9/9/2017 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 160

VOL. 160, APRIL 15, 1988 315

Amadora vs. Court of Appeals

*
No. L-47745. April 15, 1988.

JOSE S. AMADORA, LORETA A. AMADORA, JOSE A.

AMADORA JR., NORMA A. YLAYA, PANTALEON A.
AMADORA, JOSE A. AMADORA III, LUCY A.
AMADORA, ROSALINDA A. AMADORA, PERFECTO A.
AMADORA, SERREC A. AMADORA, VICENTE A.
AMADORA and MARIA TISCALINA A. AMADORA,
petitioners, vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS,
COLEGIO DE SAN JOSE-RECOLETOS, VICTOR LLUCH,
SERGIO P. DAMASO, JR., CELESTINO DICON, ANIANO
ABELLANA, PABLITO DAFFON, thru his parents and
natural guardians, MR. and MRS. NICANOR GUMBAN,
and ROLANDO VALENCIA, thru his guardian, ATTY.
FRANCISCO ALONSO, respondents.

Civil Law; Torts; Article 2180 of the Civil Code should apply
to all schools, academic as well as non-academic.—After an
exhaustive examination of the problem, the Court has come to the
conclusion that the provision in question should apply to all
schools, academic as well as non-academic. Where the school is
academic rather than technical or vocational in nature,
responsibility for the tort committed by the student will attach to
the teacher in charge of such student, following the first part of
the provision. This is the general rule. In the case of
establishments of arts and trades, it is the head thereof, and only
he, who shall be held liable as an exception to the general rule. In
other words, teachers in general shall be liable for the acts of
their students except where the school is technical in nature, in
which case it is the head thereof who shall be anBwerable.
Following the canon of reddendo singula singulis, “teachers”
should apply to the words “‘pupHs and students” and “heads of
establishments of arts and trades” to the word “apprentices.”
Same; Same; Same; No substantial distinction between the
academic and the non-academic schools insofar as torts committed
by their students are concerned.—There is really no substantial
distinction between the academic and the non-academic schools
insofar as torts committed by their students are concerned. The
same vigilance is expected from the teacher over the students
under his control and supervision, whatever the nature of the
school where he is teaching, The suggestion in the Sxconde and
Mercado Cases is that the provision would make the teacher or
even the head of the school of arts and

________________

* EN BANC.

316

316 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

9/9/2017 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 160

Amadora vs. Court of Appeals

trades liable for an injury caused by any student in its custody

but if that same tort were committed in an academic school, no
liability would attach to the teacher or the school head. All other
circumstances being the same, the teacher or the head of the
academic school would be absolved whereas the teacher and the
head of the nonacademic school would be held liable, and simply
because the latter is a school of arts and trades.
Same; Same; Same; Same; No plausible reason why different
degrees of vigilance should be exercised by the school authorities.—
The Court cannot see why different degrees of vigilance should be
exercised by the school authorities on the basis only of the nature
of their respective schools. There does not seem to be any
plausible reason for relaxLng that vigilance simply because the
school is academic in nature and for increasing such vigilance
where the school is nonacademic. Notably, the injury subject of
liability is caused by the student and not by the school itself nor it
is a result of the operations of the school or its equipment. The
injury contemplated may be caused by any student regardless of
the school where he is registered. The teacher certainly should not
be able to excuse himself by simply showing that he is teaching in
an academic school where, on the other hand, the head would be
held liable if the school were non-academic.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Reason for the disparity.—
The reason for the disparity can be traced to the fact that
historically the head of the school of arts and trades exercised a
closer tutelage over his pupils than the head of the academic
school. The old schools of arts and trades were engaged in the
training of artisans apprenticed to their master who personally
and directly instructed them on the technique and secrets of their
craft. The head of the school of arts and trades was such a master
and so was personally involved in the task of teaching his
students, who usually even boarded with him and so came under
his constant control, supervision and influence. By contrast, the
head of the academic school was not as involved with his students
and exercised only administrative duties over the teachers who
were the persons directly dealing with the students. The head of
the academic school had then (as now) only a vicarious
relationship with the students. Consequently, while he could not
be directly faulted for the acts of the students, the head of the
school of arts and trades, because of his closer ties with them,
could be so blamed.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Distinction no longer
obtains at present—It is conceded that the distinction no longer
obtains at present in view of the expansion of the schools of arts
and trades,

317

VOL. 160, APRIL 15, 1988 317

Amadora us. Court ofAppeals

the consequent increase in their enrollment, and the

corresponding diminution of the direct and personal contact of
their heads with the students. Article 2180, however, remains
unchanged. In its present state, the provision must be interpreted
by the Court according to its clear and original mandate until the
legislature, taking into account the changes in the situation
subject to be regulated, sees fit to enact the necessary
amendment.
9/9/2017 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 160

