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G.R. No. L-47745 April 15, 1988 MAIN RULING:

JOSE S. AMADORA, LORETA A. AMADORA, JOSE A. AMADORA
Unlike in Exconde and Mercado, the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos has been
JR., NORMA A. YLAYA PANTALEON A. AMADORA, JOSE A.
directly impleaded and is sought to be held liable under Article 2180; and
AMADORA III, LUCY A. AMADORA, ROSALINDA A. AMADORA,
unlike in Palisoc, it is not a school of arts and trades but an academic institu-
PERFECTO A. AMADORA, SERREC A. AMADORA, VICENTE A.
tion of learning. The parties herein have also directly raised the question of
AMADORA and MARIA TISCALINA A. AMADORA, petitioners
whether or not Article 2180 covers even establishments which are techni-
vs.
cally not schools of arts and trades, and, if so, when the offending student
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, COLEGIO DE SAN JOSE-
is supposed to be "in its custody."
RECOLETOS, VICTOR LLUCH SERGIO P. DLMASO JR., CE-
LESTINO DICON, ANIANO ABELLANA, PABLITO DAFFON thru his The Court has come to the conclusion that the provision in question should
parents and natural guardians, MR. and MRS. NICANOR GUMBAN, apply to all schools, academic as well as non-academic. Where the school
and ROLANDO VALENCIA, thru his guardian, A. FRANCISCO is academic rather than technical or vocational in nature, responsibility for
ALONSO, respondents. the tort committed by the student will attach to the teacher in charge of
such student, following the first part of the provision. This is the general
FACTS:
rule. In the case of establishments of arts and trades, it is the head thereof, and
On April 13, 1972, while they were in the auditorium of their school, the only he, who shall be held liable as an exception to the general rule. In other
Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos, a classmate, Pablito Damon, fired a gun words, teachers in general shall be liable for the acts of their students
that mortally hit Alfredo, ending all his expectations and his life as well. except where the school is technical in nature, in which case it is the head
The victim was only seventeen years old. thereof who shall be answerable. Following the canon of reddendo singula
singulis "teachers" should apply to the words "pupils and students" and
Daffon was convicted of homicide thru reckless imprudence. Additionally, "heads of establishments of arts and trades" to the word "apprentices."
the herein petitioners, as the victim's parents, filed a civil action for dam-
ages under Article 2180 of the Civil Code against the Colegio de San These questions, though, may be asked: If the teacher of the academic school
Jose-Recoletos, its rector the high school principal, the dean of boys, and is to be held answerable for the torts committed by his students, why is it the
the physics teacher, together with Daffon and two other students, head of the school only who is held liable where the injury is caused in a
through their respective parents. The complaint against the students was school of arts and trades? And in the case of the academic or non- technical
later dropped. school, why not apply the rule also to the head thereof instead of imposing
the liability only on the teacher?
CFI: Held the remaining defendants liable to the plaintiffs.
The reason for the disparity can be traced to the fact that historically the head
CA: The decision of CFI was reversed and all the defendants were complete- of the school of arts and trades exercised a closer tutelage over his pupils than
ly absolved. It found that Article 2180 was not applicable as the Colegio the head of the academic school. The old schools of arts and trades were
de San Jose-Recoletos was not a school of arts and trades but an academ- engaged in the training of artisans apprenticed to their master who personally
ic institution of learning. It also held that the students were not in the and directly instructed them on the technique and secrets of their craft. The
custody of the school at the time of the incident as the semester had al- head of the school of arts and trades was such a master and so was personally
ready ended, that there was no clear identification of the fatal gun and involved in the task of teaching his students, who usually even boarded with
that in any event the defendant, had exercised the necessary diligence in him and so came under his constant control, supervision and influence. By
preventing the injury. contrast, the head of the academic school was not as involved with his stu-
PETITIONERS’ CONTENTION: That their son was in the school to show dents and exercised only administrative duties over the teachers who were the
his physics experiment as a prerequisite to his graduation; hence, he was then persons directly dealing with the students. The head of the academic school
under the custody of the private respondents. had then (as now) only a vicarious relationship with the students. Conse-
quently, while he could not be directly faulted for the acts of the students, the
RESPONDENTS: That Alfredo Amadora had gone to the school only for the head of the school of arts and trades, because of his closer ties with them,
purpose of submitting his physics report and that he was no longer in their could be so blamed.
custody because the semester had already ended.
The other matter to be resolved is the duration of the responsibility of the
RE: IDENTITY OF THE GUN USED (negligence on the part of private teacher or the head of the school of arts and trades over the students. Is such
respondents) responsibility co-extensive with the period when the student is actually un-
There is also the question of the identity of the gun used which the petition- dergoing studies during the school term, as contended by the respondents and
ers consider important because of an earlier incident which they claim un- impliedly admitted by the petitioners themselves?
derscores the negligence of the school and at least one of the private re- In the view of the Court, the student is in the custody of the school au-
spondents. It is not denied by the respondents that on April 7, 1972, Sergio thorities as long as he is under the control and influence of the school and
Damaso, Jr., the dean of boys, confiscated from Jose Gumban an unlicensed within its premises, whether the semester has not yet begun or has al-
pistol but later returned it to him without making a report to the principal or ready ended.
taking any further action. As Gumban was one of the companions of Daf-
fon when the latter fired the gun that killed Alfredo, the petitioners con- It is too tenuous to argue that the student comes under the discipline of the
tend that this was the same pistol that had been confiscated from Gum- school only upon the start of classes notwithstanding that before that day he
ban and that their son would not have been killed if it had not been re- has already registered and thus placed himself under its rules. Neither should
turned by Damaso. The respondents say, however, that there is no proof such discipline be deemed ended upon the last day of classes not-
that the gun was the same firearm that killed Alfredo. withstanding that there may still be certain requisites to be satisfied for
completion of the course, such as submission of reports, term papers,
ISSUE: WON respondent school is liable? NO. clearances and the like. During such periods, the student is still subject to
HELD: the disciplinary authority of the school and cannot consider himself re-
leased altogether from observance of its rules.
Resolution of all these disagreements will depend on the interpretation of
Article 2180 which, as it happens, is invoked by both parties in support of As long as it can be shown that the student is in the school premises in
their conflicting positions. The pertinent part of this article reads as follows: pursuance of a legitimate student objective, in the exercise of a legitimate
student right, and even in the enjoyment of a legitimate student right,
Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable and even in the enjoyment of a legitimate student privilege, the responsi-
for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices so long as bility of the school authorities over the student continues. Indeed, even if
they remain in their custody. the student should be doing nothing more than relaxing in the campus in
Three cases have so far been decided by the Court in connection with the the company of his classmates and friends and enjoying the ambience
above-quoted provision, to with: Exconde vs. Capuno, Mercado vs. CA, and and atmosphere of the school, he is still within the custody and subject to
Palisoc vs. Brillantes. the discipline of the school authorities under the provisions of Article
2180.
In the Exconde Case, the decision exculpated the school in an obiter dictum
(as it was not a party to the case) on the ground that it was not a school of During all these occasions, it is obviously the teacher-in-charge who must
arts and trades. answer for his students' torts, in practically the same way that the par-
ents are responsible for the child when he is in their custody. The teacher-
Exconde was reiterated in the Mercado Case, the Court declared in another in-charge is the one designated by the dean, principal, or other administrative
obiter as the school itself had also not been sued that the school was not superior to exercise supervision over the pupils in the specific classes or
liable because it was not an establishment of arts and trades. Moreover, sections to which they are assigned. It is not necessary that at the time of the
the custody requirement had not been proved as this "contemplates a injury, the teacher be physically present and in a position to prevent it.
situation where the student lives and boards with the teacher, such that
the control, direction and influences on the pupil supersede those of the The school can show that it exercised proper measures in selecting the
parents." head or its teachers and the appropriate supervision over them in the
custody and instruction of the pupils pursuant to its rules and regula-
In Palisoc vs. Brillantes, the Court declared that "so long as (the students) tions for the maintenance of discipline among them. In almost all cases
remain in their custody" — means the protective and supervisory cus- now, in fact, these measures are effected through the assistance of an ade-
tody that the school and its heads and teachers exercise over the pupils quate security force to help the teacher physically enforce those rules upon
and students for as long as they are at attendance in the school, including the students. This should bolster the claim of the school that it has taken
recess time. There is nothing in the law that requires that for such liabili- adequate steps to prevent any injury that may be committed by its students.
ty to attach, the pupil or student who commits the tortious act must live
and board in the school, as erroneously held by the lower court, and the A fortiori, the teacher himself may invoke this defense as it would otherwise
dicta in Mercado (as well as in Exconde) on which it relied, must now be be unfair to hold him directly answerable for the damage caused by his stu-
deemed to have been set aside by the present decision. dents as long as they are in the school premises and presumably under his
influence.
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Applying the foregoing considerations, the Court has arrived at the following I concur in the Court's opinion so carefully analyzed and crafted by Justice
conclusions: Isagani A. Cruz. However, I would like to stress the need for a major amend-
ment to, if not a complete scrapping of, Article 2180 of the Civil Code insofar
1. At the time Alfredo Amadora was fatally shot, he was still in the custody of as it refers to teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades in relation
the authorities of Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos notwithstanding that the to pupils and students or apprentices. The seventh paragraph of Art. 2180 is a
fourth year classes had formally ended. It was immaterial if he was in the relic of the past and contemplates a situation long gone and out of date. In a
school auditorium to finish his physics experiment or merely to submit his Palisoc v. Brillantes (41 SCRA 548) situation, it is bound to result in mischief
physics report for what is important is that he was there for a legitimate and injustice.
purpose. As previously observed, even the mere savoring of the company
of his friends in the premises of the school is a legitimate purpose that The ordinary rules on quasi-delict should apply to teachers and schools of
would have also brought him in the custody of the school authorities. whatever nature insofar as grown up students are concerned. The provision of
Art. 2180 of the Civil Code involved in this case has outlived its purpose. The
2. The rector, the high school principal and the dean of boys cannot be Court cannot make law. It can only apply the law with its imperfections.
held liable because none of them was the teacher-in-charge as previously However, the Court can suggest that such a law should be amended or re-
defined. Each of them was exercising only a general authority over the stu- pealed.
dent body and not the direct control and influence exerted by the teacher
placed in charge of particular classes or sections and thus immediately in- PHILIPPINE SCHOOL OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION, JUAN D.
volved in its discipline. The evidence of the parties does not disclose who the LIM, BENJAMIN P. PAULINO, ANTONIO M. MAGTALAS, COL.
teacher-in-charge of the offending student was. The mere fact that Alfredo PEDRO SACRO and LT. M. SORIANO, petitioners,
Amadora had gone to school that day in connection with his physics report vs.
did not necessarily make the physics teacher, respondent Celestino Dicon, the COURT OF APPEALS, HON. REGINA ORDOÑEZ-BENITEZ, in her
teacher-in-charge of Alfredo's killer. capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 47, Regional Trial Court, Manila,
SEGUNDA R. BAUTISTA and ARSENIA D. BAUTISTA, respondents.
3. At any rate, assuming that he was the teacher-in-charge, there is no
showing that Dicon was negligent in enforcing discipline upon Daffon or FACTS: A stabbing incident on 30 August 1985 which caused the death of
that he had waived observance of the rules and regulations of the school Carlitos Bautista while on the second-floor premises of the Philippine
or condoned their non-observance. His absence when the tragedy happened School of Business Administration (PSBA) prompted the parents of the
cannot be considered against him because he was not supposed or required to deceased to file suit in the Regional Trial Court of Manila (Branch 47)
report to school on that day. And while it is true that the offending student presided over by Judge (now Court of Appeals justice) Regina Ordoñez-Ben-
was still in the custody of the teacher-in-charge even if the latter was physi- itez, for damages against the said PSBA and its corporate officers.
cally absent when the tort was committed, it has not been established that it
At the time of his death, Carlitos was enrolled in the third year commerce
was caused by his laxness in enforcing discipline upon the student. On the
course at the PSBA. It was established that his assailants were not mem-
contrary, the private respondents have proved that they had exercised due
bers of the school's academic community but were elements from outside
diligence, through the enforcement of the school regulations, in maintaining
the school.
that discipline.
Specifically, the suit impleaded the PSBA and the following school authori-
4. In the absence of a teacher-in-charge, it is probably the dean of boys who
ties: Juan D. Lim (President), Benjamin P. Paulino (Vice-President), Antonio
should be held liable especially in view of the unrefuted evidence that he had
M. Magtalas (Treasurer/Cashier), Col. Pedro Sacro (Chief of Security) and a
earlier confiscated an unlicensed gun from one of the students and returned
Lt. M. Soriano (Assistant Chief of Security). Substantially, the plaintiffs (now
the same later to him without taking disciplinary action or reporting the mat-
private respondents) sought to adjudge them liable for the victim's untime-
ter to higher authorities. While this was clearly negligence on his part, for
ly demise due to their alleged negligence, recklessness and lack of securi-
which he deserves sanctions from the school, it does not necessarily link
ty precautions, means and methods before, during and after the attack
him to the shooting of Amador as it has not been shown that he confiscat-
on the victim.
ed and returned pistol was the gun that killed the petitioners' son.
During the proceedings a quo, Lt. M. Soriano terminated his relationship with
5. Finally, as previously observed, the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos
the other petitioners by resigning from his position in the school.
cannot be held directly liable under the article because only the teacher
or the head of the school of arts and trades is made responsible for the PETITIONER ALLEGATIONS: since they are presumably sued under
damage caused by the student or apprentice. Neither can it be held to Article 2180 of the Civil Code, the complaint states no cause of action against
answer for the tort committed by any of the other private respondents them, as jurisprudence on the subject is to the effect that academic institu-
for none of them has been found to have been charged with the custody tions, such as the PSBA, are beyond the ambit of the rule in the afore-stated
of the offending student or has been remiss in the discharge of his duties article.
in connection with such custody.
RTC: overruled petitioners' contention and thru an order dated 8 December
In sum, none of the respondents is liable for the injury inflicted by Pablito 1987, denied their motion to dismiss
Damon on Alfredo Amadora that resulted in the latter's death at the
auditorium of the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos on April 13, 1972. CA: deny the petitioners' motion for reconsideration.

