AI and Political Culture of Democratic Socities

Daniel K.
Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies
Report Part Title: SURVEILLANCE TECHNOLOGY CHALLENGES POLITICAL CULTURE OF

DEMOCRATIC STATES
Report Part Author(s): Inez Miyamoto
Report Title: HINDSIGHT, INSIGHT, FORESIGHT

Report Subtitle: Thinking About Security in the Indo-Pacific
Report Editor(s): Alexander L. Vuving
Published by: Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies (2020)
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4
SURVEILLANCE TECHNOLOGY
CHALLENGES POLITICAL CULTURE OF
DEMOCRATIC STATES
Inez Miyamoto
The debate about the adoption of surveillance technologies by different

systems of government is already over: both autocratic and democratic
states use surveillance technologies. Autocratic states, such as China, Rus-
sia, and Saudi Arabia, embrace surveillance technologies to control their
citizens.1 They find the surveillance technologies to be effective because
once citizens know that their communications and movements are being
monitored, they change their behavior without any government interven-
tion.2 In contrast, democratic states use surveillance technologies to im-
prove public safety and national security but struggle with balancing state
and citizen interests. Accordingly, this article centers on the use of surveil-
lance technologies by democratic states against their citizens. The use of
surveillance technologies against citizens challenges the existing political
culture of democratic states—the fundamental beliefs, values, and norms
that have long defined them. In other words, surveillance technologies
conflict with the agreement between democratic governments and their
citizens for privacy and civil liberty protections. Democratic states must
act now to resolve this debate because the unprecedented speed of tech-
nological change is generating a gap between how these states and their
citizens understand their own political culture.
Democratic states use surveillance technologies to facilitate gover-
nance through social control. Torin Monahan explains democratic surveil-
lance as “intentionally harnessing the control functions of surveillance for
social ends of fairness, justice, and equality.”3 In theory, democratic states
49
Hindsight, Insight, Foresight: Thinking about Security in the Indo-Pacific
counterbalance social control through citizen participation and demo-

cratic controls (e.g., oversight, transparency, and public accountability). In
practice, citizen participation and democratic controls can be effective in
counteracting privacy-invasive surveillance, but they tend to be reactive
and slow to respond. Meanwhile, recent advancements in surveillance
technologies provide democratic states with unprecedented power to
identify, track, and analyze their citizens in real-time. In other words, digital
mass surveillance can become the norm for democratic states if allowed
to go unchecked.
This chapter examines the struggle that democratic states are having
to resolve the tension between political culture and surveillance technolo-
gies; tension often displayed in differences between policymakers, security
practitioners and civil society members. The first section examines three
U.S. case studies to show how surveillance technology is creating friction
between the government and civil society. The second section analyzes the
roles of the private sector and the state to identify the drivers contribut-
ing to the tension with political culture. The third section imagines future
technologies and their impact on the current debate. The final section
concludes with recommendations for resolving the political culture gap
between governments and their citizens.
Debating Aspects of Surveillance Through Case Studies

This section examines three U.S. case studies to understand how surveil-
lance technologies can undermine democratic political culture. Each of
the case studies illuminates how free media and civic groups play an im-
portant role in identifying violations of civil liberties and ensuring public
accountability.
Social Media and Facial Recognition

In 2016, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) of Northern Cali-
fornia sounded the alarm that law enforcement was accessing social media
intelligence to monitor social protests. By seeking public records to deter-
mine how law enforcement was using social media monitoring, the ACLU
obtained the marketing materials of the social media monitoring company
Geofeedia, which touted the Baltimore Police Department’s successful
use of its product.4 Specifically, after using Geofeedia’s product to obtain
50
Surveillance Technology Challenges Democratic Culture
social media photos of protesters, the Baltimore Police Department ran

