὦ Ἱππόκρατες,
παρὰ Πρωταγόραν νῦν ἐπιχειρεῖς ἰέναι, ἀργύριον τελῶν ἐκείνῳ
μισθὸν ὑπὲρ σεαυτοῦ, ὡς παρὰ τίνα ἀφιξόμενος καὶ τίς γενησόμενος ;
ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ ἐπενόεις παρὰ τὸν σαυτοῦ ὁμώνυμον ἐλθὼν Ἱπποκράτη
τὸν Κῷον, τὸν τῶν ᾿Ασκληπιαδῶν κτέ. Cp. 318 B foll. See on
93 B 17 ; Alc. i 124 E foll . is an imitative passage ; Gorg.
514 A foll., Hipp. maj. 283 в foll. are germane. See also Xen.
Mem. Iv ii 2 and iv 5, and particularly Aristot. NE. x ix 18
ἆρ᾽ οὖν μετὰ τοῦτο ἐπισκεπτέον πόθεν ἢ πῶς νομοθετικὸς γένοιτ᾽ ἄν
τις ; ἢ καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων, παρὰ τῶν πολιτικῶν ; μόριον γὰρ
ἐδόκει τῆς πολιτικῆς εἶναι. ἢ οὐχ ὅμοιον φαίνεται ἐπὶ τῆς πολι-
τικῆς καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν ἐπιστημῶν τε καὶ δυνάμεων ; ἐν μὲν γὰρ τοῖς
XXVII 90 D NOTES 175

ἄλλοις οἱ αὐτοὶ φαίνονται τάς τε δυνάμεις παραδιδόντες καὶ ἐνερ-

γοῦντες ἀπ' αὐτῶν , οἷον ἰατροὶ καὶ γραφεῖς · τὰ δὲ πολιτικὰ
ἐπαγγέλλονται μὲν διδάσκειν οἱ σοφισταί, πράττει δ᾽ αὐτῶν οὐδείς,
ἀλλ᾽ οἱ πολιτευόμενοι, οἳ δόξαιεν ἂν δυνάμει τινὶ τοῦτο πράττειν καὶ
ἐμπειρίᾳ μᾶλλον ἢ διανοίᾳ · οὔτε γὰρ γράφοντες οὔτε λέγοντες περὶ
τῶν τοιούτων φαίνονται . οὐδ᾽ αὖ πολιτικοὺς πεποιηκότες τοὺς
σφετέρους υἱεῖς ἤ τινας ἄλλους τῶν φίλων. (Grant in his note thinks
there is a reference to the Meno. ) Cp. Grote Hist. ch. lxviii.
Before the time of Plato the notion of general mental
training, i.e. a gymnastic beneficial to the mind apart from
the matter learnt, was hardly apprehended. To elaborate this
view is the chief object of the ' Educational Dialogues ' and one
of the objects of the Republic.
16. καλῶς ἂν ἐπέμπομεν : contrast D 23 καλῶς ἂν πέμποιμεν. C
For the first supposition-that he is to be sent to a physician
-is clearly unreal ; but in the second case the supposition is
generalized and so not impossible. See on 74 B 6.
20. ἐπ᾿ αὐτῷ τούτῳ, ' avowedly for this service. ” ἐπί with D
the dat. implies condition, and may be used to express either
the thing conceded or the thing received. In CR. VIII 444
I have tried to show that ἐπὶ ἕκτῳ μέρει may mean either on
condition of paying ' or ' on condition of receiving ' a sixth
part. Like the present passage is Rep. ix 590 Α Εριφύλη ἐπὶ
τῇ τοῦ ἀνδρὸς ψυχῇ ( ' at the sacrifce of her husband's life *) τὸν
ὅρμον δεξαμένη , Ηipp. maj. 284 ο χρήματα ἔλαβεν ἐπὶ παιδεύσει,
Apol. 41 Α ἐπὶ πόσῳ ἄν τις δέξαιτο ; on the other hand Laws
745 Α φανεῖ ὁ βουλόμενος ἐπὶ τοῖς ἡμίσεσιν ' on condition of
receiving one half.' Often of course the conditions may be
looked at from either point of view : Apol. 29 € ἀφίεμέν σε ἐπὶ
τούτῳ μέντοι, ἐφ᾽ ᾧτε μηκέτι φιλοσοφεῖν ; these are the terms
which the Athenians exact, and which Socrates is to concede.
Cp. on 75 Α 7. Nearly allied is the use in ἐπὶ σοφίᾳ 70 Β 11.
21. τοῦ βουλομένου : in this phrase the force of the article
is exhausted in making the participle into a noun ; no
demonstrative force is left ; so that ὁ βουλόμενos is ' any
• one who
chooses, just as ὁ τυχών is ' any one who chances, ὁ κωλύσων
Gany one to hinder. (Something similar is τὸν ᾿Αθηναῖον ‘ any
Athenian ' Aristoph. Birds 1035, Dem. 23 (Aristocr. ) 38, etc.: cp.
Gorg. 487 Ε ποιόν τινα χρὴ εἶναι τὸν ἄνδρα ‘ the typical man.”)
The phrase ὁ βουλόμενος is common from Herodotus ( 1 54 )
downwards, especially in the orators in the legal phrase o
βουλόμενος ᾿Αθηναίων οἷς ἔξεστιν ‘ any duly qualified Athenian
(Meier and Schömann Attische Process (564) 756). We have it
in this dialogue 70 C 17, 91 B 14 : Laws 745 A (see last
note) : Gorg. 521 Β ὅτι ἀποκτενεῖ με ὁ βουλόμενος, etc.
 176 MENO XXVII 90 E

E 26. Tà avrà Taûra ; ' does not the same hold ? ' Herm. ,
Sch. , Fr. all print a note of interrogation after these words,
understanding exe , or the like. This view I have followed.
Riddell § 18 regards тà aurà тaûтa as a forestalling ofthe sentence
that follows it, and therefore puts only a comma after Taûтa.
πολλὴ ἄνοιά ἐστι . . μὴ ἐθέλειν : it is clear that here μὴ
ἐθέλειν stands as a subject to πολλὴ ἄνοιά ἐστι, and that the
negative is a real negative, to be translated in English.
Thus these cases of un with the infinitive are to be dis-
tinguished from such as κωλύω σε τοῦτο μὴ ποιεῖν, where μὴ
Toleîv stands as an object (see on 89 D 19), and the negative is
redundant (or ' reflected ') and not to be translated in English.
But after such expressions as πολλὴ ἄνοια ·-a class which
may be generalized as falling roughly into two divisions
(a ) expressions denoting impropriety (as the present, &λoyov,
aiσxpóv, ovx öσɩóv éσtiv, etc.), (B) expressions of impossibility or
improbability (ἀδύνατον, οὐ προσδοκία ἐστίν, etc. )— we more
commonly, when the thing deprecated is negative, have uǹ oůk
instead of, as here, the simple un. Heind. on Prot. 352 D
αἰσχρόν ἐστι καὶ ἐμοὶ σοφίαν καὶ ἐπιστήμην μὴ οὐχὶ πάντων
κράτιστον φάναι είναι says “ Post αἰσχρόν ἐστι interdum sim-
plex un, frequentius multo ut h.1. un ou cum infinitivo
copulatum reperies. ' He refers to Theaet. 151 D aiσxpòv
μὴ οὐ παντὶ τρόπῳ προθυμεῖσθαι, + Erastae 139 A, Xen. Rep.
Lac. vi 2, etc. (On the other hand Laws 820 A ev ékelvwv
τοῦτ᾽ ἐστὶν ὧν ἔφαμεν αἰσχρὸν γεγονέναι τὸ μὴ ἐπίστασθαι . ) So
with the phrase before us, Symp. 210 в Tоλλǹ ăvoia µǹ ovx
ἡγεῖσθαι : cf. ibid. 218 c πάνυ ἀνόητον μὴ οὐ καὶ τοῦτο
χαρίσασθαι : with ἄλογον, Soph. 219 Ε τήν γε μὴν θηρευτικὴν
ἄλογον τὸ μὴ οὐ τέμνειν διχῇ : further Theaet. 181 Β οὐδὲν μὲν
οὖν ἀνεκτὸν μὴ οὐ διασκέψασθαι (contrast Laws 861 D τούτοιν
τοίνυν τοῖν δυοῖν τὸ μὲν οὐκ ἀνεκτόν, τό γε δὴ μὴ λέγειν κτέ.) :
Rep. 427 Ε οὐχ ὅσιον μὴ οὐ βοηθεῖν δικαιοσύνῃ : Phaedo 88 Β
οὐδενὶ προσήκει. (The examples are all from class (a) :
examples from class (6) may be dispensed with. )
μὴ οὐ in these cases is analogous to μὴ οὐ after positive
verbs of prevention or denial where the thing prevented or
denied is itself negative, the un being reflected from the
negative idea in the previous verb, while the où remains to
be translated as a qualification of the object of it. On the
other hand when we have un ou with the infin. after negatived
verbs of prevention, etc. (as at 89 D 18), both un and où are
reflected from the previous negatived negative idea, and neither
remains to be translated . Kühner deals with the two classes
in § 516, sections 4 and 5 respectively. See Goodwin MT.
§§ 816, 817 : F.E.T. pp. 367, 381. Perhaps the clearest account
XXVII 90 E NOTES 177

is given by Mr. Whitelaw Cambridge Philolog. Soc. Transactions

vol . I pp. 42, 43. In οὐχ ὅσιον μὴ οὐ βοηθεῖν , οὐχ ὅσιον is resumed
by un, which repels où ẞon@eiv ; deprecation of not rendering
assistance is the state of mind of the speaker.
With such an expression as Toλй avoiα we may have an
infin. as a subject (un éléλew ) ; but we may also have a looser
' consecutive ' infinitive, un ouк ééλe , expressing the ' net
result ' of what is recommended.
F.E.T. is therefore right in observing (p. 381 ) that in these
cases of un ou ' we may be sure that the force of each negative
was, originally at least, felt in Greek. ' But the idiom was
sustained by an ' irrational ' tendency in the Greek language.
Mr. Whitelaw CR. x 2446, at the end of a valuable article,
says : It is evident that these combinations (of negatives)
had a certain fascination for the Greek mind. This appears
especially in the ingenious and unnecessary developments of
the consecutive un ou.' The fact that un où was pronounced
as one syllable in verse is further evidence how closely the
words had coalesced . Somewhat similar is the development of
Kåv for κal (see on 72 C 1 ). By the time we get to uǹ où with
the participle we have clearly passed the bounds that separate
' rational ' from ' irrational ' idiom. For δυσάλγητος γὰρ ἂν
εἴην τοιάνδε μὴ οὐ κατοικτίρων ἕδραν is not capable of logical
explanation : it is a variant, by ' personalization,' for ducáλynrov
ἂν εἴη μὴ οὐ κατοικτίρειν . So Phil. 12 D πῶς γὰρ ἡδονή γε ἡδονῇ
μὴ οὐχ ὁμοιότατον ἂν εἴη ; may be regarded as a variant for
ἀμήχανον γὰρ ἡδονήν γε ἡδονῇ μὴ οὐχ ὁμοιότατον εἶναι. A similar
method may be applied to Gorg. 509 A, Euthyd. 297 c , where
also we have personalising extensions of the infinitive usage.
31. μήτε μήτε : “ the relative takes μή when the antecedent
is indefinite ' F.E.T. p. 362, Hadley § 1021. In these cases the
relative clause may be looked on as conditional. Cp. 80D 2,
95 B 17, 96 C 7, 99 C 23. Cp. μýжw 79 D 38.
32. μήτ' ἔστιν αὐτῶν : “ when a relative clause is continued
by a clause co-ordinate with it, the relative word is hardly ever
repeated. Where this would be necessary ' [owing to a change
of the case required ] ' the relative construction is abandoned in
the second clause, and the relative word is sometimes (a) entirely
omitted, and sometimes (b), if in an oblique case, replaced by
a personal or demonstrative pronoun ' Hadley § 1005. See on
74 D 35. As examples of (a) in Plato see Rep. 533 D, Symp.
201 B, Menex. 239 c (nom. omitted ), Prot. 313 B (dat. omitted).
As examples of (b)—of which the presentisan instance- Stallbaum
quotes Rep. 395D ὧν φαμὲν κήδεσθαι καὶ δεῖν αὐτοὺς ἄνδρας
ἀγαθοὺς γενέσθαι, Gorg. 452 D 8 φῂς σὺ μέγιστον ἀγαθὸν εἶναι καὶ
N
 178 ΜΕΝΟ XXVII 90 E

σὲ δημιουργὸν εἶναι αὐτοῦ. Kühner § 561. 1 (cp. Jelf § 833 ) also

quotes from Plato Rep. 505 E ὃ δὴ διώκει μὲν ἅπασα ψυχὴ καὶ
τούτου ἕνεκα πάντα πράττει, Phil. 12 B, Hipp. maj . 289 D ᾧ καὶ
τἄλλα πάντα κοσμεῖται καὶ προσγενομένου αὐτοῦ καλὰ φαίνεται.
Add Theaet. 192 Α δ μὴ οἶδε μηδὲ ἔχει αὐτοῦ σφραγίδα : ibid. B
ἕτερόν τι ὧν οἶδε καὶ αἰσθάνεται καὶ ἔχει αὖ καὶ ἐκείνου τὸ σημεῖον.
For the (exceptional) repetition of the relative see Prot. 313 A,
and J. & A. M. Adam's note. Analogous to the idiom now con-
sidered is the transition from a causal clause to a direct state-
ment, as Eur. Alc. 1057 διπλῆν φοβοῦμαι μέμψιν , ἔκ τε δημοτῶν
μή τίς μ' ἐλέγξη . καὶ τῆς θανούσης πολλὴν πρόνοιαν δεῖ μ'
ἔχειν. (See Graves on Thuc. v 61 , and Marchant on Thuc. vi
31. ) Perhaps these phenomena indicate incomplete develop-
ment of the subordinate sentence.
34. οὐ πολλή σοι δοκεῖ κτέ., ‘ does not this seem to you a
serious flaw in reasoning ?' ' Indeed it does, and brute
stupidity to boot. ' Buttmann well expresses the difference
between ἀλογία and ἀμαθία. The former is the case of the
man who for the time fails to apply his reasoning power ; the
latter that of the man whose reasoning power has never been
cultivated. As to ἀμαθία see Archer-Hind on Timaeus 86 B, and
J. Adam on Euthyphr. 2c.

CHAPTER XXVIII
91 A 2. ἔξεστί σε βουλεύεσθαι : the subject of ἔξεστί is σε
βουλεύεσθαι. See Kühner § 475. Anm. 1 , 2. Cp. Gorg. 486c
τὸν τοιοῦτον ἔξεστιν ἐπὶ κόρρης τύπτοντα μὴ διδόναι δίκην, Polit.
290 D οὐδ᾽ ἔξεστι βασιλέα χωρὶς ἱερατικῆς ἄρχειν ; Crito 51 D ᾧ ἂν
μὴ ἀρέσκωμεν ἡμεῖς ἐξεῖναι λαβόντα τὰ αὑτοῦ ἀπιέναι, Laws 721 D.
Mr. St. George Stock points out that ἔξεστί σε “ is more compli-
mentary than ἔξεστί σοι would have been. The latter would have
66
meant " you have the opportunity ” ; this means “ there is the
opportunity, " i.e. " I have the opportunity of your assistance ."
4. ταύτης τῆς σοφίας κτέ : this corresponds pretty much
to Meno's definition of ἀνδρὸς ἀρετή 71 Ε. Meno however has
said nothing about treatment of parents. But he has laid
stress on μεγαλοπρέπεια (74 Δ) . Cp. Prot. 318 E foll. , where
Protagoras says that what he teaches is εὐβουλία περὶ τῶν οἰκείων,
ὅπως ἂν ἄριστα τὴν αὑτοῦ οἰκίαν διοικοῖ, καὶ περὶ τῶν τῆς πόλεως,
ὅπως τὰ τῆς πόλεως δυνατώτατος ἂν εἴη καὶ πράττειν καὶ λέγειν.
See Xen. Mem. iv ii 11 ( quoted by Fr. ) οὐ δήπου, ὦ Εὐθύδημε,
ταύτης τῆς ἀρετῆς ἐφίεσαι, δι᾿ ἣν ἄνθρωποι πολιτικοὶ γίγνονται
καὶ οἰκονομικοὶ καὶ ἄρχειν ἱκανοὶ καὶ ὠφέλιμοι τοῖς τ᾽ ἄλλοις
ἀνθρώποις καὶ ἑαυτοῖς. .. ἔστι γὰρ τῶν βασιλέων αὕτη (ή τέχνη)
XXVIII 91 c NOTES 179

καὶ καλεῖται βασιλική. Cp. Rep. 600 C D. Isocr. Antid. (15)

285 speaks of himself and his pupils as Toùs rà тolaûтa µavlá-
νοντας καὶ μελετῶντας, ἐξ ὧν καὶ τὸν ἴδιον οἶκον καὶ τὰ κοινὰ τὰ
τῆς πόλεως καλῶς διοικήσουσιν.
7. πολίτας καὶ ξένους : Xen. Oec. ii 5 ἔπειτα ξένους προσήκει
σοι πολλοὺς δέχεσθαι καὶ τούτους μεγαλοπρεπῶς · ἔπειτα δὲ πολίτας
δειπνίζειν καὶ εὖ ποιεῖν (Fr.).
8. ὑποδέξασθαι καὶ ἀποπέμψαι : not merely the substantial
duties of hospitality, but the art to ' welcome the coming, speed
the parting, guest ' with all due etiquette. Charondas ap.
Stob. for. xliv 40 (προοίμια νόμων ) : ξένον — εὐφήμως καὶ οἰκείως
προσδέχεσθαι καὶ ἀποστέλλειν . Arist. NE. IV ii 15 ἡ μεγαλο-
πρέπεια—καὶ περὶ ξένων δὲ ὑποδοχὰς καὶ ἀποστολὰς καὶ δωρεάς
καὶ ἀντιδωρεάς (Fr. ).
14. κοινούς, ‘ open, ep. Xen. Cyneg. xiii 9 οἱ δὲ φιλόσοφοι πᾶσι Β
κοινοὶ καὶ φίλοι. See CR. XI 424 b.
15. Tagaµévous : aorist, because the fee is fixed once for all ;
πраτтоμÉνονs : pres., because it is exacted from time to time.
16. Kal Tĺvas : Kaí indignantis. Cp. 80 D 1. Contrast Eur.
Phoen. 1358 καὶ πῶς γένοιτ᾽ ἂν τῶνδε δυσποτμώτερα ; with 1363
πῶς καὶ πέπρακται διπτύχων παίδων φόνος ; The first question
has feeling ; the second asks for details. The explanation of
the difference is that kai accentuates the word that follows it.
See Shilleto on Dem. F.L. (19) § 257.
18. σοφιστάς : see on 85 Β 49. For the process by which C
the word acquired an opprobrious sense, see the article
' Sophist ' in Encycl. Brit. , Zeller pre- Socr. II 429 foll. ,
Grote Hist. ch. lxvii, Sidgwick in JP. IV pp. 288 foll. , v pp.
66 foll. Grote rightly protested against the representation of
the sophists as a conspiracy against morality and philosophy.
But he perhaps hardly attached sufficient weight to the in-
direct consequences of the one common attribute that they
did undoubtedly possess, namely that they were professional
teachers. Their forth-coming was the response to a feeling
of the narrowness of the older training, and the demand for
something at once more elaborate and more effective ( Zeller
pre-Socr. II 396, 397 ; 430, 436 ; Sidgwick Hist. ofEthics 17-22).
But the rise of the ' professional element ' put a new aspect
upon the pursuit of knowledge. "The introduction of pay-
ment for scientific instruction, ' says Zeller (ut sup. II 441 ), ' is
a sign that now instead of honest inquiry, satisfied with
knowledge of the actual, only that knowledge is sought which
may be applied as a means to other ends. ' Then would follow
that reaction upon teaching which must occur when it has to
180 ΜΕΝΟ XXVIII 91 c

be accommodated to the practical demands of the taught. No

man, says Plato ( Soph. 232 D), would resort to the sophists if
they did not promise to make men clever in debate about Law
and Politics. This suggests some of the reasons that led to
the odious connotation of the word ' sophist ' and the un-
popularity of the class. With a nation so prone to póvos as
the Greeks, the mere assumption of special knowledge easily
became invidious. Already in Aesch. P. V. 944 Hermes uses
the term ooporns as a taunt to Prometheus. Riddell Introd.
p. xxvii shows how in 1791 the name Philosopher ' became
a term of opprobrium among British abhorrers of the
French Revolution. The title Professor ' has before now
lent itself to an uncomplimentary use. See Prot. 312 A
(the conclusion of the passage referred to on 90 B 5) Zù dé,
ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, πρὸς θεῶν, οὐκ ἂν αἰσχύνοιο εἰς τοὺς Ἕλληνας
σαυτὸν σοφιστὴν παρέχων ; Νὴ τὸν Δία, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἴπερ γε
ἃ διανοοῦμαι χρὴ λέγειν. The sequel gives further evidence
of the unpopularity of sophists. ' Callias' porter (314 D) has
no more discrimination than Aristophanes or Anytus ; he
mistakes Socrates and his companion for σοφισταί τινες, and
shuts the door in their faces. Later, 316 CD, Protagoras speaks
with some feeling of the odium attaching to his profession, and
the great caution he has to exercise : οὐ γὰρ σμικροὶ περὶ αὐτὰ
φθόνοι τε γίγνονται καὶ ἄλλαι δυσμένειαί τε καὶ ἐπιβουλαί. See
also Xen. Cyneg. ch. xiii, from which Fr. quotes (§ 8) σopLOTÈV
κληθῆναι, ὅ ἐστιν ὄνειδος παρά γε τοῖς εὖ φρονοῦσιν. (Xen. con-
cludes his tract in the true spirit of the country squire by
advising young men to avoid the sophists and stick to hunt-
ing. ) So Isocrates Antid. (15) 168 speaks of ǹ Kowǹ πEpì TOÙS
σοφιστὰς διαβολή.
19. Ηράκλεις, εὐφήμει, ὦ Σώκρατες, ‘good gracious, Socrates,
spare our ears !' The source of Anytus' hostility to the sophists,
and to Socrates, whom he included among them, is explained by
Grote II 27 : He is a man of plain sense, practical habits, and
conservative patriotism-who worships what he finds accredited
as virtue, and dislikes the talkers and theorizers about virtue
in general. ' We must also take into account the circumstances
of the time. After the amnesty of 403 B.C. ' the eπieikeia of the
restored people did not last long, and was naturally succeeded by
a sensitive and fanatical zeal for theirrevived popularinstitutions'
Riddell Introd. p. iv (ẹp. p. xxix) . Culture of any kind was
associated with oligarchic reaction. Not that the fear of culture
was confined to democrats, for the Thirty had attempted to put
down those who taught Xóywv тéxvnv (Xen. Mem. 1 ii 31 ) . In
spite of the boasted Tappnoia and govoía at Athens (see Gorg.
461 E, Rep. 557 B), the Athenian temper was at bottom intolerant
XXVIII 91 c NOTES 181

(Holm Hist. of Greece ET. 11 293), though we may concede to

Grote Hist. ch. lxviii that it was less so than that of other
states. Cp. on 80 B 21.
The view of Callicles in the Gorgias is very similar to that
of Anytus. Callicles too is a lover of the δῆμος (Gorg. 481 D,
513 c) and a hater of the sophists (ibid. 519 E ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἀκούεις
τοιαῦτα λεγόντων τῶν φασκόντων παιδεύειν ἀνθρώπους εἰς ἀρετήν ;
ΚΑΛ. Ἔγωγε · ἀλλὰ τί ἂν λέγοις ἀνθρώπων πέρι οὐδενὸς ἀξίων ;).
Callicles, like Meno, has been trained in rhetoric by Gorgias,
but spurns the idea that Gorgias can teach τὰ δίκαια (482c foll. ),
and disbelieves in the sophists who profess to train men eis
ἀρετήν. Compare his view ibid . 485 Α φιλοσοφίας μὲν ὅσον
παιδείας χάριν καλὸν μετασχεῖν, καὶ οὐκ αἰσχρὸν μειρακίῳ ἔτι
ὄντι φιλοσοφεῖν κτέ. , a view which Socrates sums up at 487c :
ἐνίκα ἐν ὑμῖν τοιάδε τις δόξα, μὴ προθυμεῖσθαι εἰς τὴν ἀκρίβειαν
φιλοσοφεῖν, ἀλλὰ εὐλαβεῖσθαι παρεκελεύεσθε ἀλλήλοις ὅπως μὴ
πέρα τοῦ δέοντος σοφώτεροι γενόμενοι λήσετε διαφθαρέντες. See
on 95 C 23. So the practical soldier Laches disparages sophists,
Lach. 197 D (cp. 183 c foll. ). The view of Isocrates recalls that
of Callicles (Antid. ( 15) 268) . See note on 100 A 6, Jebb Att.
Or. II p. 39, and Sidgwick in JP. v 75 foll.
It is this unpopularity, shared by Socrates with other
philosophers, but in an even greater degree (Riddell Introd . xxvi),
against which he protests (Apol. 28 A ) : καὶ τοῦτ᾽ ἔστιν ὅ ἐμὲ
αἱρήσει, ἐάνπερ αἱρῇ, οὐ Μέλητος οὐδὲ ῎Ανυτος, ἀλλ᾽ ἡ τῶν
πολλῶν διαβολή τε καὶ φθόνος. Cp. Zeller Socr. 219, 220.
Rep. vi is an apology for philosophy. See 492Α ἢ καὶ
σὺ ἡγεῖ, ὥσπερ οἱ πολλοί, διαφθειρομένους τινὰς εἶναι ὑπὸ
σοφιστῶν νέους, διαφθείροντας δέ τινας σοφιστὰς ἰδιωτικούς κτέ.
See by all means Grote's vivid summary of the whole passage
(III 81, 82) ; also note on 95 C 23.
21. ἀστόν : cp. 92 Β 7. The word is always used by Plato in
contrast with ξένος (as Gorg. 514 Ε ), or μέτοικος (as Rep. 563 Α).
See Laws 869D : ' If a fellow citizen (kills ) another ' is ἐὰν πολίτης
πολίτην, but if a citizen (kills) a stranger is ἐὰν ἀστὸς ξένον :
πολίτης being a correlative term. See 70 B 8, 91 A 7.
23. ἐστι agreeing in number with the predicate : Hadley
§ 610 quotes Antiphon τετρ. II 3 § 8 αἱ χορηγίαι ἱκανὸν εὐδαι
μονίας σημεῖόν ἐστι. This usage must be distinguished from
such instances as Euthyd. 302c ἔστι ἔμοιγε καὶ βωμοί, where
there is no singular predicate, and the eσr is only justified
by coming first, the number of the subject being not yet
determined .
 182 MENO XXIX 91 C

CHAPTER XXIX
1. οὗτοι ἄρα : see on 80 Ε 8.
οὗτοι ἄρα μόνοι : we have here and in the sequel another
aspect of the paradox referred to on 90 B 5. Cp. Apol. 24 D
foll. : in the special Arts, says Socrates, many can spoil, few
can benefit : in Virtue the reverse seems according to Meletus
to be the case : the ' man in the street works for good ; the
experts-the sophists and I-for evil.
3. ὅσον οὐ μόνον οὐκ ὠφελοῦσιν, ‘ they differ so much as
amounts to this-they not only, ' etc.; see J. Adam on Euthyphr.
11 D. For ὅσον = ὥστε followed by the indicative ep. Χen. Cyr.
VIII i 4 τοσοῦτον δὲ διαφέρειν δεῖ τῶν δούλων ὅσον οἱ μὲν δοῦλοι
ἄκοντες τοῖς δεσπόταις ὑπηρετοῦσιν : Isocr. 13 (in Soph. ) 20
τοσούτῳ δὲ χείρους ἐγένοντο τῶν περὶ τὰς ἐρίδας καλινδουμένων,
ὅσον οὗτοι μὲν . . ὅμως ἀρετὴν ἐπηγγείλαντο : also 8 (de Pace)
43 τοσοῦτον ἀπολελείμμεθα . . ὅσον οἱ μὲν ὑπὲρ τῆς τῶν ἄλλων
σωτηρίας τὴν πατρίδα τὴν αὑτῶν ἐκλιπεῖν ἐτόλμησαν κτέ. ; ibid. 54
τοσοῦτον δὲ διαφέρομεν τῶν προγόνων ὅσον ἐκεῖνοι μὲν τοὺς αὐτοὺς
προστάτας τε τῆς πόλεως ἐποιοῦντο καὶ στρατηγοὺς ᾑροῦντο ; ibid.
96 τοσοῦτον γὰρ ὑπερεβάλοντο ἁμαρτήμασιν ὅσον πρὸς τοῖς πρότερον
ὑπάρχουσι σφαγὰς ἐποίησαν. The instances are all after ex-
pressions of difference (Kühner § 582. 1).
D 6. τούτων : the gen. of price is here substituted for ἐπί with
the dat. (ἐπ᾿ αὐτῷ τούτῳ ) at 90 D 20.
χρήματα ἀξιοῦσι πράττεσθαι : the taking of fees for in-
struction was the distinguishing note of the ' sophists, ' who
thus created a teaching profession . See on the general question
Zeller pre-Socratics II 436 foll. , also Hipp. maj. 281 Β-283 Β,
particularly 282 c τῶν δὲ παλαιῶν ἐκείνων οὐδεὶς πώποτε ἠξίωσεν
ἀργύριον μισθὸν πράξασθαι οὐδ᾽ ἐπιδείξεις ποιήσασθαι ἐν παντο-
δαποῖς ἀνθρώποις τῆς ἑαυτοῦ σοφίας. The context tells us that
Gorgias (see on 70 A 7) and Prodicus have made more money
by their oopia than any artist from any art, and so did
Protagoras before them ; but Hippias can boast of having
made as much money as any two sophists. On the contrary,
Anaxagoras, instead of growing rich, spent a fortune that had
been left him.
8. Protagoras was the first to make σοφία a profession. So
in Prot. 317 B he avows himself a sophist, and Socrates, ibid.
348 Ε, says to him καὶ οὕτω πεπίστευκας σαυτῷ, ὥστε καὶ ἄλλων
ταύτην τὴν τέχνην ἀποκρυπτομένων σύ γ' ἀναφανδόν σεαυτὸν
ὑποκηρυξάμενος εἰς πάντας τοὺς Ἕλληνας, σοφιστὴν ἐπονομάσας,
XXIX 91 E NOTES 183

σεαυτὸν ἀπέφηνας παιδεύσεως καὶ ἀρετῆς διδάσκαλον , πρῶτος τούτου

μισθὸν ἀξιώσας ἄρνυσθαι. Diog. L. (1x 52) says of Protagoras οὗτος
πρῶτος μισθὸν εἰσεπράξατο, μνᾶς ἑκατόν. Protagoras, however,
recognized that the success of the master is best attested by the
pupil's recognition of the benefit conferred, and so ' left it to
the pupil to decide at the end of the instructions what he
would give, if the price seemed to him excessive .'- Zeller pre-
Socratics II 409 note (see Prot. 328 BC).
As to the priority of Protagoras we read in † Alc. i 119 A
that two Athenians, Pythodorus and Callias, each paid 100
minae to Zeno of Elea for their instruction. The statement is
probably to be rejected ; for, though the date of Zeno's birth
is uncertain, there is little doubt that he was older than
Protagoras (Zeller pre-Socratics 1 609 note). Still it is not
impossible that Zeno, like Gorgias, though older than Prot-
agoras, may have followed an example set by his junior.
The same fee is asserted for Gorgias (Diod. XII 53, Zeller
pre- Socratics II 415 he thinks these fees ' greatly exaggerated ').
Euenos of Paros was content with the more modest figure of
5 minae (Apol. 20 B).
Fees were also charged for separate lectures : Diog. L. XI 50
says that Protagoras and Prodicus made collections after their
readings (λόγους ἀναγιγνώσκοντες ἠρανίζοντο). See Crat. 384 B,
where Socr. says he could not afford to hear τὴν πεντηκοντά-
δραχμον ἐπίδειξιν of Prodicus, but only τὴν δραχμιαῖαν.
12. τέρας λέγεις, εἰ οὐκ ἄν : for el after expressions of
wonder, etc. , to express the object of the emotion see Goodwin
MT. § 494. For ei followed by av withthe optative see on
79 C 27. For ei ouк see Goodwin MT. §§ 386 , 387 : ' When
two clauses introduced by μév and dé depend upon a single el,
which precedes them both, où is used even more frequently
than μή. He refers to Phaedo 97 Α θαυμάζω γὰρ εἰ ὅτε μὲν
ἑκατέρων αὐτῶν χωρὶς ἀλλήλων ἦν οὐκ ἤστην τότε δύο, ἐπεὶ δὲ
ἐπλησίασαν ἀλλήλοις κτέ.
17. Tậ Xiµŵ : words denoting affections of the mind or E
body when spoken of as causes (in the dative, or in the
genitive with Tó), often take the article, denoting not the
feeling in general but the particular occurrence of it. So here
Tu , fame quae tunc oriatur necesse est ' Fr. We have
the art. with Xuós Ar. Peace 483, Xen. Anab. I v 5, Dem.
Aristocr. (23) 156. In Plato, where the word Auós occurs, it is
always, as here, mentioned as a cause ; we have the art. here
and Symp. 207 B ; the art. omitted Rep. 416 A, Euthyphr. 4 D,
Gorg. 464 E. At Symp. 191 A the MSS . vary : Sch. writes
ὑπὸ λιμοῦ without the article. Cp. ὑπὸ τοῦ ἔθους 82 Α 29.
184 ΜΕΝΟ XXIX 91 E

δὲ ἄρα : the sentence as a whole is an argument by contrast

(' ex contrariis conclusum ' ), to which the rhetoricians gave the
name ἐνθύμημα par excellence. See Cicero Top. § 55, and cp.
Quint. v x 1 , 2 ; xiv 2. We have several instances of it in
this portion of the dialogue.
In sentences of this sort the combination of particles dè
ἄρα imports that a juxtaposition of two ideas reveals an
incongruity. The idiom is common in Plato. The sentence is
in form paratactic, the real emphasis being on the clause with
δέ. Sometimes we have apa with the μév clause as well as
with the dé, whereby each part of the antithesis is brought into
relief (see exx. 7, 8, 9 below).
A. Sometimes the paradox is introduced by some phrase
expressive of surprise, as τέρας λέγεις εἰ here.
(1) Apol. 34 c τάχα δ᾽ ἄν τις ὑμῶν ἀγανακτήσειεν εἰ ὁ μὲν
ἱκέτευσε . ἐγὼ δὲ οὐδὲν ἄρα τούτων ποιήσω.
(2 ) Ibid. 37 CD ( I should be a fool to think that) vµeîs µèv
ὄντες πολῖταί μοι οὐχ οἷοί τε ἐγένεσθε ἐνεγκεῖν τὰς ἐμὰς διατριβὰς
ἄλλοι δὲ ἄρα αὐτὰς οἴσουσι ῥᾳδίως.
(3) Gorg. 512 Α λογίζεται οὖν ὅτι οὐκ εἰ μέν τις μεγάλοις καὶ
ἀνιάτοις νοσήμασιν κατὰ τὸ σῶμα συνεχόμενος μὴ ἀπεπνίγη, οὗτος
μὲν ἄθλιός ἐστιν ὅτι οὐκ ἀπέθανεν . εἰ δέ τις ἄρα ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ
πολλὰ νοσήματα ἔχει καὶ ἀνίατα τούτῳ δὲ βιωτέον ἐστίν.
(4) Theaet. 161c (Protagoras might have jeered at us)
ἐνδεικνύμενος ὅτι ἡμεῖς μὲν αὐτὸν ὥσπερ θεὸν ἐθαυμάζομεν ἐπὶ
σοφίᾳ, ὁ δ᾽ ἄρα ἐτύγχανεν ὢν εἰς φρόνησιν οὐδὲν βελτίων γυρίνου.
(5) Phil. 30 A Β οὐ γάρ που δοκοῦμεν τοῦτο ἐν μὲν τοῖς παρ'
ἡμῖν σοφίαν ἐπικαλεῖσθαι τῶν δ᾽ αὐτῶν τούτων ὄντων ἐν
ὅλῳ τε οὐρανῷ . ἐν τούτοις δ᾽ οὐκ ἄρα μεμηχανῆσθαι τὴν τῶν
καλλίστων φύσιν.
B. Sometimes it appears as a question, as 94 B 18.
( 6) Crito 46 D ἢ πρὶν μὲν ἐμὲ δεῖν ἀποθνῄσκειν καλῶς ἐλέγετο,
νῦν δὲ κατάδηλος ἄρα ἐγένετο ὅτι ἄλλως ἐλέγετο ;
(7) Ibid. 50 E ἢ πρὸς μὲν ἄρα σοι τὸν πατέρα οὐκ ἐξ ἴσου ἦν
τὸ δίκαιον ὥστε ἅπερ πάσχοις ταῦτα καὶ ἀντιποιεῖν πρὸς
δὲ τὴν πατρίδα ἄρα καὶ τοὺς νόμους ἔσται σοι ;
(8) Prot. 325 BC διδακτοῦ δὲ ὄντος (τῆς ἀρετῆς) τὰ μὲν ἄλλα
ἄρα τοὺς ὑεῖς διδάσκονται, ἐφ᾽ οἷς οὐκ ἔστι θάνατος ἡ ζημία .
ἐφ᾽ ὧν δὲ ἡ ζημία θάνατος ταῦτα δ᾽ ἄρα οὐ διδάσκονται ;
(9) Rep. 600 € D (Homer cannot really have been an educator,
or his contemporaries would have made much more of him)
ἀλλὰ Πρωταγόρας μὲν ἄρα ὁ ᾿Αβδηρίτης καὶ Πρόδικος ὁ Κεῖος .
ἐπὶ ταύτῃ τῇ σοφίᾳ οὕτω σφόδρα φιλοῦνται . Ομηρον δ᾽ ἄρα οἱ
ἐπ᾿ ἐκείνου . . ἢ Ησίοδον ῥαψῳδεῖν ἂν περιιόντας εἴων ;
(10) Phaedo 68 Α ἢ ἀνθρωπίνων μὲν παιδικῶν . ἀποθανόντων
XXIX 92 A NOTES 185

πολλοὶ δὴ ἕκοντες ἠθέλησαν εἰς "Αιδου ἐλθεῖν . . φρονήσεως δὲ ἄρα

τις τῷ ὄντι ἐρῶν . . ἀγανακτήσει ἀποθνῄσκειν ;
(11) Ibid. 80D ἔνια δὲ μέρη τοῦ σώματος . • ὅμως ὡς ἔπος
εἰπεῖν ἀθάνατά ἐστιν · ἢ οὔ ; Ναί. Ἡ δὲ ψυχὴ ἄρα, τὸ ἀειδὲς
αὕτη δὲ δὴ ἡμῖν • • ἀπαλλαττομένη τοῦ σώματος εὐθὺς
διαπεφύσηται ;
(12) Laws 647 ο ἢ τῇ μὲν δειλίᾳ τῇ ἐν αὐτῷ προσμαχόμενον
καὶ νικῶντα αὐτὴν δεῖ τέλεον οὕτω γίγνεσθαι πρὸς ἀνδρείαν .
σώφρων δὲ ἄρα τελέως ἔσται μὴ πολλαῖς ἡδοναῖς . . διαμεμαχη-
μένος ;
In all these places de apa occurs in the second half of an
antithetic argument . But de apa often occurs without any
previous antithesis, where dé is merely connective, and apa has
its usual force. For instances of this see Hipp. maj. 283 B,
Euthyd. 279 A, Gorg. 493 B, 513 ▲, Phaedo 107 E, Laus 660 E,
+ Hipparch. 229 c. See also on 97 C 30.
18. ἐλάνθανεν διαφθείρων : a similar argument is used by
Socrates in his own favour, Apol. 33D foll. If I really
corrupt youths, they, or at any rate their guardians, would
have found it out and assailed me long ago.'
21. áπolaveîv : according to Philochorus (ap. Diog. L. IX
55), he was drowned on a voyage to Sicily. The limits of his
life appear to be about 481-411 B.C. According to Diog. L.
IX 51 and 54, he was accused of impiety before the Four
Hundred, exiled , and his books burnt (cp. Cic. N.D. 1 § 63).
If we accept this story, the shipwreck may have taken place on
his flight from Athens. But Mr. St. George Stock, in his note
here, has pointed out that the story of his prosecution is very
doubtful. The expressions here and those which Plato puts
into his mouth, Prot. 317 B, seem inconsistent with his ever
having suffered seriously from any attacks.
ἐγγὺς καὶ ἑβδομήκοντα : no other instance of ἐγγὺς καί is
forthcoming, Kaí is struck out in F (Coislinianus ) by a later
hand, and does not appear in Stephanus. Except Buttmann
all the modern editors keep it. It must be explained on the
analogy of kai after loov, etc. (L. & S. κaí A III i ). The use
with és (kal és éẞdοµýкоvта µvpiádas Hdt. 11 60, cp. 68 ; L. & S.
S.V. Kai A v) is not parallel.
26. οἱ μὲν πρότερον γεγονότες ἐκείνου : who these were is 92 A
not very clear. See on 91 D 8. Gorgias was probably rather
older than Protagoras (Zeller pre- Socratics 11 413 note ; Frey's
dates for his life, 483-375 B.C. , are accepted by Ueberweg-
Heinze § 29 and R. & P. 183 A), but he was younger in the
profession. Hippias (Hipp. maj. 282 E) and Prodicus (Prot.
 186 MENO XXIX 92 A

317 c) were both younger. (The expression of Protagoras at the

place last quoted , οὐδενὸς ὅτου οὐ πάντων ἂν ὑμῶν καθ᾿ ἡλικίαν
πaτηρ elŋv, must be hyperbolical, as he was only about twelve
years older than Socrates. Cp. 320 c. )
But perhaps Socrates here is not confining his remarks to
professional sophists. Protagoras ( Prot. 316 D) asserts that the
wise men of old were really sophists in disguise, and this fancy
Socrates seems to countenance (ibid. 342 A B).
27. οἱ δὲ καὶ νῦν ἔτι ὄντες : this is probably to be referred
to the dramatic date of the dialogue, about 402 B.C. At that
time Protagoras was dead, but the other three great sophists ,
Gorgias, Hippias, and Prodicus, were probably alive. Zeller
(pre- Socratics II 417 note) points out that Gorgias, Prodicus,
and Hippias are all spoken of in Apol. 19 E as flourishing at
the time of Socrates' trial in 399 B. C.

CHAPTER XXX

1. πολλοῦ γε δέουσι μαίνεσθαι : cp, τοσούτου δέω εἰδέναι

71 A 26, and on 79 B 20. The infin. is consecutive, ' the mean-
ing being the same as if wσre accompanied it : Apol. 30 D, 37 B,
Lysis 204 E, Phaedr. 228 A, Laws 660 B. Cp. Prot. 329 в σμ-
κροῦ τινὸς ἐνδεής εἰμι πάντ᾽ ἔχειν, 35 D (Kühner § 477 e). Where
the infin. is negative we often have un ov : Euthyd. 297 B
ὥστε πολλοῦ δέω μὴ οὐ δύο γε φεύγειν, I am far from not
running away from two. ' (The un ou is a real negative, as after
αἰσχρόν, ἀδύνατον, etc. See on 90 E 26. ) At Theaet. 166 D we
have the article with μή : πολλοῦ δέω τὸ μὴ φάναι εἶναι.
All the above instances are ' personal ' : we have the im
personal оoû deî at Gorg. 517 A (where with Madv. and Sch.
place full stop after & Zúкpaтes), Apol. 35 D etc.
At Symp. 203 c πένης ἀεί ἐστιν καὶ πολλοῦ δεῖ ἁπαλός τε καὶ
καλὸς . • ἀλλὰ σκληρός κτέ. , it is not so well to understand είναι
(which Badham would insert) as to suppose that Tooû deî is
stereotyped in the sense by no means.' We have πολλοῦ δεῖν
once in this sense, Dem. Aristocr. (23) 7 iv' eïdŋte woXXoû deîv
ǎğıov övтa (Goodwin § 779 a). Cp. on 80 B 23.
3. Tây véwv : partitive ' gen. The word is put at the end
for emphasis, and is balanced by οἱ προσήκοντες. Anytus
believes in ' home ' teaching versus professional. Interference
with home influence was one cause of jealousy against the
'sophists,' Prot. 316 c. Cp. Xen. Mem. I ii 51 for the same
feeling in the case of Socrates. Intr. § 6.
B 6. εἴτε ξένος . . εἴτε ἀστός : see on 91 C 21. Here ξένος is
XXX 92 c NOTES 187

characteristic of most ' sophists, ' who were travellers, men

without a fixed home or city- thus ' vagabonds ' in the eyes of
the many. By dorós Socrates himself is hinted at. In Soph.
223 D we have the art of the sophist divided according as he
carries his wares from city to city ( μπорiкý) or sells them at
home (кαжηλký) (cp. Prot. 313 c). The wandering sophist is
defined at 224 D, and then, ibid. E, follows the definition of the
stay-at-home sophist, who may either retail goods bought from
others, or sell goods of his own manufacture (каπηλкòν ELTE
αὐτοπωλικόν).
11. οὐδὲ . . οὐδέ : see on 75 Α 4.
15. The ye implies an affirmative answer : ' I am, and may C
I continue so. ' See App. on the text.
16. & Saiμóvie : see on 73 D 11 .
18. ἄπειρος εἴης : see on 89 Ε 25. Goodwin § 531 quotes
this passage, translating ' how then could you know about that
thing of which you had no experience at all . ' TOUTOU is here an
indefinite anaphoric (ejus with rel. and subj. ). Cp. Euthyd.
302 A Taûтa ä σoi eşein. Cobet, Coll. crit. p. 49, dissatisfied
with this, proposed for τούτου τοῦ πράγματος to read ὁτουοῦν
Tрáyμaтos. (See CR. XIV 11 for a criticism on his view, where
inter alia Gorg. 450 B is quoted : εĽTEρ Tαúτηy рηтopikην Kaλεîs
avπeρì Xóyous). Sch. , on the other hand, believing that
the question is not general, but concerning this particular
matter, ' reads ärelpos el. AN. H padiws. (One MS. , Coisl. ,
has ens corrected to el. ) I think the reply of Anytus shows
that the question is put in a general form. He replies ῥᾳδίως
to the general question, and then with ToÚTOUS Your restricts
himself to the particular case of the sophists. Kühner § 399.
6 b quotes this place, regarding eins as attracted ' into the
mood of eldeins äv ; and Goodwin, at the end of § 531 , where
he quotes this passage, observes that all these examples fall
under the general rule for assimilation § 558. ' But the fact
that the antecedent and relative clauses both have the optative
mood is due to the similarity of the nature of the clauses ;
it is hardly necessary to call in such a cause as ' assimilation '
to explain the usage. Moreover, such optative relative clauses,
expressing a vague future condition, do not always depend on
another optative. See 96 C 8 and Theaet. 155 A (pýσoµev) ŵ
μήτε προστιθοῖτο μήτε ἀφαιροῖτο τοῦτο μήτε αὐξάνεσθαί ποτε μήτε
p0ive , Kühner § 560. 4.
19. of elow : see App. on the text. There are many places
in which the relative ős is used in the sense of oîos. Kühner
§ 562. 4 says that ös is often used in dependent questions, not
 188 ΜΕΝΟ XXX 92 c
like Tis or Tis to determine the identity of a person or
thing (71 B 7), but in the sense of oios (Lat. qui for qualis). In
these cases the object is supposed known ; its quality has to be
determined. E.g. Thuc. I 136 (Θεμιστοκλῆς) δηλοῖ ὅς ἐστιν
(=qui sit, shows what he is, ' ' shows his true character ' ) ; but
ibid. 137 φράζει τῷ ναυκλήρῳ ὅστις ἐστίν (quis sit, tells him
who he is ' ) . Cp. 80 D 37 : Eur. Alc. 640 ědeiças eis eλeYXOV
ἐξελθὼν ὃς εἶ : Soph. Αj. 1259 οὐ μαθὼν ὃς εἶ φύσιν : 0.0. 1171 :
Rep. 484 Α οἱ μὲν φιλόσοφοι καὶ οἱ μὴ . . ἀνεφάνησαν οἵ εἰσιν
ἑκάτεροι : ibid. 559 A παράδειγμα ἑκατέρων αἵ εἰσιν : Gorg. 512 Α
εἰδὼς ὅτι οὐδὲν αὐτοὺς βελτίους ἐξεβίβασεν ἢ οἱ ἐνέβησαν : Euthyd.
283 D (in a sophism) ὃς μὲν οὐκ ἔστιν, βούλεσθε αὐτὸν γενέσθαι,
ὃς δ᾽ ἔστι νῦν, μηκέτι εἶναι : Phaedr. 243 E ἕωσπερ ἂν ᾖς ὃς εἶ.
See also Kühner § 554. 2.
On the other hand we have 94 B 11 opas olós éotiv, Lach.
183 c, Menex. 249 D oida ola èoτív, etc.
20. εἴτ᾿ οὖν : the particle οὖν is originally confirmative ; its
later inferential use is foreign to Homer and Pindar, and very
rare in Aesch. In alternative suppositions it is added to the
one that it is desired to bring into prominence : Apol. 27 c
(δαιμόνια) εἴτ᾿ οὖν καινὰ εἴτε παλαιά ; Laws 639 Β ἄν τ᾽ οὖν
ναυτιᾷ ἄν τε μή. Sometimes both members have οὖν, if it is
intended to give separate prominence to each : Apol. 34 E kai
τοῦτο τοὔνομα (σοφὸν) ἔχοντα, εἴτ᾿ οὖν ἀληθὲς εἴτ᾿ οὖν ψεῦδος ;
Laws 934 D ἐάν τ᾽ οὖν δοῦλον ἐάν τ᾽ οὖν καὶ ἐλεύθερον (μαινόμενον )
περιορᾷ. Here εἶτ᾽ οὖν ἄπειρος αὐτῶν is said with dark meaning,
for Anytus believes that he has at the very moment the prince
of 'sophists ' before him.
ELTE μn: see on 87 B 35.

Chapter XXX (92 C 20) to Chapter XXXIV ( 95 A).— SOCR. I

am not concerned to defend the sophists. But who do teach
Virtue ifthey do not ? AN. Any respectable man. SOCR.
But look at the great men of our city, Themistocles, Aris-
tides, Pericles, Thucydides ; they had their sons educated
in everything that could be learnt, but in ȧper they never
trained them to be anything like as good as themselves. AN.
You have no veneration, Socrates, you will get into trouble.
22. v, ' to judge from what. ' This use of ¿ is common
in Plato. Cp. 93 B 1 ἐκ τοῦ σαυτοῦ λόγου, Crito 43D ἐξ ὧν
ἀπαγγέλλουσιν ἥκοντές τινες ἀπὸ Σουνίου.
23. ἀλλὰ γάρ : see Excursus III.
D 26. kelvous : prolepsis. We expect in the sequel παρ '
XXX 92 D NOTES 189

ous ; but after the parenthesis kal . . εὐεργέτησον we have the

interrogative Tapà rivas substituted.
27. πατρικὸν ἑταῖρον : see 90 Β 2.
28. páras : the aor. ptcp. is often used with an aor. tense
to express, not an action anterior to that of the main verb, but
a circumstance of it. Το 77 4 5 ὑπόσχεσιν ἀποδοῦναι εἰπών ,
' perform your promise by saying, ' ibid. 7 éáσas öλnv eiπé,
Phaedo 60 ο εὖ ἐποίησας ἀναμνήσας με (where see Heindorfs
note), Euthyd. 282 c εὖ ἐποίησας ἀπαλλάξας με.
It seems impossible to separate from these, except by the
general sense, instances where the aor. ptcp. used with an aor.
tense does denote an anterior action, as. Thuc. I BowToi oi ¿¿
*Αρνης ἀναστάντες τὴν Βοιωτίαν ᾤκησαν, Xen. Anab. I iv 8 Κύρος
συγκαλέσας τοὺς στρατηγοὺς εἶπεν , F.Ε.Τ. 139, 148 , CR. IV 425
(Campbell) ; v 3 foll. (Frank Carter) ; 248 foll . (R. Whitelaw)
and VIII 34 a.
29. τὴν ἀρετήν : a similar acc. with words like ἀγαθός is
common contrast 91 B 9, and see note on the text there.
Cp. 93 A 10, B 18, D 12, 19, E 31 , Apol. 20 B Kaλw Te Kal
ἀγαθὼ τὴν προσήκουσαν ἀρετήν , ibid. D ταύτην (τὴν σοφίαν) εἶναι
oopós, Lach. 194 D, Prot. 324 D (a passage near akin to the
present) v dè avtoì åpeтǹv ảyaloí, Gorg. 526 A, Euthyd. 292 D
οἳ τί ἔσονται ἀγαθοί ; Rep. 349 Ε.
31. τί δὲ αὐτῷ οὐ σὺ ἔφρασας ; this form is equivalent to
a forcible imperative. It is commonest in Plato and Xenophon
(Kühner § 386. 10, Jelf 403. 3 ). The aorist is by some explained
as referring to past time : Why did you not tell him ? ' i.e.
'Tell him at once ! ' It seems, however, that the aorist here
was not felt as a past tense, as we find it with primary sequence :
Prot. 317D τί οὖν οὐ Πρόδικον καὶ Ιππίαν ἐκαλέσαμεν ἵνα
ἐπακούσωσιν ἡμῶν ; ep. Parm . 136 c αλλά μοι τί οὐ διῆλθες ἵνα
μᾶλλον καταμάθω ; There are certain idioms in which the
indic. aor. has no sense of past time, as the exclamations σoŋv,
άπéπтvσα, etc. Perhaps the same momentary or exclamatory
force of the aorist developed the usage now discussed . Tí OvK ;
with the aorist is rather a command than a question ; Tí oùK ;
with the present is rather a question than a command . The
difference is similar to that between ' Why not tell him ? ' and
'Why do you not tell him ?'
The great majority of instances are in the 2nd sing. : but
see Aesch. P. V. 747 τί οὐκ ἐν τάχει ἔρριψ᾽ ἐμαυτὴν τῆσδ᾽ ἀπὸ
στυφλοῦ πέτρας ; Soph. Ο.Τ. 1002 τί δῆτ᾽ ἐγὼ οὐχὶ τοῦδε τοῦ
φόβου σ' , ἄναξ, ἐξελυσάμην ; Aristoph. Lys. 182 τί δῆτα ταῦτ᾽ οὐχ
ὡς τάχιστα ξυνωμόσαμεν ; Plato Charm . 154 Ε τί οὖν οὐκ ἀπεδύ-
 190 ΜΕΝΟ XXX 92 D

σαμεν αὐτοῦ αὐτὸ τοῦτο καὶ ἐθεασάμεθα πρότερον τοῦ εἴδους ; Prot.
317 D (quoted above), Xen. Mem. Iv vi 14, Plato Phaedo 86 D
εἰ οὖν τις ὑμῶν εὐπορώτερος ἐμοῦ, τί οὐκ ἀπεκρίνατο ; ( ‘ let him
answer '). The line ἀλλὰ τίη μοι ταῦτα φίλος διελέξατο θυμός ;
occurring Π. ΧΧΙ 562 ; XXII 122, is not a question but a self-
exhortation.
The following are instances of the 2nd sing. in Plato :-:
Charm. 155 Α τί οὐκ ἐπέδειξάς μοι τὸν νεανίαν καλέσας δεῦρο ;
Prot. 310 Α τί οὖν οὐ διηγήσω ἡμῖν τὴν συνουσίαν ;
Gorg. 503 Β τί οὐχὶ καὶ ἐμοὶ αὐτὸν ἔφρασας ;
Ibid. 509 Ε τί οὐκ αὐτό γέ μοι τοῦτο ἀπεκρίνω ;
Symp. 173 Β τί οὖν οὐ διηγήσω μοι ;
Menex. 236 Β τί οὖν οὐ διῆλθες ;
Parm. 136 c quoted above.
Soph. 251 Ε τί οὖν οὐκ ἐφ᾽ ἑκάστου τὰ συμβαίνοντα ἐσκέψω ;
Phil. 54 Β τί οὖν οὐκ αὐτὸς ἀπεκρίνω σαυτῷ, ὦ Σώκρατες ; ΣΩ.
Οὐδὲν ὅ τι οὔ (an assent to a command rather than an
answer to a question).
+ Alc. i 114 B τί οὐκ ἀπέδειξας ;
Contrast with these Gorg. 504c τί δὲ οὐκ αὐτὸς λέγεις, ὦ
Σώκρατες ; ΣΩ. Αλλ᾽ εἴ σοι ἥδιόν ἐστιν ἐγὼ ἐρῶ, Prot. 310 Ε τί
οὐ βαδίζομεν πρὸς αὐτόν ; (Socrates explains it is too early),
Lysis 211 D ὅδε καλεύει με Μενέξενον ἐρωτᾶν. Τί οὖν, ἢ δ᾽ ὅς,
οὐκ ἐρωτᾷς ;
E 34. ἴσως τὶ λέγεις, ' perhaps there is something in what you
say.' Contrast οὐδὲν λέγων just above, also 79 E 47, etc.
ἐν τῷ μέρει, ‘ in your turn ' ; ἐν μέρει, ‘ in turn. The
former looks at the succession in reference to some particular
member of the series : ἐν τῷ μέρει Gorg. 462 A , 474 A B, Symp.
198 c, 199 A, Soph. 225 E, Phil. 50 E (Eur. Or. 452).
Contrast Symp. 214 Β ἔδοξε χρῆναι ἐπὶ δεξιὰ ἕκαστον ἐν μέρει
λόγον περὶ Ἔρωτος εἰπεῖν with 198 c ἥνικα ὑμῖν ὡμολόγουν ἐν τῷ
μέρει (in my turn) ἐγκωμιάσεσθαι τὸν Ἔρωτα, Luc. Pisc. §§ 8,
28 ἐν μέρει “ vicissim, Prot. 347 D, Gorg. 496 B, Crat. 410D
ἐν μέρει ἕκαστον προάγον εἰς φῶς, Theaet. 179 E, 189 F, Soph.
242 E, Polit. 265 A, Laws 819 B.
35. παρὰ τίνας ἔλθῃ : indirect deliberative. Goodwin $ 677,
Γ. Ε. Τ. p. 190 , Hadley § 932, Phaedo 115 D ἐρωτᾷ δὴ πῶς με
θάπτῃ.
38. ὅτῳ γὰρ ἂν ἐντύχῃ : see on 91 C 1.
τῶν καλῶν κἀγαθῶν : the phrase is used in a moral, not in
a political sense ; for Anytus was a democrat. Intr. § 6.
XXXI 93 B NOTES 191

CHAPTER XXXI
2. άTÒ Tоû aνтoµáтov, ' spontaneously ' : 90 A 39, Prot.
323 c, † Alc. i 118 c (etc. ).
τοιοῦτοι -= καλοὶ κἀγαθοί. The participial clause that follows
couples on what is really a separate part of the question : ' and
without learning from anybody are they still able, etc. ?'
5. ağı , I expect you to grant ' ; cp. the (mainly trans- 93 A
atlantic) use of ' I claim.' Instances where, as here, the verb
is followed by a proposition in the acc. and infin. occur Gorg.
450 ε τὴν ῥητορικὴν τέχνην ἀξιῶ εἶναι περὶ λόγους, Phaedo 86 D
ἐάν τις ἀξιοῖ κρᾶσιν οὖσαν τὴν ψυχὴν ἀπόλλυσθαι, Αpol.
18 D, Rep. 610 A, Polit. 262 E, etc. Different are such places as
91 D 6 χρήματα ἀξιοῦσι πράττεσθαι.
παρὰ τῶν προτέρων : this is the point of view of Protagoras
in his apologue ; see on B 17 below.
6. , like Latin an, was originally attached to the second
member of a double question ; then often to a question when a
former member might be understood . Cp. 71 B 5, also C 11 ,
D 13 below, 85 E 32 and some of the questions quoted on
91 E 17.
10. Kai ri, and, what is more . ' So Buttmann : ' insuper,'
' praeterea. ' This seems the best way of taking it. Another
way is to take er temporally ( = jam), ' before now.' A third
alternative, to take ἔτι οὐχ ἧττον in the sense of ἔτι μᾶλλον,
' yet more,' may be dismissed, for the litotes oux TTO would be
entirely spoiled by the addition of Tɩ.
Socrates hints that the statesmen of a former generation,
though he does not think very highly of them, were superior
to the men of the present .
14. μn : see on 86 D 12. Of course un here negatives not
ἀγαθοί, but᾽εἰσίν .
17. åpa oi ảyalol ävdpes kтé. : see on 90 B 5. This ground B
has been gone over in the Protagoras. Socrates urges as an
argument that Virtue cannot be taught, the fact that good
fathers often have bad sons : 319 E-320 c (a passage closely
akin to the present). In answer to this Protagoras relates a
fable, according to which the rudimentary principles, Shame
and Justice, that form the necessary moral basis of society,
were implanted at the creation in every human creature. He
then (324 D-326 E, cc. xiv, xv) explains the process of moral
education to which children are subjected , by instruction,
admonition, and punishment. Thence he goes on (ch. xvi) to
 192 MENO XXXI 93 B

deal with the problem why good fathers have bad sons ; the
reason being that all have not the same aptitude for virtue.
In the Laches we have a similar topic. Lysimachus, son of
Aristides, and Melesias, son of Thucydides, complain that they
are not on a level with their distinguished fathers ( 179 D) : xal
αἰτιώμεθα τοὺς πατέρας ἡμῶν, ὅτι ἡμᾶς μὲν εἴων τρυφᾶν, ἐπειδὴ
μειράκια ἐγενόμεθα. They are very anxious that their own sons
shall be educated so as to be worthy of their illustrious grand-
sires, whose names they bear. Whence naturally follows a
discussion where to look for teaching. Nearly related is Apol.
20 A foll. If Callias' sons were colts or steers, a trainer for
them could easily be found ; as it is, who is to train them ?
' Euenus, of Paros, for five minae ' : kaì èyw тòv Evŋvov éµaкápioa
εἰ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἔχει ταύτην τὴν τέχνην καὶ οὕτως ἐμμελῶς ( 'on such
reasonable terms ' ) didáσkel.
Alc. i 118 D foll. looks like an imitation of the passages
in the Protagoras and the Meno. The author of the compila-
tion Teρì ȧpers (cp. on 70 A 1 ) 377 в foll . has incorporated this
passage, 93 D 13-94 E 15, almost verbatim.
18. v see on 92 D 29.
20. παραδοτόν, ‘ transferable ; παραληπτόν, ‘ receivable.
See on 70 A 2.