DP: WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, without any pronouncement as ISSUE: WON PSBA is liable for the death of the student.
to costs. It is so ordered.
HELD: YES!

At the outset, it is to be observed that the respondent appellate court pri-

marily anchored its decision on the law of quasi-delicts, as enunciated in
Separate Opinions Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring and dissenting:
At any rate, the law holds the teachers and heads of the
I concur, except with respect to the restricted meaning given the term school staff liable unless they relieve themselves of
"teacher" in Article 2180 of the Civil Code as "teacher-in-charge." This would such liability pursuant to the last paragraph of Article
limit liability to occasions where there are classes under the immediate charge 2180 by "proving that they observed all the diligence to
of a teacher, which does not seem to be the intendment of the law. prevent damage." This can only be done at a trial on
the merits of the case. 5
As I understand it, the philosophy of the law is that whoever stands in loco
parentis will have the same duties and obligations as parents whenever in While we agree with the respondent appellate court that the motion to dismiss
such a standing. Those persons are mandatorily held liable for the tortious the complaint was correctly denied and the complaint should be tried on the
acts of pupils and students so long as the latter remain in their custody, mean- merits, we do not however agree with the premises of the appellate court's
ing their protective and supervisory custody. ruling.
The protective custody of the school heads and teachers is mandatorily sub- Article 2180, in conjunction with Article 2176 of the Civil Code, establishes
stituted for that of the parents, and hence, it becomes their obligation as well the rule of in loco parentis. This Court discussed this doctrine in the afore-
as that of the school itself to provide proper supervision of the students' activ- cited cases of Exconde, Mendoza, Palisoc and, more recently, in Amadora
ities during the whole time that they are at attendance in the school, including vs.Court of Appeals. 6 In all such cases, it had been stressed that the law (Ar-
recess time, as well as to take the necessary precautions to protect the students ticle 2180) plainly provides that the damage should have been caused or
in their custody from dangers and hazards that would reasonably be anticipat- inflicted by pupils or students of he educational institution sought to be
ed, including injuries that some students themselves may inflict wilfully or held liable for the acts of its pupils or students while in its custody. How-
through negligence on their fellow students. ever, this material situation does not exist in the present case for, as earli-
er indicated, the assailants of Carlitos were not students of the PSBA, for
Of course, as provided for in the same Article 2180, the responsibility treated whose acts the school could be made liable.
of shall cease when the persons mentioned prove that they observed all the
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage. However, does the appellate court's failure to consider such material
facts mean the exculpation of the petitioners from liability? It does not
And while a school is, admittedly, not directly liable since Article 2180 necessarily follow.
speaks only of teachers and schools heads, yet, by virtue of the same provi-
sion, the school, as their employer, may be held liable for the failure of its When an academic institution accepts students for enrollment, there is estab-
teachers or school heads to perform their mandatory legal duties as substitute lished a contract between them, resulting in bilateral obligations which both
parents. Again, the school may exculpate itself from liability by proving that parties are bound to comply with. 7 For its part, the school undertakes to
it had exercised the diligence of a good father of the family. provide the student with an education that would presumably suffice to equip
him with the necessary tools and skills to pursue higher education or a profes-
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., concurring:
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sion. On the other hand, the student covenants to abide by the school's acad- student-school contract for a safe learning environment. The pertinent por-
emic requirements and observe its rules and regulations. tions of petitioner's Complaint read:
Institutions of learning must also meet the implicit or "built-in" obligation of
providing their students with an atmosphere that promotes or assists in attain- 6.0. At the time of plaintiff's confinement, the defendants or any of their
ing its primary undertaking of imparting knowledge. Certainly, no student can representative did not bother to visit and inquire about his condition.
absorb the intricacies of physics or higher mathematics or explore the realm This abject indifference on the part of the defendants continued even
of the arts and other sciences when bullets are flying or grenades exploding in after plaintiff was discharged from the hospital when not even a
the air or where there looms around the school premises a constant threat to word of consolation was heard from them. Plaintiff waited for more
life and limb. Necessarily, the school must ensure that adequate steps are than one (1) year for the defendants to perform their moral obligation but
taken to maintain peace and order within the campus premises and to prevent the wait was fruitless. This indifference and total lack of concern of de-
the breakdown thereof. fendants served to exacerbate plaintiff's miserable condition.
Because the circumstances of the present case evince a contractual rela- 11.0. Defendants are responsible for ensuring the safety of its students
tion between the PSBA and Carlitos Bautista, the rules on quasi-delict do while the latter are within the University premises. And that should any-
not really govern. 8 A perusal of Article 2176 shows that obligations aris- thing untoward happens to any of its students while they are within the
ing from quasi-delicts or tort, also known as extra-contractual obliga- University's premises shall be the responsibility of the defendants. In this
tions, arise only between parties not otherwise bound by contract, case, defendants, despite being legally and morally bound, miserably
whether express or implied. However, this impression has not prevented failed to protect plaintiff from injury and thereafter, to mitigate and com-
this Court from determining the existence of a tort even when there ob- pensate plaintiff for said injury;
tains a contract
Immediately what comes to mind is the chapter of the Civil Code on Human 12.0. When plaintiff enrolled with defendant FEU, a contract was entered
Relations, particularly Article 21, which provides: into between them. Under this contract, defendants are supposed to
Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to anoth- ensure that adequate steps are taken to provide an atmosphere con-
er in a manner that is contrary to morals, good custom ducive to study and ensure the safety of the plaintiff while inside
or public policy shall compensate the latter for the defendant FEU's premises. In the instant case, the latter breached this
damage. (emphasis supplied). contract.
In the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, however, there is, as
yet, no finding that the contract between the school and Bautista had COURT: Respondents failed to discharge the burden of proving that they
been breached thru the former's negligence in providing proper security exercised due diligence in providing a safe learning environment for their
measures. This would be for the trial court to determine. And, even if students.
there be a finding of negligence, the same could give rise generally to a
breach of contractual obligation only. Using the test of Cangco, supra, the It is undisputed that petitioner was enrolled as a sophomore law student
negligence of the school would not be relevant absent a contract. In fact, that in respondent FEU. As such, there was created a contractual obligation
negligence becomes material only because of the contractual relation between between the two parties. On petitioner's part, he was obliged to comply
PSBA and Bautista. In other words, a contractual relation is a with the rules and regulations of the school. On the other hand, respondent
condition sine qua non to the school's liability. The negligence of the FEU, as a learning institution is mandated to impart knowledge and equip its
school cannot exist independently of the contract, unless the negligence students with the necessary skills to pursue higher education or a profession.
occurs under the circumstances set out in Article 21 of the Civil Code. At the same time, it is obliged to ensure and take adequate steps to maintain
This Court is not unmindful of the attendant difficulties posed by the obliga- peace and order within the campus.
tion of schools, above-mentioned, for conceptually a school, like a common
carrier, cannot be an insurer of its students against all risks. This is specially It is settled that in culpa contractual, the mere proof of the existence of
true in the populous student communities of the so-called "university belt" in the contract and the failure of its compliance justify, prima facie, a corre-
Manila where there have been reported several incidents ranging from gang sponding right of relief. In the instant case, we find that, when petitioner
wars to other forms of hooliganism. It would not be equitable to expect of was shot inside the campus by no less the security guard who was hired to
schools to anticipate all types of violent trespass upon their premises, for maintain peace and secure the premises, there is a prima facie showing that
notwithstanding the security measures installed, the same may still fail respondents failed to comply with its obligation to provide a safe and secure
against an individual or group determined to carry out a nefarious deed inside environment to its students.
school premises and environs. Should this be the case, the school may still
avoid liability by proving that the breach of its contractual obligation to
the students was not due to its negligence, here statutorily defined to be RESPONDENT’S DEFENSE: the shooting incident was a fortuitous event
the omission of that degree of diligence which is required by the nature of because they could not have reasonably foreseen nor avoided the accident
the obligation and corresponding to the circumstances of persons, time caused by Rosete as he was not their employee;16and that they complied with
and place. 9 their obligation to ensure a safe learning environment for their students by
having exercised due diligence in selecting the security services of Galaxy.
PETITION DENIED.
JOSEPH SALUDAGA, petitioner, After a thorough review of the records, we find that respondents failed to
vs. discharge the burden of proving that they exercised due diligence in
FAR EASTERN UNIVERSITY and EDILBERTO C. DE JESUS in his providing a safe learning environment for their students. They failed to
capacity as President of FEU, respondents. prove that they ensured that the guards assigned in the campus met the re-
Facts: quirements stipulated in the Security Service Agreement. Indeed, certain
Petitioner Joseph Saludaga was a sophomore law student of respondent Far documents about Galaxy were presented during trial; however, no evidence
Eastern University (FEU) when he was shot by Alejandro Rosete (Rosete), as to the qualifications of Rosete as a security guard for the university
one of the security guards on duty at the school premises on August 18, 1996. was offered.
Petitioner was rushed to FEU-Dr. Nicanor Reyes Medical Foundation (FEU-
NRMF) due to the wound he sustained. Meanwhile, Rosete was brought to Respondents also failed to show that they undertook steps to ascertain and
the police station where he explained that the shooting was accidental. He confirm that the security guards assigned to them actually possess the qualifi-
was eventually released considering that no formal complaint was filed cations required in the Security Service Agreement. It was not proven that
against him. they examined the clearances, psychiatric test results, 201 files, and other
vital documents enumerated in its contract with Galaxy.
Petitioner thereafter filed a complaint for damages against respondents
on the ground that they breached their obligation to provide students Total reliance on the security agency about these matters or failure to
with a safe and secure environment and an atmosphere conducive to check the papers stating the qualifications of the guards is negligence on
learning. the part of respondents. A learning institution should not be allowed to
completely relinquish or abdicate security matters in its premises to the secu-
rity agency it hired. To do so would result to contracting away its inherent
Respondents, in turn, filed a Third-Party Complaint against Galaxy Develop- obligation to ensure a safe learning environment for its students.
ment and Management Corporation (Galaxy), the agency contracted by re-
spondent FEU to provide security services within its premises and Mariano
D. Imperial (Imperial), Galaxy's President, to indemnify them for whatever RE: Defense of force majeure
would be adjudged in favor of petitioner, if any; and to pay attorney's fees and In order for force majeure to be considered, respondents must show that no
cost of the suit. On the other hand, Galaxy and Imperial filed a Fourth-Party negligence or misconduct was committed that may have occasioned the loss.
Complaint against AFP General Insurance. The fact that the immediate or proximate cause of the damage or injury was a
fortuitous event would not exempt one from liability. When the effect is
found to be partly the result of a person's participation - whether by active
RTC- rendered a judgment in favor of Petitioner intervention, neglect or failure to act - the whole occurrence is humanized and
CA- reversed RTC’s decision removed from the rules applicable to acts of God.

