BAR

OPERATIONS 1
SUBMISSION # 3

CASE Nos. 30 - 44

Submitted by: YSABELLE M. CARDONA

LLB – IV
Palawan State University – School of Law
S.Y 2020 – 2021

Submitted to: ATTY. ALLAN CARLOS

Professorial Lecturer
 Table of Contents

30. JONATHAN Y. DEE et al. HARVEST ALL INVESTMENT LTD et al.

G.R. No. 224834/G.R. No. 224871, March 15, 2017
31. NSC HOLDINGS, INC., vs. TRUST INTERNATIONAL PAPER CORPORATION AND
ATTY. MONICO JACOB
G.R. No. 193069, March 15, 2017
32. RENATO S. MARTINEZ vs. JOSE MARIA V. ONGSIAKO
G.R. No. 209157, March 15, 2017
33. BEVERLEY ANNE YAP VS. REPUBLIC
G.R. No. 199810, March 15, 2017
34. People of the Philippines vs. Nestor M. Bugarin
G.R. No. 224900, March 15, 2017
35. DE OCAMPO MEMORIAL SCHOOLS, INC., vs BIGKIS MANGGAGAWA SA DE
OCAMPO MEMORIAL SCHOOL, INC.,
G.R. No. 192648, March 15, 2017
36. NICOLAS VELASQUEZ, Et. Al v. PEOPLE
GR No. 195021, March 15, 2017
37. SPOUSES LARRY AND ROSARITA WILLIAMS vs RAINERO A. ZERDA
G.R. No. 207146, March 15, 2017
38. ROSEMARIE B. BINTUDAN vs. THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT
G.R. No. 211937, March 21, 2017
39. EDILBERTO M. PANCHO VS. SANDIGANBAYAN (6th Division) and People of the
Philippines,
GR Nos. 234886-911 – 235410
40. BENITO ESTRELLA y GILI vs. People of the Philippines
GR No. 212942, June 17, 2020
41. People of the Philippines vs. Niel Raymond A. Nocido
GR No. 240229, June 17, 2020
42. People of the Philippines vs. Jerry Sapla y Guerrero
GR No. 244045, June 16, 2020
43. JESSICA M. CHOZAS vs. COMMISSION ON AUDIT
G.R. NO. 226319, October 8, 2018
44. MIGUEL “LUCKY” GUILLERMO vs. PHILIPPINE INFORMATION AGENCY
GR No. 223751, March 15, 2017
30. JONATHAN Y. DEE et al. HARVEST ALL INVESTMENT LTD et al.
G.R. No. 224834/G.R. No. 224871
March 15, 2017

Facts: Harvest All Investment Ltd is a minority stock holder of Alliance Select Food
International. Jonathan Y. Dee is a majority stock holder of the said company.
Jonathan Y. Dee along with other Board Members passed a Board Resolution to
postpone the Annual Stockholder's Meeting indefinitely with the company shares
total of P1 billion. This prompted Harvest All to file a complaint with a request for
issuance of writ of preliminary injunction and to nullify the Board Resolution of the
Board Members as this Board Resolution would deprive Harvest All of their rights to
vote on the Annual Stockholder's Meeting. The complaint also includes Harvest All’s
opinion that there may be an intra-corporate against Alliance Select Food. RTC clerk
of court assessed Harvest All with filing fees of P8,860 which they paid accordingly.
Alliance Board now contests the validity of the complaint as Harvest All should have
paid P20 million or so based on the Stocks Right Offering (SRO) of P1 billion as
Harvest All complaint is about intra-corporate controversy.

Issues: Whether or not Harvest All paid the correct filing fees for the complaint which
Jonathan Y. Dee says should be based on the P1 billion SRO.

Held: Yes. Harvest All paid the correct filing fees. In determining whether an action is
one the subject matter of which is not capable of pecuniary estimation this Court has
adopted the criterion of first ascertaining the nature of the principal action or remedy
sought. If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered
capable of pecuniary estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or
in the Courts of First Instance would depend on the amount of the claim. However,
where the basic issue is something other than the right to recover a sum of money,
where the money claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal
relief sought, this Court has considered such actions as cases where the subject of
the litigation may not be estimated in terms of money, and are cognizable exclusively
by Courts of First Instance.

Harvest All, et al.'s Complaint reveals that its main purpose is to have Alliance hold
its 2015 Annual Stockholder’s Meeting on the date set in the corporation's bylaws, or
at the time when Alliance's SRO has yet to fully materialize, so that their voting
interest with the corporation would somehow be preserved and the complaint does
not involve the recovery of sum of money. Therefore, Harvest All paid the correct
filing fees.
31. NSC HOLDINGS, INC., petitioner vs. TRUST INTERNATIONAL PAPER
CORPORATION AND ATTY. MONICO JACOB, respondents.
G.R. No. 193069, March 15, 2017

Facts: Trust International paper Corporation (TIPCO) filed a “Petition for Corporate
Rehabilitation with Prayer for Suspension of Payments” before the RTC. The Trial
Court subsequently issued a Stay Order directing the appointment of respondent
Atty. Monico Jacob as the rehabilitation receiver (Receiver).

NSC filed its “Comment with Motion” alleging that certain receivables, as well as the
authority to collect payments for these were being held by TIPCO for and on behalf
of NSC. This was pursuant to the Trade Receivables Purchase and Sale Agreement
(TRPSA) entered into by both parties. In light of the TRPSA, NSC claimed that it was
a trustor, not a creditor of TIPCO. That these receivables would thereby be excluded
from TIPCO’s list of assets and payables that would be subject to the rehabilitation
plan.

