BAR OPS 1

SUBMISSION No. 5
CASE NO. 61-75

Submitted by:
JAN VEAH P. CAABAY
LLB-IV

Submitted to:
ATTY. ALLAN B. CARLOS
Professorial Lecturer

Date Submitted: 10/23/2020

 TABLE OF CONTENTS
1. People of the Philippines Vs. Joel Limson y Ferrer, et al.
G.R. No. 233533. June 30, 2020
2. Edgar T. Carreon Vs. Mario Aguillon and Betty P. Lopez
G.R. No. 240108. June 29, 2020
3. Mathew Constancio M. Santamaria Vs. Atty. Raul O. Tolentino
A.C. No. 12006. June 29, 2020
4. People of the Philippines Vs. Lucille M. David
G.R. No. 233089. June 29, 2020
5. Jesus David Vs. Atty. Diosdado M. Rongcal, et al.
A.C. No. 12103. June 23, 2020
6. People of the Philippines Vs. Jefferson Bacares
G.R. No. 243024. June 23, 2020
7. People of the Philippines Vs. PO1 Dennis Jess Esteban Lumikid
G.R. No. 242695. June 23, 2020
8. People of the Philippines Vs. Reggie Briones y Duran
G.R. No. 240217. June 23, 2020
9. Jose Tapales Villarosa Vs. People of the Philippines
G.R. Nos. 233155-63. June 23, 2020
10. People of the Philippines Vs. Jonathan Maylon y Alvero alias “Jun Puke”
and Arnel Estrada y Glorian
G.R. No. 240664. June 22, 2020
11. Helen L. Say, et al. Vs. Gabriel Dizon
G.R. No. 227457. June 22, 2020
12. Dr. Maria Encarnacion R. Legaspi Vs. Atty. Florencio D. Gonzales
A.C. No. 12076. June 22, 2020
13. People of the Philippines Vs. Cesaria Basio Vertudes and Henry Basio
Vertudes
G.R. No. 220725. October 16, 2019
14. Moises G. Coro Vs. Montano B. Nasayao
G.R. No. 235361. October 16, 2019
 TABLE OF CONTENTS
15. Romeo A. Beltran and Danilo G. Sarmiento Vs. Sandiganbayan, et al.
G.R. No. 201117. January 22, 2020
16. Manila International Airport Authority Vs. Commission on Audit
G.R. No. 218388. October 15, 2019
17. Angel A. Arde Vs. Atty. Evangeline De Silva
A.C. No. 7607. October 15, 2019
18. Atty. Francis V. Gustillo Vs. Atty. Estefano H. De la Cruz
A.C. No. 12318. October 15, 2019
19. Re: Report of Atty. Maria Consuelo Aissa P. Wong-Ruste, Assistant Clerk of
Court, Court...
A.M. No. 19-08-19-CA. October 15, 2019
20. Leila M. De Lima Vs. President Rodrigo R. Duterte
G.R. No. 227635. October 15, 2019
21. Re: News report of Mr. Jomar Canlas in the Manila Times issue of 8 March
2016
A.M. No. 16-03-10-SC. October 15, 2019
22. Film Development Council of the Philippines Vs. Colon Heritage Realty
Corporation/Film Development Council of The Philippines Vs. City Of Cebu
And Sm Prime Holdings, Inc.
G.R. No. 203754/G.R. No. 204418. October 15, 2019
23. Ferdinand “Bongbong” R. Marcos, Jr. Vs. Maria Leonor “Leni Daang
Matuwid” G. Robredo
P.E.T. Case No. 005. October 15, 2019
24. Sto. Niño Construction represented by Dexter W. Tsang Vs. Commission
on Audit, represented by Hon. Michael G. Aguinaldo, Chairperson
G.R. No. 244443. October 15, 2019
25. Shangri-la Properties, Inc. Vs. BF Corporation/BF Corporation Vs. Shangri-
la Properties, Inc., et al.
G.R. Nos. 187552-53/G.R. Nos. 187608-09. October 15, 2019
26. Office of the Court Administrator Vs. Judge Ofelia Tuazon-Pinto, and
Officer-in-charge/Legal Researcher Raquel L.D. Clarin, Both Of The Regional
Trial Court, Branch 60, Angeles City
A.M. No. RTJ-10-2250. October 15, 2019
27. Eric F. Acosta and Nathaniel G. Dela Paz Vs. Hon. Paquito N. Ochoa, et. al.
G.R. No. 211559/G.R. No. 211567/G.R. No. 212570/G.R. No. 215634. October
15, 2019
28. In the matter of Petition for Writ of Amparo of Vivian A. Sanchez
G.R. No. 242257. October 15, 2019
29. Jake Mesa y San Juan Vs. People of the Philippines
G.R. No. 241135. October 14, 2019
30. Capt. Jomar B. Daquioag Vs. Office of the Ombudsman and Hadji Salam M.
Alabain
 G.R. No. 228509. October 14, 2019
TABLE OF CONTENTS (15)
31. Lydia Balma Ceda-Tugano Vs. Jerry R. Marcelino, Sheriff III, Metropolitan
Trial Court, Branch 71,...
A.M. No. P-14-3233. October 14, 2019
32. Rowena Padas y Garcia @ “Weng”
G.R. No. 244327. October 14, 2019
33. People of the Philippines Vs. Eduardo Lacdan y Perez @ “Edwin” and
Romualdo Vierneza...
G.R. No. 208472. October 14, 2019
34. Efren J. Julleza Vs. Orient Line Philippines, Inc. Orient Navigation
Corporation and Macario Dela...
G.R. No. 225190. July 29, 2019
35. The People of the Philippines Vs. Dante Cubay y Ugsalan
G.R. No. 224597. July 29, 2019
36. Hayden Kho, Sr. Vs. Dolores G. Magbanua, et al.
G.R. No. 237246. July 29, 2019
37. Coca-Cola Femsa Philippines Vs. Ricardo S. Macapagal, et al.
G.R. No. 232669. July 29, 2019
38. People of the Philippines Vs. Albert Perez Flores
G.R. No. 241261. July 29, 2019
39. Gregorio Telen y Ichon Vs. People of the Philippines
G.R. No. 228107. October 9, 2019
40. Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company Vs. Citi Appliance M.C.
Corporation
G.R. No. 214546. October 9, 2019
41. Danilo S. Ibañez Vs. People of the Philippines
G.R. No. 198932. October 9, 2019
42. Department of Justice Prosecutor General Claro A. Arellano, et al. Vs.
Magtanggol B. Gatdula
G.R. No. 212215. October 9, 2019 [Date Uploaded: 03/10/2020]
43. People of the Philippines Vs. Jenny Tecson y Avecilla
G.R. No. 243786. October 9, 2019
44. Mark Eliseus M. Villola Vs. United Philippine Lines, Inc. and Fernandino T.
Lising
G.R. No. 230047. October 9, 2019
45. The People of the Philippines Vs. Noli Villegas, Jr., Lacrete
G.R. No. 218210. October 9, 2019
 TABLE OF CONTENTS
46. Perfecto M. Pascua Vs. Bank Wise, Inc. and Philippine Veterans
Bank/Bankwise, Inc. Vs. Perfecto M. Pascua and Philippine Veterans Bank
G.R. No. 191460/G.R. No. 191464. January 31, 2018
47. People of the Philippines Vs. Joshua Que y Utuanis
G.R. No. 212994. January 31, 2018
48. Paz E. Rebadulla, et al. Vs. Republic of the Philippines, The Secretary of
Public Works & Highways, and Engr. Tomas L. Buen, Project Manager, DPWH-
PMO-SWIM Project
G.R. No. 222159. January 31, 2018
49. Roberto P. Mabini Vs. Atty. Vitto A. Kintanar
A.C. No. 9512. February 5, 2018
50. People of the Philippines Vs. Glenn De Guzman y Delos Reyes
G.R. No. 219955. February 5, 2018
51. Felicitas L. Salazar Vs. Remedios Felias
G.R. No. 213972. February 5, 2018
52. Edmisael C. Lutap Vs. People of the Philippines
G.R. No. 204061. February 5, 2018
53. Carolina Que Villongco, et al. Vs. Cecilia Que Yabut, et al./Ceclia Que
Yabut, e tla. Vs. Carolina Que Villongco, et al.
G.R. No. 225022/G.R. No. 225024. February 5, 2018
54. Republic of the Philippines Vs. Banal na Pag-Aaral, Inc.
G.R. No. 193305. February 5, 2018
55. Office of the Court Administrator Vs. Paulino I. Sagyuod
A.M. No. P-17-3705. February 6, 2018
56. Representatives Edcel C. Lagman, et al. Vs. Senate President Aquilino
Pimentel III, et al./Eufemia Campos, et al. Vs. President Rodrigo Duterte, et
al./Loretta Ann P. Rosales Vs. President Rodrigo Duterte, et al./Christian S.
Monsod, et al. Vs. Senate President Aquilino Pimentel III, et al.
A.C. No. 235935/G.R. No. 236061/G.R. No. 236145/G.R. No. 236155. February 6,
2018
57. Office of the Court Administrator Vs. Alma P. Licay/Office of the Court
Administrator Vs. Alma P. Licay
A.M. No. P-11-2959. February 6, 2018
58. Janet Lim Napoles Vs. Sandiganbayan
G.R. No. 224162. February 6, 2018
59. Facilities, Incorporated Vs. Ralph Lito W. Lopez
G.R. No. 208642. February 7, 2018
60. People of the Philippines Vs. Abdulwahid Pundugar
G.R. No. 214779. February 7, 2018
 61. Perfecto M. Pascua Vs. Bank Wise, Inc. and Philippine Veterans Bank/Bankwise, Inc.
Vs. Perfecto M. Pascua and Philippine Veterans Bank
G.R. No. 191460/G.R. No. 191464. January 31, 2018

