Amadora vs. Court of Appeals

9/1/2018 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 160
VOL. 160, APRIL 15, 1988 315

Amadora vs. Court of Appeals
*
No. L-47745. April 15, 1988.
JOSE S. AMADORA, LORETA A. AMADORA, JOSE A.

AMADORA JR., NORMA A. YLAYA, PANTALEON A.
AMADORA, JOSE A. AMADORA III, LUCY A. AMADORA,
ROSALINDA A. AMADORA, PERFECTO A. AMADORA,
SERREC A. AMADORA, VICENTE A. AMADORA and MARIA
TISCALINA A. AMADORA, petitioners, vs. HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS, COLEGIO DE SAN JOSE-RECOLETOS,
VICTOR LLUCH, SERGIO P. DAMASO, JR., CELESTINO
DICON, ANIANO ABELLANA, PABLITO DAFFON, thru his
parents and natural guardians, MR. and MRS. NICANOR
GUMBAN, and ROLANDO VALENCIA, thru his guardian, ATTY.
FRANCISCO ALONSO, respondents.
Civil Law; Torts; Article 2180 of the Civil Code should apply to all
schools, academic as well as non-academic.—After an exhaustive
examination of the problem, the Court has come to the conclusion that the
provision in question should apply to all schools, academic as well as non-
academic. Where the school is academic rather than technical or vocational
in nature, responsibility for the tort committed by the student will attach to
the teacher in charge of such student, following the first part of the
provision. This is the general rule. In the case of establishments of arts and
trades, it is the head thereof, and only he, who shall be held liable as an
exception to the general rule. In other words, teachers in general shall be
liable for the acts of their students except where the school is technical in
nature, in which case it is the head thereof who shall be anBwerable.
Following the canon of reddendo singula singulis, “teachers” should apply
to the words “‘pupHs and students” and “heads of establishments of arts and
trades” to the word “apprentices.”
Same; Same; Same; No substantial distinction between the academic
and the non-academic schools insofar as torts committed by their students
are concerned.—There is really no substantial distinction between the
academic and the non-academic schools insofar as torts committed by their
students are concerned. The same vigilance is expected from the teacher
over the students under his control and supervision, whatever the nature of
the school where he is teaching, The suggestion in the Sxconde and
http://www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/0000016594f2d9a458014626003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 1/19
Mercado Cases is that the provision would make the teacher or even the
head of the school of arts and
________________
* EN BANC.
316
316 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
trades liable for an injury caused by any student in its custody but if that
same tort were committed in an academic school, no liability would attach
to the teacher or the school head. All other circumstances being the same,
the teacher or the head of the academic school would be absolved whereas
the teacher and the head of the nonacademic school would be held liable,
and simply because the latter is a school of arts and trades.
Same; Same; Same; Same; No plausible reason why different degrees
of vigilance should be exercised by the school authorities.—The Court
cannot see why different degrees of vigilance should be exercised by the
school authorities on the basis only of the nature of their respective schools.
There does not seem to be any plausible reason for relaxLng that vigilance
simply because the school is academic in nature and for increasing such
vigilance where the school is nonacademic. Notably, the injury subject of
liability is caused by the student and not by the school itself nor it is a result
of the operations of the school or its equipment. The injury contemplated
may be caused by any student regardless of the school where he is
registered. The teacher certainly should not be able to excuse himself by
simply showing that he is teaching in an academic school where, on the
other hand, the head would be held liable if the school were non-academic.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Reason for the disparity.—The
reason for the disparity can be traced to the fact that historically the head of
the school of arts and trades exercised a closer tutelage over his pupils than
the head of the academic school. The old schools of arts and trades were
engaged in the training of artisans apprenticed to their master who
personally and directly instructed them on the technique and secrets of their
craft. The head of the school of arts and trades was such a master and so was
personally involved in the task of teaching his students, who usually even
boarded with him and so came under his constant control, supervision and
influence. By contrast, the head of the academic school was not as involved
with his students and exercised only administrative duties over the teachers
who were the persons directly dealing with the students. The head of the
academic school had then (as now) only a vicarious relationship with the
students. Consequently, while he could not be directly faulted for the acts of
the students, the head of the school of arts and trades, because of his closer
ties with them, could be so blamed.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Distinction no longer obtains
at present—It is conceded that the distinction no longer obtains at present in
view of the expansion of the schools of arts and trades,
317
VOL. 160, APRIL 15, 1988 317
Amadora us. Court ofAppeals
the consequent increase in their enrollment, and the corresponding