the photos through facial recognition technology to identify and arrest
individuals with outstanding warrants.5
Upon learning how Geofeedia was using the social media feeds, so-
cial media companies (i.e., Facebook, Instagram, and Twitter) suspended
Geofeedia’s access citing policies prohibiting their data from being used
for surveillance activities. Without the social media feeds, Geofeedia could
not manually collect social media posts to provide a real-time view of mul-
tiple social media feeds. The impact on Geofeedia was significant, causing
layoffs and a business model shift to social media marketing and manage-
ment.6
This is not an issue of law enforcement using social media platforms,
which is publicly available information. When individuals post a public
comment or picture on a social media platform, they want the public to
see their content and are explicitly giving up their right to privacy. Since
the comment or photo is open for the world to see, law enforcement is
permitted to view and use public content. To prevent public access, indi-
viduals can increase their privacy settings so that only their followers can
see their posts and photos. In this instance, law enforcement is required to
obtain a court order to access the individuals’ information.
Instead, the key issue here was law enforcement using a social media
monitoring tool without a clear investigative purpose. Since individuals
had a right to participate in a social protest, law enforcement had no inves-
tigative predication to identify individuals, let alone to check for outstand-
ing warrants. Had there been a crime committed during the protest, then
law enforcement could have justification to use facial recognition software
in order to identify a suspect.
The underlying problem with Baltimore Police Department’s use of
Geofeedia’s tool was its lack of transparency. When the department’s use
Facial recognition technology is used to identify people using biometrics

through biological or behavioral characteristics and consists of two processes.
First, in the enrollment process, a person’s facial features are mathematically
mapped as facial landmarks into a template and saved in a database of known
individuals. Second, in the matching process, a photo of an unknown person is
processed using facial technology and compared against a database of known
individuals. Factors affecting the accuracy of matches include the technology
(e.g., the way facial landmarks are calculated) and the quality of a photo im-
age.
51
of the tool was revealed, it eroded public trust already strained by the
police brutality incident which had sparked the protest. By being open
about the social media tool and having clear policies on use of surveillance
technologies, the Baltimore Police Department could have eased public
concerns.
Website Scraping and Facial Recognition