FACTS:
Perfecto M. Pascua was employed by Philippine Veterans Bank as Executive Vice
President for Marketing. In a Memorandum of Agreement, Philippine Veterans Bank obliged
itself to purchase the entire outstanding capital stock of Bankwise. Thereafter, the Philippine
Veterans Bank elected a new set of members of board of directors and appointed a new set
of officers. Pascua was reassigned to a Special Accounts Unit without specification as to his
duties and responsibilities.
Pascua was then instructed to tender his resignation as part of the merger agreement
of the Bank with the guarantee that Pascua would receive all his money claims during the
transition. He pleaded through a letter that he may be allowed to stay until the end of the year.
Seeing as Pascua had yet to submit his resignation, the director of Bankwise told Pascua that
it was imperative that he submit his resignation and assured his continued service with
Philippine Veterans Bank. Thereafter, Pascua tendered his resignation.
Despite repeated demands for his money claims, Philippine Veterans and Bankwise
failed to release Pascua’s remuneration. Pascua then filed a complaint for illegal dismissal,
non-payment of salary, overtime pay, holiday pay, premium pay for holiday, service incentive
leave, 13th month pay, separation pay, retirement benefits, actual damages, moral damages,
exemplary damages and attorney’s fees against the banks.
The Labor Arbiter dismissed the case on the ground that Pascua had voluntarily
resigned. NLRC reversed the LA’s decision and held that Pascua is constructively dismissed.

ISSUE: Whether or not Pascua is constructively dismissed?

HELD:
No. Perfecto Pascua held a highly technical position in the company and he would have
supervised several employees in his long years in service and might have even processed
their resignation letters. He would have been completely aware of the implications of signing a
categorically worded resignation letter. If he did not intend to resign, he would not have
submitted a resignation letter. He would have continued writing letters to Bankwise signifying
his continued refusal to resign.
Pascua's resignation letter was unconditional. It contained no reservations that it was
premised on his subsequent claim for severance pay and other benefits. His resignation was
also accepted by his employers. In this instance, Pascua is not considered to have been
constructively dismissed.
The employer has the burden of proving, in illegal dismissal cases, that the employee
was dismissed for a just or authorized cause. Even if the employer claims that the employee
resigned, the employer still has the burden of proving that the resignation was voluntary.
 It is constructive dismissal when resignation "was made under compulsion or under
circumstances approximating compulsion, such as when an employee's act of handing in his
or her resignation was a reaction to circumstances leaving him or her no alternative but to
resign."
The Court also discussed that "Resignation is the voluntary act of an employee who is
in a situation where one believes that personal reasons cannot be sacrificed in favor of the
exigency of the service, and one has no other choice but to dissociate oneself from
employment." In order to prove that resignation is voluntary, "the acts of the employee before
and after the alleged resignation must be considered in determining whether he or she, in
fact, intended to sever his or her employment."
However, Pascua admitted that he filed a categorical letter of resignation.
 62. People of the Philippines Vs. Joshua Que y Utuanis
G.R. No. 212994. January 31, 2018

FACTS:
Two separate Informations were filed charging accused¬ appellant Que with violating
Sections 5 and 11 of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act.
PO3 Lim of the Philippine National Police Zamboanga City Mobile Group recounted
that an informant reported that a person identified as "Joshua," later identified as Que, was
selling shabu. Acting on this report, P/C Insp. Nickson Babul Muksan (P/C Insp. Muksan)
organized a buy-bust operation with PO3 Lim as poseur-buyer. PO3 Lim and the informant
then left for the area of Fort Pilar. There, the informant introduced PO3 Lim to Que. PO3 Lim
then told Que that he intended to purchase P100.00 worth of shabu. Que then handed him
shabu inside a plastic cellophane. In turn, PO3 Lim handed Que the marked P100.00 bill and
gave the pre-arranged signal to have Que arrested.
After the arrest, the marked bill and another sachet of shabu were recovered from Que.
Que was then brought to the police station where the sachets of shabu and the marked bill
were turned over to the investigator, SPO4 Eulogio Tubo (SPO4 Tubo), who then marked
these items with his initials. He also prepared the letter request for laboratory examination of
the sachets' contents. Arresting officer SPO1 Jacinto also testified to the same circumstances
recounted by PO3 Lim.
P/C Insp. Diestro recounted their office's receipt of a request for laboratory examination
of the contents of two (2) plastic sachets. She noted that these contents tested positive for
shabu. The RTC found Que Guilty of the crimes charged.

ISSUE: Whether or not Joshua Que's guilt for violating Sections 5 and 11 of the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 was proven beyond reasonable doubt.