CHAPTER XXXII
C 2. Plato for his illustrations takes two pairs of rivals,
Themistocles and Aristides, Pericles and Thucydides. Themi-
stocles is remembered only as a great popular statesman . The
darker memories attaching to his name are ignored. It must
be remembered that the charges of complicity in the treason of
Pausanias, brought against him after his ostracism, were never
proved. See Dr. Thompson on Gorg. 516 D. But for Plato's
purpose the truth or falsity of such charges is not very im-
portant. In Theages 126 A Themistocles with Pericles and
Cimon are spoken of as types of men τὰ πολιτικὰ δεινοί. In
Gorg. 455 E Gorgias couples him with Pericles as achieving
practical results by oratory.
It is instructive to compare the Gorgias with the Meno in
regard to the treatment of prominent Athenian statesmen.
The lists are different ; in the Gorgias we have Miltiades and
Cimon in place of Aristides and Thucydides in the Meno : see
503 c, where Callicles gives the names of four ȧyaloì ävôpes who
have made the Athenians better. At 515 D Socrates disallows
this claim, and at 519 A he says that the people suffering from
former pampering will fall out with their present advisers :
XXXII 93 c NOTES 193

and by comparison will praise their older leaders. The

object in the two dialogues is different : in the Gorgias it is
disparagement of their work as statesmen ; in the Meno the
point is that, however good they were, they could not train
their sons. Dr. Thompson (Introd. p. xix) also compares
Theaet. 172 c foll. , but adds that there is not one of Plato's
dialogues in which the public men of the best times of Athenian
history are treated with such indiscriminating severity as in
the Gorgias.' Athenaeus, 506 A, regards Plato's strictures on
Aristides and Themistocles as merely a proof of his malevolent
spirit.
7. εἶναι is imperfect. Cp. Phaedo 76 Ε ἀναγκαῖον . . τὴν
ἡμετέραν ψυχὴν εἶναι καὶ πρὶν γεγονέναι ἡμᾶς. So presently
φθονεῖν, παραδιδόναι, and 93 E 30 βούλεσθαι. This is a ' past
particular supposition ' (Goodwin § 402) : ‘ if any one was a
teacher, he was.'
8. ETTEρ BoÚλETó ye : see Exc. II and cp. E 33. εἴ γε
BouleTo would be ' assuming, of course, that he wished ' ; the
text is ' if only he wished to do so ' : ye points éẞoúλeTo.
9. av eßovλnon : the ' potential indicative, ' Goodwin §§ 244,
412, Kühner II § 392. Cp. D 23 ᾐτιάσατ᾽ ἄν, Αpol. 18 € ἐν
ταύτῃ τῇ ἡλικίᾳ ἐν ᾗ ἂν μάλιστα ἐπιστεύσατε.
It is clear that in these instances av does not point to an
' unfulfilled condition ' ; nor again do they fall under the
' iterative use ' of which familiar examples are Thuc. vII 71. 3
εἰ μέν τινες ἴδοιέν πη τοὺς σφετέρους ἐπικρατοῦντας, ἀνεθάρσησάν
τε ἄν : Ar. Frogs 1022 8 θεασάμενος πᾶς ἄν τις ἀνὴρ ἠράσθη
δάϊος εἶναι : Xen. Hell. III iv 18 επερρώσθη δ᾽ ἄν τις κἀκεῖνο
ἰδών, ᾿Αγησίλαον μὲν πρῶτον κτέ.
In neither of the two instances, here and at D 23 (where the
de virtute gives aiтiáσair' äv) is there any expressed protasis, and
the supposed conditions summed up in av are of the most general
description ; indeed the omission of av here would leave the
sense little altered . 94 D 10 is different.
On the subject of these constructions a ' Symposium ' was
held, extending over several years, in the pages of the Classical
Review. The contributions are as follows :
III 276 (summary of paper by Bayfield, read before the
Camb. Philol. Soc.).
III 314, 343 (criticisms by R. C. Seaton) .
III 417 (ditto by Caskie Harrison ).
IV 200 b (Bayfield).
IV 297 (Caskie Harrison).
v 397 Conditions contrary to fact ' : Edw. B. Clapp.
VI 90 Bayfield replies.
0
 194 MENO XXXII 93 c

VI 199 (Sonnenschein).
VI 201 Seaton rejoins.
This debate must have done a great deal to clear up the
subject ; but the most luminous utterance on the subject with
which I am acquainted is Jebb's note on Soph. O.C. 964. ' Has
not our way of translating av led us to form too narrow a con-
ception of the way in which the Greek idiom was used ? Sup-
pose, however, we treat av as what in fact it is a separate
word which qualifies the statement of fact. åv is ' on that
hypothesis ' thus el eπeσev, áπélavev av is " if he fell, on that
hypothesis he died .' Thus we see how this use, though in
practice restricted to the " unfulfilled condition , " is large
enough to include Kev KтЄîvev " he probably slew " (Od. IV 546)
and ἀνεθάρσησαν ἄν “ in that case they took courage.
The notion of non-fulfilment in av with a past tense of the
indicative is thus adventitious. When this combination is
associated with a protasis containing ei and a past tense of the
indic. the notion of unreality is inevitable ; but to this form of
condition may be applied the words of Allen and Greenough,
Lat. Gr. p. 327 note : " The implication of falsity in this con-
struction (imp. and plupf. subj. ) is not inherent in the subj. ,
but comes from the transfer of future conditions to past time.
Thus the time for the happening of the condition has at the
time of writing already passed ; so that if the condition remain
a condition, it must be contrary to fact. ' [These words will
exemplify the quality of the book noted by Prof. Hale in his
review of it, CR. III 166 : (in it) ' syntactical mechanisms are
regarded not as results, intellectually perfect, of a rational
mind, working with entire logic, but as results of the work-
ings of multitudes of minds, proceeding in part logically, in
part under the influence of associations of various kinds.'
This is the only true attitude of mind for the study of
grammar. ]
ἄλλους τε . . μάλιστα δέ : ΤΕ dé is not uncommon ; in
addition to the accession of emphasis expected by Te in the
clause that follows it, dé imports a notion of contrast. Cp.
Euthyphr. 3 Ε σύ τε κατὰ νοῦν ἀγωνιεῖ τὴν δίκην, οἶμαι δὲ καὶ
ἐμὲ τὴν ἐμήν, Χen. Hell. VI v 30 οἱ δὲ ᾿Αρκάδες τούτων τε οὐδὲν
ἐποίουν, καταλιπόντες δὲ τὰ ὅπλα εἰς ἁρπαγὴν ἐτρέποντο, Aesch.
S. c. T. 579 (571 ) with Verrall's note.
C 11. vóv this is the preferable spelling, according to Sch.
Plato forms the nom. and acc. sing. in the 2nd declension , and
all the other forms in the 3rd, as D 17 Toû véos, 94 B 13 vieîs.
D 14. Kλeópavтov : see Plut. Them. xxxii. ' Dictum ejus
commemorat Plut. de ed. puer. 2 ús, ö Tɩ äv avròs Boúλntai,
XXXII 93 D NOTES 195

τοῦτο καὶ τῷ δήμῳ συνδοκεῖ τῷ τῶν ᾿Αθηναίων · ἃ μὲν γὰρ αὐτὸς

ἐθέλει, καὶ ἡ μήτηρ · ἃ δ᾽ ἂν ἡ μήτηρ, καὶ Θεμιστοκλῆς · ἃ δ᾽ ἂν
Θεμιστοκλῆς, καὶ πάντες ᾿Αθηναῖοι Fr. If Cleophantus was a
' spoiled child,' we should not need to look much farther for
the cause of his failure,
ἐδιδάξατο : this raises the difficult question whether we may
regard as a separate force of the Middle Voice the meaning
to ' get a thing done by another ' (' Causative Middle ' F. E.T.
p. 127). Against this Riddell strongly argues, § 87. He does
not deny that didáσкoμaι often means I have some one taught ' ;
but contends that this sense is not peculiar to, or due to, the
Middle Voice, except in as far as it is deducible from the
general force of the Middle-the interest of the agent in the act.
He says that the ascription to the Middle Voice of this
meaning is proved to be erroneous, and that in its favourite
exemplification, didáσкeσbai, by some passages in the Meno. ' As
the favourite example thus falls to the ground, so do the rest.
δανείζεσθαι, for instance, is “ to take a δανείον , ” as δανείζειν is
" to give a davetov " ; that is, the general meaning of the verb
being " to deal in daveia, " the Middle means " to deal in them
for one's self. " So, rather differently, " bringing a man to
justice " becomes, on the disinterested side, the office of the
judge, кpive , and, on the interested side, the office of the
prosecutor, кpiveolaι. The fact is that the Active Voice is
quite as susceptible as the Middle of the meaning "to get a
thing done by another " ; neither Voice, however, by any
proper inherent force, but in virtue solely of the common
principle that " qui facit per alium facit per se, ' as we say a
man builds a house ' or ' educates his sons.'
This view I believe to be right. But Mr. St. George Stock's
note on this place should be consulted, with CR. II 29 a.
Neither Asts.vv. διδάσκειν, παιδεύειν, nor Kühner § 373. 6,
§ 374. 7, recognize a separate causal sense of the Middle. An
examination of these words will show, I think, that there is no
constant distinction between the active and middle voices.
(a) didáσкeolaι (causal as here) Prot. 325 BC (quoted on
91 E 17) : Rep. 467 E kai dıdağaμévovs ( ' having had them
taught ”) ἱππεύειν, ἀκτέον ἐπὶ τὴν θέαν : † Theages 122 Ε οὐκ
ἐδιδάξατό σε ὁ πατὴρ καὶ ἐπαίδευσεν ἅπερ ἐνθάδε οἱ ἄλλοι
TеTаídeνVтαι : Ep. xiii 360 E (' if possible attend this
philosopher
66 yourself ) εἰ δὲ μή, ἐκδίδαξαί τινα ( get some one
coached ” ) ἵνα κατὰ σχολὴν μανθάνων βελτίων γίγνῃ : Xen.
Mem. Iv iv 5, Cyr. I vi 2, Eur. Med. 295-
χρὴ δ᾽ οὔποθ᾽ ὅστις ἀρτίφρων πέφυκ᾽ ἀνὴρ
παῖδας περισσῶς ἐκδιδάσκεσθαι σοφούς :
 196 ΜΕΝΟ XXXII 93 D

Aristoph. Clouds 1338 ἐδιδαξάμην μέντοι σε Lucian Somn. init.

ὁ πατὴρ ἐσκοπεῖτο μετὰ τῶν φίλων ὅ τι καὶ διδάξαιτό με.
In Hdt. I 154 παῖδας παρέβαλε αὐτοῖσι Αἰγυπτίους τὴν
Ἑλλάδα γλῶσσαν ἐκδιδάσκεσθαι, the last word may be either
passive ( for them to be taught ') ; or middle in causal sense
(' so as to have them taught '), as L. & S. take it : see s.v.
ἐκδιδάσκω.
The middle appears in sense of the active, or ' merely with
the idea of the teacher's interest superadded ' (Jebb on Soph .
Ant. 356) Menex. 238 B : (the gods) οἳ τὸν βίον ἡμῶν κατεσκεύασαν
πρός τε τὴν καθ᾽ ἡμέραν δίαιταν , τέχνας πρώτους παιδευσάμενοι
καὶ πρὸς τὴν ὑπὲρ τῆς χώρας φυλακὴν ὅπλων κτησίν τε καὶ χρῆσιν
διδαξάμενοι : Pind . Οl. 8. 59 τὸ διδάξασθαι δέ τοι εἰδότι
ῥᾴτερον : Simonides ( Bergk4 145 = Anth. Ρal. VI 213) διδαξάμενος
χόρον ἀνδρῶν : Mosch. 3. 97 διδάξαο σεῖο μαθητάς : Bion 12 (2). 9.
The use of ἐδιδάξατο in Soph. Ant. 356, ‘ hath he taught him-
self,' is exceptional, and seems due to the analogy of the pres .
διδάσκομαι reflexive, as in Aristoph. Wasps 2, and Simonides
γηράσκω δ᾽ ἀεὶ πολλὰ διδασκόμενος. Cp. Aristoph. Clouds 783 οὐκ
ἂν διδαξαίμην σ᾽ ἔτι ( Elmsley διδάξαιμ᾽ ἄν σ᾽ ἔτι, approved by
Jebb l.c. ) : Plato Rep. 421 Ε καὶ τοὺς ὑεῖς ἢ ἄλλους οὓς ἂν
διδάσκῃ χείρους δημιούργους διδάξεται (Cobet διδάξει. The tense
διδάξομαι is usually passive. See on 95D 4). On Luc. Somn.
§ 10 οὐκ ἐς μακράν σε διδάξομαι Heitland observes that the
fut. mid. is used just like the active by late writers.
(β) διδάσκειν occurs 94 Β 16, D 2, 3, where the context makes
it clear that the teaching was done by means of others ; Prot.
324 D (cp. διδάσκεσθαι 325 Β).
(γ) παιδεύεσθαι “ institui curo ' D18 : Rep . 546 Β οὓς ἡγεμόνας
πόλεως ἐπαιδεύσασθε : Eur. fr. 1053
οὐ γάρ τις οὕτω παῖδας εὖ παιδεύσεται
ὥστ᾽ ἐκ πονηρῶν μὴ οὐ κακοὺς πεφυκέναι.
παιδεύεσθαι like active : Menex. 238 D (quoted above) : Eur.
Ι.Α. 562 τροφαὶ αἱ παιδευόμεναι : παιδεύεται humorously for
τρέφει Nausicrates ap. Ath. VII 325 E (τρίγλας) ἃς κλύδων
Αἰξωνικὸς πασῶν ἀρίστας ἐν τόποις παιδεύεται.
(δ) παιδεύειν, * institui curo : 93 Ε 31 παιδεῦσαι 94 Α 9,
Β 17, C 24 : Prot. 319 E ἃ μὲν διδασκάλων εἴχετο καλῶς καὶ εὖ
ἐπαίδευσεν : ibid. 320 Α ἐν ᾿Αρίφρονος ἐπαίδευε : Crito 50 D (the
laws) παραγγέλλοντες τῷ πατρὶ τῷ σῷ ἐν μουσικῇ καὶ γυμναστικῇ
παιδεύειν : † Theages 122 E (quoted above).
All this goes to show that the differentiation between the two
voices was still incomplete. See Mr. E. H. Miles On the Early
Meaning and Developments of the Middle ' Voice, pp. 26. 7 ;
31. 2 : also note on ψεύδω 71 D 29. Another verb that well
XXXII 93 D NOTES 197

illustrates the intermixture of meanings in the two voices is

φυλάσσω.
A few instances of ' causal middles ' may be added.
(1) Phil. 14 E dioμodovnoάuevos no doubt means ' having got
him to admit ' ; but this arises not so much from the voice as
fron δια-. The admission which is to his interest is part of
a mutual process (cp. dia-λéyeolai, etc. ).
(2) Tоlоûμal, ' I get made, ' see L. & S. A 1. Add Plato † Ep.
xiii 361 Α τὸν μὲν ᾿Απόλλω ἐποιησάμην ‘ I got the Apollo
made ' : Plut. Them. v 4 avтоû тоLOúμevov Eikóvas. The notion
of procuring springs from the notion of interest.
(3) Kühner § 374. 7 points out how катασiwлâv (Xen. Hell.
v iv 7) and κaтαowπâσłaι (ibid. 11 iv 20) are used in identical
sense ' to put to silence, ' where the causal sense is due, not to
the voice, but to κатá (cp. KаTnxev, originally ' to elicit a
resonance from , ' so ' to test' ; later to catechise ' ).
(4) προστρίβεσθαι : Aristoph. Εq. 5 πληγὰς ἀεὶ προστρίβεται
τοὺς οἰκέτας “ he gets stripes inflicted ' (L. & S. 111 ) : ἐντρίβεσθαι
(L. & S. I 2). Here the causal sense is clear, and seems con-
fined to the middle : but it may be deduced from the notion of
interest.
(5) Tарaτileμaι, ' I have served up to me, ' Thuc. I 130, etc.
But L. & S. s. v. BI quote the same verb from Od. xv 506
ἠθεν δέ κεν ὕμμιν ὁδοιπόριον παραθείμην , of setting meat before
others and from Plut. Per. 26 πаретilevто тŵν ȧvаукalwν doa
KTE. , of providing yourself.
(6) Symp. 205 Ε ἐπεὶ αὑτῶν γε καὶ πόδας καὶ χεῖρας ἐθέλουσιν
ἀποτέμνεσθαι οἱ ἄνθρωποι, which may mean either to cut off
from themselves, ' or ' to have cut off from themselves (by
another). ' It is absolutely indifferent who the agent is.
ἱππέα ἐδιδάξατο ἀγαθόν : διδάσκειν and παιδεύειν are treated
as ' factitive ' verbs, with subst. or adj. as secondary predicates.
This appears in some of the instances quoted above. Cp. Eur.
Her. 575-
καὶ δίδασκέ μοι
τοιούσδε τούσδε παῖδας ἐς τὸ πᾶν σοφούς.
Soph. O.C. 919 καίτοι σε Θῆβαί γ᾽ οὐκ ἐπαίδευσαν κακόν : Eur.
Andr. 601, Aristoph. Ran. 1020.
So in the pass., Soph. O.C. 562 éπaideú0nv §évos.
15. óplòs éσtηkús : the ' ars desultoria. ' Cp. Il. xv 680
foll.
18. éπαιdevσαто : see on didáğaro (line 14 above).
kai étoínσe σopóv : change from rel. to demonstrative con-
struction. See on 74 D 35, 90 E 32.
 198 MENO XXXII 93 D

19. S.Sασkáλwv exero : for the phrase cp. 94 A 8 , B 18 ;

Prot. 319 E, 324 D : for the tense see on 83 D 51.
22. Tηv ye dúov : nothing can illustrate more strikingly
the difference between Plato's point of view and ours. Because,
forsooth, he had ability to learn horsemanship, he had ability
to learn virtue.
23. ᾐτιάσατ᾽ ἄν τις : see on 93 C 9. Plato is fond of using
αἰτιῶμαι with inf. : Prot. 333 Ε τὸν λόγον ᾐτιᾶτο δυσχερῆ εἶναι :
Rep. 407 ο ιλίγγους αἰτιωμένη ἐκ φιλοσοφίας ἐγγίγνεσθαι : ibid.
599 E (addressed to Homer) σὲ δὲ τίς αἰτιᾶται πόλις νομοθέτην
ἀγαθὸν γεγονέναι ; Crat. 396D καὶ αἰτιῶμαί γε μάλιστα αὐτὴν
(τὴν σοφίαν) ἀπὸ Εὐθύφρονος προσπεπτωκέναι μοι.
E 32. τῶν γειτόνων : below 94 A 10 βελτίω ὁτουοῦν. Note the
love of variety through this passage. Toñora depends on
βούλεσθαι.
33. For εἴπερ . ye see on C 8 and Exc. II. There is a
slight ellipse : as he would have wished, if etc. '

CHAPTER XXXIII
94 A 2. Ev Toîs aρLOTOV : Kühner § 349 b 7 i, Hadley § 652.
This strengthened superlative occurs in Hdt. and is commonest
in Thuc. and Plato ( Symp. 178 c, etc. ). The origin is probably
from a phrase in which the superl. was repeated (ev Toîs ȧplσTois
äpiσTov), and the best MSS. at Crat. 427 E actually give èv Tois
μεγίστοις μέγιστον ; but Sch. cuts out μεγίστοις.
4. ᾿Αριστείδην τὸν Λυσιμάχου : see on 93C 2. In the
passage in the Gorgias in which the great statesmen of old are
disparaged, the name of Aristides does not appear. In one
place of the dialogue Plato recognizes Aristides' superiority
(526 A B) : ' the just use of power is very rare ; still, there are
some both here and elsewhere, and yet will be, kaλoì kảyaloì
ταύτην τὴν ἀρετὴν τὴν τοῦ δικαίως διαχειρίζειν ἃ ἄν τις ἐπιτρέπῃ ·
εἰς δὲ καὶ πάνυ ἐλλόγιμος γέγονεν καὶ εἰς τοὺς ἄλλους Ἕλληνας,
᾿Αριστείδης ὁ Λυσιμάχου.
8. Lysimachus and Melesias ( 94 C 23) appear in the Laches
(see on 93 B 17). Lysimachus is there represented as an elderly
man (189 c, cp. 201 B). The dramatic date of the Laches must
be before 420 B.C., the date of Laches' death. We may probably
assume then that Lysimachus was born not very much after
500 B. C. He and Sophroniscus the father of Socrates were
ἑταίρω τε καὶ φίλω Lach. 180 Ε . (Socrates was born in 469 B. C. )
' Lysimachus obscuram degebat vitam a civibus agro et argento
XXXIII 94 C NOTES 199

donatus ob paternae virtutis memoriam ' Fr., who refers to

Dem. Lept. (20 ) 115, and schol.
10. kai σvyyéyovas, ' you have actually met ' ; contrasted
with ȧkýkoαs in the case of Cleophantus 93 E 27.
11. ὁρᾷς οἷός ἐστιν : this implies that Plato regards B
Lysimachus as still alive at the dramatic date of the Meno (say
402 B.C. ). According to what we gather from the Laches he
must then have been at such an advanced age as to make a fair
estimate of his powers difficult. Lysimachus would be some
seventy years older than Meno. But Plato is not very careful
about consistency in chronology. See Athenaeus 505 E.
ei de Boúλel : see on 71 E 2.
IIeρikλéα : see on 93 C 2.
13. Súo veûs : these are the two sons which Pericles had by
his Athenian wife, the widow of Hipponicus. They were both
carried off by the plague in 429 B.C. (Plut. Pericles 24. 5 ; 36.
4, 5). After their death the Athenians legitimated his son by
Aspasia, named Pericles. Schol. on Menex. 235 E eσxe dè éž
αὐτῆς ( Ασπασίας) ὁ Περικλῆς νόθον υἱόν, ἐφ᾽ ᾧ καὶ ἐτελεύτα, τῶν
γνησίων προαποθανόντων.
The two sons (of whom Xanthippus seems to have been the
elder) are mentioned in the Protagoras. At 315 A they appear
in the row of listeners walking up and down with Protagoras.
At 320 A the sophist gives them as examples of youths whose
education has been neglected : νέμονται ὥσπερ ἄφετοι ( browsing
at large ' ), éáv Toν Tеρiтúxwσι Tŷ ȧρeтy. In † Alc. i 118 E we
read τώ Περικλέους υἱέε ηλιθίω ἐγενέσθην : with the scholium
οὓς καὶ βλιτομάμμας ἐκάλουν. (The scholiast adds an explanation
of the epithet, which, however, still remains obscure. It occurs
in Aristoph. Clouds 1001 , where the suggestion is that it was
applied to the sons of Hippocrates.) Plut. Per. 36. 1 speaks
of Xanthippus extravagance, and his variance with his father ;
and Athenaeus v 220 D says that Antisthenes wrote disparagingly
of both the youths. Lastly note Aristot. Rhet. 11 xv 3 è§-
ίσταται δὲ τὰ μὲν εὐφυᾶ γένη εἰς μανικώτερα ἤθη . . τὰ δὲ στάσιμα
εἰς ἀβελτερίαν καὶ νωθρότητα , οἷον οἱ ἀπὸ Κίμωνος καὶ Περι
Kλéοvs Kai Zwкрáтous, with which cp. Plato Polit. 310 c foll.
18. δὲ ἄρα : see on 91 E 17.
20. μὴ οὐκ ᾖ διδακτόν : see on 89 C 10.
23. ovкudidηs : the son of Melesias (unrelated to the C
historian), an aristocrat of unblemished respectability, is
reserved for the climax. (See App. on the text B 21 ). His
son Melesias is introduced in the Laches (179 c) as the com-
200 ΜΕΝΟ XXXIII 94 C

panion and coëval of Lysimachus. Here again the dates give

trouble. For whereas Aristides died about 468 B.C., Thucydides
was ostracized in 444 B.C. , returned to Athens, renewed his
opposition to Pericles, and perhaps survived him. His death
thus was later than that of Aristides by some forty years. Are
their children likely to have been coevals ? Thucydides, to
have a son coeval with Lysimachus, cannot have been born
much later than 520 B.C. (see on A 8). This would make him
at least 76 at the time of his ostracism. This is, of course,
not impossible, but none of the accounts we have suggest his
being so much older than his rival Pericles. Stephanus' name
appears in a quotation from Polemo ap. Athen. IV 234 Ε στήλη
τίς ἐστιν, ἐν ᾗ ψήφισμα μὲν ᾿Αλκιβιάδου, γραμματεὺς δὲ Στέφανος
Θουκυδίδου.
25. ἐπάλαισαν : wrestling may have been a favourite sport
of Thucydides, as is suggested by the anecdote Plut. Per. 8,
Abbott's Hist. of Greece, II 414 note.
26. που, ‘ as I understand ' : see on 75 C 29.

CHAPTER XXXIV
1. οὐκ ἄν ποτε : the negative refers to the whole double
supposition following ; or rather, if we regard the sentence as
an instance of parataxis, to the latter half of it : ' he would
not, while teaching his sons this, have omitted to teach them
that.' This place and some quoted below are instances of
argumentum ex contrariis conclusum (see on 91 E 17).
In sentences like this, where each member consists of a
protasis and apodosis, we often have μév twice in the first
number, δέ twice in the second : Apol. 28 Ε δεινὰ ἂν εἴην
εἰργασμένος εἰ, ὅτε μέν με οἱ ἄρχοντες ἔταττον τότε μὲν οὗ
ἐκεῖνοι ἔταττον ἔμενον . τοῦ δὲ θεοῦ τάττοντος . ἐνταῦθα δὲ
λίποιμι τὴν τάξιν : Gorg. 512A (quoted on 91E 17) : ibid. 514 B C
καὶ εἰ μὲν . • οὕτω μὲν . • εἰ δὲ . οὕτω δέ . : Crat. 386 Α
ὡς ἄρα οἷα μὲν ἂν ἐμοὶ φαίνηται τὰ πράγματα, τοιαῦτα μὲν ἔστιν
ἐμοί, οἷα δ᾽ ἄν σοι, τοιαῦτα δέ σοι : † Alc. i 108 Ε αἰσχρόν γε εἰ
μέν τις ἐρωτήσειεν περὶ μὲν τούτων ἔχειν εἰπεῖν . . περὶ δὲ
οὗ . • τούτου δὲ πέρι κτέ. Kühner § 529. 2 quotes instances of
μὲν • • μὲν • δὲ . . δέ . . from Hdt. ( II 26, 102, 174) ; from
Xenophon (as Oec. iv 8) and from Isocrates, whose love of παρ-
ίσωσις perhaps led him to affect this structure (see Sandys
on Paneg. $ 60). But often the structure is imperfect, μέν
being omitted in the first apodosis, as Prot. 313 a î ei µèv tò
σῶμα ἐπιτρέπειν σε ἔδει τῳ πολλὰ ἂν περιεσκέ , ω • δ δὲ
XXXIV 94 E NOTES 201

περὶ πλείονος ἡγεῖ . . περὶ δὲ τούτου κτέ. , Charm. 173 cv ; or

with both the first protasis and apodosis, Phaedo 78 c, Laches
194 D ; or dé omitted in second apodosis as Xen. Oec. iv 7 ;
or it is varied as Hdt. 11 39, where we have de substituted
for μév in the first apodosis, and in consequence dý for dé in the
second protasis. See Buttmann's Demosthenes ' Midias Exc.
XII pp. 153 foll.
2-4. δαπανώμενον . . ἀναλώσαντα : in both these clauses D
the participle contains the main thought that is dependent on
ἔδει. Cp. Euthyd. 282 E ἐπιστήμην ἣν δεῖ λαβόντα εὐδαιμονεῖν
τε καὶ ἀγαθὸν ἄνδρα είναι : Gorg. 484 D οἷς δεῖ χρώμενον ὁμιλεῖν
τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, etc. So 80D 3 πроléμevos, not intýσels, contains
the important idea.
6. ἀλλὰ γάρ : see Exc. III . This is an instance of ἀλλὰ
yáp introducing a supposed objection-a usage very rare in
Plato, though Riddell (§ 147 ) does not think it necessary to
illustrate it. Rep. 365 € ἀλλὰ γάρ, φησί τις, οὐ ῥᾴδιον ἀεὶ λαν-
Oάvelv kakòv övta is the only parallel I can cite, and this itself
differs from the present and other places, inasmuch as the
words nol Tis, usually understood, are expressed. Other
instances occur in the orators ; Lysias κаT' 'Epaт. § 40, Isocr.
Paneg. (4) 175. See Sandys' note ibid. 140 : ảλλà yàp oỷk ẻK
τούτων δίκαιόν ἐστι σκοπεῖν τὴν βασιλέως δύναμιν , ἐξ ὧν μεθ'
ἑκατέρων γέγονεν, ἀλλ᾽ ἐξ ὧν αὐτὸς ὑπὲρ αὑτοῦ πεπολέμηκεν. He
says the use is ' very common ' ; which can only apply to the
orators. (I confess I do not understand why the two places
first referred to should be printed as interrogations, and the
last not. Here ἀλλά goes with the sentence καὶ οἰκίας μεγάλης
ἦν καὶ ἐδύνατο μέγα ; and the words from γάρ to τῶν συμμάχων
really form a parenthesis, which is felt as a protasis. But,
-as perhaps I shall be told, etc. -he was both of noble family
and etc.'
7. Kal Tŵv σvμμáxov : Thucydides, as an aristocrat, was
likely to favour the claims of the allies.
10. ἐξευρεῖν ἄν : see on 93 C 9. But this instance must be
separated from those there treated, for here an unreal condition
is implied in the words εἴπερ ἂν τοῦτο διδακτόν.
12. τῶν ἐπιχωρίων : a variation for ἀστῶν ( 92 Β 7) . E
TUS: this is in apposition to the object of eževpeîv, and so
might be accus. , but we have an ' attraction to the Relative
clause as the nearest construction ' Riddell § 192. He quotes
inter alia Apol. 41 Α εὑρήσει τοὺς ἀληθῶς δικαστάς, οἵπερ καὶ
λέγονται ἐκεῖ δικάζειν, Μίνως κτέ.
 202 MENO XXXIV 94 E

εἰ αὐτὸς μὴ ἐσχόλαζεν : cp. Lach. 179 c αἰτιώμεθα τοὺς

πατέρας ἡμῶν ὅτι ἡμᾶς μὲν εἴων τρυφᾶν . . τὰ δὲ τῶν ἄλλων πράγ-
μата Ëπраттоν. A simple past condition.
14. áλλà yάρ, кTÉ. : see Exc. III. The phrase is often used
to sum up in conclusion.
μὴ οὐκ ᾖ διδακτὸν ἀρετή : with the whole of the preceding
discussion compare Socrates' argument in the Protagoras
319 A foll. The argument falls clearly into two divisions (1)
public: on matters of general policy there are no expert ad-
visers as there are with the special arts : (2) private 319 D : if
we look at the matter from the point of view of individuals, we
find that even the best and wisest citizens cannot secure a
similar virtue in their sons.
For un ouк see on 89 C 10.
16. padíws often has a bad meaning ; ' lightly,' ' recklessly ' ;
Fr. refers to Apol. 24c ῥᾳδίως εἰς ἀγῶνας καθιστὰς ἀνθρώπους :
Crito 48c Tv padíws ȧπoкTIVνúvтwv : add Rep. 377 B, 378 A,
Laws 917 Β θεῶν ὀνόματα μὴ χραίνειν ῥᾳδίως : Phaedo 63 Α τί
γὰρ ἂν βουλόμενοι ἄνδρες σοφοὶ δεσπότας ἀμείνους αὐτῶν φεύγοιεν
καὶ ῥᾳδίως ἀπαλλάττοιντο αὐτῶν ; and soon afterwards οὕτω
ῥᾳδίως φέρεις ἡμᾶς ἀπολείπων, with which ep. the reproach of
Hippolytus to Artemis (Eur. Ηip . 1441 ) μακρὰν δὲ λείπεις
ῥᾳδίως ὁμιλίαν.
kak@s λéyelv ȧvepúπovs : undoubtedly Socrates' disparage-
ment of Athenian statesmen, both past and present, was one chief
cause of the suspicion in which he was held. See Apol. 23 E
foll. Of his three accusers Anytus was angered ὑπὲρ τῶν δημι
ουργῶν καὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν. See Art. Socrates ' in Encycl.
Brit.
19. ἴσως μὲν καὶ ἐν ἄλλῃ—ἐν τῇδε δὲ καί : see an article by
Milton W. Humphreys dealing with kaí followed by dè kai in
CR. XI 141 .
20. Anytus is here no doubt referring to the facilities for
prosecutions given by the system of popular juries, of which he
is supposed to speak with approbation. Cp. Gorg. 521 B, etc.
95 A 21. Kai aÚTÒν eidéval : we read in Apol. 32 B-D of two
occasions, before the trial that led to his death, on which
Socrates risked prosecution ; but as he does not seem to have
been actually prosecuted on either occasion, the reference here
is probably quite general. The conversation with Anytus may
perhaps be considered as a sample of those by which Socrates
says (Apol. 21 c) he alienated statesmen ; see Diog. L. 11 38,
Zeller Socr. p. 206.
XXXV 95 A NOTES 203

Chapters XXXV, XXXVI (95 A-96 B). SOCR. Anytus has left
us, apparently angry. He has really no reason for being so.
Tell me, in your country do men eminent for virtue profess
to communicate it ? MENO. They utter no certain sound
on the subject. SOCR. Are the sophists then, who alone do
profess this, teachers of virtue ? MENO. The best of them,
Gorgias, never made any profession of the sort ; he only
professed the art of speaking. SOCR. What do you think
yourself about the sophists' teaching of virtue ? MENO. I
cannot make up my mind. SOCR. Observe that you find
the same vacillation in the poet Theognis. A most
remarkable result : those who profess to teach virtue are
held not to be masters of it themselves ; those who admittedly
are masters of it are very doubtful whether it can be taught.
These doubters can hardly be teachers, can they ? MENO.
No, hardly.
Here begins the fifth and last section of the dialogue.

CHAPTER XXXV
2. OLETαι Yάρ KTE. of the two assumptions that Anytus
makes, it is only the former that is distinctly mistaken.
Socrates is eulogistic of the old statesmen ; he only points out
their limitations. As far as these limitations are concerned, he
would no doubt class Anytus with them ; whether as equally
eminent or not makes no difference.
5. ołóν ẻσTIV Tò kakŵs λéyelv : Fr. ( Introd . p. 30) thinks
these words have some reference to the prosecution which
Anytus himself sustained in 409 B.C. According to Diodorus
XIII 64, being sent out to relieve Pylos, then besieged by the
Lacedaemonians, he failed to double Cape Malea, and returned
to Athens having effected nothing. This led to a prosecution :
ὁ δὲ ῎Ανυτος ἰσχυρῶς κινδυνεύων ἐρρύσατο χρήμασι τὴν ἰδίαν ψυχήν,
καὶ πρῶτος ᾿Αθηναίων δοκεῖ δικαστήριον δωροδοκῆσαι. The fact
that the dramatic date of the dialogue is pretty certainly
later than 409 (Introd . § 8 ) throws doubt on this interpretation ;
accordingly Hermann (Gesch. u. Syst. I p. 482) finds a reference
to a later prosecution of Anytus, leading to his death : of which
various improbable and inconsistent accounts are given.
But we may well ask whether in such a case, or if the
reference were to any prosecution of Anytus, the words Taúσeraι
xaλeπaivwv would be applicable. I believe we have here simply
a piece of Socratic irony. To Socrates Kaкŵs Xéyew means to
speak untruly, unreasonably.' Cp. Diog. L. II 35 (Socrates)
 204 ΜΕΝΟ XXXV 95 Β

πρὸς τὸν εἰπόντα, κακῶς ὁ δεῖνά σε λέγει · καλῶς γάρ, ἔφη, λέγειν
οὐκ ἔμαθε. Cp. Rep. 377 E ὅταν εἰκάζῃ τις κακῶς τῷ λόγῳ περὶ
θεῶν τε καὶ ἡρώων οἷοί εἰσιν. Cp. Phaedr. 258 D, 259 Ε. (Α
similar word-play Euthyd. 284 D κακῶς ἄρα λέγουσιν οἱ ἀγαθοὶ
τὰ κακά, εἴπερ ὡς ἔχει λέγουσιν. )
B 10. ἐθέλουσιν : the meaning stands between solent and volunt,
as at 98 A 28. This is pretty common in Plato, of things
inanimate as well as animate : ep. Phaedr. 230 D τὰ δένδρα
οὐδέν μ᾿ ἐθέλει διδάσκειν .
11. διδάσκαλοί τε εἶναι ἢ διδακτὸν ἀρετήν : the sequence
τε . involves a slight anacoluthon. τε expects something
to be added ; instead of adding anything gives an alternative :
' or, what comes to the same thing.' (It has been admitted 89 D
that the propositions διδακτόν ἐστιν ἀρετή and διδάσκαλοί εἰσιν
ἀρετῆς are equivalent. Wolf (in Buttmann's edition) wanted to
read kai for , observing that MSS. often confound these two
particles ; but this is unnecessary. Ullrich in his note made
the use of τε . ἤ clear, quoting Theaet. 1430 περὶ αὑτοῦ τε
ὅποτε λέγοι . • ἢ αὖ περὶ τοῦ ἀποκρινομένου , and Ion 535 D δε
ἂν κλάῃ τ᾽ ἐν θυσίαις καὶ ἑορταῖς . . ἢ φοβῆται. In both of these
cases, he says, τε • καί . . might have stood ; in this place
in the Meno, not so appropriately . See Kühner § 520. Anm. 2.
(See also on 99 C 27. )
17. οἷς : the 6 dative of the personal agent ' is not very common
with the pres. or impf. pass. In the instances here given it
will be
6 seen that the dative may generally be explained either
as a dativus commodi ' or as a dative of the person judging.'
The latter perhaps best explains the numerous instances with
ὁμολογεῖσθαι, Gorg. 497 D, Rep. 434D, 478 A, Phaedo 72 A,
Phil. 60B, Andoc . Myst. § 15 ; and with ἀμφισβητεῖσθαι, Laws
638 D ἀμφισβητεῖται δ᾽ αὖ καὶ τοῦθ᾽ ἡμῖν. Cp. γιγνώσκεσθαι ὑμῖν
Isaeus 11 § 15. Besides these we have (Laws 715 Β) λέγεται δὲ
τοῦδ᾽ ἕνεκα ταῦθ᾽ ἡμῖν ; and lastly 96 E 29 τοῖς ἀνθρώποις πράτ-
τεται τὰ πράγματα. Are there instances with any other verbs
in Plato ?
There are some examples in Thuc. , as I 51. 2 αἱ ᾿Αθηναίων
νῆες τοῖς Κερκυραίοις οὐχ ἑωρῶντο ; II 101. 5 ἐπειδὴ αὐτῷ οὐδὲν
ἐπράσσετο : ΙΙΙ 64. 4 τίνες ἂν οὖν δικαιότερον πᾶσι τοῖς Ἕλλησι
μισοῖντο ‘ in the eyes of ( see Classen's note) ; III 82. 7 ὅρκοι
ἑκατέρῳ διδόμενοι ‘ by each party ' ; iv 109. 4 αἱ οἰκοῦνται
συμμίκτοις ἔθνεσι : VI 873 τῶν ἡμῖν ποιουμένων.
In Xenophon An. I i 9 ἄλλο στράτευμα αὐτῷ συνελέγετο,
the dative of interest is apparent.
Some instances in verse may be given :
Homer Il. νι 398 ἔχεθ᾽ Εκτορι ' was held to wife by, a true
XXXV 95 c NOTES 205

dative, or dativus commodi : v 465 KTEίVEσ0αι éáσETE λadv

Αχαιοίς, VIII 244 Τρώεσσιν ἔα δάμνασθαι Αχαιούς, ΧΧΙ 556
τούτους ὑποκλονέεσθαι ἐάσω . 'Axλ are similar, the dative
being helped by the verb éáw : Empedocles ap. Diog. L. VIII 62
ἀνδράσιν ἠδὲ γυναιξὶ σεβίζομαι : Pind . Οl. XII 3 τὶν γὰρ ἐν πόντῳ
κυβερνῶνται θοαὶ νâες : Soph. Αj. 539 προσπόλοις φυλάσσεται
(see Jebb's note, who quotes Antig. 504 and 1218 and Menander
τἀληθὲς ἀνθρώποισιν οὐχ εὑρίσκεται ) : several times with ὀφεί-
Neobat, as Eur. Alc. 419 : see L. & S. s. v. II 1. ( In Aristoph.
Wasps 1145 τοῦτο τοῖσι βαρβάροις ὑφαίνεται, the meaning is
'this is woven for the barbarians. ')
As the dative implies mainly the person interested in, or
judging of, a result, it was naturally used chiefly with the
perfect tense, by which a result or state of things is indicated.
But we may have this sense with other tenses : e. g. in Thuc.
I 51 the meaning is ' the Corcyreans had not the advantage of
having the Athenian ships in sight. '
μndé : see on 90 E 31. For the subject matter Fr. refers to
† Alc. i 111 B.
23. καὶ Γοργίου μάλιστα κτέ. : Protagoras definitely pro- C
fessed to teach åpeτý. See Prat. 318 A νεανίσκε, ἔσται τοίνυν
σοι, ἐάν μοι συνῇς, ᾗ ἂν ἡμέρᾳ ἐμοὶ συγγένῃ, ἀπιέναι οἴκαδε
βελτίονι γεγονότι, καὶ ἐν τῇ ὑστεραίᾳ ταὐτὰ ταῦτα · καὶ ἑκάστης
ἡμέρας ἀεὶ ἐπὶ τὸ βέλτιον ἐπιδιδόναι. Socrates presses the question
but in what will he become better ? ' to which Protagoras
(ibid. E) gives the answer quoted on 91A 4. It is the πολιτικὴ
TéXVn which Protagoras teaches ; he will make his pupils good
citizens. So too Hippias promises to make men Beλrious
(Hipp. maj. 283 c), though his methods differed from those
of Protagoras, being more indirect, and depending more on
special arts (Prot. 318 E, Hipp. maj. 285 CD). In the Euthyd.
273 D the profession the twin sophists make is still general :
ἀρετήν, ὦ Σώκρατες, οἰόμεθα οἵω τ᾽ εἶναι παραδοῦναι κάλλιστ'
ἀνθρώπων καὶ τάχιστα-only here ἀρετή has got narrowed down
to the art of quibbling (see on 71 E 2). On the other hand,
Gorgias, in the dialogue named after him, starts by proclaiming
himself a teacher of Rhetoric (449 A) . (See Zeller pre- Socratics
II 471 foll . ) But it is argued that the study of Expression apart
from its contents is inconceivable. So Gorgias is at last forced
under press of questions to say that he will give the knowledge
of dikaia and adika if his pupil does not already possess it (460 A).
Thus he is driven to make practically the same profession as
Protagoras, and the new frontier which he has tried to draw
for his art is shown to be indefensible. Similarly in the
Protagoras 312 D, Hippocrates, at a loss to say what he will
206 ΜΕΝΟ XXXV 95 c

be taught by Protagoras, suggests τί ἄν, εἰ εἴποιμεν αὐτὸν εἶναι

ἐπιστάτην τοῦ ποιῆσαι δεινὸν λέγειν ; Ἴσως ἄν, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, ἀληθῆ
λέγοιμεν, οὐ μέντοι ἱκανῶς γε · ἐρωτήσεως γὰρ ἔτι ἡ ἀπόκρισις
ἡμῖν δεῖται · περὶ ὅτου ὁ σοφιστὴς δεινὸν ποιεῖ λέγειν κτέ. (Cp.
also Phaedr. 260 D with Dr. Thompson's note. )
On 91 C 19 reference was made to the passage from the
Republic in which Socrates resists the notion that the corrup-
tion of men of exceptional ability is due to a few sophists.
Socrates thus proceeds (493 A ) : ἔτι τοίνυν σοι, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ,
πρὸς τούτοις καὶ τόδε δοξάτω. Τὸ ποῖον ; Εκαστον τῶν μισθαρ-
νούντων ἰδιωτῶν, οὓς δὴ οὗτοι σοφιστὰς καλοῦσι καὶ ἀντιτέχνους
ἡγοῦνται, μὴ ἄλλα παιδεύειν ἢ ταῦτα τὰ τῶν πολλῶν δόγματα,
ἃ δοξάζουσιν ὅταν ἀθροισθῶσι, καὶ σοφίαν ταύτην καλεῖν. Pro-
fessional teaching has become a mere craft how to humour that
great beast, the Demos. It has become a teaching of Rhetoric.
Thus while the earlier sophist, who taught ' virtue , ' was looked
on in a democracy with suspicion almost equally with the
philosopher, the rhetor-sophist was there in his element ; and
in Gorgias 520 A B (see Dr. Thompson's notes) we have Socrates
distinctly siding with the ' sophists, ' in the older sense, against
the ῥήτορες (τῇ δὲ ἀληθείᾳ κάλλιόν ἐστι σοφιστικὴ ῥητορικῆς) .
I believe that the thorough discussion in the Gorgias pre-
ceded the Meno, and is assumed by it (Introd. § 16).
Γοργίου ταῦτα ἄγαμαι, ‘ I admire this in Gorgias. This is
a frequent construction with ayaua and verbs of similar
meaning. The gen . is in its origin ' partitive ,' depending on
ταῦτα. So Prot. 335 E, Gorg. 449 D, Laws 631 A. Stallbaum
quotes similar constructions with θαυμάζω (Apol. 17 A, etc. ),
and ἐπαινῶ (Menex. 241 B, etc. ). See Kühner § 417. Anm. 10 b.
Sometimes the acc. is replaced by a clause with örɩ (Hipp. maj.
291 Ε ἄγαμαί σου, ὅτι μοι δοκεῖς εὐνοικῶς βοηθεῖν) or διότι (Laws
948 D) . Plato seems rarely to have an unsupported gen. of the
person admired with ἄγαμαι (at Rep. 329 D καὶ ἐγὼ ἀγασθεὶς
αὐτοῦ εἰπόντος ταῦτα, the ptcp. approaches a gen. absol.). The
simple gen. with ἄγαμαι is found in Xen. (Mem. II vi 33, 34,
Oec. iv 21 ) and in † Ep. xii ad init.; and Plato has it with
θαυμάζω (Crito 43 B) .
We also often have with ayauai an acc. of the person ad-
mired, either alone, or with a gen. of the cause : Rep. 426 D
τοὺς ἐθέλοντας θεραπεύειν τὰς τοιαύτας πόλεις οὐκ ἄγασαι τῆς
ἀνδρείας ; Parm. 130 A (quasi - passive) ἄξιος εἰ ἄγασθαι τῆς
ὁρμῆς τῆς ἐπὶ τοὺς λόγους. Once in Plato we have the dat. (of
cause) substituted for the gen.: Symp. 179 D ἀγασθέντες τῷ
ἔργῳ ; ep. Χen. Cyr. It iv 9, etc. , Kühner § 425. 11.
31. ὅπερ οἱ πολλοὶ πέπονθα : see on 86 Β 21.
XXXVI 95 D NOTES 207

35. Θέογνιν τὸν ποιητήν : for the appeal to poets see on D

77 B 12. This short episode is parallel to the longer one in
the Protagoras (339 A foll. ) , where Simonides in one of his
poems is apparently guilty of a similar inconsistency. At one
moment he says ἄνδρ' ἀγαθὸν μὲν ἀλαθέως γενέσθαι χαλεπόν :
at another he rejects the saying of Pittacus χαλεπὸν ἐσθλὸν
ἔμμεναι.
Hesiod, Theognis, and Phocylides are mentioned by Isocr.
ad Nic. (2) 43 as enjoying the reputation of being the best moral
counsellors. Theognis is also quoted by Plato, Lysis 212 E and
Laws 630 A, but nowhere else. Plato's charge against the poets
does not in the Meno reach the gravity it attains in the Republic
(Books II, III, and x). But to this charge the gnomic poets
were exposed much less than Homer.
37. év Tolois Teσ ; see on 80D 3. Perhaps some sur-
prise is indicated . It is new to Meno that Theognis is as
inconsistent on the point as himself and οἱ πολλοί.
en may nearly always be taken as including elegiac as well
as strictly ' epic ' (hexameter) verse. The elegiac couplet grew
out of the hexameter, and is closely akin to it. We have ἔπη
distinguished from dramatic verse : Rep. 602 в év iaµßeíos kai
ἐν ἔπεσι : Rep. 379 Α ἐάν τέ τις αὐτὸν ἐν ἔπεσι ποιῇ [ἐάν τε ἐν
μέλεσιν] ἐάν τε ἐν τραγῳδίᾳ (the words bracketed are absent
from the best MSS. ) ; or from lyric verse : Phaedr. 241 E (after
a hexameter) ἤδη ἔπη φθέγγομαι καὶ οὐκέτι διθυράμβους : Rep.
607 A (we must only have hymns and encomia, ) ei dè Th
ἡδυσμένην Μοῦσαν παραδέξει ἐν μέλεσιν ἢ ἔπεσιν κτέ. : or from
dramatic and lyric verse : Hipp. min. 368 D каì ễπη кai
τραγωδίας καὶ διθυράμβους : Ion 534c ὁ μὲν διθυράμβους, ὁ δὲ
ἐγκώμια, ὁ δὲ ὑπορχήματα , ὁ δ᾽ ἔπη, ὁ δ᾽ ἰάμβους. The word is
used loosely sometimes of any kind of verse : Prot. 339 A ¿yù
ἀνδρὶ παιδείας μέγιστον μέρος εἶναι περὶ ἐπῶν δεινὸν εἶναι,
before citing the poem of Simonides : Laws 810 E Tоinтal πŵV
ἑξαμέτρων καὶ τριμέτρων καὶ πάντων τῶν λεγομένων μέτρων. In
Aristoph. Clouds 638 πότερον περὶ μέτρων ἢ ῥυθμῶν ἢ περὶ ἐπῶν,
the last word seems to mean verse of any sort.

CHAPTER XXXVI
1. Ev Toîs èλeyelous : the word occurs Rep. 368 A ; nowhere
else in Plato. It has been assumed by some that a distinction
is here drawn between rà èλeyeîa and other works of Theognis.
' Apparet hinc Theognidem alia quoque poëmata heroico, ut
videtur, metro scripsisse ' Buttm. Nothing is known of these
other poems. Leutsch (Philologus XXIX p. 521 ) thought that
 208 MENO XXXVI 95 D

the poems of Theognis addressed to Cyrnus were called iπоonкAι

(cp. vroongouaι Theognis v. 27 Bergk 4 ), and that other poems
of Theognis were called Meyeîa specifically, to distinguish them
from the moonka . Against this it may be argued that the
lines now cited (vv. 33-36 in Bergk ) stand amongst those
addressed to Cyrnus, and therefore would belong rather to the
ὑποθῆκαι. I believe no such emphasis on the word ελεγείοις is
intended, and have put no comma after the word." The
meaning is simply ' in the lines where. '
2. See App. on the text.
3. ὧν μεγάλη δύναμις : i.e. δυνάσται, oligarchs. See on
77 B 12.
4. olov : Theognis of Megara, a bitter oligarch, con-
tinually uses ἐσθλός, ἀγαθός, κακός, in the political sense, which
appears to be earlier than their moral one. See Grote Hist.
Pt. II, note at the end of chapter ix.
Sisageal : pass., as the tense generally is : Soph. Ant. 726,
Eur. Andr. 739 , Aristoph. Clouds 127 (but not in Rep. 421 E).
Most of the forms of the tense didaxonooμal (which is late) are
impossible in elegiac verse. Cf. on 93 D 14.
E 6. ὡς διδακτοῦ οὔσης τῆς ἀρετῆς λέγει : for ὡς thus with
gen. absol. see Goodwin § 918 : cp. Crat. 439 c diavon@évtes ÚS
ἰόντων ἁπάντων ἀεὶ καὶ ῥεόντων.
9. Sé ye : this combination of particles occurs twelve times
in the Meno. In some of the places ye accentuates some par-
ticular word : 82 E 44 but he thinks ' (opposed to older) ; 85 C7
' but (though he knew not) these opinions really existed in him. '
At 77 B 8 there is a hyperbaton of ye, which accents πapadely-
ματα. But often (as in the present place, 85 B 48, 88 E 10,
96 C 7, 99 A 53) ye does not point any particular word ; the
combination, like atqui, attaches a further premiss from which
a conclusion is to be drawn. At 87 C 13, 96 C 5, 14 we simply
have eye coupled to the context by dé ; and similar is éreion
dé ye at 98 D 29. See Shilleto on Dem. F.L. § 102, with §§ 243,
318, 342. Cp. Intr. p. lxii.
ỏλlyov μeraßás, ' in a somewhat different strain.' The
word μeraßaivel is used technically from early times of
transition to a new theme in poetry. So Od. VIII 492 Odysseus
says to the bard Demodocus ἀλλ᾽ ἄγε δὴ μετάβηθι, καὶ ἵππου
KÓσμOV ŽELσOV KTE.; three of the Homeric hymns 4 (Aphrodite),
9 (Artemis) , 18 (Hermes) end with the line σeû d' éyì ápέáµevOS
μεταβήσομαι ἄλλον ἐς ὕμνον. Cp. Phaedr. 262 A κатà σμкpòv
μεταβαίνων μᾶλλον λήσεις ἐλθὼν ἐπὶ τὸ ἐναντίον ἢ κατὰ μέγα, and
XXXVI 96 A NOTES 209

265 c ὡς ἀπὸ τοῦ ψέγειν πρὸς τὸ ἐναντίον ἔσχεν ὁ λόγος μεταβῆναι.

