G.R. No.

L-63915 April 24, 1985 The respondents, through the Solicitor General, would have this case dismissed outright on the
ground that petitioners have no legal personality or standing to bring the instant petition. The
LORENZO M. TAÑADA, ABRAHAM F. SARMIENTO, and MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR view is submitted that in the absence of any showing that petitioners are personally and directly
BROTHERHOOD, INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC. [MABINI], petitioners,  affected or prejudiced by the alleged non-publication of the presidential issuances in
vs. question 2 said petitioners are without the requisite legal personality to institute this mandamus
HON. JUAN C. TUVERA, in his capacity as Executive Assistant to the President, HON. proceeding, they are not being "aggrieved parties" within the meaning of Section 3, Rule 65 of
JOAQUIN VENUS, in his capacity as Deputy Executive Assistant to the President , the Rules of Court, which we quote:
MELQUIADES P. DE LA CRUZ, in his capacity as Director, Malacañang Records Office, and
FLORENDO S. PABLO, in his capacity as Director, Bureau of Printing, respondents. SEC. 3. Petition for Mandamus.—When any tribunal, corporation, board or person unlawfully
neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an
ESCOLIN, J.: office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use a rd enjoyment of a right or
office to which such other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy
Invoking the people's right to be informed on matters of public concern, a right recognized in in the ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the
Section 6, Article IV of the 1973 Philippine Constitution, 1 as well as the principle that laws to be proper court alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered
valid and enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette or otherwise effectively commanding the defendant, immediately or at some other specified time, to do the act required
promulgated, petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to to be done to Protect the rights of the petitioner, and to pay the damages sustained by the
publish, and/or cause the publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts of the defendant.
letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation
and administrative orders. Upon the other hand, petitioners maintain that since the subject of the petition concerns a public
right and its object is to compel the performance of a public duty, they need not show any
Specifically, the publication of the following presidential issuances is sought: specific interest for their petition to be given due course.

a] Presidential Decrees Nos. 12, 22, 37, 38, 59, 64, 103, 171, 179, 184, 197, 200, 234, 265, 286, The issue posed is not one of first impression. As early as the 1910 case of Severino vs.
298, 303, 312, 324, 325, 326, 337, 355, 358, 359, 360, 361, 368, 404, 406, 415, 427, 429, 445, Governor General, 3 this Court held that while the general rule is that "a writ of mandamus
447, 473, 486, 491, 503, 504, 521, 528, 551, 566, 573, 574, 594, 599, 644, 658, 661, 718, 731, would be granted to a private individual only in those cases where he has some private or
733, 793, 800, 802, 835, 836, 923, 935, 961, 1017-1030, 1050, 1060-1061, 1085, 1143, 1165, particular interest to be subserved, or some particular right to be protected, independent of that
1166, 1242, 1246, 1250, 1278, 1279, 1300, 1644, 1772, 1808, 1810, 1813-1817, 1819-1826, which he holds with the public at large," and "it is for the public officers exclusively to apply for
1829-1840, 1842-1847. the writ when public rights are to be subserved [Mithchell vs. Boardmen, 79 M.e., 469],"
nevertheless, "when the question is one of public right and the object of the mandamus is to
b] Letter of Instructions Nos.: 10, 39, 49, 72, 107, 108, 116, 130, 136, 141, 150, 153, 155, 161, procure the enforcement of a public duty, the people are regarded as the real party in interest
173, 180, 187, 188, 192, 193, 199, 202, 204, 205, 209, 211-213, 215-224, 226-228, 231-239, and the relator at whose instigation the proceedings are instituted need not show that he has
241-245, 248, 251, 253-261, 263-269, 271-273, 275-283, 285-289, 291, 293, 297-299, 301-303, any legal or special interest in the result, it being sufficient to show that he is a citizen and as
309, 312-315, 325, 327, 343, 346, 349, 357, 358, 362, 367, 370, 382, 385, 386, 396-397, 405, such interested in the execution of the laws [High, Extraordinary Legal Remedies, 3rd ed., sec.
438-440, 444- 445, 473, 486, 488, 498, 501, 399, 527, 561, 576, 587, 594, 599, 600, 602, 609, 431].