HELD:
No. As regards the items seized and subjected to marking, Section 21(1) of the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act, as amended, requires the performance of two (2)
actions: physical inventory and photographing. Section 21(1) is specific as to when and where
these actions must be done. As to when, it must be "immediately after seizure and
confiscation." As to where, it depends on whether the seizure was supported by a search
warrant. If a search warrant was served, the physical inventory and photographing must be
done at the exact same place that the search warrant is served. In case of warrantless
seizures, these actions must be done "at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of
the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable."
In the present case, although PO1 Santos had written his initials on the two plastic
sachets submitted to the PNP Crime Laboratory Office for examination, it was not indubitably
shown by the prosecution that PO1 Santos immediately marked the seized drugs in the
presence of appellant after their alleged confiscation. There is doubt as to whether the
substances seized from appellant were the same ones subjected to laboratory examination
and presented in court. There is no showing that a proper inventory and taking of pictures
was done by the apprehending officers. The marking of the sachets of shabu supposedly
obtained from accused-appellant was conducted at a police station without accused-
appellant, or any person representing him, around. There was not even a third person, whose
presence was required by Section 21(1) prior to its amendment — "a representative from the
media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official."
An admitted deviation from Section 21's prescribed process is an admission that statutory
requirements have not been observed. This admitted disobedience can only work against the
prosecution's cause.
The prosecution here failed to account for the intervening period between the supposed
handover of the sachet from accused-appellant to PO3 Lim, to the marking of the sachets by
SPO4 Tubo. Likewise, it absolutely failed to identify measures taken during transit from the
target area to the police station to ensure the integrity of the sachets allegedly obtained and to
negate any possibility of adulteration or substitution.
 63. Paz E. Rebadulla, et al. Vs. Republic of the Philippines, The Secretary of Public Works
& Highways, and Engr. Tomas L. Buen, Project Manager, DPWH-PMO-SWIM Project
G.R. No. 222159. January 31, 2018

FACTS:
Paz E. Rebadulla is the widow of Pablo G. Rebadulla with whom she had seven
children. The DPWH took parcels of land belonging to the Rebadullas for its Small Water
Impounding Management Project (SWIM Project). The Rebadullas rejected the price offered
by the DPWH, at P2.50 per square meter, based on the valuation of the Provincial Appraisal
Committee (PAC). No expropriation proceedings were instituted by the DPWH.
The Rebadullas wrote to the SWIM Project Management Office, requesting for a
reappraisal of their property and stating that P200.00 per square meter (sq m) was its fair
value. Thereafter, the Rebadullas wrote to the Department of Finance-Bureau of Local
Government Finance (DOF-BLGF) asking for the reappraisal of their properties. In its letter,
the DOF-BLGF informed the Rebadullas that although it had recommended a reappraisal of
the property, with P100.00 per square meter as a benchmark, the PAC declined to change its
initial valuation. The DOF-BLGF, thus, suggested that the Rebadullas pursue judicial
remedies.
The Rebadullas wrote to Engr. Buen with a final demand for P200.00 per sq m.
Subsequently, they filed a Complaint for mandamus and damages before the RTC, against
the Republic, the Secretary of Public Works and Highways and Engr. Buen (collectively, the
"Government"), praying that the Republic and/or DPWH pay just compensation, in the amount
to be determined as the fair market value by the RT.
The RTC ruled that the Republic must pay the fair market value based on the BIR zonal
valuation at Seven Pesos (Php7.00) per square meter. The RTC held that while the case was
one for mandamus and damages, the allegations in the complaint establish an action for
recovery of just compensation which was the only relief available to the Rebadullas since they
already rejected DPWH's offer and it was no longer feasible to demand the return of the
property as it was already taken and used in constructing dams for DPWH's SWIM project.
The RTC found that both parties failed to satisfy the quantum of proof to support their
respective valuations of the properties. It noted that the Rebadullas' private appraiser failed to
show the acquisition cost and to present the deeds of absolute sale of properties in the same
location, to justify his valuation. The trial court likewise noted that the Rebadullas were not
even certain as to the value of the properties as they "vacillated and had three (3) figures in
mind, Two Hundred Pesos (P200.00), Ninety Five Pesos (P95.00) and Ten Pesos (P10.00)."
As regards the Government's valuation, the RTC indicated that no witness was presented to
explain how the PAC arrived at its figure of P2.50 per sq m. The trial court likewise observed
that while the Government entered the properties in 1997, the PAC's valuation was based on
a 1994 PAC resolution.
 For this reason and holding that courts could exercise their discretion to determine just
compensation, the RTC took judicial notice of the Bureau of Internal Revenue's (BIR's) zonal
valuation of the properties in 2002, when the case was filed in court, at P7.00 per sq m. The
RTC reckoned the just compensation in 2002, noting that DPWH's entry into the properties in
1997 was not with an intention to expropriate as it was adamant on closing a negotiated sale
and the Rebadullas, at that time, merely consented to the removal of the improvements.
ISSUE: How should the Rebadullas’s just compensation be computed?
HELD:
The RTC erred in fixing the just compensation based solely on the zonal valuation of
the properties. Zonal valuation is simply one of the indices of the fair market value of real
estate; it cannot be the sole basis of "just compensation." Among the factors to be considered
in determining the fair market value of the property are the cost of acquisition, the current
value of like properties, its actual or potential uses, and in the particular case of land, its size,
shape, location, and the tax declaration thereon. The measure is not the taker's gain but the
owner's loss. To be just, the compensation must be fair not only to the owner but also to the
taker.
Since the determination of the value of the property is factual in nature, the Court finds a
need to remand the case to the trial court to determine its value. The determination shall
reflect the value of the property at the time of taking, and not at the time of filing of petitioners'
Complaint.
 64. Roberto P. Mabini Vs. Atty. Vitto A. Kintanar
A.C. No. 9512. February 5, 2018

FACTS:
Complainant Roberto Mabini stated that Regina Alamares approached him and his
wife, Mercedes M. Mabini to sell her realty. Regina made known to Mabini and Mercedes that
said title was lost but its duplicate certificate may be secured from the Register of Deeds.
Mabini and Mercedes nonetheless bought the property. Later, complainant filed a petition for
issuance of second owner’s duplicate copy of OCT which the RTC granted. The RD Transfer
Certificate of Title covering the property in the names of Mabini and Mercedes over the
property.
Mabini further averred that, in March 2012, however, respondent’s wife, Evangeline,
filed a complaint against him, for reconveyance, annulment of title, damages with prayer for
preliminary injunction or restraining order before the RTC of Legaspi City. Attached to said
complaint was an Affidavit of Lost Owner’s Duplicate Copy of Title executed by Evangeline
and notarized by respondent Atty. Kintanar and registered in his notarial book.
According to Mabini, respondent Atty. Kintanar knew that he (respondent) was not authorized
to notarize a document of his wife, or any of his relative within the fourth civil degree, whether
by affinity or consanguinity; thus, for having done so, respondent committed misconduct as a
lawyer/ Notary Public.
Commissioner Almira A. Abella-Orfanel (Investigating Commissioner) found respondent
guilty of misconduct and recommended his suspension from the practice of law for six
months. She opined that relatives by affinity are relatives by virtue of marriage. She stressed
that “if the law prohibits notarization of acts done by relatives by affinity, it is but logical that
the law also prohibits the notarization of the root cause of such relationship, the spouse.
Without the spouse, said prohibition will not exist.” She added that since the law treats
spouses as one upon their marriage, it follows that the notarization of the spouse’s act is
disallowed considering that a person cannot notarize his or her own act.

ISSUE: Whether respondent committed misconduct by notarizing his wife’s affidavit of loss in
2002.