In the present place oXiyov is ironical. The words have usually
been taken as referring to citation from a MS.- ' somewhat
lower down. ' From this point of view Bekker wished to read
καταβάς for μεταβάς. It is no answer to this to say that the
interval in our text of Theognis is a long one, namely from
v. 36 to v. 435 ; for the order of Theognis' verses followed by
Plato may have been quite different from that of the ouλoyń
preserved to us. See note on the text of D 2. But the words
used for passing to a point ' lower down ' in citations seems
to be rather vroßás (as Diog. L. VIII 52) or vтоKαтaßás (see
L. & S. ). If μeraßás be taken as above, no alteration is
necessary.
10. See App. on the text..
φησι . · Aéye not unfrequently you have some part of
pnu introduced in the middle of words quoted after a verb of
saying that introduces the whole. See L. & S. So inquit is
often redundant. Buttmann refers to Heindorf on Crat. 412 B :
see also Heindorf on Charm. 164 E. But the case here is different
(' singularis ' says Fr.) ; here not comes first with the line that
first occurs to Socrates ; and then he goes on in a tentative
manner, Xeye Tws, ' he says, if I remember rightly' ; the sequel
being quoted loosely. Stallbaum is wrong in saying that ws
here indicates miratio. It rather denotes hesitation ; cp. 73 A
29. Plato is dramatic artist enough to know that the quotation
is more natural, and so more effective, thus, than if reeled off
fluently. Cp. on 81 A 17. See also the quotation from Pindar
in Theaet. 173 E with Campbell's note : Plato almost always
thus weaves quotation with his own language , and accom-
modates the poets' measures to the rhythm of prose.'
14. οὔ ποτ᾽ ἄν : the οὐ of course does not affect πειθόμενος.
The sense is as if the participial clause had come first.
20. ἔχεις οὖν εἰπεῖν κτέ. : we have here again the argument 96 Α
by antithesis ( see 91 D 17, 94 C 1 ). Are you able to name
any other subject of which the professing teachers not only
fail to get recognition as the teachers of others, but are regarded
as not even understanding it themselves, and as quite inferior
in the very subject of which they say they are teachers ; while
those who are themselves recognized as accomplished, some-
times say that it is to be taught, and sometimes not ? '
εἰπεῖν πράγματος οὗ : Buttmann in his excellent note draws
a distinction between this place and C 7, saying that the latter
is a simple case of inverse attraction, but the present is rather
an instance of anacoluthon. The first thought here was exEIS
Р
210 ΜΕΝΟ XXXVI 96 A

εἰπεῖν ἄλλου ὁτουοῦν πράγματος διδασκάλους ; the acc. being

afterwards exchanged for a relative clause. He cites in
illustration I. XVIII 192 ἄλλου δ᾽ οὔ τευ οἶδα τοῦ ἂν κλυτὰ τεύχεα
δύω · “ ubi Achilles sententiam primariam in animo habet hanc ;
ἄλλου δ᾽ οὔτινος τεύχεα δύοιμ' ἄν, sed statim transiens in hanc
loquendi formam , οὐκ οἶδα οἵτινος τεύχεα δύω, ambas conjungit.
[Perhaps other instances of ' inverse attraction ' may also be
explained as anacolutha : cp. Aesch. S. c. T. 400—
καὶ νύκτα ταύτην ἣν λέγεις ἐπ᾽ ἀσπίδος
ἄστροισι μαρμαίρουσαν οὐρανοῦ κυρεῖν,
τάχ᾽ ἂν γένοιτο μάντις ἡ ἀνοία τινί.
Ar. Lys. 408-ὦ χρυσοχόε, τὸν ὅρμον ὃν ἐπεσκεύασας,
ὀρχουμένης μου τῆς γυναικὸς ἑσπέρας
ἡ βάλανος ἐκπέπτωκεν ἐκ τοῦ τρήματος,
'about that necklace, etc. ' :
Plut. 200— ὅπως ἐγὼ τὴν δύναμιν ὴν ὑμεῖς φατὲ
ἔχειν με ταύτης δεσπότης γενήσομαι,
where the first thought was δύναμιν κεκτήσομαι. ] Riddell § 191
gives both the present place and C7 as examples of ' Attraction
of Antecedent to Relative. ' At § 26 D, however, he quotes the
present place as an example of a ' Genitive of a Noun, without
any Participle, after Verbs of mentioning ' ; adding ' Why this
is not to be explained on the principle of Attraction of Ante-
cedent to Relative, see under Attraction (§ 191).' He had
evidently changed his mind about the passage, but omitted to
give his reasons in § 191.
I do not think the genitive πράγματος can be regarded as a
genitive after a verb of mentioning. If the limits of this
construction are strictly defined, it will be found that (1 ) the
meaning is always to say something about something (so that
περί might conceivably be supplied), not simply to mention " ;
(2) that it is nearly always helped by some substantive (noun
or pronoun) on which the genitive may be regarded as de-
pendent. Both of these conditions are satisfied by the only
prose instance Riddell quotes in support, Laws 804 E kal ovdèv
φοβηθεὶς εἴποιμ᾽ ἂν τοῦτον τὸν λόγον οὔτε ἱππικῆς οὔτε γυμναστικῆς,
ὡς ἀνδράσι μὲν πρέπον ἂν εἴη, γυναιξὶ δὲ οὐκ ἂν πρέπον. As to
the verse instances he quotes, Soph. Αj. 1236 ποίου κέκραγας
ἀνδρὸς ὧδ᾽ ὑπέρφρονα is not to the point, the genitive depending
on the neuter plural ὑπέρφρονα ; ibid. 1257 ὃς ἀνδρὸς οὐκέτ᾽ ὄντος
ἀλλ᾽ ἤδη σκιᾶς θαρσῶν ὑβρίζεις κἀξελευθεροστομείς the construction
is helped (α) by the participle ὄντος, ( β) by the expectation of
such a verb as καταφρονεῖς ; Soph. Ο. C. 355 μαντεῖ᾽ ἃ τοῦδ᾽
XXXVI 96 Α NOTES 211
ἐχρήσθη σώματος satisfies both conditions mentioned above. So
does Trach. 1122-
τῆς μητρὸς ἥκω τῆς ἐμῆς
φράσων ἐν οἷς νῦν ἐστίν ·
where ἐν οἷς νῦν ἐστίν = τὰς συμφοράς.
Riddell in his note on § 26 gives up Rep. 439 Β, τοῦ τοξότου
οὐ καλῶς ἔχει λέγειν κτέ. , observing (§ 225) that there the genitive
τοῦ τοξότου belongs to the following clause ἄλλη μὲν ἡ ἀπωθοῦσα
χείρ κτέ. Similar is Rep. 375 Ε οἶσθα γάρ που τῶν γενναίων κυνῶν
ὅτι τοῦτο φύσει αὐτῶν τὸ ἦθος.
The genitive which occurs in questions about things is often
supported by τί ; see Rep. 459 Β τί δὲ ἵππων οἴει ; where, how-
ever, the word γένος, which comes immediately before (τό τε
τῶν ὀρνίθων καὶ τὸ τῶν κυνῶν γένος) , is the main support of the
genitive : ibid. 470 Α τί δὲ γῆς τε τμήσεως καὶ οἰκιῶν ἐμπρήσεως ;
582c : Gorg. 509 D ; Phaedo 78D ; Aesch. Εum . 211 τί γὰρ
γυναικὸς ἥτις ἄνδρα νοσφίσῃ ; Ρ. V. 820 ; Soph. Phil. 439, 441 ;
El. 317. (See Kühner § 417. Anm. 9. )
Certainly εἰπεῖν πράγματος can never be Greek for ' to
mention a thing. ' I hold, therefore, with Buttmann, that we
have here a change of construction.
The present discussion is confined to the genitive after verbs
of speaking. We have more latitude in verbs of judging, etc.:
Rep. 576 D ἀλλ᾽ εὐδαιμονίας τε αὖ καὶ ἀθλιότητος ὡσαύτως ἢ
ἄλλως κρίνεις ;
485 Β μαθήματος ἀεὶ ἐρῶσιν, δ ἂν αὐτῆς δηλοῖ ἐκείνης τῆς
οὐσίας. (But the reading is doubtful. )
Laws 646 D καὶ τῆς περὶ τὸν οἶνον ἄρα διατριβῆς (ὡσαύτως
διανοητέον). Here περί is supplied with the gen. from the
previous sentence, being omitted on account of the neigh-
bouring Tepi with acc.
21. οὐχ ὅπως followed by ἀλλὰ οὐδέ (see on 71 C 13) is used
in ascending to a negative idea ; the sense then is non modo non.
The negative is not expressed with οὐχ ὅπως, being covered by
the wider negative in the clause to which it leads up. Rep.
591 c τὴν τοῦ σώματος ἕξιν καὶ τροφὴν οὐχ ὅπως τῇ θηριώδει καὶ
ἀλόγῳ ἡδονῇ ἐπιτρέψας ζήσει, ἀλλ᾽ οὐδὲ πρὸς ὑγίειαν βλέπων.
Instead of οὐχ ὅπως in this construction, we also have μὴ ὅπως,
μὴ ὅτι, very rarely οὐχ ὅτι : Dem. 23 ( Aristocr. 155. Kühner
§ 525. 3 c ; Riddell § 152.
But οὐχ ὅπως (or μὴ ὅτι) is also used = non modo non followed
by ἀλλά, when the second clause is not negative in expression ,
but simply opposed in sense to the former. Xen. Hell. v iv 34
ἐδίδασκον τὸν δῆμον ὡς οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι οὐχ ὅπως τιμωρήσαιντο,
ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐπαινέσειαν τὸν Σφοδρίαν ; Kühner § 525. 3 b.
 212 ΜΕΝΟ XXXVI 96 B

22. διδάσκαλοι ὁμολογοῦνται : εἶναι is omitted on account of

the neighbouring εἶναι. Presently ὁμολογοῦνται is understood
with ἐπίστασθαι and πονηροὶ εἶναι .
B ἀλλὰ οὐδ᾽ . ἀλλά : see on 71 C 10 and 74 D 30. Kühner
§ 535. Anm. 1 refers to Lys. 223 A, Prot. 341 D, Symp. 211 E,
for the frequent use of åλá in successive clauses, each limiting
the one before it.
28. κυρίως, ‘ in any real sense.

Chapter XXXVII ( 96 B-E). SOCR. There really seem to be no

teachers of Virtue ; therefore no learners either ; so that
Virtue is not teachable. Yet if Virtue be Knowledge, it
must be teachable. But perhaps the practical results of
Knowledge may be simulated by something that springsfrom
a different source.
7. πράγματος οὗ : a case of ‘ inverse attraction. Hadley
§ 1003 thus defines this idiom : 'The antecedent, without being
incorporated into the relative clause, is sometimes attracted to
the case of the relative. If here we had οὗ πράγματος instead
οἱ πράγματος οὗ, the antecedent would be incorporated into
the relative clause.'
Plenty of instances of inverse attraction are given in Kühner
§ 555. 4. The same thing occurs, but more rarely, in Latin :
Verg. Aen. I 573 urbem quam statuo vestra est ( ' quam urbem '
would be simple incorporation ') ; Roby Lat. Gr. § 1067.
The following are instances in Plato :-:-
Polit. 271 c τὸν βίον ὃν ἐπὶ τῆς Κρόνου φῂς εἶναι δυναστείας,
πότερον ἦν κτέ.
Lysis 221 Β οϊόν τε οὖν ἐστιν ἐπιθυμοῦντα καὶ ἐρῶντα, τούτου
οὗ ἐπιθυμεῖ καὶ ἐρᾷ μὴ φιλεῖν ; (see Heindorf).
Rep. 520 D ἐν πόλει ᾗ ἥκιστα πρόθυμοι ἄρχειν οἱ μέλλοντες
ἄρξειν ταύτην ἄριστα οἰκεῖσθαι (for πόλιν ἐν ᾗ).
Laws 740D πάντων τούτων ἀρχὴν ἣν ἂν θώμεθα μεγίστην
καὶ τιμιωτάτην , αὕτη σκεψαμένη • ποριζέτω κτέ.
Also Crito 45 B, where the attraction takes place in an
adverb , πολλαχοῦ μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἄλλοσε, ὅποι ἂν ἀφίκῃ,
ἀγαπήσουσί σε ( for ἄλλοθι).
We may bring under this head the instances of οὐδεὶς ὅστις
οὐ. See on 70 € 18.
8. είεν : see on 89 E 25 and 92 C 18.
τοῦτο μηδὲ διδακτὸν εἶναι : cp. 89 E 26.
D 24. καὶ ἐμὲ Πρόδικος : see on 75E 13. Socrates' obligations
to Prodicus are exceedingly hard to estimate. At Prot. 341 A
XXXVII 96 D NOTES 213

Socrates says that the wisdom of Prodicus is an ancient and

Wondrous thing : κινδυνεύει ἡ Προδίκου σοφία θεία τις εἶναι πάλαι :
and calls himself μαθητης Προδίκου. Cp. 315 D foll.: in the
hall where Protagoras was, Πρόδικος ἔτι κατέκειτο ἐγκεκαλυμμένος
ἐν κῳδίοις τισὶν καὶ στρώμασιν καὶ μάλα πολλοῖς ὡς ἐφαίνετο.
Several were gathered round Prodicus, says S. , περὶ δὲ ὧν
διελέγοντο οὐκ ἐδυνάμην ἔγωγε μαθεῖν ἔξωθεν, καίπερ λιπαρῶς ἔχων
ἀκούειν τοῦ Προδίκου · πάσσοφος γάρ μοι δοκεῖ ἁνὴρ εἶναι καὶ θεῖος ·
ἀλλὰ διὰ τὴν βαρύτητα τῆς φωνῆς βόμβος τις ἐν τῷ οἰκήματι
γιγνόμενος ἀσαφῆ ἐποίει τὰ λεγόμενα. Crat. 384 Β (quoted on
91 D 8) shows that Socrates did not drink deeply at the wells
of Prodicus' etymological learning. Buttmann however points
out that the present passage shows his debt to him was not
confined to etymology. See also Charm. 163 D , quoted on
75 E 13. Prodicus can hardly have been older than Socrates,
and was probably rather younger (Zeller pre- Socratics II 417
note). In Hipp. maj. 282c Socrates speaks of ὁ ἡμέτερος ἑταῖρος
Πρόδικος. But, as will be seen, Socrates was older than at least
one other of his ' teachers . ' Cp. on 76 C 22.
' All the remarks of the Platonic Socrates,' says Zeller
(pre- Socratics II 419 note) , concerning the instruction which
he received from Prodicus, even those in the Meno, have an
unmistakeably ironical tone, and as to any historical content,
nothing is to be derived from them beyond the fact that Socrates
was acquainted with Prodicus, and had heard lectures from
him as from other sophists. That he sent certain individuals
of his acquaintance to him does not prove any special preference,
for, according to the passage in the Theaetetus ( 151 Β), he sent
others to other sophists. ' (See also Zeller's note ibid. pp.
501 , 502. )
It may be noted that a similar tone is adopted by Plato
towards other persons whom he makes Socrates represent as
his teachers. Menex. 235 Ε ΣΩ. Καὶ ἐμοὶ μέν γε, ὦ Μενέξενε,
οὐδὲν θαυμαστὸν οἵῳ τε εἶναι εἰπεῖν, ᾧ τυγχάνει διδάσκαλος οὖσα
οὐ πάνυ φαύλη περὶ ῥητορικῆς, ἀλλ᾽ ἵπερ καὶ ἄλλους πολλοὺς καὶ
ἀγαθοὺς πεποίηκε ῥήτορας, ἕνα δὲ καὶ διαφέροντα τῶν Ἑλλήνων,
Περικλέα τὸν Ξανθίππου. ΜΕΝ. Τίς αὕτη ; ἢ δῆλον ὅτι Ασπασίαν
λέγεις ; ΣΩ. Λέγω γάρ, καὶ Κόννον γε τὸν Μητροβίου · οὗτοι
γάρ μοι δύο εἰσὶν διδάσκαλοι, ὁ μὲν μουσικῆς , ἡ δὲ ῥητορικῆς. But
Menexenus is very sceptical (236 c, cp. 249 D E) as to whether
Aspasia has had much to do with the speech which Socrates
proceeds to deliver. As to Connus, Socrates says he did not
do his teacher much credit : Euthyd. 272 € ἀλλ᾽ ἐγὼ ἓν μόνον
φοβοῦμαι, μὴ αὖ ὄνειδος τοῖν ξένοιν περιάψω, ὥσπερ Κόννῳ τῷ
Μητροβίου, τῷ κιθαριστῇ, ὃς ἐμὲ διδάσκει ἔτι καὶ νῦν κιθαρίζειν ·
ὁρῶντες γοῦν οἱ παῖδες οἱ συμφοιτηταί μοι ἐμοῦ τε καταγελῶσι
 214 ΜΕΝΟ XXXVII 96 D

καὶ τὸν Κόννον καλοῦσι γεροντοδιδάσκαλον . Cp. 295 D. Again,

Socrates expresses respect for the musician Damon (Lach. 180 D,
Rep. 400 BC, cp. 424 c), who was himself an associate of Prodicus
(Lach. 197 D, † Alc. i 118 c ). Later authorities improved upon
this and made Socrates a pupil of Damon (Diog. L. II 19).
Yet the tone in which he is treated is one of mock respect
(Lach. 200 A B).
It seems inconsistent with the most essential characteristic
of Socrates that he should have seriously acknowledged
obligations to any one for positive instruction. That he
availed himself of the opportunities of culture that Athens
afforded, and spoke with his unfailing courtesy ' of those to
whose influence he had been subjected, may be assumed . Plato
was not likely to estimate Socrates' debt to others more highly.
In the case of Prodicus there are several reasons that may
account for a somewhat hostile attitude on the part of Plato.
(1) Aristophanes had praised Prodicus at the expense of
Socrates : Clouds 360 foll.-
οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἄλλῳ γ᾽ ὑπακούσαιμεν τῶν νῦν μετεωροσοφιστῶν
πλὴν ἢ Προδίκῳ , τῷ μὲν σοφίας καὶ γνώμης οἵνεκα , σοὶ δέ,
ὅτι βρενθύει τ᾽ ἐν ταῖσιν ὁδοῖς καὶ τὠφθαλμὼ παραβάλλεις
κἀνυπόδητος κακὰ πόλλ᾽ ἀνέχει κἀφ᾽ ἡμῖν σεμνοπροσωπεῖς.
(2) Prodicus was a friend of Antisthenes, Plato's rival ( Xen.
Symp. iv 62).
(3) Plato, from his love for elasticity of language, and
dislike of pedantry, was likely to undervalue Prodicus ' dis-
tinctions. Socr. after referring to these ( Charm. 163 D) says
ἀλλ᾽ ἐγώ σοι τίθεσθαι μὲν τῶν ὀνομάτων δίδωμι ὅπῃ ἂν βούλῃ
ἕκαστον · δήλου δὲ μόνον ἐφ' ὅ τι ἂν φέρῃς τοὔνομα ὅ τι ἂν λέγῃς.
(See end of note on 72 C 2 : also Dr. Thompson's note on
Phaedr. 267 Β σοφώτατά γε, ὦ Πρόδικε. )
24. πaνтòs µâλλov : 80 C 35 Euthyphr. 9 B, Crito 49 B, etc.
E 27. τὴν ἄρτι ζήτησιν κτέ. : ' the state of the discussion as
it stands now is represented by two hypothetical syllogisms,
as follows :-
1 . If virtue is knowledge, it is teachable :
But virtue is knowledge :
Therefore virtue is teachable.
2. If virtue is knowledge , it is teachable :
But virtue is not teachable :
Therefore virtue is not knowledge.
The minor premiss of each of these two syllogisms contradicts
the conclusion of the other. Both cannot be true. If
virtue is not acquired by teaching, and does not come by
XXXVIII 97 A NOTES 215

nature (89 A B), how are there any virtuous men ? Socrates
continues his argument : the second premiss of the first
syllogism — that virtue is knowledge is true but not the
whole truth. In proving it we assumed that there was nothing
except knowledge which guided us to useful and profitable
consequences. But this assumption will not hold." Grote
II pp. 9 foll. Notice the guarded language of 87 B : virtue is
certainly not ἀλλοῖον ἐπιστήμης, but we cannot say without
reserve that ἀρετή is ἐπιστήμη.
29. ὀρθῶς τε καὶ εὖ : cp. 97 Α 15.
30. Toîs ȧveρúπois TράTTETαι : see on 95 B 17. The notion
of interest may be traced in the dative : ' that men get things
done rightly and well not only under the guidance of know-
ledge.'
lows кTE. , ' and this no doubt is the path along which
the discovery is escaping us.' Personifications of the object
of philosophic quest are frequent in Plato : see Campbell's
Theaet. App. A. ' The argument itself ( ò Móyos) is continually
personified and spoken of under a Protean variety of figures.
It is at one time our servant, who must wait our leisure, or
who runs away from us, or who seems likely to die and vanish
away " like a tale, " etc. ' : Theaet. 203 D кal ovтws ηµîv ỏ kaλòs
λόγος ἀποδεδρακὼς οἰχήσεται : Soph. 231 c αλλά τοι κἀκεῖνον (the
sophist, of whom we are in quest) ἡγεῖσθαι χρὴ νῦν ἤδη σφόδρα
ἀπορεῖν ὅπῃ ποτὲ ἔτι διαδύσεται τὸν λόγον. Cp. Polit. 284 B,
Hipp. maj. 294 E, etc. See below on D 12.
The metaphor is worked out most fully at Rep. 432 в vûv
δὴ ἡμᾶς δεῖ ὥσπερ κυνηγέτας τινὰς θάμνον κύκλῳ περιίστασθαι
προσέχοντας τὸν νοῦν μή πῃ διαφύγῃ ἡ δικαιοσύνη. See App. on
the text.

Chapters XXXVIII , XXXIX ( 96 E-98 A). SOCR. For practi-

cal utility Right Opinion will serve the purpose ofKnowledge.
Indeed, so long as Right Opinion is held, its effects will be
indistinguishable from those of Knowledge. The difference
between the two appears to be that the possession of the
former is precarious, the latter is bound in our minds by a
chain of causal reasoning.
2. wμodoyńkaμev : at 87 E. For the tense see on 89 C 6 (111).
6. Tον, opinor, expresses hesitancy, as at 72 C 4 and often. 97 A
7. époλoyoûμev : the change from perf. to imperf. is perhaps
not solely due to love of variety. The former admission had
 216 MENO XXXVIII 97 A

been reached in so many words ; the latter agreement they

were in process of arriving at ; it follows immediately from what
is said at 88 C foll.
9. éàv µǹ póvμos : for the matter see 88 E. For the
omission of Tis see on 79 B 15.
10. ὁμοῖοί ἐσμεν οὐκ ὀρθῶς ὡμολογηκόσιν : see on 80 D 39.
13. El Tis eidos Tηv ódóv : Grote ( 11 383 note) observes that
Plato is here illustrating the difference between Knowledge and
Opinion by a matter which belongs to sensible perception.
Similarly in Theaet. 201 B-the passage on which Grote is
there commenting— οὐκοῦν ὅταν δικαίως πεισθῶσι δικασταὶ περὶ
ὧν ἰδόντι μόνον ἔστιν εἰδέναι, ἄλλως δὲ μή, ταῦτα τότε ἐξ
ἀκοῆς κρίνοντες, ἀληθῆ δόξαν λαβόντες , ἄνευ ἐπιστήμης
Ekpivav, the matters in question about which either Opinion
(through the orator) or Knowledge (from personal observation)
is obtained, are all matters of fact and sense- perception. So
far as the present passage is concerned, it may be noted that it
is merely an illustration, and so stands on the same footing as
71 B 6, where the existence of the class Virtue is illustrated by
the existence of the individual Meno. Cp. Phaedo 73 c-74 D.
14. öπoι Boúλei äλλoσe : this is not a case of ' inverse attrac-
tion ' (see on 96 C 7) such as is found at Crito 45C kaì äλλoσe öπOL
ἂν ἀφίκῃ ἀγαπήσουσί σε, where ἄλλοσε stands for ἄλλοθι by the
influence of öπоL. A simple (not ' inverse ' ) attraction does often
occur with βούλει as at Gorg. 517 Β ἔργα τοιαῦτα οἷα τούτων ὃς
βούλει εἴργασται ( for ἐκεῖνος ὅντινα) : Ion 533 Α περὶ Πολυγνώτου
ἢ ἄλλου ὅτου βούλει : Crat. 432 Α ἢ ὅστις βούλει ἄλλος ἀριθμός.
But here there is no attraction at all. The full form would
be ἢ ὅποι βούλει ἄλλοσε αὐτὸν βαδίζειν.
B 17. ὀρθῶς μὲν δοξάζων κτέ. : it was probably in the Meno that
Plato first propounded his view of two grades of apprehension,
a higher and perfect one (èπɩστýμn), and a lower and imperfect
one (dóğa) (Zeller ch. v pp. 171-175 ; Grote II 377 foll. ). The
relation between them is set forth as follows at the end of
Bk. v of the Republic (476 D-480 A) . To the domain of Being
or Reality (the world of Ideas) Knowledge is correlative, to that
of Non-being, Ignorance (dyvwoia 477 A, äyvola 478 c). But
between the realm of Being and that of Non-being lies the
realm of Sense, which participates in both Being and Non-
being ; and to this the faculty Opinion ( dóga ) is correlative.
Opinion differs from Knowledge in being fallible, 477 E Tŵs
γὰρ ἂν τό γε ἀναμάρτητον τῷ μὴ ἀναμαρτήτῳ ταὐτόν ποτέ τις νοῦν
Exwv Tilein ; In the region of Opinion fluctuate the conventions
of the multitude ; 479D τὰ τῶν πολλῶν πολλὰ νόμιμα καλοῦ τε πέρι
XXXVIII 97 c NOTES 217

καὶ τῶν ἄλλων μεταξύ που κυλινδεῖται τοῦ τε μὴ ὄντος καὶ τοῦ ὄντος
εἰλικρινῶς. See Exc. VII.
This passage in the Meno is probably alluded to in Rep.
506 ε τί δέ ; εἶπον · οὐκ ᾔσθησαι τὰς ἄνευ ἐπιστήμης δόξας, ὡς
πᾶσαι αἰσχραί ; ὧν αἱ βέλτισται τυφλαί · ἢ δοκοῦσί τί σοι τυφλῶν
διαφέρειν ὁδὸν ὀρθῶς πορευομένων οἱ ἄνευ νοῦ ἀληθές τι
δοξάζοντες ;
Another reference to the doctrine of the Meno occurs in the
important passage Symp. 202 A : ἢ οὐκ ᾔσθησαι ὅτι ἔστι τι μεταξὺ
σοφίας καὶ ἀμαθίας ; Τί τοῦτο ; Τὸ ὀρθὰ δοξάζειν καὶ ἄνευ τοῦ ἔχειν
λόγον δοῦναι οὐκ οἶσθ᾽ , ἔφη, ὅτι οὔτε ἐπίστασθαί ἐστιν · ἄλογον
γὰρ πρᾶγμα πῶς ἂν εἴη ἐπιστήμη ; οὔτε ἀμαθία · τὸ γὰρ τοῦ ὄντος
τυγχάνον πῶς ἂν εἴη ἀμαθία ; ἔστι δὲ δή που τοιοῦτον ἡ ὀρθὴ δόξα,
μεταξὺ φρονήσεως καὶ ἀμαθίας.
The distinction was noted as characteristic of Plato's teach-
ing. Diog. L. III 28 quotes from the Ὑποβολιμαῖος of Cratinus
(junior) (Kock Fr. Com. 11 p. 292 )
Α. ἄνθρωπος εἴ δηλόνοτι καὶ ψυχὴν ἔχεις.
Β. κατὰ μὲν Πλάτων᾽ οὐκ οἶδ᾽ ὑπονοῶ δ᾽ < ὧδ' > ἔχειν.
But though in the Meno the dominant phraseology is the
antithesis ἐπιστήμη )( δόξα, we have for each grade a number of
synonyms. For ἐπιστήμη we find φρόνησις substituted line
27, 88 Β 23, etc. ; φρονῶν line 23, φρόνιμος A 10, σοφία 99 Β 8,
νους 88Β 24, 28, 99 C 23, είδώς Α 13 ( cp . 85C), with no apparent
distinction. In the Republic 476D we have δόξα contrasted
with γνώμη, 477 A with γνώσις, 478 Α δοξαστόν with γνωστόν,
479 Ε δοξάζειν with γιγνώσκειν. For the lower grade we have
here οιόμενος substituted for δοξάζειν, ep. 82 Ε, 84 AB, Rep.
506 c, where we have οἴεσθαι opposed to εἰδέναι. Sometimes
πίστις represents the lower grade. Cp. on 98 Β 2.
25. οὐδὲν γάρ : for γάρ thus in answers cp. 78 Β 3, and see
Exc. III.
30. τὸ δέ, ‘ whereas. ' Primus monuit Heindorfius ad C
Theaet. (157 Β) de formula τὸ δέ conjunctionis loco inservienti
latineque vertenda cum tamen . ' Buttm. Apol. 23 Α τὸ δὲ
κινδυνεύει τῷ ὄντι ὁ θεὸς σοφὸς εἶναι, and J. Adam's note ; Phaedo
109 D (or. obl. ) τὸ δὲ ὑπ᾽ ἀσθενείας καὶ βραδυτῆτος οὐχ οἵους τ'
εἶναι ἡμᾶς, and A..H.'s note ; Phil. 24 Ε τὸ δὲ εἰς αὖθις τε καὶ
αὖθις ἴσως λεχθέντα τόν τε ἐρωτῶντα καὶ τὸν ἐρωτώμενον ἱκανῶς
ἂν ξυμφωνοῦντας ἀποφήνειεν . The idiom is very common in
Plato. Tó is accusative (or rather the primitive case, which
became the accusative when the nominative was differentiated
from it), and the meaning is ' in regard to this. ' It has no
definite construction , and does not refer to any particular word
in the context. On the other hand in Thuc. I 37. 2 τὸ δ' ἐπὶ
 218 ΜΕΝΟ XXXVIII 97 €

κακουργίᾳ ἐπετήδευσαν, τό resumes ξυμμαχίαν οὐδενὸς δέξασθαι

from the previous clause, and is distinctly acc. governed by
ἐπετήδευσαν ; while at Ir 89. 3 τὸ δ' ἐκ τοῦ δικαίου ἡμῖν μᾶλλον
νῦν περιέσται, τό refers to ἀνδρείοις εἶναι just before, and is
nominative. Some of the instances in Plato are ambiguous :
thus, Apol. 39 c τὸ δὲ ὑμῖν πολὺ ἐναντίον ἀποβήσεται, where I
think ἀποβήσεται is impersonal and τό not nom. ; cp. Soph.
244 Α ἵνα μὴ δοξάζωμεν, τὸ δὲ τούτου γίγνηται πᾶν τοὐναντίον.
Again in Laws 731 Ε τὸ δὲ ἀληθείᾳ γε πάντων ἁμαρτημάτων διὰ
τὴν σφόδρα ἑαυτοῦ φιλίαν αἴτιον ἑκάστῳ γίγνεται ἑκάστοτε, τό is
independent, and does not agree with αἴτιον. For τὸ δέ with
questions see Laws 630 D, 967 Ε.
The idiom often occurs, as here, with apa and the imperfect :
' whereas it appears that true Opinion likewise is so, ' i.e. a
guide to right action . See on 91 E 17. Compare Symp. 198 D
τὸ δὲ ἄρα οὐ τοῦτο ἦν τὸ καλῶς ἐπαινεῖν ὁτιοῦν : Rep. 357 Α τὸ δ᾽
ἣν ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικε, προοίμιον : 362 A : Τim. 51 c τὸ δὲ οὐδὲν ἄρ᾽ ἦν
πλὴν λόγος : Laws 803 D τὸ δ᾽ ἦν ἐν πολέμῳ μὲν ἄρα οὔτ᾽ οὖν
παιδιὰ πεφυκυία οὔτ᾽ αὖ παιδεία ἀξιόλογος. Goodwin (§ 39)
rightly distinguishes this from the ' philosophic ' imperfect
(§ 40), for which see on 83 D 52. " There ἣν meant is, as we
saw, ' whereas here it means rather was, as we see.'
33. ὀρθὴ δόξα : Plato seems to use this phrase and ἀληθὴς
δόξα indifferently .
36. ἐπιτυγχάνοι . . τυγχάνοι : “ verbum simplex praecedente
composito . Phaedr. 248 Α ' ὑπερῆρεν . . ἦρεν . Ad Phaedon 59 Β
(παρῆν . ἦν), Euthyphr. 14 Α (ἀπεργάζονται . . ἐργασίας) , Fr.
For ἐπιτυγχάνειν ' succeed cp. Rep. 397 c, Phil. 61 D.

CHAPTER XXXIX
D 5. ὅ τι . δι᾽ ὅ τι : the change is merely due to love of
variety.
12. τοῖς Δαιδάλου ἀγάλμασιν : the present passage strongly
recalls Euthyphr. 11 B c ΣΩ. Τοῦ ἡμετέρου προγόνου, ὦ Εὐθύφρον,
ἔοικεν εἶναι Δαιδάλου τὰ ὑπὸ σοῦ λεγόμενα. καὶ εἰ μὲν αὐτὰ ἐγὼ
ἔλεγον καὶ ἐτιθέμην, ἴσως ἄν με ἐπέσκωπτες, ὡς ἄρα καὶ ἐμοὶ κατὰ
τὴν ἐκείνου ξυγγένειαν τὰ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἔργα ἀποδιδράσκει καὶ οὐκ
ἐθέλει μένειν ὅπου ἄν τις αὐτὰ θῇ · νῦν δὲ σαὶ γὰρ αἱ ὑποθέσεις
εἰσίν · ἄλλου δή τινος δεῖ σκώμματος. οὐ γὰρ ἐθέλουσι σοὶ μένειν
ὡς καὶ αὐτῷ σοι δοκεῖ. ' As son of a sculptor, Socrates traced
his descent to Daedalus, the eponymous hero of artists '
(J. Adam). Cp. † Alc. i 121 A.
XXXIX 97 D NOTES 219

The same idea is carried farther Euthyphr. 15 Β ΣΩ. Θαυμάσει

οὖν ταῦτα λέγων, ἐάν σοι οἱ λόγοι φαίνωνται μὴ μένοντες ἀλλὰ
βαδίζοντες, καὶ ἐμὲ αἰτιάσει τὸν Δαίδαλον βαδίζοντας αὐτοὺς ποιεῖν,
αὐτὸς ὢν πολὺ τεχνικώτερος τοῦ Δαιδάλου καὶ κύκλῳ περιιόντας
ποιών ; see on 96 E 29.
The scholium on our present passage runs thus : τῶν πάλαι
δημιουργῶν πλαττόντων τὰ ζῷα συμμεμυκότας ἔχοντα τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς
καὶ οὐ διεστηκότας τοὺς πόδας, ἀλλ᾽ ἑστῶτα σύμποδα , Δαίδαλος
ἄριστος ἀγαλματοποιὸς ἐπιγεγονὼς πρῶτος ἀναπετάννυσί τε τὰ
τούτων βλέφαρα, ὡς δόξαι βλέπειν αὐτά, καὶ τοὺς πόδας, ὡς νομίσαι
βαδίζειν, διίστησι · καὶ διὰ τοῦτο δεδέσθαι, ἵνα μὴ φύγοιεν, ὡς
δῆθεν ἐμψύχων ἤδη γεγονότων αὐτῶν. τοῖς δεδεμένοις οὖν τὰς
ἀληθεῖς ἐοικέναι δόξας φησί, τοῖς λελυμένοις δὲ τούτων τὰς ψευδεῖς.
(The last sentence is perhaps worth citing for its ludicrous
misinterpretation of Plato. ) Fr. refers, in illustration of the
scholium, to Strabo vi 264, Apollodorus II 2, 2, Diod . IV 76.
Other references to moving statues of Daedalus occur :
Aristotle Pol. I 4 εἰ ἠδύνατο ἕκαστον τῶν ὀργάνων κελευσθὲν
ἀποτελεῖν τὸ αὑτοῦ ἔργον, ὥσπερ τὰ Δαιδάλου φασίν : id . de anima
I iii 11 ἔνιοι δὲ καὶ κινεῖν φασὶ τὴν ψυχὴν τὸ σῶμα ἐν ᾧ ἐστίν , ὡς
αὐτὴ κινεῖται, οἷον Δημόκριτος, παραπλησίως λέγων Φιλίππῳ τῷ
κωμῳδοδιδασκάλῳ · φησὶ γὰρ τὸν Δαίδαλον κινουμένην ποιῆσαι τὴν
ξυλίνην ᾿Αφροδίτην ἐγχέαντ᾽ ἄργυρον χυτόν. ‘ Callistratus Εκφρασ.
8 eo progreditur, ut dicat : Δαίδαλον ἐξῆν ἰδεῖν κινούμενα μηχαναῖς
τὰ ποιήματα καὶ πρὸς ἀνθρωπίνην αἴσθησιν ἐκβιάζεσθαι τὸν
χαλκόν : Gedike, Exc. III in Buttmann's ed. The scholiast on
Eur. Hec. 838, quotes Eur. (fr. 373)—
τὰ Δαιδάλεια πάντα κινεῖσθαι δοκεῖ
βλέπειν τ᾿ ἀγάλμαθ᾽ · ὧδ᾽ ἀνὴρ κεῖνος σοφός.
We find in some of these places rationalistic explanations of
the legend that the statues of Daedalus could move, such as
the introduction of quicksilver or clockwork, besides that
which made it an exaggerated statement of the life-like effect
given to the statues by opening their eyes and parting their
feet. But the legend probably had no rational source at all ;
it was simply an expression of the marvel excited in primitive
man by what seem to him triumphs of art or of invention. To
this stock-in-trade of Wonderland belong the tripods and παρ-
θένοι of Hephaestus (Il. XVIII 375 and 417), and the Phaeacian
ships (Od. XIII 81 ). See too Athen. 3Q1 ; Crates Theria fr. 1
(which seems a realisation of the state of things supposed by
Aristotle Pol. 1 4). Perhaps the ipsa olera olla legit of Catullus,
94, has a similar reference. To just the same category belong
the stories about Amphion and Orpheus. The estimation of
the achievement is strongly coloured by hero-worship. ' It is
 220 ΜΕΝΟ XXXIX 97 D

not in times when art is mature that people are likely to tell
stories of overturning town-walls or taming savage animals
with it, but when it is in the elementary stage in which the
personal character of the performer adds so much to the effect. '
Parry Art of Music p. 24.
13. ἴσως δὲ οὐδ᾽ ἔστιν παρ' ὑμῖν, ‘ perhaps you have not
even got them in your country. ' Socrates knew well enough
what the extant works of ' Daedalus ' at Athens were, and is
only mischievously introducing the childish fable about them,
much as a Londoner might chaff a country cousin about Gog
and Magog. ' Idem (Pausanias) IX xl 2 enumerat sex Daedali
statuas, quae sua aetate adhuc reliquae essent : plures sibi
notas esse negat ' : Gedike Exc. III in Buttmann's ed.
15. πρὸς τί ; cp. E 24 πρὸς τί οὖν δὴ ταῦτα λέγω ;
16. ἐὰν μὲν μὴ δεδεμένα ᾖ : for keeping slaves bound see Xen.
Oec. iii 2. Symbolically, deities were represented as chained, to
ensure their presence. Paus. III xv 5 : Lacedaemoni πέδας
ἐστὶν ἔχων Ενυάλιος, ἄγαλμα ἀρχαῖον · γνώμη δὲ . . οὔποτε τὸν
Ενυάλιον φεύγοντα οἰχήσεσθαί σφισιν ἐνεχόμενον ταῖς πέδαις (ep.
Atheniensium Νίκη ἄπτερος) . Ita symbolico vinculo tenebantur
Liber Chii, Diana Ephyrae (schol. Pind. Ol. vII 95), Venus
Lacedaemoni (Paus. III xv 8), Juno quondam Sami (Athen. xv
672). Plut. Quaest. Rom. 61 Τύριοι δεσμοὺς ἀγάλμασι λέγονται
περιβαλεῖν. Lobeck Aglaoph. I p. 275 Fr.
17. ἀποδιδράσκει καὶ δραπετεύει : the former verb is an
inceptive, to run off' ; the latter expresses a state, ' to lie
perdu, to lurk in by-holes, in Bunyan's phrase. ἀποδιδράσκω
and δραπετεύω are often contrasted with ἀποφεύγω ; the former
implies eluding by stealth, the latter by speed. Symp. 216 Β
(Alc. of Socrates) δραπετεύω οὖν αὐτὸν καὶ φεύγω : Xen. Anab.
I iv 8 οὔτε ἀποδεδράκασιν · οἶδα γὰρ ὅπῃ οἴχονται· οὔτε ἀπο-
πεφεύγασιν · ἔχω γὰρ τριήρεις ὥστε ἑλεῖν τὸ ἐκείνων πλοῖον : ibid.
Η ν 7 τὸν γὰρ θεῶν πόλεμον οὐκ οἶδα, οὔτ᾽ ἀπὸ ποίου ἂν τάχους
φυγών τις ἀποφύγοι, οὔτ᾽ εἰς ποῖον ἂν σκότος ἀποδραίη : vir iii 11
τὰ φεύγοντα καὶ ἀποδιδράσκοντα διώκειν καὶ μαστεύειν. The word
ἀποδιδράσκειν occurs in Plato at Euthyphr. 11 c and Theaet. 203 D
(see on 96 E 30 and on line 12) , Phaedo 62 в ( of abandoning a
post).
18. παραμένειν, ' to stand by one ' ) περιμένειν ' to wait about
for one. Apol. 39 Ε ἀλλά μοι παραμείνατε τοσοῦτον χρόνον. Το
to stand one's ground Phaedo 62 E , 98 E δικαιότερον παραμέ
νοντα ὑπέχειν τὴν δίκην . From this comes the common name
for a slave Parmeno ( = ' Trusty ' ) ; cp. Maced. ' Parmenio. '
E 21. The best MSS. of Plato always give κεκτῆσθαι etc. after a
XXXIX 98 A NOTES 221

vowel, but generally ἐκτῆσθαι after a consonant. Schanz vol.

XII praef. p. xvii. Theaet. 198 D ἡ μὲν πρὶν ἐκτῆσθαι τοῦ κεκτῆσθαι
ἕνεκα · ἡ δὲ κεκτημένῳ κτέ. ; ibid. 199 Α τὸ κεκτῆσθαι . . δ μέν τις
ἔκτηται μὴ κεκτῆσθαι ; Rep. 505 Β εἰ κεκτήμεθα • . κτῆσιν
ἐκτῆσθαι.
22. δραπέτην ἄνθρωπον : for ἄνθρωπος ‘ slave'see L. & S.
who quote Philemon
κἂν δοῦλος ᾖ τις, οὐδὲν ἧττον , δέσποτα,
ἄνθρωπος οὗτός ἐστιν, ἂν ἄνθρωπος ᾖ.
23. πάνυ γὰρ καλὰ τὰ ἔργα ἐστίν : this too is in the main
chaff.' The statues attributed to Daedalus had a certain
archaic dignity, which to the reverent taste ' was no doubt
very moving ; Paus. II iv 5 Δαίδαλος δὲ ὁπόσα εἰργάσατο,
ἀτοπώτερα μέν ἐστιν ἐς τὴν ὄψιν, ἐπιπρέπει δὲ ὅμως τι καὶ ἔνθεον
αὐτοῖς. But in Hipp. maj. 282 A we read τὸν Δαίδαλόν φασιν οἱ
ἀνδριαντοποιοὶ νῦν εἰ γενόμενος τοιαῦτ᾽ ἐργάζοιτο οἳ᾽ ἦν ἀφ᾽ ὧν
τοὔνομ᾽ ἔσχε καταγέλαστον ἂν εἶναι.
Plato distinctly regards Daedalus as a human sculptor ; in
the Ion (533 A) he speaks of Daedalus son of Metion side by
side with Epeus and Theodorus ; in the Laws 677 D he couples
Daedalus with Orpheus and Palamedes, and thinks they lived
perhaps 1000 or 2000 years before his time.
24. πρὸς τί οὖν δὴ λέγω ταῦτα ; see Meno's question at
D 15. Fr. refers to Gorg. 453 c, Symp. 178 D, † Theages 129 A.
See Rid. § 325 ' Rhetorical Interrogation. ' Cp. 79 B 18.
28. ἐθέλουσι : see on 95 B 10. 98 A
30. αἰτίας λογισμῷ, ‘ by a chain of causal reasoning. The
gen. αἰτίας is objective (αἰτίαν λογιζόμενος) .
The phrase is quoted in the cloaywyń of Albinus (Teubner
text of Plato vol. VI p. 150) ἵνα δὲ τὰ δόγματα μένῃ ἐν τῇ
ψυχῇ ἀναπόδραστα, δεήσει αὐτὰ δεθῆναι τῷ τῆς αἰτίας λογισμῷ.
Another echo is found in † Ep. ii 313 в (it is assumed that
Plato is writing to Dionysius on some point which D. has mis-
apprehended) σὺ δὲ ἴσως μὲν ἀκούσας του , τάχα δ' ἂν θείᾳ μοίρᾳ
κατὰ τοῦθ᾽ ὁρμήσας, ἔπειτα αὐτοῦ τὰς ἀποδείξεις ὡς ἔχων βεβαίως
οὐ κατέδησας, ἀλλ᾽ ἄττεις τοτὲ μὲν οὕτω τοτὲ δὲ ἄλλως περὶ
τὸ φανταζόμενον. See Exc. VII p. 305.
It appeared at 85 C that the Sóğa , in order to be raised to
the level of ἐπιστῆμαι, must be evoked by a process of ques-
tioning in their proper order and relation. Cp . 86 A 10 for the
matter and for the plural ἐπιστῆμαι.
32. ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν : 81 C foll.
33. πρῶτον μὲν . . ἔπειτα : the words are not to be taken
 222 MENO XXXIX 98 A

in a temporal sense (any more than at 90 A or 95 A) , for they

would in becoming ἐπιστῆμαι at once be μόνιμοι. The meaning
is merely ' firstly ' and ' secondly.'
36. δεσμῷ : “i.e. τῷ δεδέσθαι, significationem ducit ex superi-
oribus, ut πόρος 78 D, εὐδοξία 99 Β΄ Fr. The concrete δεσμῷ
serves to keep the illustration before the mind.
37. COLKEV TOLOÚT Tɩví, ' it looks something like this. ' Here
OLKEV is impersonal, and the meaning is just the same as
ἔοικεν οὕτω πως ἔχειν. But ἔοικα has a liking for a dat. con-
struction. See on 80 D 39 and cp. Phaedo 99 E lows μèv oŵv ŵ
εἰκάζω τρόπον τινὰ οὐκ ἔοικεν.

Chapters XL- XLII (98 B - end). SOCR. Whether the simile

I have given justly represents the difference between Right
Opinion and Knowledge, I am not sure ; but that there is
a difference, I am confident. For purposes of practical
utility, however, the two things are on apar. Now Virtue,
whether based on Knowledge or on Right Opinion, in either
case is not ours by Nature. It has been made clear too
that the virtue of ordinary statesmen, not being Knowledge,
does not arise from Teaching. It remains that it must
be allotted to certain men by Divine Dispensation, like the
inspiration of soothsayers, poets, etc. Any statesman whose
art was based on Knowledge, and who thus was able to
communicate it to others, would stand out among his fellows
as Tiresias among the shades. But we shall understand the
Origin of Virtue when we have ascertained the true Nature
of Virtue, and not till then.
B 1. κal μýv : 85 C 4, 87 D 35, 89 C 8, below C 16. Very
similar is καὶ μὲν δή 88 D 1 .
kal éy : ' I, as well as you.'
2. eikátov : the main meaning here is using conjecture,'
but the notion using likenesses, ' or ' speaking in parables,' is
also present. It is possible there is a trace of a similar double
meaning at 89 Ε 26 καλῶς ἂν αὐτὸ εἰκάζοντες εἰκάζοιμεν μὴ
διδακτὸν εἶναι. εἰκάζειν, conjecture, is often opposed to exact
knowledge : Crat. 425 c οὐδὲν εἰδότες τῆς ἀληθείας τὰ τῶν
ἀνθρώπων δόγματα περὶ αὐτῶν εἰκάζομεν : Phil. 55 Ε εἰκάζειν
λείποιτ᾽ ἄν (if the measuring arts were removed we could do
nothing but ' make shots ') : † Alc. i 105 C eû olda kai OVK
εἰκάζω : † Ep. vii 324 Α οὐκ εἰκάζων ἀλλ᾽ ὡς εἰδώς (probably
imitated from here, says Karsten , de Platonis quae feruntur
epistolis p. 43) : † Sis. 387 D. The terminology of Rep. 511 E,
 XL 98 D NOTES 223

534 A, whereby eixaría is made the inferior division of dóğa, is

expressly dropped at the latter of these passages and not
resumed. (Exc. VII p. 302. )
3. où Távʊ : see on 71 C 19 : for the general tone of the
sentence cp. 86 B 22 foll. (See App. on the text. )
4. εἴπερ φαίην ἄν : see on 79 C 27. In the similar passage
Apol. 29 Β εἰ δή τῳ σοφώτερός του φαίην εἶναί κτέ , φαίην stands
without av. See Exc. II.
5. S'ouv, at any rate. ' The appearance of dé in apodosi
here is to be explained, as Buttm. points out, by the fact that
the antithesis conveyed by d'ouv refers to the parenthetical
words ὀλίγα δ᾽ ἂν φαίην.
Kai TOUTO, ' this too I should place on the list. ' Cp. the
closely parallel passage Prot. 329 Β εἴπερ ἄλλῳ τῳ ἀνθρώπων
πειθοίμην ἄν, καὶ σοὶ πείθομαι.
11. καὶ τοῦτο . . ἀληθῆ λέγειν : the phrase ἀληθῆ λέγειν
became stereotyped, so that it is used with a singular pronoun :
Lach. 186 A, cp. Soph. 226 ▲ åλŋoñ Xéɣetai Tò Tоikiλov elvaι
τοῦτο τὸ θηρίον.
13. peλíun : the fem. form is rare. It occurs Rep. 607 D. C
At Charm. 174D ὥστε εἰ αὕτη ἐστὶν ὠφέλιμος, ἡ σωφροσύνη ἄλλο
τι ἂν εἴη ἡ ὠφελίμη ἡμῖν (so B), Sch. (after Madv. ) cuts out ἡ
ὠφελίμη, which certainly is strange after ὠφέλιμος just before.
The reading peλiun here shows indifference to hiatus.
ora , ' will be found to be ' ; see on 83 D 52.
17. ὡμολόγηται : at 87 Ε.
• 19. éteidη toívuv KTE.: the sentence is interrupted, and there
is no apodosis. The conclusion pointed to is, as Fr. points
out, not reached till 99 Ε : ἀρετὴ ἂν εἴη οὔτε φύσει οὔτε διδακτόν,
ἀλλὰ θείᾳ μοίρᾳ παραγιγνομένη.
ἐπιστήμην . . δι᾽ ὀρθὴν δόξαν, ' on the ground of Knowledge
rather than by means of Knowledge ' ; but the practical differ-
ence between the acc. and the gen. with diá is here, as often,
small. Cp. 99 B 12.
20. äv elev .. elπep elev: note the ' vague future supposition,'
and see on 74 B 6, 82 C 13 ; and for elep Exc. II .
23. See App. on text.
24. ÓπотEрovoûν avтoîv : at 89 A B it was shown that Virtue, D
assuming it to arise from èπorun, was not innate. If it were,
it would be the permanent possession from birth of certain
gifted natures who would thus be marked out from their fellows.
But can the Virtue that arises from doğa ảλnońs —the other
 224 MENO XL 98 D
alternative --- be innate ? Meno says ' no, ' without giving
reasons. We get a hint what these reasons would be in Prot.
323 c, quoted on 89 A 24, words which , though put into the
mouth of Protagoras, may be taken as expressing the views of
Plato.
26. οὐ φύσει : we have to supply ὁποτερονοῦν αὐτοῖν γίγνεται.
οὐδὲ οἱ ἀγαθοὶ φύσει εἶεν ἄν : see 89 A 24 where also the
predicate is omitted .
29. ἐπειδὴ δέ γε οὐ φύσει κτέ. : the transition here is rather
abrupt. In the first place we have in éσкожоûμev a change
back from an expression of opinion (elev äv) to a history of the
discussion (as wμoλóynтaι C17). In the second place, the
subject is changed ; perhaps with Schleiermacher we may fill up
the ellipsis thus : ἐπειδὴ δέ γε οὐ φύσει ( οἱ ἀγαθοὶ γίγνονται)
ἐσκοποῦμεν τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο εἰ διδακτόν ἐστιν (τὸ ἀγαθὸν εἶναι).
This forms a bridge to the next sentence where ʼn ȧperý appears
as subject. éσкожоûμеν of course refers to 89 C foll.
35. kav ei see note on 72 C 1. This phrase has nearly
always a concessive force-' even if. ' (An exception occurs at
Phaedo 72 c κἂν εἰ συγκρίνοιτο μὲν πάντα, διακρίνοιτο δὲ μή, κτέ. ,
where the meaning, as here, is simply ' and if.') In the next
sentence we have kal ei, and T gives kai ei here, which may
possibly be right. kai el also is often concessive ; but the
instances in which it means simply ' and if ' are not rare. See
Kühner § 578. 2, F. E. T. § 226. Note av repeated with the
infinitive.
It is here clearly brought out that the hypothesis is a double
or reciprocal one. See on 87 C 10.
E 41. μὴ εἶναι (cp. μήτε . . μήτε 44) : as to the distinction
between ou and un with a dependent infinitive, Kühner § 541. 1
says that in general you have où when the statement (belief,
wish, etc. ) is regarded as independent of the subject of the
governing verb (e.g. eon), and as assumed by the writer ; un,
when it is dependent on the subject of the governing verb, and
is expressed as a view attributed to him. Usage, however, has
brought it about that with certain classes of verbs où prevails,
with others un. With pával, où is the rule ; an instructive ex-
ception occurs in Xen . Mem. I ii 39 paíŋv d' äv ëywye undevi
μηδεμίαν εἶναι παίδευσιν παρὰ τοῦ μὴ ἀρέσκοντος, where Xen. is
distinctly stating his private belief. With verbs containing a
subjective element, on the other hand, like quoλoyŵ, µń pre-
vails ; see 96 C 8, Phaedo 94 c оvкoûν wμoλovýσaμev μýжот' av
αὐτήν, ἁρμονίαν γε οὖσαν κτέ. , Prot. 336 B etc. Curious is Prot.
319 Β ἡγοῦμαι οὐ διδακτὸν εἶναι, μηδ᾽ ὑπ᾽ ἀνθρώπων παρασκευαστὸν
XLI 99 c NOTES 225

ȧvepúπois. See F. E.T. p. 353, notes 3 and 4, and J. Adam on

Euthyphr. 6 B.
54. ἃ ἔχων ἄνθρωπος ὀρθῶς ἡγεῖται : see on 88 C 33. The 99 A
transition from the individual to the political point of view is
here complete. Just as in man a certain faculty acts as guide, so
the man in whom this faculty is prominent acts asguide to others.
The word yeio@ai lends itself to this double point of view.
We have here a foreshadowing of the doctrine of the Republic
that the State is the Man writ large. ' At 88 A-E we were
concerned mainly with the individual, though the wider
political view is latent, and indeed clearly appears in the
statement 87 E 37 that all ȧya@oi are wpéλuo , reaffirmed
96 E 1 and 98 C 16. The political view- identifying the Good
Man with the Statesman-is the dominant one at 97 A wpéλɩ-
μοι ἔσονται ἂν ὀρθῶς ἡμῖν ἡγῶνται τῶν πραγμάτων : and οὐκ ἔστιν
ὀρθῶς ἡγεῖσθαι ἐὰν μὴ φρόνιμος ᾖ. Meno's conventional view of
Virtue, alike with that of Socrates, implies action in a State.
55. Tà Yàρ ảTTÒ Túxηs : cp. Aristot. Rhet. 1 x 7, where from the
class of actions &v avтol alтio are expressly excluded those that
are due to τύχη.