diminution of the direct and personal contact of their heads with the
students. Article 2180, however, remains unchanged. In its present state, the
provision must be interpreted by the Court according to its clear and original
mandate until the legislature, taking into account the changes in the situation
subject to be regulated, sees fit to enact the necessary amendment.
Same; Same; Custody requirement; Article 2180 of the Civil Code does
not mean that the student must be boarding with the school authorities but
the student should be within the control and under its influence at the time
of the occurrence of the injury.—From a reading of the provision under
examination, it is clear that while the custody requirement, to repeat Palisoc
vs. Brillantes, does not mean that the student must be boarding with the
school authorities, it does signify that the student should be within the
control and under the influence of the school authorities at the time of the
occurrence of the injury. This does not necessarily mean that such custody
be co-terminous with the semester, beginning with the start of classes and
ending upon the close thereof, and excluding the time before or after such
period, such as the period of registration, and in the case of graduating
students, the period before the commencement exercises. In the view of the
Court, the student is in the custody of the school authorities as long as he is
under the control and influence of the school and within its premises,
whether the semester has not yet begun or has already ended.
Same; Same; Same; Extent ofresponsibility;As long as the student is in
the school premises in pursuance of a legitimate purpose, the responsibility
of the school authorities over the student continues.—As long as it can be
shown that the student is in the school premises in pursuance of a legitimate
student objective, in the exercise of a legitimate student right, and even in
the enjoyment of a legitimate student privilege, the responsibility of the
school authorities over the student continues. Indeed, even if the student
should be doing nothing more than relaxing in the campus in the company
of his classmates and friends and enjoying the ambience and atmosphere of
the school, he is still within the custody and subject to the discipline of the
school authorities under the provisions of Article 2180.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Teacher-in-charge must answer for his

student’s torts.—During all these occasions, it is obviously the teacherin-
charge who must answer for his students’ torts, in practically the same way
that the parents are responsible for the child when he is in
318
Amadora vs. Court ofAppeals
their custody. The teacher-in-charge is the one designated by the dean,

principal, or other administrative superior to exercise supervision over the
pupils in the specific classes or sections to which they are assigned. It is not
necessary that at the time of the injury, the teacher be physically present and
in a position to prevent it. Custody does not connote immediate and actual
physical control but refers more to the influence exerted on the child and the
discipline instilled in him as a result of such influence. Thus, for the injuries
caused by the student, the teacher and not the parent shall be held
responsible if the tort was committed within the premises of the school at
any time when its authority could be validly exercised over him.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The school may be held to answer
for the acts of its teachers or even of the head thereof under the general
principle of respondent superior but may exculpate itself from liability by
proof that it had exercised the diligence of a bonus paterfamilias.—In any
event, it should be noted that the liability imposed by this article is supposed
to fall directly on the teacher or the head of the school of arts and trades and
not on the school itself. If at all, the school, whatever its nature, may be held
to answer for the acts of its teachers or even of the head thereof under the
general principle of respondent superior, but then it may exculpate itself
from liability by proof that it had exercised the diligence of a bonus
paterfamilias,
Same; Sarne; Same; Same; Same; Same; Such defense also available
to the teacher or the head of the school of arts and trade,—Such defense is,
of course, also available to the teacher or the head of the school of arts and
trades directly held to answer for the tort committed by the student. As long
as the defendant can show that he had taken the necessary precautions to
prevent the injury complained of, he can exonerate himself from the liability
imposed by Article 2180.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Liability attaches to
the teacher and the head of the technical school although the wrongdoer
was already of age.—In this connection, it should be observed that the
teacher will be held liable not only when he is acting in loco parentis for the
law does not require that the offending student be of minority age. Unlike
the parent, who will be liable only if his child is still a minor, the teacher is
held answerable by the law for the act of the student under him regardless of
the student’s age. Thus, in the Palisoc Case, liability attached to the teacher
and the head of the technical school although the wrongdoer was already of
age. In this sense, Article 2180 treats the parent more favorably than the
teacher.
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VOL. 160, APRIL 15, 1988 319

PETITION for certiorari to review the decision of the Court of

Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.

Jose S. Amadora & Associates for petitioners.
Padilla Law Office for respondents.
CRUZ, J.:
Like any prospective graduate, Alfredo Amadora was looking

forward to the commencement exercises where he would ascend the
stage and in the presence of his relatives and friends receive his high
school diploma, These ceremonies were scheduled on April 16,
1972. As it turned out, though, fate would intervene and deny him
that awaited experience. On April 13, 1972, while they were in the
auditorium of their school, the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletes, a
classmate, Pablito Daffon, fired a gun that mortally hit Alfredo,
ending all his expectations
1
and his life as welL The victim was only
seventeen years old. 2
Daffon was convicted of homicide thru reckless imprudence.
Additionally, the herein petitioners, as the victim’s parents, Sled a
civil action for damages under Article 2180 of the Civil Code
against the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos, its rector, the high school
principal, the dean of boys, and the physics teacher, together with
Daffon and two other students, through their respective parents, The
complaint against the students was later dropped. After trial, the
Court of First Instance of Cebu held the remaining defendants liable
to the plaintiffs in the sum of P294,984.00, representing death
compensation, loss of earning capacity, costs of litigation, funeral3
expenses, moral damages, exemplary damages, and attorney’s fees.
On appeal to the respondent court, however, the decision 4
was
reversed and all the defendants were completely absolved.
In its decision, which is now the subject of this petition for
certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the respondent
________________
1 Rollo, pp. 63, 157.
2 Ibid., p. 38.
3 Id., p. 23.
4 Id., p. 31. Climaco, J., ponente, with Pascual and Agcaoili, JJ.
320

