DOCTRINE OF IN LOCO PARENTIS

Vicarious Liability of Teachers and

Educational Institutions
I. MEANING OF VICARIOUS LIABILITY AND QUASI-DELICT
Vicarious Liability is a legal doctrine in tort law that imposes responsibility upon one person
for the failure of another or assigns liability for an injury to a person who did not cause the
injury but with whom the person has a special legal relationship to exercise such care as a
reasonably prudent person would use under similar circumstances. It is also referred to as
imputed negligence.

Legal relationships that can lead to imputed negligence include the relationship between
parent and child, husband and wife, owner of a vehicle and driver, and employer and
employee and the likes. Ordinarily the independent negligence of one person is not
imputable to another person.[1]
Sample Illustration
Eager to start your day, you run into the local diner to grab a cup of coffee and a donut.
When the waitress arrives to pour your coffee, you notice that she is a bit wobbly on her feet.
You also notice she is wearing a medical alert bracelet, but don’t pay much attention to it.
She pours the steaming hot coffee in your cup, on the table and even your lap. After letting
out a loud yelp, it becomes painfully obvious that you require medical attention to treat your
first-degree burns. This means you will be out of work, unable to wear pants and need costly
follow-up care.

The waitress was unable to perform her job due to what could have been a medical
condition. Someone must pay, but it is the employer that will bear the brunt of this
waitress’s actions. You see, the doctrine of vicarious liability holds that there can be a person
responsible for the actions of another because of a special relationship the parties
maintain.[2]
Quasi-Delict
Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is
obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing
contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict.[3]
Quasi-delicts give rise to a liability or an obligation to pay for the damage done, and this
obligation is demandable not only for one’s own acts or omissions, but also for those of
persons for whom one is responsible.

A quasi-delict may be public or private; the neglect of the affairs of a community, when it is
our duty to attend to them, may be a crime; the neglect of a private matter, under similar
circumstances, may be the ground of a civil action.[4]
II.LEGAL BASIS OF VICARIOUS LIABILITY
Article 2180 of the Civil Code enumerates those who are subject to this vicarious liability,
among them are teachers and heads of establishments of arts and trades with respect to
their pupils and students• and apprentices so long as they remain in their custody[5]. In
order that one may not be made to satisfy this liability, one needs to prove that the diligence
of a good father of a family was observed to prevent damage.
Meaning Of Custody As Used In Article 2180
The Supreme Court refined the definition of “custody” as used in Article 2180. In Amadora
v. CA it was held not to mean the student must be boarding with the school authorities, but
it does signify that the student should be within the control and under the influence of the
school authorities at the time of the occurrence of the injury, whether the semester or school
term has not yet begun or has already ended. As long as the student is still subject to the
disciplinary authority of the school and cannot consider himself released altogether from
observance of its rules, he is in the custody of the school.

Also, as long as the student is in the school premises in pursuance of a legitimate student
objective, in the exercise of a legitimate student right, and even in the enjoyment of a
legitimate student privilege [like doing nothing but relaxing in the campus in the company
of his classmates] the responsibility of the school authorities over the student continues.

III. Doctrine of in loco parentis

School heads and teachers are subject to this vicarious liability because they stand, to a
certain extent, as to their pupils or students, in loco parentis or as substitute parents, as
expressly provided under Article 218 of the Family Code.
Schools exercise their educational functional principally through their administrators and
teachers, while parents exercise their parental authority by sending their children to school
to comply with their duty to educate them according to their means, as provided in Article
220 of the Family Code, and Article 72 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code, as amended.