Same; Same; Custody requirement; Article 2180 of the Civil

Code does not mean that the student must be boarding with the
school authorities but the student should be within the control and
under its influence at the time of the occurrence of the injury.—
From a reading of the provision under examination, it is clear
that while the custody requirement, to repeat Palisoc vs.
Brillantes, does not mean that the student must be boarding with
the school authorities, it does signify that the student should be
within the control and under the influence of the school
authorities at the time of the occurrence of the injury. This does
not necessarily mean that such custody be co-terminous with the
semester, beginning with the start of classes and ending upon the
close thereof, and excluding the time before or after such period,
such as the period of registration, and in the case of graduating
students, the period before the commencement exercises. In the
view of the Court, the student is in the custody of the school
authorities as long as he is under the control and influence of the
school and within its premises, whether the semester has not yet
begun or has already ended.
Same; Same; Same; Extent ofresponsibility;As long as the
student is in the school premises in pursuance of a legitimate
purpose, the responsibility of the school authorities over the
student continues.—As long as it can be shown that the student is
in the school premises in pursuance of a legitimate student
objective, in the exercise of a legitimate student right, and even in
the enjoyment of a legitimate student privilege, the responsibility
of the school authorities over the student continues. Indeed, even
if the student should be doing nothing more than relaxing in the
campus in the company of his classmates and friends and
enjoying the ambience and atmosphere of the school, he is still
within the custody and subject to the discipline of the school
authorities under the provisions of Article 2180.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Teacher-in-charge must answer for
his student’s torts.—During all these occasions, it is obviously the
teacherin-charge who must answer for his students’ torts, in
practically the same way that the parents are responsible for the
child when he is in

318

318 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Amadora vs. Court ofAppeals

their custody. The teacher-in-charge is the one designated by the

dean, principal, or other administrative superior to exercise
supervision over the pupils in the specific classes or sections to
which they are assigned. It is not necessary that at the time of the
injury, the teacher be physically present and in a position to
prevent it. Custody does not connote immediate and actual
physical control but refers more to the influence exerted on the
child and the discipline instilled in him as a result of such
influence. Thus, for the injuries caused by the student, the
teacher and not the parent shall be held responsible if the tort
was committed within the premises of the school at any time
when its authority could be validly exercised over him.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The school may be held to
answer for the acts of its teachers or even of the head thereof under
the general principle of respondent superior but may exculpate
itself from liability by proof that it had exercised the diligence of a
bonus paterfamilias.—In any event, it should be noted that the
liability imposed by this article is supposed to fall directly on the
9/9/2017 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 160

teacher or the head of the school of arts and trades and not on the
school itself. If at all, the school, whatever its nature, may be held
to answer for the acts of its teachers or even of the head thereof
under the general principle of respondent superior, but then it
may exculpate itself from liability by proof that it had exercised
the diligence of a bonus paterfamilias,
Same; Sarne; Same; Same; Same; Same; Such defense also
available to the teacher or the head of the school of arts and trade,
—Such defense is, of course, also available to the teacher or the
head of the school of arts and trades directly held to answer for
the tort committed by the student. As long as the defendant can
show that he had taken the necessary precautions to prevent the
injury complained of, he can exonerate himself from the liability
imposed by Article 2180.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Liability
attaches to the teacher and the head of the technical school
although the wrongdoer was already of age.—In this connection, it
should be observed that the teacher will be held liable not only
when he is acting in loco parentis for the law does not require that
the offending student be of minority age. Unlike the parent, who
will be liable only if his child is still a minor, the teacher is held
answerable by the law for the act of the student under him
regardless of the student’s age. Thus, in the Palisoc Case, liability
attached to the teacher and the head of the technical school
although the wrongdoer was already of age. In this sense, Article
2180 treats the parent more favorably than the teacher.

319

VOL. 160, APRIL 15, 1988 319

Amadora vs. Court of Appeals

PETITION for certiorari to review the decision of the Court

of Appeals.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.

     Jose S. Amadora & Associates for petitioners.
     Padilla Law Office for respondents.