court found that Article 2180 was not applicable as the Colegio de
San Jose-Recoletos was not a school of arts and trades but an
academic institution of learning. It also held that the students were
not in the custody of the school at the time of the incident as the
semester had already ended, that there was no clear identification of
the fatal gun, and that in any event the defendants
5
had exercised the
necessary diligence in preventing the injury.
The basic undisputed facts are that Alfredo Amadora went to the
San Jose-Recoletos on April 13, 1972, and while in its auditorium
was shot to death by Pablito Daffon, a classmate. On the
implications and consequences of these facts, the parties sharply
disagree.
The petitioners contend that their son was in the school to finish
his physics experiment as a prerequisite to his graduation; hence, he
was then under the custody of the private respondents. The private
respondents submit that Alfredo Amadora had gone to the school
only for the purpose of submitting his physics report and that he was
no longer in their custody because the semester had already ended.
There is also the question of the identity of the gun used which
the petitioners consider important because of an earlier incident
which they claim underscores the negligence of the school and at
least one of the private respondents. It is not denied by the
respondents that on April 7, 1972, Sergio Damaso, Jr., the dean of
boys, confiscated from Jose Gumban an unlicensed pistol but later
returned it to him without
6
making a report to the principal or taking
any further action. As Gumban was one of the companions of
Daffon when the latter fired the gun that killed Alfredo, the
petitioners contend that this was the same pistol that had been
confiscated from Gumban and that their son would not have been
killed if it had not been returned by Damaso. The respondents say,
however, that there is no proof that the gun was the same firearm
that killed Alfredo.
Resolution of all these disagreements will depend on the
interpretation of Article 2180 which, as it happens, is invoked
________________
5 Id., pp. 30–31.

6 Id., pp. 23, 272.
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VOL. 160, APRIL 15, 1988 321

by both parties in support of their conflicting positions. The

pertinent part of this article reads as follows:
“Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable

for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices so long as
they remain in their custody.”
Three cases have so far been decided by the Court in connection7

with the above-quoted provision,8
to wit: Exconde v. 9
Capuno,
Mercado v. Court of Appeals, and Palisoc v. Brillantes. These will
be briefly reviewed in this opinion for a better resolution of the case
at bar.
In the Exconde Case, Dante Capuno, a student of the Balintawak
Elementary School and a Boy Seout, attended a Rizal Day parade on
instructions of the city school supervisor. After the parade, the boy
boarded a jeep, took over its wheel and drove it so recklessly that it
turned turtle, resulting in the death of two of its passengers. Dante
was found guilty of double homicide with reckless imprudence. In
the separate civil action filed against them, his father was held
solidarily liable with him in damages under Article 1903 (now
Article 2180) of the Civil Code for the tort committed by the 15-year
old boy.
This decision, which was penned by Justice Bautista Angelo on
June 29,1957, exculpated the school in an obiter dictum (as it was
not a party to the case) on the ground that it was not a school of arts
and trades. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, with whom Justices Sabino Padilla
and Alex Reyes concurred, dissented, arguing that it was the school
authorities who should be held liable. Liability under this rule, he
said, was imposed on (1) teachers in general; and (2) heads of
schools of arts and trades in particular. The modifying clause “of
establishments of arts and trades” should apply only to “heads” and
not “teachers.”
Exconde was reiterated in the Mercado Case, and with an
elaboration. A student cut a classmate with a razor blade during
recess time at the Lourdes Catholic School in Quezon City, and the
parents of the victim sued the culprit’s parents for damages. Through
Justice Labrador, the Court declared in
________________
7 101 Phil. 843.