The Receiver submitted to the RTC his “Evaluation and Recommendation Report”
(Report) which addressed NSC’s contentions. He stated that NSC was an unsecured
creditor, and the receivables were covered by the rehabilitation plan.

The RTC in its First Order approved TIPCO’s proposed rehabilitation plan as
amended and modified by the Recommendation and Evaluation Report. Unaware
that the RTC had already approved the rehabilitation plan, NSC filed a motion for the
suspension of the approval of the plan. In its Second Order, the RTC denied the
motion for being a prohibited pleading. In its Third Order, the RTC agreed with the
Receiver’s recommendation that the issues involved will need a full blown litigation
and that it is not within the Rehabilitation Receiver to adjudicate and resolve said
issues. Likewise, considering that the rehabilitation plan calls for the payment of the
obligations to NSC the implementation of the rehabilitation plan shall not be
suspended.

Issue: Whether or not the NSC could still raise the issue of its inclusion as a creditor
in the approved rehabilitation plan.

Held: No. The SC agrees with the ruling of the CA that it was the First not the Third
Order, that should have been appealed by the NSC; and the latter’s failure to appeal
the First Order barred it from insisting that it be excluded from the rehabilitation plan
as creditor.

The RTC in its First Order determined the NSC was a creditor whose claims must be
paid in accordance with the approved rehabilitation plan. This makes it a final order
with respect to that issue. Therefore, pursuant to the Interim Rules of Procedure on
Corporate Rehabilitation (Interim Rules), petitioner should have ventilated its
discontent with the First Order via a Rule 43 petition for review before the CA, and
not a mere motion before the RTC.

Clearly, NSC availed of the wrong remedy and the issue on its inclusion as a creditor
in the approved rehabilitation plan has already lapsed into finality.
32. RENATO S. MARTINEZ vs. JOSE MARIA V. ONGSIAKO
G.R. No. 209157, March 15, 2017

FACTS: Respondent filed a petition before the RTC of Makati seeking permission to
perpetuate his testimony under Rule 24 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. He alleged
that the taking of his deposition was necessary because of some personal
circumstances. In his petition, he also named the expected adverse parties in the
actions he anticipated would be filed.

Petitioner filed a Comment/Opposition to the Petition. He objected to the

proceedings on the ground that estate proceedings over the properties mentioned by
respondent in the latter’s petition were then pending, he also asserted that the filing
of a separate action for the perpetuation of testimony was tantamount to forum
shopping.

In a resolution dated June 21, 2010, the RTC granted the herein respondent’s
Petition. The trial court ordered his deposition to be taken on June 23, 2010.
Petitioner, along with other adverse parties, sought a reconsideration of the RTC
Resolution, but the RTC denied the motions in open court. A hearing and cross-
examination by adverse parties was then set.

The hearing proceeded notwithstanding the absence of the petitioner and his
counsel, and the direct examination of respondent was concluded. The RTC
conducted confidence-building activities for respondent and his brother, Juan Miguel
Ongsiako. The parties, however, failed to reach an agreement. The scheduled
hearing on August 11, 2010 was impeded by the withdrawal of appearance by the
law firm representing Juan Miguel. The trial court reset the hearing to August 18,
2010. This directive was announced to all parties present in the open court. For
those who were absent during the hearing, such as the petitioner and his counsel,
the RTC directed that copies of the written order be serve upon them.

On August 16, 2010, the RTC received a copy of the Petition for Certiorari filed by
petitioner with the CA. the Petition questioned the resolution dated June 21, 2010.

On August 18, 2010, the cross examination of respondent finally proceeded, but both
petitioner and his counsel were again absent at the hearing. The RTC noted,
however, that petitioner had filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings right before the
start of the hearing. In his motion, he requested that the proceedings for the
perpetuation of testimony be suspended pending the final resolution of the Petition
for Certiorari earlier filed with the CA. Towards the end of the proceedings on August
18, 2010, the RTC issued an Order declaring that petitioner, together with Juan
Miguel, had waived their right to cross-examine respondent.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA correctly affirmed the RTC ruling that declared
petitioner to have waived his right to cross-examination.
HELD: The conduct of a party which may be construed as an implied waiver of the
right to cross-examine may take various forms. But the common basic principle
underlying the application of the rule on implied waiver is that the party was given the
opportunity to confront and cross-examine an opposing witness but failed to take
advantage of it for reasons attributable to himself alone.

In this case, the conduct of the petitioner cannot be construed as a waiver of his right
to cross-examine respondent. The ruling of the RTC declaring that petitioner waived
his right to cross-examination was premised on his failure to attend the scheduled
hearing on 18 August 2010. However, the records of the case reveal that neither he
nor his counsel was adequately informed of the new schedule for the cross-
examination of respondent. While the RTC ordered that Notices of Hearing be sent
to both Petitioner and his counsel, they did not receive these processes in time for
the hearing through no fault of their own.

With respect to the Notice of Hearing sent to petitioner himself, the registry receipt
attached to the records of the RTC indicates that the letter was only received on 14
September 2010. On the other hand, the said Notice sent to petitioner’s counsel
never reached the intended recipient because of the incorrect address indicated on
the registered envelope containing the letter.

