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S3632873

Intelligence Revolution
Final Paper

Dr. Simon Willmetts

Word Count: 1399


Date: 01/11/2023
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The rise of social media has fundamentally reshaped the access to information, within
the private and public sphere. For intelligence agencies, this revolution called for an
adaptation of their methods and the redefinition of their role as intelligence agencies
traditional goal is “the collection, analyze and dissemination of information that helps
governments understand and respond to threats” (Agrell & Treverton, 2014). In 2012, Social
Media Intelligence (SOCMINT) was coined and with the adoption of those new technics and
tools, multiple repercussions, changes, and the rise of new challenges for intelligence
agencies. Thus, we argue that the proliferation of SOCMINT revolutionized the intelligence
sector by transforming their methods and capabilities, with significant implications for
national security and civil liberties. To understand the impact of SOCMINT on intelligence,
we will start by giving the historical context and describe its close relation with open-source
intelligence (OSINT). Afterwards, we will analyze the revolutionary shift SOCMINT brough
to the intelligence sector. Then, the consequences and implications caused by that new field
will be discussed. Finally, this paper will delve into the challenges and future implications
that this revolution brough to agencies.

Traditional intelligence is an ancient practice, originally based on human intelligence


(HUMINT) which aims to retrieve and gather information using field agents. Through the last
decades, agencies have continuously adapted to technologies’ advances by modifying and
sophisticating their methods. New branches quickly appeared such as geographic intelligence
(GEOINT) or signal intelligence (SIGNIT) (Dover, 2019). With the development of open-
source intelligence (OSINT), agencies were able to extend their capabilities to access various
data and information on the internet. SOCMINT was adopted by intelligence agencies as the
result of the proliferation of mobile communication and the growing importance of social
media platforms. SOCMINT is catalogued as a sub- branch of OSINT’s methods, however it
is important to differentiate those two practices. Compared to OSINT, the different methods
utilized within SOCMINT blur the lines between private and public available information
(reference). We can divide into two category the information collected through SOCMINT:
the public information provided by the user and that is available to other users and, the
private information left by the users’ metadata traces (Dover, 2019).

Social Media Intelligence marked a revolutionary shift in traditional intelligence


collection methods. Social media platforms are utilized by agencies to harness available data
(private or public) on specific individuals, groups, or other targets. With the blurred lines
between private and public content on social media, the access to metadata or traces left by
the user can also be utilized as relevant information. The use of social media platforms such
as Instagram or Twitter is unique as it provides real-time data and information. This specific
aspect is vital for agencies as trends, public sentiment or even current events can be
monitored, controlled, and anticipated (Dover, 2019). SOCMINT has reshaped the collection
process due to that access to real-time data, by being able to identify threats at their early-
stage agencies are capable to adopt predictive and preventive measures (Charania, 2016). For
instance, the use of SOCMINT played a crucial role during the 2013 Boston Marathon
Bombing. It is through Reddit that users were able to provide data, information and identified
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bombers. That crucial information was used by intelligence and law enforcement agencies to
assess the critical situation and control the current threat (Abad-Santos, 2013).

Another aspect that reshaped the role of agencies is the monitoring of social sentiment
and movements. By tracking and monitoring platforms, the massive amount of user-generator
content which can include locations, main actors or information on coordinated action can be
utilized. This gives agencies the opportunity to understand citizen’s concerns which could
reveal a potential threat but also serve as a predictor of future unrest (Charania, 2016). A
representative case is the use of social media during the French yellow vest movement
(YVM). The movement started in 2018 in France and was vastly publicized and covered
through social media (Baisnée, 2020). With the sharing of details and organization of public
demonstrations or collective actions, the information became accessible to other users but
also to intelligence agencies. As a result, the monitoring, tracking and utilization of those
information were used to control, anticipate, and sometimes suppress collective actions
(Baisnée, 2020). Thus, the use of SOCMINT also created a shift in the collection process,
enhanced their predictive measures but it also redefined the role of intelligence agencies.

However, SOCMINT’s impact on the intelligence sector is multifaceted which is why


it revolutionized the field. If the capacity to analyze real-time data facilitates the creation of
predictive measures, new challenges and actors also emerged. The emergence of new actors,
especially non-state entities and their own exploitation of social media platforms to their
advantage poses as a threat to intelligence and national security. Firstly, social media
platforms can be characterized by their global reach and fast communication between two or
multiple individuals. One usage of SOCMINT by malicious actors is the recruitment,
radicalization, and coercion through diverse platforms. Such use is commonly observed
within terrorist organizations or extremist groups. For instance, terrorist organization such as
ISIS or Al-Qaeda are commonly known to use platforms such as Facebook to disinform,
recruit or share violent content. In addition to spreading propaganda, those organizations also
utilize bots to amplify and promote their content on a larger scale (Charania, 2016). As a
result, agencies need to adapt to those technics, especially within the counter terrorism field.

SOCMINT can also be utilized at the disadvantage or even against intelligence


agencies. Investigative journalism or similar organizations utilize OSINT and SOCMINT
tools to uncover or expose governments and intelligence’s misconducts, abuses, or expose
corruption. If using SOCMINT to accomplish those aims can be beneficial to the public,
allowing citizen to keep an oversight on their government, it causes tensions within the
intelligence field and their role. The control and secrecy over sensitive information is vital to
the nature of intelligence agencies (Dover, 2019). Moreover, if the if the speed and
accessibility of social media platforms challenges agencies, the vast amount of data available
on those platforms is also an issue they must adapt to. With a variety of platforms and the
growing number of users, the quantity of data can exacerbate intelligence analyst capacities
(Charania, 2016). Agencies not only have to filter the information to find relevant data, but
they also need to detect misleading sources, either it being disinformation or misinformation
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(Omand, 2012). This challenges agencies as it can cause delays in reports and, most
importantly inaccurate information can have dramatic consequences on agencies actions,
risking operations.

Another aspect of SOCMINT that needs to be taken into consideration are the ethical
considerations it entails. The capacity to access such vast volume of data, either private or
public expands the power and influence of agencies. Consequently, by using SOCMINT as a
tool, intelligence agencies must re-define their role to find a correct balance between
individual privacy and security or national needs. Scandals such as Snowden’s revelation of
state surveillance and big data surveillance disclosed not only top-secret leaks but also the
abuse of agencies power and influence (Lyon, 2014). Defining with a clear framework the
rights and limits of the utilization of social media platforms is vital to avoid an abuse of
power. Such scenarios, in which governmental agencies misuses and exploit SOCMINT can
be observed within the current North Korean regime (Gause, 2012). By access social media
platforms, the authoritarian regime can identify, monitor, and track dissidents or enemies of
the states. This exploitation of SOCMINT has dramatic consequences on citizens individual
rights and especially their safety and security as they can be targeted or suppressed.
Nevertheless, mentioned earlier, SOCMINT is a double edge sword which implies that by
using those same techniques but towards different aims, SOCMINT can be beneficial.

To conclude, the proliferation of social media platforms and their utilization


revolutionized the intelligence sector in its methods but also in traditional role. Those
technologies offer new tools and capabilities to agencies, gaining access to public and private
information, real-time data, and monitoring capacities. Nevertheless, those advantages are
also new challenges to agencies as SOCMINT can be used by any actor with an access to the
internet. As agencies are still adapting and reinforcing their use of SOCMINT, some critical
aspects such as abuse, and oversight demand a clear framework and structure to find the
correct balance between individual rights and the protection of the state.
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References:

Abad-Santos, A. (2022, May 12). Reddit's 'Find Boston Bombers' Founder Says 'It Was a Disaster' but

'Incredible' The Atlantic. https://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2013/04/reddit-find-

boston-bombers-founder-interview/315987/

Agrell, W., & Treverton, G. F. (2015). National Intelligence and Science: Beyond the Great Divide in

Analysis and Policy. Oxford University Press, USA.

Baisnée, O., Cavé, A., Gousset, C., Nollet, J., & Parent, F. (2022). The digital coverage of the yellow

vest movement as protest activity. French Politics, 20(3-4), 529–549.

https://doi.org/10.1057/s41253-022-00190-0

Charania, S. (2016). Social Media’s Potential in Intelligence Collection. American Intelligence

Journal, 33(2), 94–100. https://www.jstor.org/stable/26497093?seq=1

Dover, R. (2019). SOCMINT: a shifting balance of opportunity. Intelligence and National

Security, 35(2), 216–232. https://doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2019.1694132

Gause, K. (n.d.). Coercion, Control, Surveillance, and Punishment An Examination of the North

Korean Police State The Committee for Human Rights in North Korea.

https://www.hrnk.org/uploads/pdfs/HRNK_Ken-Gause_Web.pdf

Lyon, D. (2014). Surveillance, Snowden, and Big Data: Capacities, consequences, critique. Big Data

& Society, 1(2), 205395171454186. https://doi.org/10.1177/2053951714541861


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Omand, D., Bartlett, J., & Miller, C. (2012). Introducing Social Media Intelligence

(SOCMINT). Intelligence and National Security, 27(6), 801–

823. https://doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2012.716965

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