CASE: Article 1170 of the Civil Code provides that those who are negligent in the
Petitioner is suing respondents for damages based on the alleged breach of performance of their obligations are liable for damages. Accordingly, for
 4 of 12
breach of contract due to negligence in providing a safe learning environ- of his group mates. As a result thereof, [Jayson’s] eyes were chemically
ment, respondent FEU is liable to petitioner for damages. burned, particularly his left eye, for which he had to undergo surgery
and had to spend for his medication. Upon filing of this case [in] the lower
court, [Jayson’s] wound had not completely healed and still had to undergo
DE JESUS IS NOT LIABLE another surgery.
PETITIONERS’ ALLEGATION: Before the science experiment was con-
Personal liability of a corporate director, trustee or officer along (although not ducted, [Jayson] and his classmates were given strict instructions to fol-
necessarily) with the corporation may so validly attach, as a rule, only when - low the written procedure for the experiment and not to look into the test
(1) he assents to a patently unlawful act of the corporation, or when he is tube until the heated compound had cooled off. [Jayson], however, a per-
guilty of bad faith or gross negligence in directing its affairs, or when there is son of sufficient age and discretion and completely capable of understanding
a conflict of interest resulting in damages to the corporation, its stockholders the English language and the instructions of his teacher, without waiting for
or other persons; (2) he consents to the issuance of watered down stocks or the heated compound to cool off, as required in the written procedure for the
who, having knowledge thereof, does not forthwith file with the corporate experiment and as repeatedly explained by the teacher, violated such in-
secretary his written objection thereto; (3) he agrees to hold himself personal- structions and took a magnifying glass and looked at the compound, which at
ly and solidarily liable with the corporation; or (4) he is made by a specific that moment spurted out of the test tube, a small particle hitting one of
provision of law personally answerable for his corporate action.27 [Jayson’s] eyes.
On December 6, 1994, however, the parents of [Jayson], through counsel,
None of the foregoing exceptions was established in the instant case; wrote SJC a letter demanding that it should shoulder all the medical ex-
hence, respondent De Jesus should not be held solidarily liable with re- penses of [Jayson] that had been incurred and will be incurred further
spondent FEU. arising from the accident caused by the science experiment. In a letter
dated December 14, 1994, the counsel for SJC, represented by Sr. Josephini
De Jesus cannot also be held vicariously liable under Article 2180 of the Civil Ambatali, SFIC, explained that the school cannot accede to the demand
Code, which provides: because "the accident occurred by reason of [Jayson’s] failure to comply
with the written procedure for the experiment and his teacher’s repeated
warnings and instruction that no student must face, much less look into,
Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for the opening of the test tube until the heated compound has cooled.”
one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is
responsible. Since SJC did not accede to the demand, Rodolfo, Jayson’s father, on
Jayson’s behalf, sued petitioners for damages.
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and RTC: Judgment was rendered in favor of [Jayson] and against [petitioners].
household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though CA: Affirmed in toto the ruling of the RTC.
the former are not engaged in any business or industry.
ISSUE: WON petitioner school is liable? YES. THE SCHOOL LIABLE
FOR IT IS GUILTY OF INEXCUSABLE LAXITY IN THE SUPERVI-
He cannot be held because respondents are not the employers of Rosete. The SION OF ITS TEACHERS AND IN THE MAINTENANCE OF WHAT
latter was employed by Galaxy. The instructions issued by respondents' Secu- SHOULD HAVE BEEN A SAFE AND SECURED ENVIRONMENT
rity Consultant to Galaxy and its security guards are ordinarily no more than FOR CONDUCTING DANGEROUS EXPERIMENTS.
requests commonly envisaged in the contract for services entered into by a
principal and a security agency. They cannot be construed as the element of HELD:
control as to treat respondents as the employers of Rosete.28
We find no reason to depart from the uniform rulings of the lower courts
that petitioners were "negligent since they all failed to exercise the re-
GALAXY’S LIABILITY quired reasonable care, prudence, caution and foresight to prevent or
avoid injuries to the students."
Respondents and Galaxy were able to litigate their respective claims and PETITIONERS’ CONTENTION: Yet, petitioners maintain that the proxi-
defenses in the course of the trial of petitioner's complaint. Evidence duly mate cause of Jayson’s injury was his own negligence in disregarding the
supports the findings of the trial court that Galaxy is negligent not only in the instructions given by Tabugo prior to the experiment and peeking into
selection of its employees but also in their supervision. Indeed, no administra- the test tube.
tive sanction was imposed against Rosete despite the shooting incident;
Contrary to petitioners’ assertions, the lower courts’ conclusions are borne out
moreover, he was even allowed to go on leave of absence which led eventual-
by the records of this case. Both courts correctly concluded that the imme-
ly to his disappearance.34 Galaxy also failed to monitor petitioner's condition
diate and proximate cause of the accident which caused injury to Jayson
or extend the necessary assistance, other than the P5,000.00 initially given to
was the sudden and unexpected explosion of the chemicals, independent
petitioner. Galaxy and Imperial failed to make good their pledge to reimburse
of any intervening cause. The assailed Decision of the CA quotes with favor
petitioner's medical expenses.
the RTC decision, thus:
In this case, [petitioners] failed to show that the negligence of [Jayson] was
For these acts of negligence and for having supplied respondent FEU with an
the proximate cause of the latter’s injury. We find that the immediate cause of
unqualified security guard, which resulted to the latter's breach of obligation
the accident was not the negligence of [Jayson] when he curiously looked into
to petitioner, it is proper to hold Galaxy liable to respondent FEU for such
the test tube when the chemicals suddenly exploded which caused his injury,
damages equivalent to the above-mentioned amounts awarded to peti-
but the sudden and unexpected explosion of the chemicals independent of any
tioner.
intervening cause. [Petitioners] could have prevented the mishap if they
exercised a higher degree of care, caution and foresight. The court a quo
Unlike respondent De Jesus, we deem Imperial to be solidarily liable with correctly ruled that:
Galaxy for being grossly negligent in directing the affairs of the security
"All of the [petitioners] are equally at fault and are liable for negligence
agency. It was Imperial who assured petitioner that his medical expenses will
because all of them are responsible for exercising the required reasonable
be shouldered by Galaxy but said representations were not fulfilled because
care, prudence, caution and foresight to prevent or avoid injuries to the
they presumed that petitioner and his family were no longer interested in
students. The individual [petitioners] are persons charged with the teaching
filing a formal complaint against them.35G.R. No. 182353 June 29,
and vigilance over their students as well as the supervision and ensuring of
2010
their well-being. Based on the facts presented before this Court, these
[petitioners] were remiss in their responsibilities and lacking in the de-
ST. JOSEPH'S COLLEGE, SR. JOSEPHINI AMBATALI, SFIC, and gree of vigilance expected of them. [Petitioner] subject teacher Rosalinda
ROSALINDA TABUGO, Petitioners, Tabugo was inside the classroom when the class undertook the science exper-
vs. iment although [Jayson] insisted that said [petitioner] left the classroom. No
JAYSON MIRANDA, represented by his father, RODOLFO S. MIRAN- evidence, however, was presented to establish that [petitioner] Tabugo was
DA, Respondent. inside the classroom for the whole duration of the experiment. It was unnat-
ural in the ordinary course of events that [Jayson] was brought to the
FACTS: school clinic for immediate treatment not by [petitioner] subject teacher
On November 17, 1994, at around 1:30 in the afternoon inside St. Joseph Rosalinda Tabugo but by somebody else. The Court is inclined to believe
College’s [SJC’s] premises, the class to which [respondent Jayson Val Miran- that [petitioner] subject teacher Tabugo was not inside the classroom at
da] belonged was conducting a science experiment about fusion of sulphur the time the accident happened. The Court is also perplexed why none of
powder and iron fillings under the tutelage of [petitioner] Rosalinda Tabugo, the other students (who were eyewitnesses to the incident) testified in Court
she being the subject teacher and employee of [petitioner] SJC. The adviser of to corroborate the story of the [petitioners]. The Court, however, understands
[Jayson’s] class is x x x Estefania Abdan. that these other students cannot testify for [Jayson] because [Jayson] is no
longer enrolled in said school and testifying for [Jayson] would incur the ire
Tabugo left her class while it was doing the experiment without having of school authorities. Estefania Abdan is equally at fault as the subject
adequately secured it from any untoward incident or occurrence. In the adviser or teacher in charge because she exercised control and supervi-
middle of the experiment, [Jayson], who was the assistant leader of one of the sion over [petitioner] Tabugo and the students themselves. It was her
class groups, checked the result of the experiment by looking into the test obligation to insure that nothing would go wrong and that the science experi-
tube with magnifying glass. The test tube was being held by one of his ment would be conducted safely and without any harm or injury to the stu-
group mates who moved it close and towards the eye of [Jayson]. At that dents. [Petitioner] Sr. Josephini Ambatali is likewise culpable under the
instance, the compound in the test tube spurted out and several particles doctrine of command responsibility because the other individual [peti-
of which hit [Jayson’s] eye and the different parts of the bodies of some tioners] were under her direct control and supervision. The negligent acts
 5 of 12
of the other individual [petitioners] were done within the scope of their as- negligent was the proximate cause of the injury caused because the negli-
signed tasks. gence must have a causal connection to the accident."
xxxx RE: CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE OF JAYSON
"The defense of due diligence of a good father of a family raised by [peti- [Jayson] is partly responsible for his own injury, hence, he should not be
tioner] St. Joseph College will not exculpate it from liability because it entitled to recover damages in full but must likewise bear the conse-
has been shown that it was guilty of inexcusable laxity in the supervision quences of his own negligence. [Petitioners], therefore, should be held liable
of its teachers (despite an apparent rigid screening process for hiring) only for the damages actually caused by their negligence.
and in the maintenance of what should have been a safe and secured
DP: WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of
environment for conducting dangerous experiments. [Petitioner] school is
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 68367 is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
still liable for the wrongful acts of the teachers and employees because it
had full information on the nature of dangerous science experiments but SO ORDERED.
did not take affirmative steps to avert damage and injury to students.
The fact that there has never been any accident in the past during the FILAMER CHRISTIAN INSTITUTE, Petitioner, v. HON. INTERME-
conduct of science experiments is not a justification to be complacent in DIATE APPELLATE COURT, HON. ENRIQUE P. SUPLICO, in his
just preserving the status quo and do away with creative foresight to capacity as Judge of the Court of Appeals, Branch XIV, Roxas City and
install safety measures to protect the students. Schools should not simply POTENCIANO KAPUNAN SR., Respondents.
install safety reminders and distribute safety instructional manuals.
More importantly, schools should provide protective gears and devices to
Mini facts:
shield students from expected risks and anticipated dangers.
"Ordinarily, the liability of teachers does not extend to the school or universi- Funtecha was a working student, being a part-time Janitor and a scholar
ty itself, although an educational institution may be held liable under the of petitioner Filamer. He was, in relation to the school, an employee
principle of RESPONDENT SUPERIOR. It has also been held that the even if he was assigned to clean the school premises for only two (2)
liability of the employer for the [tortuous] acts or negligence of its employees hours in the morning of each school day.