In January 2020, the New York Times published a report about Clear-
view AI’s invasive facial recognition product, which was being used by law
enforcement to identify individuals. Clearview AI sells access to a platform
which identifies an individual by using a facial recognition search against a
database containing three billion images. After the news article was pub-
lished, private technology companies (e.g., Facebook, Twitter, Venmo, and
Google) issued cease and desist letters to Clearview AI citing violations to
their terms of service.7 In response to the letters, Clearview AI claimed
it had a right to publicly available information, likening its business to a
search engine pulling information from different websites.8
In order to create a database of three billion images, Clearview AI
extracted images from open websites using a process called website scrap-
ing, which is legal. In September 2019, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
9th Circuit ruled that it is not illegal to scrape publicly accessible websites.9
This ruling is currently being appealed; if the ruling is overturned, it could
widen Clearview AI’s legal troubles beyond the lawsuits it is facing in Cali-
fornia, Illinois, and Vermont.
In February 2020, Clearview AI disclosed that an intruder stole its
client list along with details about each client.10 At the same time, BuzzFeed
News revealed that it obtained internal Clearview AI documents from an
undisclosed source, which included Clearview AI’s client list of 2,228 or-
ganizations and individuals. The size Web scraping is the process of
of the client list is somewhat mislead- collecting data from websites.
ing as a majority of the clients were The process is automated by using
using free-trial licenses rather than a web crawlers, which are programs
or scripts designed to browse and
paid subscription. Clients with paid
lift information from the World
subscriptions included many federal Wide Web. Other terms for web
government agencies (e.g., U.S. Im- scraping include web data extrac-
migration and Customs Enforcement tion and web harvesting.
52
and U.S. Secret Service) and local law Biometric technology is used to
enforcement agencies.11 identify or authenticate by using
In this case study, law enforce- the biological attributes of indi-
viduals. Individuals can be identi-
ment used a private-sector database fied using physiological biometrics
to identify individuals, whereas in (e.g., retina, vein, or fingerprint)
the Geofeedia case law enforcement or behavioral biometrics (e.g.,
used a government database. Law gait, signature, or keystrokes).
Facial recognition and fingerprint
enforcement agencies traditionally recognition are examples of bio-
rely on government databases for metrics.
criminal identification, but an indi-
vidual may not be in government da-
tabases. Clearview AI’s technology provided an alternative for identifying
individuals through open-source images. According to Clearview AI, law
enforcement’s use of its product does not violate any federal and state pri-
vacy or biometrics laws if it is used for its intended purpose and is not the
sole basis for an arrest.12 However, Clearview AI’s database was contro-
versial because the company violated individuals’ rights: it never received
the informed consent of the individuals owning the images or allowed
individuals to opt out of its database.
Video Surveillance
There are two types of video surveillance commonly used: stationary and
aerial video surveillance cameras. The first type involves the use of station-
ary cameras mounted at key locations. The second type involves the use of
aerial craft mounted with cameras, which can be manned or unmanned.
As an illustration, the military developed wide-area surveillance technol-
ogy for use on a battlefield, but now law enforcement is using it for polic-
ing, border control, and wildlife protection.
In 2016 the Baltimore Police Department contracted with a wide-
area surveillance company called Persistent Surveillance Systems. Over a
period of several months, the company collected over 300 hours of sur-
veillance video using aerial craft. After the plane downloaded the images
onto a server hard drive, police could access the imagery to solve crimes.
The video resolution did not allow for the identification of individuals or
vehicles, but it was good enough to follow objects over time.13
After the program ended, Bloomberg News published an article reveal-
ing the Baltimore Police Department’s use of wide-area surveillance tech-
53
nology. Public officials had no idea of the existence of the program be-
cause normal public spending oversight mechanisms were circumvented.
Instead of using public funding, the police used a private donation from
the Laura and John Arnold Foundation. The Foundation, which supports
evidence-based policing solutions, had a prior agreement with Persistent
Surveillance Systems to fund the project if the company could find a po-
lice department to use the technology.14
The Baltimore Police Department did not violate the law because U.S.
laws allow for aerial surveillance without a warrant as long as the tech-
nology is publicly accessible.15 The police wanted the technology because
most of Baltimore’s homicides occur in outdoor public spaces.16 Since the
camera resolution does not allow for visual identification of individuals
or vehicles, there is even less of an invasion of privacy. Nevertheless, the
department lost the public’s trust because it was not transparent: it did not
provide public notification, go through the normal procurement review, or
publish its wide-area surveillance policy.
Despite all of the controversy, in 2019, Persistent Surveillance Sys-
tems solicited the Baltimore Police Department for a long-term contract.
The three-year contract for US$6.6 million, which was funded again by the
Laura and John Arnold Foundation, involved three planes, and covered
32-square miles. Persistent Surveillance Systems also disclosed its privacy
program, limiting the resolution of images to prevent the identification
of individuals.17 Since the Baltimore Police Department was transparent
and involved the public, in April 2020, the city of Baltimore approved the
contract.
The Roles of the Private Sector and the State

Although the surveillance technologies used in the case studies were not
illegal, they undermined democratic political culture because they went
against the beliefs, values, and norms of what citizens expected of their
government. Two insights emerge from the case studies. First, govern-
ments are highly reliant on private-sector surveillance technology because
they do not organically possess these technologies or skills. Second, there
is a lack of legal and policy frameworks at the national level to guide lo-
cal governments in balancing citizen privacy and government surveillance.
This section analyzes the roles of the private sector and state in surveil-
lance technology use and explains the drivers contributing to the tension
in democratic states’ political culture.
54
Role of the Private Sector

Surveillance technology growth is now being driven by the private sector.
The United Nations (UN) concluded: “Digital surveillance is no longer
the preserve of countries that enjoy the resources to conduct mass and
targeted surveillance based on in-house tools. Private industry has stepped
in, unsupervised and with something close to impunity.”18 The private sec-
tor, in its pursuit for profit, indiscriminately sells surveillance tools around
the world. For example, although Chinese companies are the largest global
suppliers of surveillance technologies empowered by artificial intelligence
(AI), private companies from democratic states, such as the United States,
France, Germany, Israel, South Korea, United Kingdom, and Japan, are
also selling surveillance technologies to both democracies and autocra-
cies.19
International organizations are calling for regulations to monitor and
control the export of surveillance technologies, since repressive govern-
ments use them to facilitate human rights abuses. For example, in 2014 the
European Union (EU) banned the export of information communication
and technology (ICT) to governments censoring information or conduct-
ing mass surveillance. And, in 2016, the European Commission specified
the ICT for export control so that EU sales and exports of these technol-
ogies could be monitored.20 In spite of having regulations, export-control
laws are ineffective because they lack enforcement measures to address
human rights violations and do not stop the use of the technologies.21
Furthermore, since surveillance technologies are now widely available in
many products, it would be impossible to regulate all of the technologies.
There is also a growing problem with the private sector’s involvement
in surveillance technologies: the surveillance limitations placed on the
government do not always apply to the private sector. When the private
sector closely works with government, the boundaries become unclear.22
As discussed in the case studies, law enforcement leverages private sector
Artificial intelligence (AI) is the simulation of human intelligence in machines