After due consideration of the above circumstances, SC conclude that the absence
of petitioner and his counsel at the hearing was clearly not due to their own fault.
Hence, the Petition for Review was granted.
33. BEVERLEY ANNE YAP VS. REPUBLIC
G.R. No. 199810, March 15, 2017

Facts: The case was about a disputed land, which the petitioner was able to buy
from an allegedly patent holder. During trial, it was found out that, the patent holder,
which Yap was able to buy her title from, have acquired its patent through fraud. The
real owners represented by the Republic filed for the cancellation of the patent, and
that the patent be awarded to them instead, because they were the ones who have
been in adverse, exclusive, and continuous possession of the disputed land since
1945.

However, Yap, in her defense, stated that; she was a buyer in good faith, even
though there was a notice of litigation attached to the title of the patent.

Issue: Whether Yap can be considered a buyer in good faith, and that she is the
rightful owner of the property.

Held: SC held that, Yap cannot be considered a buyer in good faith, because of her
failure to notice or acknowledge the notice of litigation attached to the original title of
the patent.
34. People of the Philippines, Plaintiff-Appellee vs. Nestor M. Bugarin,
Accused-Appellant
G.R. No. 224900, March 15, 2017

FACTS: On the 30th day of May 2008, at about 8:50 o’clock in the evening, in Cebu
City, the accused-appellant armed with an unlicensed firearm, repeatedly shot his
brother-in-law Esmeraldo B. Pontanar hitting the latter on the different parts of his
body which caused his instantaneous death. On the same evening also, Cristito C
Pontanar, a 72-year old father-in-law of the accused was also shot by him when the
former came to the rescue of his son Esmeraldo by pleading to the latter to stop the
shooting. Cristito was hit in the abdomen which also resulted to his death. After
having shot the two victims, Maria Glen Neis Pontanar, wife of Esmeraldo Pontanar
who tried to run away was also shot by Bugarin. Fortunately, she was not killed but
only sustained gunshot wound in her thigh.

Informations were filed charging Bugarin with two (2) counts of murder and one (1)
count of attempted murder. Upon arraignment, he pleaded not guilty to the charges.
The accused-appellant admitted having shot the victims but insisted that he acted in
self-defense. The RTC of Cebu City found Bugarin guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of double murder and attempted murder with the special aggravating circumstance of
the use of unlicensed firearm in all the three cases. This prompted Bugarin to appeal
before the CA. On July 31, 2015, the CA denied his appeal and affirmed the RTC
decision with modifications. Bugarin appealed before the Supreme Court maintaining
his innocence in all the instant cases.

ISSUES: Whether or not the accused-appellant’s claim of self-defense is valid.

HELD: No. The accused-appellants claim of self-defense is not valid. Self-defense is

an affirmative allegation and offers exculpation from liability for crimes only if
satisfactorily proved. Having admitted the shooting of the victims, the burden shifted
to Bugarin to prove that he indeed acted in self-defense by establishing the following
with clear and convincing evidence: (1) Unlawful aggression on the part of the
victims; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel the
aggression; and (3) lack of provocation on his part. One who admits killing or fatally
injuring another in the name of self-defense bears the burden of proving the
aforementioned elements. While all three elements must concur, self-defense relies
first and foremost on proof of unlawful aggression on the part of the victim. If no
unlawful aggression is proved, no self-defense may be successfully pleaded.
Contrary to his claims, the evidence of the case shows that there was no unlawful
aggression on the part of the victims.

Self-defense cannot be justifiably appreciated when it is extremely doubtful by itself.

Indeed, in invoking self-defense, the burden of evidence is shifted and the accused
claiming self-defense must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the
weakness of the prosecution. In the case at bar, Bugarin failed to sufficiently
establish that Esmeraldo was actually carrying three (3) firearms and that he
attempted to pull out one of his guns to shoot him.

35. DE OCAMPO MEMORIAL SCHOOLS, INC., petitioner versus BIGKIS

MANGGAGAWA SA DE OCAMPO MEMORIAL SCHOOL, INC., respondent
G.R. No. 192648, March 15, 2017

FACTS: De Ocampo Memorial Schools, Inc. is a domestic corporation duly-

organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines. De Ocampo Memorial
Medical Center and De Ocampo Memorial College. Under the aforementioned
institution is Bigkis Manggagawa ng De Ocampo Medical Center a union which was
granted Union Registration No. on September 26, 2003. Another permit was issued
for Bigkis Manggagawa ng De Ocampo Memorial School, Inc. dated December 5,
2003; Union Registration/Certificate of Creation of Local Chapter declaring that they
are legitimate organization.

A Petition for Cancellation of Certificate of Registration with the Department of Labor

and Employment - National Capital Region was filed by De Ocampo against Bigkis
Manggagawa ng De Ocampo Memorial School, Inc. dated March 4, 2004. Stating in
the petition the grounds of revocation of registration 1.) Misrepresentation of
declaring the officers and members 2.) Mixed membership of rank file 3.)
Inappropriate bargaining unit.

A Comment-Opposition was then filed by BMDOMSI, denying De Ocampo's

allegations and claiming that the latter only wants to impede the formation of the
union.

A decision of Acting Regional Director Ciriaco A. Lagunzad III of the DOLE-NCR

ruled that BMDOMSI committed misrepresentation by making it appear that the
bargaining unit is composed of faculty and technical employees.