is primary and solidary, direct and immediate and not conditioned upon the
insolvency of or prior recourse against the negligent employee.” Allan Masa, the son of Filamer’s President Mr. Agustin Masa, was the
Under the foregoing circumstances, we are hard pressed to disturb the find- official driver of the school vehicle. Since Funtecha and Allan lived in
ings of the RTC, which the CA affirmed. the same house, Funtechs (holder of driver license), requested Allan to
take over the vehicle only after driving down a road, negotiating a sharp
Nonetheless, petitioners make much of the fact that Tabugo specifically in- dangerous curb, and viewing that the road was clear. According to Al-
structed her students, including Jayson, at the start of the experiment, not to lan’s testimony, a fast moving truck with glaring lights nearly hit them so
look into the heated test tube before the compound had cooled off. Petitioners that they had to swerve to the right to avoid a collision. Upon swerving,
would allocate all liability and place all blame for the accident on a twelve they heard a sound as if something has bumped against the vehicle, but
(12)-year-old student, herein respondent Jayson. they did not stop to check. Unfortunately, their jeep swerved towards
the pedestrian, Potenciano Kapunan who was walking in his lane in
We disagree.
the direction against vehicular traffic, and hit him.
As found by both lower courts, the proximate cause of Jayson’s injury
was the concurrent failure of petitioners to prevent the foreseeable The heirs of Kapunan filed an action against Filamer for damages. In
mishap that occurred during the conduct of the science experiment. Peti- its defense FIlamer alleged that Funtecha acted outside the scope of his
tioners were negligent by failing to exercise the higher degree of care, authority. Therefore, it was only Funtecha who was liable and not Fil-
caution and foresight incumbent upon the school, its administrators and ame.
teachers.
Article 218 of the Family Code, in relation to Article 2180 of the Civil
Code, bestows special parental authority on the following persons with the
corresponding obligation, thus: FACTS: The private respondents, heirs of the late Potenciano Kapunan, seek
reconsideration of the decision rendered by this Court on October 16, 1990
Art. 218. The school, its administrators and teachers, or the individual, entity (Filamer Christian Institute v. Court Appeals, 190 SCRA 477) reviewing the
or institution engaged in child care shall have special parental authority and appellate court’s conclusion that there exists an employer-employee relation-
responsibility over the minor child while under their supervision, instruction
ship between the petitioner and its co-defendant Funtecha. The Court ruled
or custody.
that the petitioner is not liable for the injuries caused by Funtecha on the
Authority and responsibility shall apply to all authorized activities whether grounds that the latter was not an authorized driver for whose acts the peti-
inside or outside the premises of the school, entity or institution. tioner shall be directly and primarily answerable, and that Funtecha was
Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only merely a working scholar who, under Section 14, Rule X, Book III of the
for one’s own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is Rules and Regulations Implementing the Labor Code is not considered an
responsible. employee of the petitioner.
xxxx The private respondents assert that the circumstances obtaining in the
Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable present case call for the application of Article 2180 of the Civil Code
for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices, so long as since Funtecha is no doubt an employee of the petitioner. The private
they remain in their custody. respondents maintain that under Article 2180 an injured party shall have
Petitioners’ negligence and failure to exercise the requisite degree of care recourse against the servant as well as the petitioner for whom, at the time of
and caution is demonstrated by the following: the incident, the servant was performing an act in furtherance of the interest
and for the benefit of the petitioner. Funtecha allegedly did not steal the
1. Petitioner school did not take affirmative steps to avert damage and injury school jeep nor use it for a joy ride without the knowledge of the school au-
to its students although it had full information on the nature of dangerous thorities.
science experiments conducted by the students during class;
2. Petitioner school did not install safety measures to protect the students who After a re-examination of the laws relevant to the facts found by the trial
conduct experiments in class; court and the appellate court, the Court reconsiders its decision. We reinstate
the Court of Appeals’ decision penned by the late Justice Desiderio Jurado
3. Petitioner school did not provide protective gears and devices, specifically
goggles, to shield students from expected risks and dangers; and and concurred in by Justices Jose G. Campos, Jr. and Serafin E. Camilon
Applying Civil Code provisions, the appellate court affirmed the trial court
4. Petitioner Tabugo was not inside the classroom the whole time her class decision which ordered the payment of the P20,000.00 liability in the Zenith
conducted the experiment, specifically, when the accident involving Jayson Insurance Corporation policy, P10,000.00 moral damages, P4,000.00 litiga-
occurred. In any event, the size of the class—fifty (50) students— conducting tion and actual expenses, and P3,000.00 attorney’s fees.
the experiment is difficult to monitor.
Moreover, petitioners cannot simply deflect their negligence and liability by It is undisputed that Funtecha was a working student, being a part-time Jani-
insisting that petitioner Tabugo gave specific instructions to her science class tor and a scholar of petitioner Filamer. He was, in relation to the school, an
not to look directly into the heated compound. Neither does our ruling in St. employee even if he was assigned to clean the school premises for only
Mary’s preclude their liability in this case. The accident was caused by a two (2) hours in the morning of each school day.
mechanical defect and there was no evidence that the school allowed the
minor to drive. Having a student driver’s license, Funtecha requested the driver, Allan Masa,
In marked contrast, both the lower courts similarly concluded that the and was allowed, to take over the vehicle while the latter was on his way
mishap which happened during the science experiment was foreseeable home one late afternoon. It is significant to note that the place where Allan
by the school, its officials and teachers. This neglect in preventing a fore- lives is also the house of his father, the school president, Agustin Masa.
seeable injury and damage equates to neglect in exercising the utmost Moreover, it is also the house where Funtecha was allowed free board while
degree of diligence required of schools, its administrators and teachers, he was a student of Filamer Christian Institute.
and, ultimately, was the proximate cause of the damage and injury to
Jayson. As we have held in St. Mary’s, "for petitioner [St. Mary’s Academy] Allan Masa turned over the vehicle to Funtecha only after driving down a
to be liable, there must be a finding that the act or omission considered as road, negotiating a sharp dangerous curb, and viewing that the road was clear.
 6 of 12
(TSN, April 4, 1983, pp. 78-79) According to Allan’s testimony, a fast mov- in the supervision of its employees, the law imposes upon it the vicarious
ing truck with glaring lights nearly hit them so that they had to swerve to the liability for acts or omissions of its employees.
right to avoid a collision. Upon swerving, they heard a sound as if something
had bumped against the vehicle, but they did not stop to check. Actually, the RE: LIABILITY
Pinoy jeep swerved towards the pedestrian, Potenciano Kapunan who was
walking in his lane in the direction against vehicular traffic, and hit him. COURT: The liability of the employer is, under Article 2180, primary and
Allan affirmed that Funtecha followed his advise to swerve to the right. (Ibid., solidary. However, the employer shall have recourse against the negligent
p. 79) At the time of the incident (6:30 P.M.) in Roxas City, the jeep had only employee for whatever damages are paid to the heirs of the plaintiff.
one functioning headlight.
RE: ALLAN MASA was not made party to the case
Allan testified that he was the driver and at the same time a security guard of
the petitioner-school. He further said that there was no specific time for him COURT: This is quite understandable considering that as far as the injured
to be off-duty and that after driving the students home at 5:00 in the after- pedestrian, plaintiff Potenciano Kapunan, was concerned, it was Funtecha
noon, he still had to go back to school and then drive home using the same who was the one driving the vehicle and presumably was one authorized by
vehicle. the school to drive. The plaintiff and his heirs should not now be left to suffer
without simultaneous recourse against the petitioner for the consequent injury
ISSUE: WON Filamer is liable for the acts of Funtecha.
caused by a janitor doing a driving chore for the petitioner even for a short
HELD: YES! Driving the vehicle to and from the house of the school presi- while. For the purpose of recovering damages under the prevailing circum-
dent where both Allan and Funtecha reside is an act in furtherance of the stances, it is enough that the plaintiff and the private respondent heirs were
interest of the petitioner-school. Allan’s job demands that he drive home the able to establish the existence of employer-employee relationship between
school jeep so he can use it to fetch students in the morning of the next school Funtecha and petitioner Filamer and the fact that Funtecha was engaged in an
day. act not for an independent purpose of his own but in furtherance of the busi-
ness of his employer. A position of responsibility on the part of the petitioner
It is indubitable under the circumstances that the school president had knowl- has thus been satisfactorily demonstrated.
edge that the jeep was routinely driven home for the said purpose. Moreover,
it is not improbable that the school president also had knowledge of Fun-
MA. LOURDES VALENZUELA, petitioner,
techa’s possession of a student driver’s license and his desire to undergo
vs.
driving lessons during the time that he was not in his classrooms.
COURT OF APPEALS, RICHARD LI and ALEXANDER COMMER-
CIAL, INC., respondents.
In learning how to drive while taking the vehicle home in the direction of
Allan’s house, Funtecha definitely was not, having a joy ride Funtecha was Facts:
not driving for the purpose of his enjoyment or for a "frolic of his own" but
ultimately, for the service for which the jeep was intended by the petitioner
school. Therefore, the Court is constrained to conclude that the act of Plaintiff's version of the accident is as follows: At around 2:00 in the morn-
Funtecha in taking over the steering wheel was one done for and in be- ing, plaintiff Ma. Lourdes Valenzuela was driving a blue Mitsubishi lancer
from her restaurant at Marcos highway to her home at Palanza Street, Araneta
half of his employer for which act the petitioner-school cannot deny any
Avenue.
responsibility by arguing that it was done beyond the scope of his janitor-
ial duties. The clause "within the scope of their assigned tasks" for pur- She was travelling along Aurora Blvd. with a companion, Cecilia Ramon,
poses of raising the presumption of liability of an employer, includes any heading towards the direction of Manila. Before reaching A. Lake Street,
act done by an employee, in furtherance of the interests of the employer she noticed something wrong with her tires; she stopped at a lighted
or for the account of the employer at the time of the infliction of the in- place where there were people, to verify whether she had a flat tire and to
jury or damage. Even if somehow, the employee driving the vehicle derived solicit help if needed. Having been told by the people present that her
some benefit from the act, the existence of a presumptive liability of the rear right tire was flat and that she cannot reach her home in that car's
employer is determined by answering the question of whether or not the condition, she parked along the sidewalk, about 1-1/2 feet away, put on
servant was at the time of the accident performing any act in furtherance of her emergency lights, alighted from the car, and went to the rear to open
his master’s business. the trunk.