CHAPTER XLI
2. eri yĺyveraι : see App. on the text. 'We no longer hold
that Virtue is Knowledge ' : see on 83 D 52.
5. ἀπολέλυται, ' has been eliminated . B
9. οἱ ἀμφὶ Θεμιστοκλέα : this use of ἀμφί, of which Ast
quotes nine instances in Plato (also Tepí : Crat. 440 c, Phil.
44 c), occurs in denoting the head of a school with his followers,
'Themistocles and Co. ,' 6 our Gladstones. ' See CR. XIII 168.
15. eudogía is another instance of a word pressed to an
unusual meaning by stress on its etymology : cp. 78 D 29. I do
not think Plato intended any play on the ordinary meaning of
the word ' good repute.' See App. on the text.
17. τὰς πόλεις ὀρθοῦσιν, maintain their States. Cp. C
Lach. 181 A eû ye · ὅτι ὀρθοῖς τὸν πατέρα : ibid . Β οὐ μόνον τὸν
πατέρα ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν πατρίδα ὀρθοῦντα : Laws 957 1 αὑτόν τε
ὀρθοῦν καὶ τὴν πόλιν. κατορθοῦν, on the other hand , is rarely
used with external acc. ; but see Tim. 71 D катор@оûνTES TÒ
paûλov huŵv, and-in the physical sense-† Alc. i 121 D ȧva-
πλάττοντας τὰ μέλη τοῦ παιδὸς καὶ κατορθοῦντας.
18. eoμávтes : the only other place from which L. & S. quote
Q
 226 MENO XLI 99 c

the word is Apol. 22c (of poets) ενθουσιάζοντες ὥσπερ οἱ θεομάντεις

καὶ οἱ χρησμῳδοί.
19. ἀληθῆ καὶ πολλά : contrast with πολλὰ καὶ μεγάλα below.
The latter is simply ' many great things ' ; the former is vera
et sane multa, the kai being intensive. Stallb. refers to
Elmsley on Eur. Med. 871.
22. θείους καλεῖν : see 81 Β 24. Plato takes the view that
the use of clos as a mere expression of admiration is antique.
Some support of this is to be found in Homer, with whom it
is often merely ornate. The ' divine swineherd ' of Od. XVI 1 is
notorious. For the use in Herodotus see L. & S. Plato appeals
to colloquial usage as enshrining a deep truth. Cp. the two
grades of meaning of кaкodaiμwv (78 B 57). It is not long
ago that a similar colloquial use of ' divine ' was common in
England ; perhaps, as with etos at Athens, more among
women than men. Plato uses this word frequently, but never,
I think, without some notion of inspiration. It is used of
Simonides ( Rep. 331 E) ; of Prodicus, not without irony (Prot.
316 A, quoted on 96 D 23) ; of Phaedrus (Phaedr. 234 D)
συνεβάκχευσα μετά σου, τῆς θείας κεφαλῆς, with reference to his
rapt look, cp. 242 A ; Soph. 216 B of the mysterious Stranger ;
of ' grave and reverend seniors ' Laws 666 D Tís (wôǹ) äv oŵv
πρέποι θείοις ἀνδράσιν ;
27. Belovs TE : the particle re naturally would come after
Xpnouwdous. The hyperbaton, by which Te is forced forward in
the sentence, is not uncommon in Plato. Buttm. refers to
Heindorf's index to the Phaedo, and quotes Hdt. vi 86 Taûtá te
ŵv éπiλeɣoμévų kai ẞovλevoμévw. Instances occur Prot. 316 D,
325 B, 336 c, Crito 43 в (for Ion 535 D see on 95 B 11 ).
D 28. χρησμῳδοὺς καὶ μάντεις καὶ τοὺς ποιητικοὺς ἅπαντας :
the divine inspiration of poets is the main thesis of the Ion ;
see especially 533 E. See too Laws 719 c TоNTÈS ÓTÓTAV Év
τῷ τρίποδι τῆς Μούσης καθίζηται, τότε οὐκ ἔμφρων ἐστίν (Fr. ) :
and 682 Α θεῖον γὰρ οὖν δὴ καὶ τὸ ποιητικὸν [ἐνθεαστικὸν] ὃν γένος
ὑμνῳδοῦν πολλῶν τῶν κατ᾽ ἀλήθειαν γιγνομένων ἐφάπτεται ἑκά-
στοτε. The tendency to appeal to their authority is of course
a natural outcome of this view. See on 77 B 12.
29. Kal TOUS TOλITIKOÚS KTE. : in the Apol. 21c foll. we find
statesmen, poets, and craftsmen alike convicted of ignorance,
but the source whence statesmen derive such skill as they have
is not indicated. In the Phaedrus (244 B foll. ) we have three
kinds of feia uavía, or divine possession, described, producing
respectively the Prophet, the Purifier, and the Poet ; to which
at 249 D is added the fourth kind, which produces the Philo-
XLII 99 E NOTES 227

sopher. Nothing is said about any feia pavía of the Statesman.

I think it was in the Meno that statesmen were first included
by Plato in the class of the inspired. See on E 5 below.
32. &K Tou beo0 : see App. on the text. Fr. endeavours to
prove that by this phrase we can only understand Apollo. I
doubt whether Plato here intends to attribute the inspiration
of statesmen to any particular deity (as he does the four kinds
of uavía severally in the Phaedrus). He is simply personifying
the divine agency, without any mythological reference.
35. Kal al ye yuvaîkes : Stallb. quotes Crat. 418c ai yuvaîkes
αἵπερ μάλιστα τὴν ἀρχαίαν φωνὴν σῴζουσι. The secluded life of
women in Greece would tend to increase their conservatism .
See Aristoph. Eccl. 214 foll. Cp. † Alc. i 120 в ëтɩ тǹv åνdpa-
ποδώδη, φαῖεν ἂν αἱ γυναῖκες, τρίχα ἔχοντες ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ.
38. θεῖος ἀνήρ : Aristot. ΝΕ. VII i 3 καθάπερ οἱ Λάκωνες
εἰώθασι προσαγορεύειν, ὅταν ἀγασθῶσι σφόδρα του, σεῖος ἀνήρ
φασιν. See H. Jackson in Phil. Soc. Proc. November 1887.
It seems doubtful whether the Spartan address & eîe ( Laws
626 c) is really the same word as ecos ' divine.' See L. & S. on
ἠθεῖος.

CHAPTER XLII

2. καὶ αὖθις διαλεξόμεθα : this probably refers to the trial ; Ε

though we need not suppose this to be immediately impending
at the time of the dialogue.
3. ἐζητήσαμεν καὶ ἐλέγομεν : for the change of tense see on
72 B 22.
4. ἀρετὴ ἂν εἴη οὔτε φύσει οὔτε διδακτόν : it may be noted
that the view here expressed is that which Socr. really holds in
the Protagoras, though there he pretends to have surrendered
it in deference to the sophist ; 328 Ε ἐγὼ γὰρ ἐν μὲν τῷ ἔμπροσθεν
χρόνῳ ἡγούμην οὐκ εἶναι ἀνθρωπίνην ἐπιμέλειαν , ᾗ ἀγαθοὶ οἱ ἀγαθοὶ
γίγνονται · νῦν δὲ πέπεισμαι. See on 70 Α 1 , 2.
5. Dela μolpa, ' by divine dispensation ' : on this important
phrase see Zeller p. 176 note, Grote I 461 , 462 (on the Ion).
It is not confined to Plato ; see Xen. Mem. 11 iii 18, Cyr. IV
ii 1, Hell. VII v 10 ; cp. too Hdt. III 139 Oeia TúX?. In
Plato it sometimes denotes the common divine element in
man ; e.g. in Prot. 322 Α ἐπειδὴ δὲ ὁ ἄνθρωπος θείας μετέσχε
poipas : Phaedr. 230 A (I study myself to see whether I am a
Typhon) εἴτε ἡμερώτερόν τε καὶ ἁπλούστερον ζῷον , θείας τινὸς καὶ
ἀτύφου μοίρας φύσει μετέχον. Oftener it denotes a privilege of
 228 ΜΕΝΟ XLII 99 E

individuals : Apol. 33 c (the Art of Examining has been forced

on Socrates by all kinds of agencies) περ τίς ποτε καὶ ἄλλη θεία
μοῖρα ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ ὁτιοῦν προσέταξε πράττειν. It occurs con-
tinually in the Ion, contrasted with τέχνῃ, of the gift of poetry :
534c (also θείᾳ δυνάμει), 535 A, 536 CD , and 542 A ; Phaedr.
244 Α νῦν δὲ τὰ μέγιστα τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἡμῖν γίγνεται διὰ μανίας,
θείᾳ μέντοι δόσει διδομένης : ibid . c ὡς καλοῦ ὄντος (τῆς
μανίας) ὅταν θείᾳ μοίρᾳ γένηται : Phaedo 58 Ε μηδ' εἰς "Αιδου
ϊόντα ἄνευ θείας μοίρας ἰέναι : Rep. 366 c (speech of Adimantus)
ἀλλ᾽ οἶδεν ὅτι, πλὴν εἴ τις θείᾳ φύσει δυσχεραίνων τὸ ἀδικεῖν ἢ
ἐπιστήμην λαβὼν ἀπέχεται αὐτοῦ, τῶν γε ἄλλων οὐδεὶς ἑκὼν
δίκαιος (ep. Socrates' answer 368 Α πάνυ γὰρ θεῖον πεπόνθατε,
εἰ μὴ πέπεισθε ἀδικίαν δικαιοσύνης ἄμεινον εἶναι, οὕτω δυνάμενοι
εἰπεῖν ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ) : ibid . 492 Ε (a democracy offers insuperable
obstacles to a virtuous training : by human agency it is im-
possible) θεῖον μέντοι κατὰ τὴν παροιμίαν ἐξαιρῶμεν λόγου · εὖ γὰρ
χρὴ εἰδέναι ὅτιπερ ἂν σωθῇ τε καὶ γένηται οἷον δεῖ ἐν τοιαύτῃ
καταστάσει πολιτειῶν, θεοῦ μοῖραν αὐτὸ σῶσαι λέγων οὐ κακῶς
ἐρεῖς.
For Laws 642 c see on 89 A 24 : ibid. 875 c we have the heaven-
born governor spoken of as superior to law : ἐπεὶ ταῦτα εἴ ποτέ
τις ἀνθρώπων φύσει ἱκανός, θείᾳ μοίρᾳ γεννηθείς, παραλαβεῖν
δυνατὸς εἴη, νόμων οὐδὲν ἂν δέοιτο τῶν ἀρξόντων ἑαυτοῦ. The
phrase also occurs † Ep. ii 313 в (quoted on 98 A 30) : † Ep. vii
326 Β (see on line 6 below) : cp. 327 Ε θείᾳ τινὶ τύχῃ.
Between θείᾳ μοίρᾳ and φύσει in this dialogue a distinction
is made, though the ground of this distinction is not made as
clear as could be wished. See on 89 A 24.
ἄνευ νοῦ : cp. on 70 A 2 and 97 B 17 ; also t Alc. ii 146 A
ἄνευ νοῦ δόξῃ πεπιστευκότα.
100 A 6. οἷς ἂν παραγίγνηται : cp. Prot. 323 c quoted on 89 Α 24.
εἰ μή τις εἴη τοιοῦτος κτέ. : the distinction between the
philosophic and the popular statesman is parallel to that
between philosophic and popular Virtue. 'Socrates had made
virtue to consist entirely in knowledge. He had assumed that
virtue, like knowledge, could be taught. In all these respects
Plato at first followed him ; as against the ordinary notions of
virtue he would indeed always have acknowledged the view of
Socrates to be substantially correct. But riper reflection led
him in after life to modify the Socratic doctrines and to
determine them more accurately. He became convinced that
side by side with perfect virtue, which is no doubt founded on
knowledge, the unscientific virtue of ordinary men has its
value ; that though the former is based on instruction, and
the latter only on custom, yet that this virtue of custom
XLII 100 A NOTES 229

precedes the higher kind as an indispensable preparatory

stage ' Zeller p. 448.
On the subject of dημoтiên ȧperý see Archer- Hind's Phaedo
App. I. (He refers to Dr. Thompson's note on Gorg. 506 D. )
He clearly shows under what different aspects δημοτικὴ ἀρετή
may appear. It may be ( 1 ) the reflex of philosophic virtue,
possessed, as the best of which they are capable, by men under
the guidance of a philosopher. In this light it is the virtue of
the Auxiliaries in the Republic, distinguished from the Rulers.
Or ( 2) it may be a precarious guide to right action in certain
directions, acquired by the individual either feia μoipa or by
habit and fortunate environment (Rep. 619 c ; cp. on 70 A 2).
This, according to circumstances, may be either practically
beneficial, or deceptive and dangerous. (Exc. VII p. 301. )
J. & A. M. Adam in their Introd. to the Protagoras, p. xxxiv,
say : Although the subject of the dialogue might seem to
have expressly invited mention of that " demotic virtue " of
which Plato made so much, no mention of it is made ' ; and
add in a note-' It is in the Meno that the difference between
demotic and philosophic virtue is first clearly laid down .'
'The whole discussion in the Meno brings out very clearly that
the fundamental distinction between popular and philosophic
ȧperý is the same as that between true opinion and knowledge '
(A.-H. loc. cit. ). And in the Meno it is popular virtue and
popular statesmanship that is conferred θείᾳ μοίρᾳ.
The only true Statesman, Plato holds, is the Philosopher.
For the difference between him and the popular statesman see
Rep. 534 B-D. Howthe desirable consummation may be brought
about we read in Rep. 473 D. Either philosophers must gain
rule in the States, or else the present so -styled Kings and Rulers
must sincerely and thoroughly ( γνησίως τε καὶ ἱκανῶς) embrace
philosophy. Compare ibid. 499 Β οὔτε πόλις οὔτε πολιτεία οὐδέ
γ᾽ ἀνὴρ ὁμοίως μή ποτε γένηται τέλεος, πρὶν ἂν τοῖς φιλοσόφοις
τούτοις τοῖς ὀλίγοις καὶ οὐ πονηροῖς, ἀχρήστοις δὲ νῦν κεκλημένοις,
ἀνάγκη τις ἐκ τύχης παραβάλῃ , εἴτε βούλονται εἴτε μή, πόλεως
ἐπιμεληθῆναι καὶ τῇ πόλει κατηκόῳ γενέσθαι, ἢ τῶν νῦν ἐν
δυναστείαις ἢ βασιλείαις ὄντων υἱέσιν ἢ αὐτοῖς ἔκ τινος θείας
ἐπιπνοίας ἀληθινῆς φιλοσοφίας ἀληθινὸς ἔρως ἐμπέσῃ.
It is possible that in the latter passage Plato had in mind
the affairs of Sicily. We find the writer of † Ep. vii (addressed
to the supporters of Dion) quoting it (326 B) Kakŵv ovv où Xýžeiv
τὰ ἀνθρώπινα γένη, πρὶν ἂν ἢ τὸ τῶν φιλοσοφούντων ὀρθῶς γε καὶ
ἀληθῶς γένος εἰς ἀρχὰς ἔλθῃ τὰς πολιτικὰς ἢ τὸ τῶν δυναστευόντων
ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν ἔκ τινος μοίρας θείας ὄντως φιλοσοφήσῃ.
The sequel of events in Sicily affords an ironical commentary
on Plato's views, in the contrast it shows between the failure of
230 ΜΕΝΟ XLII 100 A

Dion, with his philosophic training,

6 and the success of Timoleon,
with his belief in αὐτοματία or spontaneity (Plut. Tim. 36).
In Plato's identification of the Philosopher with the States-
man there is a veiled polemic against Isocrates. Isocrates
believed in practical sagacity as of greater utility than theoreti-
cal knowledge. His was the sceptical view, the belief in a
working rule, to which orators, as J. S. Reid observes ( Intr.
to Cicero's Acad. pp. 11-13 ), are prone. Thus Isocrates,
in his pamphlet against the Sophists (13) § 8, says we see
πλείω κατορθοῦντας τοὺς ταῖς δόξαις χρωμένους ἢ τοὺς τὴν
ἐπιστήμην ἔχειν ἐπαγγελλομένους, which we should certainly
regard as directed against Plato were it not that the date-
about 391 B.c.is too early. See Jebb Att. Or. II 51 foll.
The jeers at the small fees and at the saying ὡς οὐδὲν δέονται
χρημάτων in §§ 3, 4 seem to point at Antisthenes and his
school. In the Antidosis (15) are similar passages : §§ 264 foll.
he speaks patronizingly of philosophic studies as a good
gymnastic for youth, but a man must not let his mind get
fossilized (κατασκελετευθεῖσαν) over them, nor get stranded
(ἐξοκείλασαν) among the theories of the old sophists, such as
Empedocles and Parmenides.' (The resemblance to the view
of Callicles in the Gorgias 484 is pointed out by Dr. Thompson,
Phaedr. p. 174. ) At § 271 follows a significant passage :
ἐπειδὴ γὰρ οὐκ ἔνεστιν ἐν τῇ φύσει τῇ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐπιστήμην
λαβεῖν . . ἐκ τῶν λοιπῶν σοφοὺς μὲν νομίζω τοὺς ταῖς δόξαις
ἐπιτυγχάνειν ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ δυναμένους, φιλοσόφους δὲ τοὺς ἐν
τούτοις διατρίβοντας ἐξ ὧν τάχιστα λήψονται τὴν τοιαύτην φρόνησιν
( practical wisdom). Cp. note on 91 C 19. In the (late) Panath.
(12) § 9 he says of himself τὴν δὲ φύσιν εἰδὼς δοξάσαι μὲν περὶ
ἐκάστου τὴν ἀλήθειαν μᾶλλον δυναμένην τῶν εἰδέναι φασκόντων .
At the beginning of the Helena ( 10) we have successive attacks
on Antisthenes, on Plato (οἱ δὲ διεξιόντες ὡς ἀνδρία καὶ σοφία καὶ
δικαιοσύνη ταὐτόν ἐστιν, καὶ φύσει μὲν οὐδὲν αὐτῶν ἔχομεν, μίαν δ'
ἐπιστήμην κατὰ πάντων ἔχομεν), and Euclides, and come at $ 5
to the statement ὅτι πολὺ κρεῖττόν ἐστι περὶ τῶν χρησίμων
ἐπιεικῶς δοξάσαι ἢ περὶ τῶν ἀχρήστων ἀκριβῶς ἐπίστασθαι.
Cp. also letter v (to Alexander) §§ 3, 4, I hear, ' says Isocrates,
that among philosophies you do not reject τὴν περὶ τὰς ἐρίδας,
but you think that in private society it is too aggressive,
and that debate between a ruler and his subjects is somewhat
derogatory ' : ταύτην μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἀγαπᾶν σε τὴν διατριβήν,
προαιρεῖσθαι δὲ τὴν παιδείαν τὴν περὶ τοὺς λόγους . . δι ἣν νῦν
τε δοξάζειν περὶ τῶν μελλόντων ἐπιεικῶς ἐπιστήσει κτέ. See
Dr. Thompson App. II on the Phaedrus.
8. σχεδόν τι : Const. Ritter's tables (Intr. p. lxii) show that
the phrase σχεδόν τι (together or separated) prevails in the
XLII 100 B NOTES 231

dialogues up to the Republic, σχεδόν in the later dialogues.

This is the only place in which the word occurs in the Meno.
9. οἷον ἔφη Ομηρος . · τὸν Τειρεσίαν εἶναι : Οd. x 494.
Cobet refers to the anecdote told by Plutarch ( Cat. maj. 27)
that Cato applied this line to Scipio minor. It is quite possible
that Cato knew that this line had been applied by Plato to
distinguish the philosophic statesman from others and that he
meant to imply that Scipio by force of education stood out in
just this manner among his compeers. (We perhaps have here
a foreshadowing of the simile of the Cave in Rep. VII. ) Near
the end of the Laws (969 B) Plato compares the specially
trained Philosophers (the ' Nocturnal Council ' ) with ordinary
governments : ἐάν γε μὴν οὗτος ἡμῖν ὁ θεῖος γένηται ξύλλογος, ὦ
φίλοι ἑταῖροι, παραδοτέον τούτῳ τὴν πόλιν, ἀμφισβήτησίς τ᾽ οὐκ
ἔστ᾽ οὐδεμία οὐδενὶ τῶν νῦν παρὰ ταῦθ᾽ ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν νομοθετῶν,
ὄντως δὲ ἔσται σχεδὸν ὕπαρ ἀποτετελεσμένον , οὗ σμικρῷ πρόσθεν
ὀνείρατος ὣς τῷ λόγῳ ἐφηψάμεθα, κεφαλῆς τοῦ τε κοινωνίας εἰκόνα
τινά πως ξυμμίξαντες, ἐὰν ἄρα ἡμῖν οἵ τε ἄνδρες ἀκριβῶς ἐκλεχθῶσι,
παιδευθῶσί τε προσηκόντως, παιδευθέντες τε ἐν ἀκροπόλει τῆς χώρας
κατοικήσαντες φύλακες ἀποτελεσθῶσιν, οἵους ἡμεῖς οὐκ εἴδομεν ἐν τῷ
πρόσθεν βίῳ πρὸς ἀρετὴν σωτηρίας γενομένους.
12. καὶ εὐθύς : Buttm. (index) explains idem etiam statim
esset vir ejusmodi in virtute ' h.e. statim apparet idem fore
etc. ' The idiom falls under the class noticed at 83 D 52.
Buttm. quotes Xen. Hier. ix 4 οὐκοῦν εὐθὺς ἐν τούτοις τὸ μὲν
ἐπίχαρι διὰ τοῦ ἄρχοντος ἐγένετο, τὰ δὲ ἀντίτυπα δι ἄλλων , and
observes that the use of αὐτίκα is somewhat similar.
21. αὐτὸ καθ᾽ αὑτὸ ζητεῖν τί ποτ᾽ ἔστιν ἀρετή : these words B
appear to me to be a clear reference forward to the Republic,
where the subject, though formally Justice, is really nothing
less than Virtue in its entirety . Thus the Meno is designed as
a prelude. Very nearly allied to this passage is the conclusion
of Bk. I of the Republic. Socrates has ' tasted each dish as it
was handed round, and had no satisfaction : ὁπότε γὰρ τὸ
δίκαιον μὴ οἶδα ὅ ἐστι, σχολῇ εἴσομαι εἴτε ἀρετή τις οὖσα τυγχάνει
εἴτε καὶ οὔ, καὶ πότερον ὁ ἔχων αὐτὸ οὐκ εὐδαίμων ἐστὶν ἢ εὐδαίμων.
22. ώρα ποι ἰέναι : it is rare for Socrates to make any excuse
for breaking off a colloquy. Cp. the end of the Protagoras.
The conclusion of these dialogues suits their inchoate character.
It says, in effect, to be continued . '
232 MENO

ADDENDA TO NOTES ON 87 A 23 AND 30

I. Investigators contemporaneous with or later than Butcher

have done little to further the solution (see Ueb. -Heinze p.
150). Gercke (Archiv für Gesch. d. Philosophie 11 2. 170-174,
1889) would read τὸ χωρὶς τρίγωνον for τὸ χωρίον τρίγωνον .
He thinks that the only problem is to apply to a circle a
figure (whether triangle or anything else) and see if it fits.
But where then is the vπóleσis ? Tannery in the same volume,
pp. 509-514 (also 1889 ), naturally rejects this, and falls back
on the solution of Benecke, which has also received the suffrages
of Moritz Cantor. Tannery confesses the inexplicability of the
disguise of the problem ; puisque l'existence de la condition
imposée est précisement aussi difficile à reconnaître que la
possibilité de la solution.' He would cut out the words avTOÛ
γραμμήν in line 29. Lastly Dummler (Academica Anhang
IV, 1889) expresses dissatisfaction with Gercke, and says with
much point that most of the solutions ' come to this : if it
is possible, it is possible. ' He says the place is ' stark ver-
derbt, ' and rewrites it, bringing it into relation with the
tetrahedra of the Timacus.
II. Benecke points out that while τόδε τὸ χωρίον τρίγωνον
certainly cannot mean this triangular figure, ' yet Plato could
hardly have written τὸ τρίγωνον χωρίον οι τὸ χωρίον τὸ τρίγωνον
in that sense ; inasmuch as Plato and Euclid only know
Tplywvov as a substantive, and xwpiov, unqualified , regularly
means a parallelogram, and moreover a rectangle. A recti-
lineal figure is σχῆμα εὐθύγραμμον. To the same effect argues
Tannery : xwpiov properly means a rectangle ; it is by an exten-
sion of usage that the term is applied to any figure, insomuch
as it can be measured under the form of a rectangle.
 APPENDIX ON THE TEXT

THE text of the present edition is founded mainly on the

valuable recension of Schanz (Sch. ) . I have however not in-
variably followed him ; but in some cases have sided with
Fritzsche (Fr. ) where he and Schanz do not agree. In a very
few places I have given a reading that differs from both these
editions. I have discussed the text at all places of any im-
portance where Sch . and Fr. differ. Fortunately there is in
the Meno no place, with the possible exception of 87 A, where
any serious doubt as to interpretation is caused by uncertainty
in the text.
Fr. has given a full and clear account of the MSS. of Plato,
with reference to the Meno, in his edition , pp. 35 foll . The
work of Sch. , besides his edition of the text, is mainly contained
in three tracts : Novae commentationes Platonicae, Würzburg
1871 ; Studien zur Geschichte des platonischen Textes, Würzburg
1874 ; Ueber den Platocodex der Markus Bibliothek in Venedig,
append. class 4 No. 1, Leipzig 1877.
The MSS. of the Meno fall into two classes . Of the first (a),
the great representative is the Bodleian MS. This ranks first in
excellence. Fr. , following Bekker, marks this as ; I follow
Sch. in referring to it as B. Only one other MS. belongs to
this class ; a Vatican MS . (Bekker A), copied, whether directly
or not is uncertain, from B. All the other MSS. , some nine-
teen collated for the Meno, form the other class. The best
MS. of this class is the Venetian, marked by Sch. as T. Sch .
was the first to demonstrate its importance. He holds that all
the MSS. of the second class are derived from it (Ueber den
Platocodex etc. ). Fr. divides the MSS. of the second class
into two sub-classes. One of these sub-classes (62) he allows
(p. 43) to have been derived from T. This contains several
Paris MSS.; namely the ' Coislinianus ' (Bekker I ) , once more
highly esteemed than now, and Bekker's BCE and F ; also
 234 MENO
some Florentine MSS. The other sub-class (b¹) Fr. denies to
be derived from T ; he shows that in the Meno there are eleven
places where this sub-class coincides with B rather than with
T. This sub-class contains two 6 Veneti, ' two 6 Vindobonenses,'
two Vaticani, ' two ' Laurentiani. ' The most interesting
among them is Laurentianus 85, 7, appropriately marked as x
by Fr., who says of it ' A libris reliquis familiae saepissime
secedit x, qui negligentissime scriptus tamen " multas habet
egregias lectiones, quas in ceteris libris frustra quaesiveris.
The last words are quoted from Stallb. See also for this MS.
Schanz Studien p. 70 and p. 69, note.
70 B 9. Aapioralov was bracketed by Naber (Commentationes II
63, which appeared in the Tydschrift vor de Nederlandsche
Gymnasien). Sch. and Fr. both follow him. (1 ) The word is
superfluous ; we are presently told that Aristippus was one of
the Aleuadae, and every one knew that the Aleuadae were of
Larisa. (2 ) With Aapioaíou the article Toû would be required.
Three MSS . of the class b¹ supply this. The Coislinianus and
x, on the other hand, correct to Aapioaîoi. This makes it
almost certain that the word is a gloss. The spelling Aapioaiov
is better than Aapioσaíov : Sch. prolegomena to Phaedrus § 1 .
Cp. Λαρίσαν 97 Α 14.
71 A 23. épéola : the proper accent of the aor. is preserved by
Β as usual ; ἔρεσθαι Τ. See Sch. Phaedr. prolegomena p. viii.
At Gorg. 447 c both B and T wrongly give epov for ẻpoỹ.
25. ἀρετὴν γοῦν εἴτε διδακτὸν εἴθ᾽ ὅτῳ τρόπῳ παραγίγνεται
eidéval : Naber (Commentationes) brackets these words, I
believe rightly, though neither Sch. nor Fr. follow him. The
words are clumsy and superfluous, and the use of you is, I
believe, not Attic. The Attic use of yoûv is illustrated by ei
γοῦν τινα ἐθέλεις just above, ep. 89 E 30 πολλάκις γοῦν ζητῶν,
90 Β 47 αἱροῦνται γοῦν αὐτόν, 93 D 15 επέμενεν γοῦν ἐπὶ τῶν
πTV. The speaker retires, as it were, to firmer ground from
which he defends his former statement. So your is often used
6
in quoting an example ' (L. & S. ) ; a previous general state-
ment is narrowed down to a special instance, which, so far as
it goes, supports it. Ast quoting this passage translates yoûv
videlicet ; but I cannot see that he quotes any other passage
where the restrictive force is absent as it is here. At Phaedr.
236 Α ἀναγκαῖα γοῦν ὄντα the meaning seems elliptical, like
praesertim cum, C which at least you would expect, as. In
later Greek-as in Diog. Laert. -the use of your became much
looser. A similar gloss containing yoûv is expelled at Symp.
195 D.
26. τοσούτου δέω : the MSS. give τοσοῦτον, to which
 APPENDIX ON THE TEXT 235

Buttmann took exception . Cobet Collect. critica 44 says : ' Certo

et perpetuo omnium Atheniensium usu dicebatur ToσOÛTOV
ἀπέχω et τοσούτου δέω, et πολλοῦ, πλείστου, μικροῦ ὀλίγου δέω et
similia sine ulla exceptione, quam natura verbi deîv non admittit. '
The acc. TOGOÛTOV is defended by Ullrich, and retained by
Hermann. Cobet is followed by Sch. and Fr. , and I have
followed them. It must be noted, however, that the accusative
TOσOÛTOV is logically quite defensible ; indeed either of the three
cases is theoretically possible, and the dative actually occurs
in the MSS. of Isocr. Bus. (11) 5 τοσούτῳ δέεις ἀποχρῆσθαι.
I may say I am lacking of so much ' (gen. ) or by so much
(dat. ) or ' in respect of so much ' (acc.). Cobet's rule, as all
such rules, assumes that Attic usage was quite uniform . The
other instances of TоGOÛTOV are however all from late writers ;
twice in the spurious † Axiochus 366 в TоσOÛTоν ȧπodéw Tŵv
περιττῶν : 372 Β τοσοῦτον γὰρ ἀποδέω τοῦ δεδοικέναι (where, as
Buttmann points out, there are already dependent genitives).
So too Charito VIII 1 τοσοῦτον ἀποδέω τοῦ σε κωλύειν . Plut. adv.
Coloten. x 6 τοσοῦτον ἐδέησε τοῦ κινεῖν, qui etiam μικρόν, ὀλίγον
déw seq. inf. vel 70û c. infin. aliquoties praebet ' Fr. In Plutarch
and other later writers no doubt the desire to avoid hiatus
influenced the use. Thus Lucian Nigr. 26 gives TоσOÚTOV déwv,
Pisc. 29 τοσούτου δέω : but Icaromen. 5 τοσοῦτον ἐδέησαν.
27. os ovde autó : so the MSS. , Buttm. and Fr. Sch.,
following Stallb. , corrects is to wor'. as in consecutive sense,
after a demonstrative, is very rare in Plato (see Prot. 330 E
οὕτως ἔχοντα πρὸς ἄλληλα · ὡς οὐκ εἶναι κτέ , with J. and A. M.
Adam's note) and perhaps unparalleled with the indic. as here.
But Xen. affords examples : Hell. Iv i 33 vûv ovтw diáкeiμai is
οὐδὲ δεῖπνον ἔχω, Symp. iv 37 οὕτω πολλὰ ἔχω ὡς μόλις αὐτὰ
Evρloкw, ibid. ix 3. Krüger § 65. 3, 4 ; Goodwin MT. § 609.
5. Naber, following x, inserts éσTiv after onоîóv yé tɩ. I B
have ventured to follow him.
28. Hirschig, Cobet and Sch. read cité, after one Florentine D
MS. (n). Fr. keeps eirov. Rutherford New Phrynichus p. 219
'The two (aorists, eirov and eina) accurately supplement one
another according to the following paradigm :
Indic. εἶπον εἴπομεν
εἶπας εἴπατον εἴπατε
είπε εἰπάτην εἶπον
Imper. εἰπέ εἴπατον εἴπατε
εἰπάτω εἰπάτων εἰπόντων .
This is the scheme to which Attic usage was approximating.
But the process of selection and elimination must have taken
 236 ΜΕΝΟ
time. We should expect to see sporadic survivals, which we
actually find.
72 A 12. ei dè Boúλe , Soúλov : Cobet ( Collect. crit. 46) would
omit Boule , in accordance with general usage (see expository
note) . But the repetition of Boúλe here seems characteristic of
Meno's verbose style.
20. κειμένων ΒΤ, κείμενον x, which is adopted by Cobet
(Collect. crit. 46) and Sch. Fr. keeps кeuévwv. No one has
followed Gedike, who from Plutarch Tepi Tоλvpiλías, c. I
wished to read κινουμένων or κεκινημένων. This spoils the irony
of the passage, for the double meaning of παρὰ σοὶ κειμένων,
and the reference to Meno's real character, cannot be ignored.
с 4. ȧπокρiváμεvov BT was retained by Bekker and Hermann.
Buttm. , Sch. , and Fr. give ȧTокρIVÓμеVOV, which is supported
by some MS. of the sub- class b¹ and by a Paris MS . (F), de-
rived from T, of small independent authority. Madv. (adv.
crit. I 413) condemns the aorist. The reading ἀποκρινούμενον
given in the old printed editions, and rendered by Ficinus,
is not supported by any existing MS . I think there is ground
here for adhering to the aorist åπокρivάμevov. All the neigh-
bouring verbs are aorists. A distinction very commonly
observed by Plato is that ερέσθαι, ἐρωτῆσαι, ἀποκρίνασθαι are
used for single inquiries and answers ; ἐρωτῶν, ἀποκρίνεσθαι οἱ
a process of inquiry and answer. (See note on 72B 22. ) Rep. I
will furnish abundant instances : 332 c (aorists) ; 336 c un μóvov
Ερώτα μηδὲ φιλοτιμοῦ ἐλέγχων, ἐπειδάν τίς τι ἀποκρίνηται
(aor. ), ἐγνωκώς τοῦτο, ὅτι ῥᾷον ἐρωτῶν ἢ ἀποκρίνεσθαι, ἀλλὰ
καὶ αὐτὸς ἀπόκριναι καὶ εἰπέ, τί φῂς εἶναι τὸ δίκαιον : 337 F ἵνα
αὐτὸς μὲν μὴ ἀποκρίνηται ( pres. ) , ἄλλου δ᾽ ἀποκρινομένου λαμβάνῃ
λόγον. Πῶς γὰρ ἄν τις ἀποκρίναιτο ; (to the particular question) :
338 Α ἀποκρινόμενος ‘ becoming respondent, τὸν ἀποκρινόμενον
' the respondent ' (so Prot. 338 D) : 343 A ȧvтì tоû ȧπокρíveσbαι
' keeping the part of respondent ' -no particular question is now
before him : οὐκ ἀποκρίνεσθαι χρήν μᾶλλον ἢ τοιαῦτα ἐρωτᾶν ;
346 A (pres. ) ; 348 в (aor. ) ; 349 в (aor. ) ; 351 c (pres. ) ; 352 B
(pres. ). At 340 E the MSS. vary between ȧπокрíveσ0αι and
άTокрívaolaι. Either would suit the sense ; a single answer is
referred to, but that answer is in the act of being given. In
the present dialogue note 74 C 21 ὁ ἐρωτῶν ; Ε 3 τῷ ἐρωτῶντι ;
75D 10, with note on text ; 83 D 50 тOÛто ȧπокρívov (as a general
practice). Other considerations may sometimes cause the aor.
to be used of a process, as 85 D 20 ovdevòs didáğavтos áλX'
ἐρωτήσαντος ἐπιστήσεται (where the aor. ptcp. expresses priority
of time) ; or the pres. of a single act : Phil. 19 A σkóme on
πότερος ἡμῶν ἀποκρινεῖται τὸ νῦν ἐρωτώμενον : but just below
 APPENDIX ON THE TEXT 237

διὰ τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι τὸ νῦν ἐρωτηθὲν ἀποκρίνασθαι . Again,

compare εἴ τις ἀνέροιτο 74 Β 6 with εἴ τις ερωτῴη 75 Α 8. At
Gorg. 465 D Ti OйK ȧπоKρivει may be ' why don't you go on
answering ?' ; but owing to the special use of the aor. in this
idiom (see on 92 D 30 ) the pres. is here inevitable. See further
Gorg. 462 B épúта ȧπокρívov, ' take which part you prefer,'
ΠΩΛ. ᾿Αλλὰ ποιήσω ταῦτα. καί μοι ἀπόκριναι κτέ . : ibid. 515 Β
ὀκνεῖς ἀποκρίνασθαι ; Prot. 330C- E ; 351D οὐ μόνον πρὸς τὴν
νῦν ἀπόκρισιν . . ἀποκρίνασθαι : Theaet. 146 Α ἐπιτάξει ὅ τι ἂν
βούληται ἀποκρίνεσθαι : Phil. 24 Ε τόν τε ἐρωτῶντα καὶ τὸν
EрwτúμEVOV. In Polit. 258 A ȧπокρivоμévov (Bekker) is right.
Note άπокρvóuevos for the defendant ' (L. & S. ) ; cp.
VπEраπокрiveσai Ar. Wasps 951 ; contrast ȧπóкρivαι ibid. 964,
Frogs 1008, of single answers. See CR. IX 147.
17. vyletá ye : all the MSS. give vyield тe, except x, which E
gives the reading in the text, adopted by Bekker, Sch. , and Fr.
(See 91 D 10 for a converse instance. ) ye was also preferred
by Buttm. , who however mentions another alternative, which
has found some favour, to omit the first κaí, reading vyíelá te
εἶναι ἀνδρός κτέ , with hyperbaton of re, for which see on
99 C 27. ye and Te are confused Polit. 258 a, etc.
9. ἄρχειν οἷόν τε εἶναι τοῦ δεσπότου ; the MSS. all give 73 D
ol Te, a corruption not easy to account for. Wolf read ow,
to which Buttm. rightly objects ( 1) that the dual implies a
pair conjointly, not two separate individuals ; ( 2) that the rest
of the sentence, especially Toû deσTórov, implies that the slave
only, not the child, is here considered . He proposed οἷόν τε
Οι οἵου τε. The latter attraction would be awkward with the
genitive deσTÓTOU following. Madvig adv. crit. I 413 olov TE,
followed by Sch. and Fr. The language naturally repeats
Meno's olov r' eivaι just above ; cp. 1. 13 below.
12. ἔτι δὲ καί : so Fr. The MSS. all give ἔτι γὰρ καί.
yap is certainly out of place ; the new point is entirely separate
from the former ; not a support added to it. Sch. thinks that
γάρ has arisen from a dittography of καί, and reads ἔτι καί.
On this Fr. rightly says ' asyndeton aegre fertur ' ; at Soph.
239 D we have, it is true, τά τε ἐν τοῖς ὕδασι καὶ κατόπτροις
εἴδωλα, ἔτι καὶ τὰ γεγραμμένα καὶ τὰ τετυπωμένα καὶ τἆλλα ,
but this occurs in the middle of a list, and is not parallel,
though there also Heindorf wished to insert dé after eTɩ. Fr.
gives many passages in Plato in which dé and yάp are confused
by particular MSS. Add Aesch. Choëph. 32 where Lachmann
gave dé for yáp of the MSS.; Hes. O. et D. 526 where Hermann
gave οὐδέ οἱ for MSS. οὐ γάρ οἱ, etc. See CR. XIV 433 a.
 238 ΜΕΝΟ

74 B 5. πρоßißáσaι is given by one Florentine MS. (n ) of no.

great authority ; but seems to be right. It was proposed by
Schneider, and is adopted by Sch. Fr. with the other MSS.
προσβιβάσαι. But προβιβάζειν, promovere, is the sense required ;
ep. Prot. 328 Β ἡμᾶς προβιβάσαι εἰς ἀρετήν. προσβιβάζειν is
admovere ; neither of its senses is suitable here. Compounds
of pós and pó are continually confused in MSS. See on
75 D 10, and Badham's note on Phil. 45 B. At Xen. Mem . I ii
17 most of the MSS . give kai тŵ Xóуw πроßißášovras , and this
I should keep, but most modern editors give, after one or two
MSS. , προσβιβάζοντας.
75 B 21. πεiρâμaí σo : so Sch.: the MSS . give Tεiрúμelα, Naber
Tεiρáσoμai. The ' modest ' use of the plur. 1st person is rare
in prose. At 71 C 12 ἀπαγγέλλωμεν refers to Meno and his
suite. Kühner § 371. 3 quotes examples from Xen. where a
plural pronoun is used by a person speaking of himself ; also
the phrase o doкoûμev Soph. 229 B. But in this case, as in
others (as Rep. 545 c), the plural is accounted for by the fact
that Socr. is regarded as taking his pupil into partnership.
This is excluded in the present case by oo (cp. Hadley § 637).
I follow Sch. , with some hesitation , as the corruption is hard
to account for. Dr. Thompson in his note on Phaedr. 253 c
(dieíλoμev) gives instances of the converse corruption of the
plural into the singular.
с 30. elev : the MSS. give this to Socrates. Heind. (on Crat.
410 c) first saw that it was part of a continuous speech of
Meno.
D 10. προομολογῇ : all the MSS. give προσομολογῇ (see
crit. note on 74 B 5). Gedike suggested pooμolon, but none
of the editors have followed him. I believe him to be right.
(1) This reading is supported by 79D 38 μńπw wμoloynμévwv,
where the present passage is referred to ; (2 ) πрoσoμoλoɣeîv
always (in Plato at any rate) means ' to acknowledge in
addition' a meaning not suitable here. I think Buttm.
(Index) is wrong in saying that poσoμoλoyεîv is ' idem quod
oμoλoyeîv,' and Stallb. wrong in giving the rendering una cum
altero fateri.
Gorg. 461 Β ὅτι Γ. ᾐσχύνθη σοι μὴ προσομολογῆσαι κτέ,
' because Gorgias was ashamed not to grant that the rhetorician
(besides his knowledge of rhetoric ) would know the just etc. '
Soph. 248 c δεόμεθα παρ᾽ αὐτῶν ἔτι πυθέσθαι σαφέστερον, εἰ
προσομολογοῦσιν κτέ. , ‘ if, after asserting that οὐσία has nothing
to do with ποιεῖν οι πάσχειν , theyfurther grant that οὐσία can
be known.'
ibid. 261 Ε ὅπερ ᾠήθην ὑπολαβόντα σε προσομολογεῖν, what
 APPENDIX ON THE TEXT 239

I thought you meant when (after asserting of forms and letters

that some would go together, others not) you made the further
similar statement about words.'
" we+ Hipparchus 227 D is clearest of all : avт πроσwμoloyńoaµev,
acknowledged in addition to it.'
L. & S. are wrong in quoting Theaet. 159 c under πрoσ-
ομολογεῖν : the reading there is προωμολογημένων.
At Soph. 241 A the MSS. vary between poodiwμoλoynμéva
and προδιωμολογημένα. I believe the latter is required by the
context, and that πрoσdioμoλoyeîobaι occurs neither there nor
anywhere else ; πрodioμoλoyεîolai occurs Tim. 78 A.
In other authors the point is almost equally clear. Xen.
Anab. VII iv 24 προσωμολόγουν is contrasted with ὡμολόγουν
above. Andoc. de Myst. § 15 кaì таû0' vµîν πроσоμολоyεîTαι
ἅπαντα : after the first μήνυσις of Andromachus comes the
second of Teucrus. Isocr. Trapez. (17) 39, ' to acknowledge a
further debt ' ; see L. & S. Dem. 27 § 42 = 826 end (in same sense ;
see L. & S. ). Dem. 48 § 44 = 1179. 17, ' granted in addition
to my previous collusions with him. ' Dem. 56 § 6 = 1284. 17 ,
' they first promise they will return from Egypt to Rhodes or
Athens ; afterwards they further promise ( pooоμoλoyoûσi) they
will return to Athens and nowhere else. See Aesch. 3. 53 un
ψευδῆ ἀλλὰ παλαιὰ καὶ λίαν προωμολογημένα, acknowledged
before proof is brought ' (Weidner) , ' self - evident. ' (Cobet
here from a minority of MSS. gives προσωμολογημένα.) προσ-
oμoλoyia, ‘ a further admission ' (L. & S. ) ; but the one instance
they quote (Dem. 39. 41 ) hardly bears out this rendering.
Buttmann, after acknowledging that 79 D 38 favours Gedike's
πрооμολon, says ' sed in hac forma necessarium foret prae-
teritum рooμoλoynon, quo non opus est in forma quoad tempus
indefinita, προσομολογεῖν. If épóuevos be read in the sequel
he is probably right. This is one of my reasons for not reading
ἐρόμενος.
ὁ ἐρωτῶν : all the MSS. give ὁ ἐρωτώμενος, which is defended
by Gedike and Ullrich, and retained by Hermann. It must
be wrong ; for it is the person who asks for the definition
who must acknowledge his familiarity with the terms em-
ployed. This Meno, now ỏ èpwrŵv, presently does, in answer to
Socrates' question ἐπίπεδον καλεῖς τι. Most editors, following
Cornarius, correct to ò èpóμevos, referring to Hipp. maj. 293 A,
where all the MSS. give epwтwuévou, which is universally
corrected to ἐρομένου. In that place the aorist ἐρομένου is no
doubt right. Here, after the presents ἀποκρίνεσθαι, προομολογῇ,
it comes in strangely. The interpretation of Ficinus, ' qui
rogat ' is adduced in support of the usual correction . But if
Ficinus read ò épóμevos, would he not rather have written ' qui
 240 MENO

rogavit ? For these reasons I correct ερωτώμενος to ἐρωτῶν.

ἐρωτῶν
The corruption arose either from a dittography ἐρόμενος or
because the scribes failed to see how the person who is, on the
whole, ó éρwrŵv, could be expected to make an admission ; and
so altered ἐρωτῶν to ἐρωτώμενος.
A 4. πрάуμата πрoσTάTтas : so the MSS. , which Fr. follows.
Many of the editors are dissatisfied . Ast struck out πράγ-
Mara ; Gedike would substitute Tapavrika for it ; Cobet alters
προστάττεις τo παρέχεις, whom Sch. follows. No doubt
πрáyμата парéxew is the usual phrase ( 90 E 30, etc. ). But
as Plato uses προστάττειν with such objects as ἔργον (Rep . 530 €,
Parm. 136 D), diairav (Rep. 406 c ), où paûλov Polit. 263 A, it
may surely be admitted with the object páуμara, ' trouble. '
See L. & S. Tроσтáσow II 1. Heindorf in Buttm. quotes for
πрάуμата πроσтάTTEL Xen. Oec. xvii 11 , to which Fr. adds
ibid. ix 16.
77 A 5. Kaтà öλov : this seems to be the only instance of this
combination in Plato. In Aristotle the phrase became
stereotyped, and was written as one word kalóλov. L. & S. (s. v.
καθόλου) say it was written καθ' ὅλου in ‘ writers before Aristotle.”
But where are the instances ? The letter of Philip in Dem.
de Cor. ( 18 ) 77 is not genuine. Ast read καθ᾽ ὅλον, which
occurs Tim. 40 A, 55 E. κατὰ ὅλον is the form which occurs
Rep. 392 E. Possibly this is the true reading here but κarà
ölov, even though this be an isolated instance in Plato, is
parallel to κarà пáνтшv at 73 D 5 etc. The hiatus need not
surprise us Fr. gives instances of hiatus between prep. and
relative, all from dialogues not later than the Republic. He
quotes Cicero Or. § 151, where Cicero observes Platonem hiatum
non fugisse. But this is much less true of the later dialogues.
See Blass Attische Beredsamkeit 11 426.
8. ủyên : so the MSS. ; Sch. ủy . The old rule was
'Those adjectives in -ns that have a vowel before the termination
in Attic contract -ea into -â, not - ' ( Matthiae Gr. § 113). For
this Hadley § 231 b substitutes an amended rule : -ea is con-
tracted into -â, not - , when an e precedes : évdeâ from evdeýs,
needy (Lach. 199 D). After し and v both vowels occur, vyiâ and
ὑγιῆ from ὑγιής, εὐφυᾶ and εὐφυῆ from εὐφυής. Sch. appears
not to be uniform in practice. At Gorg. 478 c, Phaedo 89 D,
Laws 684 c he gives y ; but at Charm. 155 E, 156 B, 164 B,
Laws 735 B, vyιâ. At Laws 857 D most MSS. and editions
give vy . As to other adjectives in ens, at Rep. 386 в most
MSS. appear to give aden, at † Alc. i 122 A ådeâ, at Phaedr.
257 D yopodea. Meisterhans Grammatik der Att. Inschriften
 APPENDIX ON THE TEXT 241

p. 118 gives interesting statistics from Inscr. as to vys : after

350 B.C. the neuter plur. and acc. sing. is vyn (eight places) ;
in an Inser. (CIA. 1 67 ) between 357 and 354 B.C. both forms
occur, Ἁγιᾶ and ὑγιῆ.
32. I have followed Buttm. in reading aur@ here, which C
Sch. gives in the parallel passage Symp. 204 D E.
43. οἱ ἀγνοοῦντες αὐτά : Cobet brackets these words, and E
is followed by Sch. , I think quite rightly.
4. TOû λEXOÉVTOS : the MSS. give TOÚTOU Xex¤évтos, which Fr. 78 B
retains. But this would mean when this has been said, '
whereas we want a substantive phrase. Schleiermacher read
TOUTOU TOU ; Ast, whom Seh . follows, rou.
29. Before ToÚT TO Tópw the MSS. give T , which Fr. D
retains. But T with a transitive verb could only be a sub-
stantive, not a qualifying adverb ( 80 A 12 referred to by Fr. is
not parallel). Sch. substitutes Tou, somewhat boldly. The
MSS. vary in their spelling of poσtileîs, and it seems possible
that the uncertainty of the termination originated T.
Stephanus, followed by Ast, omits it.
18. ΜΕΝ. Τί οὖν δή ; ΣΩ. Τοῦτο λέγω, κτέ. The MSS. 79 B
give to Meno the words τί οὖν δὴ τοῦτο λέγω ; Heusdius gave
the question to Socrates, who thus interrupts and answers
himself, as at 97 E 24 and Prot. 343 D. But Schleiermacher
pointed out that this usage only occurs to explain a statement
the application of which is not obvious, which is not the case
here. Buttm. (whom Fr. follows) approves the reading in
the text, quoting Crat. 398 A ; Gorg. 497D ; ' unde apparet nostro
loco " Eywye sive qualemcunque affirmandi formulam ante ri ouv
d ; mente supplendam esse.' Sch. gives the words to Socrates,
but punctuates τί οὖν δή ; τοῦτο λέγω, ὅτι κτέ.
19. öλov : this reading (Sch . ) has the support of the bulk of
the MSS. including B. Some MSS . however, and the old
editions, give öλŋy, which Buttm. and Fr. retain . The fact
that we have oλny at 77 A 8, where άperý is almost personified,
cannot decide the point here. Cp. Prot. 361 B el pavńσetai
ἐπιστήμη ὅλον.
25. B, with some other MSS. , gives deîraɩ ; T deî ; x gives C
δεῖ τι . Thus the balance of MS. authority is in favour of deîrai
(Sch. and Fr. ). Buttm. reads deî, denying the impersonal use
οι δεῖται. We have however at C 31 deîolai, at E 46 denσeoDai
(where Buttm. would read denσew ). Cp. Rep. 340 A κai Tí
δεῖται μάρτυρος ; + Alc. ii 149 c ; Soph. O.C. 570 ὥστε βραχέα
μοι δεῖσθαι φράσαι.
R
 242 MENO

27. ei μeтà μopíov ȧperîs : all the MSS. (save Paris F, in

which el is written as a correction) give or ǹ. Ficinus ( who
renders siquidem) must have read ei, and this seems necessary.
28. τοῦτο γάρ ἐστιν λέγειν . . ἀρετή ἐστιν : these clumsy
and intrusive words are, I think, rightly bracketed by Naber.
Fr. keeps the words, and so does Sch. , but reading TOûTO yàp
ἄρα λέγει κτέ. , no doubt including this place among those to
which he refers in the Notarum Index to this vol. (p. x)
' In his locis aliquot locos ita emendabam, ut emendatio
proficisceretur a compendio vocabuli äpa. '
D 43. 8 TI OTV, olov : both the best MSS. have missed the
right reading here : Β ἐστιν οὐ , Τ ἐστι σύ : ἐστιν , οἴου is
preserved by x, by Coislin. and some other MSS. of the
b¹ sub-class, by A (the copy of B), and by the old editions.
E 46. Senσeola : see on C 25 above.
80 B 13. vaрxâv was bracketed by Dobree and Cobet, whom Sch.
follows, I think rightly ; Fr. retains the word.
E 7. Karáуes : this is generally explained as a metaphor drawn
from spinning : Kaтάуw = ' spin ' Soph. 226 в ; Kάтayμα = =
'yarn ' Polit. 282 E. Fr. quotes as illustrating the metaphor
Hipp. min. 369 Β ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀεὶ σύ τινας τοιούτους (scil.
captiosos) TNÉKELs Móyous. The same metaphor appears in sub-
tilis, fine-spun, ' etc. But nowhere else is κaтáyw or any of
its derivatives found in a metaphorical sense. And Buttmann
6
says with much justice comparatio cum filo quod nendo
deducitur de tam brevi sermone locum non habet. ' He suggests
παράγεις, citing Dem. Androt. ( 22) 4 πλάττων καὶ παράγων πρὸς
ἕκαστα τούτων κακούργους λόγους. Ficinus renders in medium
adduxisti, ' a rendering to be got out of mapάyes, but not out
οι κατάγεις.
81 C 34. uxás : so Boeckh, whom Sch. follows, for yuxar of the
MSS. which Buttmann and Fr. retain. We might defend κείνων
ψυχάν by Aesch. Persae 28 δεινοὶ δὲ μάχην ψυχῆς εὐτλήμονι
dóŋ . But the following ¿к Tâv seems conclusive for the plural.
3. Kal Távта Xρημатa : I have with Fr. retained κaí, which
is bracketed by Sch.; for ( 1) it is not clear that the division Tà
ἐνθάδε and τὰ ἐν "Αιδου is exhaustive, and (2) it seems to be
possible that kaí might be taken comprehensively (denique) as
Stallb. suggests .
D 16. éруaσTIKοús : so Fr. following B, some other MSS. , the
old editions and Hermann. T and its descendants give épyаTI-
KOÚS, which Sch. gives. Hermann's defence of epyaσтikoús ( Praef.
p. xxi) seems strong : this is from ἐργάζομαι, as ζητητικός from
 APPENDIX ON THE TEXT 243

Snréw, and means ' productive ' ; this is the sense it bears at
Polit. 280 E, 281 A, and the sense wanted here : épуaтikós is
from ἐργάτης, like a labourer, opposed to ἀρχιτέκτων, which
sense it bears at Polit. 259 E. It must be noted, however, that
épyárŋs occurs as adj . ' industrious ' at Rep. 554 a peidwλòs kai
ἐργάτης (v.1. ἐργαστής), Euthyd. 281 c ἄργος μᾶλλον ἢ ἐργάτης.
Cp. Xen. Mem. I ii 57, III i 6.
19. ἀλλὰ πῶς ; this, undoubtedly the right reading, has E
been preserved only by x, by r (another MS. of the b¹ class,
in the Vatican) and by Stobaeus, who cites from 80 E 7 to 82
A 28. Stallb.'s argument against the reading aXX' àπλŵs,
which is given by all the other MSS. , is conclusive. Meno
would thus be represented as accepting Socrates' statement in
the main, and merely asking whether it was to be accepted
without qualification . But this is not Meno's attitude.
41. εἰ ἀναμιμνησκόμενος ἢ μανθάνων : the MSS. give ἢ 82 Β
ȧvaμiμvŋokóμevos KTE. , which Fr. retains. Sch. thinks the place
corrupt. I have followed Ast in reading ei for the former .
At 79 C 27 and 88 B 21 we have other instances in the MSS. of
confusion between ei and . The matter is complicated,
because in Homer indirect alternative questions are introduced
by .. , and the same usage perhaps extends to tragedy ;
though in some of the places ei is a v. 1. for the former .
The chief places are Aesch. Choëph. 756, 890 (see Verrall's note) :
Soph. O.C. 80 (see Jebb) : Eur. Med. 492. In Aesch. P.V. 780
¿λoû yàp † .. is really not an indirect question, but a pro-
posed choice. The only prose instance given is Xen . Anab.
I x 17 (which recent editors correct). See Hadley § 1017,
Kühner § 587. 19. For ei . . cp. Apol. 18 A etc.
40. τετράπουν : all the MSS. give τέταρτον. Cornarius' 83 C
emendation TETрáπоυv is generally accepted.
45. The reply of the slave has fallen out in the MSS.
1. oû : Buttm. approved Beck's emendation ol . Cp. on 84 A
94 D 2.
21. ἐκ γωνίας εἰς γωνίαν τινὰ τέμνουσα is the reading of the 85 Α
MSS. Tiva is obviously corrupt, and Teívovoa is given as a
correction in a Paris MS. (E) and by Cornarius. This Hermann
has adopted. It is strongly supported by 85 B 45 ȧπò TŶs ÈK
γωνίας εἰς γωνίαν τεινούσης. Sch. gives the reading proposed
by Wex (Soph. Antig. II 80) εἰς γωνίαν ἀντίαν, τέμνουσα.
This assumes that the first two letters of ȧvríav were lost by
' lipography ' after ywvíav ; and that the remaining av natur-
ally became τινα. Palaeographically the two corrections are
 244 ΜΕΝΟ

much on a par ; but in my mind 85 B 45 turns the balance in

favour of Hermann's.
C 10. τῷ οὐκ εἰδότι ἄρα περὶ ὧν ἂν μὴ εἰδῇ ἔνεισιν ἀληθεῖς
δόξαι περὶ τούτων ὧν οὐκ οἶδε ; pleonastic as the language is, I
see no sufficient reason for any excision . The reading is de-
fended by Heindorf, Ullrich and Buttmann, and retained by
Herm. and Fr. Schleiermacher, Bekker and Madv. cut out
περὶ τούτων ὧν μὴ οἶδε ; Sch . cuts out ὧν μὴ εἶδε only. The
words περὶ ὧν ἂν μὴ εἰδῇ depend closely on οὐκ εἰδότι. Plato
may wish to remind us that neither Knowledge nor Ignorance
is universal. Meno has shown ignorance of Virtue ; the slave
ignorance of Geometry. In one who lacks Knowledge then on
certain subjects, whatever they may be, there are True Opinions
about the subjects on which he lacks Knowledge. '
86 A 2. on so two MSS . , Paris E and Venice ; and so Stallb.
(approved by Shilleto on Dem. F.L. § 83 ), Sch. and Fr. Most
MSS. ᾔδει.
11. I follow Stallb. here in reading ap' où for âp' ovv, which
the MSS. give and Sch. and Fr. retain. No doubt there are
plenty of instances of ap' ovv in the sense nonne, but are there
any instances of ap' ouv resuming a previous ouv, or indeed of
ap' ovv in any other place than the beginning of a sentence ?
Phaedo 65 Ε ἆρ᾽ οὖν ἐκεῖνος resumed 66 A by ἆρ᾽ οὐχ οὗτος favours
ἆρ᾽ οὐ here.
87 A 25-30 on textual questions arising in this passage see
expository notes.
B 7. ἆρα διδακτὸν ἢ οὔ : so the MSS. ; ἆρα διδακτόν που Sch.
E 37. πάντα γὰρ τἀγαθά : B has πάντα (ending a line ) τὰ γὰρ
ȧyalá. The MS. A, derived from it, reads rà yàp ảyalá omit-
ting πάντα. All the other MSS. appear to have Távта yàρ
τἀγαθά, which Fr. keeps. Sch. πάντα γὰρ ἀγαθά.
88 B 21. ei ouxí : the MSS. are divided between oʊxí ( B) and ǹ
ouxi (T and others). is impossible ; on Heind. (in Buttm.)
observes in Attico sermone nusquam in interrogatione ante
Ouk invenias .' For confusion of ei see on 82 B 41 .
22. Here Fr. gives TOTÈ μèv . TOTè dé With BT. Sch. gives
τοτέ μὲν . τοτὲ δέ. This is only supported by x (see on 81 E
19). But it is the form used elsewhere ; 88 D 2, 95 B 14, C 31 ,
D 34, 96 B 25, 97 C 37. In Theaet. 192 D каi äжтоμal TоT'
aŮTŵv, TOTÈ d ' ou the phraseology is different ; ( Sch. there ex-
punges Tот').
C 28. As the text stands in the MSS. and editions, the parti-
 APPENDIX ON THE TEXT 245

ciples μανθανόμενα and καταρτυόμενα have no substantives to

agree with. For it is absurd to speak of evμalia as itself
μανθανόμενον, or of σωφροσύνη as καταρτυόμενον. I insert
πάντα. Another remedy would be to cut out καὶ μανθανόμενα
καὶ καταρτυόμενα. For πάντα omitted see on 87 Ε 37.
25, B 28, C 2 : I have followed Sch. and Fr. , who follow 89 A
the MSS. , in reading ȧyaooi once only in the first and second
of these places, twice in the third . The consensus of the MSS .
is unbroken, except that in the first passage x reads oủk äv eîev
φύσει οἱ ἀγαθοὶ ἀγαθοί. Cp. 98 D 27.
33. Siép0eɩpev BT, Buttmann, Herm. (see Praef. vol. I p. vii), B
Fr. διαφθείρειεν Madv. adv. crit. 1 414 : Rectum esset διέφθειρεν,
si hoc significaretur, tunc neminem eos corrupturum fuisse,
quod nunc fiat. ' Sch. follows Madv. But I think Plato wishes
to imply that now as a matter of fact they are corrupted . See
J. & A. M. Adam on Prot. 335 c, who think that here we should
perhaps read ἀφίκοντο and ἐγίγνοντο.
34. Both here and at line 36 all the MSS. but one corrupt E
the name ῎Ανυτος. In the former place they give αὐτὸς ὅδε
παρεκαθέζετο, in the latter T and most MSS. give εἰκότως δ᾽ αὖ
μεταδοῖμεν ἄν · αὐτὸς γάρ κτέ. Β gives εἰκότως δ᾽ ἂν μεταδοῖμεν
ἄν · αὐτὸς γάρ κτέ. (Here the priority of the reading of B
is obvious ; aû was a correction after " AvvTos had become av
autós. a is not in place here. Stallbaum extracted from
it the reading εἰκότως δ᾽ αὐτῷ μεταδοῖμεν ἄν . ) The name
"AVUTOS is preserved by x alone, which keeps it in both places.
It was restored to the text by Struve. Buttmann makes a
strange mistake over the passage by supposing that the subj.
μεταδῶμεν is final. See Goodwin MT. § 572. For a similar
confusion between ῎Ανυτοs and αὐτός , ep. ᾿Αθ. πολ. ch . 76 . See
Cobet Nov. Lect. p. 670.
30. Sch. follows Naber in bracketing ηToûvra pavoávelv 90 E
Tаρà TоÚTOV, and I have followed Sch. The sentence runs
better without the words, and the change of number from
βουλομένους το ζητοῦντα is very harsh.
9. I follow Sch. , who follows Cobet, in assuming a lacuna 91 B
after τὴν ἀρετήν. Cobet would supply μαθησόμενον οι βουλόμενοι
αὐτὸν σοφὸν γενέσθαι : κτησόμενον, οι ἀγαθὸν γενησόμενον, would
be equally possible. Biester defended the MS. reading by
making τὴν ἀρετήν not dependent on σκόπει, but an absolute
accusative. But such an accusative of reference, connected with
no word in the sentence, is impossible. At 92 D 29 τηv åρetǹv
γένοιτ᾽ ἂν ἄξιος λόγου such a word is supplied . Buttmann,
also separating τὴν ἀρετήν from σκόπει, says the notion διδαχ-
 246 MENO