The respondents then filed an appeal to Bureau of Labor Relations. On December

29, 2004, a decision was released by BLR reversing the Regional Director's finding
of misrepresentation, false statement or fraud in BMDOMSI’s application for
registration.

According to BLR the petitioner failed to present proof to support its allegation of
mixed membership within respondent union. Certiorari was filed by the petitioner to
the CA seeking to annul and set aside the BLR Decision as well as the Resolution
dated January 24, 2005 denying its motion for reconsideration. CA affirmed the
Decision of the BLR. It ruled that there was no misrepresentation, false statement or
fraud in the application for registration. The respondents were able to substantiate
that there have been no misrepresentation as the members appearing in the minutes
of the general membership meeting BMDOMSI Union, and the list of members who
attended the meeting and ratified the union constitution and by-laws, are in truth
employees of the school, though some service the hospital.
ISSUE: Whether or not De Ocampo Bigkis Manggagawa ng De Ocampo Memorial
School, Inc. Union Registration should be revoked

HELD: No. The respondents did not violate any regulation for them to have grounds
for cancelation of their Union Registration. BMDOMSI Union was able to testify to the
court that there were no misrepresentation, mixed membership and inappropriate
bargaining unit in their union. The CA ruled the according to Article 247 of the Labor
Code provides: Art. 247. Grounds for Cancellation of Union Registration. The
following may constitute grounds for cancellation of union registration:

1.) Misrepresentation, false statement or fraud in connection with the adoption or

ratification of the constitution and by-laws or amendments thereto, the minutes of
ratification, and the list of members who took part in the ratification;

2.)Misrepresentation, false statements or fraud in connection with the election of

officers, minutes of the election of officers, and the list of voters;

3.) Voluntary dissolution by the members.

The petitioner was not able to establish to the court the violation alleged to the
respondents, wherefore CA decision favored for BMDOMSI, and declaring the
petition denied for lack of merit.
36. NICOLAS VELASQUEZ, Et. Al v. PEOPLE
GR No. 195021, March 15, 2017

Facts: Petitioners along with four (4) other men were charged with attempted murder
under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code. All accused, except Ampong, who
remained at large, pleaded not guilty upon arraignment. Trial then ensued.

According to the prosecution, the spouses Jesus and Ana Del Mundo (Del Mundo
Spouses) left their home to sleep in their nipa hut, which was about 100 meters
away. Arriving at the nipa hut, the Del Mundo Spouses saw Ampong and Nora
Castillo (Nora) in the midst of having sex. Aghast at what he perceived to be a
defilement of his property, Jesus Del Mundo (Jesus) shouted invectives at Ampong
and Nora, who both scampered away. Jesus decided to pursue Ampong and Nora,
while Ana Del Mundo (Ana) left to fetch their son, who was then elsewhere. Jesus
went to the house of Ampong's aunt, but neither Ampong nor Nora was there. He
began making his way back home when he was blocked by Ampong and his fellow
accused.

Without provocation, petitioner Nicolas hit the left side of Jesus' forehead with a
stone. Petitioner Victor also hit Jesus' left eyebrow with a stone. Accused Felix did
the same, hitting Jesus above his left ear. Accused Sonny struck Jesus with a
bamboo, hitting him at the back, below his right shoulder. Ampong punched Jesus
on his left cheek. The accused then left Jesus on the ground, bloodied. Jesus
crawled and hid behind blades of grass, fearing that the accused might return. He
then got up and staggered his way back to their house.

At the Del Mundo Spouses' residence, Maria Teresita recounted to them what she
had witnessed (Jesus had managed to return home by then). Ana and Maria
Teresita then brought Jesus to Barangay Captain Pilita Villanueva, who assisted
them in bringing Jesus to the hospital.

After undergoing an x-ray examination, Jesus was found to have sustained a crack
in his skull. Dr. Jose D. De Guzman issued a medico-legal certificate indicating
injuries obtained by the victim. Dr. De Guzman noted that Jesus' injuries required
medical attention for four (4) to six (6) weeks. Jesus was also advised to undergo
surgery. He was, however, unable to avail of the required medical procedure due to
shortage of funds.

Issue: Whether or not Petitioners acted in defense of themselves and in defense of

their relatives.
Held: No. Petitioners failed to prove that they acted in defense of themselves and in
defense of their relatives. Anyone who acts in defense of the person or rights of his
spouse, ascendants, descendants, or legitimate, natural or adopted brothers or
sisters, or of his relatives by affinity in the same degrees, and those by consanguinity
within the fourth civil degree, provided that the first and second requisites prescribed
in the next preceding circumstance are present, and the further requisite, in case the
provocation was given by the person attacked, that the one making defense had no
part therein.