8 108 Phil. 414.
9 41 SCRA 548.
322

another obiter (as the school itself had also not been sued) that the
school was not liable because it was not an establishment of arts and
trades. Morever. the custody requirement had not been proved as this
contemplates a situation where the student lives and boards with the
teacher, such that the control, direction and influences on the pupil
supersede those of the parents.” Justice J.B.L. Reyes did not take
part but the other members of the court concurred in this decision
promulgated on May 30,1960.
In Palisoc vs. Brillantes, decided on October 4, 1971, a 16year
old student was killed by a classmate with fist blows in the
laboratory of the Manila Technical Institute. Although the
wrongdoer-—who was already of age—was not boarding in the
school, the head thereof and the teacher in charge were held
solidarily liable with him. The Court declared through Justice
Teehankee:
“The phrase used in the cited article—'so long as (the students) remain in
their custody'—means the protective and supervisory custody that the
school and its heads and teachers exercise over the pupils and students for as
long as they are at attendance in the school, including recess time. There is
nothing in the law that requires that for such liability to attach, the pupil or
student who commits the tortious act must live and board in the school, as
erroneously held by the lower court, and the dicta in Mercado (as well as in
Exconde) on which it relied, must now be deemed to have been set aside by
the present decision.”
10
This decision was concurred in by five other members, including
Justice J.B.L. Reyes, who stressed, in answer to the dissenting
opinion, that even students already of age were covered by the
provision since they were equally in the custody of the school
11
and
subject to its discipline. Dissenting with three others, Justice
Makalintal was for retaining the custody interpretation in Mercado
and submitted that the rule should apply only to torts committed by
students not yet of age as the school would be acting only in loco
parentis.
In a footnote, Justice Teehankee said he agreed with Justice
________________
10 Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, Barredo, Villamor, and Makasiar, JJ.

11 Castro, Fernando, and Zaldivar, JJ.
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VOL. 160, APRIL 15, 1988 323

Reyes’ dissent in the Exconde Case but added that “since the school
involved at bar is a non-academic school, the question as to the
applicability of the cited codal provision to academic institutions
will have to await another case wherein it may properly be raised.”
This is the case.
Unlike in Exconde and Mercado, the Colegio de San
JoseRecoletos has been directly impleaded and is sought to be held
liable under Article 2180; and unlike in Palisoc, it is not a school of
arts and trades but an academic institution of learning. The parties
herein have also directly raised the question of whether or not
Article 2180 covers even establishments which are technically not
schools of arts and trades, and, if so, when the offending student is
supposed to be “in its custody.”
After an exhaustive examination of the problem, the Court has
come to the conclusion that the provision in question should apply to
all schools, academic as well as non-academic. Where the school is
academic rather than technical or vocational in nature, responsibility
for the tort committed by the student will attach to the teacher in
charge of such student, following the first part of the provision. This
is the general rule. In the case of establishments of arts and trades, it
is the head thereof, and only he, who shall be held liable as an
exception to the general rule. In other words, teachers in general
shall be liable for the acts of their students except where the school
is technical in nature, in which case it is the head thereof who shall
be answerable. Following the canon of reddendo singula singulis,
“teachers” should apply to the words “pupils and students” and
“heads of establishments of arts and trades” to the word
“apprentices.”
The Court thus conforms to the dissenting opinion expressed by
Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Exconde where he said in part:
“I can see no sound reason for limiting Art. 1903 of the Old Civil Code to
teachers of arts and trades and not to academic ones. What substantial
difference is there between them insofar as concerns the proper supervision
and vigilance over their pupils? It cannot be seriously contended that an
academic teacher is exempt from the duty of watching that his pupils do not
commit a tort to the detriment of third persons, so long as they are in a
position to exercise authority and supervision over the pupil. In my opinion,
in the phrase ‘teachers or
324

heads of establishments of arts and trades’ used in Art. 1903 of the old Civil
Code, the words ‘arts and trades’ does not qualify teachers’ but only Tieads
of establishments.’ The phrase is only an updated version of the equivalent
terms ‘preceptores ‘x artesanos’ used in the Italian and Prench Civil Codes.
“If, as conceded by all commentators, the basis of the presumption of
negligence of Art. 1903 in some culpa in vigilando that the parents,
teachers, etc. are supposed to have incurred in the exercise of their authority,
it would seem clear that where the parent places the child under the effective
authority of the teacher, the latter, and not the parent, should be the one
answerable for the torts committed while under his custody, for the very
reason that the parent is not supposed to interfere with the discipline of the
school nor with the authority and supervision of the teacher while the child
is under instruction. And if there is no authority, there can be no
responsibility.’
There is really no substantial distinction between the academic and

the non-academic schools insofar as torts committed by their
students are concerned. The same vigilance is expected from the
teacher over the students under his control and supervision,
whatever the nature of the school where he is teaching. The
suggestion in the Exconde and Mercado Cases is that the provision
would make the teacher or even the head of the school of arts and
trades liable for an injury caused by any student in its custody but if
that same tort were committed in an academic school, no liability
would attach to the teacher or the school head. All other
circumstances being the same, the teacher or the head of the
academic school would be absolved whereas the teacher and the
head of the non-academic school would be held liable, and simply
because the latter is a school of arts and trades.
The Court cannot see why different degrees of vigilance should
be exercised by the school authorities on the basis only of the nature
of their respective schools. There does not seem to be any plausible
reason for relaxing that vigilance simply because the school is
academic in nature and for increasing such vigilance where the
school is non-academic. Notably, the injury subject of liability is
caused by the student and not by the school itself nor is it a result of
the operations of the,school or its equipment. The injury
contemplated may be caused by any student regardless of the school
where he is registered. The
325
VOL. 160, APRIL 15, 1988 325