The present case does not deal with a labor dispute on conditions of em- She was standing at the left side of the rear of her car pointing to the
ployment between an alleged employee and an alleged employer. It in- tools to a man who will help her fix the tire when she was suddenly
vokes a claim brought by one for damages for injury caused by the bumped by a 1987 Mitsubishi Lancer driven by defendant Richard Li
and registered in the name of defendant Alexander Commercial, Inc.
patently negligent acts of a person, against both doer-employee and his
Because of the impact plaintiff was thrown against the windshield of the car
employer. Hence, the reliance on the implementing rule on labor to disre-
of the defendant, which was destroyed, and then fell to the ground. She was
gard the primary liability of an employer under Article 2180 of the Civil pulled out from under defendant's car. Plaintiff's left leg was severed up to the
Code is misplaced. An implementing rule on labor cannot be used by an middle of her thigh, with only some skin and sucle connected to the rest of
employer as a shield to void liability under the substantive provisions of the body. She was brought to the UERM Medical Memorial Center where she
the Civil Code. was found to have a "traumatic amputation, leg, left up to distal thigh (above
knee)". She was confined in the hospital for twenty (20) days and was even-
There is evidence to show that there exists in the present case an extra- tually fitted with an artificial leg.
contractual obligation arising from the negligence or reckless impru-
dence of a person "whose acts or omissions are imputable, by a legal RTC- found Richard Li negligent
fiction, to other(s) who are in a position to exercise an absolute or limited CA- affirmed. It however absolved Li's employer, Alexander Commercial,
control over (him)." Inc. from any liability towards petitioner Lourdes Valenzuela.
Funtecha is an employee of petitioner Filamer. He need not have an offi-
cial appointment for a driver’s position in order that the petitioner may COURT:
be held responsible for his grossly negligent act, it being sufficient that
the act of driving at the time of the incident was for the benefit of the Re: liability of Alexander Commercial, Inc. Li's employer.
petitioner. Hence, the fact that Funtecha was not the school driver or was
not acting with the scope of his janitorial duties does not relieve the peti-
In denying liability on the part of Alexander Commercial, the respondent
tioner of the burden of rebutting the presumption juris tantum that there
court held that:
was negligence on its part either in the selection of a servant or employee,
or in the supervision over him. The petitioner has failed to show proof of
its having exercised the required diligence of a good father of a family There is no evidence, not even defendant Li's testimony, that the visit was
over its employees Funtecha and Allan. in connection with official matters. His functions as assistant manager
sometimes required him to perform work outside the office as he has to
In the present case, the petitioner has not shown that it has set forth such visit buyers and company clients, but he admitted that on the night of the
accident he came from BF Homes Paranaque he did not have "business
rules and guidelines as would prohibit any one of its employees from
from the company". The use of the company car was partly required
taking control over its vehicles if one is not the official driver or prohibit-
by the nature of his work, but the privilege of using it for non-official
ing the driver and son of the Filamer president from authorizing another business is a "benefit", apparently referring to the fringe benefits
employee to drive the school vehicle. Furthermore, the petitioner has attaching to his position.
failed to prove that it had imposed sanctions or warned its employees
against the use of its vehicles by persons other than the driver.
Under the civil law, an employer is liable for the negligence of his em-
ployees in the discharge of their respective duties, the basis of which
The petitioner, thus, has an obligation to pay damages for injury arising
liability is not respondeat superior, but the relationship of pater famil-
from the unskilled manner by which Funtecha drove the vehicle. (Cangco
ias, which theory bases the liability of the master ultimately on his
v. Manila Railroad Co. 38 Phil. 760, 772 [1918]) In the absence of evidence own negligence and not on that of his servant. Before an employer
that the petitioner had exercised the diligence of a good father of a family
 7 of 12
may be held liable for the negligence of his employee, the act or omis- ther, satisfied that its employee will use the privilege reasonably and
sion which caused damage must have occurred while an employee responsively.
was in the actual performance of his assigned tasks or duties.
In the ordinary course of business, not all company employees are given the
In defining an employer's liability for the acts done within the scope of privilege of using a company-issued car. For large companies other than those
the employee's assigned tasks, the Supreme Court has held that this in- cited in the example of the preceding paragraph, the privilege serves impor-
cludes any act done by an employee, in furtherance of the interests of tant business purposes either related to the image of success an entity intends
the employer or for the account of the employer at the time of the to present to its clients and to the public in general, or - for practical and
infliction of the injury or damage. An employer is expected to impose utilitarian reasons - to enable its managerial and other employees of rank or
upon its employees the necessary discipline called for in the performance its sales agents to reach clients conveniently. In most cases, providing a com-
of any act "indispensable to the business and beneficial to their employ- pany car serves both purposes. Since important business transactions and
er”. decisions may occur at all hours in all sorts of situations and under all
kinds of guises, the provision for the unlimited use of a company car
therefore principally serves the business and goodwill of a company
In light of the foregoing, We are unable to sustain the trial court's and only incidentally the private purposes of the individual who actually
finding that since defendant Li was authorized by the company to use the uses the car, the managerial employee or company sales agent. As such, in
company car "either officially or socially or even bring it home", he can providing for a company car for business use and/or for the purpose of fur-
be considered as using the company car in the service of his employer or thering the company's image, a company owes a responsibility to the public
on the occasion of his functions. Driving the company car was not among to see to it that the managerial or other employees to whom it entrusts
his functions as assistant manager; using it for non-official purposes virtually unlimited use of a company issued car are able to use the com-
would appear to be a fringe benefit, one of the perks attached to his posi- pany issue capably and responsibly.
tion. But to impose liability upon the employer under Article 2180 of
the Civil Code, earlier quoted, there must be a showing that the
damage was caused by their employees in the service of the employer As applied:
or on the occasion of their functions. There is no evidence that
Richard Li was at the time of the accident performing any act in
In the instant case, Li was an Assistant Manager of Alexander Commercial,
furtherance of the company's business or its interests, or at least for
Inc. In his testimony before the trial court, he admitted that his functions as
its benefit. The imposition of solidary liability against defendant
Assistant Manager did not require him to scrupulously keep normal
Alexander Commercial Corporation must therefore fail.
office hours as he was required quite often to perform work outside the
office, visiting prospective buyers and contacting and meeting with com-
We agree with the respondent court that the relationship in question is pany clients. 30 These meetings, clearly, were not strictly confined to routine
not based on the principle of respondeat superior, which holds the master hours because, as a managerial employee tasked with the job of representing
liable for acts of the servant, but that of pater familias, in which the liabil- his company with its clients, meetings with clients were both social as well as
ity ultimately falls upon the employer, for his failure to exercise the dili- work-related functions. The service car assigned to Li by Alexander Com-
gence of a good father of the family in the selection and supervision of his mercial, Inc. therefore enabled both Li - as well as the corporation - to
employees. It is up to this point, however, that our agreement with the re- put up the front of a highly successful entity, increasing the latter's
spondent court ends. goodwill before its clientele. It also facilitated meeting between Li and its
clients by providing the former with a convenient mode of travel.
Utilizing the bonus pater familias standard expressed in Article 2180 of
the Civil Code, we are of the opinion that Li's employer, Alexander Moreover, Li's claim that he happened to be on the road on the night of the
Commercial, Inc. is jointly and solidarily liable for the damage caused by accident because he was coming from a social visit with an officemate in
the accident of June 24, 1990. Paranaque was a bare allegation which was never corroborated in the court
below. It was obviously self-serving. Assuming he really came from his of-
ficemate's place, the same could give rise to speculation that he and his of-
The employer's primary liability under the concept of pater familias embod- ficemate had just been from a work-related function, or they were together to
ied by Art 2180 (in relation to Art. 2176) of the Civil Code is quasi-delictual discuss sales and other work related strategies.
or tortious in character. His liability is relieved on a showing that he exercised
the diligence of a good father of the family in the selection and supervision of
its employees. Once evidence is introduced showing that the employer exer- In fine, Alexander Commercial, inc. has not demonstrated, to our satis-
cised the required amount of care in selecting its employees, half of the em- faction, that it exercised the care and diligence of a good father of the
ployer's burden is overcome. The question of diligent supervision, however, family in entrusting its company car to Li. No allegations were made as
depends on the circumstances of employment. to whether or not the company took the steps necessary to determine or
ascertain the driving proficiency and history of Li, to whom it gave full
and unlimited use of a company car. Not having been able to overcome the
Ordinarily, evidence demonstrating that the employer has exercised diligent burden of demonstrating that it should be absolved of liability for entrusting
supervision of its employee during the performance of the latter's assigned its company car to Li, said company, based on the principle of bonus pater
tasks would be enough to relieve him of the liability imposed by Article 2180 familias, ought to be jointly and severally liable with the former for the in-
in relation to Article 2176 of the Civil Code. The employer is not expected to juries sustained by Ma. Lourdes Valenzuela during the accident.
exercise supervision over either the employee's private activities or during the
performance of tasks either unsanctioned by the former or unrelated to the
employee's tasks. The case at bench presents a situation of a different G.R. No. 132266 December 21, 1999
character, involving a practice utilized by large companies with either CASTILEX INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION, petitioner,
their employees of managerial rank or their representatives. vs.
VICENTE VASQUEZ, JR. and LUISA SO VASQUEZ, and CEBU
It is customary for large companies to provide certain classes of their em- DOCTORS' HOSPITAL, INC., respondents.
ployees with courtesy vehicles. These company cars are either wholly owned
and maintained by the company itself or are subject to various plans through FACTS:
which employees eventually acquire their vehicles after a given period of On 28 August 1988, at around 1:30 to 2:00 in the morning, Romeo So
service, or after paying a token amount. Many companies provide liberal "car Vasquez, was driving a Honda motorcycle around Fuente Osmeña Rotunda.
plans" to enable their managerial or other employees of rank to purchase cars, He was traveling counter-clockwise, (the normal flow of traffic in a rotunda)
which, given the cost of vehicles these days, they would not otherwise be able but without any protective helmet or goggles. He was also only carrying a
to purchase on their own. Student's Permit to Drive at the time. Upon the other hand, Benjamin Abad
[was a] manager of Appellant Castilex Industrial Corporation, registered
Under the first example, the company actually owns and maintains the car up owner [of] a Toyota Hi-Lux Pick-up with plate no. GBW-794. On the same
to the point of turnover of ownership to the employee; in the second example, date and time, Abad drove the said company car out of a parking lot but in-
the car is really owned and maintained by the employee himself. stead of going around the Osmeña rotunda he made a short cut against [the]
flow of the traffic in proceeding to his route to General Maxilom St. or to
Belvic St.
ISSUE: In furnishing vehicles to such employees, are companies totally
absolved of responsibility when an accident involving a company-issued In the process, the motorcycle of Vasquez and the pick-up of Abad collid-
car occurs during private use after normal office hours? ed with each other causing severe injuries to the former. Abad stopped his
vehicle and brought Vasquez to the Southern Islands Hospital and later to the
Cebu Doctor's Hospital.
Most pharmaceutical companies, for instance, which provide cars under the
first plan, require rigorous tests of road worthiness from their agents prior to On September 5, 1988, Vasquez died at the Cebu Doctor's Hospital. It was
turning over the car (subject of company maintenance) to their representa- there that Abad signed an acknowledgment of Responsible Party wherein
tives. In other words, like a good father of a family, they entrust the com- he agreed to pay whatever hospital bills, professional fees and other inciden-
pany vehicle only after they are satisfied that the employee to whom the tal charges Vasquez may incur.
car has been given full use of the said company car for company or pri- After the police authorities had conducted the investigation of the accident, a
vate purposes will not be a threat or menace to himself, the company or Criminal Case was filed against Abad but which was subsequently dis-
to others. When a company gives full use and enjoyment of a company missed for failure to prosecute. So, the present action for damages was
car to its employee, it in effect guarantees that it is, like every good fa- commenced by Vicente Vasquez, Jr. and Luisa So Vasquez, parents of the
 8 of 12
deceased Romeo So Vasquez, against Jose Benjamin Abad and Castilex Appeals that since ABAD was driving petitioner's vehicle he was acting with-
Industrial Corporation. in the scope of his duties as a manager.
RTC: Ruled in favor of private respondents. Before we pass upon the issue of whether ABAD was performing acts within
the range of his employment, we shall first take up the other reason invoked
CASTILEX and ABAD separately appealed the decision. by the Court of Appeals in holding petitioner CASTILEX vicariously liable
CA: Affirmed the ruling of the trial court holding ABAD and CASTILEX for ABAD's negligence, i.e., that the petitioner did not present evidence that
liable but held that the liability of the latter is "only vicarious and not sol- ABAD was not acting within the scope of his assigned tasks at the time of the
idary" with the former. motor vehicle mishap. Contrary to the ruling of the Court of Appeals, it was
not incumbent upon the petitioner to prove the same. It was enough for
PETITIONER’S CONTENTION: Hence, CASTILEX filed the instant petitioner CASTILEX to deny that ABAD was acting within the scope of
petition contending that the Court of Appeals erred in (1) applying to the case his duties; petitioner was not under obligation to prove this negative
the fifth paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code, instead of the fourth averment. Ei incumbit probatio qui dicit, non qui negat (He who asserts, not
paragraph thereof; (2) that as a managerial employee, ABAD was deemed to he who denies, must prove). The Court has consistently applied the ancient
have been always acting within the scope of his assigned task even outside rule that if the plaintiff, upon whom rests the burden of proving his cause of
office hours because he was using a vehicle issued to him by petitioner; and action, fails to show in a satisfactory manner facts which he bases his claim,
(3) ruling that petitioner had the burden to prove that the employee was not the defendant is under no obligation to prove his exception or defense.
acting within the scope of his assigned task.
WON the private respondents have sufficiently established that ABAD
RESPONDENT SPOUSES’ CONTENTION: On the other hand, respon- was acting within the scope of his assigned tasks?
dents Spouses Vasquez argue that their son's death was caused by the neg-
ligence of petitioner's employee who was driving a vehicle issued by peti- ABAD, who was presented as a hostile witness, testified that at the time of
tioner and who was on his way home from overtime work for petitioner; and the incident, he was driving a company-issued vehicle, registered under the
that petitioner is thus liable for the resulting injury and subsequent death name of petitioner. He was then leaving the restaurant where he had some
of their son on the basis of the fifth paragraph of Article 2180. snacks and had a chat with his friends after having done overtime work for
the petitioner.
CEBU DOCTOR’S HOSPITAL: Petitioner CASTILEX is indeed vicarious-
ly liable for the injuries and subsequent death of Romeo Vasquez caused by The court a quo and the Court of Appeals were one in holding that the driving
ABAD, who was on his way home from taking snacks after doing overtime by a manager of a company-issued vehicle is within the scope of his assigned
work for petitioner. Although the incident occurred when ABAD was not tasks regardless of the time and circumstances.
working anymore "the inescapable fact remains that said employee We do not agree. The mere fact that ABAD was using a service vehicle at
would not have been situated at such time and place had he not been the time of the injurious incident is not of itself sufficient to charge peti-
required by petitioner to do overtime work." tioner with liability for the negligent operation of said vehicle unless it
ISSUE: WON petitioner may be held vicariously liable for the death result- appears that he was operating the vehicle within the course or scope of
ing from the negligent operation by a managerial employee of a company- his employment.
issued vehicle? NO. ABAD WAS CARRYING OUT A PERSONAL PUR- The following are principles in American Jurisprudence on the employ-
POSE NOT IN LINE WITH HIS DUTIES AT THE TIME HE FIG- er's liability for the injuries inflicted by the negligence of an employee in
URED IN A VEHICULAR ACCIDENT, HENCE, PETITIONER the use of an employer's motor vehicle:
CASTILEX IS NOT LIABLE.
I. Operation of Employer's Motor Vehicle in Going to or from Meals
HELD:
It has been held that an employee who uses his employer's vehicle in going
PETITIONER’S CLAIM: It is not vicariously liable for the injuries and from his work to a place where he intends to eat or in returning to work from
subsequent death caused by ABAD.
a meal is not ordinarily acting within the scope of his employment in the
PETITIONER’S CONTENTION: Petitioner contends that the fifth para- absence of evidence of some special business benefit to the employer.
graph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code should only apply to instances where II. Operation of Employer's Vehicle in Going to or from Work
the employer is not engaged in business or industry. Since it is engaged in the
business of manufacturing and selling furniture it is therefore not covered by In the same vein, traveling to and from the place of work is ordinarily a per-
said provision. Instead, the fourth paragraph should apply. sonal problem or concern of the employee, and not a part of his services to his
employer. Hence, in the absence of some special benefit to the employer other
Petitioner's interpretation of the fifth paragraph is not accurate. The than the mere performance of the services available at the place where he is
phrase "even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry" needed, the employee is not acting within the scope of his employment even
found in the fifth paragraph should be interpreted to mean that it is not neces- though he uses his employer's motor vehicle.
sary for the employer to be engaged in any business or industry to be liable
for the negligence of his employee who is acting within the scope of his as- The employer may, however, be liable where he derives some special benefit
signed task. from having the employee drive home in the employer's vehicle as when the
employer benefits from having the employee at work earlier and, presumably,
A distinction must be made between the two provisions to determine what is spending more time at his actual duties. However, even if the employee be
applicable. Both provisions apply to employers: the fourth paragraph, to deemed to be acting within the scope of his employment in going to or from
owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise; and the fifth para- work in his employer's vehicle, the employer is not liable for his negligence
graph, to employers in general, whether or not engaged in any business or where at the time of the accident, the employee has left the direct route to his
industry. The fourth paragraph covers negligent acts of employees commit- work or back home and is pursuing a personal errand of his own.
ted either in the service of the branches or on the occasion of their functions,
while the fifth paragraph encompasses negligent acts of employees acting III. Use of Employer's Vehicle Outside Regular Working Hours
within the scope of their assigned task. The latter is an expansion of the for-
An employer who loans his motor vehicle to an employee for the latter's
mer in both employer coverage and acts included. Negligent acts of employ-
personal use outside of regular working hours is generally not liable for the
ees, whether or not the employer is engaged in a business or industry, are
employee's negligent operation of the vehicle during the period of permissive
covered so long as they were acting within the scope of their assigned task,
use, even where the employer contemplates that a regularly assigned motor
even though committed neither in the service of the branches nor on the occa-
vehicle will be used by the employee for personal as well as business purpos-
sion of their functions. For, admittedly, employees oftentimes wear different
es and there is some incidental benefit to the employer. Even where the em-
hats. They perform functions which are beyond their office, title or designa-
ployee's personal purpose in using the vehicle has been accomplished and he
tion but which, nevertheless, are still within the call of duty.
has started the return trip to his house where the vehicle is normally kept, it