Consequently, when parents send their minor child to school, they must necessarily pass on
or share their parental authority, their custody over the child, and the responsibility to
educate their child properly with the school, its administrators and teachers temporarily, as
the latter shall assume such during all the time the child is under their supervision and
instruction. This, in essence, is the principle of substituted parental authority.[6]
A teacher’s liability arises from the failure to provide due diligence in the performance of the
responsibilities that come with the substituted parental authority.[7] A teacher must not
only be charged with teaching but also vigilance over their students or pupils”. Without the
parents to look after their children when in school, it is the teacher who takes over in the
supervision. It is thus fitting that the basis of a teacher’s liability is the principle of in loco
parentis which, according to Black’s Dictionary, means “in the place of a parent”.[8]
The law holds the teachers and heads of the school staff liable unless they relieve
themselves of such liability pursuant to the last paragraph of Article 2180 by “proving that
they observed all the diligence to prevent damage.”[9]
The law also applies to all kinds of educational institutions, academic or
vocational.[10] When an academic institution accepts students for enrollment, there is
established a contract between them, resulting in bilateral obligations which both parties
are bound to comply with. The contract between school and student is one “imbued with
public interest” but a contract nonetheless.[11]
For its part, the school undertakes to provide the student with an education that would
presumably suffice to equip him with the necessary tools and skills to pursue higher
education or a profession. On the other hand, the student covenants to abide by the school’s
academic requirements and observe its rules and regulations.[12]
In all such cases, it had been stressed that the law (Article 2180) plainly provides that the
damage should have been caused or inflicted by pupils or students of the educational
institution sought to be held liable for the acts of its pupils or students while in its
custody.[13]
IV. The Palisoc Doctrine:
The case of Spouses Palisoc v. Brillantes, et al.,[14] raised into a doctrine the idea that
teachers are responsible for the acts of their students, not only minors but those
emancipated as well.
Dominador Palisoc, deceased son of petitioners spouses Palisoc, and the defendant Virgilio
Daffon (who was not a minor) were classmates at the Manila Technical Institute. There was
a fight during recess time, and Daffon caused the death of Dominador Palisoc. The trial
court found Daffon responsible for Dominador’s death, and sentenced him to pay damages.
However, the owner (Antonio Brillantes) and the president (Teodosio Valenton) of Manila
Technical Institute (MTI) and the teacher in charge of the students at that time (Santiago
Quibulue) were absolved. The spouses appealed.

In this particular case the action was instituted directly against the school officials, and the
Supreme Court had the occasion to decide directly on the question of the liability of teachers
and heads of schools under Article 2180, Civil Code for damages caused by their pupils and
students against fellow students on the school premises. The Supreme Court held that
defendants Valenton (President of MTI) and Quibulue (teacher in charge) were liable.

According to the High Tribunal, the death resulting from the fight of the students could
have been avoided if Valenton and Quibulue had complied with their duty of providing
adequate supervision over the activities of the students in the school premises to protect
their students from harm, whether at the hands of fellow students or other parties.

The construction of the phrase “so long as (the students) remain in their custody” previously
it was understood to mean that the student actually boarded in the school,[15] now it was
understood to mean the protective and supervisory custody that the school and its heads
and teachers exercise over the pupils and students for as long as they are at attendance in
the school, including recess time. In other words it is not necessary that the student actually
boarded in the school; as long as they are at attendance in school, the school authorities will
be liable.
The school head and the teacher-in-charge were found liable, even if Daffon was already of
age at the time of the commission of the offense. There was intent that the liability be not
restricted to the case of persons under age. Furthermore, teachers and heads of scholarly
establishments are not grouped with parents and guardians but ranged with owners and
managers of enterprises, employers and the state, as to whom no reason is discernible to
imply that they should answer only for minors. The responsibility of the teachers and school
heads are more plenary than that of the parents.[16]
According to Justice Reyes in his concurring opinion:
“While in the case of parents and guardians, their authority and supervision over the children and
wards end by law upon the latter reaching majority age, the authority and custodial supervision over
pupils exist regardless of the age of the latter.
A student over twenty-one, by enrolling and attending a school, places himself under the custodial
supervision and disciplinary authority of the school authorities, which is the basis of the latter’s
correlative responsibility for his torts, committed while under such authority. Of course, the
teachers’ control is not as plenary as when the student is a minor; but that circumstance can only
affect the decree of the responsibility but cannot negate the existence thereof. It is only a factor to be
appreciated in determining whether or not the defendant has exercised due diligence in endeavoring
to prevent the injury, as prescribed in the last paragraph of Article 2180.”