θησόμενον may be extracted from πέμπειν παρά τινας. Fr.

rightly protests against the separation, and holds that σKÓTEL
is to be taken twice, ' regard this Virtue and consider. ' But
we are not really asked to ' consider this virtue, ' and such a
' prolepsis ' would only be possible if the word åpeτýv itself were
understood later in the sentence, as in such a sentence as тaúтNV
τὴν ἀρετὴν σκόπει παρὰ τίνας ἂν πεμπόμενος ἀγαθὸς γίγνοιτο.
17. I have followed Sch. in reading ous, which is given by
x and two other MSS . , rather than Fr. who gives olous with
BT and the majority. It is not a similarity between the men
under discussion and the sophists, but an identity, that is
asserted ; and though ös is used sometimes when you might
expect ofos (see on 92 C 18), the converse does not hold.
C 20. μηδὲ οἰκείων μηδὲ φίλων : all the MSS. appear to have
μÝTE Oik. μÝTE P. That would, as Herm. says (vol. 111 Praef. p.
xxi) make οἰκεῖοι and φίλοι an exhaustive division of συγγενεῖς.
He therefore reads undè undé, which Sch. and Fr. adopt.
Cp. 96 C 8. μηδὲ . μηδέ (after μηδένα) are further sugges-
tions of other classes ( ' nor yet '), and then the last class (píλo )
is subjected to an exhaustive division by μηte μήτε,
'whether they be . or. Cp. Gorg. 508D ĐỦ TÒ TÚT TẠO Đại
οὐδέ γε τὸ τέμνεσθαι οὔτε τὸ σῶμα τὸ ἐμὸν οὔτε τὸ βαλλάντιον .
(See on 92 B 10. ) As to the sequel, B, which is supported
by x, reads μήτε φίλον μήτε ἀστὸν μήτε ξένον. The other
MSS. give μήτε φίλων μήτε ἀστῶν μήτε ξένων. Correcting the
first word to unde (as above) we get the best reading by
taking pilov from one class of MSS. and dσTòv ξένον
from the other. The change of case (from φίλων to ἀστόν)
shows the sub- division.
D 10. Peidíav Te : here x alone preserves the true reading Te :
all other MSS. ye. Cp. on 72 E 17.
92 C 15. The emendation of Heindorf kaì < deì > eïnv ye, adopted
by Sch. , though extremely plausible, appears to me unnecessary.
Fr. defends the text successfully.
17. < v> aur : the preposition is supplied in x and by
a later hand in I (Coislin . ) and another Paris MS . (E).
18. ameipos eins : see expository note.
19. of elow : for of x and I have otot. This is adopted by
Wolf (in Buttm. ), Bekk. , Madvig, Cobet and Herm. Buttm.
defends of, and Sch. and Fr. both keep it. See expository note.
23. Lýtovμev : Cobet and Hirschig read ( Toûμev, which Sch.
adopts. The alteration seems hardly necessary.
 APPENDIX ON THE TEXT 247

26. σTOV : the MSS. give oтwoav, which Fr. keeps . Sch . D
ἔστων. "The endings -Twoav and -o0woav, if Attic at all,
belong only to the later Attic.' Hadley § 380. See J. Adam
on Euthyphr. 9 D. Cobet nov. lect. p. 327. See Soph. 231 A
MSS. ἔστωσαν Sch. ἔστων, and 244 B MSS. ἀποκρινέσθωσαν Sch.
ἀποκρινέσθων : ep. Rep. 352 B.
21. Kal Tous pavλoráтous : I have kept the MSS. reading, to 94 B
which Buttm. and Fr. adhere, though it is not free from difficulty.
To suppose that the three distinguished statesmen just men-
tioned could be regarded by Anytus, or any one else, as
φαυλότατοι would be absurd. But really the words ὀλίγους καὶ
τοὺς φαυλοτάτους, negatived by μή, form a kind of litotes.
' Neque ego aliter rem expedire possum, nisi ut neglegentius
neque ullo ad superiora exempla respectu sed velut extrinsecus
hunc transitum fecerit scriptor ad Thucydidem quem ut
hominem divitem et optimatium praesulem, aliquo modo
tanquam cumulum ceteris videtur potius adjicere ' Buttm .
See presently D 6 foll. Socrates overdoes the distinction between
Thucydides and the others. Sch. (following Ast) reads kal
< οὐ > τοὺς φαυλοτάτους, which appears to me to raise fresh
difficulties. Stallb. (1827) and Madvig adv. crit. I 414 Kai < TOL
οὐ > τοὺς φαυλοτάτους, an objection to which is that it leaves
too much stress on ỏliyous. If the only hesitation were due to
the fewness of the examples, would one more entirely remove it ?
2, 3. οὗ . • où so all the MSS. , which Fr. follows. Sch. D
οι • of, which Buttm. favoured (cp. on 84 A 1 ). In the
corresponding passage of the de virtute 378 B, the MSS. give
οἱ . . οἶ. This is all the external support the reading of has
here. οὗ . • oû is quite defensible ; not, as Ullrich would take
it, as a gen. of price ( ! ) , but with the local sense transferred to
circumstances : in a case where.' Cp. Symp. 194 A ei dè
γένοιο οὗ νῦν ἐγώ εἰμί, Theaet. 172 Β ἀλλ' ἐκεῖ οὗ λέγω, Soph.
Phil. 1049, etc. So Tov still more frequently. I doubt very
much whether, admitting you can say danavav eis T , you can
say οἳ δαπανώ. I can find no instance of of where the local
sense is so much weakened ; for it seems clear that this is not
the case in of μ' åтiµías äɣeis (Soph. El. 404) and the like.
5. TOUTO : the MSS. give raûra ; the de virtute,6 TOûTO, this
time probably preserving the right reading ; tum ob proxime
succedens didakтóv, tum ob sensum, cum ceteris artibus omnibus
studium virtutis commodius opponatur ita : ταῦτα μὲν—τοῦτο
de-.' Buttm.
19. paov : all the MSS. give padtov, which is retained by E
Herm. and the Zürich editors. Buttm. showed that paov was
 248 ΜΕΝΟ

necessary here. Riddell § 170 includes this among instances of

' omission of μâλλov. ' These instances have broken down . It
was suspicious that so many instances of ' omission of µâ\\ov '
should have taken place with a word so easily confused with its
comparative as PAIAION with PAION. Heindorf on Phaedo
70 D pointed to Rep. 370 A as a place where in the MSS. padtov
had obviously displaced the true reading paov ; at Phaedo 70D
one MS. has padiov for paov ; at Rep. 348 E, on the other hand,
the Paris MS. gives paov for pádiov, and so the MSS. of Diog.
L. 1 26. Isocr. v 115, vIII 50, Lys. XII 89, adduced by Riddell,
have now all been corrected . Against another possibility, of
reading pádov éσTɩ , and taking eû in the sense 6 or well , ' Buttm.
argues (1 ) that in that case the author would have written kai
e ; (2) that the words eû (or κal e ) are then quite pointless.
Ast read οὐ ῥᾴδιόν ἐστιν, omitting ή εὖ, which two words are
omitted, according to Buttm. , in Vatican r, probably by a
conjecture.
95 D 2 foll. The four lines ( 33-36 Bergk) appear also in an extract
from Musonius Rufus (Stob. LVI 18) ; lines 35 , 36 are quoted by
Xen. Mem. I ii 20, Symp. 11 5, Clemens Strom. v p. 572 (besides
other late authors : see Bergk PLG.4 11 p. 121 ). They are twice
alluded to by Aristotle : NE. 1x ix 7 γίνοιτο δ᾽ ἂν καὶ ἄσκησίς
τις τῆς ἀρετῆς ἐκ τοῦ συζῆν τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς, καθάπερ καὶ Θεογνίς
φησιν : Ix xii 3 ἀπομάττονται γὰρ παρ᾽ ἀλλήλων οἷς ἀρέσκονται ,
ὅθεν
ἐσθλῶν μὲν γὰρ ἄπ᾽ ἐσθλά.
A comparison of the lines as quoted by Plato, with the other
quotations, and with the MSS. of Theognis, reveals some
diversities of reading.
In v 33 Bergk gives кal μerà тоîow Tîve from the MSS.
He observes, offensioni fuit μerà iteratum, itaque variandi
gratia apud Platonem priore loco Tapà substitutum. '
In v 35 Bergk gives (for Sidáţeaι) μalnoeai, from the MSS .
of Theognis, Clemens, etc. Xenophon and other citators agree
with Plato in didáğeal. Bergk thinks from NE. Ix xii 3 (cited
above) that Aristotle read ἔσθλ᾽ ἀπομάξεαι, which appears to me
doubtful.
In v 36 the MSS . of Plato give ovμuys, and so do most of
the late citators and some of the MSS. of Theognis. The best
MS. of Theognis, and the MSS. of Xenophon, give ovμμloys,
which the modern editors of Plato restore. It is probable
that the σvoyń, or collection of excerpts, from Theognis,
which has come down to us, was not made at the time when
the Meno was written ; for Isocrates, in his address to Nicocles,
written at a date not far distant from that of the Meno (Isocr.
 APPENDIX ON THE TEXT 249

II 43), after mentioning Hesiod , Theognis, and Phocylides,

speaks of the making such selections from them as a task for
the future : εἴ τις ἐκλέξειε τῶν προεχόντων ποιητῶν τὰς καλουμένας
γνώμας κτέ. (Bergk 1 234).
10. The passage of Theognis stands thus in Bergk F.L.G.4 : E
φῦσαι καὶ θρέψαι ῥᾷον βροτόν, ἢ φρένας ἐσθλὰς
430 ἐνθέμεν · οὐδείς πω τοῦτό γ᾽ ἐπεφράσατο,
ᾧ τις σώφρον᾽ ἔθηκε τὸν ἄφρονα , κἀκ κακοῦ ἐσθλόν ·
εἰ δ᾽ ᾿Ασκληπιάδαις τοῦτό γ᾽ ἔδωκε θεός,
ἰᾶσθαι κακότητα καὶ ἀτηρὰς φρένας ἀνδρῶν,
πολλοὺς ἂν μισθοὺς καὶ μεγάλους ἔφερον ·
435 εἰ δ᾽ ἦν ποιητόν τε καὶ ἔνθετον ἀνδρὶ νόημα,
οὔ ποτ᾽ ἂν ἐξ ἀγαθοῦ πατρὸς ἔγεντο κακός,
πειθόμενος μύθοισι σαόφροσι · ἀλλὰ διδάσκων
οὔ ποτε ποιήσεις τὸν κακὸν ἄνδρ' ἀγαθόν.
Line 432 is quoted by Clearchus ap . Athenaeum, 256 c, etc.
See Bergk p. 156. Line 434 is quoted by Aristotle NE. x
ix 3 εἰ μὲν οὖν ἦσαν οἱ λόγοι αὐταρκεῖς πρὸς τὸ ποιῆσαι ἐπιεικεῖς,
πολλοὺς ἂν μισθοὺς καὶ μεγάλους δικαίως ἔφερον κατὰ τὸν Θέογνιν,
καὶ ἔδει ἂν τούτους πορίσασθαι.
Leutsch Philologus xxx pp. 211 foll. elaborately discusses
the order and continuity of the lines, comparing Plato's quota-
tion with the reading found in the MSS. of Theognis . But
such discussions are subject to the consideration that Plato is
obviously, and purposely, quoting loosely. (The MSS. of Plato
give ἐγένετο for ἔγεντo in v. 436. It is quite possible that
Plato wrote ἐγένετο, ignoring the metre ; but more probable
that the copyists finding eyevro altered it to the familiar form.
Cp. συμμιγῇς above. )
8. τοῦτο μηδὲ διδακτὸν εἶναι : the great preponderance of 96 C
MSS. give μήτε διδακτόν , the remainder giving μὴ διδακτόν.
μηδέ here is due to Bekker, and is adopted by recent editors.
Buttm. thought that at 89 E 27 also we should read μηδὲ
διδακτόν. See on 91 C 20 for confusion of μήτε and μηδέ.
30. ᾗ ἴσως καὶ διαφεύγει : this reading is due to Madvig, E
and is adopted by Sch. and Fr. The MSS. give ἢ ἴσως καὶ
διαφεύγειν. This is retained by Buttm. and Stallb. , in the
sense For otherwise the knowledge must escape us ' ; the in-
finitive being regarded as dependent on the notion de in
προσεκτέον and ζητητέον above. Of the four places adduced by
Stallb. in illustration, the most apposite is Crito 51 c ποιητέον
ἃ ἂν κελεύῃ ἡ πόλις καὶ ἡ πατρίς, ἢ πείθειν αὐτὴν κτέ. But in
this (as well as in the other places cited) the notion to be ex-
tracted from the verbal is rather duty than (as here) necessity ;
 250 MENO

also, the infinitive stands much nearer to the verbal than

it does here. (At Rep. 424 в the infinitive puλáттew is not
affected by ἀνθεκτέον above. At Phaedr. 245 D we have to
understand δεῖ with στῆναι, but from a preceding δυνατόν. )
97 A 12. Sch. brackets opeŵs, which occurs in the MSS. and is
kept by Fr. The omission is right. The fact that the word
occurs twice in the speech of Socrates makes it absurd to put
the question thus. Which opes does he mean ? It cannot
reasonably be the second, so Buttm. says the question refers to
the former op0ŵs. To pass over the awkwardness of referring
to a former use of a word in spite of the intervention of a
latter, the great objection remains that it is not the word opeŵs
that requires explanation , but rather the words éàv µǹ opóviμos
. Socrates does not in the sequel explain what opeŵs means.
It keeps recurring as a known and accepted term, and it was
its frequency that caused it to come in here, once too often.
13. < el > Tis : el is unaccountably omitted in nearly all
MSS.
15. Some MSS. of the b¹ class give the fuller form äλλo Tɩ ½.
C 2. All the MSS. give ouk deì тvyxáva , except x, which gives
οὐκ ἀεὶ ἂν τυγχάνοι. The reading οὐκ ἂν ἀεὶ τυγχάνοι was ad-
vocated by Struve and Madvig, and is adopted by Sch. Fr.
keeps the MS. reading. The present affords a good example of
cases on which a sort of πόλεμος ἀκήρυκτος exists between two
different classes of critics. With regard to a rare and doubtful
construction, the one class urge that whereas many of the
apparent instances can be easily and probably corrected, a
presumption is raised against the remainder. The other class
reply that as long as a single instance remains for which no
plausible correction can be brought forward , this may defend
others. The question is further complicated by the fact
that in the early language many constructions occurred that
were subsequently discarded. But how far did the process of
purgation go ? Naturally, poets still claimed greater license
than prose-writers. But was the line limiting prose-usage a
hard and fast one ? The best answer is that more thorough
examination of the MSS. has undoubtedly got rid of many
solecisms. Further help is obtained from analysis of the ex-
ceptions remaining. This, in the case of questions with the
optative without av, has been given by Professor Jebb, note on
Soph. Ant. 605 , and Exc. on O.C. 170. He makes it clear that
this construction , even in verse, is limited to places which are
exclamations, rather than interrogations, adding that there is
' no real instance in prose. ' We should then have no hesitation
 APPENDIX ON THE TEXT 251

in inserting av here. The following is a list of apparent

instances of questions in Plato with the optative without av—
Lach. 190 Β εἰ γάρ που μηδ' ἀρετὴν εἰδεῖμεν τὸ παράπαν ὅ τί
ποτε τυγχάνει ὄν, τίνα τρόπον σύμβουλοι γενοίμεθα ; ( τίν᾽ ἄν
Bekk. Sch. ; Cron leaves unaltered ).
Euthyd. 281 c πότερον οὖν μᾶλλον ἐλάττω τις πράττοι κτέ. ;
(so B, but T has πότερον οὖν ἂν κτέ. ) .
ibid. 286 Β πῶς ἀντιλέγοι ; Sch. , after one Paris MS. , πῶς
< ἂν > ἀντιλέγοι ;
ibid. 291 Ε οὐ τὴν ὑγίειαν φαίης ; Sch. , after Ast, οὐ τὴν
ὑγίειαν < ἂν > φαίης ; Badham omits φαίης.
Gorg. 4923 τί τῇ ἀληθείᾳ αἴσχιον καὶ κάκιον εἴη ; Sch.,
following Coraës, gives κάκιον ἂν εἴη.
Rep. 352 Ε ἔσθ᾽ ὅτῳ ἂν ἄλλῳ ἴδοις ἢ ὀφθαλμοῖς ; Οὐ δῆτα. Τί
δέ ; ἀκούσαις ἄλλῳ ἢ ὠσίν ; Οὐδαμῶς . Here we may regard the
av as carried on from the first question into the second. But
Ast proposed ἀκούσαις ἄν.
ibid. 382 D πότερον διὰ τὸ μὴ εἰδέναι τὰ παλαιὰ ἀφομοιῶν ἂν
ψεύδοιτο ; Γελοῖον μεντἂν εἴη, ἔφη. Ποιητὴς μὲν ἄρα ψευδὴς ἐν
θεῷ οὐκ ἔνι. Οὐ μοι δοκεῖ. ᾿Αλλὰ δεδιὼς τοὺς ἐχθροὺς ψεύδοιτο ;
Here again it is possible that av may be mentally supplied from
the neighbouring questions.
ibid . 437 Β ἆρ᾽ οὖν . . πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν ἐναντίων ἀλλή-
λοις θείης ; ( would you regard all such things as opposite to one
another ? '). The Zurich editors read έναντίων ἂν ἀλλήλοις.
ibid . 516 Ε ἆρ᾽ οὐ σκότους ἀνάπλεως σχοίη τοὺς ὀφθαλμούς ;
Herm. gives ἂν πλέως σχοίη.
[Other exx. of dr apparently omitted with opt. in Plato are
Charm . 156 Β ἀλλ᾽ ἀναγκαῖον < ἂν > εἴη (Sch. after Madv. ) :
ibid. 169 Α τοῖς μὲν ἀπιστίαν < ἂν > παρέχοι (Sch. after
Heindorf) : Lysis 214 D ὃ δὲ αὐτὸ αὑτῷ ἀνόμοιον εἴη καὶ διάφορον ,
σχολῃ γ' < ἂν > τῷ ἄλλῳ ὁμοῖον ἢ φίλον γένοιτο (Sch . after
Bekker) : Euthyd. 299 Α δικαιότερον < ἂν > τὸν ὑμέτερον πατέρα
τύπτοιμι (Sch. after Ast) : Rep. 360 Β οὐδεὶς ἂν γένοιτο, ὡς
δόξειεν (the whole passage is in indirect speech) : ibid. 362 D
ἀδελφὸς ἀνδρὶ παρείη (quotation from an old poet) : Phaedo 72 c
πάντα λῆρον τὸν Ἐνδυμίωνα ἀποδείξειεν (Sch. πάντ' ἄν, which
A. Η. adopts) : ibid. 107 Α οὐκ οἶδα εἰς ὅντιν < ἂν > τις ἄλλον
καῖρον ἀναβάλλοιτο (Sch. after Bekker ; Α.-H. defends the vul-
gate) . ] See CR. vi 435, ' J. D. ' on the ' Remote Deliberative. '
9. δι' ὅ τι θαυμάζεις : all the MSS. give θαυμάζοις, which D
shows with what caution their evidence on such points must be
received.
 252 MENO
93 A 31. The MSS. nearly all give Mévwv èтaîρe. The omission
of & with the vocative in prose in an address free from emotion
is rare ; and the ease with which & would fall out probably
justifies its insertion in the few cases in Plato where it is
wanting. Sch. restores it at Prot. 358 A E, 359 A ; Gorg.
489 A ; in all of which cases a contiguous & may have expelled
it ; also at Hipp. maj. 289 в, Soph. 220 D. But at Laches 198 A
he leaves σὺ δέ, Νικία , λέγε, and at + Theages 127 Β τί τοῦτο
λέγεις, θέαγες ; 129 c εἰμι δή, Σώκρατες. The former of the
instances in the Theages is a violation of Attic usage ; the
second instance falls under rule, as excitement is certainly
intended. Cp. τί λέγεις, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες ; ibid. 129 Β. I
follow Naber in supposing that here Mévwv is a gloss upon
éraîpe which has extruded &. The Florentine x gives & éraîpe
Μένων. At Crito 52 A, B reads ταύταις δή φαμεν καί σε, Σώκρατες,
ταῖς αἰτίαις ἐνέχεσθαι, probably rightly, as great impressiveness
is intended ; but inferior MSS. give & Zúкрates.
B 3. Practically all the MSS. omit où. It appears as a cor-
rection in Paris E and in the edition of Stephanus. For omission
of ou see Badham's Philebus ed. 2 p. 132, and cr. n. on 94 B 21 .
D 23. OUT' TĺKTηra : that there is something wrong about
these words is obvious. Buttm. pointed out that the third oυTE
cannot stand ; for you do not want a third term to add to
ἐπιστήμη and δόξα ἀληθής, but something as an antithesis to
φύσει. Hence Bekker read οὐδ᾽ ἐπίκτητα. The objection to
this is that it goes too far. A human attribute must be
either φύσει or ἐπίκτητον , either part of the original stock or
subsequently acquired. (See expository note on 89 A 24. ) Much
therefore is to be said for the reading ἀλλ᾽ ἐπίκτητα given by
Gedike, and supported by a correction in Paris E. TÍKTηTOS
is opposed to φύσει in Rep. 618 D τῶν φύσει περὶ ψυχὴν ὄντων
καὶ τῶν ἐπικτήτων, and to ἔμφυτος in Phaedr. 237 Ε.
The words our' èπíктηта were expunged by Cornarius, with
the approval of Buttm. , Madv. , and Ast ; and are bracketed by
Sch. and Fr.
On the other hand it may be urged that the words are too
foolish to have been a gloss. Fr. assumes that oυr' èπíкTηтα has
arisen from ἀλλ᾽ ἐπίκτητα, but that this was a gloss. But if
we had found ἀλλ᾽ ἐπίκτητα in our texts, should we have
thought of disturbing it ? The corruption of aXX' into our' is
hard to explain, but perhaps we may assume that in the
archetype the copyist carelessly ran on from two oore's to a
third.
99 A 2. The MSS. give ἐπιστήμῃ δὴ ἐπιγίγνεται. This would
mean ' is an outcome or accident of Knowledge. ' So Phil.
 APPENDIX ON THE TEXT 253

37 Β ὅτι δόξῃ ἐπιγίγνεσθον ψεῦδος καὶ ἀληθές, Rep. 574 Α αἱ ἐν

αὐτῷ ἡδοναὶ ἐπιγιγνόμεναι, Ηipp. maj. 303 Α . But Virtue has
never been described as an éπyévvηua of Knowledge. Virtue is
Knowledge—or something like it. Nor would oud' have any
point with eπylyveraι , whereas with the correction it is easy :
as it is not διδακτόν so neither is it ἐπιστήμη. ” The reading in
the text, adopted by Sch. , Fr. , and most modern editors, is due
to Schleiermacher ; but it is also supported by the version of
Ficinus, ' Igitur cum virtus doctrina percipi nequeat, nequaquam
scientia est. ' [Herm. defends éπiyiуverαi. ]
15. εἰ μὴ ἐπιστήμη, εὐδοξία . . . γίγνεται, ᾗ κτέ. : so Fr. B
following the MSS. Sch . and most editors after Schleiermacher
read εἰ μὴ ἐπιστήμῃ, εὐδοξίᾳ γίγνεται · ᾗ κτέ. I fail to
see any sufficient objection to the MS. reading, which I have
accordingly kept.
24. κατορθοῦσιν ὧν πρ. : Buttm. proposed κατορθοῦσι δι᾽ ὧν C
πp. which is supported by the version of Ficinus, " multa tamen
et magna et agendo et dicendo disponunt. "
27. oplas av kaλoîμev : so the MSS . except x, which has
ὀρθῶς ἄρα καλοῖμεν, and the Paris F, which has ὀρθῶς οὖν ἂν κ.
as a correction. Sch. defends the asyndeton by Theaet. 183 A
καλὸν ἂν ἡμῖν συμβαίνοι. Ficinus has quamobrem merito divinos
vocabimus, ' as if he had our or apa in his text. Fr. (after
Stallb. ) and Herm. read ὀρθῶς ἀρ᾽ ἄν : Bekk. ὀρθῶς οὖν ἄν.
32. EK TOû BEOû : I have followed the MS. reading, as does D
Fr. Sch . reads EK TOυ OeOû. If that had been Plato's meaning
he would rather have written eк TOU Oeŵv (which Cobet gives).
38. θεῖος ἀνήρ : so the MSS. Sch. gives σεῖος ἀνήρ. This
no doubt represents the Laconian dialect ; but it is not at all
clear that Plato wished to reproduce this.
 EXCURSUS I

Οὐσία AS A PHILOSOPHICAL TERM IN PLATO (on 72 B 22)

We have no certain examples of ovoía in any sense except

' wealth, ' ' patrimony ' in any writer before Plato . [ The frag-
ments of the Pythagorean Philolaus, in which it appears as a
philosophical term in the form ἐσσία (ep. Crat. 401 c), are
almost certainly spurious. See Prof. Bywater in JP. I pp. 21
foll., Archer - Hind on Phaedo 61 D. For a different view see
Zeller pre- Socr. I 314 and note : for a summary of the con-
troversy R. & P. § 50 c, Ueberweg- Heinze p. 58. ]
Plato in his earlier dialogues uses the term with reserve,
and leads up to it by periphrases. In the present passage,
for instance, we have been prepared for it by :
71 Α 28 αὐτὸ ὅ τι ποτ᾽ ἐστὶ τὸ παράπαν ἀρετή
71 Β 3 οὐκ εἰδὼς περὶ ἀρετῆς τὸ παράπαν
72 Α 14 εἰπεῖν ἀρετῆς πέρι ὅ τι ἔστιν
The word occurs nowhere else in this dialogue.
In Laches 190 we have similar periphrases, but the term
οὐσία is never reached .
Euthyphro 11 A (see on 71B 4 ) κινδυνεύεις ἐρωτώμενος τὸ ὅσιον,
ὅ τί ποτ᾽ ἔστι, τὴν μὲν οὐσίαν μοι αὐτοῦ οὐ βούλεσθαι δηλῶσαι,
πάθος δέ τι περὶ αὐτοῦ λέγειν. Here the words ὅ τί ποτ᾽ ἔστι
lead up to οὐσίαν, also heralded at 6 D τὸ ὅσιον ὅ τί ποτ᾽ εἴη,
and further by the words at 5D ἢ οὐ ταὐτόν ἐστιν ἐν πάσῃ
πράξει τὸ ὅσιον αὐτὸ αὑτῷ, καὶ τὸ ἀνόσιον αὖ . . ἔχον μίαν τινὰ
ἰδέαν κατὰ τὴν ἀνοσιότητα πᾶν, ὅ τί περ ἂν μέλλῃ ἀνόσιον εἶναι ;
In the Hippias major the word ovcía occurs four times :-
(1 ) (2) 301 Β Ηἱρρίας : διὰ ταῦτα οὕτω μεγάλα ὑμᾶς λανθάνει
καὶ διανεκὴ σώματα τῆς οὐσίας πεφυκότα. καὶ νῦν τοσοῦτόν σε"
λέληθεν, ὥστε οἴει εἶναί τι ἢ πάθος ἢ οὐσίαν , ἢ περὶ μὲν ἀμφότερ
ἄττα ἔστιν ἅμα , περὶ δὲ ἑκάτερον οὔ.
(3) 301 - Socrates : οὐ γὰρ οἷόν τε διανεκεῖ λόγῳ τῆς οὐσίας
κατὰ Ἱππίαν ἄλλως ἔχειν.
256 MENO

(4) 302 c Socrates : τῇ οὐσίᾳ τῇ 6 ἐπ᾽ ἀμφότερα ἑπομένῃ.

In (2) and (4) the meaning is essential nature ' (as here in
the Meno). The use in (2) has been led up to by Socrates, who
at 300 E has expressed the same antithesis : δ μήτ᾽ ἐγὼ πέπονθα
εἶναι μήτ' εἰμί.
In ( 1 ) and (3) the use is curious. Grote (1 384) says ' The
Rhetor accuses the Dialectician of departing from the conditions
of reality of breaking up the integrity of those concretes
which occur in Nature as continuous and indivisible wholes '
(see his note also). I doubt whether the distinction attributed
to Hippias is quite so scientific as this. He paraphrases his
criticism at 304 Α κνίσματά τοί ἐστι καὶ περιτμήματα τῶν λόγων,
ὅπερ ἄρτι ἔλεγον, κατὰ βραχὺ διῃρημένα. It is rather a dis-
tinction of treatment, the hair-splitting ' or ' logic-chopping '
of the dialectician opposed to the broad view taken by the
practical man and expressed in continuous discourse-a dis-
tinction fully illustrated by Grote at the place referred to.
οὐσία here then, I think , means truth. [But it is probable
that the speech of Hippias, τὰ μὲν ὅλα τῶν πραγμάτων οὐ σκοπεῖς
κτέ. , contains phrases actually quoted from the sophist, of which
διανεκἢ σώματα τῆς οὐσίας may be one. Cp. κρούετε δὲ ἀπολαμ-
βάνοντες τὸ καλὸν καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν ὄντων ἐν τοῖς λόγοις κατατέμ-
νοντες with Hipp. min. 369 Β ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀεὶ σύ τινας τοιούτους
πλέκεις λόγους, καὶ ἀπολαμβάνων, ὃ ἂν ᾖ δυσχερέστατον τοῦ
λόγου, τούτου ἔχει κατὰ σμικρὸν ἐφαπτόμενος, καὶ οὐχ ὅλῳ
ἀγωνίζει τῷ πράγματι, περὶ ὅτου ἂν ὁ λόγος ᾖ.]
In the Prot. 329 c foll. the question is raised whether the
parts of Virtue, Justice, Temperance, etc. , are separate and
different, ἆρ᾽ οὖν οὕτω καὶ τὰ τῆς ἀρετῆς μόρια οὐκ ἔστι τὸ
ἕτερον οἷον τὸ ἕτερον, οὔτε αὐτὸ οὔτε ἡ δύναμις αὐτοῦ ; When the
same question is resumed at 349 B we have ἢ ἑκάστῳ τῶν
ὀνομάτων τούτων ὑπόκειταί τις ἴδιος οὐσία καὶ πρᾶγμα ἔχον ἑαυτοῦ
δύναμιν ἕκαστον.
In Gorg. 472B Plato apparently plays on the meaning
wealth and the philosophical sense truth, ἀλλὰ ψευδο-
μάρτυρας πολλοὺς κατ᾿ ἐμοῦ παρασχόμενος ἐπιχειρεῖς ἐκβάλλειν με
ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας καὶ τοῦ ἀληθοῦς, where the philosophical meaning
of οὐσία is defined by καὶ τοῦ ἀληθοῦς. 'Substance ' or ' reality
will preserve the double meaning. Dr. Thompson, however
(ad loc. ) doubts if any other meaning of οὐσία than ' patrimony
is intended .
In the Phaedrus it is used as an accepted term 237 c, 270 E ;
it is slightly helped out 245 Ε ψυχῆς οὐσίαν καὶ λόγον and
247 ο ἀναφὴς οὐσία, ὄντως οὖσα, ψυχῆς.
Here in the Meno to ουσία the words ὅ τί ποτ᾽ ἐστίν are
added as an interpretation. So in Phaedo 65 D περὶ τῶν ἄλλων
 EXCURSUS I 257

ἁπάντων οὐσίας δ τυγχάνει ἕκαστον ὄν . Heindorf on that passage

observes that the interpretation shows that ovoía as a philosophic
term was not yet established. He refers to this place of the
Meno, and to Rep. 377 E (where οὐσίαν is omitted in the best
texts). So the meaning of ovoía is driven home Phaedo 78 D
αὐτὴ ἡ οὐσία ἧς λόγον δίδομεν τοῦ εἶναι καὶ ἐρωτῶντες καὶ ἀποκρινό-
μενοι ‘ as whose principle we assign being, 92D ὥσπερ αὐτῆς
ἔστιν ἡ οὐσία ἔχουσα τὴν ἐπωνυμίαν τὴν τοῦ ὃ ἔστιν ‘ the very
substance that has the title of absolute essence ' (the transla-
tions are Archer - Hind's ). But in these places the additions
are not so much for elucidation as for emphasis. At 101 c
μετασχὸν τῆς ἰδίας οὐσίας ἑκάστου it is used as an accepted term.
In the Republic the word sometimes receives support, some-
times is used without it. In Bk. II 359 A we have γένεσίν τε καὶ
οὐσίαν δικαιοσύνης, which is to some extent prepared by 358 Ε
τί οἷόν τε καὶ ὅθεν γέγονε δικαιοσύνη. οὐσία does not occur
again, I think, in books I to V. In the account of dóğa at
the end of book v, we have always τὸ ὄν, not οὐσία. At
the beginning of book vi (484 Β) we have τοῦ ἀεὶ κατὰ ταὐτὰ
ὡσαύτως ἔχοντος, but soon after ( 485 B) ἐκείνης τῆς οὐσίας
τῆς ἀεὶ οὔσης, and again (486 A), in a very wide sense,
παντὸς μὲν χρόνου, πάσης δὲ οὐσίας. In p. 490 the word
is avoided but towards the end of the book it comes
noticeably forward (509 B ) καὶ τοῖς γιγνωσκομένοις τοίνυν μὴ
μόνον τὸ γιγνώσκεσθαι φάναι ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ παρεῖναι, ἀλλὰ
καὶ τὸ εἶναί τε καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν ὑπ᾽ ἐκείνου αὐτοῖς προσεῖναι,
οὐκ οὐσίας ὄντος τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, ἀλλ᾽ ἔτι ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας
πρεσβείᾳ καὶ δυνάμει ὑπερέχοντος. In book VII we have phrases
concerning the power of certain studies to stimulate the
Reason, the comparison of which is instructive : 521 D μάθημα
ψυχῆς ὁλκὸν ἀπὸ τοῦ γιγνομένου ἐπὶ τὸ ὄν : 523 Α ἑλκτικῷ πρὸς
οὐσίαν : 524 Ε ὁλκὸν ἐπὶ τὴν οὐσίαν : 525 Α ἀγωγὰ πρὸς ἀλήθειαν :
Β φιλοσόφῳ δὲ διὰ τὸ τῆς οὐσίας ἁπτέον εἶναι γενέσεως ἐξαναδύντι :
ο ἀπὸ γενέσεως ἐπ᾽ ἀλήθειάν τε καὶ οὐσίαν : 527 Β ὁλκὸν πρὸς
ἀλήθειαν. We next come upon a group of instances at p. 534,
where the partition of the mental faculties and their respective
objects that concludes book vi, is resumed : A καὶ δόξαν μὲν
περὶ γένεσιν, νόησιν δὲ περὶ οὐσίαν · καὶ ὅ τι οὐσία πρὸς γένεσιν,
νόησιν πρὸς δόξαν. In the earlier exposition (p. 511 ) the term
οὐσία is not used, but meanwhile we have been amply prepared
for its use here : B ἢ καὶ διαλεκτικὸν καλεῖς τὸν λόγον ἑκάστου
λαμβάνοντα τῆς οὐσίας ; cμὴ κατὰ δόξαν ἀλλὰ κατ᾽ οὐσίαν
προθυμούμενος ἐλέγχειν. The last group of instances of οὐσία
as a philosophical term occurs at p. 585 in the discussion of
Pleasure : Α πότερα οὖν ἡγεῖ τὰ γένη μᾶλλον καθαρᾶς οὐσίας
μετέχειν ; c Ἡ οὖν ἀνομοίου οὐσία οὐσίας τι μᾶλλον ἢ ἐπιστήμης
S
258 MENO

μετέχει ; Οὐδαμῶς. Τί δ᾽ ἀληθείας ; Οὐδὲ τοῦτο. Εἰ δὲ ἀληθείας

ἧττον, οὐ καὶ οὐσίας ; which is repeated below at D.
In the later dialogues preparation or explanation of the term
is less and less felt necessary. In the Theaet. 160 в C, 172 B,
202 B it seems used as current coin ; at 185 c in answer to a
question in which the words occur τὸ ἐπὶ πᾶσι κοινόν, ᾧ τὸ
ἔστιν ἐπονομάζεις καὶ τὸ οὐκ ἔστιν, Theaetetus says οὐσίαν λέγεις
καὶ τὸ μὴ εἶναι.
The philosophical meanings of ovcía in Plato may be classified
as follows ; but many usages fall on the line between two
divisions, especially between (2) and (3) . The ‘ Ideal Theory '
is implied by (2), not by (3).
(1) Being in general, opposed to Not-being and to Becoming :
Rep. 525 BC, Phaedo 78 D, 98 D, Theaet. 185 c ; common in
Sophista, Parmenides, also Politicus and Timaeus.
(2) Essential Nature of a Species, as self-existent (meta-
physical) : Rep. 509 B, Phaedo 65 D, 101 c, Phaedr. 245 E (?),
247 C.
(3) Essential Nature of a Species, as apprehended by us
(logical) : Meno 72B 22, Euthyphro 11 A, Hipp. maj. 301 в, 302 c,
Prot. 349 B, Rep. 359 A, Phaedr. 237 c, 245 E ( ?) , 270 E, Theaet.
202 B.
(4) Truth : Hipp. maj. 301 в E, Gorg. 472 B.
To these meanings must be added the uses Theaet. 160 B
ἡμῶν (sc. ‘ of myself and the thing perceived ' ) ἡ ἀνάγκη τὴν
οὐσίαν συνδεῖ, 160 c τῆς γὰρ ἐμῆς οὐσίας ἀεί ἐστιν. Here οὐσία
= púois and amounts to little more than a periphrasis.

EXCURSUS II

Εἴπερ AND εἴ γε

On 73 C 55 el ye µǹ ʼn avτǹ åρern v Stallb. , quoted by Fr. ,

says : el ye usurpatur de re quae jure sumpta creditur, eoque
differt ab eiπep, quod incertum relinquit utrum quid jure an
injuria sumatur. This note appears to me obscure and mis-
leading. Whether elπep or el ye be used the view taken of the
condition will depend on the mood and tense of the verb in the
conditional clause. The meaning here is : ' this would not be
the case if their virtue were not, as it is, the same ' : and the
meaning would be very little altered by substituting elrep for
εἴ γε. [eye is similarly used 74 C 16, D 25 ; cp. Dem.
 EXCURSUS II 259

Aristocr. (23) 93 ἐξὴν αὐτῷ μὴ γράφειν εἴ γε τὸ βέλτιστον τῇ πόλει

σκοπεῖν ἐβούλετο : ib. 161 καλά γ᾽· οὐ γάρ ; εἴ γ᾽ ἦν ἀληθῆ.
Euthyphr. 10 Ε εἴ γε ταὐτὸν ἦν : Soph. 255 D. ] L. & S. realise
this and say that errep is used ' in Attic mostly to imply that
the supposition agrees with the fact : "if, that is to say" ; with
the impf. it implies that it is contrary to the fact ' ; and quote
Soph. Εl. 312 εἴπερ ἦν πέλας (but he is not) ; ib. 604 εἴπερ ἔσθενον.
This is perfectly true, but does not take us far towards grasping
the distinction between εἴπερ and εἴ γε. As diametrically
opposed to the view of Stallb. it is instructive to quote a note,
itself somewhat over-hasty, of Whiston on Dem. Tim. (24)
89 (78) : ὥστ᾽ εἴπερ ὑμῶν ἑκάστῳ μέλει τι τῆς πολιτείας, κτέ. :
' Here elep is used instead of ei, for " if, as I assume to be the
fact " ; this particle always assuming the truth of the sup-
position which it makes. Cf. εἴπερ καὶ τὴν ἀξίωσιν τῆς ἀρετῆς
ὡς ἐλευθερῶν τὴν Ἑλλάδα φέρεται (Thuc. I 69. 1) which Mr.
Shepherd correctly renders "' Especially if they carry off the
credit of being the liberators of Greece, as I suppose you think
is the case. (A different view of the passage in Thuc. is taken
by Classen, as we shall presently see. )
To pass back to an earlier stage of the discussion, Viger p.
512 gives as the principal meaning of εἴπερ ' si modo, on which
Zeune notes : ' Haec vis videtur esse praecipua, propterea quod
particula πep valet ad conditionem limitandam et coercendam ' ;
quoting Plato Rep. 457 D οὐκ οἶμαι περὶ τοῦ ὠφελίμου ἀμφισβη-
τεῖσθαι ἂν ὡς οὐ μέγιστον ἀγαθὸν κοινὰς μὲν τὰς γυναῖκας εἶναι
εἴπερ οἷόν τε and Dem. Olynth. 1 § 2 τῶν πραγμάτων ὑμῖν
ἐκείνων αὐτοῖς ἀντιληπτέον ἐστίν, εἴπερ ὑπὲρ σωτηρίας αὐτῶν
φροντίζετε. Besides this meaning Viger recognises three others :
(α) si quidem , instituendo comparationem inter diversa, tuncque
particulas illas sequitur kai in opposito membro, quoting Dem.
Tim. (24) 51 ἄξιον δέ κτέ. , where however εἰ περί του καὶ ἄλλου is
now read. Zeune notes that sometimes the κaí is absent, and
quotes Thuc. IV 55. 2 ἐς δὲ τὰ πολεμικά, εἴπερ ποτέ, μάλιστα
δὴ ὀκνηρότεροι ἐγένοντο [ep. for εἴπερ ποτέ Thuc. iv 20. 1 , VII 64.
2, Plato Ep. vii 328 A], Xen. Cyr. III iii 19 συμφέρει δ' ὑμῖν,
εἴπερ τῳ καὶ ἄλλῳ, τὸ νικᾶν. He shows that there is in these
cases an ellipse after εἴπερ, and how the ellipse is to be filled up.
He gives as a stronger case of ellipse Aristoph. Clouds 226—
ἔπειτ᾽ ἀπὸ ταρροῦ τοὺς θεοὺς ὑπερφρονεῖς
ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ ἀπὸ τῆς γῆς, εἴπερ ; (scil. δεῖ ὑπερφρονεῖν τοὺς θεούς)
and, as a case where there is no ellipse, Aristoph. Frogs 76-
εἶτ᾽ οὐ Σοφοκλέα , πρότερον ὄντ᾽ Εὐριπίδου,
μέλλεις ἀνάγειν, εἴπερ γ' ἐκεῖθεν δεῖ σ' ἄγειν ;
(β) quandoquidem (ὅτι δή, ἐπειδή) : Arist. Pol. VII (VI) 2, 3 =
260 ΜΕΝΟ

1317 b 17 εἴπερ τοῦ δούλου ὄντος, τὸ ζῆν οὐχ ὡς βούλεται, to

which Zeune adds Plato Phaedr. 245 D εἴπερ ἐξ ἀρχῆς δεῖ τὰ
πάντα γίγνεσθαι.
Viger's third sense is shown to rest on a misconception , and
may be passed over ; but Zeune adds another real sense of
εἴπερ, ‘ qua sequente ἀλλά significat quamvis . . tamen, quoting
Homer 77. XXI. 576
εἴπερ γὰρ φθάμενός μιν ἢ οὐτάσῃ ἠὲ βάλῃσιν
ἀλλά τε καὶ περὶ δουρὶ πεπαρμένη οὐκ ἀπολήγει
ἀλκῆς .
G. Hermann in his notes derides Viger's analysis : multum
interest, he says, inter εἴπερ et εἴ γε : " εἴπερ δοκεῖ σοι dicimus
ei de quo non certo scimus quid ei placeat, aut de quo id nescire
simulamus : εἴ γε δοκεῖ σοι dicimus ei de quo scimus quid ei
placeat. ' This is apparently the source of Stallbaum's note,
which I started by criticising. Hermann's sweeping generalisa-
tion has tended to darken counsel. He was probably led into
it by too exclusive attention to what Viger rightly says is the
principal meaning of εἴπερ, ‘ si modo. Other examples of this
are Prot. 319 A ή καλὸν τέχνημα ἄρα κέκτησαι, εἴπερ ἔκτησαι : ib.
351 εἴπερ τοῖς καλοῖς γ᾽ , ἔφη, ζῴη ἡδόμενος : Euthyphr. 8 D οὐ
τολμῶσι λέγειν ὡς οὐχί, εἴπερ ἀδικοῦσί γε, δοτέον δίκην : Gorg.
495 Α Β οὐκ ἂν ἔτι μετ᾿ ἐμοῦ ἱκανῶς τὰ ὄντα ἐξετάζοις, εἴπερ παρὰ
τὰ δοκοῦντα σαυτῷ ἐρεῖς. ΚΑΛ. Καὶ γὰρ σύ, ὦ Σώκρατες. ΣΩ.
Οὐ τοίνυν ὀρθῶς ποιῶ οὔτ᾽ ἐγώ , εἴπερ ποιῶ τοῦτο, οὔτε σύ : Phaedr.
261 Ε περὶ πάντα τὰ λεγόμενα μία τις τέχνη, εἴπερ ἔστιν , αὕτη ἂν
εἴη : Charm. 170 c : Xen. Oec. i 8 (if a man buys a horse, and
not knowing how to ride, gets a fall and is hurt, is the horse
wealth to him ?) οὐκ εἴπερ τὰ χρήματά γ᾽ ἐστὶν ἀγαθόν : Symp.
ii. 6 quoted on 70 A 1 : Thuc. VI 21. 1 : Eur. Αlc. 303 εἴπερ εὖ
φρονεῖς : Phoen. 524 εἴπερ γὰρ ἀδικεῖν χρή κτέ. : Aristoph. Wasps
535 εἴπερ, ὃ μὴ γένοιθ' , οὗτός σ᾽ ἐθέλει κρατῆσαι.
It is hardly necessary to prove that alike εἴπερ and εἴ γε may
be used with an unreal condition.' Examples with eye are
given at the beginning of this excursus ; for εἴπερ I may cite
Plato +Ep. vii 330 A ᾗ δ᾿ ἂν οὕτως ἐγένετο, εἴπερ ἐγίγνετο, κάλ-
λιστα. As to other kinds of condition it may be said that either
εἴπερ οι εἴ γε (or el simply), may express every grade of accepta-
tion of the condition from quandoquidem ( since ' ) to si modo
(' if only ' ). Indeed the manner in which a speaker regards
a condition, is often locked within his own breast. In such
cases as Euthyd. 284 Α εἴπερ λέγει αὐτό, and εἴπερ λέγει τὰ ὄντα,
it is impossible to say to what extent the sophist accepts as
true the answer that has been given him.
There are certainly instances in which elπep assumes the
 EXCURSUS II 261

truth of the supposition it introduces, as has already been seen.

To the instances given by Viger and Zeune many might be
added ; e.g. Lach. 197 ε φημὶ γάρ σε εἶναι σοφόν, καὶ Λάμαχόν
γε, εἴπερ ἔστε ἀνδρεῖοι : Prot. 312 Α εἴπερ γε ἃ διανοοῦμαι χρὴ
λέγειν, 329 Β ἐγὼ εἴπερ ἄλλῳ τῳ ἀνθρώπων πειθοίμην ἄν, καὶ σοὶ
πείθομαι : Gorg. 515 D οὐκοῦν εἴπερ ἀγαθοί, δῆλον ὅτι ἕκαστος
αὐτῶν βελτίους ἐποίει τοὺς πολίτας : Meno 98 B 4 : Rep . 351 Α
εἴπερ σοφία καὶ ἀρετή ἐστι δικαιοσύνη : Phaedo 71 c ἐξ ἀλλήλων
γίγνεται ταῦτα εἴπερ ἐναντία εστίν (contrast ibid . Ε εἴπερ ἔστι τὸ
ἀναβιῴσκεσθαι, ἐκ τῶν τεθνεώτων ἂν εἴη γένεσις αὕτη, where εἴπερ
is si modo) : Parm. 134c φαίης ἂν ἢ οὔ, εἴπερ ἔστιν αὐτό τι
γένος ἐπιστήμης, πολὺ αὐτὸ ἀκριβέστερον εἶναι ἢ τὴν παρ' ἡμῖν
ἐπιστήμην ; . . Οὐκοῦν εἴπερ τι ἄλλο αὐτῆς ἐπιστήμης μετέχει,
οὐκ ἄν τινα μᾶλλον ἢ θεὸν φαίης ἔχειν τὴν ἀκριβεστάτην ἐπιστή-
μην : Dem. Aristocr. (23) 144 δίκην δίδοντες τὴν μεγίστην,
εἴπερ οἱ κακόνοι καὶ φενακίζοντες ὑμᾶς : Dem . 52. 2 δέομαι οὖν
ὑμῶν, εἴπερ τι καὶ ἄλλο πώποτε πρᾶγμα αὐτὸ καθ᾽ αὑτὸ ἐδικά-
σατε οὕτω καὶ νῦν διαγνῶναι (referred to by Milton W.
Humphreys, CR. XI 140 b) : Thuc. III 113. 4 εἴπερ γε ὑμεῖς ἐν
Ιδομενῇ χθὲς ἐμάχεσθε ‘ yes it is so, since you fought etc.
(see Classen on Thuc. I 77. 6).
On the other hand et ye has as its prevalent meaning si
quidem. An obvious instance is Dem. Androt. ( 22) 68 : ἐρωτῶν
εἰ μάτην τὸ δεσμωτήριον ᾠκοδομήθη. καταφαίην ἂν ἔγωγε · εἴ γ' ὁ
πατὴρ ὁ σὸς ᾤχετο αὐτόθεν αὐταῖς πέδαις ἐξορχησάμενος, on which
Weil says ' εἴ γε, si quidem, ne diffère guère de εἴπερ ου ἐπειδή,
puisque.' But there are plenty of instances where it means si
modo : as Euthyd. 282 Β εἰ ἔστι γε ἡ σοφία διδακτόν : Phaedr.
242 D εἴ γε σὺ ἀληθῆ λέγεις : +4lc. i 106 D ἀλλ᾽ εἴ γε δὴ μὴ
χαλεπόν τι λέγεις τὸ ὑπηρέτημα, ἐθέλω : Xen. Mem . IV vi 7 τίνι
γὰρ ἂν ἄλλῳ τις εἴη σοφός, εἴ γε μὴ ἐπιστήμῃ ;
It may be worth while to put together some instances of
εἴπερ and εἴ γε with fut. indic. The instances given are modal
futures, not real future conditions ; but in the view of the
condition I can trace no difference between εἴπερ and εἴ γε.
(See on 86 A 8 and Exc. IV. )
Thuc. 1 77. 6 εἴπερ, οἷα καὶ τότε πρὸς τὸν Μῆδον ὑπεδείξατε,
ὁμοῖα καὶ νῦν γνώσεσθε ‘ since you mean to resolve : VI 38.
4 τὸν ἐχθρὸν καὶ τῆς διανοίας προαμύνεσθαι χρή, εἴπερ καὶ μὴ προ-
φυλαξάμενός τις προπείσεται : Rep. 375 A (δεῖ ἀνδρεῖον εἶναι ) εἴπερ
εὖ μαχεῖται : Phil. 37 Ε ἀλλ' οὐχ οἷόν τε, εἴπερ ἁμαρτήσεταί γε
ἡδονή (a possibility which Protarchus does not accept), 62c
εἴπερ γε ἡμῶν ὁ βίος ἔσται καὶ ὁπωσοῦν ποτε βίος.
Hdt. VII 46 ως βραχὺς εἴη ὁ πᾶς ἀνθρώπινος βίος, εἰ (since)
τούτων γε ἐόντων τοσούτων οὐδεὶς ἐς ἑκατοστὸν ἔτος περιέσται :
Xen. Mem. II i 17 ἀλλὰ γάρ, ὦ Σώκρατες, οἱ εἰς τὴν βασιλικὴν
262 MENO

τέχνην παιδευόμενοι, τί διαφέρουσι τῶν ἐξ ἀνάγκης κακοπαθούντων

εἴ γε πεινήσουσι κτέ. ; ib. III iv 2 (is not Antisthenes appoint-
ment a good thing) εἴ γε τοῖς στρατιώταις ἱκανὸς ἔσται τἀπιτήδεια
πορίζειν : Plat. Prot. 330 Ε εἰ μὴ αὐτή γε ἡ ὁσιότης ὅσιον ἔσται :
Phaedo 106 D σχολῇ γὰρ ἄν τι ἄλλο φθορὰν μὴ δέχοιτο εἴ γε τὸ
ἀθάνατον ἀΐδιον ὂν φθορὰν δέξεται : Den . Aristocr. (23) 61 (δεινὸν
μὴ ἐξεῖναι) εἴ γε μὴ ἐξέσται κτέ.
With regard to εἴ γε, we must distinguish cases where γε
emphasises ei, or the whole conditional clause, from cases where
some word intervenes between ei and ye on which the ye throws
its emphasis (Krüger 69. 15. 3). Cp. Laches 192 c εἰ τό γε διὰ
πάντων πεφυκὸς δεῖ εἰπεῖν. ΣΩ. ᾿Αλλὰ μὴν δεῖ, εἴ γε τὸ ἐρω-
τώμενον ἀποκρινούμεθα ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς : Hdt. I 60 εἰ καὶ τότε γε
κτέ. , where el is si quidem and γε points καὶ τότε.
One point that alone should make us doubt any broad con-
trast between εἴπερ and εἴ γε is that εἴπερ often occurs followed
by γε. Many instances of this have already been given.
Kühner § 511. 9 c quotes Xen. Anab. i vii 9 : (the_king will
fight) εἴπερ γε Δαρείου καὶ Παρυσάτιδός ἐστι παῖς. Here again
we must distinguish cases where ye immediately follows εἴπερ,
and helps Tep to emphasise el, from cases where some word
intervenes to which the emphasis of γε belongs : εἴπερ γε
simply Symp. 205 B, Lysis 216 B, Theaet. 182 c ; on the other
hand Hipp. maj. 290 Β εἴπερ χρυσοῦν γε, Laches 193 c εἴπερ
οἴοιτό γε, etc.
There are two uses of εἴπερ which are not shared by εἴ γε.
One is the elliptic use (noticed by Zeune above). This use
occurs in Plato, and is common in Aristotle. Riddell § 252.
Euthyd. 296 Β οὔκουν ἡμᾶς γε [σφαλεῖ] , ἀλλ᾽ εἴπερ, σέ : Rep. 497 Ε
οὐ τὸ μὴ βούλεσθαι, ἀλλ᾽ εἴπερ, τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι, διακωλύσει (here
we might give the force of eπep by italics but, if any one is
deceived,' but, if anything does interfere ' ) : Prot. 352 c, Parm.
150 B, Laws 667 A, 900 E. Cp. Xen. Symp. ii 6 ŵs, elπep tɩ kai
ἄλλο, καὶ τοῦτο μαθητόν. Even such milder ellipses as Apol.
21 - ὥσπερ ἐνταῦθα, εἴπερ που, ἐλέγξων and Phaedo 63 c, would
not be found with et ye (Kühner § 599. 2, Jelf § 895. 2). See
also for the elliptical use of εἴπερ CR. XII 271 b, where are
quoted from the tragedians Aesch. Αgam . 934 εἴπερ τις εἰδώς
γ᾽ εὖ τόδ᾽ ἐξεῖπον τέλος : Soph. Αj. 488 ἐξέφυν πατρὸς εἴπερ
τινὸς σθένοντος ἐν πλούτῳ Φρυγών.
The other is the concessive force, also noted by Zeune.
Kühner § 578 Anm. 2 (cp. § 533. 1 ) only illustrates this from
Homer, but see Theaet. 196 Β ὡς προσῆκον αὐτοῖς χρῆσθαι εἴπερ
στερόμεθα ἐπιστήμης ‘ as if we had a right to use these terms
when (i.e. though) we have no part in knowledge. Here εť
ye would give a quite different sense, ' as if, since we have
 EXCURSUS II 263

no part in knowledge, we have a right to use them. ' Classen,

I believe rightly, regards εἴπερ in Thuc. Ι 69. 1, quoted above
in Whiston's note, as concessive.
In this dialogue etπep occurs thirteen times, seven times
with principal tenses of the indic. ( 73 B D, 78 A B, 89 C D,
96 D) , four times with impf. indic. ( 93 C twice, E, 94 D) , twice
with optative (98 BC). With this we may reckon ἐάν περ,
which occurs four times (72 D E, 73 B, 79 B). εἴ γε occurs six
times, namely, thrice with impf. indic. ( 73 C, 74 C twice), thrice
with optative ( 75 C , 98 D E).
73 Β 42 εἴπερ μέλλουσιν ἀγαθοὶ εἶναι = si modo.
73 D 5 εἴπερ ἕν γέ τι ζητεῖς = si quidem ( ?) : ἕr is pointed by γε.
78 Α 63 εἴπερ μὴ βούλεται τοιοῦτος είναι = si quidem.
78 Β 8 εἴπερ ἐστὶ βελτίων = si modo.
89 C 4 εἴπερ ἐπιστήμη ἐστὶν ἀρετή = si quidem.
89 D 17 εἴπερ ἐπιστήμη ἐστίν (ἀρετή) = si quidem.
93 C 5 εἴπερ τις ἄλλος διδάσκαλος ἦν κἀκεῖνον εἶναι = si quidem
( Viger's a) .
93 C 8 εἴπερ ἐβούλετό γε = si modo ( he Was, or at least would
have been, if he wished ' : past or unreal supposition) .
93 Ε 33 εἴπερ ἦν γε διδακτὸν ἡ ἀρετή = si modo : unreal sup-
position .
94 D 10 εἴπερ ἦν τοῦτο διδακτόν : unreal supposition.
96 D 17 εἴπερ ὀρθῶς ἡμεῖς ἐσκέμμεθα = si quidem.
98 Β 4 εἴπερ φαίην ἂν . . θείην ἄν = si modo : an example of
this form where the meaning is not si quidem.
98 C 21 ἄνδρες ἂν εἶεν ὠφέλιμοι εἴπερ εἶεν = si modo.
73 C 55 εἴ γε μὴ ἦν : unreal condition.
74 C 16 εἴ γε προσανηρώτα : unreal condition .
74 D 25 εἴ γε ἐκέλευε : unreal condition .
75 C 1 εἰ μέν γε τῶν σοφῶν τις εἴη future supposition. (γε
points τῶν σοφῶν, being misplaced. )
98 D 35 κἂν εἴ γε διδακτὸν εἴη.
98 Ε 38 καὶ εἰ μέν γε διδάσκαλοι είεν, διδακτὸν ἂν εἶναι. In
these last two sentences there is little, if any, difference,
from εἴπερ.
To conclude : it is impossible to convey in English any
uniform difference in meaning between εἴπερ and εἴ γε. For
near juxtapositions of the two see Theaet. 203 D ἀλλὰ μέντοι εἴ
γε ἀνάγκη ἑκάτερον γιγνώσκειν, εἴπερ ἀμφότερά τις γνώσεται κτέ. :
Parm. 162 Α ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰ μηδαμοῦ γε ἐστι τῶν ὄντων, ὡς οὐκ
ἔστιν, εἴπερ μὴ ἔστιν, οὐδ᾽ ἂν μεθίσταιτο ποθέν ποι (here εἴπερ is
less truly conditional than et γε) : Soph. 255 D οὐκ ἄν, εἴ γε
τὸ ὂν καὶ τὸ θάτερον μὴ πάμπολυ διεφερέτην · ἀλλ᾽ εἴπερ
θάτερον ἀμφοῖν μετεῖχε τοῖν εἰδοῖν ὥσπερ τὸ ὄν, ἣν ἂν ποτέ τι
264 MENO

καὶ τῶν ἑτέρων ἕτερον οὐ πρὸς ἕτερον. The difference must be

felt by realising the force of πep and ye in general : πep is
emphatic, ye is emphatic but restrictive ; errep lays stress on
the fact that the statement is conditional, eye says that at
any rate under that condition it is true. We should often
give the force of eπep by italicising if ; the force of el ye by
putting a dash before ' if.'