HELD:
No. A lawyer cannot be held liable for a violation of his duties as Notary Public when
the law in effect at the time of his complained act does not provide any prohibition to the
same, as in the case at bench.
The notarial law in force in the years 2000-2001 was the Revised Administrative Code
of 1917 which did not contain the present prohibition against notarizing documents where the
parties are related to the notary public within the 4th civil degree, by affinity or consanguinity.
Therefore, there is indeed no basis to hold respondent liable for misconduct for notarizing his
wife’s Affidavit in 2002.
To recall, complainant alleged that respondent was guilty of misconduct because he
notarized the affidavit of his wife on April 25, 2002. Nevertheless, at the time of such
notarization, it was the 1917 Revised Administrative Code that covered notarial practice.
During the effectivity of said Code, a Notary Public was not disallowed from notarizing a
document executed by a relative. Neither was there a prohibition for a Notary Public to
notarize a document executed by his or her spouse.
 65. People of the Philippines Vs. Glenn De Guzman y Delos Reyes
G.R. No. 219955. February 5, 2018

FACTS:
De Guzman was charged with the illegal sale and possession of dangerous drugs, as
well as the use of dangerous drugs under Sections 5,11 and 15, Article II of RA 9165 in three
Informations.
The Anti-Illegal Drugs Special Unit of Olongapo City, in coordination with the Philippine
Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA), conducted an entrapment operation against appellant
along Balic-balic Street, Sta. Rita, Olongapo City. Prior surveillance had confirmed numerous
reports that appellant was indiscriminately selling marijuana within the neighborhood.
At the target area, appellant approached PO1 Reyes and asked if he wanted to buy
marijuana. PO1 Reyes accepted the offer and handed the P100.00 marked money to
appellant who, in turn, gave him a sachet of marijuana fruiting tops. Once the exchange was
completed, PO1 Reyes grabbed appellant’s right hand which served as the pre-arranged
signal that the transaction had been consummated.
SPO1 Delos Reyes rushed to the scene and assisted PO1 Reyes in conducting a body
search on appellant. They introduced themselves as police officers, informed appellant of his
constitutional rights and placed him under arrest. After the body search, SPO1 Delos Reyes
recovered the P100.00 marked money, four sachets of marijuana and one plastic pack
containing a small brick of marijuana fruiting tops. The entrapment team immediately brought
appellant to the police station after his relatives created a commotion and tried to interfere in
appellant’s arrest.
At the police station, PO1 Reyes marked the sachet that was the subject of the buy-
bust operation with his initials “LR” and turned it over to SPO1 Delos Reyes who also put his
initials “ADR” thereon. SPO1 Delos Reyes separately marked the other four sachets and the
plastic pack that he had confiscated from appellant during the body search with his initials
“ADR”.
SPO1 Delos Reyes then prepared the Inventory Receipt, the Letter Request for
Laboratory Examination, and the Request for Drug Test. Photographs of the confiscated
items were also taken. notably, only two barangay officials were present during the conduct of
a physical inventory of the seized items-there were no representatives from both the
Department of Justice (DOJ) and the media.

ISSUE: Whether the chain of custody over the seized items had remained unbroken despite
the arresting officers' failure to strictly comply with the requirements under Section 21, Article
II of RA 9165, i.e., the failure to mark the seized items at the crime scene, and the absence of
the representatives from both the DOJ and the media during the conduct of the physical
inventory and taking of photographs of said items.

HELD:
No. In this case, the records show that the buy-bust team had failed to strictly comply
with the prescribed procedure under Section 21, par. 1. Although the seized items were
marked at the police station, there is nothing on record to show that the marking had been
done in the presence of appellant or his representatives.35 Clearly, this constitutes u major
lapse that, when left unexplained, is fatal to the prosecution's case.
The last sentence of Section 21(1), Article II of RA 9165, as amended, provides a
saving mechanism, viz.: Provided, finally, That noncompliance of these requirements under
justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are
properly preserved by the apprehending officer/learn, shall not render void and invalid such
seizures and custody over said items.
However, this saving mechanism operates only "under justifiable grounds, and as long
as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the
apprehending officer/team." Thus, it is incumbent upon the prosecution to: a) recognize and
explain the lapse or lapses committed by the apprehending team; and b) demonstrate that the
integrity and evidentiary value of the evidence seized had been preserved, despite the failure
to follow the procedural safeguards under RA 9165.
Unfortunately, the prosecution failed not only to recognize and explain the procedural
lapses committed by the buy-bust team, but also to adduce evidence establishing the chain of
custody of the seized items that would demonstrate that the integrity and evidentiary value of
said items had been preserved.
 66. Felicitas L. Salazar Vs. Remedios Felias
G.R. No. 213972. February 5, 2018

FACTS:
Remedios Felias, representing the heirs of Nivera filed a Complaint for Recovery of
Ownership, Possession and Damages against the Spouses Romualdo and Felisa. The former
sought to recover from the latter four parcels of land located in Baruan, Agno, Pangasinan.
During the trial of the case, Romualdo died. Consequently, a Motion for Substitution was filed
by the decedent's wife, Felisa, and their children.
On March 16, 2004, the RTC rendered a Decision, declaring the Heirs of Nivera as the
absolute owners of the parcels of land in question, and thereby ordering the Heirs of
Lastimosa to vacate the lands and to surrender possession thereof.
Meanwhile, Felicitas, daughter of Romualdo filed a Petition for Annulment of Judgment
with the CA. Felicitas sought the nullification of the RTC Decision dated March 16, 2004, and
the corresponding Writs of Execution and Demolition issued pursuant thereto. In her Petition
for Annulment of Judgment, Felicitas claimed that she was deprived of due process when she
was not impleaded in the case for Recovery of Ownership, before the RTC.
The Former Tenth Division of the CA rendered a Decision dismissing the Petition for
Annulment of Judgment. The CA refused to give credence to the contention that the Heirs of
Nivera are at fault for failing to implead Felicitas as a party defendant in the action for
recovery of ownership. Rather, the failure to include Felicitas in the proceedings was due to
the fault of the Heirs of Lastimosa, who neglected to include her (Felicitas) in their Motion to
Substitute. This Court affirmed the CA decision in the Petition for Annulment of Judgment.
The Court's ruling became final.

ISSUE: Whether Felicitas was deprived of due process of law for not having been impleaded
in the case for recovery of ownership and possession

HELD:
No. It must be recalled that the lower court acquired jurisdiction over the person of the
original defendants Romualdo and Feliza Lastimosa. Hence, the outcome of this case is
binding on all the heirs or persons claiming rights under the said defendants. When Romualdo
died on March 3, 1997, the defendants filed an Urgent Motion to Substitute Other Heirs of the
said defendant listing the names of the heirs to be substituted. It is therefore crystal clear that
if Felicitas was not impleaded in this case as party defendant being the daughter of
Romualdo, that omission could not be attributed to the private respondent but the defendants
themselves.
This ruling of the CA was affirmed by this Court in the Resolution dated June 3, 2009,
and attained finality as per Entry of Judgment. Markedly, it is crystal clear that the issues
pertaining to Felicitas' non-inclusion in the proceedings, and the consequent validity of the
lower court's judgment have long attained finality. It bears reiterating that a judgment that is
final and executory cannot be altered, even by the highest court of the land. This final
judgment has become the law of the case, which is now immutable.
 Additionally, as an heir of the original defendants in the action for recovery of
ownership, Felicitas is bound by the decision rendered against her predecessors-in-interest.
Thus, there is nothing that exempts her from the enforcement of the Writ of Execution.
 67. Edmisael C. Lutap Vs. People of the Philippines
G.R. No. 204061. February 5, 2018

FACTS:
In an information, petitioner Lutap was charge of the crime of rape by sexual assault.

The prosecution presented as witnesses private complainant AAA, her younger brother
BBB, her mother DDD and P/SUPT. Ruby Grace Sabino-Diangson. The evidence for the
prosecution tends to establish the following facts:

At the time of the incident, AAA was only six (6) years old. Petitioner, who was also
known as "Egay", frequently visits the house of AAA’s family, being the best friend of AAA's
father. Around 6:30 o'clock in the evening, AAA and her younger siblings, BBB and CCC,
were watching television in their sala, together with petitioner. Meanwhile, their mother DDD
was cooking dinner in the kitchen separated only by a concrete wall from the sala.
AAA was then wearing short pants and was sitting on the floor with her legs spread apart
while watching television and playing with "text cards." BBB, on the other hand, was seated
on a chair beside CCC, some five steps away from AAA. Petitioner was seated on the sofa
which was one foot away from AAA.
Petitioner then touched AAA's vagina. AAA reacted by swaying off his hand.
BBB saw petitioner using his middle finger in touching AAA's vagina. Upon seeing this,
BBB said "Kuya Egay, bad iyan, wag mong kinikiliti ang pepe ni Ate." BBB then went to where
DDD was cooking and told her that petitioner is bad because he is tickling AAA's vagina. DDD
then called AAA, brought her inside the room and asked her if it were true that petitioner
tickled her vagina. AAA answered, "but I swayed his hand, Mama." DDD again asked AAA
how many times have petitioner tickled her vagina and AAA answered, "many times in
petitioner's house" and that he also "let her go on the bed, remove her panty, open her legs
and lick her vagina."
As such, DDD confronted petitioner and asked why he did that to AAA. Petitioner said
that it was because AAA's panty was wet and that he was sorry.
The RTC found petitioner guilty as charged. The RTC gave full credit to AAA's and
BBB's candid testimonies that petitioner inserted his finger in the vagina of AAA. On appeal,
the CA found that there was no insertion of petitioner's finger into AAA's vagina as it was
merely slightly touched or touched without too much pressure by petitioner. The CA went on
to conclude that since petitioner's finger merely touched AAA's vagina and that there was no
penetration, petitioner can only be held liable for attempted rape.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner is guilty of the crime of attempted rape.

HELD:
No. We agree with the CA's ruling that the fact of insertion of petitioner's finger into
AAA's sexual organ was not established beyond reasonable doubt to support petitioner's
conviction of rape by sexual assault. We also agree with the CA that there was sexual
molestation by petitioner's established act of touching AAA's vagina. Be that as it may, the act
of touching a female's sexual organ, standing alone, is not equivalent to rape, not even an
attempted one. At most, therefore, petitioner's act of touching AAA's sexual organ
demonstrates his guilt for the crime of acts of lasciviousness, an offense subsumed in the
charge of rape by sexual assault.

It must be emphasized, however, that like in the crime of rape whereby the slightest
penetration of the male organ or even its slightest contact with the outer lip or the labia majora
of the vagina already consummates the crime, in like manner, if the tongue, in an act of
cunnilingus, touches the outer lip of the vagina, the act should also be considered as already
consummating the crime of rape through sexual assault, not the crime of acts of
lasciviousness. Notwithstanding, in the present case, such logical interpretation could not be
applied.

Since there was neither an insertion nor an attempt to insert petitioner's finger into
AAA's genitalia, petitioner can only be held guilty of the lesser crime of acts of lasciviousness
following the variance doctrine. Acts of lasciviousness, the offense proved, is included in rape,
the offense charged.

Acts of lasciviousness is consummated when the following essential elements are

present: (a) the offender commits any act of lasciviousness or lewdness upon another person
of either sex; and (b) the act of lasciviousness or lewdness is committed either (i) by using
force or intimidation; or (ii) when the offended party is deprived of reason or is otherwise
unconscious; or (iii) when the offended party is under 12 years of age.
 68. Carolina Que Villongco, et al. Vs. Cecilia Que Yabut, et al./Ceclia Que Yabut, e tla. Vs.
Carolina Que Villongco, et al.
G.R. No. 225022/G.R. No. 225024. February 5, 2018

FACTS:
Phil-Ville Development and Housing Corporation is a family corporation founded by
Geronima that is engaged in the real estate business. During her lifetime, Geronima owned
3,140 shares of stock while the remaining 196,860 shares were equally distributed among
Geronima's six children, namely: Carolina Que Villongco, Ana Maria Que Tan, Angelica Que
Gonzales, Cecilia Que Yabut, Ma. Corazon Que Garcia, and Maria Luisa Que Camara.
Geronima died. By virtue of the Sale of Shares of Stocks purportedly executed by
Cecilia as the attorney-in-fact of Geronima, Cecilia allegedly effected an inequitable
distribution of the 3,140 shares that belonged to Geronima.
Cecilia, Eumir Carlo Que Camara and Ma. Corazon [Cecilia Que, et. al.] wrote a letter
to Ana Maria, Corporate Secretary of Phil-Ville, to send out notices for the holding of the
annual stockholders' meeting. However, before Ana Maria could reply thereto, several letters
were sent to Phil-Ville's stockholders containing a document captioned "Notice of Annual
Stockholders' Meeting" signed by Cecilia and Ma. Corazon as directors.
Thereafter, Carolina, Ana Maria, and Angelica, comprising the majority of the Board of
Directors of Phil-Ville held an emergency meeting and made a decision, by concensus, to
postpone the annual stockholders' meeting of Phil-Ville until the issue of the distribution of the
3,140 shares of stocks in the name of certain stockholders is settled. Despite the
postponement, however, [Cecilia Que, et al.] proceeded with the scheduled annual
stockholder's meeting participated only by a few stockholders. In the said meeting, they
elected the new members of the Board of Directors and officers of Phil-Ville namely: Cecilia,
Ma. Corazon and Eumir, Chairman/Vice President/Treasurer, President/General Manager,
and Secretary, respectively.
Meantime, two days prior to the stockholders' meeting, Carolina, Ana Maria, and
Angelica, together with several others, had already filed a Complaint for Annulment of
Sale/Distribution or Settlement of Shares of Stock/Injunction against Cecilia, Eumir Carlo and
Ma. Corazon.
While the civil case was still pending, Eumir Carlo sent a Notice of Annual
Stockholders' Meeting to all the stockholders of Phil-Ville, notifying them of the setting of the
annual stockholders' meeting. During the meeting, Cecilia, Ma. Corazon and Eumir Carlo
were elected as directors and later elected themselves to the following positions: Cecilia as
Chairperson/Vice President/Treasurer; Ma. Corazon as Vice¬ Chairperson/President/General
Manager; and Eumir Carlo as Corporate Secretary/Secretary.
Consequently, Carolina, Ana Maria, Angelica, Elaine and Edison Williams [Carolina, et
al.] filed the instant election case against [Cecilia Que, et al.] before the RTC. The Complaint
prayed that the election of Cecilia, Ma. Corazon and Eumir Carlo as directors be declared
void considering the invalidity of the holding of the meeting for lack of quorum.

ISSUE: Whether or not the total undisputed shares of stocks in Phil-Ville should be the basis
in determining the presence of a quorum.
HELD:
Total outstanding capital stocks, without distinction as to disputed or undisputed shares
of stock, is the basis in determining the presence of quorum.
A transfer of shares of stock not recorded in the stock and transfer book of the
corporation is non-existent as far as the corporation is concerned. As between the corporation
on the one hand, and its shareholders and third persons on the other, the corporation looks
only to its books for the purpose of determining who its shareholders are. It is only when the
transfer has been recorded in the stock and transfer book that a corporation may rightfully
regard the transferee as one of its stockholders. From this time, the consequent obligation on
the part of the corporation to recognize such rights as it is mandated by law to recognize
arises.
In this case, there is no evidence that the 3,140 shares of the late Geronima were
recorded in the stocks and transfer book of Phil-Ville. Thus, insofar as Phil-Ville is concerned,
the 3,140 shares of the late Geronima allegedly transferred to several persons is non-
existent. Therefore, the transferees of the said shares cannot exercise the rights granted unto
stockholders of a corporation, including the right to vote and to be voted upon.
 69. Republic of the Philippines Vs. Banal na Pag-Aaral, Inc.
G.R. No. 193305. February 5, 2018

FACTS:
In its Decision, the Court of Appeals dismissed Banal na Pag-aaral, Inc.'s application
for land registration on the ground of its failure to prove that the land sought to be registered
is alienable and disposable. Subsequently, Banal na Pag-aaral filed a motion for
reconsideration and submitted a Certification issued by the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources, declaring the subject land alienable and disposable. Considering that the
Office of the Solicitor General posed no objection to such belated submission of document,
the CA admitted the same. Thereafter, the CA, through its Amended Decision, reversed its
previous ruling, thus, allowing registration of the subject land.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA may admit a belated submission of evidentiary documents
when the case is already on appeal.

HELD:
Under Section 9 of Batas Blg. 129, as amended by R.A. No. 7902, the CA has the
power to receive evidence and perform any and all acts necessary to resolve factual issues.
However, in case of appeals, this authority is limited to instances where the CA has granted a
new trial.5 In other words, the CA cannot unqualifiedly admit evidence on appeal, as it did
with the document in question. The rule is that, evidence which has not been formally offered
shall not be considered.6 Nevertheless, the Court, in the interest of justice and only for the
most meritorious of reasons, has allowed the submission of certification in petitions of this
kind, after the parties were granted the opportunity to verify the authenticity and due
execution of such document.
In view of the foregoing, the case is remanded to the Court of Appeals for further
proceedings in order to determine the authenticity and due execution of the aforementioned
document. The Court of Appeals is directed to hear and receive evidence from the parties in
furtherance of this purpose and to forthwith submit its resolution to the Court for appropriate
action.
 70. Office of the Court Administrator Vs. Paulino I. Sagyuod
A.M. No. P-17-3705. February 6, 2018

FACTS:
In its Report, the Audit Team examined 1,194 cases decided by former Judge Liberty
O. Castañeda of the RTC where BCC Saguyod was also stationed. After the conduct of
investigation, not only did the Audit Team find fault with the way Judge Castañeda proceeded
with the cases she handled, they also discovered that Branch Clerk of Court Saguyod had
been notarizing a multitude of documents filed before the RTC in connection with the various
cases before it without properly observing the Court's appropriate guidelines. Particularly, the
Audit Team observed that BCC Saguyod violated Rules on Notarial Practice as he notarized
said documents without any certification that there are no available notaries public within the
Municipality of Paniqui, Tarlac. Thus, the Audit Team recommended - with such
recommendation being adopted by the OCA - that BCC Saguyod be made to explain as to
why he should not be held administratively liable for such act.
In his Explanation, BCC Saguyod claimed that he performed said act in good faith and
without any monetary consideration. Citing the Administrative Code of 1987 which authorizes
clerks of courts to administer oaths, he thought that he was doing an important function which
is vital to the prompt and sound administration of justice. Nonetheless, BCC Saguyod
profusely apologized for notarizing documents without strictly adhering to the provisions of the
Rules on Notarial Practice, and even manifested that after the Audit Team called his attention
on the matter, he had already refrained from subscribing any other document filed before the
RTC out of fear of committing the same mistake.
In a Memorandum, the OCA recommended that BCC Saguyod be found guilty of
inefficiency and incompetence in the performance of official duties, and accordingly, be meted
the penalty of suspension from the service for a period of one (1) year, with a warning that a
repetition of the same or similar offense shall warrant dismissal from service.

ISSUE: Whether or not BCC Saguyod should be held administratively liable for notarizing
various documents submitted to the RTC in connection with the cases filed before it.

HELD:
Yes. The Court adopts the findings and the recommendation of the OCA that BCC
Saguyod must be held administratively liable for inefficiency and incompetence in the
performance of official duties.
Inefficiency involves specific acts or omission on the part of the employee which results
in the damage to the employer or to the latter's business. It is akin to neglect of duty, which is
the failure of an employee or official to give proper attention to a task expected of him or her,
signifying a disregard of a duty resulting from carelessness or indifference.
In this case, BCC Saguyod readily admitted to notarizing hundreds, if not thousands, of
various documents which were submitted before the RTC where he is stationed. As a Clerk of
Court, BCC Saguyod's acts of notarization should comply with the Rules on Notarial Practice
Under the rules, Clerks of Courts of various Regional Trial Courts are authorized to notarize
not only documents relating to their official functions, but also private documents; provided,
that: (a) the notarial fees received in connection thereto shall be for the account of the
Judiciary; and (b) they certify in said documents that there are no available notaries public
within the territorial jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court where they are stationed.
Here, aside from maintaining that he did not receive compensation for notarizing
documents, BCC Saguyod claims that he only did so because: (a) there are no notaries public
available within the Municipality of Paniqui, Tarlac; and (b) he believed in good faith that he
was authorized to do so. However, and as correctly pointed out by the OCA, such claim is
belied by the fact that there are other documents filed before the RTC which are duly
subscribed by notaries public based in the same municipality. Furthermore, BCC Saguyod
cannot feign good faith in performing the aforesaid acts of notarization, as he repeatedly did
so even on those documents which were not completely accomplished by the concerned
parties. In light of BCC Saguyod's repeated violations, the OCA correctly recommended that
he be found administratively liable for inefficiency and incompetence in the performance of
official duties.
 71. Representatives Edcel C. Lagman, et al. Vs. Senate President Aquilino Pimentel III, et
al./Eufemia Campos, et al. Vs. President Rodrigo Duterte, et al./Loretta Ann P. Rosales
Vs. President Rodrigo Duterte, et al./Christian S. Monsod, et al. Vs. Senate President
Aquilino Pimentel III, et al.
A.C. No. 235935/G.R. No. 236061/G.R. No. 236145/G.R. No. 236155. February 6, 2018

FACTS:
These are consolidated petitions assailing the constitutionality of the extension of the
proclamation of martial law and suspension of the writ of habeas corpus in the entire
Mindanao for one year from January 1 to December 31, 2018.
On May 23, 2017, President Rodrigo Roa Duterte issued Proclamation No. 216,
declaring a state of martial law and suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in
the whole of Mindanao for a period not exceeding sixty (60) days, to address the rebellion
mounted by members of the Maute Group and Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG).
On May 25, 2017, within the 48-hour period set in Section 18, Article VII of the
Constitution, the President submitted to the Senate and the House of Representatives his
written Report, citing the events and reasons that impelled him to issue Proclamation No. 216.
Thereafter, the Senate adopted P.S. Resolution No. 388 while the House of Representatives
issued House Resolution No. 1050, both expressing full support to the Proclamation and
finding no cause to revoke the same.
In July 2017, the President requested the Congress to extend the effectivity of
Proclamation No. 216. In a Special Joint Session on July 22, 2017, the Congress adopted
Resolution of Both Houses No. 2 extending Proclamation No. 216 until December 31, 2017.
In a letter to the President, through Defense Secretary Lorenzana, AFP Chief of Staff
General Guerrero, recommended the further extension of martial law and suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the entire Mindanao for one year beginning January
1, 2018 “for compelling reasons based on current security assessment.”
Acting on said recommendation, the President asked both the Senate and the House of
Representatives to further extend the proclamation of martial law and the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the entire Mindanao for one year or for such period as
the Congress may determine.
On December 13, 2017, the Senate and the House of Representatives, in a joint
session, adopted Resolution of Both Houses No. 4 further extending the period of martial law
and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the entire Mindanao for one
year, from January 1, 2018 to December 31, 2018.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Congress has the power to extend and determine the period of
martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.

HELD:
Yes. Congress has the power to extend and determine the period of martial law and the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
 The Constitution is silent as to how many times the Congress, upon the initiative of the
President, may extend the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of
habeas corpus. Such silence, however, should not be construed as a vacuum, flaw or
deficiency in the provision. While it does not specify the number of times that the Congress is
allowed to approve an extension of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus, Section 18, Article VII is clear that the only limitations to the exercise of the
congressional authority to extend such proclamation or suspension are that the extension
should be upon the President's initiative; that it should be grounded on the persistence of the
invasion or rebellion and the demands of public safety; and that it is subject to the Court's
review of the sufficiency of its factual basis upon the petition of any citizen.
A cardinal rule in statutorv construction is that when the law is clear and free from any
doubt or ambiguity, there is no room for construction or interpretation, but only for
application.108 Thus, whenever there is a determination that the invasion or rebellion persists
and public safety requires the extension of martial law or of the suspension of the privilege of
the writ, the Congress may exercise its authority to grant such extension as may be requested
by the President, even if it be subsequent to the initial extension.
 72. Office of the Court Administrator Vs. Alma P. Licay/Office of the Court Administrator Vs.
Alma P. Licay
A.M. No. P-11-2959. February 6, 2018

FACTS:
The OCA reported that the Financial Management Office (FMO) of the OCA found that
Licay Clerk of Court, Municipal Circuit Trial Court, San Juan, La Union, failed to regularly
submit her Monthly Financial Reports for (1) the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF), (2) the
Special Allowance for the Judiciary (SAJ) (3) the Fiduciary Fund (FF), and (4) the Sheriff's
Trust Fund (STF).
The OCA sent letters to Licay to show cause why her salaries should not be withheld
for failure to comply with the rules on the submission of the Monthly Financial Reports. The
FMO received from Licay a partial compliance. Another letter was sent again to Licay
reminding her to submit the other unsubmitted reports but Licay failed to do so.
The OCA recommended Licay’s suspension for one year, submission of missing Monthly
Financial Reports, payment of fines, among others.

ISSUE: Whether or not Licay is guilty of the administrative offenses of gross insubordination
and refusal to perform official duty for her continuous refusal to comply with the Court's
directives to submit her Monthly Financial Reports.

HELD:
No. Licay is guilty of grave misconduct and gross neglect of duty. Under Administrative
Circular No. 3-2000, the duty of the clerk of court is to receive JDF collections in their
respective courts, issue the proper receipts and maintain a separate cash book properly
marked as "CASH BOOK FOR JUDICIARY DEVELOPMENT FUND." The clerk of court shall
then deposit such collections every day and render the proper Monthly Report of Collections
and Deposits for said Fund within ten (10) days after the end of every month. Section 3-C of
the JDF and SAJ procedural guidelines in Administrative Circular No. 35-2004, as amended,
provides that the daily remittance of JDF and SAJ collections is required.
OCA Circular No. 50-9536 provides that all collections from bailbonds, rental deposits
and other fiduciary collections shall be deposited with the Land Bank of the Philippines by the
clerk of court concerned. The deposit must be made within 24 hours from receipt. In localities
where there are no Land Bank of the Philippines branches, fiduciary collections shall be
deposited by the clerk of court with the provincial, city or municipal treasurer.
To implement these circulars, OCA Circular No. 113-200437 requires clerks of court to
submit monthly reports for three funds: JDF, SAJ, and FF.
In the present case, Licay not only failed to fully comply with her duty as Clerk of Court
based on the provisions of law, but likewise continuously ignored the reminders and stern
warnings of the OCA and the Court to submit the missing Monthly Financial Reports.
Evidently, Licay committed the grave offense of grave misconduct for her obstinate refusal to
comply with the repeated directives of the Court requiring her to submit the Monthly Financial
Reports.
 73. Janet Lim Napoles Vs. Sandiganbayan
G.R. No. 224162. February 6, 2018

FACTS:
Before this Court is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which
sought to nullify and set aside the Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan. These Resolutions
denied Janet Lim Napoles' (Napoles) application for bail because the evidence of her guilt for
the crime of Plunder is strong.
Napoles points out in her petition, however, that the Sandiganbayan erred in finding
strong evidence of her guilt for the crime of Plunder. She challenges the credibility of the
prosecution witnesses, particularly the whistleblowers Luy, Suñas, Sula, and Baltazar.
She further claims that her bail application should have been granted because the
prosecution did not present any documentary evidence directly connecting her to the NGOs
that facilitated the misappropriation of former Senator Enrile's PDAF. In the same manner,
she likewise argues that there was no direct proof of any agreement with former Senator
Enrile and Reyes to obtain kickbacks from the implementation of former Senator Enrile's
PDAF projects. Napoles particularly repudiates the evidentiary value of the Summary of
Rebates that Luy prepared from the Daily Disbursement Reports (DDRs) and Disbursement
Vouchers (DVs) that came into in his possession while he was an employee of Napoles.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion, amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction, in denying her bail application.

HELD:
No. Since Napoles was charged with the crime of Plunder, which carries the imposable
penalty of reclusion perpetua, she cannot be admitted to bail when the evidence of her guilt is
strong. This was the burden that the prosecution assumed in the subsequent hearings that
followed the filing of Napoles' Petition for Bail before the Sandiganbayan. As a trial court, the
Sandiganbayan, in turn, possessed the jurisdiction to hear and weigh the evidence of the
prosecution and the defense.
At that stage of the proceedings, the bail hearings are limited to the determination of
whether there is a strong presumption of Napoles' guilt. It is merely a preliminary
determination, and the Sandiganbayan may deny admission to bail even when there is
reasonable doubt as to the guilt of Napoles. Thus, the prosecution can discharge its burden
by proving that the evidence against Napoles shows evident proof of guilt or a great
presumption of guilt.
Applying these jurisprudential standards to the present case, it is readily apparent that
the Sandiganbayan did not gravely abuse its discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. Upon receiving Napoles' Petition for Bail, it scheduled hearings to allow the
parties to submit their respective pieces of evidence. The prosecution submitted numerous
testimonial and documentary evidence, endeavoring to establish evident proof of Napoles'
guilt. Napoles, on the other hand, opted not to submit any evidence on her behalf and relied
instead on the supposed weakness of the prosecution's evidence.
 The Sandiganbayan's first assailed Resolution also reveals straightaway that the
evidence of the prosecution was summarized accordingly, effectively complying with the due
process requirements. It even extensively discussed the available evidence in relation to the
elements of Plunder, which the prosecution intended to prove point by point for purposes of
demonstrating Napoles' great presumption of guilt.
Remarkably, the respective testimonies of Commissioner Garcia and the supposed
beneficiaries of former Senator Enrile's PDAF were corroborated on material points by the
whistleblowers. These whistleblowers, who were former employees of Napoles, participated
in different capacities to the conspiracy.
Since the whistleblowers personally received instructions from Napoles to incorporate
the NGOs, prepare the requirements for the release of the PDAF, prepare and deliver the
rebates to the middlepersons, and fabricate the liquidation documents, they were competent
witnesses on the subject of their respective testimonies. Clearly, the prosecution witnesses
and the documentary evidence supply interlocking pieces of information that when taken
together, provide a complete picture of the indispensability of the participation of Napoles in
the scheme to misappropriate public funds for the benefit of select individuals, by using the
NGOs as conduits for the PDAF projects of former Senator Enrile. The directions and
instructions she gave to her former employees constitute a clear evidence of her active
participation, not mere acquiescence or presence, in the conspiracy.
 74. Facilities, Incorporated Vs. Ralph Lito W. Lopez
G.R. No. 208642. February 7, 2018

FACTS:
A Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) was entered into between Facilities, Inc.
(Facilities), represented by its President Araneta III and Primelink Properties and
Development Corporation (PPDC), represented by its developer, President and CEO Lopez.
As stated in the MOA, PPDC is the owner of three lots which it is developing into a residential
subdivision project known as Tagaytay Woodsborough Residential Estate (the Project); while
Facilities is the registered owner of condominium units of Summit One Office Tower. On even
date, the parties executed a Contract to Sell over the subject lots and Contract of Lease over
the condominium units. These contracts, which Facilities referred to as a "swap
arrangement," are embodied in the essential provisions of the MOA.
The MOA provides for the so-called "swap arrangement" between Facilities and PPDC
in the following manner: Facilities agreed to lease the condominium units for a period of four
years to PPDC. As a consideration for the first twenty (21) months of the four-year lease,
PPDC through Lopez, agreed to execute a deed of absolute sale covering the subject lots in
favor of Facilities. PPDC also committed to deliver the transfer certificate of title covering the
subject lots in Facilities' name within a period of 360 days. PPDC further bound itself to issue
a certificate of ownership over the subject lots during the pendency of the processing and
issuance of the individual titles.
Pursuant to these agreements, PPDC moved into the condominium units and occupied
the same for over a period of 21 months. Facilities followed-up on PPDC's commitment to
deliver the TCTs over the subject lots. Despite repeated demands, PPDC failed to comply
with its contractual obligation and instead vacated the leased premises without leaving any
forwarding address. Later on, Facilities discovered that contrary to PPDC's representation,
the title over the subject lots was still registered in the name of a certain Primo Erni.
Consequently, Facilities filed a Complaint-Affidavit before the Office of the City
Prosecutor alleging that Lopez's failure to deliver the titles to the subject lots is in clear
contravention of P.D. No. 957, otherwise known as The Subdivision and Condominium
Buyers' Protective Decree.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is probable cause to institute a criminal case against Lopez, as
president of PPDC, for violating Section 25 of P.D. No. 957.

HELD:
Yes. Section 25 of P.D. No. 957, requires a developer, such as PPDC, of which Lopez
is the President and CEO, to deliver the title of the lot or unit to the buyer, upon full payment
of the said lot or unit. The provision partly reads, thus:
Despite the MOA, PPDC through Lopez, refused to complete the titling process and
issue the titles over the subject lots in the name of Facilities. Lopez ignored several demands
made by Facilities for the delivery of the titles which was part of their agreement. Instead, he
justified the non-delivery of the titles on the allegation that Facilities failed to pay the purchase
price in full, including the notarial fees, documentary stamps, transfer and registration fees on
the subject lots.
What Lopez refuses to state is the unconverted fact that Primo Erni, the registered
owner of the subject lots has not yet transferred the titles in the name of PPDC. This belies
Lopez's feigned effort at securing title in PPDC's name, so that the latter may, in turn, be
transferred in the name of Facilities. Likewise, Facilities' non-payment of the taxes is
reasonable for the simple reason that these taxes are required to be paid only after the tax on
the sale (ordinary tax and capital gains tax) has already been paid. Until the sales tax over the
subject lots have been paid by PPDC, no title could be issued in Facilities' favor. Thus,
Facilities has no obligation yet to pay notarial fees, documentary stamps, transfer and
registration fees.
Evidence also shows that there was misrepresentation on the part of PPDC as regards
the true status of the subject lots. Though Facilities was shown the deed of sale between
PPDC and the heirs of the original owner thereof, the continued failure of PPDC to transfer
the ownership thereof to Facilities within the stipulated period of time, and up to the filing of
the case, only shows that there was bad faith on its part when it presented the deed of
absolute sale to Facilities which appeared to be a forgery. Without the assurance from PPDC
that the lots were in fact its property, Facilities could not have possibly agreed to the sale and
in the process, part with the lease of their two commercial units as payment for the full
consideration of the subject lots. Undoubtedly therefore, PPDC have acted in bad faith and
committed deceit in deliberately concealing the true status of the subject lots.
 75. People of the Philippines Vs. Abdulwahid Pundugar
G.R. No. 214779. February 7, 2018

FACTS:
: Challenged in this appeal is the CA’s decision affriming the judgment of the RTC
finding Abdulwahid Pundugar y Imam (appellant) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal
sale of dangerous drugs and illegal possession of dangerous drugs.
The RTC ruled that the prosecution has sufficiently proven that appellant was caught
inflagrante delicto selling dangerous drug to a law enforcement agent who posed as buyer
and a subsequent search on his body yielded four more plastic sachets containing white
crystalline substance. When these items were subjected to chemistry examination, they were
found positive for the presence of shabu. The RTC rejected appellant's defense of denial and
frame-up. Thus, it found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt as charged.
Appellant appealed to the CA ascribing error on the trial court in finding him guilty
despite the prosecution's failure to prove the same beyond reasonable doubt as well as the
non-compliance by the apprehending police officers with the chain of custody over the
confiscated drugs.
Appellant capitalizes on the failure of the apprehending officers to mark and make an
inventory of the seized illicit items at the crime scene immediately upon his arrest and not at
the police station as what the officers did. In essence, appellant asks for a strict compliance
with the prescribed procedures.

ISSUE: Whether or not appellant is guilty of the crimes charged?

HELD:
Yes. It is settled that failure to strictly comply with the prescribed procedures in the
inventory (and marking) of seized drugs does not render an arrest of the accused illegal or the
items seized/confiscated from him inadmissible. What is essential is the preservation of the
integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items, as the same would be utilized in the
determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused.
Records disclosed that after PO2 Julaton received one plastic sachet and confiscated
another four plastic sachets containing shabu from appellant, he immediately brought the
same to the police station where he marked them
In warrantless seizures, the marking, physical inventory and photograph of the seized
items in the presence of the violator shall be done immediately at the place where the drugs
were seized or at the nearest police station or nearest office of the apprehending officer/team,
whichever is practicable.
Thus, as the law now stands, the apprehending officer has the option whether to mark,
inventory, and photograph the seized items immediately at the place where the drugs were
seized, or at the nearest police station, or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer,
whichever is the most practical or suitable for the purpose.
In this case, the apprehending officers found it more practicable to mark, inventory, and
photograph the seized drugs at the police station.
 Appellant's harping on the failure of the buy-bust team to immediately mark the seized
contrabands at the time of apprehension must give way to the paramount safety and security
of the team. It is of record and noted in the appealed Judgment that the area where the buy-
bust team operated is a squatters area with a big Muslim population and fearing any
commotion and possible retaliation since appellant is a Muslim, they opted to immediately
leave the place and performed the marking at their office. Besides a crowd was already
starting to gather in the vicinity.
Next, there is no dispute that the seized illegal drugs were marked, inventoried, and
photographed in the presence of appellant. However, appellant claims that the absence of
representatives ·from the media, the Department of Justice (DOJ) and an elective
government official during the conduct of the inventoy and taking of photograph is fatal to the
prosecution's cause.
The prosecution explained that they were not able to invite representatives from the
media, the DOJ, or an elected public official because they could not find anyone available22
and that they were pressed for time. To our mind, these are justifiable reasons for non-
compliance with the requirements. And considering that the integrity and evidentiary value of
the seized items were properly preserved, as shown by the unbroken chain of custody of the
seized items, said non-compliance did not render void or invalid such seizure and custody
over the illegal drugs.