To successfully invoke self-defense, an accused must establish: "(1) unlawful

aggression on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means
employed to prevent or repel such aggression; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation
on the part of the person resorting to self-defense." Defense of a relative under
Article 11 (2) of the Revised Penal Code requires the same first two (2) requisites as
self-defense and, in lieu of the third "in case the provocation was given by the person
attacked, that the one making the defense had no part therein." In case at the bar,
petitioners' entire defense rests on proof that it was Jesus who initiated an assault by
barging into the premises of petitioners' residences, hacking Victor's door, and
threatening physical harm upon petitioners and their companions. That is, that
unlawful aggression originated from Jesus.
37. SPOUSES LARRY AND ROSARITA WILLIAMS, Petitioners vs RAINERO A.
ZERDA, Respondent
G.R. No. 207146, March 15, 2017

FACTS: Respondent Rainero A. Zerda (Zerda) was the owner of a parcel of land,
known as Lot No. 1177-B (dominant estate) of the Surigao Cadastre, situated in
Barangay Lipata, Surigao City. Behind the dominant estate was Lot No. 7298, a
swampy mangrove area owned by the Republic of the Philippines. On both sides
were Lot No. 1177-C, registered under the name of Woodridge Properties, Inc. and
Lot No. 1206, in the name of Luis G. Dilag. In front was Lot No. 1201-A owned by
petitioner-spouses Larry and Rosarita Williams (Spouses Williams), where the
national highway ran along. On July 28, 2004, Zerda filed a complaint against
Spouses Williams for easement of right of way. The complaint alleged that Zerda's
lot was without adequate outlet to a public highway, that it could not be accessed
except by passing through Spouses Williams' property; that the isolation of Zerda's
property was not due to his own acts, as it was the natural consequence of its
location; that the right of way he was claiming was at a point least prejudicial to
Spouses Williams' property; and that on January 27, 2004, Zerda wrote to Spouses
Williams formally asking them to provide him with right of way, for which he was
willing to pay its reasonable value or to swap a portion of his property, but Spouses
Williams refused.

Spouses Williams countered that the complaint should be dismissed for lack of
cause of action because Zerda failed to establish the requisites for the existence of
right of way. RTC ruled in favor of Spouses Williams. On November 28, 2012
Decision, the CA reversed and set aside the ruling of the RTC.

ISSUE: WHETHER RESPONDENT ZERDA IS ENTITLED TO AN EASEMENT OF

RIGHT OF WAY.

RULING: The conferment of the legal easement of right of way is governed by

Articles 649 and 650 of the Civil Code: ART. 649. The owner, or any person who by
virtue of a real right may cultivate or use any immovable, which is surrounded by
other immovables pertaining to other persons and without adequate outlet to a public
highway, is entitled to demand a right of way through the neighboring estates, after
payment of the proper indemnity. Should this easement be established in such a
manner that its use may be continuous for all the needs of the dominant estate,
establishing a permanent passage, the indemnity shall consist of the value of the
land occupied and the amount of the damage caused to the servient estate.
In case the right of way is limited to the necessary passage for the cultivation of the
estate surrounded by others and for the gathering of its crops through the servient
estate without a permanent way, the indemnity shall consist in the payment of the
damage caused by such encumbrance. This easement is not compulsory if the
isolation of the immovable is due to the proprietor's own acts. ART. 650. The
easement of right of way shall be established at the point least prejudicial to the
servient estate, and, insofar as consistent with this rule, where the distance from the
dominant estate to a public highway may be the shortest.
38. ROSEMARIE B. BINTUDAN, petitioner vs. THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT,
respondent.
G.R. No. 211937, March 21, 2017

Facts: On the night of March 16, 2005, unidentified suspects gained access inside
and robbed the DILG-CAR Provincial Office. They carted away the contents of the
vault amounting to ₱ 114,907.30. Petitioner Rosemarie Bindutan, Disbursing Officer
II of the DILG-CAR, reported the robbery to the Provincial Office in Lagawe, Ifugao
Police as well as to the Audit Team Leader (ATL) of DILG-CAR. On April 6, 2005,
she requested the ATL to be relieved from liability over the stolen money.

In its own investigation and inspection report, the ATL found the robbery to have
occurred while the brown filing steel cabinet was forcibly opened, the safe/vault was
opened with ease using the number combination that was posted on the door of the
safe/vault; the money inside the vault at the time or the robbery represents the
salaries and wages of the DILG-Ifugao Provincial Personnel; and there was early
withdrawal of the salaries and considering that the distance from the bank to the
DILG of1icc is only a few meters away.

The Legal and Adjudication Office National (LAO-N) of the COA denied the request
for relief of the petitioner because of her negligence. The petitioner moved for
reconsideration. In its Decision the COA LSS denied the petitioner's motion for
reconsideration. The petitioner's appeal to the COA, Commission Proper, was later
on denied.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner is guilty of negligence.

Held: Yes. Petitioner is guilty of negligence. The findings show that the petitioner
was severely negligent in the performance of her duties as the disbursing officer.
She did not properly discharge her responsibility to safeguard the public funds
entrusted to her. The ATL found that she had withdrawn from a nearby bank the
funds for salaries 13 days from the deadline for the submission of reports, and had
placed the funds inside the safety vault despite the number combination having been
left posted at safety vault's very door. She was further found to have even failed to
inform the security guard on duty that she had kept a considerable amount of cash in
the safety vault if only to ensure that the amount would be safe.

As provided in Presidential Decree No. 1445, Section 105. (1) Every officer
accountable for government property shall be liable for its money value in case of
improper or unauthorized use or misapplication thereof, by himself or any person for
whose acts he may be responsible. He shall likewise be liable for all losses,
damages, or deterioration occasioned by negligence in the keeping or use of the
property, whether or not it be at the time in his actual custody. (2) Every officer
accountable for government funds shall be liable for all losses resulting from the
unlawful deposit, use, or application thereof and for all losses attributable to
negligence in the keeping of the funds.

