Africa vs.

Caltex, 16 SCRA 448

By LLBe:LawLifeBuzzEtcetera Facts: In the afternoon of March 18, 1948, a fire broke out at the Caltex service station at the corner of Antipolo St. and Rizal Avenue, Manila. It started while gasoline was being hosed from a tank truck into the underground storage, right at the opening of the receiving tank where the nozzle of the hose was inserted. The fire spread to and burned several houses. The owners, among them petitioner spouses Africa and heirs of Ong, sued respondents Caltex Phil., Inc., the alleged owner of the station, and Mateo Boquiren, the agent in charge of its operation, for damages. The CFI and CA found that the petitioners failed to prove negligence of the respondents, and that there was due care in the premises and with respect to the supervision of their employees. Issue: Whether or not, without proof as to the cause and origin of the fire, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur should apply so as to presume negligence on the part of the respondents. Held: Yes. Res ipsa loquitur literally means the thing or transaction speaks for itself. For the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to apply, the following requisites should be present: (a) the accident is of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of someones negligence; (b) it is caused by an instrumentality within the exclusive control of the defendant or defendants; and (c) the possibility of contributing conduct which would make the plaintiff responsible is eliminated. In the case at bar, the gasoline station, with all its appliances, equipment and employees, was under the control of respondents. A fire occurred therein and spread to and burned the neighboring houses. The persons who knew or could have known how the fire started were respondents and their employees, but they gave no explanation thereof whatsoever. It is a fair and reasonable inference that the incident happened because of want of care. The negligence of the employees was the proximate cause of the fire, which in the ordinary course of things does not happen. Therefore, the petitioners are entitled to the award for damages.

Amadora v CA (160 scra 315)Facts:Pabling

Daffon shot classmate Alfredo Amadora in the auditorium of Colegio de San Jose. He wasconvicted of homicide thru reckless

imprudence. Alfredos parents filed a civil action to recover damages against CSJ, its rector, the high school principal, the dean of boys,

and the physics teacher,together with Pabling and two other students.The CFI found the school officials liable for damages. The CA, however, reversed

the CFI decisionbecause: 1) Art 2180 was not applicable since CSJ was not a school of arts and trades; 2) the studentswere not in the custody of

the school at the time of the incident since the semester had already ended;3) there was no clear identification of the gun; and 4) the defendants

had exercised the necessarydiligenc e in preventing the injury.In this petition for certiorari, petitioners contend that Alfredo went to

school to finish his physicsexperimen t as a prerequisite for graduation; hence, he was under the custody of the privaterespondent

s. The private respondents, on the other hand, contend that Alfredo went to school to submithis physics experiment; hence, he was no

longer under their custody since the semester had alreadyended.Issu e:1)Whether Art 2180 applies to establishments which are technically not

schools of arts and trades2)Whether private respondents are liable for damages under Art 2180Held:1) YES

Art 2180 applies to all schools

, academic as well as non-academic. Teachers, in general, shallbe liable for the acts of their students except where the

school is technical in nature, in which case it isthe head thereof who shall be answerable. Following the cannon of reddendo singula

singulis,teachers should apply to the words pupils and students and heads of establishments of arts andtrades to the word apprentices.2)

NOThe same vigilance is expected from the teacher over his students, regardless of the nature of theschool where he is teaching.

The injury subject of liability is caused by the student and not by theschool or any of its personnel and equipment. It may be inflicted by any student

regardless of theschool where he is registered.The student is under the custody of school authorities as long as he is

under the control andinfluence of the school and within its premises

, whether the semester has already begun or hasalready ended. As long as it can

be shown that the student is in the school in the pursuit of alegitimate student objective, in the exercise of a legitimate student right, and

even in the enjoyment of a legitimate student privilege, the responsibility of the school continues.The teacher-in-charge is liable for his

students torts as he is designated to exercise supervisionover them. Moreover, the teacher is liable regardless of the students age.In this case,

none of the private respondents were held liable. The rector, dean of boys, and highschool principal cannot be held liable

because they were not teachers-incharge. The physics teacher was not negligent. The school cannot be held directly liable since Art

2180 only speaks of teacher or head of the school of arts and trades.PETITION DENIED - sorry na lang

Palisoc v Brillantes (41 SCRA 548)Facts:Palisoc and Daffon were classmates at the Manila Technical Institute (MTI), a non-

academicinstitutio n. While Daffon was working on a machine at the schools laboratory, he remarked that Palisocwas acting like a foreman.