by using software. There are three general types of AI: artificial narrow intel-
ligence, artificial general intelligence, artificial super intelligence. Artificial
narrow intelligence involves systems performing defined tasks and is found
in commercialized applications, such as Siri or facial recognition technology.
Researchers are striving to achieve artificial general intelligence, which occurs
when systems perform human-like thinking, and artificial super intelligence,
which occurs when systems become more capable than humans.
55
technology to fight crime. In the future as more data becomes available,

law enforcement may need to outsource the digital analysis and investiga-
tion to the private sector; thereby, the private sector becomes an extension
of the government. This could be problematic if a private company were
to sell a service to law enforcement and then unknowingly sell the same
service to a criminal organization, or if the private company were to use
the insider policing information for profit.
Private companies can also use surveillance technologies to monitor
their customers without transparency or individual consent (i.e., in states
without comprehensive privacy and security laws). While the biometric
data compiled from facial, voice, and body-language analysis support the
marketing and/or product sales of private companies, the data is extreme-
ly invasive (e.g., some data can be used to determine health, disease, or
personality) and raises ethical and privacy concerns.23 Another problem
with surveillance data is the data retention period. Unless there are regula-
tions or laws, the private sector is not required to follow the beliefs, values,
or norms of a democratic state.
As the driver of surveillance technology growth, the private sector
can increase trust with the government and civil society by self-regulating
their use and sales of surveillance technology. Specifically, private com-
panies that sell surveillance technologies can promote governance poli-
cies to address ethical and privacy concerns, establish an ethics board, and
provide an annual transparency report. The private sector can also engage
with civil society organizations to address the ethical problems raised by
surveillance technologies. As an illustration, the Partnership on AI is one
such organization working to increase AI dialogue among for-profit com-
panies and academic and research institutions.24
Role of the State

At the international level, states should engage in multilateral discourse
to avert the potentially dangerous side effects of surveillance technolo-
gies to democratic political culture. In reality, states will find it difficult to
reach consensus and to establish international norms and standards for
two reasons. Firstly, surveillance technologies are dual-use—having both
civilian and defense applications—so they are the sources of geopolitical
competition. States are unwilling to restrict their development of dual-
use technologies because they are accelerators of economic growth and
national defense advantage.25 Secondly, technological innovation is accel-
56
erating faster than global governance. According to the Office of the Di-
rector of National Intelligence, “technological change will continue to far
outpace the ability of states, agencies and international organizations to set
standards, policies, regulations, and norms.”26 Under those circumstances,
the gap between technology and governance will only widen.
Nevertheless, there are other ways states can work collaboratively to-
ward global norms and standards in areas such as human rights, ethics, and
safety. International organizations, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Orga-
nization (NATO) and International Committee of the Red Cross, provide
opportunities to identify common values and approaches for increasing
trust in surveillance technologies. In a like manner, while the Organisation
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Principles on AI
are non-binding, they establish political commitment to promote AI that
is trustworthy and respects human rights and democratic values.27 Addi-
tionally, the World Economic Forum has an initiative to bringing private
and public stakeholders together to design and test policy frameworks for
technologies such as AI, machine learning, and facial recognition.28 These
types of initiatives are the first steps toward global cooperation.
At the domestic level, states should consider establishing comprehen-
sive security and privacy laws and engaging in dialogue with their citizens
about surveillance technologies. First, the EU’s General Data Protection
Regulation (GDPR) is considered to be one of the strictest and most
comprehensive laws for privacy and security.29 The regulation was passed
in 2014 when surveillance technologies were not as advanced as they are
today. Consequently, critics are calling for GDPR regulatory reforms be-
cause it hinders the development and use of AI by placing limitations on
the collection and sharing of personal data.30 In addition, although the
GDPR limits live facial recognition by mandating individual consent, it
also specifies exceptions for law enforcement use, personal use, and situ-
ations where a person cannot be identified.31 Therefore, while the GDPR
is a proven framework that can be used to build a comprehensive privacy
and security law, the GDPR should be expanded to include emerging tech-
nologies and their impacts on privacy and security.
Second, the public and private sector will need more dialogue on
future surveillance technologies. Michelle Cayford, Wolter Pieters, and
P.H.A.J.M. van Gelder found that when it comes to surveillance technol-
ogy, the public wants both security and privacy with no tradeoffs.32 For
this reason, states need to engage with their citizens to take the discussion
beyond the balance between security and civil liberty. Specifically, Cayford
57
and Pieters concluded, “Rather than just speaking of providing ‘security,’