teacher certainly should not be able to excuse himself by simply

showing that he is teaching in an academic school where, on the
other hand, the head would be held liable if the school were non-
academic.
These questions, though, may be asked: If the teacher of the
academic school is to be held answerable for the torts committed by
his students, why is it the head of the school only who is held liable
where the injury is caused in a school of arts and trades? And in the
case of the academic or non-technical school, why not apply the rule
also to the head thereof instead of imposing the liability only on the
teacher?
The reason for the disparity can be traced to the fact that
historically the head of the school of arts and trades exercised a
closer tutelage over his pupils than the head of the academic school.
The old schools of arts and trades were engaged in the training of
artisans apprenticed to their master who personally and directly
instructed them on the technique and secrets of their craft. The head
of the school of arts and trades was such a master and so was
personally involved in the task of teaching his students, who usually
even boarded with him and so came under his constant control,
supervision and influence. By contrast, the head of the academic
school was not as involved with his students and exercised only
administrative duties over the teachers who were the persons
directly dealing with the students. The head of the academic school
had then (as now) only a vicarious relationship with the students.
Consequently, while he could not be directly faulted for the acts of
the students, the head of the school of arts and trades, because of his
closer ties with them, could be so blamed.
It is conceded that the distinction no longer obtains at present in
view of the expansion of the schools of arts and trades, the
consequent increase in their enrollment, and the corre-sponding
diminution of the direct and personal contract of their heads with the
students. Article 2180, however, remains unchanged. In its present
state, the provision must be interpreted by the Court according to its
clear and original mandate until the legislature, taking into account
the changes in the situation subject to be regulated, sees fit to enact
the necessary amendment.
The other matter to be resolved is the duration of the respon-
326

sibility of the teacher or the head of the school of arts and trades
over the students. Is such responsibility co-extensive with the period
when the student is actually undergoing studies during the school
term, as contended by the respondents and impliedly admitted by the
petitioners themselves?
From a reading of the provision under examination, it is clear that

while the custody requirement, to repeat Palisoc v. Brillantes, does
not mean that the student must be boarding with the school
authorities, it does signify that the student should be within the
control and under the influence of the school authorities at the time
of the occurrence of the injury, This does not necessarily mean that
such, custody be co-terminous with the semester, beginning with the
start of classes and ending upon the close thereof, and excluding the
time before or after such period, such as the period of registration,
and in the case of graduating students, the period before the
commencement exercises. In the view of the Court, the student is in
the custody of the school authorities as long as he is under the
control and influence of the school and within its premises, whether
the semester has not yet begun or has already ended.
It is too tenuous to argue that the student comes under the
discipline of the school only upon the start of classes
notwithstanding that before that day he has already registered and
thus placed himself under its rules. Neither should such discipline be
deemed ended upon the last day of classes notwithstanding that there
may still be certain requisites to be satisfied for completion of the
course, such as submission of reports, term papers, clearances and
the like. During such periods, the student is still subject to the
disciplinary authority of the school and cannot consider himself
released altogether from observance of its rules.
As long as it can be shown that the student is in the school
premises in pursuance of a legitimate student objective, in the
exercise of a legitimate student right, and even in the enjoyment of a
legitimate student right, and even in the enjoyment of a legitimate
student privilege, the responsibility of the school authorities over the
student continues. Indeed, even if the student should be doing
nothing more than relaxing in the campus in the company of his
classmates and friends and enjoying the ambience and atmosphere
of the school, he is still
327
VOL. 160, APRIL 15, 1988 327

within the custody and subject to the discipline of the school

authorities under the provisions of Article 2180.
During all these occasions, it is obviously the teacher-incharge
who must answer for his students’ torts, in practically the same way
that the parents are responsible for the child when he is in their
custody. The teacher-in-charge is the one designated by the dean,
principal, or other administrative superior to exercise supervision
over the pupils in the specific classes or sections to which they are
assigned. It is not necessary that at the time of the injury, the teacher
be physically present and in a position to prevent it. Custody does