39. EDILBERTO M. PANCHO VS. SANDIGANBAYAN (6 th Division) and People of

the Philippines
GR Nos. 234886-911 – 235410, June 17, 2020
FACTS: The Field Investigation Office and Prosecution Officer (GIPO), Marie Beth
Almero (Almero) filed a Complaint-Affidavit with Office of the Ombudsman (OMB)
charging former Nueva Ecija Governor Joson and Petitioner Pancho (former
provincial treasurer) with violation of Sec 3 of RA 3019 and gross neglect of duty for
failure to remit Government Service System premiums and other trust liabilities of the
Provincial Government of Nueva Ecija.
The complaint-affidavit was referred to the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for
Luzon and was received on November 2013. On January 2014, the Deputy
Ombudsman for Luzon directed petitioner to submit their respective counter-
affidavits.
On July 1, 2015, the Special Panel of Investigation through GIPO submitted their
draft resolution finding probable cause against petitioner and on September 15,
2016, Ombudsman Conchita-Carpio Morales approved the resolution dated July 1,
2015.
Petitioner filed with the Sandiganbayan (SB) a Motion to Quash/Dismiss informations
contending that the Office of the Ombudsman is without authority or has lost
jurisdiction to file the case due to inordinate delay in the conduct of the preliminary
investigation. It took 1 year and 3 months to cause the filing of the informations
before the SB.
ISSUE: Whether the period between the approval of the draft resolution and filing of
the resolution or 1 year, 4 months and 16 days violated petitioner’s constitutional
right to speedy disposition of cases.
RULING: NO. Constitutional right to speedy disposition of cases, like the right to a
speedy trial, is deemed violated only when the proceeding is attended by vexations,
capricious, and oppressive delays. The prosecution was able to satisfactorily explain
the delay by stating that the drafting of the informations to be filed before the SB also
has to pass the scrutiny of the different offices within the OMB; otherwise, the
informations would not be able to stand the rigors of trial or would fail to charge the
correct offenses. On the other hand, petitioner, despite having actual knowledge of
the pendency of the criminal complaint against him, neglected to assert his rights
during the period in question. Considering his failure to timely question the allege
delay in the filing of the informations, he is deemed to have assented to the delay
and to have ultimately abandoned or waived his right to the speedy disposition of his
cases.

40. BENITO ESTRELLA y GILI vs. People of the Philippines

GR No. 212942, June 17, 2020
FACTS: An information was filed charging petitioner with intent to gain, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously acquire, possess, sell and dispose of 3 pails
of Skydrol knowing that it was stolen or otherwise derived the proceeds of the crime
of robbery or theft in violation of Section 2 of PD 1612 to the damage and prejudice
of the owner, Philippine Airlines.
Records shows that PAL is an importer of the fast fluid system, Skydrol and it is not
available in local market. PAL’s Maintenance and Engineering Management
Information noticed the acquisition and use of Skydrol remain unusually high
notwithstanding the downsizing of its operation, still there was a noted high usage of
Skydrol. Upon investigation, Yao found that Aerojam Supply and Trading (Aerojam)
a sole proprietorship owned by petitioner, was selling five gallons of Skydrol to Air
Philippines at a low price. He initially doubted since PAL was the sole proprietorship
of Skydrol in five-gallon pails.
The RTC found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Fencing
under PD 1612.
ISSUE: Whether the elements of the crime of Fencing were established by the
prosecution.
RULING: Yes. Under section 2 of PD 1612 defines fencing as the act of any person
who, with intent to gain for himself or for another, shall buy, receive, possess, keep,
acquire, conceal, sell or dispose of, or shall buy and sell, or in any manner deal in
any article, item, object or anything of value which he knows, or should be known to
him, to have been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft.
All elements of the offences of fencing considering the following:
First, the occurred of theft was duly established despite the downsizing of the PAL’s
operation, there was still unusual upward movement of PAL’s Skydrol consumption.
It was concluded that someone was stealing Skydrol from PAL.
Second, the petitioner was caugh in possession and in process of disposing pails of
Skydrol to Air Philippine.
Third, for failing to prove ownership of the Skydrol confiscated from him, petitioner
should have known that the three Skydrol pails were derived form an illegal source.
Petitioner failed to present his alleged supplier and the pertinent documents proving
that their transaction was legal.
Fencing is malum prohibitum, and PD 1612 creats a prima facie presumption of
Fencing from evidence of possession by the accused of any good, article, item,
object or anything of value, which has been the subject of robbery or theft.