the debate should be sharpened to discuss the effectiveness of the sur-
veillance technology in achieving the security goal.”33 Additionally, states
need to articulate that surveillance-technology effectiveness cannot be
measured by using traditional crime or security statistics. To illustrate, the
public expects to see an inverse correlation between surveillance technol-
ogy use and crime or security threats, so when the expected pattern is not
seen, the public concludes the surveillance technology is ineffective.34 In
reality, states measure surveillance-technology effectiveness by looking at
the overall value in achieving outcomes (e.g., disruptions of threats and in-
telligence validation).35 There is a need for states and the public to develop
a common language to determine acceptable measures of effectiveness.
Future Challenges
Technology is constantly evolving and providing states with more power-
ful surveillance capabilities. Advancements in real-time connectivity and
data analytics, in particular, elevate the privacy threat from omnipresent
surveillance. In this section, two technological drivers of change are exam-
ined in understanding the future environment: 5th Generation (5G) and
6th Generation (6G) connectivity and AI analytics advancement.
First, 5G-cellular technology is the catalyst launching the world into
the Fourth Industrial Revolution with speeds of up to 100 times faster
than current cellular networks. 5G is an enabling technology for the In-
ternet of Things (IoT), which is a network of devices and objects with
built-in sensors for connectivity and communication. The IoT needs 5G’s
speed and low latency to move data to and from a massive number of
devices and sensors. Many of the IoT connections involve machine-to-
machine (M2M) applications in which communication between devices
and sensors occur without human intervention. The convergence of 5G
and IoT provides the means to create smart cities, smart manufacturing,
and autonomous cars, all of which run M2M applications.
In the future, many aspects of life will be monitored by billions of
IoT sensors and devices. By 2023, Cisco expects there will be 3.9 billion
Internet users and 29.3 billion connected devices, of which half (14.7 bil-
lion devices) are for M2M applications.36 By 2030, not only will the num-
ber of connected devices grow to 500 billion,37 but connectivity speed is
also expected to increase with the deployment of 6G-mobile technology.38
It is important to realize that this vast network of devices and sensors will
58
be distributed without centralized control or governance.39 Furthermore,