not connote immediate and actual physical control but refers more to
the influence exerted on the child and the discipline instilled in him
as a result of such influence. Thus, for the injuries caused by the
student, the teacher and not the parent shall be held responsible if
the tort was committed within the premises of the school at any time
when its authority could be validly exercised over him.
In any event, it should be noted that the liability imposed by this
article is supposed to fall directly on the teacher or the head of the
school of arts and trades and not on the school itself. If at all, the
school, whatever its nature, may be held to answer for the acts of its
teachers or even of the head thereof under the general principle of
respondent superior, but then it may exculpate itself from liability by
proof that it had exercised the diligence of a bonus paterfamilias.
Such defense is, of course, also available to the teacher or the
head of the school of arts and trades directly held to answer for the
tort committed by the student. As long as the defendant can show
that he had taken the necessary precautions to prevent the injury
complained of, he can exonerate himself from the liability imposed
by Article 2180, which also states that:
“The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons
herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father
of a family to prevent damages.”
In this connection, it should be observed that the teacher will be held

liable not only when he is acting in loco parentis for the law does
not require that the offending student be of minority
328

age. Unlike the parent, who will be liable only if his child is still a
minor, the teacher is held answerable by the law for the act of the
student under him regardless of the student’s age. Thus, in the
Palisoc Case, liability attached to the teacher and the head of the
technical school although the wrongdoer was already of age. In this
sense, Article 2180 treats the parent more favorably than the teacher.
The Court is not unmindful of the apprehensions expressed by
Justice Makalintal in his dissenting opinion in Palisoc that the school
may be unduly exposed to liabUity under this article in view of the
increasing activism among the students that is likely to cause
violence and resulting injuries in the school premises. That is a valid
fear, to be sure. Nevertheless, it should be repeated that, under the
present ruling, it is not the school that will be held directly liable.
Moreover, the defense of due diligence is available to it in case it is
sought to be held answerable as principal for the acts or omission of

its head or the teacher in its employ.
The school can show that it exercised proper measures in
selecting the head or its teachers and the appropriate supervision
over them in the custody and instruction of the pupils pursuant to its
rules and regulations for the maintenance of discipline among them.
In almost all cases now, in fact, these measures are effected through
the assistance of an adequate security force to help the teacher
physically enforce those rules upon the students. This should bolster
the claim of the school that it has taken adequate steps to prevent
any inj ury that may be committed by its students.
A fortiori, the teacher himself may invoke this defense as it
would otherwise be unfair to hold him directly answerable for the
damage caused by his students as long as they are in the schooJ
premises and presumably under his influence, In this respect, the
Court is disposed not to expect from the teacher the same measure of
responsibility imposed on the parent for their influence over the
child is not equal in degree. Obviously, the parent can expect more
obedience from the child because the latter’s dependence on him is
greater than on the teacher. It need not be stressed that such
dependence includes the child’s support and sustenance whereas
submission to the teacher’s influence, besides being co-terminous
with the period of cus-
329
VOL. 160, APRIL 15, 1988 329

Amadora vs. Court of Appecds
tody, is usually enforced only because of the students’ desire to pass

the course. The parent can instill more lasting discipline on the child
than the teacher and so should be held to a greater accountability
than the teacher for the tort committed by the child.
And if it is also considered that under the article in question, the
teacher or the head of the school of arts and trades is responsible for
the damage caused by the student or apprentice even if he is already
of age—and therefore less tractable than the minor—then there
should all the more be justification to require from the school
authorities less accountability as long as they can prove reasonable
diligence in preventing the injury. After all, if the parent himself is
no longer liable for the student’s acts because he has reached
majority age and so is no longer under the former’s control, there is
then all the more reason for leniency in assessing the teacher’s
responsibility for the acts of the student.
Applying the foregoing considerations, the Court has arrived at
the following conclusions:
1, At the time Alfredo Amadora was fatally shot, he was still in
the custody of the authorities of Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos
notwithstanding that the fourth year classes had formally ended. It

was immaterial if he was in the school auditorium to finish his
physics experiment or merely to submit his physics report for what
is important is that he was there for a legitimate purpose. As
previously observed, even the mere savoring of the company of his
friends in the premises of the school is a legitimate purpose that
would have also brought him in the custody of the school
authorities.
2. The rector, the high school principal and the dean of boys
cannot be held liable because none of them was the teacher-incharge
as previously defined. Each of them was exercising only a general
authority over the student body and not the direct control and
influence exerted by the teacher placed in charge of particular
classes or sections and thus immediately involved in its discipUne.
The evidence of the parties does not disclose who the teacher-in-
charge of the offending student was. The mere fact that Alfredo
Amadora had gone to school that day in connection with his physics
report did not necessarily make the physics teacher, respondent
Celestino Dicon, the teacher-in-
330