EXCURSUS III

ΟΝ ἀλλὰ γάρ (92 C 23, 94 D 6, Ε 14)

On this idiom Riddell § 147 says ' Here we must observe
that there is no Ellipse, such as is involved in the supposition
that whereas the yáp refers to the clause immediately subjoined
to it, the ảά belongs either to a clause understood or to a
clause following at a greater distance. The sense forbids such
a supposition ; for the dλλá sits much closer to the clause
immediately subjoined than the yáp does. ἀλλὰ γάρ has two
meanings one when it introduces an objection , and is there-
fore ironical ; the other, which alone needs illustration, when
it has the force of " but be that as it may, " or " but the
truth is."
It is one question whether the Greeks in Plato's time were
still conscious of an ellipse in ảλλà yάp ( see J. Adam on Apol.
19 D, Euthyphr. 11 c) ; another whether this construction grew
out of an ellipse. Riddell would apparently answer both
questions in the negative. And it must be allowed that it is
quite possible to frame a theory of the origin of ảλλà yάp in
which no ellipse is implied. For yap (ye + apa) , like åpa , is
originally emphatic or confirmative ' (Kühner § 509. 8 a), as
are also the inferential particles igitur, enim, nam, namque in
Latin (Conington on Verg. Aen. x 614). How the causal use
was developed from the confirmative Kühner explains § 544 a.
It might therefore be held that the combination ảλλà yάp was
formed while yap was still merely emphatic ; and so it would
not be necessary to suppose any ellipse.
The evidence however is very strong, I might say over-
whelming, that yáp was felt as causal at an early stage of the
combination , that it was used to introduce a clause which gave
 EXCURSUS III 265

the reason of what followed, much as ' for ' in Shakespeare's

time was used for because ' in such a sentence as :-
'it is as lawful,
For we would give much, to use violent means
And rob in the behalf of charity.
If ἀλλὰ γάρ developed while γάρ was still merely emphatic,
we should expect to find the words in close juxtaposition from
the first. As a matter of fact, however, ἀλλὰ γάρ never occurs
in juxtaposition in Homer. Ebeling in his Homeric lexicon
says · ἀλλὰ . . γάρ, ita ut verbum aliquod semper interponatur ;
de re certissima quae opponitur superioribus : sed enim .' The
word interposed between dλá and yáp may be regarded as
introducing the subordinate or parenthetic clause to which yáp
belongs, yap itself not being capable of beginning a clause.
We have the full structure shown in such passages as-
Π. xν 739 ἀλλ᾽ ἐν γὰρ Τρώων πεδίῳ πύκα θωρηκτάων
πόντῳ κεκλιμένοι, ἑκὰς ἥμεθα πατρίδος αἴης—
τῷ ἐν χερσὶ φόως.
Π. ΧΧΙΙΙ 60% ἀλλὰ—σὺ γὰρ δὴ πόλλ᾽ ἔπαθες εἵνεκ᾽ ἐμεῖο—
τῷ τοι λισσομένῳ ἐπιπείσομαι.
Οd. ΧΙ 393 ἀλλ᾽ οὐ γάρ οἱ ἔτ᾽ ἦν ὃς ἔμπεδος οὐδέ τι κίκυς—
τὸν μὲν ἐγὼ δάκρυσα ἰδών.
Od. XIV 355 ἀλλ᾿ οὐ γάρ σφιν ἐφαίνετο κέρδιον εἶναι
μαίεσθαι προτέρω—τοὶ μὲν πάλιν αὖτις ἔβαινον.
In each of these cases we have an apodosis going with
ἀλλά : in the following instances we have ἀλλά put after the
γάρ-clause with the clause to which it properly belongs
Οd. x 174 ὦ φίλοι, οὐ γάρ πω καταδυσόμεθ' , ἀχνύμενοί περ
εἰς ᾿Αίδαο δόμους, πρὶν μόρσιμον ἦμαρ ἐπέλθῃ,
ἀλλ᾽ ἄγετ᾽ κτέ.
ibid. 226 ὦ φίλοι, ἔνδον γάρ τις ἐποιχομένη μέγαν ἱστὸν
καλὸν ἀοιδάει, δάπεδον δ᾽ ἅπαν ἀμφιμέμυκεν,
ἢ θεὸς ἠὲ γυνή· ἀλλὰ φθεγγώμεθα θᾶσσον.
But there are even in Homer many instances in which there
is no separate clause to go with ἀλλά ; from which may be
inferred that the separate force of dá and yάp was already
indistinctly felt ; examples are Il. vii 242—
ἀλλ᾽ οὐ γάρ σ' ἐθέλω βαλέειν τοιοῦτον ἐόντα
λάθρῃ ὀπιπεύσας, ἀλλ᾽ ἀμφαδόν, αἴ κε τύχωμι .
Cp. Od. x 202, 568, XIX 591 , and, for yáp in protasis without
ἀλλά, Ι . VII 328 foll.
ἀλλὰ γάρ seems not to occur in Hesiod. But there are
266 ΜΕΝΟ

instances in the elegiac poets like those in Homer, as Tyrt. I 1

(Bergk4)
ἀλλ᾽ Ἡρακλῆος γὰρ ἀνικήτου γένος ἔστε,
θαρσείτ' .
A very important step was taken when yάp was allowed to
follow ἀλλά immediately. As γάρ cannot begin a clause it was
now felt to lean upon ἀλλά, and its significance as introducing
a separate clause was disguised. The following epitaph of
Simonides (Bergk4 124 A = Anth. Ρal. VII 607) is amongst the
earliest recorded instances :
ἄνθρωπ᾽ οὐ Κροίσου λεύσσεις τάφον, ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἀνδρὸς
χερνητέω μικρὸς τύμβος, ἐμοὶ δ᾽ ἱκανός.
It must be confessed that it is difficult to discover any trace
of ellipse in this.
In Pindar there are the following instances of ἀλλὰ γάρ in
juxtaposition :-
07. 1 55 = 87 ἀλλὰ γὰρ καταπέψαι
μέγαν ὄλβον οὐκ ἐδυνάσθη, κόρῳ δ᾽ ἕλεν
ἄταν ὑπέροπλον .
Pyth. Iv 32 = 56
ἀλλὰ γὰρ νόστου πρόφασις γλυκεροῦ
κώλυεν μεῖναι.
Fennell ' But (we declined to stay) for. '
Nem. VII 52 = 77
ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἀνάπαυσις ἐν παντὶ γλυκεῖα ἔργῳ · κόρον δ᾽ ἔχει
καὶ μέλι κτέ.
In the following places we have ἀλλὰ . . γάρ separated :
Οι. νι 54 = 90
ἀλλ᾽ ἐν κέκρυπτο γὰρ σχοίνῳ βατίᾳ τ᾽ ἐν ἀπειράτῳ
ἴων ξανθαῖσι καὶ παμπορφύροις ἀκτῖσι βεβρεγμένος ἁβρὸν
σῶμα · τὸ καὶ κατεφάμιξεν καλεῖσθαί μιν κτέ.
Here ἀλλά really goes with the clause beginning τὸ καί ‘ so
too ' ; yap introduces the clause giving the reason of Iamus'
name, from loν. At Nem. VII 30 = 44, Isth. III 34 = IV 25, Isth.
VI 16 there is no subsequent clause with which ảλλά may be
taken.
In Herodotus we have many examples of yáp used with a
protasis in the sense ' since.' See especially 1 8 ἦν γάρ
οἱ τῶν αἰχμοφόρων Γύγης . τούτῳ καὶ τὰ σπουδαιέστερα τῶν
πρηγμάτων ὑπερετίθετο. χρόνου δὲ οὐ πολλοῦ διελθόντος—χρῆν
γὰρ Κανδαύλῃ γενέσθαι κακῶς—ἔλεγε · Γύγη οὐ γάρ σε δοκέω
πείθεσθαι (ὦτα γὰρ ἀπιστότερα . .) . ποίεε ὅκως κτέ. Here the
fourth yáp succeeds the clause of which it gives the reason.
Compare i 14 ἀλλ᾽ , οὐδὲν γὰρ μέγα ἔργον ἀπ' αὐτοῦ ἄλλο ἐγένετο,
 EXCURSUS III 267

τοῦτον μὲν παρήσομεν : IV 83 ἀλλ' , οὐ γὰρ ἔπειθε συμβουλεύων οἱ

χρηστά, ὁ μὲν ἐπέπαυτο : VIII 8, 1X 27 end , 1x 109 τῇ δὲ κακῶς
γὰρ ἔδει γενέσθαι, πρὸς ταῦτα εἶπε, and in the same chapter
ἀλλ᾽ , οὐ γὰρ ἔπειθε, διδοῖ τὸ φᾶρος.
Thus it still remained possible for ἀλλὰ γάρ, even when in
immediate juxtaposition, to be succeeded by two clauses, the
former of which might be taken with yáp, the latter with
ἀλλά. Jebb in his valuable note on Soph. Ο.C. 988 says
that we must distinguish two cases of the formula ἀλλὰ
γάρ : (1) with an ellipse as here : “ but (your charges are
untrue) for" ; in which cases yáp may be represented by in
fact, indeed : (2) where there is no ellipse.'
I give instances of both classes from the dramatists, calling
' elliptical ' those instances where no separate clause that
might go with ảλλá is expressed ; though to what extent the
Greeks were then conscious of an ellipse I do not undertake to
say. It will be noted that in the majority of cases ảά and
γάρ are not in juxtaposition.
Αα . Full construction (ἀλλὰ . • γάρ separate).
Aesch. Prom. 941 ἀλλ᾽ εἰσορῶ γὰρ τόνδε τὸν Διὸς τρόχιν,
τὸν τοῦ τυράννου τοῦ νέου διάκονον,
πάντως τι καινὸν ἀγγελῶν ἐλήλυθεν.
(The asyndeton in the last line makes it probable that it is
to be connected with ἀλλά.)
Choeph. 375 ἀλλὰ διπλῆς γὰρ τῆσδε μαράγνης
δοῦπος ἱκνεῖται, τῶν μὲν ἀρωγοί
κατὰ γῆς ἤδη ( scil. εἰσίν) .
Soph. Αnt. 392 ἀλλ᾽ ἡ γὰρ ἐκτὸς καὶ παρ᾽ ἐλπίδας χαρὰ
ἔοικεν ἄλλῃ μῆκος οὐδὲν ἡδονῇ,
ἥκω.
ΕΙ. 256 ἀλλ' ἡ βία γὰρ τοῦτ᾽ ἀναγκάζει με δρᾶν,
ξύγγνωτε.
Phil. 81 ἀλλ᾽ ἡδὺ γάρ τοι κτῆμα τῆς νίκης λαβεῖν,
τόλμα.
Ο.Ε. 755 ἀλλ' οὐ γὰρ ἔστι τἀμφανῆ κρύπτειν, σύ νιν
κρύψον.
ibid. 797 ἀλλ᾽ οἶδα γάρ σε ταῦτα μὴ πείθων, ἴθι.
Ο.Τ. 1409 ἀλλ᾽ οὐ γὰρ αὐδᾶν ἔσθ' ἃ μηδὲ ὁρᾶν καλόν,
ὅπως τάχιστα πρὸς θεῶν ἔξω μέ που
καλύψατο.
Eur. Alc. 422 ἀλλ᾽ ἐκφορὰν γὰρ τοῦδε θήσομαι νεκροῦ,
πάρεστε.
268 ΜΕΝΟ

Med. 1067 ἀλλ᾽ εἰμι γὰρ δὴ τλημονεστάτην ὁδόν,

παῖδας προσειπεῖν βούλομαι.
Bacch. 1166 ἀλλ᾽ εἰσορῶ γὰρ ἐς δόμους ὁρμωμένην
Πενθέως ᾿Αγαύην μητέρ' · ""
δέχεσθε κῶμον εὐίου θεοῦ.
Ar. Wasps 320 ἀλλ᾽ οὐ γὰρ οἷός τ᾽ ἔτ᾽ εἴμ᾽ ᾄδειν, τί ποιήσω ;
A b. Full construction (ἀλλὰ γάρ juxtaposed).
Aesch. Sept. 861 ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἥκουσ' αἵδ᾽ ἐπὶ πρᾶγος
πικρὸν ᾿Αντιγόνη τ᾽ ἠδ᾽ Ἰσμήνη,
θρῆνον ἀδελφοῖν · οὐκ ἀμφιβόλως
οἶμαί σφ᾽ ἐρατῶν ἐκ βαθυκόλπων
στηθέων ἥσειν ἄλγος ἐπάξιον.
Soph. Αnt. 148 ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἁ μεγαλώνυμος ἦλθε Νίκα
ἐκ μὲν δὴ πολέμων
τῶν νῦν θέσθε λησμοσύναν.
Eur. Phoen. 1307
ἀλλὰ γὰρ Κρέοντα λεύσσω τόνδε δεῦρο συννεφῆ
πρὸς δόμους στείχοντα, παύσω τοὺς παρεστῶτας γόους.
Βα. Elliptical construction (ἀλλὰ . . γάρ separate).
Aesch. Eum. 797
ἀλλ᾽ ἐκ Διὸς γὰρ λαμπρά μαρτυρία παρὴν κτέ.
(On this place Whitelaw remarks in a review of Sidgwick's
edition, CR. II 110 b , Why must ἀλλὰ γάρ with a single verb
be regarded as elliptical ? γάρ in the combination εἰ γάρ is
not a conjunction, and the possibility of putting the yap next
the ¿ ά seems to show that it was not so regarded. This
combination is found, however, sometimes when ἀλλὰ γάρ=
sed quia.' I am endeavouring to answer the points here
raised .)
Soph. Ajax 167
ἀλλ᾽ ὅτε γὰρ δὴ τὸ σὸν ὄμμ᾽ ἀπέδραν
παταγοῦσιν κτέ.
Jebb No (we can do nothing) for.'
Antig. 155 ἀλλ' ὅδε γὰρ δὴ βασιλεὺς χώρας
χωρεῖ κτέ.
Jebb But (let us cease) for.'
Εl. 223 ἀλλ' ἐν γὰρ δεινοῖς οὐ σχήσω
ταύτας ἄτας ὄφρα με βίος ἔχῃ.
Jebb'But (ye speak in vain) for.'
ibid. 595 ἀλλ' οὐ γὰρ οὐδὲ νουθετεῖν ἔξεστί σε.
O.C. 988 ἀλλ᾽ οὐ γὰρ οὐδ᾽ ἐν τοῖσδ᾽ ἀκούσομαι κακός.
 EXCURSUS III 269
Eur. Heracl. 480
ἀλλ᾽ εἰμὶ γάρ πως πρόσφορος, μέλει δέ μοι κτέ.
Ar. Knights 328 ἀλλ' ἐφάνη γὰρ ἀνὴρ ἕτερος πολὺ
σοῦ μιαρώτερος, ὥστε με χαίρειν
ὅς σε παύσει κτέ.
Bb. Elliptical construction (ἀλλὰ γάρ juxtaposed).
Eur. Phoen. 1762
ἀλλὰ γὰρ τί ταῦτα θρηνῶ καὶ μάτην ὀδύρομαι ;
τὰς γὰρ ἐκ θεῶν ἀνάγκας θνητὸν ὄντα δεῖ φέρειν.
(I have left out of account Soph. Ο. C. 985 ἀλλ᾽ ἓν γὰρ οὖν
ξύνοιδα, where γάρ belongs to the emphatic phrase γὰρ οὖν.)
When we pass from the dramatists to Plato we find an
important further stage of development has taken place.
Among the numberless instances of ἀλλὰ γάρ in Plato I can
cite only two in which any word intervenes, namely Prot. 336 A
and Apol. 20 c, in both which cases we have ἀλλ' οὐ γάρ. The
words áà yáp have almost coalesced, and we may be pretty
sure that the Greeks were no longer conscious of any ellipse.
The use of ἀλλὰ γάρ in Xenophon is generally similar to that in
Plato : but we have yap with a parenthetic clause in Anab. III
i 24 ἀλλ᾽ ἴσως γὰρ ἄλλοι ταῦτ᾽ ἐνθυμοῦνται —μὴ ἀναμένωμεν
ἄλλους ἐφ᾿ ἡμᾶς ἐλθεῖν, and a word interposed at Cyr. ut i 13
ἀλλὰ γιγνώσκω γάρ (Kühner § 509. 8 a).
It may perhaps be held that no discussion of ἀλλὰ γάρ is
complete which does not take account of other combinations in
which γάρ occurs. With regard to vûv dè yáp (which does not
occur in the Meno) , it seems parallel to ἀλλὰ γάρ, but we have
little record of its earlier history, and it is possible that the
analogy of ἀλλὰ γάρ has mainly operated in producing it, as
also the phrase at Parm . 137 Α ὅμως δὲ δεῖ γὰρ χαρίζεσθαι ἐπειδὴ
καὶ αὐτοί εσμεν. For καὶ γάρ Thuc. affords evidence of a
parenthetic stage, as I 137. 2 καὶ (ἦν γὰρ ἀγνὼς τοῖς ἐν τῇ νηί)
δείσας φράζει τῷ ναυκλήρῳ ὅστις ἐστί. Thuc. like Herodotus
abounds in parenthetic clauses with yáp. But I do not think
it at all necessary to suppose that the history of all combina-
tions of yáp has been similar ; in some it is probable that
the original emphatic force of yáp has been preserved through-
out, as in γὰρ οὖν, in questions like πῶς γὰρ οὔ ; and in answers
like εἶπον γάρ 78 Β 3, οὐδὲν γάρ 97 Β 25, οὐ γὰρ εἰκός 73 D 12.
270 ΜΕΝΟ

EXCURSUS IV

E WITH THE FUTURE INDICATIVE (on 85 C 15 and 86 A 8).

For el with the future indicative in present conditions, where

' it expresses merely a present intention or necessity that some-
thing shall be done hereafter, ' see Goodwin M. T. 407. This
(modal) use, as he observes (ibid. 408, 449) is equivalent to
μέλλω with the infinitive : e.g. we might have had at 73 Β 42
(for εἴπερ μέλλουσιν ἀγαθοὶ εἶναι) εἴπερ ἀγαθοὶ ἔσονται. el with
the future indicative in real future conditions is treated by
Goodwin ibid. 447, 448. Much has been written as to the dis-
tinction in future conditions between el with the fut. indic. , ἐάν
with the subj . , and el with the optative (see F. E. T. §§ 194,
206 ; Hadley § 899). It is clear that different writers have
their idiosyncrasies as to the form they prefer for expressing
future conditions ; and that Plato rarely expresses a real future
condition by el with the future indicative (see Archer-Hind on
Phaedo 106 D).
The following list of places in Plato, where ei is followed by
the future indicative, is by no means exhaustive, but may
serve to illustrate the two classes, and to show the much greater
frequency of the ' modal ' class. (Instances where ei introduces
an indirect question, as Rep. 387 D, Phaedo 77 B, are of course
left out of account.) As real future conditions may be cited,
besides 85 C 15 , Apol. 28 c εἰ τιμωρήσεις Πατρόκλῳ καὶ Εκτορα
ἀποκτενεῖς αὐτὸς ἀποθανεῖ : probably also Euthyph. 3 Ε εἰ μέλλοιέν
μου καταγελᾶν οὐδὲν ἂν εἴη ἀηδές, εἰ δὲ σπουδάσονται, τοῦτο ἤδη
ὅπῃ ἀποβήσεται ἄδηλον : Prot. 338 B c εἴτε γὰρ χείρων ἔσται
ἡμῶν ὁ αἱρεθείς, οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἂν ἔχοι τὸν χείρω τῶν βελτιόνων
ἐπιστατεῖν . εἰ δὲ αἱρήσεσθε μὲν μηδὲν βελτίω, φήσετε δέ,
αἰσχρὸν καὶ τοῦτο τῷδε γίγνεται : Rep. 361 c εἰ γὰρ δόξει δίκαιος
εἶναι, ἔσονται αὐτῷ τιμαὶ καὶ δωρεαί.
The remaining instances seem to me to be all modal , though
a doubt may arise in some cases :
Hipp. min. 375 D δεινὸν μέντ᾽ ἂν εἴη εἰ οἱ ἑκόντες ἀδικοῦντες
βελτίους ἔσονται ἢ οἱ ἄκοντες.
Lysis 213 c τί οὖν δὴ χρησώμεθα εἰ μήτε οἱ φιλοῦντες φίλοι
ἔσονται μήτε οἱ φιλούμενοι μήτε οἱ φιλοῦντές τε καὶ φιλούμενοι, ἀλλὰ
καὶ παρὰ ταῦτα ἄλλους ἔτι φήσομεν εἶναι φίλους ;
Prot. 330 Ε σχολῇ μέντ᾽ ἄν τι ἄλλο ὅσιον εἴη, εἰ μὴ αὐτή γε ἡ
ὁσιότης ὅσιον ἔσται.
 EXCURSUS IV 271

Ibid. 351 c καθ᾽ ὁ ἡδέα ἐστίν, ἂρα κατὰ τοῦτο οὐκ ἀγαθά, εἰ
μή τι ἀπ' αὐτῶν ἀποβήσεται ἄλλο ;
Gorg. 495 Α οὐκ ἂν ἔτι μετ᾿ ἐμοῦ ἱκανῶς τὰ ὄντα ἐξετάζοις,
εἴπερ παρὰ τὰ δοκοῦντα σαυτῷ ἐρεῖς.
Ibid. 505 Ε εἰ μέντοι ποιήσομεν (scil. engage in continuous
discourse), οἶμαι ἔγωγε χρῆναι πάντας ἡμᾶς φιλονίκως ἔχειν πρὸς
τὸ εἰδέναι τὸ ἀληθές.
Ibid. 520 Ε καλὸν δοκεῖ τὸ σημεῖον εἶναι, εἰ εὖ ποιήσας ἀντ᾽
εὖ πείσεται.
Phaedr. 242 Ε ἔτι δὲ ἡ εὐήθεια αὐτῶν πάνυ ἀστεία εἰ ἄρα
ἀνθρωπίσκους τινὰς ἐξαπατήσαντε εὐδοκιμήσετον ἐν αὐτοῖς.
Rep. 375 Α καὶ μὴν ἀνδρεῖον ( δεῖ εἶναι) εἴπερ εὖ μαχεῖται.
Phaedo 73 ο ὁμολογοῦμεν γὰρ δήπου εἴ τίς τι ἀναμνῃσθήσεται,
δεῖν αὐτὸν τοῦτο πρότερον ἐπίστασθαι.
Ibid . 106 D σχολῇ γὰρ ἄν τι φθορὰν μὴ δέχοιτο, εἴ γε τὸ
ἀθάνατον ἀΐδιον ἂν φθορὰν δέξεται.
Parm. 135 Α Β ἔτι ἄλλα πάνυ πολλὰ ἀναγκαῖον ἔχειν τὰ
εἴδη, εἰ εἰσὶν αὗται αἱ ἰδέαι τῶν ὄντων καὶ ὁριεῖταί τις αὐτό τι
ἕκαστον εἶδος . . ἀλλὰ μέντοι εἴ γέ τις δὴ αὖ μὴ ἐάσει εἴδη τῶν
ὄντων εἶναι, μήδε τι ὁριεῖται εἶδος ἑνὸς ἑκάστου, οὐδὲ ὅποι τρέψει τὴν
διάνοιαν ἕξει κτέ.
Theaet. 161 D εἰ γὰρ δὴ ἑκάστῳ ἀληθὲς ἔσται ὃ ἂν δι᾿ αἰσθή
σεως δοξάσῃ, καὶ μήτε τὸ ἄλλου πάθος ἄλλος βέλτιον διακρινεῖ,
μήτε τὴν δόξαν κυριώτερος ἔσται ἐπισκέψασθαι ἀλλ᾽ αὐτὸς τὰ
αὑτοῦ ἕκαστος μόνος δοξάσει . τί δή ποτε Πρωταγόρας μὲν
σοφός, ἡμεῖς δὲ ἀμαθέστεροί τε καὶ φοιτητέον ἡμῖν ἦν παρ᾽ ἐκεῖνον ;
Soph. 248 Ε τὸ γιγνώσκειν εἴπερ ἔσται ποιεῖν τι, τὸ γιγνω-
σκόμενον ἀναγκαῖον αὖ ξυμβαίνει πάσχειν.
Phil. 37 Ε ἀλλ᾽ οὐχ οἷόν τε (καλὸν ὄνομα προστιθέναι) εἴπερ
ἁμαρτήσεταί γ᾽ ἡδονή.
Ibid. 62 ἀναγκαῖον φαίνεται ἐμοίγε, εἴπερ γ᾽ ἡμῶν ὁ βίος
ἔσται καὶ ὁπωσοῦν ποτε βίος. [Cp. ibid. B, where instead of εἰ
withfut. indic. we have εἰ μέλλει ἐξευρήσειν. ]
Τim. 31 Α (ὀρθῶς ἕνα οὐρανὸν προσειρήκαμεν) εἴπερ κατὰ τὸ
παράδειγμα δεδημιουργημένος ἔσται.
Laws 822 Β ταῦτ᾽ οὖν εἰ πέφυκε μὲν οὕτως, ἡμεῖς δὲ μὴ ταύτῃ
δόξομεν . . οὐκ ὀρθῶς οἶμαι ἡμᾶς ἂν τὰ ἐγκώμια προσάπτειν .
Add Apol. 34 c quoted on 91 E 17.
272 MENO

EXCURSUS V

ON ERISTIC (75 C, 80 E)

The art of the Eristic is Contentious Dialectic : the Eristics.

' can reduce any respondent to a contradiction , if he will only
continue to answer their questions- whether what he says be
true or false ' (Grote 1 528, on the Euthydemus).
Eristic thus presents certain points of likeness to the
Socratic elenchus. Both are opposed to the rhetorical method ,
and imply a process of question and answer between two
persons face to face. At the same time the differences between
the two things are very great. Grote, comparing the pair of
Eristic Sophists with Socrates, says (1 531 ) : The real contrast
between the competitors consists, first in the pretensions, next
in the method. The two Sophists are described as persons of
exorbitant arrogance, professing to teach virtue¹ and claiming
a fee as if they did teach it : Socrates disdains the fee, doubts
whether such teaching is possible, and professes only to en-
courage or help forward a willing pupil. ' As to the differences
in method, the main points are that in Eristic verbal con-
sistency is all that is aimed at ; the questions must be answered
categorically, without qualifications ; whereas the Platonic
Socrates regards elasticity and variety of language as an
essential of profitable discussion . Eristic takes no heed whether
the answer represents the bona fide opinion of the answerer ; to
the Platonic Socrates this is all important (see on 83 D 49).
Lastly, the object of Eristic is victory, and the presence, as
well as the loud manifestations of an indiscriminate crowd, are
essential features in the drama.' The Platonic Socrates, on the
other hand, gives his attention exclusively to the respondent,
and is absolutely indifferent to outside opinion (cp. e.g. Gorg.
472 B C ; 475 E). To the differences recognized by Grote, must
however be added a further difference which he refuses to
recognize. He says ( 1 530) ' the contrast does not consist in
this that Socrates so contrives his string of questions as to
bring out some established and positive conclusion, while
Euthydemus and his brother leave everything in perplexity.
Such is not the fact. Socrates ends without any result and
with a confession of his inability to find any.' This surely is
untrue of the Platonic Socrates, in whom the Elenchus has
1 i.e. ȧperý : see on 71 E 2.
 EXCURSUS V 273

developed into a maieutic art ( Theaet. 149 foll. ) by which un-

suspected treasures of knowledge are brought to light. Even
in the Euthydemus, largely satirical as it is, the amount of
positive result is considerable. No dialogue can show more
clearly than does the Meno, that the " numbing shock " was
only half the work of Socrates, the indispensable preliminary to
something of a constructive process. Nor with regard to the
historic Socrates do we gather from Xenophon that the con-
versations of Socrates were barren of positive result, that they
always left the hearer just where they found him, only puzzled
and humiliated ; though this may have been the result in the
case of pupils who left him prematurely. Grote himself goes
far towards admitting some positive teaching from Socrates
when he allows him to profess his willingness to help forward
a willing pupil. ' ¹
Other important differences arise out of the fact that the
Socratic elenchus was systematized and unified by having a
definite object, the framing or testing of definitions (chiefly in
the department of Ethics). It was a thing that could be aped,
no doubt ; Socrates in the Platonic Apology 23 c, declares how
readily his example was followed : πρὸς δὲ τούτοις οἱ νέοι μοι
ἐπακολουθοῦντες οἷς μάλιστα σχολή ἐστιν . • αὐτοὶ πολλάκις ἐμὲ
μιμοῦνται, εἶτα ἐπιχειροῦσιν ἄλλους ἐξετάζειν. Pupils of Socrates
are sometimes represented as playing this part by Plato. At
the beginning of the Gorgias, Chaerephon has a skirmish with
Polus before the two principals engage. See, too, the conversa-
tion between Alcibiades and Pericles in Xen. Mem. 1 ii 40-46,
about Law, where Alcibiades retails the art of his master
Socrates, with some success. Pericles asserts (with what truth
it is hard to say) that he could do that sort of thing when he
was young ; to which Alcibiades, somewhat sceptical, replies
that he only wishes he had known him when he was at his best
in that art : Μάλα τοι, φάναι τὸν Περικλέα , ὦ ᾿Αλκιβιάδη, καὶ
ἡμεῖς τηλικοῦτοι ὄντες δεινοὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἢμεν · τοιαῦτα γὰρ καὶ
ἐμελετῶμεν καὶ ἐσοφιζόμεθα οἰάπερ καὶ σὺ νῦν ἐμοὶ δοκεῖς μελετᾶν.
τὸν δὲ ᾿Αλκιβιάδην φάναι, Εἴθε σοι, ὦ Περίκλεις, τότε συνεγενόμην
ὅτε δεινότατος σαυτοῦ ταῦτα ἦσθα.
Again, in the Euthydemus, Ctesippus is the squire of
Socrates and plays Iolaus to his Heracles (298 D). He engages
with the Eristics, and soon learns to match them with their own
weapons (see 303 E and cp. Lysis 211 B). This leads to a further
consideration.
1 The difference between him (the Eristic) and Socrates is that his
effect is purely negative ; he begins and ends with captious disputation,
his skill is simply to bewilder and perplex : he is not, as Socrates, a mid-
wife of true knowledge.' Sidgwick in J.P. IV 296.
T
274 ΜΕΝΟ

The Elenchus was an art not to be mastered in a day ; it

could only be attained by an apprehension of the object to
which it was directed, and in the apprehension of this lay its
chief utility. On the other hand, Eristic was bound together
by no common tie. It consisted of a number of isolated tips,'
easily learnt. 'The different artifices which they (the Eristics)
employed were collected from all sides, just as they presented
themselves ; and the attempt was never made to combine these
various tactics into a theory, and to arrange them from fixed
points of view. They therefore made their disciples learn quite
mechanically the questions and fallacies which most commonly
came before them." Zeller pre-Socratics II 462. In his note
Zeller quotes Aristotle Soph. El. 34, 183 b 36 ' kai yàp Tŵν
περὶ τοὺς ἐριστικοὺς λόγους μισθαρνούντων ὁμοία τις ἣν ἡ παίδευσις
τη Γοργίου πραγματείᾳ. λόγους γὰρ οἱ μὲν ῥητορικοὺς οἱ δὲ
ἐρωτητικοὺς ἐδίδοσαν ἐκμανθάνειν, εἰς οὓς πλειστάκις ἐμπίπτειν
ᾠήθησαν ἑκάτεροι τοὺς ἀλλήλων λόγους. διόπερ ταχεῖα μὲν ἄτεχνος
δ᾽ ἦν ἡ διδασκαλία τοῖς μανθάνουσι παρ' αὐτῶν, οὐ γὰρ τέχνην ἀλλὰ
τὰ ἀπὸ τῆς τέχνης διδόντες παιδεύειν ὑπελάμβανον, as if a shoe-
maker (says Aristotle) were to give his pupil a number of
ready-made shoes instead of instruction in his trade. ' Cp.
Campbell, General Introduction to the Sophistes and Politicus,
P. xii.
We must remember however that in speaking of ' Eristic,'
we are speaking of something which we hardly know except
from caricatures, especially those by Plato. Who were the
persons who really practised and disseminated the art thus
caricatured ? On this matter I must refer to two papers in the
Journal of Philology, vols. IV pp. 288 foll. and v pp. 66 foll.,
by Dr. Henry Sidgwick, especially the former of them, where,
at p. 298, he says ' I am disposed to think that the Art of
Disputation which is ascribed to Sophists in the Euthydemus
and the Sophistes (and exhaustively analyzed by Aristotle in
the περὶ Σοφιστικῶν Ἐλέγχων) originated entirely with Socrates,
and that he is altogether responsible for the form at least of this
second species of Sophistic (namely eristic, as distinguished
from rhetorical, sophistry). Again, p. 302, ' I conceive, then,
that Socrates was seed and source of a new kind of Sophistry,
the post-Socratic Sophistry, as we may call it, which it was
extremely difficult for the subtlest mind to distinguish from
the profession of Socratic philosophy. '
I have italicized the words for the form at least ' in the
former extract, as the point is important, and is recurred to by
Dr. Sidgwick in the following page : ' I do not see from whom
else ' (than Socrates) ' the method could have been derived-as
far as the form is concerned : for no doubt its sceptical and
 EXCURSUS V 275

destructive aim, and the logical puzzles and paradoxes which

it uses, may be traced to Protagoras and Zeno.'
Eristic was thus the progeny-the ' barren hybrid ' to use
Prof. Campbell's phrase-sprung on the one side from Socrates,
on the other from a line as whose ancestor we must recognize
Zeno of Elea.
In an important passage of the Phaedrus (261 в foll. ), Plato
distinguishes between two classes of men who are skilled in the
warfare of words. The first class are the Rhetoricians, of whom
Gorgias, Thrasymachus, and Theodorus are taken as types.
The others are described as the followers of the Eleatic
Palamedes.' Under this soubriquet ancient and modern
commentators have recognized Zeno of Elea. Dr. Thompson
says in his notes ' That the father of the Eristic sects is here
meant, the context proves to demonstration. ' ' Zeno is well
represented by Palamedes, the " sophist " of the heroic times,
distinguished for his inventive genius. ' (Doubtless the character
of the hero was a deduction from his name, which whether
connected with παλάμη or μηδος lent itself to the same inter-
pretation. ) Aristotle spoke of Zeno as the ' inventor of dialectic '
(Diog. L. Ix 25, 29, cp. VIII 57 ), and we know that many of
the Eristic puzzles were derived from problems that presented
themselves to Zeno. (Grote I 97 ; Zeller pre-Socratics 1 613, 4 ;
R. & P. § 107. )
An important step in the development of Eristic took place
when the problems-chiefly logical and metaphysical - dealt
with by Zeno (and others) were taken up and exploité for their
own purposes by professional teachers or ' sophists. ' This was
done by the man who is asserted to have been the earliest of the
Sophists, Protagoras. We are told by Diogenes Laertius (IX
51) that Protagoras πρῶτος ἔφη δύο λόγους εἶναι περὶ ἅπαντος
πράγματος, ἀντικειμένους ἀλλήλοις, οἷς καὶ συνηρώτα, πρῶτος τοῦτο
πράξας. Further in §§ 52, 3, καὶ τὴν διάνοιαν ἀφείς, πρὸς
τοὔνομα διελέχθη, καὶ τὸ νῦν ἐπιπόλαιον γένος τῶν ἐριστικῶν
ἐγέννησεν. ἵνα καὶ Τίμων φησὶ περὶ αὐτοῦ,
Πρωταγόρης τ᾽ ἐπίμικτος ἐριζέμεναι εὖ εἰδώς.
οὗτος καὶ τὸ Σωκρατικὸν εἶδος τῶν λόγων πρῶτος ἐκίνησε, καὶ
τὸν ᾿Αντισθένους λόγον τὸν πειρώμενον ἀποδεικνύειν ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν
ἀντιλέγειν, οὗτος πρῶτος διείλεκται, καθά φησι Πλάτων ἐν Εὐθυ
δήμῳ (286 €).
The connexion of Protagoras with the subtleties of Zeno is
sufficiently attested . As to the evidence of Plato, besides the
place in the Euthydemus, there is the Theaetetus, where Protagoras
is spoken ofas a man of much dialectic subtlety. He has adopted
the Heraclitean philosophy that there is naught but change,
276 MENO

and on it based a system that denies objective truth, and is

summed up in the aphorism πάντων μέτρον ἄνθρωπος. It is not
mere irony when Socrates ( 164 E) , after refuting this view,
says they would not have disposed of it so easily if its father
(Protagoras) had been alive. Even in the dialogue called after
him, in which his dialectical failure is most conspicuous, he is
represented as acquainted with the common fallacy of Conver-
sion (350 c). Aristotle also gives evidence to the same effect
(R. & P. § 180 ) , and an anecdote related by Simplicius connects
Protagoras with Zeno in regard to one of the stock puzzles
(R. & P. § 104).
The list of the works of Protagoras given by Diogenes (IX
§ 55) begins ‘ τέχνη ἐριστικῶν. περὶ πάλης. It seems probable
(though a different view is taken by Zeller pre- Socr. 11 432),
that we have here one work under two titles, Teρì Táλns being
a metaphorical, and Téxνn épiσTIK@v an explanatory, title. This
may be argued from Plato Soph. 232 D. The only ' practical
men ' (onμloupyoí) here under discussion are those concerned
with laws and politics. The Stranger says Tá ye µǹv tepì taoŵv
τε καὶ κατὰ μίαν ἑκάστην τέχνην, ἃ δεῖ πρὸς ἕκαστον αὐτὸν τὸν
δημιουργὸν ἀντειπείν , δεδημοσιωμένα που καταβέβληνται γεγραμ-
μένα τῷ βουλομένῳ μαθεῖν. To which Theaetetus replies Tà
Πρωταγόρειά μοι φαίνει περί τε πάλης καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνῶν
eipnκéval. Here any allusion to an art of wrestling seems quite
out of place. Cp. D. L. vi § 4 when Antisthenes says (surely
metaphorically) that he is παλαιστικός.
But that Diogenes attributes too much to Protagoras in
making Eristic spring from him alone, Dr. Sidgwick is able to
show (loc. cit. p. 299). Diogenes leaves out of account the
method of application, the weapon, which was supplied by
Socrates. In the Protagoras the defeat of the sophist at the
hands of Socrates is represented as due to the fact that he can
only make long speeches and is incapable of dialectic. 'It
seems to me quite incredible that if Protagoras had really not
only practised, but actually invented, Eristic, as described in
the Sophistes — methodical disputation by short questions and
answers - he could ever have been represented as Plato
represents him in the dialogue which bears his name' . . Again
(p. 300) ' Protagoras, no doubt, was in a manner Eristic, just as
Zeno was, but it was in a rhetorical manner : he very likely
wrote a réxvn épiσTIKŵv, as D. says : but if so we must suppose
it merely to have contained instructions how to make speeches
on both sides of a case, no doubt with the aid of logical
fallacies. ' 1
1 Prof. Campbell is, I think, using misleading expressions when he
speaks of the ' negative dialectic ' of Zeno, and the ' eλeyxos of Zeno ' (notes
 EXCURSUS V 277

To this view of Protagoras' function in substance I incline to

subscribe. But there are one or two considerations that seem
to me to indicate that Protagoras may have made some advance
in the method of disputation. Thus the mistake of Diogenes
will be both smaller and more venial than it would otherwise
appear. In the first place it is to be noted that Protagoras
professes to be able to speak at any length that may be
required. This, says Dr. Sidgwick, is only a bit of his brag. '
It may be noted however that the statement is put forward
by Socrates as a matter of common rumour about Protagoras,
though it is a reputation which Protagoras by no means dis-
claims : 329 Β Πρωταγόρας δὲ ὅδε ἱκανὸς μὲν μακροὺς λόγους καὶ
καλοὺς εἰπεῖν , ὡς αὐτὰ δηλοῖ, ἱκανὸς δὲ καὶ ἐρωτηθεὶς ἀποκρίνασθαι
κατὰ βραχὺ καὶ ἐρόμενος περιμεῖναί τε καὶ ἀποδέξασθαι τὴν
ἀπόκρισιν, ἃ ὀλίγοις ἐστὶ παρεσκευασμένα. In the latter portion
of this passage a distinct claim is made to the art of Dialectic ;
it goes a good deal further than 334 E, where Socrates, again on
common rumour, asserts that Protagoras can put a particular
answer either in short or at length (cp. 335 B). This is merely
a part of the art of Expression, and is a claim also made by
Gorgias (Gorg. 449 c). It seems to me a question whether Plato
would have made Protagoras claim, or popular rumour ascribe to
him, proficiency in this art, if it had been wholly alien from his
practice. It is just because Protagoras does make the claim
that he is so mortified at his failure. Gorgias- though he too
was influenced by Zeno- makes no claim to any cross-
questioning power, and he is little affected by Socrates' success
against him. Theodorus expressly repudiates the art ; he has
never learnt it, and he is not going to begin at his time of life
(Theaet. 146 B) . Hippias pours scorn upon it (Hipp . maj. 301 B,
cp. Hipp. min. 373 A).
It is true that Protagoras is hopelessly defeated by Socrates,
and this is taken as showing that the method of question and
answer, in all its forms, was unfamiliar to him. I will not
insist on the point that Plato is playing both sides of the game ;
it may of course be answered that the coarsest satirist would
not describe a man as quite unskilled in an art which he
himself invented . ' But the difference between the two things
must be remembered. Not only were the topics of the Socratic
elenchus generally different from those of Eristic, but the
Elenchus was a Method ; Eristic was not. The Eristic in the
hands of Socrates was liable to find himself in the same pre-
on the Sophistes, p. 3). Not much stress can be laid on Soph. 217 c,
attributing the method of questions to ' Parmenides,' as the reference is
probably merely to Plato's dialogue of that name. See Art. ' Sophist ' in
Encyc. Brit. IX 270 a.
278 ΜΕΝΟ

dicament as a man in a foreign land who has tried to get up the

language from a conversation -book.
In the article ' Sophist ' in the Encyc. Brit. the view is taken
that there was a large element of Eristic, contemporary with,
and independent of, Socrates. See p. 267 b ' Incidentally we
gather two important facts, ( 1 ) that contemporary with the
dialectic of Socrates there was an eristic, (2) that this eristic
was mainly applied to ethical questions ' ; also the arguments
adduced ibid. p. 270 a, and Archer-Hind on Phaedo 90 c.
The difficulty, however, of identifying these Eristic Sophists
is great, and on the whole I believe that wherever we find
in Plato the word εριστικός (or its synonym ἀντιλογικός)
certain persons are held in view who were in fact, either
directly or indirectly, pupils of Socrates. These are first and
foremost Euclides of Megara and his school, of whom Diogenes
Laertius says (II 106) οἱ ἀπ᾿ αὐτοῦ Μεγαρικοὶ προσηγορεύοντο,
εἶτ᾽ ἐριστικοί, ὕστερον δὲ διαλεκτικοί, οὓς οὕτως ὠνόμασε πρῶτος
Διονύσιος ὁ Χαλκηδόνιος διὰ τὸ πρὸς ἐρώτησιν καὶ ἀπόκρισιν τοὺς
λόγους διατίθεσθαι. In the same author (II 30) we doubtless
have a tradition of some rival Socratic school : ( Socrates) ὁρῶν
Εὐκλείδην ἐσπουδακότα περὶ τοὺς ἐριστικοὺς λόγους, ὦ Εὐκλείδη,
ἔφη, σοφίσταις μὲν δυνήσει χρῆσθαι, ἀνθρώποις δὲ οὐδαμῶς.
The other school glanced at by Plato, under this name, is
that of Antisthenes. In Soph. 251 B the Eleatic stranger says
that by attempting predication ( by saying that ër is πολλά, or
πολλά, ἕν) τοῖς τε νέοις καὶ τῶν γερόντων τοῖς ὀψιμαθέσι θοίνην
παρεσκευάκαμεν : these ὀψιμαθεῖς, we read, χαίρουσιν οὐκ ἐῶντες
ἀγαθὸν λέγειν ἄνθρωπον, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν ἀγαθὸν ἀγαθόν, τὸν δὲ
ἄνθρωπον ἄνθρωπον. ἐντυγχάνεις γάρ, ὦ Θεαίτητε, ὡς ἐγᾦμαι,
πολλάκις τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐσπουδακόσιν, ἐνίοτε πρεσβυτέροις ἀνθρώ-
ποις, καὶ ὑπὸ πενίας τῆς περὶ φρόνησιν κτήσεως τὰ
τοιαῦτα τεθαυμακόσι, καὶ δή τι καὶ πάσσοφον οἰομένοις τοῦτ᾽ αὐτὸ
ἀνευρηκέναι. It was this very quibble about predication,
arising out of a misunderstanding of the nature of the copula,
that was characteristic of Antisthenes. (Grote II 434, III 521 ;
Zeller Socrates p. 297, pre- Socr. II 456 note. )
The word ouaons seems to show that the actual persons
indicated were rather pupils of Antisthenes, than A. himself,
who was only some five years older than Plato (Dr. Thompson
Phaedrus p. 175 note).¹ It was one point about Eristic that
it took so short a time to learn that it was never too late to
begin. The word véous also has its point : mere schoolboys
were able to learn Eristic : see Rep. 498 A, 539 B. The last
1 The date of his birth is uncertain (R. & P. 214 ; Zeller Socr. 285, 6).
I do not know on what grounds Ueb. -Heinze (p. 129) place it at ' about
444 B.C.' Even so he would not be more than 45 at Socrates' death.
 EXCURSUS V 279

words of the extract contain a personal hit. Antisthenes was

poor in worldly goods, and yet when asked (Xen. Symp. iii 8)
on what he prides himself, he says éπì πλouтw. Subsequently
(iv 34) he explains that the wealth of which he was speaking
was wealth of mind. The anecdote may well have a historical
basis, and thus give point to Plato's gibe in the Theaetetus,
that Antisthenes was as poor in opóvnois as in gold or lands.
The attack on Eristic in the Euthydemus is levelled mainly
at him (Grote 1 537 note ; Zeller p. 119) . The chief evidence
for this is the mock eulogy on the Eristics pronounced by
Socrates near the end of the dialogue (303 c foll. ) . Socrates
praises them on three grounds. The first is that they only
care for the approbation of people like themselves. The
second is a ' really popular and kindly feature ' ; by for-
bidding us to speak of anything as ' fair, ' or ' good, ' or ' white, '
and indeed disallowing predication altogether, they not only
stop the mouths of others, but, what is more, their own ; so no
one can be offended : τοῦτο πάνυ χαρίεν τέ ἐστι καὶ τὸ ἐπαχθὲς
τῶν λόγων ἀφαιρεῖται. The reference to Antisthenes is here
unmistakable. The third point is that any one can learn the
art in a short time ; he has noticed how soon Ctesippus was
able to pick it up.
Antisthenes, the sincerity of whose purpose cannot be
doubted, and whose whole interest lay with questions of
Conduct, was glad of a short cut that abridged the field of
philosophy which he regarded as superfluous and which he
was indeed unable to appreciate (Zeller Socrates pp. 292 foll. ).
And though sincere himself he was the father of a sect who
brought philosophy into contempt, much as the mendicant
friars did religion at a later day.
Plato and Antisthenes were thoroughly antipathetic. Plato
loved the pleasures of Reason, and probably was not indifferent
to the pleasures of Sense ; Antisthenes would rather be visited
by Madness than Pleasure (Diog. L. vI 3). Indeed Plato's
feud with him may well have been fiercer than against
Euclides, if only because Antisthenes lived in Athens, while
Euclides was at Megara.
It is important to remember that at the time when the
Meno was written, the three men whom Plato had chiefly to
regard as heads of rival schools were Isocrates the rhetor,
Euclides, and Antisthenes. Each of these four men , as κεραμεὺς
Kepaμeî, was engaged in continual wrangle with each of the others.
The works of two of them are before us to speak for themselves ;
the titles of the works of the two others, preserved by Diogenes
Laertius, are sufficient to show the part they played. But
even in reading the works of the two surviving authors we
280 MENO

have to work to a great extent blindfold in making out the

history of this literary feud ' ; as the etiquette of the time,
borrowed perhaps from Comedy, which no longer lampooned
individuals by name, discouraged the introduction of the names
of living persons. The terms ' Sophist, ' ' Rhetor, ' ' Eristic'
have all become mere polemic missiles ; Isocrates includes
Plato with Euclides and Antisthenes as Eristics ; Plato calls
Euclides and Antisthenes Eristics, and Isocrates a Rhetor or
Onunyopos ; while each of the four was to himself a ' philosopher,'
and to hisbrother teacher a ' sophist ' (see Dr. Thompson's Gorgias,
App. I pp. 177 foll.; Zeller pre- Socratics II 432 ). There
was perhaps no form of attack to which Plato was more sensitive
than that which identified him with a class of teachers whom
he hated as cheapening Philosophy and bringing it into
contempt. Hence his continual endeavour to draw a broad
line between Eristic and the Elenchus, of which latter he felt
himself the lawful proprietor as the heir of Socrates.
For a list of passages in Plato bearing on ἐριστική οι ἀντι-
Xoyiký see Campbell, Introduction to the Sophist p. liv, note,
and Sidgwick in J. P. IV 304 foll.
The earliest reference to Eristic in Plato appears to be in
the Lysis 211 B (Socrates, about to converse with Menexenus,
is addressing Lysis) : ἀλλὰ ὅρα ὅπως ἐπικουρήσεις μοι, ἐάν με
ἐλέγχειν ἐπιχειρῇ ὁ Μενέξενος · ἢ οὐκ οἶσθα ὅτι ἐριστικός ἐστιν ;
Ναὶ μὰ Δία, ἔφη, σφόδρα γε · διὰ ταῦτά τοι καὶ βούλομαί σε αὐτῷ
διαλέγεσθαι. Ἵνα, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, καταγέλαστος γένωμαι ; Οὐ μὰ Δία,
ἔφη, ἀλλ᾽ ἵνα αὐτὸν κολάσῃς. Πόθεν ; ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ · οὐ ῥᾴδιον · δεινὸς
γὰρ ὁ ἄνθρωπος, Κτησίππου μαθητής. Later in the dialogue,
after the paradox has been broached that everything loves its
opposite (216 Α), εἶεν · ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ · οὐκ ἀλλόκοτον , ὦ Μενέξενε ;
καὶ ἡμῖν εὐθὺς ἄσμενοι ἐπιπηδήσονται οὗτοι οἱ πάσσοφοι ἄνδρες, οἱ
ȧvTiλoyikol, and will ask us if Love is not opposite to Hate,
and whether Hate loves Love, and so forth.
Here it is extremely difficult to identify the epiσtikoí or
avriλoyikoi, though I think that a definite recognizable class is
indicated. We naturally look to find in them some con-
temporaries of Socrates, and indeed it must be allowed that
if the Eristics of Plato are always post-Socratic, an anachronism
is involved in making Socrates speak of them as he does.
Further, if the Eristics of the Euthydemus really derived their
art from Socrates, how extraordinary is the position that
Socrates is there made to take up in regard to them ! And yet
such were the dramatic exigencies when Plato had once deter-
mined to make Socrates the mouthpiece of his own views. (See
1 Sidgwick however (J.P. iv 305) thinks that the use of epiσTikós in
the Lysis is ' untechnical.'
 EXCURSUS V 281