610, 611, 612, 615, 641, 642, 665, 702, 712-713, 726, 837-839, 878-879, 881, 882, 939-940,
964,997,1149-1178,1180-1278. Thus, in said case, this Court recognized the relator Lope Severino, a private individual, as a
proper party to the mandamus proceedings brought to compel the Governor General to call a
c] General Orders Nos.: 14, 52, 58, 59, 60, 62, 63, 64 & 65. special election for the position of municipal president in the town of Silay, Negros Occidental.
Speaking for this Court, Mr. Justice Grant T. Trent said:
d] Proclamation Nos.: 1126, 1144, 1147, 1151, 1196, 1270, 1281, 1319-1526, 1529, 1532, 1535,
1538, 1540-1547, 1550-1558, 1561-1588, 1590-1595, 1594-1600, 1606-1609, 1612-1628, 1630- We are therefore of the opinion that the weight of authority supports the proposition that the
1649, 1694-1695, 1697-1701, 1705-1723, 1731-1734, 1737-1742, 1744, 1746-1751, 1752, relator is a proper party to proceedings of this character when a public right is sought to be
1754, 1762, 1764-1787, 1789-1795, 1797, 1800, 1802-1804, 1806-1807, 1812-1814, 1816, enforced. If the general rule in America were otherwise, we think that it would not be applicable
1825-1826, 1829, 1831-1832, 1835-1836, 1839-1840, 1843-1844, 1846-1847, 1849, 1853-1858, to the case at bar for the reason 'that it is always dangerous to apply a general rule to a
1860, 1866, 1868, 1870, 1876-1889, 1892, 1900, 1918, 1923, 1933, 1952, 1963, 1965-1966, particular case without keeping in mind the reason for the rule, because, if under the particular
1968-1984, 1986-2028, 2030-2044, 2046-2145, 2147-2161, 2163-2244. circumstances the reason for the rule does not exist, the rule itself is not applicable and reliance
upon the rule may well lead to error'
e] Executive Orders Nos.: 411, 413, 414, 427, 429-454, 457- 471, 474-492, 494-507, 509-510,
522, 524-528, 531-532, 536, 538, 543-544, 549, 551-553, 560, 563, 567-568, 570, 574, 593, No reason exists in the case at bar for applying the general rule insisted upon by counsel for the
594, 598-604, 609, 611- 647, 649-677, 679-703, 705-707, 712-786, 788-852, 854-857. respondent. The circumstances which surround this case are different from those in the United
States, inasmuch as if the relator is not a proper party to these proceedings no other person
f] Letters of Implementation Nos.: 7, 8, 9, 10, 11-22, 25-27, 39, 50, 51, 59, 76, 80-81, 92, 94, 95, could be, as we have seen that it is not the duty of the law officer of the Government to appear
107, 120, 122, 123. and represent the people in cases of this character.
g] Administrative Orders Nos.: 347, 348, 352-354, 360- 378, 380-433, 436-439.
The reasons given by the Court in recognizing a private citizen's legal personality in the Reales decretos, Instrucciones, Circulares y Reales ordines dictadas de conformidad con las
aforementioned case apply squarely to the present petition. Clearly, the right sought to be mismas por el Gobierno en uso de su potestad.5
enforced by petitioners herein is a public right recognized by no less than the fundamental law of
the land. If petitioners were not allowed to institute this proceeding, it would indeed be difficult to The very first clause of Section I of Commonwealth Act 638 reads: "There shall be published in
conceive of any other person to initiate the same, considering that the Solicitor General, the the Official Gazette ... ." The word "shall" used therein imposes upon respondent officials an
government officer generally empowered to represent the people, has entered his appearance imperative duty. That duty must be enforced if the Constitutional right of the people to be
for respondents in this case. informed on matters of public concern is to be given substance and reality. The law itself makes
a list of what should be published in the Official Gazette. Such listing, to our mind, leaves
Respondents further contend that publication in the Official Gazette is not a sine qua non respondents with no discretion whatsoever as to what must be included or excluded from such
requirement for the effectivity of laws where the laws themselves provide for their own effectivity publication.
dates. It is thus submitted that since the presidential issuances in question contain special
provisions as to the date they are to take effect, publication in the Official Gazette is not The publication of all presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is
indispensable for their effectivity. The point stressed is anchored on Article 2 of the Civil Code: mandated by law. Obviously, presidential decrees that provide for fines, forfeitures or penalties
for their violation or otherwise impose a burden or. the people, such as tax and revenue
Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the measures, fall within this category. Other presidential issuances which apply only to particular
Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided, ... persons or class of persons such as administrative and executive orders need not be published
on the assumption that they have been circularized to all concerned. 6
The interpretation given by respondent is in accord with this Court's construction of said article.