This court has applied the fifth paragraph to cases where the employer was has been held that he has not resumed his employment, and the employer is
engaged in a business or industry such as truck operators and banks. The not liable for the employee's negligent operation of the vehicle during the
Court of Appeals cannot, therefore, be faulted in applying the said para- return trip.
graph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code to this case.
The foregoing principles and jurisprudence are applicable in our jurisdiction
Under the fifth paragraph of Article 2180, whether or not engaged in any albeit based on the doctrine of respondent superior, not on the principle of
business or industry, an employer is liable for the torts committed by employ- bonus pater familias as in ours. Whether the fault or negligence of the em-
ees within the scope of his assigned tasks. But it is necessary to establish ployee is conclusive on his employer as in American law or jurisprudence, or
the employer-employee relationship; once this is done, the plaintiff must merely gives rise to the presumption juris tantum of negligence on the part of
show, to hold the employer liable, that the employee was acting within the employer as in ours, it is indispensable that the employee was acting in
the scope of his assigned task when the tort complained of was commit- his employer's business or within the scope of his assigned task.
ted. It is only then that the employer may find it necessary to interpose the
In the case at bar, it is undisputed that ABAD did some overtime work at the
defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of the employee.
petitioner's office, which was located in Cabangcalan, Mandaue City. There-
It is undisputed that ABAD was a Production Manager of petitioner after, he went to Goldie's Restaurant in Fuente Osmeña, Cebu City, which is
CASTILEX at the time of the tort occurrence. As to whether he was about seven kilometers away from petitioner's place of business. A witness for
acting within the scope of his assigned task is a question of fact, which the private respondents, a sidewalk vendor, testified that Fuente Osmeña is a
the court a quo and the Court of Appeals resolved in the affirmative. "lively place" even at dawn because Goldie's Restaurant and Back Street were
still open and people were drinking thereat. Moreover, prostitutes, pimps, and
Well-entrenched in our jurisprudence is the rule that the factual findings of drug addicts littered the place.
the Court of Appeals are entitled to great respect, and even finality at times.
This rule is, however, subject to exceptions such as when the conclusion is At the Goldie's Restaurant, ABAD took some snacks and had a chat with
grounded on speculations, surmises, or conjectures. Such exception obtain in friends. It was when ABAD was leaving the restaurant that the incident in
the present case to warrant review by this Court of the finding of the Court of question occurred. That same witness for the private respondents testified that
at the time of the vehicular accident, ABAD was with a woman in his car,
 9 of 12
who then shouted: "Daddy, Daddy!" This woman could not have been Indeed the pictures taken of the two vehicles (Exh. 1, 2 and 3) will clearly
ABAD's daughter, for ABAD was only 29 years old at the time. show that the MCL bus was at its proper lane and not in an overtaking
position while the car driven by John Macarubo was positioned in a
To the mind of this Court, ABAD was engaged in affairs of his own or diagonal manner and crossed the line of the MCL, which is an indication
was carrying out a personal purpose not in line with his duties at the time of an overtaking act. If it were the bus that was overtaking at the time,
he figured in a vehicular accident. It was then about 2:00 a.m. of 28 August the car would have been thrown farther away from the point of the im-
1988, way beyond the normal working hours. ABAD's working day had end- pact.
ed; his overtime work had already been completed. His being at a place
which, as petitioner put it, was known as a "haven for prostitutes, pimps, and The court is convinced of the close supervision and control of MCL over their
drug pushers and addicts," had no connection to petitioner's business; neither drivers, and its exercise of due diligence in seeing to it that no recklessness is
had it any relation to his duties as a manager. Rather, using his service vehicle committed by its employees, drivers especially, from the unrebutted testi-
even for personal purposes was a form of a fringe benefit or one of the perks monies of Cesar Cainglet.
attached to his position.
The Court noted the respective damages of the two vehicles especially the
Since there is paucity of evidence that ABAD was acting within the scope point of the impact. From these damages as shown by the picture, it can be
of the functions entrusted to him, petitioner CASTILEX had no duty to clearly deduced which vehicle did the bumping. It was the car driven by
show that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in provid- John Macarubo that hit the MCL which was on its right and correct
ing ABAD with a service vehicle. Thus, justice and equity require that lane.2
petitioner be relieved of vicarious liability for the consequences of the
RTC: dismissing both civil cases against MCL and ruling favorably on its
negligence of ABAD in driving its vehicle.
third-party complaint against Juanita Macarubo, ordering the latter to pay
DP: WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED, and the appealed decision MCL P54,232.12 as actual damages, P24,000.00 for lost income, and
and resolution of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with the modification P10,000.00 as attorney's fees.
that petitioner Castilex Industrial Corporation be absolved of any liability for
CA: reversed RTC.
the damages caused by its employee, Jose Benjamin Abad.
ISSUE1: RE: SUPERVISION AND CONTROL
SO ORDERED.
COURT:
ARMANDO JOSE y PAZ and MANILA CENTRAL BUS LINES (MCL),
represented by its General Manager MR. DANILO T. DE DIOS, petition- Appellate court also ruled that MCL failed to make a satisfactory showing
ers, that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection
vs. and supervision of its bus driver, Armando Jose.13 Under the circum-
COURT OF APPEALS, ROMMEL ABRAHAM, represented by his stances of this case, we hold that proof of due diligence in the selection
father FELIXBERTO ABRAHAM, JOSE MACARUBO and MER- and supervision of employees is not required.
CEDES MACARUBO, respondents.
The Civil Code provides in pertinent parts:
FACTS: Petitioner Manila Central Bus Lines Corporation (MCL) is the oper-
ator-lessee of a public utility bus (hereafter referred to as Bus 203) with plate Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another,
there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage
number NVR-III-TB-PIL and body number 203. Bus 203 is owned by the
done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contrac-
Metro Manila Transit Corporation and is insured with the Government Ser- tual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is
vice Insurance System. governed by the provisions of this chapter.
On February 22, 1985, at around six o'clock in the morning, Bus 203, then Art. 2180 The obligation imposed in Art. 2176 is demandable not
driven by petitioner Armando Jose, collided with a red Ford Escort driven by only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons
John Macarubo on MacArthur Highway, in Marulas, Valenzuela, Metro for whom one is responsible.
Manila. Bus 203 was bound for Muntinlupa, Rizal, while the Ford Escort was
xxx xxx xxx
headed towards Malanday, Valenzuela on the opposite lane. As a result of the
collision, the left side of the Ford Escort's hood was severely damaged while Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their em-
its driver, John Macarubo, and its lone passenger, private respondent Rommel ployees and household helpers acting within the scope of their
Abraham, were seriously injured. The driver and conductress of Bus 203 assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any
rushed Macarubo and Abraham to the nearby Fatima Hospital where business or industry.
Macarubo lapsed into a coma. Despite surgery, Macarubo failed to recover
and died five days later. Abraham survived, but he became blind on the left xxx xxx xxx
eye which had to be removed. In addition, he sustained a fracture on the The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the
forehead and multiple lacerations on the face, which caused him to be hospi- persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the dili-
talized for a week. gence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.
On March 26, 1985, Rommel Abraham, represented by his father, Fe- Therefore, before the presumption of the employer's negligence in the
lixberto, instituted Civil Case No. 2206-V-85 for damages against peti- selection and supervision of its employees can arise, the negligence of the
tioners MCL and Armando Jose in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 172, employee must first be established. While the allegations of negligence
Valenzuela. against the employee and that of an employer-employee relation in the
On July 17, 1986, the spouses Jose and Mercedes Macarubo, parents of complaint are enough to make out a case of quasi-delict under Art. 2180
of the Civil Code, the failure to prove the employee's negligence during
the deceased John Macarubo, filed their own suit for damages in the same
the trial is fatal to proving the employer's vicarious liability. In this case,
trial court, where it was docketed as Civil Case No. 2428-V-86, against MCL
private respondents failed to prove their allegation of negligence against
alone. driver Armando Jose who, in fact, was acquitted in the case for criminal
negligence arising from the same incident.15
On the other hand, MCL filed a third-party complaint against Juanita
Macarubo, registered owner of the Ford Escort on the theory that John For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the appellate court erred in holding
Macarubo was negligent and that he was the "authorized driver" of petitioners liable to private respondents.
Juanita Macarubo. (TOPIC)
The latter(Juanita), in turn, filed a counterclaim for damages against ISSUE2: WON Juanita Macarubo is liable for the negligence of John
MCL for the damage to her car. Macarubo (“authorized driver”).
HELD: NO! Art. 2180 of the Civil Code makes the persons specified therein
Civil Case No. 2206-V-85 and Civil Case No. 2428-V-86 were consolidated responsible for the quasi-delicts of others. The burden is upon MCL to prove
and later tried jointly. that Juanita Macarubo is one of those specified persons who are vicariously
liable for the negligence of the deceased John Macarubo.
The facts, as found by the trial court, are as follows:
In its third-party complaint, MCL alleged that Juanita Macarubo was the
In Civil Case No. 2206-V-85, the Court heard the testimonies that during the registered owner of the Ford Escort car and that John Macarubo was the
night previous to the accident of February 22, 1985 at 6:15 a.m., Rommel "authorized driver" of the car.16 Nowhere was it alleged that John Macarubo
Abraham and John Macarubo were at a party. There was therefore, no sleep was the son, ward, employee or pupil of private respondent Juanita Macarubo
for them, notwithstanding testimony to the contrary and the service of drinks so as to make the latter vicariously liable for the negligence of John
cannot be totally discounted. After the party at 11 p.m., while both Rommel Macarubo. The allegation that John Macarubo was "the authorized dri-
and John were enroute home to Valenzuela from La Loma, the car encoun- ver" of the Ford Escort is not equivalent to an allegation that he was an
tered mechanical trouble and had to be repaired as its cross-joint was de- employee of Juanita Macarubo. That John Macarubo was the "autho-
tached. The defect of a cross-joint is not minor and repair thereof would as rized driver" of the car simply means that he drove the Ford Escort with
testified to by Rommel lasted up to early dawn and the car started to run only the permission of Juanita Macarubo.
after five o'clock in the morning. With lack of sleep, the strains of a party still
on their bodies, and the attention to the repair coupled with the wait until the Nor did MCL present any evidence to prove that Juanita Macarubo was
car was ready to run, are potentials in a driver for possible accident. The the employer of John Macarubo or that she is in any way liable for John
accident happened at 6:15 a.m. when the physical and mental condition of the Macarubo's negligence under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code. For failure to
driver John Macarubo was as expected not too fit for the driving as he could discharge its burden, MCL's third-party complaint should be dismissed.
not anymore control the car. The desire to be home quick for the much needed
ISSUE3: whether it was the driver of Bus 203 or that of the Ford Escort
sleep could have prompted him to overtake the preceding vehicle.
who was at fault for the collision of the two vehicles.
 10 of 12
COURT: The trial court was justified in relying on the photographs rather The same negligent act may produce civil liability arising from a delict
than on Rommel Abraham's testimony which was obviously biased and un- under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, or may give rise to an ac-
supported by any other evidence. tion for a quasi-delict under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. An aggrieved
party may choose between the two remedies. An action based on a quasi-
The photograph shows that the left side of Bus 203 is about a few feet delict may proceed independently from the criminal action. There is,
from the center line and that the bus is positioned parallel thereto. This however, a distinction between civil liability arising from a delict and civil
negates the claim that Bus 203 was overtaking another vehicle and, in so liability arising from a quasi-delict. The choice of remedy, whether to sue for
doing, encroached on the opposite lane occupied by the Ford Escort. a delict or a quasi-delict, affects the procedural and jurisdictional issues of the
If there had been a great impact, such as would be the case if Bus 203 action.[37]
had been running at a high speed, the two vehicles should have ended up
far from each other. Tuazon chose to file an action for damages based on a quasi-
delict. In his complaint, Tuazon alleged that Mrs. Cerezo, without exercising
Thus, as Rommel Abraham himself admitted, the Ford Escort's rear due care and diligence in the supervision and management of her employees
cross-joint was cut/detached. This mechanism controls the movement of and buses, hired Foronda as her driver. Tuazon became disabled because of
the rear tires. Since trouble in the cross-joint affects a car's maneuver- Forondas recklessness, gross negligence and imprudence, aggravated by Mrs.
ability, the matter should have been treated as a serious mechanical Cerezos lack of due care and diligence in the selection and supervision of her
problem. In this case, when asked if they were able to repair the cross- employees, particularly Foronda.
joint, Abraham said "Ginawaan ng paraan, ma'am," by simply welding
them just so they could reach home. His testimony indicates that the rear
The trial court thus found Mrs. Cerezo liable under Article 2180 of
cross-joint was hastily repaired and that, at most, the kind of repairs
the Civil Code. Article 2180 states in part:
made thereon were merely temporary; just enough to enable Abraham
and Macarubo to reach home. Given such fact, the likelihood is that
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and
while the Ford Escort might not have been overtaking another vehicle, it
household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though
actually strayed into the bus' lane because of the defective cross-joint,
the former are not engaged in any business or industry.
causing its driver to lose control of the vehicle.
The appellate court refused to give credence to the physical evidence on the Contrary to Mrs. Cerezos assertion, Foronda is not an indis-
ground that the photographs were taken an hour after the collision and that pensable party to the case. An indispensable party is one whose interest is
within such span of time the bus could have been moved because there was affected by the courts action in the litigation, and without whom no final
no showing that the driver left the scene of the accident. This is not correct. resolution of the case is possible.[39] However, Mrs. Cerezos liability as an
Constancia Gerolada, Bus 203's conductress, testified that, immediately after employer in an action for a quasi-delict is not only solidary, it is also
the collision, she and bus driver, petitioner Armando Jose, took the injured primary and direct. Foronda is not an indispensable party to the final resolu-
driver and passenger of the Ford Escort to the Fatima Hospital.12 This fact is tion of Tuazons action for damages against Mrs. Cerezo.
not disputed by private respondents.
Rommel Abraham mentioned in his appellant's brief in the appellate court a The responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for a
sketch of the scene of the accident allegedly prepared by one Patrolman quasi-delict is solidary. Where there is a solidary obligation on the part of
Kalale, which shows Bus 203 to be occupying the Ford Escort's lane. Howev- debtors, as in this case, each debtor is liable for the entire obligation. Hence,
er, the records of this case do not show that such a sketch was ever pre- each debtor is liable to pay for the entire obligation in full. There is no merger
sented in evidence in the trial court or that Patrolman Kalale was ever or renunciation of rights, but only mutual representation.[41]Where the obliga-
presented as a witness to testify on the sketch allegedly prepared by him. tion of the parties is solidary, either of the parties is indispensable, and the
Under Rule 132, §3 of the Rules on Evidence, courts cannot consider any other is not even a necessary party because complete relief is available from
evidence unless formally offered by a party. either.[42]Therefore, jurisdiction over Foronda is not even necessary as Tuazon
may collect damages from Mrs. Cerezo alone.
Hermana R. Cerezo, petitioner, vs. David Tuazon, respondent.
Moreover, an employers liability based on a quasi-delict is pri-
Facts: mary and direct, while the employers liability based on a delict is merely
subsidiary. The words primary and direct, as contrasted with subsidiary, refer
Around noontime of 26 June 1993, a Country Bus Lines passenger to the remedy provided by law for enforcing the obligation rather than to the
bus collided with a tricycle along Captain M. Palo Street, Sta. Ines, Mabala- character and limits of the obligation.[44] Although liability under Article
cat, Pampanga. On 1 October 1993, tricycle driver Tuazon filed a com- 2180 originates from the negligent act of the employee, the aggrieved
plaint for damages against Mrs. Cerezo, as owner of the bus line, her party may sue the employer directly.
husband Attorney Juan Cerezo (Atty. Cerezo), and bus driver Danilo A.
Foronda (Foronda). The complaint alleged that: When an employee causes damage, the law presumes that the employer
has himself committed an act of negligence in not preventing or avoiding
7At the time of the incident, Tuazon was in his proper lane when the the damage. This is the fault that the law condemns. While the employer is
second-named defendant [Foronda], being then the driver and person in civilly liable in a subsidiary capacity for the employees criminal negligence,
charge of the Country Bus with plate number NYA 241, did then and the employer is also civilly liable directly and separately for his own civil
there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously operate the said motor vehicle negligence in failing to exercise due diligence in selecting and supervising his
in a negligent, careless, and imprudent manner without due regard to employee. The idea that the employers liability is solely subsidiary is wrong.
traffic rules and regulations, there being a Slow Down sign near the scene [45]
of the incident, and without taking the necessary precaution to prevent
loss of lives or injuries, his negligence, carelessness and imprudence The action can be brought directly against the person responsible (for
resulted to severe damage to the tricycle and serious physical injuries to another), without including the author of the act. The action against the
plaintiff thus making him unable to walk and becoming disabled, with his principal is accessory in the sense that it implies the existence of a prejudicial
thumb and middle finger on the left hand being cut. act committed by the employee, but it is not subsidiary in the sense that it can
not be instituted till after the judgment against the author of the act or at least,
RTC- ruled in Tuazons favor. The trial court made no pronouncement on that it is subsidiary to the principal action; the action for responsibility (of the
Forondas liability because there was no service of summons on him. The employer) is in itself a principal action.[46]
trial court did not hold Atty. Cerezo liable as Tuazon failed to show that
Mrs. Cerezos business benefited the family, pursuant to Article 121(3) of Thus, there is no need in this case for the trial court to acquire
the Family Code. The trial court held Mrs. Cerezo solely liable for the jurisdiction over Foronda. The trial courts acquisition of jurisdiction
damages sustained by Tuazon arising from the negligence of Mrs. Cere- over Mrs. Cerezo is sufficient to dispose of the present case on the merits.
zos employee, pursuant to Article 2180 of the Civil Code.
In contrast, an action based on a delict seeks to enforce the sub-
Petitioner’s contention: sidiary liability of the employer for the criminal negligence of the employee
as provided in Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code. To hold the employer
Mrs. Cerezo contends that the basis of the present petition for annulment is liable in a subsidiary capacity under a delict, the aggrieved party must initiate
lack of jurisdiction. Mrs. Cerezo asserts that the trial court could not validly a criminal action where the employees delict and corresponding primary
render judgment since it failed to acquire jurisdiction over Foronda. Mrs. liability are established.[47] If the present action proceeds from a delict,
Cerezo points out that there was no service of summons on Foronda. More- then the trial courts jurisdiction over Foronda is necessary. However, the
over, Tuazon failed to reserve his right to institute a separate civil action for present action is clearly for the quasi-delict of Mrs. Cerezo and not for
damages in the criminal action. Such contention betrays a faulty the delict of Foronda.
foundation. Mrs. Cerezos contention proceeds from the point of view of crim-
inal law and not of civil law, while the basis of the present action of Tuazon is The Cerezo spouses contention that summons be served anew on
quasi-delict under the Civil Code, not delict under the Revised Penal Code. them is untenable in light of their participation in the trial court
proceedings. To uphold the Cerezo spouses contention would make a fetish of
Court:The petition has no merit. a technicality. Moreover, any irregularity in the service of summons that
might have vitiated the trial courts jurisdiction over the persons of the Cerezo
Mrs. Cerezos Liability and theTrial Courts Acquisition of Jurisdiction spouses was deemed waived when the Cerezo spouses filed a petition for
relief from judgment.

We hold that the trial court had jurisdiction and was competent to
decide the case in favor of Tuazon and against Mrs. Cerezo even in the ab-
 11 of 12
sence of Foronda. Contrary to Mrs. Cerezos contention, Foronda is not an "manager" ("director" in the Spanish version) is used in the sense of "em-
indispensable party to the present case. It is not even necessary for Tuazon to ployer".
reserve the filing of a separate civil action because he opted to file a civil
Hence, under the allegations of the complaint, no tortious or quasi-
action for damages against Mrs. Cerezo who is primarily and directly liable
delictual liability can be fastened on Balingit as manager of Phil-Ameri-
for her own civil negligence. The words of Justice Jorge Bocobo in Barredo
can Forwarders, Inc., in connection with the vehicular accident already
v. Garcia still hold true today as much as it did in 1942:
mentioned because he himself may be regarded as an employee or depen-
diente of his employer, Phil-American Forwarders, Inc.
x x x [T]o hold that there is only one way to make defendants liability effec-
tive, and that is, to sue the driver and exhaust his (the latters) property first, Thus, it was held "que es dependiente, a los efectos de la responsabilidad
would be tantamount to compelling the plaintiff to follow a devious and cum- subsidiaria establecida en el num 3.0 del (art.) 1903, el director de un periodi-
bersome method of obtaining relief. True, there is such a remedy under our co explotado por una sociedad, porque cualquiera que sea su jerarquia y
laws, but there is also a more expeditious way, which is based on the primary aunque Ileve la direccion de determinadas convicciones politicas no por eso
and direct responsibility of the defendant under article [2180] of the Civil deja de estar subordinado a la superior autoridad de la Empresa" (Decision of
Code. Our view of the law is more likely to facilitate remedy for civil wrongs, Spanish Supreme Court dated December 6, 1912 cited in 12 Manresa, Codigo
because the procedure indicated by the defendant is wasteful and productive Civil Español 5th Ed. 662; 1913 Enciclopedia Juridica Española 992).
of delay, it being a matter of common knowledge that professional drivers of
taxis and other similar public conveyances do not have sufficient means with
which to pay damages. Why, then, should the plaintiff be required in all cases >> GOOGLE TRANSLATE: ”that is dependent, for the purposes of the
to go through this roundabout, unnecessary, and probably useless subsidiary liability established in number 3.0 of (art.) 1903, the director of a
procedure? In construing the laws, courts have endeavored to shorten and newspaper exploited by a company, because whatever its hierarchy and al-
facilitate the pathways of right and justice. though it directs certain political convictions that is why it ceases to be sub-
ordinated to the superior authority of the Company”
G.R. No. L-25142 March 25, 1975 RE: NEW ISSUE NOT ALLEGED IN THE COMPLAINT
PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES, INC. and FELIX PANGALAN-
GAN, plaintiffs-appellants, The bus company and its driver, in their appellants' brief, injected a new
vs. factual issue which was not alleged in their complaint. They argue that
PHIL-AMERICAN FORWARDERS, INC., ARCHIMEDES J. BALIN- Phil- American Forwarders, Inc. is merely a business conduit of Balingit
GIT and FERNANDO PINEDA, defendants-appellees. because out of its capital stock with a par value of P41,200, Balingit and his
wife had subscribed P40,000 and they paid P10,000 on their subscription,
FACTS: while the other incorporators, namely, Rodolfo Limjuco, Ponciano Caparas
Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. and Felix Pangalangan appealed on pure and Rafael Suntay paid P250.25 and P25, respectively.
questions of law from the order of the Court of First Instance of Tarlac, dis- That argument implies that the veil of corporate fiction should be pierced and
missing their complaint against Archimedes J. Balingit. that Phil-American Forwarders, Inc. and Balingit and his wife should be
The dismissal was based on the ground that Balingit as the manager of Phil- treated as one and the same civil personality.
American Forwarders, Inc., which together with Fernando Pineda and Balin- We cannot countenance that argument in this appeal. It was not raised in
git, was sued for damages in an action based on quasi-delict or culpa aquil- the lower court. The case has to be decided on the basis of the pleadings
iana, is not the manager of an establishment contemplated in article 2180 of filed in the trial court where it was assumed that Phil-American For-
the Civil Code (Civil Case No. 3865). warders, Inc. has a personality separate and distinct from that of the
In the complaint for damages filed by the bus company and Pangalangan Balingit spouses.
against Phil-American Forwarders, Inc., Balingit and Pineda, it was alleged The legal issue, which the plaintiffs-appellants can ventilate in this appeal, is
that on November 24, 1962, Pineda drove recklessly a freight truck, owned one which was raised in the lower court and which is within the issues framed
by Phil-American Forwarders, Inc., along the national highway at Sto. Tomas, by the parties (Sec. 18, Rule 46, Rules of Court).
Pampanga. The truck bumped the bus driven by Pangalangan, which was
owned by Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. As a result of the bumping, When a party deliberately adopts a certain theory and the case is decided
Pangalangan suffered injuries and the bus was damaged and could not be upon that theory in the court below, he will not be permitted to change his
used for seventy-nine days, thus depriving the company of earnings amount- theory on appeal because, to permit him to do so, could be unfair to the ad-
ing to P8,665.51. Balingit was the manager of Phil-American Forwarders, verse party (2 Moran's Comments on the Rules of Court, 1970 Ed. p. 505).
Inc.
DP: WHEREFORE, the lower court's order of dismissal is affirmed. Costs
DEFENDANTS’ DEFENSE: Among the defenses interposed by the defen- against the plaintiffs-appellants.
dants in their answer was that Balingit was not Pineda's employer.
SO ORDERED.
Balingit moved that the complaint against him be dismissed on the ground
SPS. JAYME VS. APOSTOL
that the bus company and the bus driver had no cause of action against him.
As already stated, the lower court dismissed the action as to Balingit. The bus
FACTS: On February 5, 1989, Mayor Miguel of Koronadal, South
company and its driver appealed.
Cotabato was on board the Isuzu pick-up truck driven by Fidel Lozano, an
The Civil Code provides: employee of the Municipality of Koronadal.[2] The pick-up truck was regis-
tered under the name of Rodrigo Apostol, but it was then in the possession of
ART. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there Ernesto Simbulan.[3] Lozano borrowed the pick-up truck from Simbulan to
being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or bring Miguel to Buayan Airport at General Santos City to catch
negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, his Manila flight.[4]
is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
ART. 2180. The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only The pick-up truck accidentally hit Marvin C. Jayme, a minor, who was then
for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is crossing the National Highway in Poblacion, Polomolok, South Cotabato.
[5] The intensity of the collision sent Marvin some fifty (50) meters away from
responsible.
the point of impact, a clear indication that Lozano was driving at a very high
xxx xxx xxx speed at the time of the accident.[6]
The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise
responsible for damages caused by their employees in the service of the Marvin sustained severe head injuries with subdural hematoma
branches in which the latter are employed or on the occasion of their func- and diffused cerebral contusion. [7] He was initially treated at
tions. the Howard Hubbard Memorial Hospital.[8]Due to the seriousness of his in-
juries, he was airlifted to
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and the Ricardo Limso Medical Center in Davao City for more intensive treat-
household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though ment.[9] Despite medical attention, Marvin expired six (6) days after the acci-
the former are not engaged in any business or industry. dent.[10]
xxx xxx xxx
Petitioners spouses Buenaventura and Rosario Jayme, the parents
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein of Marvin, filed a complaint for damages with the RTC against respondents.
mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a [11] In their complaint, they prayed that all respondents be held solidarily
family to prevent damage. (1903a) liable for their loss. They pointed out that that proximate cause of Marvins
death was Lozanos negligent and reckless operation of the vehicle. They
ISSUE: The novel and unprecedented legal issue in this appeal is whether the
prayed for actual, moral, and exemplary damages, attorneys fees, and litiga-
terms "employers" and "owners and managers of an establishment or enter-
tion expenses.
prise" (dueños o directores de un establicimiento o empresa) used in article
2180 of the Civil Code, formerly article 1903 of the old Code, embrace the
In their respective Answers, all respondents denied liability for
manager of a corporation owning a truck, the reckless operation of which
Marvins death. Apostol and Simbulan averred that Lozano took the pick-up
allegedly resulted in the vehicular accident from which the damage arose.
truck without their consent.Likewise, Miguel and Lozano pointed out that
NO.
Marvins sudden sprint across the highway made it impossible to avoid the
HELD: accident. Yet, Miguel denied being on board the vehicle when it hit
Marvin. The Municipality of Koronadal adopted the answer of Lozano and
We are of the opinion that those terms do not include the manager of a Miguel. As for First Integrated Bonding and Insurance Company, Inc., the
corporation. It may be gathered from the context of article 2180 that the term vehicle insurer, it insisted that its liability is contributory and is only condi-
 12 of 12
tioned on the right of the insured. Since the insured did not file a claim within attributed to a fellow employee who only happens to be an occupant of
the prescribed period, any cause of action against it had prescribed. the vehicle. [27] Whatever right of control the occupant may have over the
driver is not sufficient by itself to justify an application of the doctrine of
vicarious liability. Handley v. Lombardi[28] is instructive on this exception to
RTC: in favour of Sps. Jayme the rule on vicarious liability:

MAYOR MIGUEL CONTENTION: RTC erred in ruling that he was Plaintiff was not the master or principal of
Lozanos employer and, hence, solidarily liable for the latters negligent the driver of the truck, but only an intermediate and
act. Records showed that the Municipality of Koronadal was the drivers true superior employee or agent. This being so, the doctrine
and lawful employer. Mayor Miguel also denied that he did not exercise due of respondeat superior or qui facit per alium is not
care and diligence in the supervision of Lozano. The incident, although unfor- properly applicable to him. His power to direct and
tunate, was unexpected and cannot be attributed to him. control the driver was not as master, but only by virtue
of the fact that they were both employed by Kruse, and
CA: REVERSED and SET ASIDE decision of RTC, insofar as defendant- the further fact that as Kruses agent he was delegated
appellant Mayor Fernando Q. Miguel is concerned Kruses authority over the driver. x x x

In the case of actionable negligence, the rule is well settled both in this state
ISSUE: WON MAYOR MIGUEL is liable for the negligence of Lozano and elsewhere that the negligence of a subordinate employee or subagent is
(driver). not to be imputed to a superior employee or agent, but only to the master or
principal and see the elaborate note in 61 A. L. R. 277,and particularly that
HELD: NO! part commencing at p. 290.) We can see no logical reason for drawing any
distinction in this regard between actionable negligence and contributory
SPOUSES CONTENTION: vicarious liability attaches to Mayor
negligence. x x
Miguel. He was not a mere passenger, but instead one who had direct
control and supervision over Lozano during the time of the accident. Ac-
In the case at bar, Mayor Miguel was neither Lozanos employ-
cording to petitioners, the element of direct control is not negated by the fact
er nor the vehicles registered owner. There existed no causal relationship
that Lozanos employer was the Municipality of Koronadal. Mayor Miguel,
between him and Lozano or the vehicle used that will make him account-
being Lozanos superior, still had control over the manner the vehicle was
able for Marvins death. Mayor Miguel was a mere passenger at the time
operated.
of the accident.

Parenthetically, it has been held that the failure of a passenger

COURT: Article 2180[16] of the Civil Code provides that a person is not only
to assist the driver, by providing him warnings or by serving as lookout
liable for ones own quasi-delictual acts, but also for those persons for whom
does not make the passenger liable for the latters negligent acts.[35] The
one is responsible for.This liability is popularly known as vicarious or imput-
drivers duty is not one that may be delegated to others.[36]
ed liability. To sustain claims against employers for the acts of their employ-
ees, the following requisites must be established: (1) That the employee was
As correctly held by the trial court, the true and lawful employer of
chosen by the employer personally or through another; (2) That the service to
be rendered in accordance with orders which the employer has the authority Lozano is the Municipality of Koronadal. Unfortunately for Spouses
to give at all times; and (3) That the illicit act of the employee was on the Jayme, the municipality may not be sued because it is an agency of the
occasion or by reason of the functions entrusted to him.[17] State engaged in governmental functions and, hence, immune from suit.

Significantly, to make the employee liable under paragraphs 5 The law on the matter is clear: only the negligent driver, the
and 6 of Article 2180, it must be established that the injurious or tortuous drivers employer, and the registered owner of the vehicle are liable for
act was committed at the time the employee was performing his func- the death of a third person resulting from the negligent operation of the
tions.[18] vehicle.

Furthermore, the employer-employee relationship cannot be assumed. It is

incumbent upon the plaintiff to prove the relationship by preponderant evi-
dence.

In resolving the present controversy, it is imperative to find

out if Mayor Miguel is, indeed, the employer of Lozano and therefore
liable for the negligent acts of the latter.To determine the existence of an
employment relationship, We rely on the four-fold test. This involves: (1)
the employers power of selection; (2) payment of wages or other remu-
neration; (3) the employers right to control the method of doing the
work; and (4) the employers right of suspension or dismissal.[21]

Applying the foregoing test, the CA correctly held that it was

the Municipality of Koronadal which was the lawful employer of Lozano
at the time of the accident. It is uncontested that Lozano was employed as a
driver by the municipality. That he was subsequently assigned to Mayor
Miguel during the time of the accident is of no moment. This Court has, on
several occasions, held that an employer-employee relationship still exists
even if the employee was loaned by the employer to another person or entity
because control over the employee subsists.[22] In the case under review,
the Municipality of Koronadal remains to be Lozanos employer not-
withstanding Lozanos assignment to Mayor Miguel.

Spouses Jayme argued that Mayor Miguel had at least supervi-

sion and control over Lozano and how the latter operated or drove the Isuzu
pick-up during the time of the accident. They, however, failed to buttress
this claim.
Even assuming arguendo that Mayor Miguel had authority to give
instructions or directions to Lozano, he still can not be held liable. In Benson
v. Sorrell,[23] the New England Supreme Court ruled that mere giving of direc-
tions to the driver does not establish that the passenger has control over the
vehicle. Neither does it render one the employer of the driver. This Court,
in Soliman, Jr. v. Tuazon,[24] ruled in a similar vein, to wit:

x x x The fact that a client company may give instruc-

tions or directions to the security guards assigned to
it, does not, by itself, render the client responsible as
an employer of the security guards concerned and
liable for their wrongful acts and omissions. Those
instructions or directions are ordinarily no more than
requests commonly envisaged in the contract for ser-
vices entered into with the security agency. x x
x[25] (Emphasis supplied)

Significantly, no negligence may be imputed against a fellow

employee although the person may have the right to control the manner of the
vehicles operation.[26] In the absence of an employer-employee relation-
ship establishing vicarious liability, the drivers negligence should not be