CRUZ, J.:

Like any prospective graduate, Alfredo Amadora was

looking forward to the commencement exercises where he
would ascend the stage and in the presence of his relatives
and friends receive his high school diploma, These
ceremonies were scheduled on April 16, 1972. As it turned
out, though, fate would intervene and deny him that
awaited experience. On April 13, 1972, while they were in
the auditorium of their school, the Colegio de San Jose-
Recoletes, a classmate, Pablito Daffon, fired a gun that
mortally hit Alfredo, ending all his expectations and
1
his life
as welL The victim was only seventeen years old.
Daffon was2
convicted of homicide thru reckless
imprudence. Additionally, the herein petitioners, as the
victim’s parents, Sled a civil action for damages under
Article 2180 of the Civil Code against the Colegio de San
Jose-Recoletos, its rector, the high school principal, the
dean of boys, and the physics teacher, together with Daffon
and two other students, through their respective parents,
The complaint against the students was later dropped.
After trial, the Court of First Instance of Cebu held the
remaining defendants liable to the plaintiffs in the sum of
P294,984.00, representing death compensation, loss of
earning capacity, costs of litigation, funeral expenses,
3
moral damages, exemplary damages, and attorney’s fees.
9/9/2017 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 160

3
moral damages, exemplary damages, and attorney’s fees.
On appeal to the respondent court, however, the decision
was reversed
4
and all the defendants were completely
absolved.
In its decision, which is now the subject of this petition
for certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the
respondent

________________

1 Rollo, pp. 63, 157.

2 Ibid., p. 38.
3 Id., p. 23.
4 Id., p. 31. Climaco, J., ponente, with Pascual and Agcaoili, JJ.

320

320 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Amadora vs. Court of Appeals

court found that Article 2180 was not applicable as the

Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos was not a school of arts and
trades but an academic institution of learning. It also held
that the students were not in the custody of the school at
the time of the incident as the semester had already ended,
that there was no clear identification of the fatal gun, and
that in any event the defendants had 5 exercised the
necessary diligence in preventing the injury.
The basic undisputed facts are that Alfredo Amadora
went to the San Jose-Recoletos on April 13, 1972, and while
in its auditorium was shot to death by Pablito Daffon, a
classmate. On the implications and consequences of these
facts, the parties sharply disagree.
The petitioners contend that their son was in the school
to finish his physics experiment as a prerequisite to his
graduation; hence, he was then under the custody of the
private respondents. The private respondents submit that
Alfredo Amadora had gone to the school only for the
purpose of submitting his physics report and that he was
no longer in their custody because the semester had
already ended.
There is also the question of the identity of the gun used
which the petitioners consider important because of an
earlier incident which they claim underscores the
negligence of the school and at least one of the private
respondents. It is not denied by the respondents that on
April 7, 1972, Sergio Damaso, Jr., the dean of boys,
confiscated from Jose Gumban an unlicensed pistol but
later returned it to him without making6
a report to the
principal or taking any further action. As Gumban was one
of the companions of Daffon when the latter fired the gun
that killed Alfredo, the petitioners contend that this was
the same pistol that had been confiscated from Gumban
and that their son would not have been killed if it had not
been returned by Damaso. The respondents say, however,
that there is no proof that the gun was the same firearm
that killed Alfredo.
Resolution of all these disagreements will depend on the
interpretation of Article 2180 which, as it happens, is
invoked

________________

5 Id., pp. 30–31.

9/9/2017 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 160

6 Id., pp. 23, 272.

321

VOL. 160, APRIL 15, 1988 321

Amadora vs. Court of Appeals

by both parties in support of their conflicting positions. The

pertinent part of this article reads as follows:

“Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades

shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or
apprentices so long as they remain in their custody.”

Three cases have so far been decided by the Court in

connection with the 7
above-quoted provision, to 8 wit:
Exconde v. Capuno,9 Mercado v. Court of Appeals, and
Palisoc v. Brillantes. These will be briefly reviewed in this
opinion for a better resolution of the case at bar.
In the Exconde Case, Dante Capuno, a student of the
Balintawak Elementary School and a Boy Seout, attended
a Rizal Day parade on instructions of the city school
supervisor. After the parade, the boy boarded a jeep, took
over its wheel and drove it so recklessly that it turned
turtle, resulting in the death of two of its passengers.
Dante was found guilty of double homicide with reckless
imprudence. In the separate civil action filed against them,
his father was held solidarily liable with him in damages
under Article 1903 (now Article 2180) of the Civil Code for
the tort committed by the 15-year old boy.
This decision, which was penned by Justice Bautista
Angelo on June 29,1957, exculpated the school in an obiter
dictum (as it was not a party to the case) on the ground
that it was not a school of arts and trades. Justice J.B.L.
Reyes, with whom Justices Sabino Padilla and Alex Reyes
concurred, dissented, arguing that it was the school
authorities who should be held liable. Liability under this
rule, he said, was imposed on (1) teachers in general; and
(2) heads of schools of arts and trades in particular. The
modifying clause “of establishments of arts and trades”
should apply only to “heads” and not “teachers.”
Exconde was reiterated in the Mercado Case, and with
an elaboration. A student cut a classmate with a razor
blade during recess time at the Lourdes Catholic School in
Quezon City, and the parents of the victim sued the
culprit’s parents for damages. Through Justice Labrador,
the Court declared in

________________

7 101 Phil. 843.