In a long line of decisions,4 this Court has ruled that publication in the Official Gazette is It is needless to add that the publication of presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of
necessary in those cases where the legislation itself does not provide for its effectivity date-for general applicability" is a requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that before a person may
then the date of publication is material for determining its date of effectivity, which is the fifteenth be bound by law, he must first be officially and specifically informed of its contents. As Justice
day following its publication-but not when the law itself provides for the date when it goes into Claudio Teehankee said in Peralta vs. COMELEC 7:
effect.
In a time of proliferating decrees, orders and letters of instructions which all form part of the law
Respondents' argument, however, is logically correct only insofar as it equates the effectivity of of the land, the requirement of due process and the Rule of Law demand that the Official
laws with the fact of publication. Considered in the light of other statutes applicable to the issue Gazette as the official government repository promulgate and publish the texts of all such
at hand, the conclusion is easily reached that said Article 2 does not preclude the requirement of decrees, orders and instructions so that the people may know where to obtain their official and
publication in the Official Gazette, even if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity. specific contents.
Thus, Section 1 of Commonwealth Act 638 provides as follows:
The Court therefore declares that presidential issuances of general application, which have not
Section 1. There shall be published in the Official Gazette [1] all important legisiative acts and been published, shall have no force and effect. Some members of the Court, quite apprehensive
resolutions of a public nature of the, Congress of the Philippines; [2] all executive and about the possible unsettling effect this decision might have on acts done in reliance of the
administrative orders and proclamations, except such as have no general applicability; [3] validity of those presidential decrees which were published only during the pendency of this
decisions or abstracts of decisions of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals as may be petition, have put the question as to whether the Court's declaration of invalidity apply to P.D.s
deemed by said courts of sufficient importance to be so published; [4] such documents or which had been enforced or implemented prior to their publication. The answer is all too familiar.
classes of documents as may be required so to be published by law; and [5] such documents or In similar situations in the past this Court had taken the pragmatic and realistic course set forth
classes of documents as the President of the Philippines shall determine from time to time to in Chicot County Drainage District vs. Baxter Bank 8 to wit:
have general applicability and legal effect, or which he may authorize so to be published. ...
The courts below have proceeded on the theory that the Act of Congress, having been found to
The clear object of the above-quoted provision is to give the general public adequate notice of be unconstitutional, was not a law; that it was inoperative, conferring no rights and imposing no
the various laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. Without such notice duties, and hence affording no basis for the challenged decree. Norton v. Shelby County, 118
and publication, there would be no basis for the application of the maxim "ignorantia legis non U.S. 425, 442; Chicago, 1. & L. Ry. Co. v. Hackett, 228 U.S. 559, 566. It is quite clear, however,
excusat." It would be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the that such broad statements as to the effect of a determination of unconstitutionality must be
transgression of a law of which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one. taken with qualifications. The actual existence of a statute, prior to such a determination, is an
operative fact and may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot
Perhaps at no time since the establishment of the Philippine Republic has the publication of laws always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The effect of the subsequent ruling as to
taken so vital significance that at this time when the people have bestowed upon the President a invalidity may have to be considered in various aspects-with respect to particular conduct,
power heretofore enjoyed solely by the legislature. While the people are kept abreast by the private and official. Questions of rights claimed to have become vested, of status, of prior
mass media of the debates and deliberations in the Batasan Pambansa—and for the diligent determinations deemed to have finality and acted upon accordingly, of public policy in the light of
ones, ready access to the legislative records—no such publicity accompanies the law-making the nature both of the statute and of its previous application, demand examination. These
process of the President. Thus, without publication, the people have no means of knowing what questions are among the most difficult of those which have engaged the attention of courts,
presidential decrees have actually been promulgated, much less a definite way of informing state and federal and it is manifest from numerous decisions that an all-inclusive statement of a
themselves of the specific contents and texts of such decrees. As the Supreme Court of Spain principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified.
ruled: "Bajo la denominacion generica de leyes, se comprenden tambien los reglamentos,
Consistently with the above principle, this Court in Rutter vs. Esteban 9 sustained the right of a 2. It is quite understandable then why I concur in the separate opinion of Justice Plana. Its first
party under the Moratorium Law, albeit said right had accrued in his favor before said law was paragraph sets forth what to me is the constitutional doctrine applicable to this case. Thus: "The
declared unconstitutional by this Court. Philippine Constitution does not require the publication of laws as a prerequisite for their
effectivity, unlike some Constitutions elsewhere. It may be said though that the guarantee of due
Similarly, the implementation/enforcement of presidential decrees prior to their publication in the process requires notice of laws to affected Parties before they can be bound thereby; but such
Official Gazette is "an operative fact which may have consequences which cannot be justly notice is not necessarily by publication in the Official Gazette. The due process clause is not that
ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration ... that an all-inclusive precise. 1 I am likewise in agreement with its closing paragraph: "In fine, I concur in the majority
statement of a principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified." decision to the extent that it requires notice before laws become effective, for no person should
be bound by a law without notice. This is elementary fairness. However, I beg to disagree
From the report submitted to the Court by the Clerk of Court, it appears that of the presidential insofar as it holds that such notice shall be by publication in the Official Gazette. 2
decrees sought by petitioners to be published in the Official Gazette, only Presidential Decrees
Nos. 1019 to 1030, inclusive, 1278, and 1937 to 1939, inclusive, have not been so 3. It suffices, as was stated by Judge Learned Hand, that law as the command of the
published. 10 Neither the subject matters nor the texts of these PDs can be ascertained since no government "must be ascertainable in some form if it is to be enforced at all. 3 It would indeed
copies thereof are available. But whatever their subject matter may be, it is undisputed that none be to reduce it to the level of mere futility, as pointed out by Justice Cardozo, "if it is unknown
of these unpublished PDs has ever been implemented or enforced by the government. and unknowable. 4 Publication, to repeat, is thus essential. What I am not prepared to subscribe
In Pesigan vs. Angeles, 11 the Court, through Justice Ramon Aquino, ruled that "publication is to is the doctrine that it must be in the Official Gazette. To be sure once published therein there
necessary to apprise the public of the contents of [penal] regulations and make the said is the ascertainable mode of determining the exact date of its effectivity. Still for me that does
penalties binding on the persons affected thereby. " The cogency of this holding is apparently not dispose of the question of what is the jural effect of past presidential decrees or executive
recognized by respondent officials considering the manifestation in their comment that "the acts not so published. For prior thereto, it could be that parties aware of their existence could
government, as a matter of policy, refrains from prosecuting violations of criminal laws until the have conducted themselves in accordance with their provisions. If no legal consequences could
same shall have been published in the Official Gazette or in some other publication, even attach due to lack of publication in the Official Gazette, then serious problems could arise.
though some criminal laws provide that they shall take effect immediately. Previous transactions based on such "Presidential Issuances" could be open to question.
Matters deemed settled could still be inquired into. I am not prepared to hold that such an effect
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish in the Official Gazette all is contemplated by our decision. Where such presidential decree or executive act is made the
unpublished presidential issuances which are of general application, and unless so published, basis of a criminal prosecution, then, of course, its ex post facto character becomes evident. 5 In
they shall have no binding force and effect. civil cases though, retroactivity as such is not conclusive on the due process aspect. There must
still be a showing of arbitrariness. Moreover, where the challenged presidential decree or
SO ORDERED.
executive act was issued under the police power, the non-impairment clause of the Constitution
may not always be successfully invoked. There must still be that process of balancing to
Separate Opinions determine whether or not it could in such a case be tainted by infirmity. 6 In traditional
terminology, there could arise then a question of unconstitutional application. That is as far as it
FERNANDO, C.J., concurring (with qualification): goes.
There is on the whole acceptance on my part of the views expressed in the ably written opinion 4. Let me make therefore that my qualified concurrence goes no further than to affirm that
of Justice Escolin. I am unable, however, to concur insofar as it would unqualifiedly impose the publication is essential to the effectivity of a legislative or executive act of a general application. I
requirement of publication in the Official Gazette for unpublished "presidential issuances" to am not in agreement with the view that such publication must be in the Official Gazette. The Civil
have binding force and effect. Code itself in its Article 2 expressly recognizes that the rule as to laws taking effect after fifteen
days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette is subject to this
I shall explain why. exception, "unless it is otherwise provided." Moreover, the Civil Code is itself only a legislative
enactment, Republic Act No. 386. It does not and cannot have the juridical force of a
1. It is of course true that without the requisite publication, a due process question would arise if
constitutional command. A later legislative or executive act which has the force and effect of law
made to apply adversely to a party who is not even aware of the existence of any legislative or
can legally provide for a different rule.
executive act having the force and effect of law. My point is that such publication required need
not be confined to the Official Gazette. From the pragmatic standpoint, there is an advantage to 5. Nor can I agree with the rather sweeping conclusion in the opinion of Justice Escolin that
be gained. It conduces to certainty. That is too be admitted. It does not follow, however, that presidential decrees and executive acts not thus previously published in the Official Gazette
failure to do so would in all cases and under all circumstances result in a statute, presidential would be devoid of any legal character. That would be, in my opinion, to go too far. It may be
decree or any other executive act of the same category being bereft of any binding force and fraught, as earlier noted, with undesirable consequences. I find myself therefore unable to yield
effect. To so hold would, for me, raise a constitutional question. Such a pronouncement would assent to such a pronouncement.
lend itself to the interpretation that such a legislative or presidential act is bereft of the attribute
of effectivity unless published in the Official Gazette. There is no such requirement in the I am authorized to state that Justices Makasiar, Abad Santos, Cuevas, and Alampay concur in
Constitution as Justice Plana so aptly pointed out. It is true that what is decided now applies only this separate opinion.
to past "presidential issuances". Nonetheless, this clarification is, to my mind, needed to avoid
any possible misconception as to what is required for any statute or presidential act to be Makasiar, Abad Santos, Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.
impressed with binding force or effectivity.
TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:
I concur with the main opinion of Mr. Justice Escolin and the concurring opinion of Mme. Justice different period for reckoning its effectivity date but also a different mode of notice. Thus, a law
Herrera. The Rule of Law connotes a body of norms and laws published and ascertainable and may prescribe that it shall be published elsewhere than in the Official Gazette.
of equal application to all similarly circumstances and not subject to arbitrary change but only
under certain set procedures. The Court has consistently stressed that "it is an elementary rule Commonwealth Act No. 638, in my opinion, does not support the proposition that for their
of fair play and justice that a reasonable opportunity to be informed must be afforded to the effectivity, laws must be published in the Official Gazette. The said law is simply "An Act to
people who are commanded to obey before they can be punished for its violation,1 citing the Provide for the Uniform Publication and Distribution of the Official Gazette." Conformably
settled principle based on due process enunciated in earlier cases that "before the public is therewith, it authorizes the publication of the Official Gazette, determines its frequency, provides
bound by its contents, especially its penal provisions, a law, regulation or circular must first be for its sale and distribution, and defines the authority of the Director of Printing in relation
published and the people officially and specially informed of said contents and its penalties. thereto. It also enumerates what shall be published in the Official Gazette, among them,
"important legislative acts and resolutions of a public nature of the Congress of the Philippines"
Without official publication in the Official Gazette as required by Article 2 of the Civil Code and and "all executive and administrative orders and proclamations, except such as have no general
the Revised Administrative Code, there would be no basis nor justification for the corollary rule applicability." It is noteworthy that not all legislative acts are required to be published in the
of Article 3 of the Civil Code (based on constructive notice that the provisions of the law are Official Gazette but only "important" ones "of a public nature." Moreover, the said law does not
ascertainable from the public and official repository where they are duly published) that provide that publication in the Official Gazette is essential for the effectivity of laws. This is as it
"Ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith. should be, for all statutes are equal and stand on the same footing. A law, especially an earlier
one of general application such as Commonwealth Act No. 638, cannot nullify or restrict the
Respondents' contention based on a misreading of Article 2 of the Civil Code that "only laws operation of a subsequent statute that has a provision of its own as to when and how it will take
which are silent as to their effectivity [date] need be published in the Official Gazette for their effect. Only a higher law, which is the Constitution, can assume that role.
effectivity" is manifestly untenable. The plain text and meaning of the Civil Code is that "laws
shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official In fine, I concur in the majority decision to the extent that it requires notice before laws become
Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided, " i.e. a different effectivity date is provided by the law effective, for no person should be bound by a law without notice. This is elementary fairness.
itself. This proviso perforce refers to a law that has been duly published pursuant to the basic However, I beg to disagree insofar as it holds that such notice shall be by publication in the
constitutional requirements of due process. The best example of this is the Civil Code itself: the Official Gazette.
same Article 2 provides otherwise that it "shall take effect [only] one year [not 15 days] after
such publication. 2 To sustain respondents' misreading that "most laws or decrees specify the Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.
date of their effectivity and for this reason, publication in the Official Gazette is not necessary for
their effectivity 3 would be to nullify and render nugatory the Civil Code's indispensable and GUTIERREZ, Jr., J., concurring:
essential requirement of prior publication in the Official Gazette by the simple expedient of
I concur insofar as publication is necessary but reserve my vote as to the necessity of such
providing for immediate effectivity or an earlier effectivity date in the law itself before the
publication being in the Official Gazette.
completion of 15 days following its publication which is the period generally fixed by the Civil
Code for its proper dissemination. DE LA FUENTE, J., concurring:
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring: I concur insofar as the opinion declares the unpublished decrees and issuances of a public
nature or general applicability ineffective, until due publication thereof.
I agree. There cannot be any question but that even if a decree provides for a date of effectivity,
it has to be published. What I would like to state in connection with that proposition is that when
a date of effectivity is mentioned in the decree but the decree becomes effective only fifteen (15) Separate Opinions
days after its publication in the Official Gazette, it will not mean that the decree can have
FERNANDO, C.J., concurring (with qualification):
retroactive effect to the date of effectivity mentioned in the decree itself. There should be no
retroactivity if the retroactivity will run counter to constitutional rights or shall destroy vested There is on the whole acceptance on my part of the views expressed in the ably written opinion
rights. of Justice Escolin. I am unable, however, to concur insofar as it would unqualifiedly impose the
requirement of publication in the Official Gazette for unpublished "presidential issuances" to
PLANA, J., concurring (with qualification):
have binding force and effect.
The Philippine Constitution does not require the publication of laws as a prerequisite for their
I shall explain why.
effectivity, unlike some Constitutions elsewhere. * It may be said though that the guarantee of
due process requires notice of laws to affected parties before they can be bound thereby; but 1. It is of course true that without the requisite publication, a due process question would arise if
such notice is not necessarily by publication in the Official Gazette. The due process clause is made to apply adversely to a party who is not even aware of the existence of any legislative or
not that precise. Neither is the publication of laws in the Official Gazette required by any statute executive act having the force and effect of law. My point is that such publication required need
as a prerequisite for their effectivity, if said laws already provide for their effectivity date. not be confined to the Official Gazette. From the pragmatic standpoint, there is an advantage to
be gained. It conduces to certainty. That is too be admitted. It does not follow, however, that
Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that "laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the
failure to do so would in all cases and under all circumstances result in a statute, presidential
completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided " Two things
decree or any other executive act of the same category being bereft of any binding force and
may be said of this provision: Firstly, it obviously does not apply to a law with a built-in provision
effect. To so hold would, for me, raise a constitutional question. Such a pronouncement would
as to when it will take effect. Secondly, it clearly recognizes that each law may provide not only a
lend itself to the interpretation that such a legislative or presidential act is bereft of the attribute
of effectivity unless published in the Official Gazette. There is no such requirement in the I am authorized to state that Justices Makasiar, Abad Santos, Cuevas, and Alampay concur in
Constitution as Justice Plana so aptly pointed out. It is true that what is decided now applies only this separate opinion.
to past "presidential issuances". Nonetheless, this clarification is, to my mind, needed to avoid
any possible misconception as to what is required for any statute or presidential act to be Makasiar, Abad Santos, Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.
impressed with binding force or effectivity.
TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:
2. It is quite understandable then why I concur in the separate opinion of Justice Plana. Its first
paragraph sets forth what to me is the constitutional doctrine applicable to this case. Thus: "The I concur with the main opinion of Mr. Justice Escolin and the concurring opinion of Mme. Justice
Philippine Constitution does not require the publication of laws as a prerequisite for their Herrera. The Rule of Law connotes a body of norms and laws published and ascertainable and
effectivity, unlike some Constitutions elsewhere. It may be said though that the guarantee of due of equal application to all similarly circumstances and not subject to arbitrary change but only
process requires notice of laws to affected Parties before they can be bound thereby; but such under certain set procedures. The Court has consistently stressed that "it is an elementary rule
notice is not necessarily by publication in the Official Gazette. The due process clause is not that of fair play and justice that a reasonable opportunity to be informed must be afforded to the
precise. 1 I am likewise in agreement with its closing paragraph: "In fine, I concur in the majority people who are commanded to obey before they can be punished for its violation,1 citing the
decision to the extent that it requires notice before laws become effective, for no person should settled principle based on due process enunciated in earlier cases that "before the public is
be bound by a law without notice. This is elementary fairness. However, I beg to disagree bound by its contents, especially its penal provisions, a law, regulation or circular must first be
insofar as it holds that such notice shall be by publication in the Official Gazette. 2 published and the people officially and specially informed of said contents and its penalties.

3. It suffices, as was stated by Judge Learned Hand, that law as the command of the Without official publication in the Official Gazette as required by Article 2 of the Civil Code and
government "must be ascertainable in some form if it is to be enforced at all. 3 It would indeed the Revised Administrative Code, there would be no basis nor justification for the corollary rule
be to reduce it to the level of mere futility, as pointed out by Justice Cardozo, "if it is unknown of Article 3 of the Civil Code (based on constructive notice that the provisions of the law are
and unknowable. 4 Publication, to repeat, is thus essential. What I am not prepared to subscribe ascertainable from the public and official repository where they are duly published) that
to is the doctrine that it must be in the Official Gazette. To be sure once published therein there "Ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith.
is the ascertainable mode of determining the exact date of its effectivity. Still for me that does
Respondents' contention based on a misreading of Article 2 of the Civil Code that "only laws
not dispose of the question of what is the jural effect of past presidential decrees or executive
which are silent as to their effectivity [date] need be published in the Official Gazette for their
acts not so published. For prior thereto, it could be that parties aware of their existence could
effectivity" is manifestly untenable. The plain text and meaning of the Civil Code is that "laws
have conducted themselves in accordance with their provisions. If no legal consequences could
shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official
attach due to lack of publication in the Official Gazette, then serious problems could arise.
Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided, " i.e. a different effectivity date is provided by the law
Previous transactions based on such "Presidential Issuances" could be open to question.
itself. This proviso perforce refers to a law that has been duly published pursuant to the basic
Matters deemed settled could still be inquired into. I am not prepared to hold that such an effect
constitutional requirements of due process. The best example of this is the Civil Code itself: the
is contemplated by our decision. Where such presidential decree or executive act is made the
same Article 2 provides otherwise that it "shall take effect [only] one year [not 15 days] after
basis of a criminal prosecution, then, of course, its ex post facto character becomes evident. 5 In
such publication. 2 To sustain respondents' misreading that "most laws or decrees specify the
civil cases though, retroactivity as such is not conclusive on the due process aspect. There must
date of their effectivity and for this reason, publication in the Official Gazette is not necessary for
still be a showing of arbitrariness. Moreover, where the challenged presidential decree or
their effectivity 3 would be to nullify and render nugatory the Civil Code's indispensable and
executive act was issued under the police power, the non-impairment clause of the Constitution
essential requirement of prior publication in the Official Gazette by the simple expedient of
may not always be successfully invoked. There must still be that process of balancing to
providing for immediate effectivity or an earlier effectivity date in the law itself before the
determine whether or not it could in such a case be tainted by infirmity. 6 In traditional
completion of 15 days following its publication which is the period generally fixed by the Civil
terminology, there could arise then a question of unconstitutional application. That is as far as it
Code for its proper dissemination.
goes.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring:
4. Let me make therefore that my qualified concurrence goes no further than to affirm that
publication is essential to the effectivity of a legislative or executive act of a general application. I I agree. There cannot be any question but that even if a decree provides for a date of effectivity,
am not in agreement with the view that such publication must be in the Official Gazette. The Civil it has to be published. What I would like to state in connection with that proposition is that when
Code itself in its Article 2 expressly recognizes that the rule as to laws taking effect after fifteen a date of effectivity is mentioned in the decree but the decree becomes effective only fifteen (15)
days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette is subject to this days after its publication in the Official Gazette, it will not mean that the decree can have
exception, "unless it is otherwise provided." Moreover, the Civil Code is itself only a legislative retroactive effect to the date of effectivity mentioned in the decree itself. There should be no
enactment, Republic Act No. 386. It does not and cannot have the juridical force of a retroactivity if the retroactivity will run counter to constitutional rights or shall destroy vested
constitutional command. A later legislative or executive act which has the force and effect of law rights.
can legally provide for a different rule.