each IoT sensor and device will generate digital data, which can be col-
lected into massive datasets.
Second, AI will be used to interpret the massive datasets generated
from IoT devices and sensors. It is through the AI-generated intelligence
that an individual can be tracked by facial recognition, smart payment,
and smart phones, or that pattern anomalies can be identified as threats.
Eventually, AI systems will be integrated so that they can communicate
with each other, without human intervention. For instance, autonomous
surveillance systems will use AI-enabled camera systems to decide what
qualifies as a threat.40
Furthermore, the power from other technologies, such as quantum
computing and nanotechnology, will be harnessed to make AI even more
powerful. Futurists expect that in the next 10 years artificial general intel-
ligence, which is when machines will think like humans, will be achieved.41
At that time, the digital world will be highly interconnected with over 500
billion devices and sensors, which means cyber attackers have more ways
to compromise the security and privacy of individuals. At some time be-
tween 2030 and 2050, futurists predict technological singularity, which is
the point when AI in machines exceed human intellect, will be achieved.42
As AI races toward technological singularity, there will be transnational
challenges for which the world will be unprepared: they include combat
robots, precision biometric attacks, and new types of information warfare.
For this reason, futurists also predict that a global AI arms race will ensue.43
AI applications will continue to raise ethical concerns, surpassing the
current debate on biases. These concerns will be difficult to resolve be-
cause there is a lack of transparency with AI algorithms, which are con-
sidered intellectual property.44 In addition, as AI systems are given more
decision-making capability, AI algorithm liability, when a machine makes a
decision leading to human harm, comes into question. For example, if an
autonomous car is involved in an accident, it is unclear if the owner of the
system, programmer, or manufacturer is responsible.
When fully deployed, 6G and AI will change every aspect of modern
life. These technologies will greatly improve the quality of life of individu-
als, as they bring advancements to healthcare, transportation, and manu-
facturing. At the same time, they also will create tremendous challenges
and risks, for which societies are unprepared. Since the speed of techno-
logical change cannot be slowed, democratic states must take action now
59
to build strategies and mechanisms to protect civil society while promoting

their strategic competitiveness.
The Way Ahead and Conclusion

Although the challenges posed by AI and AI-enabled surveillance technol-
ogy to democratic values and norms are huge, they are not insurmount-
able. Rather than provide an exhaustive list of recommendations, this sec-
tion will suggest foundational steps to take now, so that states can begin to
resolve these new challenges to democratic political culture.
Recommendation #1: National AI Strategy

Democratic states should create a national AI strategy because AI is the
enabler for the other surveillance technologies. The Atlantic Council rec-
ommended using anticipatory governance in developing a national AI
strategy to not only define national objectives but also delineate ethical or
societal limitations.45 According to Eleonore Pauwels, anticipatory gover-
nance can be used to understand “plausible scenarios related to AI con-
vergence” to imagine hybrid-security threats.46 Creating a national AI strat-
egy will be challenging for policymakers: they will need to harmonize the
conflicting demands of many stakeholders, given the dual-use nature of
the technologies, and to consider the impact of associated-emerging tech-
nologies (e.g., quantum computing and nanotechnology). Finally, in order
for the strategy to succeed, policymakers will also need an implementation
plan, with sufficient resources and supporting institutions.47
Recommendation #2: Privacy and Security Task Force

Democratic states should create a “privacy and security task force” com-
prised of government and private sector representatives to ensure that
democratic belief, values, and norms are maintained and protected. The
first effort of the task force is to ensure that there is a comprehensive
privacy and security law, which could be modeled after the EU GDPR
and include the other impacts of emerging technologies. The second un-
dertaking of the task force would be to develop a framework to evaluate
the social, economic, and human risks and harms created by surveillance
and emerging technologies. This will not be an easy undertaking because
emerging technologies cross multiple domains, each with differing im-
60
pacts. The third effort of the task force is to use the framework to exam-
ine risks, gaps, and opportunities, to develop policies, and to recommend
regulations and laws. The fourth effort of the task force is to regularly
monitor the progress of the government toward achieving task force ob-
jectives using annual reports, to update the framework, and to proactively
respond with policy or regulatory recommendations.
Recommendation #3: Import Control

Democratic states should penalize private companies selling technologies
to governments censoring information or conducting mass surveillance
by banning their future business interactions with that state. In essence,
this recommendation is the inverse of the EU’s 2014 ban on the export of
technology to governments conducting human rights abuses from surveil-
lance technologies. For example, if U.S. companies were to sell technol-
ogy to repressive governments, a state could put these companies on a
banned-from-importing list, thereby disallowing these companies access
to markets in that particular state. This unconventional strategy could
prove to be more effective in curbing the behavior of the private sector
than export controls because it has a broader impact on global companies
by affecting their profits and market access.
In conclusion, surveillance technologies can conflict with the political
culture of democratic states by violating the agreement between govern-
ments and their citizens for privacy and civil liberty protections. The good
news is that by acting now to resolve the political culture debate, demo-
cratic states will be in a better position to deal with emerging technologies,
which will pose even more ethical and democratic value challenges. More-
over, although the future will bring an accelerated growth of surveillance-
driven technology, democratic states will have the strategies, policies, and
laws in place to keep pace and maintain the democratic promise to their
citizens.
61
Notes
1 Steven Feldstein, “The Global Expansion of AI Surveillance,” Carnegie Endow-