charge of Alfredo’s killer,

3. At any rate, assuming that he was the teacher-in-charge, there
is no showing that Dicon was negligent in enforcing discipline upon
Daffon or that he had waived observance of the rules and regulations
of the school or condoned their nonobservance. His absence when
the tragedy happened cannot be considered against him because he
was not supposed or required to report to school on that day. And
while it is true that the offending student was still in the custody of
the teacher-in-charge even if the latter was physically absent when
the tort was committed, it has not been established that it was caused
by his laxness in enforcing discipline upon the student. On the
contrary, the private respondents have proved that they had
exercised due diligence, through the enforcement of the school
regulations, in maintaining that discipline.
4. In the absence of a teacher-in-charge, it is probably the dean of
boys who should be held liable, especially in view of the unrefuted
evidence that he had earlier confiscated an unlicensed gun from one
of the students and returned the same later to him without taking
disciplinary action or reporting the matter to higher authorities.
While this was clearly negligence on his part, for which he deserves
sanctions from the school, it does not necessarily link him to the
shooting of Amador as it has not been shown that he confiscated and
returned pistol was the gun that killed the petitioners’ son.
5. Finally, as previously observed, the Colegio de San

JoseRecoletos cannot be held directly liable under the article
because only the teacher or the head of the school of arts and trades
is made responsible for the damage caused by the student or
apprentice. Neither can it be held to answer for the tort committed
by any of the other private respondents for none of them has been
found to have been charged with the custody of the offending
student or has been remiss in the discharge of his duties in
connection with such custody.
In sum, the Court finds under the facts as disclosed by the record
and in the light of the principles herein announced that none of the
respondents is liable for the injury inflicted by Pablito Daffon on
Alfredo Amadora that resulted in the latter’s death at the auditorium
of the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos on April 13,1972. While we
deeply sympathize with the petition-
331
VOL. 160, APRIL 15, 1988 331

ers over the loss of their son under the tragic circumstances here
related, we nevertheless are unable to extend them the material relief
they seek, as a balm to their grief, under the law they have invoked.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, without any
pronouncement as to costs. It is so ordered.
Yap, Narvasa, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Bidin,

Sarmiento, Cortés and Grino-Aquino, JJ., concur.
Teehankee, C.J., did not participate in deliberations.
Fernan and Padilla, JJ., no part, formerly counsel for
Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos.
Gutierrez, Jr., J., concur but please see additional statement.
Herrera, J., with separate concurring and dissenting opinion.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring and dissenting:
I concur, except with respect to the restricted meaning given the

term “teacher” in Article 2180 of the Civil Code as “teacherin-
charge.” This would limit liability to occasions where there are
classes under the immediate charge of a teacher, which does not
seem to be the intendment of the law.
As I understand it, the philosophy of the law is that whoever
stands in loco parentis will have the same duties and obligations as
parents whenever in such a standing. Those persons are mandatorily
held liable for the tortious acts of pupils and students so long as the
latter remain in their custody, meaning their protective and
supervisory custody.
Thus, Article 349 of the Civil Code enumerates the persons who
stand in loco parentis and thereby exercise substitute parental
authority:
“Art 349,. The following persons shall exercise substitute parental authority:
xxx
(2) Teachers and professors;
xxx
(4) Directors of trade establishments, with regard to apprentices;”
332

Article 352 of the Civil Code further provides:
“Art. 352. The relationB between teacher and pupil, professor and student,
are fixed by government regulations and those of each school or institution.
x x x”
But even such rules and regulations as may be fixed can not
contravene the concept of substitute parental authority. The rationale
of liability of school heads and teachers for the tortious acts of their
pupils was explained in Palisoc vs. Brillantes (41 SCRA 548), thus:
“The protective custody of the school heads and teachers is mandatorily

substituted for that of the parents, and hence, it becomes their obligation 05
well as that of the school itself to provide proper supervision of the students’
activities during the whole time that they are at attendance in the school,
including recess time, as well as to take the necessary precautions to protect
the students in their custody from dangers and hazards that would
reasonably be anticipated, including injuries that some students themselves
may inflict wilfully or through negligence on their fellow students. (Italics
supplied)
Of course, as provided for in the same Article 2180, the

responsibility treated of shall cease when the persons mentioned
prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a
family to prevent damage.
And while a school is, admittedly, not directly liable since Article
2180 speaks only of teachers and schools heads, yet, by virtue of the
same provision, the school, as their employer, may be held liable for
the failure of its teachers or school heads to perform their mandatory
legal duties as substitute parents (Sangco, Philippine Law on Torts &
Damages, 1978 ed., p. 201). Again, the school may exculpate itself
from liability by proving that it had exercised the diligence of a good
father of the family.
“Art. 2180. x x x
“Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees
and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even
though the former are not engaged in any business or industry.
xxx xxx
333
VOL. 160, APRIL 15, 1988 333