8 108 Phil. 414.
9 41 SCRA 548.

322

322 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Amadora vs. Court of Appeals

another obiter (as the school itself had also not been sued)
that the school was not liable because it was not an
establishment of arts and trades. Morever. the custody
requirement had not been proved as this contemplates a
situation where the student lives and boards with the
9/9/2017 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 160

teacher, such that the control, direction and influences on

the pupil supersede those of the parents.” Justice J.B.L.
Reyes did not take part but the other members of the court
concurred in this decision promulgated on May 30,1960.
In Palisoc vs. Brillantes, decided on October 4, 1971, a
16year old student was killed by a classmate with fist
blows in the laboratory of the Manila Technical Institute.
Although the wrongdoer-—who was already of age—was
not boarding in the school, the head thereof and the teacher
in charge were held solidarily liable with him. The Court
declared through Justice Teehankee:

“The phrase used in the cited article—'so long as (the students)

remain in their custody'—means the protective and supervisory
custody that the school and its heads and teachers exercise over
the pupils and students for as long as they are at attendance in
the school, including recess time. There is nothing in the law that
requires that for such liability to attach, the pupil or student who
commits the tortious act must live and board in the school, as
erroneously held by the lower court, and the dicta in Mercado (as
well as in Exconde) on which it relied, must now be deemed to
have been set aside by the present decision.”
10
This decision was concurred in by five other members,
including Justice J.B.L. Reyes, who stressed, in answer to
the dissenting opinion, that even students already of age
were covered by the provision since they were equally in
the custody of the school and 11
subject to its discipline.
Dissenting with three others, Justice Makalintal was for
retaining the custody interpretation in Mercado and
submitted that the rule should apply only to torts
committed by students not yet of age as the school would be
acting only in loco parentis.
In a footnote, Justice Teehankee said he agreed with
Justice

________________

10 Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, Barredo, Villamor, and Makasiar, JJ.

11 Castro, Fernando, and Zaldivar, JJ.

323

VOL. 160, APRIL 15, 1988 323

Amadora vs. Court of Appeals

Reyes’ dissent in the Exconde Case but added that “since

the school involved at bar is a non-academic school, the
question as to the applicability of the cited codal provision
to academic institutions will have to await another case
wherein it may properly be raised.”
This is the case.
Unlike in Exconde and Mercado, the Colegio de San
JoseRecoletos has been directly impleaded and is sought to
be held liable under Article 2180; and unlike in Palisoc, it
is not a school of arts and trades but an academic
institution of learning. The parties herein have also
directly raised the question of whether or not Article 2180
covers even establishments which are technically not
schools of arts and trades, and, if so, when the offending
student is supposed to be “in its custody.”
After an exhaustive examination of the problem, the
Court has come to the conclusion that the provision in
question should apply to all schools, academic as well as
non-academic. Where the school is academic rather than
9/9/2017 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 160

technical or vocational in nature, responsibility for the tort

committed by the student will attach to the teacher in
charge of such student, following the first part of the
provision. This is the general rule. In the case of
establishments of arts and trades, it is the head thereof,
and only he, who shall be held liable as an exception to the
general rule. In other words, teachers in general shall be
liable for the acts of their students except where the school
is technical in nature, in which case it is the head thereof
who shall be answerable. Following the canon of reddendo
singula singulis, “teachers” should apply to the words
“pupils and students” and “heads of establishments of arts
and trades” to the word “apprentices.”
The Court thus conforms to the dissenting opinion
expressed by Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Exconde where he said
in part:

“I can see no sound reason for limiting Art. 1903 of the Old Civil
Code to teachers of arts and trades and not to academic ones.
What substantial difference is there between them insofar as
concerns the proper supervision and vigilance over their pupils? It
cannot be seriously contended that an academic teacher is exempt
from the duty of watching that his pupils do not commit a tort to
the detriment of third persons, so long as they are in a position to
exercise authority and supervision over the pupil. In my opinion,
in the phrase ‘teachers or

324

324 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Amadora vs. Court of Appeals

heads of establishments of arts and trades’ used in Art. 1903 of

the old Civil Code, the words ‘arts and trades’ does not qualify
teachers’ but only Tieads of establishments.’ The phrase is only an
updated version of the equivalent terms ‘preceptores ‘x artesanos’
used in the Italian and Prench Civil Codes.
“If, as conceded by all commentators, the basis of the
presumption of negligence of Art. 1903 in some culpa in vigilando
that the parents, teachers, etc. are supposed to have incurred in
the exercise of their authority, it would seem clear that where the
parent places the child under the effective authority of the
teacher, the latter, and not the parent, should be the one
answerable for the torts committed while under his custody, for
the very reason that the parent is not supposed to interfere with
the discipline of the school nor with the authority and supervision
of the teacher while the child is under instruction. And if there is
no authority, there can be no responsibility.’

There is really no substantial distinction between the

academic and the non-academic schools insofar as torts
committed by their students are concerned. The same
vigilance is expected from the teacher over the students
under his control and supervision, whatever the nature of
the school where he is teaching. The suggestion in the
Exconde and Mercado Cases is that the provision would
make the teacher or even the head of the school of arts and
trades liable for an injury caused by any student in its
custody but if that same tort were committed in an
academic school, no liability would attach to the teacher or
the school head. All other circumstances being the same,
the teacher or the head of the academic school would be
absolved whereas the teacher and the head of the non-
academic school would be held liable, and simply because
the latter is a school of arts and trades.
9/9/2017 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 160

The Court cannot see why different degrees of vigilance

should be exercised by the school authorities on the basis
only of the nature of their respective schools. There does
not seem to be any plausible reason for relaxing that
vigilance simply because the school is academic in nature
and for increasing such vigilance where the school is non-
academic. Notably, the injury subject of liability is caused
by the student and not by the school itself nor is it a result
of the operations of the,school or its equipment. The injury
contemplated may be caused by any student regardless of
the school where he is registered. The
325

VOL. 160, APRIL 15, 1988 325

Amadora vs. Court of Appeals

teacher certainly should not be able to excuse himself by

simply showing that he is teaching in an academic school
where, on the other hand, the head would be held liable if
the school were non-academic.
These questions, though, may be asked: If the teacher of
the academic school is to be held answerable for the torts
committed by his students, why is it the head of the school
only who is held liable where the injury is caused in a
school of arts and trades? And in the case of the academic
or non-technical school, why not apply the rule also to the
head thereof instead of imposing the liability only on the
teacher?
The reason for the disparity can be traced to the fact
that historically the head of the school of arts and trades
exercised a closer tutelage over his pupils than the head of
the academic school. The old schools of arts and trades
were engaged in the training of artisans apprenticed to
their master who personally and directly instructed them
on the technique and secrets of their craft. The head of the
school of arts and trades was such a master and so was
personally involved in the task of teaching his students,
who usually even boarded with him and so came under his
constant control, supervision and influence. By contrast,
the head of the academic school was not as involved with
his students and exercised only administrative duties over
the teachers who were the persons directly dealing with the
students. The head of the academic school had then (as
now) only a vicarious relationship with the students.
Consequently, while he could not be directly faulted for the
acts of the students, the head of the school of arts and
trades, because of his closer ties with them, could be so
blamed.
It is conceded that the distinction no longer obtains at
present in view of the expansion of the schools of arts and
trades, the consequent increase in their enrollment, and
the corre-sponding diminution of the direct and personal
contract of their heads with the students. Article 2180,
however, remains unchanged. In its present state, the
provision must be interpreted by the Court according to its
clear and original mandate until the legislature, taking
into account the changes in the situation subject to be
regulated, sees fit to enact the necessary amendment.
The other matter to be resolved is the duration of the
respon-
326
9/9/2017 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 160

326 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Amadora vs. Court of Appeals

sibility of the teacher or the head of the school of arts and

trades over the students. Is such responsibility co-extensive
with the period when the student is actually undergoing
studies during the school term, as contended by the
respondents and impliedly admitted by the petitioners
themselves?
From a reading of the provision under examination, it is
clear that while the custody requirement, to repeat Palisoc
v. Brillantes, does not mean that the student must be
boarding with the school authorities, it does signify that
the student should be within the control and under the
influence of the school authorities at the time of the
occurrence of the injury, This does not necessarily mean
that such, custody be co-terminous with the semester,
beginning with the start of classes and ending upon the
close thereof, and excluding the time before or after such
period, such as the period of registration, and in the case of
graduating students, the period before the commencement
exercises. In the view of the Court, the student is in the
custody of the school authorities as long as he is under the
control and influence of the school and within its premises,
whether the semester has not yet begun or has already
ended.
It is too tenuous to argue that the student comes under
the discipline of the school only upon the start of classes
notwithstanding that before that day he has already
registered and thus placed himself under its rules. Neither
should such discipline be deemed ended upon the last day
of classes notwithstanding that there may still be certain
requisites to be satisfied for completion of the course, such
as submission of reports, term papers, clearances and the
like. During such periods, the student is still subject to the
disciplinary authority of the school and cannot consider
himself released altogether from observance of its rules.
As long as it can be shown that the student is in the
school premises in pursuance of a legitimate student
objective, in the exercise of a legitimate student right, and
even in the enjoyment of a legitimate student right, and
even in the enjoyment of a legitimate student privilege, the
responsibility of the school authorities over the student
continues. Indeed, even if the student should be doing
nothing more than relaxing in the campus in the company
of his classmates and friends and enjoying the ambience
and atmosphere of the school, he is still
327

VOL. 160, APRIL 15, 1988 327

Amadora vs. Court of Appeals

within the custody and subject to the discipline of the

school authorities under the provisions of Article 2180.
During all these occasions, it is obviously the teacher-
incharge who must answer for his students’ torts, in
practically the same way that the parents are responsible
for the child when he is in their custody. The teacher-in-
charge is the one designated by the dean, principal, or
other administrative superior to exercise supervision over
the pupils in the specific classes or sections to which they
are assigned. It is not necessary that at the time of the
9/9/2017 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 160

injury, the teacher be physically present and in a position

to prevent it. Custody does not connote immediate and
actual physical control but refers more to the influence
exerted on the child and the discipline instilled in him as a
result of such influence. Thus, for the injuries caused by
the student, the teacher and not the parent shall be held
responsible if the tort was committed within the premises
of the school at any time when its authority could be
validly exercised over him.
In any event, it should be noted that the liability
imposed by this article is supposed to fall directly on the
teacher or the head of the school of arts and trades and not
on the school itself. If at all, the school, whatever its
nature, may be held to answer for the acts of its teachers or
even of the head thereof under the general principle of
respondent superior, but then it may exculpate itself from
liability by proof that it had exercised the diligence of a
bonus paterfamilias.
Such defense is, of course, also available to the teacher
or the head of the school of arts and trades directly held to
answer for the tort committed by the student. As long as
the defendant can show that he had taken the necessary
precautions to prevent the injury complained of, he can
exonerate himself from the liability imposed by Article
2180, which also states that:

“The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the

persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damages.”

In this connection, it should be observed that the teacher

will be held liable not only when he is acting in loco
parentis for the law does not require that the offending
student be of minority

328

328 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Amadora vs. Court of Appeals

age. Unlike the parent, who will be liable only if his child is
still a minor, the teacher is held answerable by the law for
the act of the student under him regardless of the student’s
age. Thus, in the Palisoc Case, liability attached to the
teacher and the head of the technical school although the
wrongdoer was already of age. In this sense, Article 2180
treats the parent more favorably than the teacher.
The Court is not unmindful of the apprehensions
expressed by Justice Makalintal in his dissenting opinion
in Palisoc that the school may be unduly exposed to
liabUity under this article in view of the increasing
activism among the students that is likely to cause violence
and resulting injuries in the school premises. That is a
valid fear, to be sure. Nevertheless, it should be repeated
that, under the present ruling, it is not the school that will
be held directly liable. Moreover, the defense of due
diligence is available to it in case it is sought to be held
answerable as principal for the acts or omission of its head
or the teacher in its employ.
The school can show that it exercised proper measures
in selecting the head or its teachers and the appropriate
supervision over them in the custody and instruction of the
pupils pursuant to its rules and regulations for the
maintenance of discipline among them. In almost all cases
now, in fact, these measures are effected through the
9/9/2017 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 160

assistance of an adequate security force to help the teacher

physically enforce those rules upon the students. This
should bolster the claim of the school that it has taken
adequate steps to prevent any inj ury that may be
committed by its students.
A fortiori, the teacher himself may invoke this defense
as it would otherwise be unfair to hold him directly
answerable for the damage caused by his students as long
as they are in the schooJ premises and presumably under
his influence, In this respect, the Court is disposed not to
expect from the teacher the same measure of responsibility
imposed on the parent for their influence over the child is
not equal in degree. Obviously, the parent can expect more
obedience from the child because the latter’s dependence on
him is greater than on the teacher. It need not be stressed
that such dependence includes the child’s support and
sustenance whereas submission to the teacher’s influence,
besides being co-terminous with the period of cus-