41. People of the Philippines vs. Niel Raymond A. Nocido

GR No. 240229, June 17, 2020
FACTS: The victim, AAA, a 12 year old, narrated that she and her friends attended a
wake. While walking accused Bagon suddenly accosted and pointed a fan knife at
her. As soon as Bagon got hold of her, accused-appellant Nocido and accused
Ventura approached her. Fearing for her life, she struggle to free herself.
Unfortunately Ventura and Bagon were able to forcibly bring her to an alley that
leads to a vacant house. It was accused-appellant who guided them to the secluded
area. Bagon and Ventura raped AAA. Bagon and Ventura are both at-large.
Accused-Appellant raised the defense of denial, and placed the blame on his co-
accused Bagon and Ventura.
RTC convicted Nocido for rape by sexual assault, which he personally committed.
He was also held liable for rape through sexual intercourse committed by the other
two accused. The RTC explained that Nocido’s cooperation in the consummation of
the rape through sexual intercourse made him co-conspirator.
ISSUE: Whether Nocido is guilty as a conspirator.
RULING: Yes. The court takes into consideration that AAA was 12 years old at the
time of the commission of the crimes; and that when the sexual acts and sexual
intercourse were committed, these were done without her consent and by force,
intimidation and threat. The court affirms in convicting Nocido of rape under Article
266-A(1)(a) of the Revised Penal Code (rape through sexual intercourse). On the
other hand, the proper designation of the crime of rape by sexual assault committed
against a victim who is 12 years old or below 18 years old is lascivious conduct
under Section 5 (b) of RA 7610.
42. People of the Philippines vs. Jerry Sapla y Guerrero
GR No. 244045, June 16, 2020
FACTS: In an Information, the appellant was charged with violation of Section 5,
Article II of RA 9165 (possession of marijuana leaves)
The evidence for the prosecution established that an officer on duty received a
phone call from a concerned citizen who informed that a certain male individual
would be transporting marijuana from Kalinga and into the Province of Isabela. The
passenger jeepney arrived, wherein the police officers flagged down the said vehicle
and told its driver to park on the side of the road. Officers approached the jeepney
and saw Appellant-Accused Sapla and was asked if he was the owner of the blue
sack in front of him which he answered in affirmative. The office then requested to
open the blue sack. After accused open the sack, officers saw 4 bricks of suspected
marijuana leaves wrapped in newspaper and an old calendar. Officers subsequently
arrested accused-appellant Sapla and was informed the cause of his arrest, and his
constitutional rights in the Ilocano dialect.
ISSUE: Whether there was a valid search and seizure conducted by the police
officers.
RULING: No. As a rule, a search and seizure operation conducted by the authorities
is reasonable only when a court issues a search warrant after it has determined the
exercise of probable cause through the personal examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses presented before the court, with the
place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized particularly described.
There is a valid warrantless search and seizure conducted by the authorities such as
search of a moving vehicle. Warrantless search and seizure of the moving vehicles
are allowed in recognition of the impracticability of securing warrant under said
circumstances as the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction
in which the warrant may be sought. On the other hand, an extensive search of a
vehicle is permissible, but only when “the officers made it upon probable cause, i.e,
upon a belief, reasonably arising out of circumstances known to the seizing officer,
that an automobile or other vehicle contains an item or object which by law is subject
to seizure and destruction.
Applying the foregoing to the instant case, it cannot be disputed that the target of the
search conducted was not the passenger jeepney boarded by the Accused-Appellant
Sapla nor the cargo or contents of the said vehicle. The target of the search was the
person matched the description given by the person who called the RPSB hotline.

43. JESSICA M. CHOZAS vs. COMMISSION ON AUDIT

G.R. NO. 226319, October 8, 2018
FACTS: The Board of Regent (BOR) of Bulacan State University passed a
Resolution authorizing the grant of an Accomplishment Incentive Award in favor of
the officials, faculty members and non-academic personnel of BulSU in recognition
of their efforts and achievement in maintaining the BulSU’s program of excellence in
education, sports and culture. Consequently 164 Disbursement Vouchers for Special
Trust Fund (STF) with an aggregate amount more than 37Million were distributed to
the BoR, regular employees, part-time faculty and employees by job order/contract.
On post audit, the COA Auditor of BulSU issued a Notice of Disallowance (ND)
disallowing the payment of the accomplishment incentive award. The award was
disallowed for being irregular, bereft of legal basis and in contravention of Salary
Standardization Law.
Aggrieved by the disallowance, the petitioners-officials and petitioners-employees
filed appeals before the COA Regional Office. The Regional Director upheld the NDs
declaring that the Accomplishment Incentive Award cannot be regarded as part of
the programs/projects referred to in the Higher Education Modernization Act.
COA rendered decision and upheld the ND and categorically states that the STF
shall only be used for expenditures pertaining to the basic and primary objective of
state universities and colleges to attain quality education. The STF cannot be used
for the payment of the Accomplishment Incentive Award, which is not part of BulSU’s
academic program. Consequently, the petitioners-employee/officials were declared
liable to refund the illegal disbursement.
ISSUE: Whether COA erred in declaring the petitioners-employees/officials
personally liable to refund the accomplishment incentive award.

RULING: No. Concededly, R.A. No. 8292 grants the governing boards of state
universities and colleges the power to use the STF for any charges or expenses
necessary for instruction, research, extension and other programs or projects of the
university or college. Besides, the law clearly states that the STF may only be used
for expenses necessary for instruction, research and extension. The incentive
granted by the BulSU does not in any way relate to any particular academic program
or project pertaining to instruction, research, or extension. In fact, all that the BulSU
officers latch on to is the broad and vague excuse that the recipients aided in the
university's goal of achieving excellence. An automatic grant of incentives on shallow
and unsubstantiated grounds will certainly lead to the hemorrhaging of government
funds, which the Court shall not countenance.

Neither may the award be regarded as part of the catch-all phrase "other
programs/projects" of the BulSU. Notably, the basic statutory construction principle
of ejusdem generis states that where a general word or phrase follows an
enumeration of particular and specific words of the same class, the general word or
phrase must be construed to include, or to be restricted to things akin to, resembling,
or of the same kind or class as those specifically mentioned. 58 Thus, the phrase
"other programs/projects" must be interpreted to pertain to those relating to
instruction, research and extension.