Parenthetically, from the enumeration in Article 348 of the Civil

Code, supra, it is apparent that the Code Commission had already
segregated the classification of “teachers and professors” vis-a-vis
their pupils, from “directors of trade establishments, with regard to
their apprentices.”
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., concurring opinion:
I concur in the Court’s opinion so carefully analyzed and crafted by

Justice Isagani A. Cruz. However, H. would like to stress the need
for a major amendment to, if not a complete scrapping of, Article
2180 of the Civil Code insofar as it refers to teachers or heads of
establishments of arts and trades in relation to pupils and students or
apprentices. The seventh paragraph of Art. 2180 is a relic of the past
and contemplates a situation long gone and out of date. In a Palisoc
v. Brillantes (41 SCRA 548) situation, it is bound to result in
mischief and injustice.
First, we no longer have masters and apprentices toiling in
schools of arts and trades. Students in “technologicaT colleges and
universities are no different from students in liberal arts or
professional schools. Apprentices now work in regular shops and
factories and their relationship to the employer is covered by laws
governing the employment relationship and not by laws governing
the teacher—student relationship.
Second, except for kindergarten, elementary, and perhaps early
high school students, teachers are often no longer objects of
veneration who are given the respect due to substitute parents. Many
students in their late teens or early adult years view some teachers as
part of a bourgeois or reactionary group whose advice on behaviour,
deportment, and other non-academic matters is not only resented but
actively rejected. It seems most unfair to hold teachers liable on a
presumption juris tantum of negligence for acts of students even
under circumstances where strictly speaking there could be no in
loco parentis relationship, Why do teachers have to prove the
contrary of negligence to be freed from solidary liabiUty for the acts
of bomb-throwing or pistol packing students who would just as soon
hurt them as they would other members of the so-called

establishment.
334

Nakpil & Sons vs. Court of Appeals
The ordinary rules on quasi-delicts should apply to teachers and

schools of whatever nature insofar as grown up students are
concerned. The provision of Art. 2180 of the Civil Code involved in
this case has outlived its purpose. The Court cannot make law. It can
only apply the law with its imperfections. However, the Court can
suggest that such a law should be amended or repealed.
Petition denied.
Note.—Trial is necessary for any final decision of the two cases

on the merits or on the issues as to the power of a school over its
students, like the case of re-enrollment of an expelled student.
(University of the Phttippines vs. Fernandez, 137 SCRA l.)
——o0o——
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9/1/2018 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 160

VOL. 160, APRIL 15, 1988 315

JOSE S. AMADORA, LORETA A. AMADORA, JOSE A.

316 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Amadora vs. Court of Appeals

VOL. 160, APRIL 15, 1988 317

Amadora us. Court ofAppeals

the consequent increase in their enrollment, and the corresponding

Same; Same; Same; Same; Teacher-in-charge must answer for his

318 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Amadora vs. Court ofAppeals

their custody. The teacher-in-charge is the one designated by the dean,

VOL. 160, APRIL 15, 1988 319

PETITION for certiorari to review the decision of the Court of

The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.

Like any prospective graduate, Alfredo Amadora was looking

1 Rollo, pp. 63, 157.

320 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

5 Id., pp. 30–31.

VOL. 160, APRIL 15, 1988 321

by both parties in support of their conflicting positions. The

“Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable

Three cases have so far been decided by the Court in connection7

7 101 Phil. 843.

322 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

10 Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, Barredo, Villamor, and Makasiar, JJ.

VOL. 160, APRIL 15, 1988 323

324 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

There is really no substantial distinction between the academic and

VOL. 160, APRIL 15, 1988 325

teacher certainly should not be able to excuse himself by simply

326 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

From a reading of the provision under examination, it is clear that

VOL. 160, APRIL 15, 1988 327

within the custody and subject to the discipline of the school

be physically present and in a position to prevent it. Custody does

In this connection, it should be observed that the teacher will be held

328 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

sought to be held answerable as principal for the acts or omission of

VOL. 160, APRIL 15, 1988 329

tody, is usually enforced only because of the students’ desire to pass

notwithstanding that the fourth year classes had formally ended. It

330 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

charge of Alfredo’s killer,

5. Finally, as previously observed, the Colegio de San

VOL. 160, APRIL 15, 1988 331

Yap, Narvasa, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Bidin,

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring and dissenting:

I concur, except with respect to the restricted meaning given the

332 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Article 352 of the Civil Code further provides:

“The protective custody of the school heads and teachers is mandatorily

Of course, as provided for in the same Article 2180, the

VOL. 160, APRIL 15, 1988 333

Parenthetically, from the enumeration in Article 348 of the Civil

GUTIERREZ, JR., J., concurring opinion:

I concur in the Court’s opinion so carefully analyzed and crafted by

hurt them as they would other members of the so-called

334 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED