[G.R. No. L-18512. December 27, 1963.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. SIMACO BELLOSILLO,

FERNANDO DIOPIDO, ARTURO PALACIO, CRISOSTOMO GONZALES and
FEDERICO FRANCISCO, Defendants-Appellees.

Solicitor General, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Amado B. Atol for Defendants-Appellees.

SYLLABUS

1. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; JUDGMENTS; NO RES ADJUDICATA WHERE ORDER

OF DISMISSAL IS NOT DECISION ON THE MERITS. — Where an order dismissing a
criminal case is not a decision on the merits, it cannot bar a res adjudicata a
subsequent case based on the same offense.

2. ID.; ID.; NO RES ADJUDICATA IN CRIMINAL CASES. — The provision of Rule 30,
Section 3, of the Rules of Court, to the effect that a "dismissal shall have the effect of an
adjudication upon the merits, unless otherwise provided by the Court," does not apply to
criminal cases.

3. ID.; DOUBLE JEOPARDY; NOT APPLICABLE WHERE DISMISSAL WAS WITH

EXPRESS CONSENT OF ACCUSED. — The accused was never in double jeopardy
where the previous case had, not only been dismissed before arraignment and plea,
but, also, because its dismissal took place with the express consent of the accused.

DECISION

CONCEPCION, J.:

This is an appeal, taken by the prosecution, from an order of the Court of First Instance
of Iloilo dismissing the information in the above entitled case, with costs de oficio.

It is not disputed that, sometime in 1959, an information was filed with the Court of First
Instance of Iloilo and docketed therein as criminal case No. 7689, charging defendants
herein — Simaco Bellosillo, Fernando Diopido, Arturo Palacio, Crisostomo Gonzales
and Federico Francisco — with the crime of theft of coconuts, valued P300.00 and
belonging to Pe Julian Lao, allegedly committed on December 23, 1958. Predicated on
the ground that, upon a reinvestigation conducted at the request of the accused, it
turned out that the property from which the coconuts were allegedly stolen was involved
in a civil case between the complainant on the one hand and the accused on the other,
said criminal case was, on motion of the prosecution, and "with the express conformity"
of the accused, dismissed on January 4, 1960. However, soon thereafter, or on March
23, 1960, the prosecution filed against the accused an identical information which was
docketed as criminal case No. 7997 of the same court, and is the case at bar.

Before arraignment, the accused moved to quash the last information upon the ground
that the facts alleged therein do not constitute an offense, and that the previous
information therefor had been dismissed. The lower court granted this motion, upon the
theory that, having failed to move for a reconsideration of the order of dismissal of
January 4, 1960, or to appeal therefrom, the prosecution may no longer maintain the
present action. Hence, this appeal.

The order appealed from is untenable. The order of January 4, 1960, dismissing case
No. 7689, cannot be an obstacle to the institution of the present case for, not being a
decision on the merits, said order cannot bar the present case upon the principles of res
adjudicata, and the provision of Rule 30, section 3, of the Rules of Court, to the effect
that a "dismissal shall have the effect of an adjudication upon the merits, unless
otherwise provided by the Court," does not apply to criminal cases. Neither does the
present action place the accused twice in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense,
not only because he had never been in jeopardy of punishment therefor in the previous
case, the same having been dismissed before arraignment and plea, but, also, because
its dismissal took place with the express consent of the accused (Rule 113, section 9,
Rules of Court; U.S. v. Palisoc, 4 Phil., 207; U.S. v. Solis, 6 Phil., 676; U.S. v.
Sobreviñas, 35 Phil., 32; People v. Turla, 50 Phil., 676, People v. Romero, L-4517-20;
July 31, 1951; Gaudicela v. Lutero, L-4069, Resolution of May 21, 1951; People v.
Reyes, L-7712, March 23, 1956).

WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is hereby set aside and the case remanded to
the lower court for further proceedings, with costs de oficio. It is so ordered.
G.R. No. L-30526 November 29, 1971

BATAMA FARMER'S COOPERATIVE MARKETING ASSOCIATION INC. and

IGNACIO VICENTE, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE INOCENCIO ROSAL, in his capacity as Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Negros Oriental, ANTONIO VILLEGAS and JUAN TEVES, respondents.

Geminiano M. Eleccion for petitioners.

Lenin R. Victoriano for private respondents.

MAKASIAR, J.:

On December 11, 1968, respondent Antonio Villegas filed a complaint in the Court of
First Instance of Negros Oriental in Civil Case No. 4784, for injunction and damages
with prayer for a restraining order against the petitioners, claiming that since he already
resigned as a member of petitioner BATAMA Farmers' Cooperative Marketing
Association, Inc. as of July 10, 1968, and revoked, effective August 30, 1968, the
"Marketing Agreement and Power of Attorney" which he executed in favor of said
BATAMA Farmers' Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc., said association and its
agents should be enjoined from continuing or trying to continue, with the authority of the
1967-1968 "Marketing Agreement and Power of Attorney," in the management,
production, milling, and marketing of his sugar cane and sugar cane products for the
crop year 1968-1969 and succeeding crop years, or from doing or performing any act or
acts thereunder (pp. 1-2, Petition; Appendix "A", 18-22, rec.).

On December 18, 1968, the petitioners filed their Answer denying the material
averments of the complaint and as asserting affirmative defenses and counterclaims (p.
3, Petition; Appendix "G", pp. 24-27, rec.).

On January 6, 1969, respondent Juan Teves, claiming to have a legal interest in the
subject matter of respondent Antonio Villegas' complaint or in the success of the latter
because "he has a common cause of action with the plaintiff i.e., the lack of authority of
defendant association to act on the strength of the already-expired 'Marketing
Agreement and Power of Attorney'," filed, thru the same course of respondent Antonio
Villegas, an urgent motion for intervention. Attached to said motion was his proposed
complaint-in-intervention, in which he averred, among others that as a sugar cane
planter, he joined defendant association as a member and in 1967, signed with the
association a "Marketing Agreement and Power of Attorney" similar in substance as to
terms and conditions to the "Marketing Agreement and Power of Attorney" of plaintiff
Antonio Villegas with said association (pp. 3-4, Petition; Appendices "D" and "D-1", 29-
35, rec.).

On January 21, 1969, petitioners filed their opposition to urgent motion for intervention,
alleging that Juan Teves "Marketing Agreement and Power of Attorney" with defendant
BATAMA Farmers' Cooperative Marketing Association Inc., is entirely distinct and
separate from the Marketing Agreement and Power of Attorney" of plaintiff Antonio
Villegas; that accordingly, a breach or grievances arising out of one agreement, no
matter how similar it may be to a breach or grievance arising out of another or
agreement with another person, both in the manner of the infliction and in the remedy
for the redress thereof, does not and cannot give rise to a so-called "common cause of
action" that will justify intervention, or stated differently, that the rights of movant Juan
Teves under his "Marketing Agreement and Power of Attorney" with defendant
association are so entirely distinct and separate from the rights of plaintiff Antonio
Villegas under the latter's separate "Marketing Agreement and Power of Attorney" with
same defendant association, that their enforcement cannot be joined in one action or
complaint; and that the proposed intervenor's rights are not of such nature that may not
be fully protected in a separate proceeding (Appendix "H", pp. 40-42, rec.).

Private respondents filed their rejoinder to the opposition to the urgent motion for
intervention dated February 5, 1969, asserting, among others, that as "plaintiff-in-
intervention has certainly an interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of the
plaintiff, since he has a common cause of action with the plaintiff," the intervention is in
order (Appendix "J", pp. 45-46, rec.).

On March 15, 1969, respondent judge issued an order (Appendix "K", p. 47, rec.)
admitting respondent Juan Teves complaint-in-intervention, on the ground that it "is in
due form and substance and that it has, been shown that he has a legal interest in the
matter in litigation, or in the success of the plaintiff."

On March 27, 1969, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the last-mentioned
order on the ground that said order is contrary to the facts and the law of the case
(Appendix "L", pp. 48-50, rec.). This motion for reconsideration was denied by
respondent judge "for lack of sufficient merits" in an order dated May 7, 1969 (Appendix
"M", p. 51, rec.).

On May 12, 1969, petitioners filed an ex parte motion for extension of time to plead to
respondent Juan Teves' complaint-in-intervention (Appendix "N", p. 52, rec.).

On May 14, 1969, petitioners filed an urgent motion for suspension of proceedings on
the complaint-in-intervention of respondent Juan Teves (Appendix "P", pp. 54-56, rec.).
Acting on said motion, respondent judge, on May 15, 1969, issued an order, as prayed
for, suspending the proceedings, insofar as the complaint-in-intervention of Juan Teves
is concerned, in order to afford the petitioners an opportunity to test before the appellate
courts the validity of its order dated March 15, 1969, allowing the intervention of
respondent Juan Teves, giving the petitioners a period of fifteen (15) days for said
purpose (Appendix "Q", p. 57, rec.).

On May 27, 1969, the present petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction was filed
with this Court, petitioners praying among others for the annulment of the order of
respondent Judge dated March 15, 1969 allowing respondent Juan Teves' complaint-in-
intervention, as well as his order dated May 7, 1969, and to disallow as a consequence,
respondent Juan Teves' complaint-in-intervention (p. 16, Petition).

On June 28, 1969, this Court issued a writ of preliminary injunction, ordering respondent
Judge to refrain from taking any action on respondent Juan Teves' complaint-in-
intervention until further orders from this Court (pp. 64-65, rec.).

As clearly stated in Section 2 of Rule 12 of the Rules of Court, to be permitted to

intervene in a pending action, the party must have a legal interest in the matter in
litigation, in the success of either of the parties or an interest against both, or he must
be so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition if the
property in the custody of the court or an officer thereof.

The legal interest must be actual and material, direct and immediate, and not simply
contingent and expectant. If the party who has no true interest in the subject matter of
the action would be allowed to intervene, the proceedings will become unnecessarily
complicated, expensive and interminable, which contravenes the policies of the law. 1

Herein private respondent Juan Teves signed a separate independent contract with
herein petitioner Association. Nobody else, much less herein private respondent
Villegas, signed the said contract with him. Herein private respondent Villegas has
likewise a separate independent contract with herein petitioner Association, which he
alone signed, without any intervention on the part of herein private respondent Teves.
Consequently, private respondent Teves has no legal interest in the subject matter of
the contract signed by herein private respondent Villegas with petitioner Association.
The fact that their respective separate, distinct and independent contracts with herein
petitioner Association contain the same identical terms and conditions with respect to
the management, production, milling and marketing of their sugar cane, milled sugar
and the by-products thereof, does not create in favor of private respondent Teves a
legal interest in the contract of private respondent Villegas or vice versa. Whatever may
happen to the sugar cane, milled sugar, and its by-products belonging to private
respondent Villegas which are the subject matter of the contract between him and
herein petitioner Association, or any breach of the terms of said agreement, is no
concern of herein private respondent Juan Teves. Consequently, any decision that may
be rendered in the case filed by herein private respondent Villegas against herein
petitioner Association on the basis of Villegas' contract with petitioner Association, will
not affect one way or the other the interest of herein private respondent Juan Teves
under his own contract with herein petitioner Association. Respondent Teves is a total
stranger to, and therefore has no legal interest in, the contract of respondent Villegas
with petitioner Association.2 A mere collateral interest in the subject matter of the
litigation cannot justify intervention. 3

The interest of herein private respondent Juan Teves in the contract between herein
private respondent Villegas and herein petitioner Association, cannot be likened to the
interest of:

(1) an unpaid vendor who claims right of preference over the proceedings
of the sale of the properties he sold to a partnership under dissolution, by
reason of which such unpaid vendor may validity intervene in the
dissolution and distribution of the proceeds of the property of the
partnership;4

(2) a third party who claims preference over the mortgaged property
sought to be foreclosed, which interest justifies intervention, 5 unless said
third party is merely a general unsecured creditor; 6

(3) the heirs in the hereditary estate of a decedent, who believe that the
acts of a judicial administrator are prejudicial to their interests; 7

(4) the Republic of the Philippines, which can properly intervene in an

action instituted by a Filipino citizen against the Philippine Alien Property
Administration of the United States for the return of a parcel of land of
which said entity divested an enemy corporation of all title and rights and
transferred the same to the United States government, because under the
Property Act of 1946, such properties will have to be transferred to the
Republic of the Philippines;8

(5) the possessor of parcels of land, which are the subject matter of an
action filed by a judicial administratrix of the estate of her deceased
husband against another party seeking the annulment of a deed of sale
over said parcels of land, some of which parcels were the exclusive
property of her deceased husband and the others were conjugal property; 9

(6) the unpaid supplier of construction materials, who by reason thereof

can intervene in an action by the plaintiff for damages against the
defendant contractor who abandoned the unfinished construction of a
hospital; 10

(7) the alleged purchaser of the estate of the deceased who was allowed
to intervene in the probate of the will and testament of the said
deceased; 11

(8) the transferee or assignee of the insured's interest in his insurance

policy, who was allowed to intervene in an action filed by the insured
against the insurance company to recover on his policy under an
 agreement to pay certain fees to the attorney employed in the litigation,
because the transferee or assignee would in the end have to pay for such
attorney's fees; 12

(9) an alleged natural daughter of the decedent to intervene in the probate

of his will, upon the production of a prima facie evidence of her civil
status, 13 although only such heirs whose rights have been prejudiced can
intervene in the case of this character; 14

(10) an heir who can intervene in order to protect the interest of the
deceased, when the judicial administrator fails to interpose the necessary
and effective legal defenses in an action for the recovery of a claim
rejected by the committee on claims and appraisal; 15

(11) a testamentary heir who may properly intervene in a civil action filed
against the administratrix of the estate of the deceased to recover the
unpaid balance on a promissory note signed by the deceased and his
wife, where the wife alleges that the said promissory note is fictitious,
without consideration and was obtained through
fraud; 16

(12) an heir to intervene in the probate of a will and distribution of the

testatrix's estate at any time after the court acquired jurisdiction over the
estate and establishes his right to participate in the final distribution or
disposition thereof; 17

(13) an alleged partner of the deceased to intervene in the approval of the

accounts of the said deceased on the allegations that he and the
deceased during his lifetime had formed a partnership which was
dissolved upon the death of one of the partners; 18 or

(14) the intervenor seeking possession of the vessel solely from the
plaintiff who tried to remove from the defendant the possession of said
vessel. 19

The interest of the herein private respondent Teves does not even approximate the
interest of a party whose intervention was disallowed in the following cases:.

(1) one who claims that the goods sold by the plaintiff to the defendant
were acquired from him, cannot intervene in the case, where it was found
that the sale by the intervenor to the plaintiff and the sale by plaintiff to the
defendant were two separate and distinct sales which had been
consummated (similar to the case at bar) and such intervention would only
result in delay in the adjudication of the right of parties and the claim of the
intervenor could be better threshed out in a separate proceeding; 20
 (2) in an action filed against the defendant for the recovery of the value of
a certain promissory note, the heirs of the deceased husband of the
defendant, who on the date of the execution of the note was already
married to another, cannot intervene as they have no sufficient legal
interest as their interest in the property of the deceased is, if not
conjectural, contingent and expectant; 21

(3) in an action for partition of property of a deceased person where an

amicable settlement was reached whereby one of the defendants ceded
his interest and title in a parcel of land to the plaintiff, a third party who
claims that the said land ceded in the amicable settlement had already
been adjudicated to them by the cadastral court, cannot properly intervene
as the proceeding is in personam, not in rem and therefore, he is not
bound by the amicable settlement; 22

(4) in an action for the foreclosure of a real estate mortgage executed by

the defendant in favor of the plaintiff, the collector of internal revenue
cannot properly intervene on the ground that the two defendants in said
cases were indebted to the government for a deficiency in a specific tax; 23

(5) the owner of merchandise lost by reason of a collision between two

vessels, may not be allowed to intervene in an action between the owners
of the two steamships for damages; 24

(6) neither a mere creditor can intervene in a foreclosure suit since he has
no right to the property litigated; 25 when the rights of the intervenor may
be fully protected in the separate proceedings, the intervention should be
disallowed. 26

A fortiori the intervention of herein private respondent Teves should have been

disallowed by the trial court, which erred in so permitting his intervention in the case
filed by private respondent Villegas against herein petitioner Association.

While it is true that the motion for intervention is addressed to the sound discretion of
the trial court (Section 2[b], Rule 12, Rules of Court), such discretion however is not
without limitations. 27 Intervention should be denied when it will unduly delay or
prejudice the adjudication of the right of the parties; 28 or when the claim of the
intervenor can be properly decided in a separate proceedings like the claim of
respondent Teves.

To sustain the position of private respondent Juan Teves would be to permit persons
similarly situated as he is, to save on filling fees and other expenses of litigation by just
intervening in cases analogous to the case filed by private respondent Villegas against
herein petitioner Association.
There are numerous borrowers from financing institutions and purchasers on credit from
industrial concerns from Batanes in the North down to Sulu in the South executing
identical contracts with the same terms and conditions. Following the logic of herein
private respondent Juan Teves, the moment one borrower or purchaser on credit files a
suit on the basis of his contract with the creditor firm, all other customers of such firm
with similar contracts can intervene in such suit. Such absurdity can never be
envisioned as permissible under the rules on intervention.

The respondent Judge therefore committed a grave abuse of discretion in allowing the
intervention of private respondent Juan Teves in Civil Case No. 4784.

As a consequence, private respondent Juan Teves should file against herein petitioner
Association a separate action, which may be heard jointly with Civil Case No. 4784,
should the court and the parties find it feasible and convenient.

WHEREFORE, the writ prayed for is granted; the orders of respondent Judge dated
March 15, 1969 and May 7, 1969 are hereby set aside as null and void; and the motion
for intervention and the complaint filed by private respondent Juan Teves are hereby
denied and disallowed, with costs against private respondents Antonio Villegas and
Juan Teves.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee,

Barredo and Villamor, JJ., concur.

PEOPLE VS. SERGIO

FACTS: Mary Jane Veloso, Maria Cristina P. Sergio (Cristina), and Julius L. Lacanilao
(Julius) were friends and neighbors in Talavera, Nueva Ecija. Taking advantage of her
dire situation and susceptibility, Cristina and Julius offered Mary Jane a job as a
domestic helper in Malaysia. Cristina gave Mary Jane her plane ticket as well as a
luggage to bring on her trip. She then asked Cristina why the luggage was heavy but
the latter simply replied that because it was new. The luggage was the same bag she
used on her trip to Indonesia. It was only after she was apprehended at the airport when
Mary Jane realized that it contained prohibited drugs.

The Philippine Government requested the Indonesian Government to suspend the

scheduled execution of Mary Jane. It informed the Indonesian Government that the
recruiters and traffickers of Mary Jane were already in police custody, and her testimony
is vital in the prosecution of Cristina and Julius.

The Indonesian authorities however imposed the following conditions relative to the
taking of Mary Jane's testimony, viz.:

(a) Mary Jane shall remain in detention in Yogyakarta, Indonesia;

(b) No cameras shall be allowed;

(c) The lawyers of the parties shall not be present; and

(d) The questions to be propounded to Mary Jane shall be in writing. 

Thereafter, the State filed a "Motion for Leave of Court to Take the Testimony of
Complainant Mary Jane Veloso by Deposition Upon Written Interrogatories. " It averred
that the taking of Mary Jane's testimony through the use of deposition upon written
interrogatories is allowed under Rule 23 of the Revised Rules of Court because she is
out of the country and will not be able to testify personally before the court due to her
imprisonment.

Cristina and Julius objected to the motion asserting that the deposition should be made
before and not during the trial. The depositions under Rules 23 and 25 of the Rules of
Court are not designed to replace the actual testimony of the witness in open court and
the use thereof is confined only in civil cases. Also, they argued that such method of
taking testimony will violate their right to confront the witness, Mary Jane, or to meet her
face to face as provided under Section 14(2) of the 1987 Constitution. Finally, they
claimed that the prosecution's reliance on the Rules of Procedure for Environmental
Cases and the Judicial Affidavit Rule was misplaced because the affiants therein were
still subject to cross-examination.

The RTC granted the motion. CA reversed the RTC.

ISSUES:

[1] Does Rule 23 apply to criminal cases?

[2] Will allowing deposition of Mary Jane violate the right of the accused to confront the
witnesses?

HELD: 

On Substantive Matters

The OSG asserts that the presence of extraordinary circumstances, i.e., Mary Jane's
conviction by final judgment and her detention in a prison facility in Yogyakarta,
Indonesia, while awaiting execution by firing squad; the grant by the Indonesian
President of an indefinite reprieve in view of the ongoing legal proceedings against
Cristina and Julius in the Philippines; and the conditions attached to the reprieve
particularly that Mary Jane should remain in confinement in Indonesia, and any question
propounded to her must only be in writing, are more than enough grounds to have
allowed the suppletory application of Rule 23 of the Rules of Court.

The OSG's contentions are meritorious.

The Court cannot subscribe to the pronouncement by the appellate court that the State
failed to show compelling reasons to justify the relaxation of the Rules and the
suppletory application of Rule 23. The Court also cannot agree to its declaration that the
constitutional rights of Cristina and Julius to confront a witness will be violated since
safeguards were set in place by the trial court precisely to protect and preserve their
rights.

Section 15, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court

is inapplicable in the instant case

Under Section 15, Rule 119 of the revised Rules of Criminal Procedure , in order for the
testimony of the prosecution witness be taken before the court where the case is being
heard, it must be shown that the said prosecution witness is either: (a) too sick or infirm
to appear at the trial as directed by the order of the court, or; (b) has to leave the
Philippines with no definite date of returning.

Surely, the case of Mary Jane does not fall under either category. Therefore, a liberal
interpretation of the Rules should be allowed. We should not silence Mary Jane and
deny her and the People of their right to due process by presenting their case against
the said accused. By the CA's belief that it was rendering justice to the respondents, it
totally forgot that it in effect impaired the rights of Mary Jane as well as the People. By
not allowing Mary Jane to testify through written interrogatories, the Court of Appeals
deprived her of the opportunity to prove her innocence before the Indonesian authorities
and for the Philippine Government the chance to comply with the conditions set for the
grant of reprieve to Mary Jane.

The extraordinary factual circumstances

surrounding the case of Mary Jane warrant
the resort to Rule 23 of the Rules of Court

Is the prosecution's resort to Rule 23 of the Rules of Court in taking Mary Jane's
testimony as a prosecution witness proper? Yes.

Interestingly, nowhere in the present Rules on Criminal Procedure does it state how a
deposition, of a prosecution witness who is at the same time convicted of a grave
offense by final judgment and imprisoned in a foreign jurisdiction, may be taken to
perpetuate the testimony of such witness. The Rules, in particular, are silent as to how
to take a testimony of a witness who is unable to testify in open court because he is
imprisoned in another country.

Depositions, however, are recognized under Rule 23 of the Rules on Civil Procedure.
Although the rule on deposition by written interrogatories is inscribed under the said
Rule, the Court holds that it may be applied suppletorily in criminal proceedings so long
as there is compelling reason.
Verily, in light of the unusual circumstances surrounding the instant case, the Court
sees no reason not to apply suppletorily the provisions of Rule 23 of the Rules on Civil
Procedure in the interest of substantial justice and fairness. Hence, the taking of
testimony of Mary Jane through a deposition by written interrogatories is in order.

The deposition by written interrogatories

is pursuant to Mary Jane's right to due process

Furthermore, to disallow the written interrogatories will curtail Mary Jane's right to due
process.

The benchmark of the right to due process in criminal justice is to ensure that all the
parties have their day in court. It is in accord with the duty of the government to follow a
fair process of decision-making when it acts to deprive a person of his liberty. But just
as an accused is accorded this constitutional protection, so is the State entitled to due
process in criminal prosecutions. It must likewise be given an equal chance to present
its evidence in support of a charge.

No violation of the constitutional right to confrontation of a witness

Similarly, the deposition by written interrogatories will not infringe the constitutional right
to confrontation of a witness of Cristina and Julius.

The right to confrontation is part of due process not only in criminal proceedings but
also in civil proceedings as well as in proceedings in administrative tribunals with quasi-
judicial powers. It has a two-fold purpose: (1) primarily, to afford the accused an
opportunity to test the testimony of the witness by cross-examination; and (2)
secondarily, to allow the judge to observe the deportment of the witness.

True, Cristina and Julius have no opportunity to confront Mary Jane face to face in light
of the prevailing circumstance. However, the terms and conditions laid down by the trial
court ensure that they are given ample opportunity to cross-examine Mary Jane by way
of written interrogatories so as not to defeat the first purpose of their constitutional right.
To recall, the trial court requires Cristina and Julius, through their counsel, to file their
comment and may raise objections to the proposed questions in the written
interrogatories submitted by the prosecution. The trial court judge shall promptly rule on
the objections. Thereafter, only the final questions would be asked by the Consul
of the Philippines in Indonesia or his designated representative. The answers of
Mary Jane to the propounded questions must be written verbatim, and a transcribed
copy of the same would be given to the counsel of the accused who would, in turn,
submit their proposed cross interrogatory questions to the prosecution. Should the
prosecution raised any objection thereto, the trial court judge must promptly rule on the
same, and the final cross interrogatory questions for the deposition of Mary Jane will
then be conducted. Mary Jane's answers in the cross interrogatory shall likewise be
taken in verbatim and a transcribed copy thereof shall be given to the prosecution.
The second purpose of the constitutional right to confrontation has likewise been
upheld. As aptly stated in the terms and conditions for the taking of deposition, the trial
court judge will be present during the conduct of written interrogatories on Mary Jane.

Indubitably, the constitutional rights of Cristina and Julius are equally safeguarded. The
parameters laid down by the trial court are sufficient in detail ensuring that Mary Jane
will give her testimony under oath to deter lying by the threat of perjury charge. She is
still subjected to cross-examination so as to determine the presence of any falsehood in
her testimony. Lastly, the guidelines enable the trial court judge to observe her
demeanor as a witness and assess her credibility. SO ORDERED.