Palisoc slightly slapped Daffon in the face. The latter retaliated with abarrage of blows causing Palisoc to retreat. While retreating, Palisoc stumbled

on an engine block andfell unconscious. He died thereafter. The cause of death was internal injuries probably caused bystrong fist blows.Daffon

was of legal age at the time of the incident, hence the parents were not liable under Art2180.The trial court found Daffon guilty for quasi-delict (Why

not a felony?), but absolved the defendantsofficials of MTI, citing the ruling in Mercado v CA.Issue: Whether defendants-school

officials are jointly and severally liable as tortfeasorsHeld: YESValenton (head) and Quibule (teacher) are liable for damages under

Art 2180 CC. Brillantes is notliable as being a member of the schools board of directors.School heads and teachers, to a

certain extent, stand in loco parentis to students who remain intheir custody. Custody, as used in Art 2180, means the

protective and supervisory custody

that theschool and its heads and teachers exercise over their students for

as long as they are in attendance

in the school, including recess time.The basis of the presumption of negligence in Art 2180 is some culpa in vigilando

that the parents,teachers, etc. are supposed to have incurred in the exercise of their authority. Where the parent placesthe child under the custody

of the teacher, the latter, and not the parent, should be the one responsiblefor the tortuous act of the child.Judgment modified Daffon, Valenton,

and Quibule are jointly and severally liableDissent (Makalintal)The size of enrollment of educational institutions makes it highly

unrealistic to consider students asin the custody of teachers or school heads merely from the fact of enrollment and class attendance,unless

the latter can prove due diligence. The restrictive interpretation of Art 2180 in Mercado shouldbe maintained.

Under Art 2180, parents are responsible for the tortious acts of their minor children who live in their company. Since the basis of liability of

teachers and school heads is in loco parentis, the said provisionshould be applied by analogy, i.e. so long as they remain in their

custody should be equated with wholive in their company; and school heads and teachers should not be responsible for damages caused bychildren

who are no longer minors

MERRIT vs GOVT OF PHIL. ISLAND

FACTS: Merrit, riding on a motorcycle at a

speed of 10-12 mi/hr, collided with an ambulance of theGeneral Hospital which turned suddenly and unexpectedly without having

sounded any whistle or hornMerrit was severely injured. His condition had undergone depreciation and his efficiency as acontractor was

affected.TC held that Govt is liable for damages sustained by plaintiff even if the collision was due to thenegligence of chauffeur.ISSUE:

WON Govt may be held liable in this caseHELD: NORATIO: Art 1903, par 5 of Old CC states that: The State is liable in this sense when it acts through a

special agent but not when the damageshould have been caused by the official to whom properly it pertained to do the act performed, in whichcase the

provisions of the preceding article shall be applicable

Thus, the responsibility of the State is limited by Art 1903 to the case wherein it

acts through aspecial agent who, in representing the state and being bound to act as an agent thereof, executes thetrust confided to

him.Special agent is one who receives a definite and fixed order or commission, foreign to theexercise of the duties of his office if he is a special

official.Art. 1903 does not apply to executive agent who is an employee of the active administration andwho on his own responsibility

performs the functions which are inherent and naturally pertain to his officewhich are regulated by law and regulations.The chauffeur of the

ambulance of the General Hospital was not a special agent thus the Govt isnot liable. Salvosa v IAC (166 SCRA 274)Facts:Jimmy

Abon was the duly appointed armorer of theBaguio Colleges Foundation ROTC. He received his appointment from

the AFP, who also pays his salaryand gives him orders. He was also a commerce student of the same school.On that fateful night of 3 March 1977,

Abon shot fellow student Napoleon Castro in BCFs parkingspace. Castro died and Abon was convicted of homicide.Castros heirs sue Abon,

BCF, and its officers for damages. The trial court held Abon, BCF, andBen Salvosa (BCF Pres) liable for damages. The IAC affirmed the

decision with modification. Hence,this petition.IAC ruled that the shooting incident occurred at about dismissal time, and was therefore within

therecess time referred to in Palisoc v Brillantes.Issue: Whether petitioner can be held solidarily liable with Abon for damages under

Art 2180Held: NOCustody refers to protective and supervisory custody that the school and its heads and teachersexercise over its students

as long as they are in attendance in the school, including recess time. Recess , as embraced in the phrase

at attendance in the school

, is a temporary adjournment of school activities where the student remains within call of his mentor

and is not permitted to leave theschool premises, or the area within which the school activity is conducted. By its nature, it

does notinclude dismissal

.The mere fact of being enrolled or being in the premises of the school without more does notconstitute

attending school

or being in the protective and supervisory custody of the school, ascontemplated in the law.Abon

cannot be considered to have been at attendance in the school , or in the custody of BCF,when he shot Castro. Therefore, the

petitioners cannot be held solidarily liable with Abon for damagesunder Art 2180.
PSBA v CA (205 SCRA 729)Facts:Carlitos Bautista, a student of PSBA, was stabbed in the schools premises by outsiders. He dies,prompting his parents to file an action for damages against PSBA.PSBA files a motion to dismiss arguing that it is beyond the ambit of Art 2180 since it is anacademic institution. The lower court denied their motion to dismiss. Their motion for recon was alsodenied. The CA affirmed the lower courts decision by citing the Palisoc ruling that Art 2180 isapplicable to all kinds of educational institutions. Hence, this petition.Issue: Whether PSBA can be held liable for damagesHeld: YESArt 2180 does not apply since the persons who caused the injury were not students of PSBA, for whose acts the school could be made liable.There is a contractual relation that exists between academic institutions and students enrolledtherein. The academic institution undertakes to provide the student with education. There is also animplicit obligation of providing students with an atmosphere conducive to learning, i.e. provide theproper security measures. Because of this contractual obligation, the rules on quasi-delict do not reallygovern.A contractual relation is a condition sine qua on to the schools liability for negligence, unless thenegligence occurs in bad faith

FILAMER CHRISTIAN INSTITUTE v IAC

August 17, 1992 FACTS: Funtecha was a working student, being a part-time

janitor and scholar of Filamer Christian Institute. One day, Funtecha, who already had a students drivers license, requested

Masa, the school driver and son of the school president, to allow him to drive the school vehicle. Assenting to the request, Masastopped the

vehicle he was driving and allowed Funtecha to take over behind the wheel. However, after negotiating a sharp dangerous

curb, Funtecha came upon a fast moving truck so that hehad to swerve to the right to avoid a collision. Upon swerving, they bumped a

pedestrian walking in hislane. The pedestrian died due to the accident. ISSUE: Won Filamer Christian Institute

should be held liable HELD: YES First it should be noted that driving the vehicle to and from the house of

the school president were bothAllan and Funtecha reside is an act in furtherance of the interest of the petitioner-school. The school jeep

had to be brought home so that the school driver can use it to fetch students in the morning of thenext school day.

Thus, in learning how to drive while taking the vehicle home in the direction of Allans home, Funtechadefinitel y was not having a joy ride or for

enjoyment, but ultimately, for the service for which the jeepwas intended by the petitioner school.(School president had knowledge of

Funtechas desire to learn how to drive.) Court is thus constrained to conclude that the act of Funtecha in taking over the

steering wheel was onedone for and in behalf of his employer for which act the school cannot deny any responsibility byarguing that it

was done beyond the scope of his janitorial duties. The fact that Funtecha was not the school driver does not relieve the school from

the burden of rebutting the presumption of negligence on its part. It is sufficient that the act of driving at the time of theincident was

for the benefit of the school. Petitioner school has failed to show that it exercised diligence of a good father of a family.Petitioner

has not shown that it has set forth rules and guidelines as would prohibit any one of itsemployees from taking control over its vehicles if

one is not the official driver or prohibiting theauthorized driver from letting anyone than him to drive the vehicle. Furthermore,

school had failed toshow that it impose sanctions or warned its employees against the use of its vehicles by persons other than the driver.

Thus, Filamer has an obligation to pay damages for injury arising from the unskilled manner by whichFuntecha drove the vehicle

since the law imposes upon the employers vicarious liability for acts or omissions of its employees.The liability of the employer, under

Article 2180, is primary and solidary. However, the employer shallhave recourse against the negligent employee for

whatever damages are paid to the heirs of theplaintiff.

CASTILEX INDUSTRIAL CORP vs VASQUEZ

FACTS: On Aug. 28, 1988, around 1:30-2 am, Romeo Vasquez was driving his motorcycle around theOsmea Rotunda in the

normal flow and collided with the company pick-up driven by Benjamin Abad whowas going against the flow of the the traffic in the same

Rotunda.Vasquez died at the hospital on Sept. 5, 1988. Abad signed an acknowledgement of Responsibleparty wherein he would

pay all the expenses.Vasquez parents commenced an action for damages against Abad and Castilex. TC held thatboth must pay

jointly and solidarily. CA affirmed but held that the liability of Castilex is only vicarious andnot solidary.ISSUE: WON an employer may be

held vicariously (subsidiarily) liable for the death resulting from thenegligent operation by a managerial employee of a

company-issued vehicle HELD: NO RATIO: Art 2180 par 5 says that WON engaged in any business or industry, an employer is liable

for thetorts committed by emplyees within the scope of his assigned tasks. But it is necessary to first establishthe employee-

employer relnship. Then the plaintiff must show, to hold emplyer liable, that the employeewas acting within the scope of his

assigned task when the tort complained of was committed. It is onlythen that the employer can interpose the defense of due diligence in the

selection and supervision of itsemployee.In the case at bar, it is undisputed that Abad was production manager of Castilex. At the

night of the incident, he did some overtime work at petitioners office. Thereafter he went to a restaurant at a placeknown as a

haven for prostitutes, pimps,and drug pushers and addictsThe Court finds that Abad was engaged in affairs of his own (

had a woman in the car with him not young enough to call him Daddy!!

) or was carrying out a personal purpose not in line with his duties at

thetime he figured in a vehicular accident. It was 2 am and way beyond normal working hours. His overtimehad ended.Since there is a paucity

(scarcity, insufficiency) of evidence that Abad was acting within the scopeof the functions entrusted to him, Castilex had no duty to show that

it exercised the diligence of a goodfather of a family in providing Abad with a service vehicle.Thus, justice and equity require that

Castilex be relieved of vicarious liability for theconsequences of the negligence of Abad in driving its vehicle.