Zeller p. 95. ) And the anachronism is not greater than many

others that we find in utterances put into the mouth of Socrates
by Plato. The traditions of the drama demanded little of
consistency or realism, nor was the philosophic dialogue much
more rigorous. So I think it not impossible that in Menexenus,
of whom Socrates is so afraid, we must find a pupil who has
borrowed his arms (indirectly ) from Socrates himself. But the
complications extend farther. Ctesippus in the Euthydemus,
and Menexenus in the dialogue named after him, appear as
pupils of Socrates. Ctesippus, as genuine disciple of Socrates,
at first vigorously takes up arms against the two Eristics, who
are themselves (though Plato_gives no hint of this) indirect
and unrecognized disciples. Towards the end of the dialogue
Ctesippus has mastered their art. The Lysis, though almost
certainly earlier than the Euthydemus, may have a later
dramatic date, and so regard Ctesippus as having already got
up Eristic, and passed on his lightly- won acquisition to Mene-
xenus. Thus it would seem that Ctesippus besides being son
of Socrates is also his-shall we say ?-great-grandson ; while
Menexenus, also his son, is, through Antisthenes, Euthydemus
and Ctesippus, one generation yet farther removed.
A late date for the dialogue Euthydemus is claimed by
Sidgwick (ut sup. p. 306), who would assign it to the same
period as the Sophist. This is on the ground that it expressly
identifies Eristic with Sophistic, speaking of Euthydemus and
his mate as ' Sophists.' But were the successive uses of the
word ' Sophist ' so well defined that we can infer a late date
for this dialogue from the fact that Plato therein applies the
title to a class of teachers who were certainly in existence soon
after the death of Socrates, and of whom Plato must always
have disapproved , whether he happened to call them ' Sophists '
or not ? I cannot then see any necessity for placing the
Euthydemus any later than the Republic, or for not placing
it, as H. Jackson does, among the Educational dialogues
leading up to that work.
But who were Euthydemus and Dionysodorus ? Unless
they, directly or indirectly, derived their art from Socrates, the
whole theory of the Socratic origin of Eristic breaks down.
That they were ever direct pupils of Socrates his attitude to
them makes dramatically impossible. But that they may have
been pupils of Euclides or Antisthenes is not at all impossible.
Socrates could hardly be made to face his own spiritual children
without recognizing them ; the same obligation does not hold
of spiritual grandchildren.
That Euthydemus and Dionysodorus were real persons may,
I think, be assumed. Grote indeed (1 536) says ' That they
282 ΜΕΝΟ

correspond to any actual persons at Athens is neither6 proved

nor provable.' Schleiermacher, on the other hand, cannot
make out who the two Sophists were personally, but he
conceives them as obscure persons, deserving no notice ' (ibid.
p. 537 note). There is no other instance, apparently, in Plato,
of imaginary persons introduced with names ( Zeller pre- Socr.
II 425 note 4). Euthydemus is mentioned in the Cratylus
386 D, where the phrase οὐδὲ κατ᾽ Εὐθύδημόν γε is proverbial
for οὐδὲ κατ᾽ ἐριστικήν. Here it is of course not impossible that
the proverb should have been drawn from a fictitious character,
but surely unlikely (Zeller pre- Socr. 11 457 note). Euthydemus
is also mentioned as the author of sophisms by Aristotle Soph.
El. ch. 20 177 b 12, and Rhet. 11 ch. 24 = 1401 a 26, and it
happens that the particular sophisms that Aristotle quotes are
not found in Plato's Euthydemus. Dionysodorus is probably
the same person who is mentioned by Xen. (Mem. III i 1 ) as
professing the art of strategy (cp. Euthyd. 271 D).
There is no explicit allusion to Eristic in the Gorgias. ' In
the Meno, which I should place between the Gorgias and the
Republic, we have Sophistic and Eristic side by side and un-
connected. The Sophists are still our old friends : they are not
exactly attacked : they are even half-defended against Anytus.
But Eristic is noticed quite independently : it is contrasted
with the method of Socrates as a perverse kind of Dialectic '
(Sidgwick ut supra p. 305). At a later time not only is the
Eristic included by Plato in the class ' Sophist, ' but it is the
type which the term Sophist pre- eminently suggests.
In the Phaedrus 261 B foll. we have the distinction , already
mentioned, between the two kinds of adverse speakers '
(ȧvriλoyikoi), first the Rhetoricians, Gorgias, etc.; then the
6 descendants of the Eleatic Palamedes. '
In the Rep. 453 E Socr. and Glaucon have acknowledged ä››ŋv
φύσιν ἄλλο δεῖν ἐπιτηδεύειν, γυναικὸς δὲ καὶ ἀνδρὸς ἄλλην εἶναι.
Yet they are proposing to give the same employment to men
and women. How can they reconcile this ? Socrates proceeds :
Η γενναία, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ , ὦ Γλαύκων, ἡ δύναμις τῆς ἀντιλογικῆς
τέχνης. Τί δή ; Οτι, εἶπον, δοκοῦσί μοι εἰς αὐτὴν καὶ ἄκοντες
πολλοὶ ἐμπίπτειν καὶ οἴεσθαι οὐκ ἐρίζειν, ἀλλὰ διαλέγεσθαι, διὰ τὸ
μὴ δύνασθαι κατ᾽ εἴδη διαιρούμενοι τὸ λεγόμενον ἐπισκοπεῖν, ἀλλὰ
κατ᾿ αὐτὸ τὸ ὄνομα διώκειν τοῦ λεχθέντος τὴν ἐναντίωσιν , ἔριδι;
οὐ διαλέκτῳ, πρὸς ἀλλήλους χρώμενοι. Socrates in what follows
applies this to their own case. They have accepted πávv
ἀνδρείως τε καὶ ἐριστικῶς the word ἄλλην as a verbal counter,
without considering whether the Otherness of sex is relevant to
the Otherness of employment. Here ȧvтiλoyiкý is represented
as differing from Dialectic, not by any perverse intent, but by
 EXCURSUS V 283

imperfect training and limitation of view. Somewhat later in

the dialogue (498 foll . ) we find it strongly insisted upon that
education in philosophy shall be thorough and shall not begin
too early. Those short, cheap courses taken before the mind is
mature for the subject, and in the intervals of practical business
(cp. Euthyd. 304 c), are worse than useless. They leave no
abiding impression, and stand in the way of anything better.
In fact men have never had a chance of getting acquainted with
real Philosophy, which aims at Truth and keeps at a distance
τὰ κομψά τε καὶ ἐριστικὰ καὶ μηδαμόσε ἄλλοσε τείνοντα ἢ πρὸς
δόξαν καὶ ἔριν καὶ ἐν δίκαις καὶ ἐν ἰδίαις συνουσίαις (199 Α).
Similar is the tendency of a later passage 539 в : philosophy
must not be begun too young : οἶμαι γάρ σε οὐ λεληθέναι ὅτι
οἱ μειρακίσκοι, ὅταν τὸ πρῶτον λόγων γεύωνται, ὡς παιδιᾷ
αὐτοῖς καταχρῶνται, ἀεὶ εἰς ἀντιλογίαν χρώμενοι, καὶ μιμούμενοι
τοὺς ἐξελέγχοντας αὐτοὶ ἄλλους ἐλέγχουσι, χαίροντες ὥσπερ
σκυλάκια τῷ ἕλκειν τε καὶ σπαράττειν τῷ λόγῳ τοὺς πλησίον
ἀεί. An older man approaches the thing in a more earnest
spirit and is μετριώτερος (ep. the word at Soph. 216 Β quoted
below).
In Phaedo 89 D foll. , on the ἀντιλογικοί is thrown the blame
for the existence of certain μισόλογοι-haters of philosophy.
(See Archer-Hind's note on ἄνω καὶ κάτω στρέφεται 90 c. ) Cp.
101 E, where their defective dialectic is pointed out. In the
Theaetetus at 154 D Socrates tells Theaetetus that if he answers
contrary to his opinion Ευριπιδεῖόν τι ξυμβήσεται · ἡ μὲν γὰρ
γλῶττα ἀνέλεγκτος ἡμῖν ἔσται, ἡ δὲ φρὴν οὐκ ἀνέλεγκτος. ΘΕΑΙ.
᾿Αληθή. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν εἰ μὲν δεινοὶ καὶ σοφοὶ ἐγώ τε καὶ σὺ ἦμεν,
πάντα τὰ τῶν φρενῶν ἐξητακότες, ἤδη ἂν τὸ λοιπὸν ἐκ περιουσίας
ἀλλήλων ἀποπειρώμενοι, συνελθόντες σοφιστικῶς εἰς μάχην τοιαύτην,
ἀλλήλων τοὺς λόγους τοῖς λόγοις ἐκρούομεν— but as we are poor
ordinary creatures in pursuit of Truth, we have no time for
such frivolities (Sidgwick ut supra p. 306 notes that here Eristic
is definitely identified with Sophistic). Then at 165 D E we have
the picture of the Eristie free - lance, the πελταστικὸς ἀνὴρ
μισθόφορος ἐν λόγοις. Lastly, at 197 A , how will Socrates (asks
Theaetetus) carry on discourse if he is debarred from such
words as ἀγνοεῖν and συνιέναι ? Socrates does not know ; εἰ
μέντοι ἦν ἀντιλογικός, he says, he would not only have professed
to abstain from these phrases, but have come down sharply on
any one who used them.
In the Sophistes we are introduced to a Stranger, τὸ μὲν
γένος ἐξ Ελέας, ἑταῖρον δὲ τῶν ἀμφὶ Παρμενίδην καὶ Ζήνωνα, μάλα
δὲ ἄνδρα φιλόσοφον. Can this be some Higher Power come to
convict us of ignorance, θεὸς ὢν τις ελεγκτικός ? asks Socrates.
Theodorus replies Οὐχ οὗτος ὁ τρόπος, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοῦ ξένου,
284 ΜΕΝΟ

ἀλλὰ μετριώτερος τῶν περὶ τὰς ἔριδας ἐσπουδακότων. He is no

mere Eristic.
In what follows, the fourth¹ of the ' preliminary definitions'
of the Sophist clearly corresponds to the Eristic : τὸ χρηματι-
στικὸν γένος, ἐριστικῆς ὂν τέχνης, τῆς ἀντιλογικῆς, κτέ. ( 226 Α) .
Following this we have a definition which unmistakeably points
to Socrates himself or his true followers . It is summed up at
231 Β : τῆς δὲ παιδευτικῆς ὁ περὶ τὴν μάταιον δοξοσοφίαν γιγνό-
μενος ἔλεγχος ἐν τῷ νῦν λόγῳ παραφανέντι μηδὲν ἄλλ᾽ ἡμῖν εἶναι
λεγέσθω πλὴν ἡ γένει γενναία σοφιστική.
The final definition makes the sophist a conscious impostor,
and that of two kinds (Soph. 268 B foll . ) : τὸν μὲν δημοσίᾳ τε
καὶ μακροῖς λόγοις πρὸς πλῆθος εἰρωνεύεσθαι καθορῶ, τὸν δὲ ἰδίᾳ
καὶ βραχέσι λόγοις ἀναγκάζοντα τὸν προσδιαλεγόμενον ἐναντιολογεῖν
αὐτὸν αὑτῷ κτέ.
In this dialogue the Sophist, as Sidgwick (ut supra p. 296)
points out, is ' expressly contrasted with both the Statesman
and the Rhetor.' That is, he has ousted from the title the
persons who in the earlier dialogues are chiefly before one's
mind when ' sophists ' are spoken of. He resembles the true
Dialectician as a wolf does a dog.'
The last passage in Plato demanding notice is Phil. 17 A.
Right Classification is the special faculty of the διαλεκτικός (ep.
Phaedr. 266 B) : οἱ δὲ νῦν τῶν ἀνθρώπων σοφοί (i.e. the half-
educated ' imperfect ' Socratics ), instead of making sub-classes, go
straight from the One to the infinity of particulars : τὰ δὲ μέσα
αὐτοὺς ἐκφεύγει, οἷς διακεχώρισται τό τε διαλεκτικῶς πάλιν καὶ τὸ
ἐριστικῶς ἡμᾶς ποιεῖσθαι πρὸς ἀλλήλους τοὺς λόγους (See W. H. Τ.
in J.P. VIII 301).
The chief references to Eristic in Isocrates are the following :
(see Sidgwick ut supra pp. 292, 293 ; Dr. Thompson's Phaedrus
pp. 172 foll.; also note on 100 A 6).
In the oration κατὰ τῶν Σοφιστών, an early work, the word
ἐριστικός does not occur ; but near the beginning we read τις
γὰρ οὐκ ἂν μισήσειεν ἅμα καὶ καταφρονήσειε πρῶτον μὲν τῶν περὶ
τὰς ἔριδας διατριβόντων οἳ προσποιοῦνται μὲν τὴν ἀλήθειαν ζητεῖν
κτέ. ; § 20 the composers of the old τέχναι were worse τῶν περὶ
τὰς ἔριδας καλινδουμένων.
At the beginning of the Helena (10) after the references to
Antisthenes and Plato, we have the followers of Euclides spoken
1 Or, in the later summary, the fifth (231 Ε) τῆς ἀγωνιστικῆς περὶ λόγους
τις ἀθλητής, τὴν ἐριστικὴν τέχνην ἀφωρισμένος. On this definition the Encyc.
Brit. Art. Sophist, ' p. 267 a notes that it makes the matter of anti-logic
' Justice,' ' Injustice ' and other abstractions (225 c) : further, that it
represents the earlier eristics, contemporaries of Socrates, whom it was
necessary to distinguish from the teachers of forensic oratory. ” (See p. 278.)
2 Or at 231 Ε δοξῶν ἐμποδίων μαθήμασι περὶ ψυχὴν καθαρτής.
 EXCURSUS V 285

of thus : ἄλλοι δὲ περὶ τὰς ἔριδας διατρίβουσι τὰς οὐδὲν μὲν

ὠφελούσας κτέ.
In the tract ad Nicoclem (2) 51 we read : περὶ μὲν τῶν γυμνα-
σίων τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς ἀμφισβητοῦσιν οἱ περὶ τὴν φιλοσοφίαν ὄντες, καί
φασιν οἱ μὲν διὰ τῶν ἐριστικῶν λόγων , οἱ δὲ διὰ τῶν πολιτικῶν, οἱ
δὲ δι᾽ ἄλλων τινῶν φρονιμωτέρους ἔσεσθαι τοὺς αὑτοῖς πλησιάζοντας.
In the Antidosis ( 15) 45 we are told that some work at
mythology, some on the poets, some on military history : ἄλλοι
δέ τινες περὶ τὰς ἐρωτήσεις καὶ ἀποκρίσεις γεγόνασιν , οὓς ἀντιλο-
γικοὺς καλοῦσιν.
In § 258 of the same work we read τῶν περὶ τὰς ἔριδας
σπουδαζόντων ἔνιοί τινες ὁμοίως βλασφημοῦσι περὶ τῶν λόγων τῶν
κοινῶν καὶ τῶν χρησίμων ὥσπερ οἱ φαυλότατοι τῶν ἀνθρώπων.
This is aimed at Plato (Sidgwick ut supra p. 293) : § 261
ἡγοῦμαι γὰρ καὶ τοὺς ἐν τοῖς ἐριστικοῖς λόγοις δυναστεύοντας (again
Plato and his school) καὶ τοὺς περὶ τὴν ἀστρολογίαν καὶ τὴν
γεωμετρίαν καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν μαθημάτων διατρίβοντας οὐ βλά-
πτειν ἀλλ᾽ ὠφελεῖν τοὺς συνόντας, ἐλάττω μὲν ὧν ὑπισχνοῦνται,
πλείω δ᾽ ὧν τοῖς ἄλλοις δοκοῦσιν.
In the Panathenaicus, his latest work, published in 339 B.C.
after Plato's death, he adopts much the same tone as in the
Antidosis : (I have much respect for the current education) λέγω
δὲ τήν τε γεωμετρίαν καὶ τὴν ἀστρολογίαν καὶ τοὺς διαλόγους
τοὺς ἐριστικοὺς καλουμένους : but these things are only for boys ;
and so forth (Jebb Attic Orators II 131).
There are many allusions to Eristic in Aristotle. It may be
assumed that these are in all cases aimed at rival post- Socratic
schools, that is chiefly the ' imperfect ' schools of the6 Megarians
and Cynics (Sidgwick in J.P. v 70, 71 ). The Sophistici
Elenchi'-'-an appendix to the Topica-is a series of solutions
of eristic puzzles. At ii 2 = 165 b 7 he defines ἐριστικοὶ λόγοι
as οἱ ἐκ τῶν φαινομένων ἐνδόξων, μὴ ὄντων δέ, συλλογιστικοὶ ἢ
φαινόμενοι συλλογιστικοί. The following places may also be
referred to : Τοpica VIII xi l foll. , especially δυσκολαίνοντες οὖν
ἀγωνιστικὰς καὶ οὐ διαλεκτικὰς ποιοῦντες τὰς διατριβάς (see Grote
Aristotle p. 366) ; Rhet. I xi 15 = 1371 a 7 (see Cope's note) and
II xxiv = 1402 a 5 and 14.
286 MENO

EXCURSUS VI

THE DOCTRINE OF TRANSMIGRATION IN PLATO (on 81 A 21 ff. )

The belief that the soul has some persistence after death,
that the ghost of a man has power at least for some time after
it has quitted the body, was shared by the early Greeks with
many primitive races. This stage of belief we find in Homer
(Il. xxiii 65 foll.; Od. x1 ) . Already in Homer we also note
the emergence of a belief in certain future rewards and
punishments. But from this primitive belief to the doctrines
of Immortality and Transmigration is a considerable step.
Transmigration implies not merely a dream-like echo of life
reverberating after death, but a series of lives each as real and
vivid as the present, or even more so. How was this step
taken by the Greeks ?
To this question Zeller answers that in this matter the
mysteries, especially the Orphic, do seem to have acted as the
teachers of a higher truth. "The doctrine of metempsychosis
seems really to have passed from the theology of the mysteries
into Philosophy.' ' In the Orphic theology transmigration is
clearly to be found, and the probabilities are very strongly
against its having come there through the medium of the
philosophers ' (Zeller pre- Socratics, I pp. 69, 71 ) . Plato
nowhere definitely connects the notion of transmigration with
the Orphics. In the Phaedo 70 c, he speaks of transmigration
simply as a maλaiòs λóyos. But in the Cratylus 400 c oi àµpi
'Oppéa are credited with a doctrine which is at any rate closely
connected with Transmigration, namely that the body is a
prison in which the soul is pent in punishment for some ancient
sin. With this we may connect Phaedo 62 в o pèv ovv èv
ἀπορρήτοις λεγόμενος περὶ αὐτῶν λόγος ὡς ἔν τινι φρουρᾷ ἐσμὲν οἱ
aveрwπоι KтE. , where ' the ancient commentators explain that the
Orphic traditions are meant. '
Cicero indeed (Tusc. Disp. 1 § 38) speaks of Pherecydes of
Scyrus as the first who taught the doctrine of transmigration.
The evidence is late and poor, and is rejected by Zeller. It is
possible that its foundation is the statement of Theopompus
(Diog. L. 1 § 116) τοῦτον ( Pherecydes) πρῶτον περὶ φύσεως καὶ
θεῶν Ἕλλησι γράψαι. But the doctrine of transmigration may
have been taught long before it was committed to writing. The
 EXCURSUS VI 287

mythical element is very large in the accounts of Pherecydes.

Suidas says of him that no one trained him, ἀλλ᾽ αὑτὸν ἠσκηκέναι
κτησάμενον τὰ Φοινίκων ἀπόκρυφα βιβλία, that he divides with
Cadmus of Miletus the reputation of being the first prose-writer,
καὶ πρῶτον τὸν περὶ τῆς μετεμψυχώσεως λόγον εἰσηγήσασθαι.
The question whence the Orphics derived their doctrine is
hard to answer . Herodotus (1 123) says it was derived from
Egypt : πρῶτοι δὲ καὶ τόνδε τὸν λόγον Αἰγύπτιοί εἰσι οἱ εἰπόντες,
ὡς ἀνθρώπου ψυχὴ ἀθάνατός ἐστι, τοῦ σώματος δὲ καταφθίνοντος εἰς
ἄλλο ζῷον αἰεὶ γιγνόμενον ἐσδύεται · ἐπεὰν δὲ πάντα περιέλθῃ τὰ
χερσαία καὶ τὰ θαλάσσια καὶ τὰ πετεινά, αὖτις ἐς ἀνθρώπου σῶμα
γινόμενον ἐσδύνειν · τὴν περιήλυσιν δὲ αὐτῇ γίνεσθαι ἐν τρισχιλίοισι
ἔτεσι. τούτῳ τῷ λόγῳ εἰσὶ οἳ Ἑλλήνων ἐχρήσαντο, οἱ μὲν πρότερον,
οἱ δὲ ὕστερον, ὡς ἰδίῳ ἑωυτῶν ἐόντι · τῶν ἐγὼ εἰδὼς τὰ οὐνόματα
où ypápw. (At ch. 81 he says that the Orphic or Bacchic
rites are really Egyptian. ) It is clear from this passage that
some of those who taught the doctrine of transmigration in
Greece, acknowledged no indebtedness to Egypt . It may be
that Herodotus, finding similar doctrines in Egypt, supposed
that the Greeks had borrowed them, a notion which his priestly
informers naturally encouraged. Grote (11 202 ) speaks of the
belief in metempsychosis as having its root in the Egyptian
and Oriental religions.' But Zeller shows how easily such a
doctrine may have grown up independently on Greek soil. 'If
the soul is conceived as a breath- like essence which dwells in
the body, and leaves it after death, the question inevitably
arises whence this essence comes, and whither it goes. For
answer to this question, a child -like imagination most easily
satisfied with the simple notion that there is a place, invisible
to us, in which the departed souls remain, and from which the
newly-born come forth. From this there is but a step to the
theory that the same souls which previously inhabited a body
should afterwards enter another body " (pre- Socratics I p. 73
note). We may point to the sixth century B. C. as an epoch to
which important advances in Greek religious thought may be
referred (Ânrich, das antike Mysterienwesen).
The doctrine of Transmigration played an important part in
the system of the Pythagoreans. It does not appear, however,
that the school claimed to have originated the doctrine ; and
the probable conclusion is that they received it from the
Orphics, with whom they were closely connected.
Plato unmistakeably copied his mythical descriptions of
the soul after death from the Pythagoreans (Zeller pre- Socr.
I 482). At Gorg. 492 E foll. we have the etymology σua from
onua suggested, the body being the tomb of the soul. (Cp.
Phaedr. 250 € καθαροὶ ὄντες καὶ ἀσήμαντοι τούτου ὃ νῦν σῶμα
288 MENO

περιφέροντες ὀνομάζομεν, ὀστρέου τρόπον δεδεσμευμένοι. ) That

the passage in the Gorgias is drawn from the Pythagorean
Philolaus is made almost certain by Dr. Thompson in his note.
In the words that follow, καὶ τοῦτο ἄρα τις μυθολογῶν κομψὸς ἀνὴρ
ἴσως Σικελός τις ἢ Ἰταλικός, the reference is still to Philolaus,
not to Empedocles, as some have thought. For as the
proverbial expression was Σίκελος κομψὸς ἀνήρ, why should the
amendment'Iтaλkós have been added, unless because the
writer referred to was really an Italian, as Philolaus, rather
than a Sicilian, as Empedocles ? (Zeller Plato 126, note 81 ).
In the Cratylus 400 B c (quoted above) there appears a slight
divergence between the Orphics and the Pythagoreans. We are
told that some (Ties) connect oŵua with onμa ; these we may
conclude to be the Pythagoreans, as in the passages from the
Gorgias and Phaedrus just referred to. Socrates prefers the
etymology connecting σῶμα with σῴζεσθαι, which οἱ ἀμφὶ
Ορφέα support.
'
But however much of mythical material Plato may have
borrowed from the Pythagoreans, his debt to them as regards
any philosophic account of the soul is almost nothing. The
Pythagoreans hardly attempted to connect their views of the
future state, the product of moral instinct and poetic imagina-
tion, with the more scientific parts of their system ( Zeller
pre-Socr. 1 485-7). It may be remarked that though Philolaus
is once mentioned in the Phaedo as discountenancing suicide,
yet Kebes has ' heard nothing clear from him ' ; and there is no
hint of Pythagorean sources in any of the philosophic theorems
on which the arguments for immortality in that dialogue are
based.
In much the same position stand Heraclitus and Empedocles,
who held similar views. Of Heraclitus, Zeller says : ' It is
doubtless his opinion that souls enter the body from a higher
existence, and after death, when they have proved themselves
worthy of this privilege, they return as daemons into a purer
life ' (ut supra II 87). But this view is in no way co-ordinated
with his general philosophy.
So with regard to Empedocles. In a well-known passage he
introduces a fallen spirit explaining that any dalμwv who sins
is doomed to wander for 30,000 pai from the society of the
Blessed,
φυόμενον παντοῖα διὰ χρόνου εἴδεα θνητῶν,
ἀργαλέας βιότοιο μεταλλάσσοντα κελεύθους.
ὧν καὶ ἐγὼ νῦν εἰμι, φυγὰς θεόθεν καὶ ἀλήτης.
But interesting as is this and his other utterances about the
history of the soul, the whole topic is an excrescence on his
 EXCURSUS VI 289

system . ' There remains only the supposition that he adopted

the doctrine of Metempsychosis and all depending on it, from
the Orphico - Pythagorean tradition, without combining it
scientifically with his philosophic convictions advanced in
another place and in another connexion ' (Zeller ut supra II 177).
Thus for a long time the stream of myth and that of philo-
sophy ran on side by side, touching, but hardly commingling.
A scientific basis was first given to the belief in immortality
by Plato ' (Zeller ut supra 1 74). This basis is found in the
doctrine of Ideas.
To examine the progress of Plato's views as shown in his
various myths of the soul's history is an interesting, but very
difficult task. In the suggestions that we have as to the future
state in Apol. 40 E foll. , there is but little advance from the
Homeric standpoint. In the myth that concludes the Gorgias,
the material is again of the simplest kind. After death the
good are sent to the Islands of the Blest, the bad to Tartarus,
and the only refinement is the distinction between curable and
incurable sinners (526 B) . The case is very different when we
come to the Phaedrus, the Republic and the Phaedo. What-
ever may have been the order in which these dialogues were
written, they agree in this, that in each the mythical material
is accompanied by an assertion of the soul's commerce with
Ideas, and a demonstration of its immortality. Finally in the
Timaeus we have myth and philosophy fused into one.
In the Phaedrus after the proof of immortality given in
ch. xxiv (245 c-246 A) follows the myth of the soul's history
a masterpiece of the author's myth-making genius : the ex-
emplary specimen of an art of which he has left us many other
instances, but none so brilliant and elaborate. ' I quote from Dr.
Thompson, Intr. p. xviii, who proceeds : ' In one respect, indeed,
this discourse may be said to differ from similar philosophical
myths which are scattered in the Platonic writings ; it is, in most
of its parts, a deliberate allegory, in which the thing signified
is designed to be intelligible to the instructed hearer or reader.'
In his note on 246 D, however, he admits that ' the sign and
the thing signified are intentionally fused. ' And indeed a
close examination reveals (as must be the case with almost any
allegory) not merely certain gaps in the statement, but incon-
sistencies.
The soul is likened to a winged charioteer driving a winged
pair of horses. By this we have figured the tripartite division
of the soul, as explained in the Republic. The charioteer is
Reason, the two steeds are Spirit and Appetite. All three
elements are in the original state winged (251 B). With the
gods both charioteer and horses are noble, but with other souls
U
290 MENO

the steed Appetite is of a baser strain . The ' wing ' does not
represent any part of the soul ; but something material with
which the soul is linked. Though the wing is of the nature
of σῶμα, it is the finest and purest σῶμα : κεκοινώνηκε δέ πῃ
μάλιστα τῶν περὶ τὸ σῶμα τοῦ θείου ( 246 D). It bcars aloft that
to which it is attached, and the Being thus upborne is an
ȧlávaтov Šov. It is compounded of Soul and Matter ; but the
union of the two is indissoluble. But the soul that loses its
wings is borne down to earth, receives an earthy body and
becomes θνητὸν ζῷον. Earth, the grossest material element, "
cannot be indissolubly united with soul, and their union is
liable to be broken by death.
The wing is thus an upward tendency acting on the soul,
and counteracting a permanent downward tendency. How the
loss of the wings takes place Plato proceeds to explain. There
is no suggestion of any original sin to bring this about, as in
the lines of Empedocles ; the fall seems regarded mainly as a
matter of fate (Tivi σvvтvxía Xpnoáμevn 248 c) , as in the Timaeus.
A vast procession of gods and daemons (unfallen spirits)
ever follows the winged chariot of Zeus, as it moves on its
providential course within the heavenly sphere. The daemons
severally follow the train of their patron god, and are thus
already differentiated. Within this sphere there is no lack of
fair sights and journeys, and here the gods, as they fulfil their
several courses, may be followed by any soul that wills.
But all souls, even those of the gods, require occasional
refreshing with their proper sustenance, that is by commerce
with the world of Reality, the world of Ideas. So ' there is a
route which they tread only on their high feast days-a route
up-hill from first to last, leading to the very apex of the arch
which supports the vault of heaven, and there opening upon its
outer circumference, whence they can feast their eyes on the
glories of the supra-celestial region, which far exceed the Oéal
EvTòs oupavoû in beauty, as the road which leads to them exceeds
in difficulty the beaten highways on which the gods ordinarily
go to and fro' (Dr. Thompson on 247 A). Only the chariots
of the gods perform this journey with ease and certainty.
With them also Reason, the charioteer, directs the two steeds,
Spirit and Appetite ; but in their case all the three elements
are noble.
In this way the nutrition of the wing is accomplished ; for
the wing, as we read at 246 D, is nourished on the ' fair, wise and
good' ; in which words, as Dr. Thompson points out, the allegory
is partially dropped. The same sense is given at 247 D where
the allegory is for the time dropped altogether : the diάvoia of
the gods, and of all souls which are destined to receive their
 EXCURSUS VI 291

rightful inheritance, is fed on pure intelligence (V TE Kal

ἐπιστήμῃ ἀκηράτῳ). (How it is that some souls fail to enter
into ' their rightful inheritance ' is explained in the sequel. )
These are borne round one ' revolution ' (TEρipopά) in con-
templation of the Ideas. By the Teрipopά here we must under-
stand, not the Great Year of 10,000 years, but a lesser period.
Every tenth millennium is spent by the souls in achieving, or
attempting, the supra-celestial circuit. The remaining 9000
years consist
6 of nine periods of ' life ' followed by as many
periods of death ' (249 A B, 256 E). Certain expressions indeed ,
as 248 Ε εἰς μὲν γὰρ τὸ αὐτὸ ὅθεν ἥκει ἡ ψυχὴ ἑκάστη, οὐκ ἀφικνεῖ-
Taι ÉTŵv μvρíwv suggest that there are ' ten millennial probations '
(Dr. Thompson ad loc. ) the supra-celestial repɩpopά being ex-
clusive of these. Such apparent inconsistencies are quite unim-
portant ; indeed it is hard to see how the supra -celestial state
could be measured by time at all. (Cp. a parallel inconsistency
between the Phaedrus andthe Republic pointed out in the
note on 81 Β 33 ἐνάτῳ ἔτει. )
As to the word diavola, it is used here as a synonym for the
whole vuxn, where the distinction between the charioteer and
the steeds is not insisted on, and the allegory is for the time
abandoned. (So at 256 A we have rà BeλTiw Tŷs diavolas, and
C οὐ πάσῃ δεδογμένα τῇ διανοίᾳ. Cp. also 251 Β πᾶσα γὰρ ἦν
ἡ ψυχὴ) τὸ πάλαι πτερωτή with 249 c μόνη πτεροῦται ἡ τοῦ
φιλοσόφου διάνοια. )
The souls run the circuit of the Ideas, Justice, Temperance,
Knowledge, etc. , until they come back to the point from which
they have started . After its feast of truth the divine dtávola
returns within the sphere of heaven, and goes to its home.
There (the allegory is suddenly resumed ) the Charioteer satisfies
the steeds, Spirit and Appetite, with ' nectar ' and ' ambrosia. '
The above description applies to the gods alone. Other
souls follow with different degrees of difficulty. The noblest
souls, those most godlike, succeed in keeping the head of the
Charioteer in the supra - celestial sphere, and thus remain in
continuous communication with the Ideas. We may identify
these with the daiμoves mentioned at 247 A as forming the
trains of the several gods. A second class only enjoy an in-
terrupted vision ; sometimes Reason triumphs over the baser
elements, sometimes not. A third class are permanently
over-weighted by the baser elements, and are carried round
ever struggling to emerge but never succeeding. With the
gods the baser element is non -existent ; of other souls there
are :-
(1) those in which the baser element is in permanent sub-
ordination ;
292 MENO

(2 ) those in which there is a continual struggle, with

varying result ;
(3) those in which the nobler element is in permanent
subordination.
( It is worth while to compare this with the more elaborate
scale given by Aristotle N.E. VII i. )
In what follows it looks at first sight as if Plato had in
mind the third of these three classes. It is however clear that
he really means mainly the second. For the last class, having
had no vision of the truth, cannot expect a human incarnation.
The first class remain in the divine company, the second sink
to human life, the third, we may assume, to the life of brutes.
Of the unsuccessful classes, then, many souls are maimed by
the fault of the charioteers. Bad training of the baser steed
by the charioteer is also spoken of as a cause of mischief at
247 Β ὁ τῆς κακῆς ἵππος μετέχων . ᾧ μὴ καλῶς ᾖ τεθραμμένος
Twv vιóxwv. Here we do seem to have the notion that a moral
cause may be assigned for the fall. Reason is rò nyeμovikóv, tò
KUBEρVηTIKÓν, and commands the rest of the soul, as the soul
commands the body (see on 88 C 33). Here we have a
mythical statement of the doctrine Vice is Ignorance. In
the struggle the wing suffers grievously. These souls after
labour and sorrow go back to their place without attaining the
vision of Truth, and feed henceforth on the ' chaff and husks
of Opinion ' ( popĥ dožαστy Xpŵvτa ). This of course is the
antithesis to νοῦς τε καὶ ἐπιστήμη ἀκήρατος, the nutriment of
the highest διάνοιαι. What, in the case of the less fortunate
steeds, corresponds to the ' nectar and ambrosia ' of the divine
steeds, is not expressed.
The supra-celestial region is called at 248 в åλŋlelas mediov.
The reason why there is such eagerness to attain to this is
that there is found the pasturage for the best part of the soul,
and that the nature of the wing is thus nourished. Here we
have put before us mythically, the doctrine that all desire the
Best (78 B 4) . The TTEрóv is, I think, not to be identified with
τὸ ἄριστον τῆς ψυχῆς.
Any soul that in company with God sees anything—that
is, as Dr. Thompson explains, ' some considerable measure '—
of Truth, is to be untroubled till the next revolution, and if it
can always attain this, it is to be always unharmed. The
Teρíodos here mentioned must be the Great Year, the period of
10,000 years from one supra- celestial journey to the next. (See
Zeller p. 392, and for the Great Year his note 43 on p. 382,
and note 64 on p. 412. ) But any soul that, falling out of rank
in the divine procession, loses the Vision, and by some evil
chance founders, filled with forgetfulness and vice, and so loses
 EXCURSUS VI 293

its wings and comes to earth- this soul, since it has had at some
time commerce with the Ideas, must at its first incarnation be
united with the body of a man (cp. Tim. 41 E foll. ).
According to the degree of vision they have enjoyed, they
become either-
1. φιλόσοφος, ἢ φιλόκαλος, ἢ μουσικός τις καὶ ἐρωτικός,
2. a King, either a Law-giver, or a Warrior and Ruler,
3. a Statesman, Social Reformer, or Financier,
4. a lover of Labour, a Trainer of the body, or a Surgeon ,
5. a soothsayer, or a votary of the mysteries,
6. a poet, or some other ' imitator,'
7. an artisan or husbandman,
8. a sophist or demagogue,
9. a tyrant.
On this passage (248 c) Dr. Thompson remarks "Those
whose powers are unequal to the effort ' (of keeping their place
in the divine train) are in their first earthly genesis incarnated
as man, never as beasts ; this last degradation being apparently
the result of a perverse choice deliberately made by the soul
itself at a subsequent period. Human destiny would seeni
therefore to be partly the result of choice, partly of necessity
-and we have here a metaphysical problem clothed in a
mythical dress.' This is the doctrine of the Timaeus (l.c. ) ; but
the description in the Phaedrus would seem to suggest that souls
of the lowest class, who perform the whole supra-celestial circuit
iπoßpúxial, without ever seeing the Realities, do enter into
beasts even at their first incarnation (cp. 249 B and E). Stress
is however laid in the Phaedrus on the superior excellence of the
first life, as lying nearer to the world of Ideas, and preserving the
memory ofthem still fresh : each soul (252 D) imitates his patron
god to the best of his power ἕως ἂν ᾖ ἀδιάφθορος καὶ τὴν τῇδε
πρώτην γένεσιν βιοτεύῃ (cp. 250 Ε ὁ μὲν οὖν μὴ νεοτελὴς ἢ διεφθαρ-
μένος οὐκ ὀξέως ἐνθένδε ἐκεῖσε φέρεται πρὸς αὐτὸ τὸ κάλλος) . On
the other hand the Pindar fragment in the Meno suggests the
view that the highest lives on earth are those nearest the other
end of the course, on the eve of the soul's restoration- though
of course in Pindar there is no thought of any world of Ideas.
As to the fate that follows the first life we read ( 248 E) év dǹ
τούτοις ἅπασιν ὃς μὲν ἂν δικαίως διαγάγῃ ἀμείνονος μοίρας μετα-
λαμβάνει, ὃς δ᾽ ἂν ἀδίκως , χείρονος. 'The destiny of the soul
after death is determined solely by the life it had led on earth,
without reference to the ante-natal state. How & σοφιστής οι
3 τύραννος can be said δικαίως διάγειν we are not informed , and
the ToÚTOS &πaou must therefore probably be taken with a
grain of allowance. It is however noteworthy that, in its
first genesis, the soul's condition is fixed according to an
294 MENO

intellectual standard (τὴν μὲν πλεῖστα ἰδοῦσαν) whereas its doom

after leaving the body depends on moral considerations (ös äv
dikaiws diaɣáyn).' (Dr. Thompson's note.)
We must remember, however, that for Plato the antithesis
between ' intellectual ' and ' moral ' is by no means so strong as
it seems to us. We have seen that the fall is represented as
due in part to the fault of the nvíoxos, a view which would
reduce all vice and error, whether in this life or before it, to
intellectual weakness. It is precisely the soul who has seen
most of the Realities ' in a former state, that will ' live most
justly ' in the present.
But the doctrine of the Phaedrus as to the causes of the fall
is not clear, and the fatalist view, as seen above, predominates.
Not merely as regards the previous state but in regard to this
life, the Phaedrus seems to recognise an element of fate or
chance. The soul's life here depends on reminiscence of the
Realities ; (250 A ) ἀναμιμνήσκεσθαι δ᾽ ἐκ τῶνδε ἐκεῖνα οὐ ῥᾴδιον
ἁπάσῃ, οὔτε ὅσαι βραχέως εἶδον τότε τἀκεῖ, οὔτε αἳ δεῦρο πεσοῦσαι
ἐδυστύχησαν, ὥστε ὑπό τινων ὁμιλιῶν ἐπὶ τὸ ἄδικον τραπόμεναι
λήθην ὧν τότε εἶδον ἱερῶν ἔχειν. This may be owing, ' says Dr.
Thompson, ' to their ill - luck either in the former or in the
present state of existence. In the latter case evil associations
may have turned them from the right path and clouded their
memory.' With this may be contrasted the view in Rep. 617 E,
which asserts free-will and the responsibility of the individual
for all the conditions of this life : αἰτία ἑλομένου · θεὸς ἀναίτιος.
After the first life, then, judgment follows. According to
their deserts souls either are sent for the rest of the 1000 years
εἰς τὰ ὑπὸ γῆς δικαιωτήρια (purgatories), or are raised εἰς οὐρανοῦ
τινα τόπον. (Cp. 256 D, where for the place of punishment
occurs the phrase ἡ ὑπὸ γῆς πορεία, which also occurs Rep.
615 A. ) Then comes the choice of a second life. Here a soul
that has previously inhabited the body of a man may enter into
a beast, and vice versa, always provided that no soul that has
never beheld the Ideas can ever enter into the human form
(249 B, see on 81 D 12).
The great majority of souls have nine of these millennial
periods to fulfil before they regain their wings, and restored to
their original state again commence, or attempt, the supra-
celestial circuit. But the soul that has thrice running chosen
the lot of a guileless votary of philosophy, or of a lover in the
highest sense, regains its wings at the end of the third
millennial period , instead of the ninth ; and so departs, not yet,
we may presume, to the supra-celestial sphere, but rather to the
society of the gods évтòs oúpavoû ( 249 a, cp. 256 в). Cp. Pindar
Ol. 2. 68 foll.:
 EXCURSUS VI 295

ὅσοι δ᾽ ἐτόλμασαν ἐς τρὶς

ἑκατέρωθι μείναντες ἀπὸ πάμπαν ἀδίκων ἔχειν
ψυχάν, ἔτειλαν Διὸς ὁδὸν παρὰ Κρόνου τύρσιν · ἔνθα μακάρων
νᾶσον ὠκεανίδες αΰραι περιπνέοισιν · κτέ.
Apparently all souls, at least all that have ever inhabited a
human form, are destined to restoration, and the recovery of
their wings, after the elapse of the Great Period ( 248 E). In
the light of this must be interpreted the words at 249 c diò dǹ
δικαίως μόνη πτεροῦται ἡ τοῦ φιλοσόφου διάνοια. They seem to
refer to the early recovery of wings, just mentioned, accorded
to the philosopher.
It is not necessary to follow in the same detail the remainder
of the myth , in which its application to the doctrine of "Epws is
explained . The sequel represents the recovery of the wings as a
gradual process ( 251 BC), the chief agency in its accomplishment
being Love and Philosophy. The souls of lovers who have
enjoyed a pure and philosophic love even for one life only,
become UTÓTTEρo ( 256 B) ; their wings are sprouting, they have
won one of their ' Olympian bouts, ' but we must not suppose
they are fully fledged till after the third. As it is, they have
attained something οὗ μεῖζον ἀγαθὸν οὔτε σωφροσύνη ἀνθρωπίνη
οὔτε θεία μανία δύναται πορίσαι ἀνθρώπῳ. Here σωφροσύνη
ἀνθρωπίνη is not the same as σωφροσύνη δημοτική. It is the
human reflexion of divine owppoσúvn ; it is conditioned by
human life, but otherwise the best of which man is capable.
Next among lovers are those who have only lived up to the
standard of popular repute (piλóriμo ). These also are elevated
by their love. They die at last &TTEрol, but their wings are
ready to sprout. They must not be condemned to the ' sub-
terranean journey,' for they have started on the course up
through heaven which will lead them at last to the supra-
celestial sphere (256 D). Last we have presented the vulgar
connexion, from which Love is absent, where we have olkeιótns
σωφροσύνῃ θνήτῃ συγκεκραμένη. This is popular virtue in its
lower aspect, the virtue of the olyaрxikós (see Rep. 554 c,
and Phaedo 68 c with 82 A B) ; whereas the classes described
before correspond respectively to the ἄριστος οι φιλόσοφος, and
the pilóriuos of the Republic. To cast in your lot with this
third grade will cause you to flit ' a senseless shade for nine
millenniums over the surface of this earth and beneath it. '
If, unblinded by the magnificence of this allegory, we
attempt to analyse it minutely, we cannot help noting a certain
amount of vagueness and inconsistency. The question is
whether this exists to a larger extent than the nature of
allegory makes necessary. I am disposed to think that the
myth does show traces of not being the result of a single
296 MENO

inspiration. I venture to offer a suggestion that we may find

in the notion of the wing the original kernel of the myth, and
that the image of the charioteer and steeds was a subsequent
elaboration. But in any case the myth forms a chapter of the
utmost importance and interest in the history of the Ideal
theory. Plato found in the heaven of Pindar and the Orphics
a suitable home in which to place his embodiments of intellectual
concepts.
The myths in the Republic and the Phaedo have much in
common. Both of them cover a smaller field of speculation
than the Phaedrus or the Timaeus. Each is associated with
a proof of the soul's immortality. That in the Republic is
found at 608 D-611 A, that in the Phaedo pervades the entire
work. In neither dialogue does the doctrine meet with ready
acceptance ; in the Republic Adimantus receives it with sur-
prise ; in the Phaedo, Kebes is hard to persuade. In both
myths there is a large amount of cosmological matter. But we
have nothing about the supra- celestial course, nothing about
the final restoration of the soul ; these myths deal with the
smaller Tepíodos, a life followed by a death. The period of
wandering for the soul after death is given in the Republic as
1000 years ( 615 A B) and the moment of rebirth is called ȧpxǹ
ἄλλης περιόδου θνητοῦ γένους θανατηφόρου ( 617 D ). The in-
centives to a righteous life are limited to its bearing on the
subsequent period of death, and to the preparation of the soul
for the ensuing choice of a life. This topic is elaborately
handled in the Republic ; the moment of choice is the grand
crisis in which all the results of previous learning and conduct
culminate : (618 Β) ἔνθα δή, ὦ φίλε Γλαύκων, ὁ πᾶς κίνδυνος
ἀνθρώπῳ, καὶ διὰ ταῦτα μάλιστα ἐπιμελητέον, ὅπως ἕκαστος ἡμῶν
τῶν ἄλλων μαθημάτων ἀμελήσας τούτου τοῦ μαθήματος καὶ ζητητὴς
καὶ μαθητὴς ἔσται, ἐάν ποθεν οἷός τ᾽ ᾖ μαθεῖν καὶ ἐξευρεῖν, τίς
αὐτὸν ποιήσει δυνατὸν καὶ ἐπιστήμονα, βίον καὶ χρηστὸν καὶ πονηρὸν
diayiyνwσкovтa KTẻ. With this may be compared Phaedo 107 C D
εἴπερ ἡ ψυχὴ ἀθάνατος, ἐπιμελείας δὴ δεῖται οὐχ ὑπὲρ τοῦ χρόνου
τούτου μόνον, ἐν ᾧ καλοῦμεν τὸ ζῆν, ἀλλ᾽ ὑπὲρ τοῦ παντός, καὶ ὁ
κίνδυνος νῦν δὴ καὶ δόξειεν ἂν δεινὸς εἶναι εἴ τις αὐτῆς ἀμελήσει. . .
οὐδὲν γὰρ ἄλλο ἔχουσα εἰς "Αιδου ἡ ψυχὴ ἔρχεται πλὴν τῆς παιδείας
τε καὶ τροφῆς, ἃ δὴ καὶ μέγιστα λέγεται ὠφελεῖν ἢ βλάπτειν τὸν
τελευτήσαντα εὐθὺς ἐν ἀρχῇ τῆς ἐκεῖσε πορείας. Cp. 81 E foll.
Yet Plato believed he could not help believing—in heredity
(Rep. 424 A, 459 ; Polit. 310). Perhaps his teaching might
not unfairly be summed up in the maxim, ' You cannot be too
particular in the selection of your parents.'
The myth in the Phaedo is contained in chapters lvii to
lxii, of which the first and last ( 107 c-108 c, and 113 D-114 c)
 EXCURSUS VI 297

are the most important. No definite time is specified for the

wandering : τυχόντας δὲ ἐκεῖ ὧν δεῖ τυχεῖν καὶ μείναντας ὃν
χρὴ χρόνον ἄλλος δεῦρο πάλιν ἡγεμὼν κομίζει ἐν πολλαῖς χρόνου
κal μaкрaîs πepiódols ( 107 E). Indeed the time of wandering
is not the same for all : of (at the λίμνη Αχερουσιάς) αἱ τῶν
τετελευτηκότων ψυχαὶ τῶν πολλῶν ἀφικνοῦνται καί τινας είμαρ
μένους χρόνους μείνασαι, αἱ μὲν μακροτέρους, αἱ δὲ βραχυτέ-
ρους, πάλιν ἐκπέμπονται εἰς τὰς τῶν ζῴων γενέσεις.
Lastly, the Republic and Phaedo agree with the Gorgias in
recognizing a class of incurable sinners, of whom in the
Republic (615 c foll. ) Ardiaeus is the type. Compare with
this Phaedo 113 Ε οἱ δ᾽ ἂν δόξωσιν ἀνιάτως ἔχειν διὰ τὰ μεγέθη
τῶν ἁμαρτημάτων, ἢ ἱεροσυλίας πολλὰς καὶ μεγάλας ἢ φόνους
ἀδίκους καὶ παρανόμους πολλοὺς ἐξειργασμένοι , ἢ ἄλλα ὅσα τοιαῦτα
τυγχάνει ὄντα, τούτους δὲ ἡ προσήκουσα μοῖρα ῥίπτει εἰς τὸν
Τάρταρον ὅθεν οὔποτε ἐκβαίνουσιν. On this A. H. observes :
'But in Timeaus 42 c it is evident that the degenerate soul at
any period of her transmigrations has the chance of reformation
and final restoration to her original purity : nor is this
possibility excluded in Phaedrus 248 c foll. '
The myth in the Phaedrus has most in common with the
Timaeus, and the myth in the Republic with that in the
Phaedo. As the Timaeus is undoubtedly the latest of these
four dialogues, this might be taken as prima facie evidence that
the Phaedrus is the latest of the remaining three. Such
an inference would, however, I am persuaded, be mistaken. It
must be remembered that the Republic and Phaedo differ from
the Phaedrus chiefly in leaving a large part of the mythological
material untouched.
The representation by Vergil in Aen. vI 735 foll. is very
interesting. It is pretty clear that Vergil, starting with a
mere imitation of the Homeric nether-world, such as he gives
us in Georg. IV 467 foll. , was superimposing on this a body
of philosophic doctrine. But the result is unfinished and
probably dislocated. (See Whitelaw in CR. v 186. ) When we
read at 745 foll.-
donec longa dies perfecto temporis orbe
concretam exemit labem, purumque relinquit
aetherium sensum, atque aurai simplicis ignem,
we think we are reading of the ultimate restoration of the soul
in purity. Yet this turns out to be merely the prelude to
another mortal existence :
has omnis ubi mille rotam volvere per annos
Lethaeum ad fluvium deus evocat agmine magno.
This is based on Rep. 615 A, 621 A.
298 MENO

EXCURSUS VII

Δόξα AND ἐπιστήμη ( 97 Β 17)

The antithesis of dóga and ToThun is prominent in Greek
philosophy at least as early as Parmenides. Before him
Xenophanes had already said of the speculator concerning the
Gods and the Universe
εἰ γὰρ καὶ τὰ μάλιστα τύχοι τετελεσμένον εἰπών,
αὐτὸς ὅμως οὐκ οἶδε, δόκος δ᾽ ἐπὶ πᾶσι τέτυκται.
Parmenides' poem Nature ' is traditionally divided into
three
66 parts ; the " Prooem," " Truth " (rà πpòs åλý¤¤‹av), and
Opinion " (rà πρòs dóέav). In " Truth, " starting from the
formula "the Ent is, the Non-ent is not, " Parmenides attempted
to distinguish between the unity or universal element of nature,
and its variety or particularity, insisting upon the reality of its
unity, which is therefore the object of Knowledge, and upon the
unreality of its variety, which is therefore the object, not of
Knowledge, but of Opinion ' (Encyc. Brit. art. ' Parmenides ' ).
He passes from the section ' Truth ' to the section ' Opinion '
in the following lines :
ἐν τῷ σοι παύσω πιστὸν λόγον ἠδὲ νόημα
ἀμφὶς ἀληθείης · δόξας δ᾽ ἀπὸ τοῦδε βροτείας
μάνθανε, κόσμον ἐμῶν ἐπέων ἀπατηλὸν ἀκούων,
and then proceeds to propound a theory of the world of seeming
and its development, pointing out, however, that, in accordance
with the principles already laid down, these cosmological
speculations do not pretend to anything more than probability ;
and ends his description with the words :
οὕτω τοι κατὰ δόξαν ἔφυ τάδε. (R. & P. § 102 c d.)
As to the precise import that Parmenides attached to his
account of the World κarà dóžav, there has been much dispute.
(An important new work, Parmenides im Kampfe gegen Heraklit
by Dr. A. Patin, is reviewed by Mr. John Burnet in CR.
XIV 312.)
We may probably rest assured that the account was meant
seriously, not ironically. Parmenides felt, as the article in the
Encyc. Brit. puts it, that ' a natural history of illusion is a
 EXCURSUS VII 299

necessary sequel to the account of Truth. ' The section Aóga

springs in fact from the ineradicable desire to constitute some
system for practical purposes, after it has become evident how
little of our thought falls within the province of flawless
certainty. Parmenides, Plato and other ancient philosophers
taught that there were two paths for the mind, an upper and a
lower ; that the upper path was not only the nobler but the
more important, and to this we ought to strive to attain. In
modern times it has come to be seen more clearly that the
lower path is really the only one, and that invulnerable
' necessary ' Truth is from its nature sterile. At the same time
the nature of the infirmities and limitations of the conclusions
by which we practically guide our lives is better understood .
The scepticism of Socrates naturally led him to the view
'that while scientific truth is unattainable by man, right
opinion is the only ground for right action ' (Encyc. Brit. art.
'Sophist ' 266 a, cp. art. ' Socrates ' 237). This view strongly
recalls the conclusion of the Meno, with the difference that
Plato does not absolutely despair of the attainment of the
higher level, Knowledge.
Among Socrates' followers, besides Plato, the subject received
attention from Antisthenes, who, as we are told by Diogenes
Laertius (VI 17), wrote four books Περὶ δόξης καὶ ἐπιστήμης.
R. & P. § 146 b suggest that the phrase ὀρθή οι ἀληθὴς δόξα
may have been derived from Antisthenes.
In tracing the contrast of eriorýμn and dóğa in Plato's
writings we must never forget that the contrast was familiar in
Greek thought before Plato's time . Certain points, chiefly as
to the nomenclature adopted by Plato, may be of sufficient
interest to justify the inquiry.
In the earlier dialogues of Plato the word doğa hardly occurs
in a technical sense. Not much stress can be laid upon Charm.
168 A, where in the discussion of the question whether there
can be an ἐπιστήμη ἐπιστήμης, a knowledge that is Knowledge
of itself simply without any external object, it is asked whether
similarly there can be a doğa doğŋs ; for similar questions have
already been asked about Sensation and Emotion.
In the Gorgias we get a clear recognition of two different
grades of apprehension, though this is expressed in other terms
than δόξα and ἐπιστήμη. After Rhetoric has been defined
(453 A) as Telloûs dŋmovрyós, the contrast between Rhetoric
and Arithmetic brings out the point that there are two kinds
of πειθώ, one accompanied by μάθησις, the other not. Πότερον
οὖν, asks Socrates ( 454 D ) , ταὐτὸν δοκεῖ σοι εἶναι μεμαθηκέναι καὶ
πεπιστευκέναι, καὶ μάθησις καὶ πίστις, ἢ ἄλλο τι ; ΓΟΡ. Οἴομαι
μὲν ἔγωγε, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἄλλο. ΣΩ. Καλῶς γὰρ οἴει · γνώσει δὲ
300 ΜΕΝΟ
ἐνθένδε. εἰ γάρ τίς σε ἔροιτο · ἆρ᾽ ἔστι τις, ὦ Γοργία, πίστις
ψευδὴς καὶ ἀληθής ; φαίης ἄν, ὡς ἐγὼ οἶμαι. ΓΟΡ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Τί δέ ;
ἐπιστήμη ἐστὶ ψευδὴς καὶ ἀληθής ; ΓΟΡ. Οὐδαμῶς. Here we
have no mention of δόξα, πίστις being used instead. Again at
465 A we read τέχνην δὲ αὐτὴν (τὴν ῥητορικὴν ) οὔ φημι εἶναι ἀλλ᾽
ἐμπειρίαν , ὅτι οὐκ ἔχει λόγον οὐδένα ὧν προσφέρει, ὁποῖ᾽ ἄττα
τὴν φύσιν ἐστίν, ὥστε τὴν αἰτίαν ἑκάστου μὴ ἔχειν εἰπεῖν. ἐγὼ
δὲ τέχνην οὐ καλῶ δ ἂν ᾖ ἄλογον πρᾶγμα. Cp. 501 A. Here the
relation of ἐμπειρία to τέχνη is analogous to that of δόξα to
ἐπιστήμη. As δόξα does not occur (in the technical sense) in
the Gorgias, so πίστις does not occur in the Meno. In later
dialogues, as in the Philebus 58 E foll. , δόξα is expressly
assigned as the sphere of Rhetoric. It seems probable that
the Gorgias represents a stage before doğa had come to fill
so important a place in Plato's nomenclature as it afterwards
did .
In the later rhetorical dialogue, the Phaedrus, we get some
indications of δόξα as a technical term. We can hardly
reckon as such the difficult passage 237 D foll. There are, we
are told, two forces acting upon us, ἡ μὲν ἔμφυτος οὖσα
ἐπιθυμία ἡδονῶν, ἄλλη δὲ ἐπίκτητος δόξα, ἐφιεμένη τοῦ
ἀρίστου. . . δόξης μὲν οὖν ἐπὶ τὸ ἄριστον λόγῳ ἀγούσης καὶ
κρατούσης τῷ κράτει σωφροσύνη ὄνομα · ἐπιθυμίας δὲ ἀλόγως
ἑλκούσης ἐπὶ ἡδονὰς καὶ ἀρξάσης ἐν ἡμῖν τῇ ἀρχῇ ὕβρις ἐπωνομάσθη.
Here the definition of σωφροσύνη, as the product of δόξα λόγῳ
ἄγουσα, recalls what we read elsewhere of the origin of popular
Virtue. But here there is no contrast between doga and some-
thing higher (ἐπιστήμη) : there is a contrast between δόξα and
something lower (ἐπιθυμία). Nor is the phrase in the descrip-
tion of the nobler horse (252 Ε) , ἀληθίνης δόξης ἑταῖρος, to the
point. The words are probably spurious, and in any case
ἀληθίνη δόξα must mean something different from ἀληθὴς δόξα.
(See Dr. Thompson's note. But the antithesis ἐπιστήμη )( δόξα
comes out quite clearly at 247 D , 248 B. The highest διάνοιαι
are fed νῷ καὶ ἐπιστήμῃ ἀκηράτῳ : those who fail of the
heavenly vision τροφῇ δοξαστῇ χρῶνται (see Exc. VI p. 292).
Later in the dialogue comes the passage in which the verdict
of the Gorgias on Rhetoric is revised. Phaedrus has heard that
the Orator need not busy himself about τὰ τῷ ὄντι δίκαια ἀλλὰ
τὰ δόξαντα τῷ πλήθει (260 Α ; ep. c δόξας πλήθους). Socrates
shows that a knowledge of the Truth is a necessary condition
of the power to persuade : λόγων ἄρα τέχνην (262 Β), ὁ τὴν
ἀλήθειαν μὴ εἰδώς, δόξας δὲ τεθηρευκώς γελοίαν τινά, ὡς ἔοικε,
καὶ ἄτεχνον παρέξεται. Further in 275 A Thamus says to
Theuth about his invention of writing οὔκουν μνήμης ἀλλ᾽
ὑπομνήσεως φάρμακον εὗρες · σοφίας δὲ τοῖς μαθηταῖς δόξαν,
 EXCURSUS VII 301

οὐκ ἀλήθειαν πορίζεις. But in all this we do not get beyond

the old antithesis current before Plato.
The special doctrine of Plato as to the relation of doğa to
ÉTIOτýμn is to be looked for in the Meno, the Republic and the
Symposium. Of these three expositions that in the Meno is
probably the earliest. It should be noted that whereas
Parmenides made Opinion correlative to un ov, the non-
existent, Plato in these dialogues makes it correlative to
something intermediate between Being and Not-being. Later,
in the Sophist, we have the term un ov itself analyzed and its
ambiguity explained. The problem presented at the end of the
Protagoras is in the Meno carried a step towards solution by
the doctrine of dóğa. On the other hand the doctrine of dóža
propounded in the Meno, etc. , receives in the Theaetetus an
important development.
In the passage of the Rep. (506 c), quoted in the note on
97 B 17, the epithet aioxpai seems discordant with the view
taken in the Meno of the value of ảλn◊ǹs dó§a . But the context
shows it is ironical. It would be aioxpóv to content ourselves
with Tupλά Te Kal σкoλiά on the nature of the Good, if it were
possible παρ᾽ ἄλλων ἀκούειν φανά τε καὶ καλά. But Glaucon
knows quite well that it is not, and is ready to acquiesce when
Socrates proposes for the present to take the lower method. A
similar ambiguous character attaches to the ethical counter-
part of doğa, Popular Virtue, which is honourable or dis-
honourable according as it is the highest standard attainable
in mundane circumstances, or a lazy and specious substitute for
something better. For the Good is the enemy of the Best.
See on 100 A 6.
The passage from the Symposium also quoted on 97 B 17 is
succeeded by some most important thoughts in which the view
taken of doğa and epws is generalized. They fall within the
function of Tò dauóviov, and that is to be intermediary between
gods and men. Πᾶν τὸ δαιμόνιον ( 202 Ε) μεταξύ ἐστι θεοῦ καὶ
θνητοῦ. Τίνα, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, δύναμιν ἔχον ; Ἑρμηνεύον καὶ
διαπορθμεύον θεοῖς τὰ παρ᾽ ἀνθρώπων καὶ ἀνθρώποις τὰ παρὰ
θεῶν. ἔρως, to which δόξα is correlated, is an intermediate
link between Ignorance and Knowledge, between Earth and
Heaven (see on 76 C 16). So the stage of aspiration , of pilooopía,
belongs not to the highest existences, but to those conscious of
an inferiority in themselves and of an ideal outside themselves :
(203 Ε) σοφίας δὲ καὶ ἀμαθίας ἐν μέσῳ ἐστίν (Ἔρως) · ἔχει γὰρ
ὧδε. θεῶν οὐδεὶς φιλοσοφεῖ οὐδ᾽ ἐπιθυμεῖ σοφὸς γενέσθαι. ἔστι
γάρ· οὐδ᾽ εἴ τις ἄλλος σοφός, οὐ φιλοσοφεῖ. Somewhat as for the
production of mechanical energy a contact of bodies at different
temperatures is necessary, so is a sense of deficiency a necessary
302 MENO

condition of spiritual energy or φιλοσοφία. Plato had already

expressed a similar thought in Lys. 218 A : διὰ ταῦτα δὴ φαῖμεν
ἂν καὶ τοὺς ἤδη σοφοὺς μηκέτι φιλοσοφεῖν, εἴτε θεοὶ εἴτε ἄνθρωποί
εἰσιν οὗτοι · οὐδ᾽ αὖ ἐκείνους φιλοσοφεῖν τοὺς οὕτως ἄγνοιαν ἔχοντας
ὥστε κακοὺς εἶναι · κακὸν γὰρ καὶ ἀμαθῆ οὐδένα φιλοσοφεῖν.
λείπονται δὴ οἱ ἔχοντες μὲν τὸ κακὸν τοῦτο, τὴν ἄγνοιαν, μήπω δὲ
ὑπ᾽ αὐτοῦ ὄντες ἀγνώμονες μηδὲ ἀμαθεῖς, ἀλλ᾽ ἔτι ἡγούμενοι μὴ
εἰδέναι ἃ μὴ ἴσασιν.
At Symp. 207 E we have an interesting passage illustrating
the genesis of ἐπιστήμη from δόξα expounded in the Meno. Here
we read no longer of an absolute changeless ἐπιστήμη ; but are
told how matters of human knowledge (ἐπιστῆμαι) share the
characteristics of growth and decay that attach to everything
human : πολὺ δὲ τούτων ἀτοπώτερον ἔτι, ὅτι καὶ αἱ ἐπιστῆμαι μὴ
ὅτι αἱ μὲν γίγνονται αἱ δὲ ἀπόλλυνται ἡμῖν, καὶ οὐδέποτε οἱ αὐτοί
ἐσμεν οὐδὲ κατὰ τὰς ἐπιστήμας, ἀλλὰ καὶ μία ἑκάστη τῶν ἐπιστη-
μῶν ταὐτὸν πάσχει. ὃ γὰρ καλεῖται μελετῶν, ὡς ἐξιούσης ἐστὶ
τῆς ἐπιστήμης· λήθη γὰρ ἐπιστήμης ἔξοδος, μελέτη δὲ πάλιν
καινὴν ἐμποιοῦσα ἀντὶ τῆς ἀπιούσης σῴζει τὴν ἐπιστήμην, ὥστε
τὴν αὐτὴν δοκεῖν εἶναι. τούτῳ γὰρ τῷ τρόπῳ πᾶν τὸ θνητὸν
σῴζεται, οὐ τῷ παντάπασι ταὐτὸν ἀεὶ εἶναι ὥσπερ τὸ θεῖον, ἀλλὰ
τῷ τὸ ἀπιὸν καὶ παλαιούμενον ἕτερον νέον ἐγκαταλείπειν οἷον
αὐτὸ ἦν.
Certain places in the Republic bear upon the use of wiσris and
δόξα in Plato's nomenclature. At 505 Ε οὐδὲ πίστει χρήσασθαι
μονίμῳ, πίστει is nearly equivalent to δόξῃ. At 511 Ε, 534 Α
we find πίστις made the superior division of δόξα, a sub -division
which is abandoned at the latter of these passages (cp. on
98 B 2). Αt 601 η πίστις and δόξα are used interchangeably :
οὐκοῦν ὁ μὲν ( the fautist) εξαγγέλλει περὶ χρηστῶν καὶ πονηρῶν
αὐλῶν, ὁ δὲ (the flute- maker) πιστεύων ποιήσει ; Ναί. Τοῦ
αὐτοῦ ἄρα σκεύους ὁ μὲν ποιητὴς πίστιν ὀρθὴν ἕξει περὶ κάλλους
τε καὶ πονηρίας, ξυνὼν τῷ εἰδότι καὶ ἀναγκαζόμενος ἀκούειν παρὰ
τοῦ εἰδότος · ὁ δὲ χρώμενος ἐπιστήμην. Πάνυ γε. Ὁ δὲ μιμητὴς
πότερον ἐκ τοῦ χρῆσθαι ἐπιστήμην ἕξει ὧν ἂν γράφῃ, εἴτε καλὰ καὶ
ὀρθὰ εἴτε μή, ἢ δόξαν ὀρθὴν διὰ τὸ ἐξ ἀνάγκης συνεῖναι τῷ εἰδότι
καὶ ἐπιτάττεσθαι οἷα χρὴ γράφειν ; Οὐδέτερα. Οὔτε ἄρα εἴσεται
οὔτε ὀρθὰ δοξάσει ὁ μιμητής κτέ.
In the Theaetetus (201 A B) we have an advance upon the
nomenclature of the Gorgias ( 454 D), where the result of oratory
was expressed as πίστις. The term δοξάζειν is now correlated
with πίστις : οὗτοι γάρ που ( οἱ ῥήτορες) τῇ ἑαυτῶν τέχνῃ πείθουσιν,
οὐ διδάσκοντες ἀλλὰ δοξάζειν ποιοῦντες ἃ ἂν βούλωνται. Orators
are unable διδάξαι ἱκανῶς, but only πείσαι. ΣΩ. Τὸ πείσαι δ'
οὐχὶ δοξάσαι λέγεις ποιῆσαι ; ΘΕΑΙ. Τί μήν ; ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν
ὅταν ὀρθῶς πεισθῶσι δικασταὶ περὶ ὧν ἰδόντι μόνον ἐστὶν εἰδέναι,
 EXCURSUS VII 303

ἄλλως δὲ μή, ταῦτα τότε ἐξ ἀκοῆς κρίνοντες, ἀληθῆ δόξαν λαβόντες,

ἄνευ ἐπιστήμης ἔκριναν, ὀρθὰ πεισθέντες εἴπερ εὖ ἐδίκασαν ;
In the Parmenides doğa simply appears in a list with
ἐπιστήμη, αἴσθησις and other faculties (142 Α , 155 D , 164 Α) .
In the Timaeus 29 c, ὅ τί περ πρὸς γένεσιν οὐσία τοῦτο πρὸς
πίστιν ἀλήθεια, πίστις is equivalent to δόξα . On 37 Β δόξαι καὶ
πίστεις βέβαιοι καὶ ἀληθεῖς Α.-H. says ( there is a slight chiasmus ;
βέβαιοι is appropriate to πίστεις and ἀληθεῖς to δόξαι. But
πίστις and δόξα are practically synonyms.
The sequel shows a strong contrast between πίστεις and δόξαι
on the one hand, which are formed when the soul is busy in
the domain of the Sensible, and νοῦς ἐπιστήμη τε which are
perfected when the soul is occupied with the Rational.
The difference between the two planes of thought is nowhere
more constantly and strongly affirmed than in the Timaeus ;
and the note is made prominent early in the dialogue. ἔστιν
οὖν δὴ (says Socrates 27 D ) κατ' ἐμὴν δόξαν πρῶτον διαιρετεόν τάδε ·
τί τὸ ὂν ἀεί, γένεσιν δὲ οὐκ ἔχον, καὶ τί τὸ γιγνόμενον μὲν ἀεί, ὂν
δὲ οὐδέποτε. τὸ μὲν δὴ νοήσει μετὰ λόγου περιληπτόν, ἀεὶ κατὰ
ταὐτὰ ὄν, τὸ δ᾽ αὖ δόξῃ μετ᾿ αἰσθήσεως ἄλογον δοξαστόν, γιγνό-
μενον καὶ ἀπολλύμενον, ὄντως δὲ οὐδέποτε ὄν.
Further may be quoted 51D ὧδε δ᾽ οὖν τήν γ᾽ ἐμὴν αὐτὸς
τίθεμαι ψῆφον · εἰ μὲν νοῦς καὶ δόξα ἀληθής ἐστον δύο γένη,
παντάπασιν εἶναι καθ᾽ αὑτὰ ταῦτα, ἀναίσθητα ὑφ᾽ ἡμῶν εἴδη,
νοούμενα μόνον · εἰ δ᾽, ὥς τισι φαίνεται, δόξα ἀληθὴς τοῦ διαφέρει
τὸ μηδέν, πάνθ' ὁπόσ᾽ αὖ διὰ τοῦ σώματος αἰσθανόμεθα, θετέον
βεβαιότατα. δύο δὴ λεκτέον ἐκείνω, διότι χωρὶς γεγόνατον
ἀνομοίως τε ἔχετον κτέ. ‘ Summing up all previous discussions,
the Timaeus declares that Knowledge (voûs) is implanted in us
by instruction, Right Opinion by persuasion ; the one is
always accompanied by true reason (λόγος), the other is without
reason ; the one is not to be moved by persuasion , the other
maybe moved ; and lastly every man may be said to participate
in Right Opinion , but in voûs only the gods and very few men
. (Zeller p. 174).
The phrase ὀρθὴ δόξα occurs several times in the Philebus.
In the contest between Pleasure and Reason, it is ranked as
allied with_the latter ( 11 B) ; Right Opinion is a concomitant
of Right Pleasures 37 D, 38 A. In the Laws 632 A, 653 a,
ἀληθὴς δόξα is mentioned side by side with φρόνησις, dis-
tinguished from it though not contrasted .
The distinction of ἐπιστήμη from δόξα ἀληθής was preserved
by Aristotle ; see Anal. post. I 33 = 88 b 30 quoted by R. & P.
311 Bb : τὸ δ ' ἐπιστητὸν καὶ ἐπιστήμη διαφέρει τοῦ δοξαστοῦ
καὶ δόξης ὅτι ἡ μὲν ἐπιστήμη καθόλου καὶ δι᾿ ἀναγκαίων κτέ. See
too NE. VII iii 3, 4, with Grant's note.
304 ΜΕΝΟ

It hardly belongs to the present place to consider at any

length the development of the doctrine of doğa in the Theaetetus.
A general reference may be given to H. Jackson's paper in JP.
XIII pp. 242 foll.
The three sections into which that dialogue is divided corre-
spond respectively to the definitions of ἐπιστήμη as ( 1 ) αἴσθησις,
(2) δόξα ἀληθής, (3 ) δόξα ἀληθὴς μετὰ λόγου. The first section
does not now concern us ; in the second certain important
points are cleared up that might suggest themselves to a reader
of the Meno. How is False Opinion possible ? (180 Α) οὐκοῦν
τόδε γ᾽ ἐσθ᾽ ἡμῖν περὶ πάντα καὶ καθ᾽ ἕκαστον, ἤτοι εἰδέναι ἢ μὴ
εἰδέναι ; μανθάνειν γὰρ καὶ ἐπιλανθάνεσθαι μεταξὺ τούτων
ὡς ὄντα χαίρειν λέγω ἐν τῷ παρόντι. But it is just the omission
of these things from consideration that is one main cause of our
trouble in other words, so long as we ignore the states of
learning and forgetting, which are intermediate between absolute
knowledge and absolute ignorance, no place can be found for
False Opinion (JP. XIII p. 258, ep. Zeller p. 171 ). The
Eristic quibble about False Opinion meets us already in Euthyd.
286 ο ἄλλο τι ψευδῆ λέγειν οὐκ ἔστιν ; (τοῦτο γὰρ δύναται ὁ λόγος ·
ἢ γάρ ;) ἀλλ᾽ ἢ λέγοντ᾽ ἀληθῆ λέγειν ἢ μὴ λέγειν ; (The sophist
agrees). Πότερον οὖν ψευδῆ μὲν λέγειν οὐκ ἔστι , δοξάζειν μέντοι
ἔστιν ; Οὐδὲ δοξάζειν, ἔφη. Οὐδ᾽ ἄρα ψευδής, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, δόξα
ἔστι τὸ παράπαν · Οὐκ ἔφη. It here appears that another
source of confusion is the ambiguity of the phrase τὰ μὴ ὄντα,
which may mean either ' what is non-existent, ' or ' what is other
than the fact. '
But though the possibility of False Opinion, and con-
sequently the legitimacy of the phrase ' True Opinion, ' is thus
demonstrated, yet the gulf that yawns between True Opinion
and Knowledge still remains (201 B). This forms the transition
to the third section. ΘΕΑΙ. Ο γε ἐγώ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐπιόντος του
ἀκούσας ἐπελελήσμην , νῦν δ᾽ ἐννοῶ. ἔφη δὲ τὴν μὲν μετὰ λόγου
ἀληθῆ δόξαν ἐπιστήμην εἶναι, τὴν δὲ ἄλογον ἐκτὸς ἐπιστήμης · καὶ
ὧν μὲν μή ἐστι λόγος οὐκ ἐπιστητὰ εἶναι, οὑτωσὶ καὶ ὀνομάζων,
ἃ δ᾽ ἔχει, ἐπιστητά. The view here put forward strikingly
recalls that of the Meno. But ούτωσὶ καὶ ὀνομάζων must refer to
the strange word ἐπιστητά— a word which does not occur in the
Meno, nor indeed in any place in Plato except this in the
Theaetetus. This makes it probable that the passage in the
Theaetetus is not a criticism on the Meno. Another difference
between the phraseology of the Meno and that of the Theaetetus
strengthens this view.. The distinctive phrase μετὰ λόγου
does not occur in the Meno 98 A. On the other hand we have
in the Meno the hint that ἐπιστήμη differs from ὀρθὴ δόξα,
αἰτίας λογισμῷ. This hint, it is true, is only put forward
 EXCURSUS VII 305

tentatively ; Socrates utters it ὡς οὐκ εἰδὼς ἀλλὰ εἰκάζων.

That there is a difference between ὀρθὴ δόξα and ἐπιστήμη he
holds as firm ground ; but the problem of the nature of the
difference Plato had not fully solved when he wrote the Meno.
It is remarkable that the speculation suggested in the words
αἰτίας λογισμῷ, though indicated in the Gorg. 465 A (see p. 300),
is in the Theaetetus, so far as I can see, neither criticized nor
developed .
Two other passages must be cited as recalling the phraseology
of the Meno. In the Phaedo 96 B, Socrates, running through
his former speculations, says he inquired whether it is through
the brain that we get sensations, ἐκ τούτων δὲ γίγνοιτο μνήμη
καὶ δόξα, ἐκ δὲ μνήμης καὶ δόξης λαβούσης τὸ ἠρεμεῖν κατὰ
ταὐτὰ γίγνεσθαι ἐπιστήμην. The other is Polit. 309 ε : τὴν
τῶν καλῶν καὶ δικαίων πέρι καὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ τῶν τούτοις ἐναντίων
ὄντως οὖσαν ἀληθῆ δόξαν μετὰ βεβαιώσεως, ὁπόταν ἐν ψυχαῖς
ἐγγίγνηται, θείαν φημὶ ἐν δαιμονίῳ γίγνεσθαι γένει.
A few words may be added on the subject of the relation of
δόξα to Discourse. It appears in the Meno ( 85 C) that δόξαι
arise in the individual soul, and that it is by dialectic, by
friction with other minds, that these become converted into
matters of Knowledge. We find passages in which it is noted
as a mark of doğa that it belongs to the separate workings of
the mind ; e.g. in Theaet. 187 A Socrates speaks of a certain
faculty of the soul ὅταν αὐτὴ καθ᾽ αὑτὴν πραγματεύηται περὶ τὰ
ὄντα. ΘΕΑΙ. ᾿Αλλὰ μὴν τοῦτό γε καλεῖται, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὡς
ἐγᾦμαι, δοξάζειν. ΣΩ. Ορθῶς γὰρ οἴει, ὦ φίλε. The same
view is carried on at 189 E ΣΩ. Τὸ δὲ διανοεῖσθαι ἆρ᾽ ὅπερ ἐγὼ
καλεῖς ; ΘΕΑΙ. Τί καλῶν ; ΣΩ . Λόγον ὃν αὐτὴ πρὸς αὑτὴν ἡ
ψυχή διεξέρχεται περὶ ὧν ἂν σκοπῇ. ὥς γε μὴ εἰδώς σοι ἀποφαί-
νομαι. τοῦτο γάρ μοι ινδάλλεται διανοουμένη, οὐκ ἄλλο τι ἢ
διαλέγεσθαι, αὐτὴ ἑαυτὴν ἐρωτῶσα καὶ ἀποκρινομένη, καὶ φάσκουσα
καὶ οὐ φάσκουσα. ὅταν δὲ ὁρίσασα , εἴτε βραδύτερον, εἴτε καὶ
ὀξύτερον ἐπαΐξασα, τὸ αὐτὸ ἤδη φῇ καὶ μὴ διστάζῃ , δόξαν ταύτην
τίθεμεν αὐτῆς. ὥστ᾽ ἔγωγε τὸ δοξάζειν λέγειν καλῶ καὶ τὴν δόξαν
λόγον εἰρήμενον , οὐ μέντοι πρὸς ἄλλον οὐδὲ φωνῇ, ἀλλὰ σιγῇ πρὸς
αὑτόν. This makes it the easier to understand why when later
the phrase δόξα ἀληθὴς μετὰ λόγου is analyzed, it is thought
necessary to" suggest as one possible meaning of λόγος vocal
expression (206 D). Of course it at once appears that λόγος
understood in this sense is a quite inadequate expression of the
difference between δόξα and ἐπιστήμη. Note that while in the
Republic (511 D ) διάνοια is made the inferior division of τὸ
νοητόν and to lie μεταξύ τι δόξης τε καὶ νοῦ, in the Theaetetus
διάνοια is represented as preparatory to δόξα. )
Very much the same view of δόξα occurs Soph. 263 E ΞΕ.
X
306 ΜΕΝΟ

Οὐκοῦν διάνοια καὶ λόγος ταὐτόν · πλὴν ὁ μὲν ἐντὸς τῆς ψυχῆς
πρὸς αὑτὴν διάλογος ἄνευ φωνῆς γιγνόμενος τοῦτ᾽ αὐτὸ ἡμῖν
ἐπωνομάσθη, διάνοια ; ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. ΞΕ. Τὸ δέ γ᾽ ἀπ᾿
ἐκείνης ῥεῦμα διὰ τοῦ στόματος τὸν μετὰ φθόγγου κέκληται λόγος ;
ΘΕΑΙ. Αληθῆ. Το λόγος, continues the Stranger, belong
assertion and negation ; ὅταν οὖν τοῦτο ἐν ψυχῇ κατὰ διάνοιαν
ἐγγίγνηται μετὰ σιγῆς, πλὴν δόξης ἔχεις ὅ τι προσείπῃς αὐτό ;
ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ πῶς ; Cp. with this the view of δόξα in Philebus 38 c.
You see an object indistinctly in the distance. Then follows
the internal colloquy (διάνοια ) : What is that yonder ? Is it a
man ? Or is it perchance an image set up by the shepherds ?
Κἂν μέν τίς γ᾽ αὐτῷ παρῇ, τά τε πρὸς αὑτὸν ῥηθέντα ἐντείνας
εἰς φωνὴν πρὸς τὸν παρόντα αὐτὰ ταῦτ᾽ ἂν πάλιν φθέγξαιτο, καὶ
λόγος δὴ γέγονεν οὕτως δ τότε δόξαν ἐκαλοῦμεν ;
But this distinction between doğa and Discourse does not in
the least overlie or obliterate the grand distinction between
δόξα and Knowledge ; indeed not long after the passage just
quoted from the Sophist we have the old distinction reappearing
(268 Α ) οἰόμενος εἰδέναι ταῦτα ἃ δοξάζει.
 INDEX I : GREEK WORDS

The references, both to the text and notes, are to Stephanus'

pages and the lines of the chapters.
cr.critical note.
X = distinguished from.

ἄγαμαι with acc. of thing, | ἄλλο ἤ 80 A 4

gen. of person 95 c 23 ἄλλο τι 82 € 16, 84 E 12, 97 Α
ἄθλιος 78 Α 54 15 cr.
αἰτίας λογίσμῳ 98 Α 30 ἄλλως τε for ἄλλως τε και 85 Ε
airi@μaι followed by infin. 93 D 37
23 ἀλογία 90 Ε 34
ȧkóλovo , retainers ' 82 A 34 ἀμαθία 90 € 36
ἀκροπόλει ἐν 89 Β 31 ἀμφί (οἱ ἀμφὶ Θεμ.) 99 Β 9
ἀλήθεια τῶν ὄντων, ἡ 86 Β 15 av omitted in the MSS. 97 c
ἀληθῆ λέγειν 98 Β 11 2 cr.
ἀλλά transitional ) ἀλλά com- ἀνάμνησις 81D 12 : see Remi-
plemental 71 c 10, 74 D 30, niscence
76 E 47, 96 B 22 ; com- ȧvaµvnoтóv 87 B 8
plemental 73 B 49, 75 E 17, ȧvaтileμaι 89 D 18
78 c 25, 79c 30, 82 в 43 , | ȧvпpтñolaι 89 A 15
E 38, 84 D 35, 85 D 20 ; ȧvтelкášw 80 c 28
following elliptical negative "AvUTOs, name corrupted 89 E
clauses 71 c 13, 85 c 3 ; 34 cr.
' appealing ' with imperat. ağıŵ 91 d 6, 93 a 5
83 E 79, 86 E 18 ära , construction with , 82 c
ἀλλὰ γάρ Exc. III ; introducing 16
supposed objection 94 E 6 άπioт , constructions with,
ἀλλὰ μήν γε 73 D 7 89 D 14, 18
¿λλ 76 в 13, 84 D 32 ἀποβλέπειν 72 c 3, 96 E 27
ἀλλ᾽ οὖν γε 84 Α 5 ἀποδιδράσκω 97 D 17
308 ΜΕΝΟ

ἀποκρίνομαι, pres. ) aor. 72 c | δαιμόνιε ( ω ) 92 € 16

4 cr., 83 D 50 ; pf. 75 c 32 δέ after είεν 78 D 26
ἀπολείψω (προθυμίας γε οὐδὲν δὲ ἄρα 91 Ε 17
77 A 1 δέ γε 82 Ε 44, 95 Ε 9
ἀπολέλυται 99 Β 5 δ᾽ οὖν 98 Β 5
ἀποπέμψαι (of guests) 91 Α 8 δεῖ for πρέπει 80 Α 8
=
ἀπορία τὸ μὴ πορίζεσθαι 78 Ε δεῖσθαι, impersonal use 79 € 25
44 δέχομαί τινι 81 Β 32
ἀπορροαί 76 € 22 déw, ' I lack, ' personal use 79B
ἄρα in conclusions 73 Β 42 ; 20, cp. 71 A 26, 92 A 1
with an inference causing δή, igitur, 75 D 10 ; nota, bene
surprise or doubt 80 E 8; 81 B 30 ; ‘ of course 87 E
with impf. ind . 97 c 30 : 40, 43 : see ἵνα δή, τί δή ; τί
see γὰρ ἄρα, δὲ ἄρα οὖν δή ;
ἆρ᾽ οὐ confused with ἆρ᾽ οὖν διά with acc. 98 C 19, 99 3 12
86 A 11 cr. διὰ πάντων of Universal and
ἀργός 81 D 14 Particulars 73 D 5
ἀρετή : see Virtue διαλεκτικός, characteristic of,
ἄριστε (3) 73 D 12 75 D 7
ἄριστον (ἐν τοῖς) 94 Α 2 διάμετρος ‘ diagonal 85 Β 48
ἁρμόττειν ἐνίοις τῶν πόρων 76 c | διάνοια, not in Meno : see pp.
28 291, 305
ἀσκητόν 70 Α 2 διδάσκω as factitive verb 93D
ἀστός 91 € 21, 92 Β 7 14 ; )( διδάσκομαι 93D 14 ;
αὐτό referring to ἀρετή (ep. fut. διδάξομαι 95 D 4
' Attraction ' ) 87 D 25 δοκῶ 71 € 14 ; personal and im-
αὐτομάτου (ἀπὸ τοῦ) 92 Ε 2 personal use mixed 72 D 9
αὐτός, vague reference of cases, δόξα ) πίστις Exc. VII pp.
86 D 13, 87 A 29 300, 302, 303
αὐτόσε 73 D 13 δραπετεύω 97 D 17, 98 Α 28
δραπέτης 97 Ε 22
βασιλεύς (ὁ μέγας) 78 D 27 δύναμις 95 D 3
βουλόμενος (ὁ) 70 € 17, 90 D 21 , δύνασθαι 77 Β 13
91 B 14

γάρ in answers 73 D 12, 78 Β 3, ἐγγὺς καί 91 E 27

97 Β 25, Exc. III p. 269 ; ἔγεντο 95 E 14 cr.
confused with dé 73 D 12 cr. ἐθέλουσι, solent and volunt, 95 Β
yap apa 79 c 28 cr. , 81 D 11 10, 98 A 28
γε implying affirmative answer ἔθους (ὑπὸ τοῦ) 82 Α 29
92 € 15 ; confused with τε εἰ omitted in MSS . 97 Α 13 cr. ;
72 E 17 cr. confused with ἤ or ἡ 79 c 27
γεωμετρίαι 76 Α 20 cr., 82 B 41 cr. , 88 B 21 cr.;
γοῦν 71 Α 22, 25 cr. with av and optative 79 c
γραμμή, of the diameter of a 27, 91D 12, 98 B 4 ; followed
circle 87 A 29 by οὐ 91 D 12 ; with future
 GREEK INDEX 309

indic. 85 € 15 , 86 Α 8 , Exc . | έρωτώμενον, τὸ )( τὸ ἐρωτηθέν

IV 72D 8
εἰ βούλει, εἰ δὲ βούλει 71 Ε 2, ἐρωτῶν, ὁ )( ὁ ἐρόμενος 75 D 10 c .
72 A 12 cr. ἐσθλός in political sense 95 D 4
εἴ γε, Exc. II ἔστων )( ἔστωσαν 92D 26 cr.
εἰ εἶεν (indirect question) 89 Ε ἔτι 73 D 10 ; insuper 93 Α 10 ;
29 confused with ἐπί 99 A 2 cr.
εἰ ὅ τι μάλιστα 80 D 4 εὐδοξία 99 Β 15
είδος, philosophical meanings in εὐμαθία 88 Α 17, c 28
Plato, 72 c 2 ; εἴδει (τῷ αὐτῷ εὐπορῶ 80 € 34
72 E 20 εὐσταλής 90 Β 44
elev 75 c 30, 78 D 26 ἔχομαι with gen. 93 D 19
εικάζω 98 Β 2
εἰκασίαι 80 € 28 ἤ introducing a single ques-
είναι as copula with pres. tion 93 A 6
ptcp. 82 c 7, 84 A 1 , E 21 , ĥ qua 72в 30 ; confused with
99 E 5 ἤ 96 Ε 30
εἴπερ Exc . II ἡγουμένη οι φρόνησις 88 € 33
εἶπον, imperat. , 71 € 28 cr. ἤδη confused with ᾔδει 86 A 2
εἶτα cum admiratione 71c 18, cr.
79 A 5 6
ἡλικίαν (εἰς τὴν) of age 89 €
εἴτε οὐ ) εἴτε μή in second half 33
of indirect disjunctive ques- ἥλιος ( εἰς τὸν ὕπερθεν ἅλιον) 81 c
tion 86 D 12, 87 B 35, 3 33
ἐκτῆσθαι )( κεκτῆσθαι 97 Ε 21 rarely ' understood ' 76 E 49
ἐλεγεία 95 D 1 ἥρωες )( δαίμονες 81 € 36
ἐλεύθερος 86 D 15 ἤτοι • · 85 D 28, 89 A 20
ἐνάτῳ ἔτει 81 € 33
ἐντείνειν 87 Α 25 θάρρος )( ἀνδρεία 88 Β 23
ἐξ ὧν ‘ to judge from what ' θείᾳ μοίρᾳ 99 E 5
92 c 22 θεῖος 81 Β 24, 99 € 23, etc. ;
ἔξεστί σε 91 Α 2 θεῖος ἀνήρ (Spartan) 99 D 38
ἐπαχθής 90 Β 43 θεομάντεις 99 € 18
ἔπη, elegiac as well as ' epic
verse, 95 D 37 ἰδέα nowhere in Meno : on
ἐπί with dat. ; ἐφ' ἱππικῇ 70 Β 7 ; 72c 2
ἐπὶ σοφίᾳ 70 Β 11 ; ἐπὶ τούτοις ἵνα δή 82 Α 26, 86 D 14
75 Α 7 ; ἐπ' αὐτῷ τούτῳ 90 D
20 ; of Universal and Parti- καί intensive 71 B 8 , c 12,
culars 75 A 6 D 26, 79 D 35, 80 A 8, 84 c
ἐπιστῆμαι 86 Β 10, 98 Α 33 31 , 88 A 7, 94 A 10 , 98 в 1 ,
ἐπιτυγχάνειν 97 € 36 5, 99 c 19 ; in final clauses
ἐπιχώριοι 94 Ε 12 75A 11 ; admirantis in ques-
εργαστικός ) εργατικός 81 D tions 80 D 1, 91 B 16 ; four,
16 cr. coupling two pairs 78 c 21
ἐριστικός 75 € 2, 80 Ε 7 καὶ . . δὲ καί 94 Ε 19
310 ΜΕΝΟ

καὶ μήν 87 D 35, 98 Β 1 μή in conditional relative

καὶ ταῦτα και 74 D 33 clause 80 D 2, 90 E 31 , 95 B
κακοδαίμων 78 Α 57 17, 79 D 38
κακῶς λέγειν 95 Α 6 μή, μὴ οὐ, various uses with
καλεῖς τι ; (securing recognition indic. , on 89 c 6 ; with subj.,
of terms) 75 E 12, 15, 76 A on 89 C 10, D 14 ; with infin.
19, 88 A 16 after πολλὴ ἄνοια , etc. 90 E 26
καλοὶ κἀγαθοί 92 Ε 38 μή redundant with infinitive
καλὸν (εἰς) 89 Ε 33 89 D 18
κἂν εἰ 72 € 1, 75 € 25, 98 D 35 μή )( οὐ after a second εἴτε 71 Α
καρτέρημα 88 € 33 C 27
κατά with acc. of following μή ) οὐ with a dependent infin.
up ' a notion 72 B 21 ; refer- 98 E 41
ring to an authority 76 c 19, μηδέ confused with μήτε 91 €
23 ; with gen. of Universal 20 cr. , 96 c 8 cr.
and Particulars 73 D 5 μήν : see ἀλλὰ μήν, καὶ μήν
κατὰ ὅλον )( κατὰ ὅλου 77 A 5 cr. μνήμη a Virtue 88 A 17
κατάγειν (?) 80 Ε 7 μόνιμοι (ἐπιστῆμαι) 98 Α 34
καταγιγνώσκω 76 € 15 μόριον ἀρετῆς 78 E 38 , 79 A B C
κατακεκαλυμμένος 76 Β 9 μῶν 73 Β 46
κατακερματίζειν 79 € 24
καταρτυόμενα 88 € 29 νάρκη 80 Α 10
κατασημηνάμενοι 89 Β 31
κατέχει of Universal and Par- ξένος )( ἀστός 91 c 21, 92 Β 6
ticulars 74 D 35
κεκτῆσθαι )( ἐκτῆσθαι 97 Ε 21 ὁ (art. ) omitted before national
κερματίζειν 79 Α 8 names 70 A 4 ; referring to
κοινός free 91 c 14 particular instance περὶ τοῦ
σχήματος 79 Ε 36 ; cp. 82 A
Λαρισαίου 70 Β 9" c . 29, 91 E 17, 92 E 34
λέγω, ‘ I mean, with two acc. τὸ δέ “ whereas 97 € 30
72E 21 ὀγκώδης 90 Β 43
λιμῷ, τῷ 91 Ε 17 οἰκογενής (πενεστής) verna 82 B
λόγον διδόναι 81 Β 23 ; )( λόγον 39
λαμβάνειν 75 D 4 οἴομαι -= δοξάζω 82 Ε, 84 Α Β
οἷον velut 76 Α 20, 88 Β 22, 23 ;
μεγαλοπρέπεια 74 Α 30, 88 Α = ώστε 87 Α 29
13 olous confused with ous 91 B 17
μέν in questions 82 Β 38 ; not cr.
answered by δέ 87 Α 28 ὀλίγου, ' almost 80 Β 23
μὲν—μέν, δὲ—δέ 94 € 1 ὅλον )( ὅλην 79 3 18 cr.
μέρει, ἐν τῷ )( ἐν μέρει 92 Ε 34 ὁμοῖος εἶναι with dat. ptcp.
μεστὸν ἀπορίας 80 Α 7 80 D 39, 97 A 10
μεταβάς 95 D 9 ὁμολογῶ aor. 89 c 6 ; pf. 96c, Ε
μή deprecatory 74D 30, 75 Β 2, 97 A 11 , 98E ; change from
13 ; tentative 78 € 23 pf. to impf. 97 A 7
 GREEK INDEX 311

ὄναρ (ὥσπερ) 85 c 14 παρεκαθέζετο aor. 89 E 34

ὁποία = ὁπόση of lines 82 Β 39 πένθος = πάθος (παλαιόν) 81 Β 32
ὁποῖόν τι : see ποιόν τι περαίνει intrans. 76 Α 24 ,
ὅπως μή 77 Α 3 περί (ἀρετῆς) after εἰδέναι 71 Β
ὀρθὴ δόξα = ἀληθὴς δόξα 97 € 33 3 ; after διδασκάλους 90 Β
ὀρθοῦσιν 99 € 17 47, 2
ὀρθῶς spurious 97 A 12 cr . ; τε ποῖον ; implying feeling : on
καὶ εὖ 96 1 29, 97 Α 15 80 D 3 , 95 D 37
ös in sense of οἷος 80 D 37, 92 c ποιόν τι )( τι on 71 Β 4
19 (and cr., ep. 91 B 17 cr. ) ; πολῖται 'fellow - citizens ” 70 Β
with adversative effect 82 A 9, 91 A 7 (cp. on 91 c 21 )
25 πολλὰ ποιῶν ἐκ τοῦ ἑνός 77 Α 6
ὅς γε giving a reason 81 c 6 πολλοῦ δέω 79 Β 20, 92 Α 1
ὁσίως 78 € 30 πόρος=τὸ πορίζεσθαι 78 D 29
ὅσον = ὥστε with indic. 91 c 3 ποτέ confused with τοτέ 88 Β
ὅτι redundant 74 D 30, 75 A 4 , 22 cr.
c 3, 87 A 25 Toν opinor 72c 4, etc.; ' if I
οὐ redundant 89D 18 ; omitted understand ' 75c 29, 79 D 36,
in MSS. (?) 94 в 21 cr. , 98 B 94 c 26
3 cr. πρίν with aor. indic. 84 c 26,
οὐ πάνυ on 71 € 19 86 D 13
οὗ confused with oἳ 84 Α 1 cr. , προβιβάσαι ) προσβιβάσαι 74 Β
94 D 2 cr. 5 cr.
οὐδὲ . . οὐδέ 75 A 4 , 92 Β 11 προθυμίας οὐδὲν ἀπολείψω 77 Α 1
οὐδεὶς ὅστις οὐκ 70 € 18 προομολογεῖν ) προσομολογεῖν
οὐκέτι 73 Α 29 75 D 10 cr.
οὖν resumptive 74 Α 29 ; origin- προσκάλεσον act. )( middle 82 Α
ally ' confirmative ' 92 c 20 33
οὐσία Exc. Ι προστάττειν (πράγματα) 76 A 4 c .
οὐσία )( πάθος on 71 B 4, 72 B 22 προύργου 84 Β 16, 87 A 27
οὗτος ille 76 Α 20, 80 A 10 ; πως implying hesitation 95 Ε
τοῦτο μετὰ τοῦτο 87 D 23 ; τὰ 11
αὐτὰ ταῦτα “the same holds
90 E 26 ῥᾳδίως 94 Ε 16
οὕτως ἁπλῶς 73 Ε 21 ῥᾷor confused with ῥᾴδιον 94 Ε
οὐχ ὅπως . · ἀλλ᾽ οὐδέ 96 Α 21 19 cr.

παιδεύειν )( παιδεύεσθαι 93D 14 σμήνος (ἀρετῶν) 72 Α 19

πάλιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς 79 € 25 , Ε 1 σοφισταί 85 Β 49, 91 € 18
πάντα omitted in MSS. 87 Ε σύμμαχοι 94 1 7
37 cr., 88 c 28 cr. συμμίσγῃς ) συμμίγης 95 Ε 5 cr.
παντὸς μᾶλλον 80 C 35 , 96 D 24 συμπένομαι 71 Β 2
παραδοτόν 93 Β 20 συν in composition 71 B 2
παραληπτόν 93 Β 20 σύνες ὅ τοι λέγω 76 D 33
παραμένειν 97 D 12 σχεδόν 100 Α 8
παρατείνειν 87 Α 29 σωφρόνως καὶ δικαίως 73 Α 35
312 ΜΕΝΟ

ταξάμενος of fixing a fee 91 B 15 ὑγιής 77 Α 8 , 89 c 12 ; acc. sing.

τε confused with γε 91 D 10 cr. and neut. plur. ὑγιῆ οι ὑγιᾶ ?
τε . δέ 93 € 9 on 77 A 8 cr.
τε . • 95 B 12 vós, spelling and decl. , 93 c 11
τε, hyperbaton of, 72E 17 cr. , ὑποδέξασθαι of hospitality 91 A 8
99 c 27 ὑπόθεσις 86 Ε 20
τελευτᾶν ) πάλιν γίγνεσθαι 81 Β
28 φρόνησις on 88 Β 23, 97 Β 27,
τέρας λέγεις, εἰ 91 D 12 30
τετράγωνον (χωρίον ) 82 Β 2 φρονῶν, φρόνιμος ) δοξάζων,
τετράπουν confused with τέταρ- οἰόμενος on 97 Β 17
τον 83 € 40 cr. φύσει 70 Α 3, 89 Α 25, Β 27, 1 ,
τι spurious 78 D 29 cr. 98 C D
τί )( ποιόν τι on 71 Β 4 φύσις indoles 93 D 22
τί δή ; )( τί δέ ; 76 Β 12
τί μάλιστα ; 80 B 25 χρησμῳδοί 99 D 28
τί οὖν δή ; 79Β 18 ( see cr. ) , 89 D χρόα 75 € 30, 76 D 34
13, 97 Ε 19 χρώμα 75 c etc.
τις, ἀρετή τις ἀρετή 73 Ε 17,
cp. 21 ψεύδομαι, middle and passive,
τὸ δέ whereas '97 € 30 on 71 D 29
τοιοῦτον of similar figures 82 c ψεύσμα 71 D 29 (only place in
10, D 28, 87 A Plato)
-τος, verbals in, 70 A 2
τοσούτου δέω 71 A 26 cr. & omitted with voc. 98 A 31 cr.
τοῦ confused with τούτου 78 Β ὡς for ὥστε with indic. 71A
4 cr.; confused with του 27 cr.; omitted in introdu-
99 D 32 cr. cing quotations 76 D 33 ; with
τοῦτο confused with ταῦτα 94 D gen. absol . 95 E 6
5 cr. ὥσπερ out of construction 71 A
τραγικός 76 Ε 43 20, 87 Α. 26
τρίγωνον adv . 87 Α 25 ὠφελίμη 98 € 13
τρίπους 83 Ε 60 ὠφέλιμον )( ἀγαθόν 77 D 34, 87 Ε
τρυφῶντες (οἱ) 76 Β 14 37
 INDEX II : MATTERS

The references are to pages.

Names of dialogues are in italics.

Abstract nouns, in plural 92, | Anytus xxi foll. , 173, 202 foll.
143 ; replaced by concrete Aorist, after ri ouk equivalent
106, 222 to imperative 189 ; inter-
Accusative of reference, with mixed with imperfect 77,
ȧyalós etc. 189, 245 227 ; participle, time of 189
Address, Tатрółεv 97 ; äpiσтe Apollo indicated ? 227
84 ; ὦ δαιμόνιο 187 Aristides 198
Aleuadae 61 Aristippus, follower of Cyrus
Amatory, expressions in xv, 60, 106
spiritual sense 60 ; character Aristotle, refers to Meno xxv,
of Socrates 93 (end) ; side 58 ; denies identity of Virtue
of Plato's philosophy 94, 95 in Man and Woman (ref. to
Anachronisms in dialogue xxv, Meno ?) 75 ; Posterior Analy-
172, 281 tics beginning quoted 115
Anacoluthon 81 (end) Asyndeton 253
Answer-formulae lxi, lxii Athens, intolerance at 180 ;
Anthemion xxi , 171 , 174 facilities for prosecution at
Antiptosis : see Prolepsis 202
Antisthenes, Head of school Attraction , to nom . 82 ; to dat.
at Athens xxxiii, lvii ; after TOTEUw 128, after
believes Virtue can be ἀναγκαῖον 160 ; to case of
taught 58 ; Virtue same in relative clause 201 ; to
Man and Woman 75 ; holds gender of predicate 145 ; to
predication impossible 86 ; sing. predicate 181 ; inverse
Eristic and rivalry with 62, 209, 210, 212, 216
Plato 278 foll. ; on Know-
ledge and Opinion 299 Binary Structure 61 , 62, 157
314 MENO

Callicles, in the Gorgias 107, by description of individual

181 65 ; difficulty of grasping
Chance, excluded from causes the problem of 72 ; of
of moral action 225 ignotum per ignotius 89 ; of
Charmides lx, 117, 159 Form (model definition) 92 ;
Circulus in definiendo 108 of Colour 96
Cleophantus, son of Themisto- Dialectic, nowhere fully ana-
cles 194 lysed 143 ; method of 143
Clitophon, ' Can Virtue be Dialogue as a literary form X, xi
taught ? ' 57 Dissimilation of cases 151
Colour, definition of 95, 96 ;
coupled with Form 89 ' Educational' dialogues xxxvii
Compound verb succeeded by foll.
simple 218 Elenchus, provocative shock
Conditional clauses with εἴπερ, of 109 ; contrasted with
el ye Exc. II, ei and fut. Eristic 272-274, 277, 278
indic. 143 , Exc. IV ; com- Ellipsis of v rare 97
plex, see Protasis ; indef. )( Empedocles, theory of sensa-
unreal 85, 131 ; relative tion 95 , 96 ; his трayıkÒS
clause with past tense of Túpos 97 ; belief in im-
indic. 162, optative 169, mortality 119, 288 ; quoted
187, 212, 223 ; apodosis 123 (end)
indef. ) unreal 175 ; with Emphasis, false, on a pronoun
' potential indic. ' (av éẞovλý- 136
On) 193, 194, with infin. (av Enemies, to be injured 74
ἐξευρεῖν) 201 Enthymema ' argumentum ex
Courage, reduced to póvnois contrariis conclusum ' 184,
157 200, 209
Crito, pupil of Socrates, on Epistles, Platonic, spurious 65
teachableness of Virtue 58 Eristic 127, 134, 167, Exc. V
Ctesippus in Euthyd. , double Erotic : see Amatory
relation to Socrates 281 Essence Property and Acci-
dent 63-65
Daedalus 218, 219, 220, 221 Euclides of Megara xxxiii,
Daemons and Heroes 124, 288, 278, 279
290, 291 Euthydemus ' Can Virtue be
Dative, with déxouaι 121 , with taught ? ' 57 ; published be-
ὁμοῖός εἰμι οι ἔοικα 113, 222 ; fore Meno 1, li, 157 , 272, 273,
of personal agent with pres. 281
or impf. pass. 204, 205, 215 Euthydemus and Dionysodorus
de virtute, spurious work 58, 281
192, 247 Euthyphro 72, 107
Debate, personal, superior to
books or absent authorities Fees taken by sophists 182 ,
70 183
Definition of Class, illustrated Final clause, with past tense of
 INDEX OF MATTERS 315

indic. 162, 245 ; with optative | Health and Wealth, types of

163 bona corporis and bona
Form (oxua), definition of 92, externa 105
coupled with Colour 89 Heraclitus and Immortality
Friends to be benefited 74 288
Future, conditions 143, Exc. Hiatus lx, 223, " 240
IV ; perf. act. 143 Hippias the sophist' 256,
277
Game, πόλεις 100 Homer quoted 231
Gender, differentiation of, to Hospitality 179 : see μeyaλo-
express πούς, γραμμή, χωρίον πρέπεια
131 Hyperbaton (av) 78, 89, 169 ,
Genitive, governed by diλáσiov (TE) 226, 237
etc., not by ärağ etc. 131 , Hypothesis, method of, 146 ,
134 ; partitive, ' of infin. 147 153
137 ; of price 182 ; after
ayaμai 206 ; after verbs of
mentioning 210 Ideal Theory, implied in
Geometrical problem (with Meno 63, 127, 132 ; origin
ὑπόθεσις ) 148 foll. , 232 of xlv, xlvi ; later 65, 77
Goethe, view of Plato xxx Ignorance accompanied by con-
Goods, classification of 105 , fidence 72, 131
154, 155 Immortality, Plato's attitude
Gorgias earlier than Meno towards liii foll. , 118, 119,
xxxiii, xxxvi foll . , xlii foll . , 142
69, 206, 282 ; not an attack Imperative, 3rd plur. , forms
on Gorgias xlvi ; contrasted in -ωσαν 247
with Phaedrus xlvii, xlviii ; Imperfect, intermixed with
contrasted with Meno as to aorist 77 , 109 ; in references
treatment of Statesmen back lxii, 82 ; special use
193 ; myth simple 289 ; no ( OVTO) 104 ; referring to
technical use of δόξα 299 thought about a fact rather
Gorgias, teacher of Meno, than fact itself 135 ; with
Aristippus, and Proxenus ἄρα 218
60 ; high professions 61 ; Incommensurable magnitudes
style not caricatured in 136
the Meno 76 ; relation to Indicative confused with op-
Empedocles 96 ; his тpayiκòs tative in MSS. 251
Túpos 97 ; professes to im- Infinitive, of purpose shows
part not Virtue but Power dative origin 61 ; active
of Speaking 205, 277 ; Plato's commoner than passive
attitude to xlix note after Tapexw etc. 62 ; de-
Grammar, illogical element in pendent on notion of neces-
177, 194 sity extracted from previous
Grote, services to Plato xxix word 249
foll. Innate ideas, controversy 132
316 MENO

Inspiration of poets, etc. 226 , | Melesias, son of Thucydides

227 199
Interrogation emerging late Memory, good, disclaimed by
in the sentence 70, 105 ; Socrates 70
elasticity of Greek 109, 145, Menexenus, Eristic in, 281
153, 157 ; derived from ex- Meno, assumed date of dia-
clamation 116 ; rhetorical logue xxiv ; genuineness
221 and merits of XXV ; con-
Interrupted speech for im- struction of xxvi foll. ; date
pressiveness 118 and occasion of lvi, lvii
Ismenias xl, 171, 172 Meno, life, family, and times
Isocrates, rival of Plato xii foll.; no longer very
xxxiii, xlviii, 279, 280 ; young at time of dialogue
master of Theopompus xx ; xv, 92 ; character xviii foll.,
believes in no τέχνη to 236 ; combines the piλóriuos
make men virtuous 57 ; with the φιλοκερδής 105 ;
defends dóca against Plato's hereditary friend of the
ἐπιστήμη 230 ; treatment of Great King 106 , of Anytus
Eristic 284, 285 174 ; acquiesces in conven-
tional view of morality 107 ;
Jealousy (40óvos) out of place less cautious than Simmias
in philosophy 71 128 ; δόξαι still unsettled
Justice and Temperance, ordi- 144
nary civil Virtue 82 Middle voice, causative sense
195 foll.
Knowledge, genesis of, 113, Mysteries, Plato's estimate of
140, 141 ; the only true 98, 124
Power 101 ; ( póvnois) sove- Myth, Plato's attitude to-
reignty of, 156, 160 ; )( wards 144
Opinion 216, 217, Exc. VII ;
illustrated by matters of
Perception 216 ; synonyms Nature, all cognate 125 ; )
for 217 θεία μοῖρα 161
Negative, words with ety-
Laches 73, 157 , 158, 192 , 198, mology pressed 107 ; ap-
199 parent redundance of 167,
Learning (Search ) difficulties 176
about 113, 114
Linear and superficial measure Opinion (dóğa), analogy with
131 epws 95, 301 ; )( Knowledge
Lipography 243 216, Exc. VII ; relics of
Lysimachus, son of Aristides previous μálnois 141 ; syno-
198, 199, 200 nyms for 217 ; relation to
Lysis, Eristic in, 280 discourse (Móyos) 305
Optative with av , polite , in
MSS . of Meno 233 apodosis 161
 INDEX OF MATTERS 317

Orphic cult and Immortality Antisthenes, Euclides, Iso-

118, 286 foll. crates ; little technical ter-
minology 65, 81 ; on zoology
'Palamedes, the Eleatic ' 275 76 ; rather enthusiast for
Paradox as to Virtue and the mathematics than mathe-
Special Arts 174 , 182 , 191 , matician 152 ; rarely names
192, 202 his contemporaries xl (note),
Parataxis 71 (end) , 106 , 200 172, 280 ; growing attention
Parmenides on Opinion 298 to order of words lviii foll. ,
Participle, containing im- 170 ; to hiatus lx, 223, 240 ;
portant idea of sentence 201 see Variety
(ep. 191) ; present in peri- Plural, ' modest ' use of 1st
phrastic use 130 person rare in prose 238 ;
Perfect optative, simple forms of abstract nouns 92 , 143
rare 141 Poets, Plato's attitude towards
Pericles, his oratory xlvii ; his 100, 200 ; see Inspiration
sons 199 Polycrates of Samos, a type of
Personalisation 69, 108, 141 , wealth 171
151 , 177 Polycrates the sophist lvii
Phaedo, date of xxxix, lii , note
liii ; reference to Meno xxv, Power, the only true, is Know-
126, 127 ; Eristic in 283 ; ledge 101
myth compared with Re- Practice as an avenue to
public 296, 297 ; doğa in Virtue 59 ; Metaphysic
305 ; Immortality in liv, lv should precede 65
Phaedrus, date of xliii foll. Predicables 63 foll.
Ocía μavía in 226, 227 ; Predicate abbreviated 161 ,
Eristic in 275, 282 ; dóca in 224, 245
300 ; Immortality in liii, liv, Predication, import of 86
289 foll.; compared with Proclus quoted 115 , 149 , 150
Timaeus 297 Prodicus, on synonyms 91 ;
Pherecydes of Scyrus taught Socrates' obligations to
Transmigration 286 212, 213 ; Plato's hostility
Philebus, problem of One and to 214
Many 86, 87 ; ỏpůǹ dóğa in Prolepsis 62, 128, 153 , 173 ,
303 188 (end), 246
Philolaus referred to 125, 255 Pronouns, wealth of, in Greek
Philosophy, Greek, three stages 134
of ix 'Property ' ) Essence 63
Pindar quoted 96 ; belief in Protagoras, earliest of Educa-
Immortality 119 tional Dialogues xxxiii, xli,
Plato, outline of life xxxi xlii ; can Virtue be
foll.; the dialogue his ap- taught ? ' 57, 227 ; view of
propriate literary form x ; origin of Society 191 ; dis-
problem of order of writ- cussion in parallel to that
ings xxix foll. ; rivals, see with Anytus xxviii, 202 ;
318 MENO
Simonides episode parallel 205 ; contrast between Gor-
to Theognis episode in gias and Phaedrus xlvii, xlviii
Meno 207 ; notion of ' demotic Riding, ars desultoria 197
virtue ' not put forward 229 ; Rule, self-rule the first con-
problem of One and Many dition of 145
86 ; end of, parallel to that
of Meno 231
Protagoras, his μéyas Móyos Sicily, affairs in 229
quoted 58 ; the first to make Simo, pupil of Socrates, on
copía a profession 182 ; his teachableness of Virtue 58
alleged prosecution and Simonides of Ceos, probably
death 185 ; his connexion quoted 100
with Eristic 275 foll. Slave (of Meno) a typical blank
Protasis, complex 77, 85, 86 mind xxiv, 129
Purgation ofthe Soul, duration Slaves bound 220
of 123 Socrates, place in Greek
Pythagoreans, Plato's inter- philosophy ix ; personality
course with xxxv, xxxvi , in the Meno xi ; meaning
xliv foll . ; and Transmigra- of amatory language 94 ;
tion 287 foll. physiognomy 94, 110 ; stay-
at - home habits 111 ; Pla-
Quotations from poets inter- tonic, criticizes real Socrates
woven with prose 209 xxxix, 158 ; unpopular, as
a ' sophist ' 181 ; for inter-
Rectangles assumed where ference with home influence
parallelograms are discussed xxiii , 186 ; for criticizing
130, 149, 232 statesmen 202, 203 ; trial
Relative constr. exchanged for foreshadowed 227 ; scepti-
demonstr. 88, 177 , 197 ; see cism of 299 ; and Eristic 274
Conditional relative clause ' Socratic ' dialogues xxxiii,
Reminiscence, all learning is Xxxviii
127, 140 ; doctrine of, in- Sophist, Eristic in 284 ; dóğa
volves Ideal Theory 127 , in 306
143 ; bearing on Innate Sophists, unpopularity of
Ideas ' 132 xxviii, 179, 180 , 181 , 186 ;
Republic, date of xl, 172 ; )( Rhetors 206
preluded by Meno li, 57 ; Soul's history, conditioning
foreshadowed in Meno 162, causes of 122
231 ; reference to Meno xxv, Spartan use of leîos 227
217 ; Eristic in 282 ; dóca in Square, definition of 130
217, 301 ; Virtue in li, 158 ; State, the Man ' writ large '
Immortality in liv , 289, 296 ; 225
'Auxiliaries ' in 229 Statesmen, Athenian, criti-
Research, duty of 127 , 144 ; cized by Plato 192, 193 ;
object of, personified 215 inspired 226 ; philosophic
Rhetoric, professed by Gorgias and popular 229, 230
 INDEX OF MATTERS 319

Stephanus, son of Thucydides | Universal and Particular,

son of Melesias 200 phrases to denote relation
Stylometry and Hylometry 83
Ïvii foll.; results as to
Meno lx foll. Variety of phrase 83, 153 , 198,
Subject omitted with vb. in 218, 272
3rd person 107, 216 Vergil and Transmigration
Subjunctive dependent on 123, 297
Boule 89 ; indirect delibera- Vice, involuntary 101 , 102
tive 190 Virtue, can it be taught ?
Symposium, date of lii, liii ; xxviii, 57 ; ordinary civil,
Immortality in liii, liv ; Temperance and Justice 82 ;
dóğa in 217, 301, 302 the 6 cardinal ' virtues 85,
Synonyms, argument by sub- 107 ; philosophic and popu-
stitution of 102, 103 lar 228, 229, 295, 301 ;
divine allotment depends on
Temperance reduced to φρό- soul's previous history 120,
νησις 159 122, 296 ; ' special function '
Theaetetus, points of contact 75 ; resolved into Knowledge
with Meno lv foll. , 73, 76 ; 154, 157, 214, 215 ; ἀνδρὸς
Eristic in 286 ; dóğa in 304, ἀρετή 74, 178 ; γυναικὸς
306 άperý 75 ; self-regarding in
Themistocles 192 Plato 75 ; Gorgias, unlike
Theognis 207 ; text of 248, other sophists, does not
249 profess 205 ; see Paradox
Thessaly, circumstances of Wisdom : see Knowledge
xii, xiii ; horsemanship 59 ; Women, expressions used by
wealth 60 227
Thucydides son of Melesias Wonderland in early Art 219,
199 220
Timaeus, cosmogony of 125 ; Wrestling 200, 276
myth in 289, 297 ; doğa and
TíσTIS in 303 Xenophon, can κaλoκȧyalía be
Time of thought transferred taught ? 58 ; is Virtue iden-
to time of fact 135, 223, 231 tical in Man and Woman ?
Tiresias among the shades 231 75, 82
Transmigration doctrine de-
rived from Egpyt ? 287 Zeno of Elea ix, 275

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