ment for International Peace, September 17, 2019, https://carnegieendowment.
org/2019/09/17/global-expansion-of-ai-surveillance-pub-79847.
2 Andrea Kendall-Taylor, Erica Franz, and Joseph Wright, “The Digital Dictators:
How Technology Strengthens Autocracy,” Foreign Affairs 99, no. 2 (March/April
2020): 103, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2020-02-06/digital-dicta-
tors.
3 Torin Monahan, “Surveillance as Governance: Social Inequality and the Pursuit
of Democratic Surveillance,” in Surveillance and Democracy, ed. Kevin D. Haggerty and
Minas Samatas (New York: Routledge, 2010), 91-110, http://publicsurveillance.com/
papers/Monahan_Surv_Democracy.pdf.
4 Nichole Ozer, “Police Use of Social Media Surveillance Software Is Escalat-
ing, and Activists Are in the Digital Crosshairs,” American Civil Liberties Union,
September 22, 2016, https://www.aclu.org/blog/privacy-technology/surveillance-
technologies/police-use-social-media-surveillance-software.
5 U.S. Congress, House, Committee Hearing on Oversight and Reform, Facial
Recognition Technology (Part I): Its Impact on Our Civil Rights and Liberties, 116th Cong.,
1st sess., 2019, https://docs.house.gov/meetings/GO/GO00/20190522/109521/
HHRG-116-GO00-20190522-SD012.pdf.
6 “Map: Social Media Monitoring by Police Departments, Cities, and Counties,”
Brennan Center for Justice, July 10, 2019, https://www.brennancenter.org/our-
work/research-reports/map-social-media-monitoring-police-departments-cities-and-
counties.
7 Rebecca Heilweil, “The World’s Scariest Facial Recognition Company, Ex-
plained,” Vox, May 8, 2020, https://www.vox.com/recode/2020/2/11/21131991/
clearview-ai-facial-recognition-database-law-enforcement.
8 “Google, YouTube, Venmo and LinkedIn Send Cease-and-Desist Letters to Fa-
cial Recognition App That Helps Law Enforcement,” CBS News, February 5, 2020,
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/clearview-ai-google-youtube-send-cease-and-
desist-letter-to-facial-recognition-app/.
9 HiQ Labs, Inc., v. LinkedIn Corporation, 938 F.3d 985 (9th Cir. 2019), http://
cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2019/09/09/17-16783.pdf.
10 Betsy Swan, “Facial-Recognition Company That Works with Law Enforcement
Says Entire Client List Was Stolen,” Daily Beast, February 26, 2020, https://www.
thedailybeast.com/clearview-ai-facial-recognition-company-that-works-with-law-
enforcement-says-entire-client-list-was-stolen.
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65

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Daniel K.

Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies

Report Part Title: SURVEILLANCE TECHNOLOGY CHALLENGES POLITICAL CULTURE OF

Report Title: HINDSIGHT, INSIGHT, FORESIGHT

The debate about the adoption of surveillance technologies by different

counterbalance social control through citizen participation and demo-

Debating Aspects of Surveillance Through Case Studies

Social Media and Facial Recognition

social media photos of protesters, the Baltimore Police Department ran

Facial recognition technology is used to identify people using biometrics

Website Scraping and Facial Recognition

The Roles of the Private Sector and the State

Role of the Private Sector

Artificial intelligence (AI) is the simulation of human intelligence in machines

technology to fight crime. In the future as more data becomes available,

Role of the State

and Pieters concluded, “Rather than just speaking of providing ‘security,’

be distributed without centralized control or governance.39 Furthermore,

to build strategies and mechanisms to protect civil society while promoting

The Way Ahead and Conclusion

Recommendation #1: National AI Strategy

Recommendation #2: Privacy and Security Task Force

Recommendation #3: Import Control

1 Steven Feldstein, “The Global Expansion of AI Surveillance,” Carnegie Endow-

45 Peter Engelke, “AI, Society, and Governance: An Introduction,” Atlantic Council,

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