V. LIABILITIES OF ACADEMIC AND TECHNICAL SCHOOLS

The Palisoc doctrine applies to all schools, whether academic or non-academic.[17] This was
settled in the Amadora case.[18] The Supreme Court did not see any substantial distinction
between an academic school and a non-academic school with respect to torts committed by
their students. For them, the same vigilance of the teacher with respect to the safety of his
students should be expected, whether it the school is academic or technical.
“In academic schools, the liability attaches to the teacher, while in a technical school, the
liability attaches to the head”[19]
According to the Supreme Court:

The reason for the disparity can be traced to the fact that historically the head of the school of arts
and trades exercised a closer tutelage over his pupils than the head of the academic school. The old
schools of arts and trades were engaged in the training of artisans apprenticed to their master who
personally and directly instructed them on the technique and secrets of their craft.
The head of the school of arts and trades was such a master and so was personally involved in the
task of teaching his students, who usually even boarded with him and so came under his constant
control, supervision and influence.
By contrast, the head of the academic school was not as involved with his students and exercised
only administrative duties over the teachers who were the persons directly dealing with the students.
The head of the academic school then has only a vicarious relationship with the students.
Consequently, while he could not be directly faulted for the acts of the students, the head of the
school of arts and trades, because of his closer ties with them, could be so blamed.
The Court conceded however that the distinction no longer obtains at present because of the
expansion of technological schools, the increase in their enrolment, and the decrease of the
direct and personal contact of vocational school heads with their students.

We no longer have masters and apprentices toiling in schools of arts and trades. Students in
technological• colleges and universities are no different from students in liberal arts or
professional schools. Apprentices now work in regular shops and factories and their
relationship to the employer is covered by laws governing the employment relationship and
not by laws governing the teacher student relationship.[20]
VI. LIABILITY OF THE SCHOOL ON ACTS OF A STRANGER AND
ACTIVITIES OUTSIDE OF THE SCHOOL
In the PSBA case[21] although the person injured was a student of PSBA, the person that
caused the injury was not a student of PSBA. Art. 2180 on quasi-delict would naturally not
apply as it requires that the damage should be caused by a student of the educational
institution. However, the Court held that although 2180 does not apply, the school’s liability
can arise from a breach in contract as when an educational institution accepts students for
enrolment, there exists a contract which is one “imbued with public interest”. This contract
produces bilateral obligations, and one of the school’s obligations is to provide their
students with an atmosphere that is conducive in furthering their primary purpose which is
to impart knowledge.
A similar ruling was adopted in the case of Regino v. Pangasinan Colleges of Scienceand
Technology[22] where it upheld the school-student relationship as contractual in nature. In
the case of Soliman although the Court held that the school was not liable for the acts of the
school security guard whose employer was a security agency, the court still upheld the
school-student contractual relationship.[23]
May a teacher escape liability for outings and activities held outside the school but
authorized by the school? Art 218 of the Family Code states that “authority and
responsibility shall apply to all authorized activities whether inside or outside the premises
of the school, entity or institution.”[24] In the case of St. Mary’s Academy[25], the Court held
that special parental authority and responsibility applies to all authorized activities, whether
inside or outside the school premises.
VII. DEFENSE AGAINST LIABILITY
To avoid responsibility and liability, the teacher must prove that due diligence was
observed. As to the kind of due diligence, the last paragraph of Art 2180 is clear – “The
persons must prove that they have observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to
prevent damage”. This can only be done at a trial on the merits of the case.