44. MIGUEL “LUCKY” GUILLERMO vs. PHILIPPINE INFORMATION AGENCY

GR No. 223751, March 15, 2017
Facts:
Miguel "Lucky" Guillermo (Guillermo) and AV Manila Creative Production, Co. (AV
Manila) filed a Complaint for a sum of money and damages before the Regional Trial
Court of Marikina City.
Guillermo and AV Manila alleged that the Acting Secretary of the Department of
Public Works and Highways Victor Domingo (Acting Secretary Domingo), consulted
and discussed with Guillermo and AV Manila the urgent need for an advocacy
campaign.
Guillermo and AV Manila formally submitted in a letter-proposal the concept of
"Joyride," a documentary film showcasing milestones of the Arroyo Administration.
Acting Secretary Domingo signed a marginal note on the letter-proposal, which read,
"OK, proceed!"Guillermo and AV Manila allegedly worked on "Joyride" on a tight
schedule and submitted the finished product on April 4, 2010. "Joyride" was aired on
NBN-Channel4 on April 5, 2010.
Petitioners alleged that, they are working with the Department of Public Works and
Highways' production team, committed to the following deliverables: (a) reproduction
and distribution of a revised, expanded, and more comprehensive "Joyride"
documentary, for distribution to the Department of Foreign Affairs, the Department of
Transportation and Communication, Philippine consulates and embassies, and for
showing to various transport sectors, as well as to the audience of the Independence
Day rites on June 12, 2010 at the Quirino Grandstand in Rizal Park;[17] (b)
production and distribution of a "Joyride" coffee table book;[18] (c) production of
"Joyride" comics;[19] (d) production of a "Joyride" infomercial entitled "Sa Totoo
Lang!" in the form of a 45-second advertisement, which captured the essence of the
full length film;[20] and (e) production of a "Joyride" infomercial entitled "Sa Totoo
Lang-GFX"
Petitioners further alleged that Acting Secretary Domingo informed them that the
total consideration of P25,000,000.00 for their services and deliverable items was
acceptable and approved.
A Memorandum of Agreement dated April 30, 2010[27] was entered into by the Road
Board and respondent Philippine Information Agency. The Road Board was to
provide P15,000,000.00 to be released to the Philippine Information Agency for the
"Joyride" materials, and AV Manila was the preferred production agency.Thus, the
Philippine Information Agency instructed Guillermo to send billings directly to the
Philippine Information Agency.
Thereafter, petitioners delivered 10,000 "Joyride" comics to the Department of Public
Works and Highways, and subsequently billed the Philippine Information Agency
P15,000,000.00. No funds were released by the Philippine Information Agency.
After all the deliverables had been delivered, petitioners followed up on the payment
from the Philippine Information Agency. Despite several demands, no payments
were made.
Petitioners said that they made demands through letters dated August 19,
September 20, and October 12, 2010, to various officials of the Philippine
Information Agency, under the Administration of Former President Benigno Aquino
III. However, respondents refused and failed to pay the amount of P25,000,000.00.
The Office of the Solicitor General moved to dismiss the Complaint for failure to state
a cause of action and for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
The Regional Trial Court of Marikina granted the Office of the Solicitor General's
Motion to Dismiss, finding that, although a contract existed between petitioners and
Acting Secretary Domingo, this contract was not binding on the government of the
Philippines.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the Regional Trial Court Order dismissing petitioners'
Complaint. The Court of Appeals found that the Complaint sought to enforce a legal
right based on a contract. However, petitioners failed to prove the existence of a
contract
Issue: Whether the Complaint was properly dismissed for failure to state a cause of
action.
Ruling: A complaint states a cause of action if it sufficiently avers the existence of
the three (3) essential elements of a cause of action, namely: (a) a right in favor of
the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created; (b) an
obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate such right;
and (c) an act or omission on the part of the named defendant violative of the right of
the plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of defendant to the plaintiff for
which the latter may maintain an action for recovery of damages. If the allegations of
the complaint do not state the concurrence of these elements, the complaint
becomes vulnerable to a motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to state a cause
of action.
To sufficiently state a cause of action, the Complaint should have alleged facts
showing that the trial court could grant its prayer based on the strength of its factual
allegations.
The Complaint in this case prayed:WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is
respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court that, after proper proceedings, judgment
be rendered ordering the defendants to jointly and severally:1. Pay the plaintiffs the
amount of PESOS: TWENTY-FIVE MILLION (Php25,000,000.00) to cover plaintiffs'
services and the delivered items which were received and used by the defendants as
above-mentioned;2. Pay the plaintiff Guillermo an amount of not less than PESOS:
ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND (P100,000.00) as and by way of moral damages;3.
Pay the plaintiffs an amount of not less than PESOS: ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND
(P100,000.00) as and by way of exemplary or corrective damages;4. Pay the
plaintiffs an amount of not less than PESOS: ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND
(P100,000.00) as and by way of attorney's fees and litigation expenses; and5. Pay
the cost of the suit.
Assuming that the Complaint's factual allegations are true, they are not sufficient to
establish that the Regional Trial Court could grant its prayer.The Complaint attempts
to establish a contract that involves expenditure of public funds. As pointed out by
respondents, contracts involving the expenditure of public funds have additional
requisites to be valid. The Complaint, however, completely ignored the foregoing
requisites for the validity of contracts involving expenditure of public funds. Thus, the
Regional Trial Court could not order the enforcement of the alleged contract on the
basis of the Complaint, and the Complaint was properly dismissed for failure to state
a cause of action.