329

VOL. 160, APRIL 15, 1988 329

Amadora vs. Court of Appecds

tody, is usually enforced only because of the students’

desire to pass the course. The parent can instill more
lasting discipline on the child than the teacher and so
should be held to a greater accountability than the teacher
for the tort committed by the child.
And if it is also considered that under the article in
question, the teacher or the head of the school of arts and
trades is responsible for the damage caused by the student
or apprentice even if he is already of age—and therefore
less tractable than the minor—then there should all the
more be justification to require from the school authorities
less accountability as long as they can prove reasonable
diligence in preventing the injury. After all, if the parent
himself is no longer liable for the student’s acts because he
has reached majority age and so is no longer under the
former’s control, there is then all the more reason for
leniency in assessing the teacher’s responsibility for the
acts of the student.
Applying the foregoing considerations, the Court has
arrived at the following conclusions:
1, At the time Alfredo Amadora was fatally shot, he was
still in the custody of the authorities of Colegio de San
Jose-Recoletos notwithstanding that the fourth year classes
had formally ended. It was immaterial if he was in the
school auditorium to finish his physics experiment or
merely to submit his physics report for what is important is
that he was there for a legitimate purpose. As previously
observed, even the mere savoring of the company of his
friends in the premises of the school is a legitimate purpose
that would have also brought him in the custody of the
school authorities.
2. The rector, the high school principal and the dean of
boys cannot be held liable because none of them was the
teacher-incharge as previously defined. Each of them was
exercising only a general authority over the student body
and not the direct control and influence exerted by the
teacher placed in charge of particular classes or sections
and thus immediately involved in its discipUne. The
evidence of the parties does not disclose who the teacher-in-
charge of the offending student was. The mere fact that
9/9/2017 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 160

Alfredo Amadora had gone to school that day in connection

with his physics report did not necessarily make the
physics teacher, respondent Celestino Dicon, the teacher-
in-

330

330 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Amadora vs. Court of Appeals

charge of Alfredo’s killer,

3. At any rate, assuming that he was the teacher-in-
charge, there is no showing that Dicon was negligent in
enforcing discipline upon Daffon or that he had waived
observance of the rules and regulations of the school or
condoned their nonobservance. His absence when the
tragedy happened cannot be considered against him
because he was not supposed or required to report to school
on that day. And while it is true that the offending student
was still in the custody of the teacher-in-charge even if the
latter was physically absent when the tort was committed,
it has not been established that it was caused by his
laxness in enforcing discipline upon the student. On the
contrary, the private respondents have proved that they
had exercised due diligence, through the enforcement of the
school regulations, in maintaining that discipline.
4. In the absence of a teacher-in-charge, it is probably
the dean of boys who should be held liable, especially in
view of the unrefuted evidence that he had earlier
confiscated an unlicensed gun from one of the students and
returned the same later to him without taking disciplinary
action or reporting the matter to higher authorities. While
this was clearly negligence on his part, for which he
deserves sanctions from the school, it does not necessarily
link him to the shooting of Amador as it has not been
shown that he confiscated and returned pistol was the gun
that killed the petitioners’ son.
5. Finally, as previously observed, the Colegio de San
JoseRecoletos cannot be held directly liable under the
article because only the teacher or the head of the school of
arts and trades is made responsible for the damage caused
by the student or apprentice. Neither can it be held to
answer for the tort committed by any of the other private
respondents for none of them has been found to have been
charged with the custody of the offending student or has
been remiss in the discharge of his duties in connection
with such custody.
In sum, the Court finds under the facts as disclosed by
the record and in the light of the principles herein
announced that none of the respondents is liable for the
injury inflicted by Pablito Daffon on Alfredo Amadora that
resulted in the latter’s death at the auditorium of the
Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos on April 13,1972. While we
deeply sympathize with the petition-
331

VOL. 160, APRIL 15, 1988 331

Amadora vs. Court of Appeals

ers over the loss of their son under the tragic circumstances
here related, we nevertheless are unable to extend them
9/9/2017 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 160

the material relief they seek, as a balm to their grief, under

the law they have invoked.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, without any
pronouncement as to costs. It is so ordered.

          Yap, Narvasa, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Bidin,

Sarmiento, Cortés and Grino-Aquino, JJ., concur.
     Teehankee, C.J., did not participate in deliberations.
     Fernan and Padilla, JJ., no part, formerly counsel
for Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos.
     Gutierrez, Jr., J., concur but please see additional
statement.
          Herrera, J., with separate concurring and
dissenting opinion.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring and dissenting:

I concur, except with respect to the restricted meaning

given the term “teacher” in Article 2180 of the Civil Code
as “teacherin-charge.” This would limit liability to
occasions where there are classes under the immediate
charge of a teacher, which does not seem to be the
intendment of the law.
As I understand it, the philosophy of the law is that
whoever stands in loco parentis will have the same duties
and obligations as parents whenever in such a standing.
Those persons are mandatorily held liable for the tortious
acts of pupils and students so long as the latter remain in
their custody, meaning their protective and supervisory
custody.
Thus, Article 349 of the Civil Code enumerates the
persons who stand in loco parentis and thereby exercise
substitute parental authority:

“Art 349,. The following persons shall exercise substitute parental

authority:
xxx
(2) Teachers and professors;
xxx
(4) Directors of trade establishments, with regard to
apprentices;”

332

332 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Amadora vs. Court of Appeals

Article 352 of the Civil Code further provides:

“Art. 352. The relationB between teacher and pupil, professor and
student, are fixed by government regulations and those of each
school or institution. x x x”

But even such rules and regulations as may be fixed can

not contravene the concept of substitute parental authority.
The rationale of liability of school heads and teachers for
the tortious acts of their pupils was explained in Palisoc vs.
Brillantes (41 SCRA 548), thus:

“The protective custody of the school heads and teachers is

mandatorily substituted for that of the parents, and hence, it
becomes their obligation 05 well as that of the school itself to
provide proper supervision of the students’ activities during the
whole time that they are at attendance in the school, including
recess time, as well as to take the necessary precautions to protect
the students in their custody from dangers and hazards that
9/9/2017 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 160

would reasonably be anticipated, including injuries that some

students themselves may inflict wilfully or through negligence on
their fellow students. (Italics supplied)

Of course, as provided for in the same Article 2180, the

responsibility treated of shall cease when the persons
mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a
good father of a family to prevent damage.
And while a school is, admittedly, not directly liable
since Article 2180 speaks only of teachers and schools
heads, yet, by virtue of the same provision, the school, as
their employer, may be held liable for the failure of its
teachers or school heads to perform their mandatory legal
duties as substitute parents (Sangco, Philippine Law on
Torts & Damages, 1978 ed., p. 201). Again, the school may
exculpate itself from liability by proving that it had
exercised the diligence of a good father of the family.

“Art. 2180. x x x
“Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their
employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their
assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any
business or industry.
x x x      x x x

333

VOL. 160, APRIL 15, 1988 333

Amadora vs. Court of Appeals

Parenthetically, from the enumeration in Article 348 of the

Civil Code, supra, it is apparent that the Code Commission
had already segregated the classification of “teachers and
professors” vis-a-vis their pupils, from “directors of trade
establishments, with regard to their apprentices.”

GUTIERREZ, JR., J., concurring opinion:

I concur in the Court’s opinion so carefully analyzed and

crafted by Justice Isagani A. Cruz. However, H. would like
to stress the need for a major amendment to, if not a
complete scrapping of, Article 2180 of the Civil Code
insofar as it refers to teachers or heads of establishments of
arts and trades in relation to pupils and students or
apprentices. The seventh paragraph of Art. 2180 is a relic
of the past and contemplates a situation long gone and out
of date. In a Palisoc v. Brillantes (41 SCRA 548) situation,
it is bound to result in mischief and injustice.
First, we no longer have masters and apprentices toiling
in schools of arts and trades. Students in “technologicaT
colleges and universities are no different from students in
liberal arts or professional schools. Apprentices now work
in regular shops and factories and their relationship to the
employer is covered by laws governing the employment
relationship and not by laws governing the teacher—
student relationship.
Second, except for kindergarten, elementary, and
perhaps early high school students, teachers are often no
longer objects of veneration who are given the respect due
to substitute parents. Many students in their late teens or
early adult years view some teachers as part of a bourgeois
or reactionary group whose advice on behaviour,
deportment, and other non-academic matters is not only
resented but actively rejected. It seems most unfair to hold
teachers liable on a presumption juris tantum of negligence
9/9/2017 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 160

for acts of students even under circumstances where

strictly speaking there could be no in loco parentis
relationship, Why do teachers have to prove the contrary of
negligence to be freed from solidary liabiUty for the acts of
bomb-throwing or pistol packing students who would just
as soon hurt them as they would other members of the so-
called establishment.

334

334 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Nakpil & Sons vs. Court of Appeals

The ordinary rules on quasi-delicts should apply to

teachers and schools of whatever nature insofar as grown
up students are concerned. The provision of Art. 2180 of
the Civil Code involved in this case has outlived its
purpose. The Court cannot make law. It can only apply the
law with its imperfections. However, the Court can suggest
that such a law should be amended or repealed.
Petition denied.

Note.—Trial is necessary for any final decision of the

two cases on the merits or on the issues as to the power of a
school over its students, like the case of re-enrollment of an
expelled student. (University of the Phttippines vs.
Fernandez, 137 SCRA l.)

——o0o——

© Copyright 2017 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.