The case of Amadora and St Francis,[26] the accused parties have proven that they have
exercised the diligence required of them by law under the circumstances to guard against
the harm they had foreseen.”
The court held:

“The school can show that it exercised proper measure in selecting the head or its teachers and the
appropriate supervision over them in the custody and instruction of pupils pursuant to its rules and
regulations for the maintenance among them. In fact, these measures are affected through the
assistance of an adequate security force to help the teacher physically enforce the rules upon the
students. It bolster the claim of the school that it has taken adequate steps to prevent any injury that
may be committed by the students.”
VIII. WAIVERS

Can a teacher or school escape responsibility by asking parents to file a waiver during field
trips and outings? This issue is closely related to liabilities outside school and Art 218 is
clear that “authority and responsibility shall apply to all authorized activities whether inside
or outside the premises of the school, entity or institution.” In the case of St. Francis, the
Court still held some teachers responsible despite the fact that the parent permitted the
child to go to the picnic.

IX. ILLUSTRATIVE CASES

School of the Holy Spirit vs Corazon P. Taguiam[27]
Respondent Corazon P. Taguiam was the Class Adviser of the petitioner, School of the Holy
Spirit of Quezon City. On March 10, 2000, the class president, wrote a letter to the grade
school principal requesting permission to hold a year-end celebration at the school
grounds. The principal authorized the activity and allowed the pupils to use the swimming
pool. In this connection, respondent distributed the parent’s/guardian’s permit forms to
the pupils.

Respondent admitted that Chiara Mae Federico’s permit form was unsigned. Nevertheless,
she concluded that Chiara Mae was allowed by her mother to join the activity since her
mother personally brought her to the school with her packed lunch and swimsuit.

Before the activity started, respondent warned the pupils who did not know how to
swim to avoid the deeper area. However, while the pupils were swimming, two of them
sneaked out. Respondent went after them to verify where they were going.

Unfortunately, while respondent was away, Chiara Mae drowned. When respondent
returned, the maintenance man was already administering cardiopulmonary resuscitation
on Chiara Mae. She was still alive when respondent rushed her to the General Malvar
Hospital where she was pronounced dead on arrival.

Petitioners dismissed respondent on the ground of gross negligence resulting to loss of trust
and confidence. Meanwhile, Chiara Mae’s parents filed a P7 Million damage suit against
petitioners and respondent, among others. They also filed against respondent a criminal
complaint for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide.

The Court held that “As a teacher who stands in loco parentis to her pupils, respondent
should have made sure that the children were protected from all harm while in her
company. Respondent should have known that leaving the pupils in the swimming pool
area all by themselves may result in an accident. A simple reminder “not to go to the
deepest part of the pool”was insufficient to cast away all the serious dangers that the
situation presented to the children, especially when respondent knew that Chiara Mae
cannot swim. Dismally, respondent created an unsafe situation which exposed the lives of
all the pupils concerned to real danger. This is a clear violation not only of the trust and
confidence reposed on her by the parents of the pupils but also of the school.

X. CONCLUSION

The essence of the principle of substituted parental authority is that when parents send their
minor child to school, they must necessarily pass on or share their parental authority, their
custody over the child, and the responsibility to educate their child properly with the school,
its administrators and teachers temporarily, as the latter shall assume such during all the
time the child is under their supervision and instruction.
A teacher, who stands in loco parentis to her pupils, should make sure that the children
were protected from all harm while in her company. An academic institution accepts
students for enrollment, there is established a contract between them, resulting in bilateral
obligations which both parties are bound to comply with. The contract between school and
student is one “imbued with public interest” but a contract nonetheless.

The law holds the teachers and heads of the school staff liable unless they relieve themselves
of such liability pursuant to the last paragraph of Article 2180 by “proving that they
observed all the diligence to prevent damage.”

[1] US Tort Law Dictionary

[2] Taught by Kat Kadian-Baumeyer
[3] Article 2176, Civil Code of the Philippines
[4] Bowy. Mod. C. L. c. 43, p. 265
[5] Paragraph 7 of Article 2180 of the Civil Code