PLANA, J., concurring (with qualification):
5. Nor can I agree with the rather sweeping conclusion in the opinion of Justice Escolin that
presidential decrees and executive acts not thus previously published in the Official Gazette The Philippine Constitution does not require the publication of laws as a prerequisite for their
would be devoid of any legal character. That would be, in my opinion, to go too far. It may be effectivity, unlike some Constitutions elsewhere. * It may be said though that the guarantee of
fraught, as earlier noted, with undesirable consequences. I find myself therefore unable to yield due process requires notice of laws to affected parties before they can be bound thereby; but
assent to such a pronouncement. such notice is not necessarily by publication in the Official Gazette. The due process clause is
not that precise. Neither is the publication of laws in the Official Gazette required by any statute [G.R. No. L-63915. December 29, 1986.]
as a prerequisite for their effectivity, if said laws already provide for their effectivity date.
LORENZO M. TAÑADA, ABRAHAM F. SARMIENTO, and MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR
Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that "laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the
BROTHERHOOD, INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC. (MABINI), Petitioners, v. HON. JUAN
completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided " Two things
C. TUVERA. in his capacity as Executive Assistant to the President, HON. JOAQUIN VENUS, in
may be said of this provision: Firstly, it obviously does not apply to a law with a built-in provision
his capacity as Deputy Executive Assistant to the President, MELQUIADES P. DE LA CRUZ,
as to when it will take effect. Secondly, it clearly recognizes that each law may provide not only a
ETC., ET AL., Respondents.
different period for reckoning its effectivity date but also a different mode of notice. Thus, a law
may prescribe that it shall be published elsewhere than in the Official Gazette. FERNAN, J., concurring:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Commonwealth Act No. 638, in my opinion, does not support the proposition that for their
1. CIVIL LAW; EFFECT AND APPLICATION OF LAWS; ARTICLE 2, CIVIL CODE;
effectivity, laws must be published in the Official Gazette. The said law is simply "An Act to
PUBLICATION OF LAWS MADE TO ENSURE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS
Provide for the Uniform Publication and Distribution of the Official Gazette." Conformably
AND TO INFORMATION. — The categorical statement by this Court on the need for publication
therewith, it authorizes the publication of the Official Gazette, determines its frequency, provides
before any law be made effective seeks to prevent abuses on the part if the lawmakers and, at
for its sale and distribution, and defines the authority of the Director of Printing in relation
the time, ensure to the people their constitutional right to due process and to information on
thereto. It also enumerates what shall be published in the Official Gazette, among them,
matter of public concern.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary:red
"important legislative acts and resolutions of a public nature of the Congress of the Philippines"
and "all executive and administrative orders and proclamations, except such as have no general
applicability." It is noteworthy that not all legislative acts are required to be published in the
Official Gazette but only "important" ones "of a public nature." Moreover, the said law does not RESOLUTION
provide that publication in the Official Gazette is essential for the effectivity of laws. This is as it
should be, for all statutes are equal and stand on the same footing. A law, especially an earlier CRUZ, J.:
one of general application such as Commonwealth Act No. 638, cannot nullify or restrict the
operation of a subsequent statute that has a provision of its own as to when and how it will take Due process was invoked by the petitioners in demanding the disclosure or a number of
effect. Only a higher law, which is the Constitution, can assume that role. presidential decrees which they claimed had not been published as required by law. The
government argued that while publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was
In fine, I concur in the majority decision to the extent that it requires notice before laws become "otherwise provided," as when the decrees themselves declared that they were to become
effective, for no person should be bound by a law without notice. This is elementary fairness. effective immediately upon their approval. In the decision of this case on April 24, 1985, the
However, I beg to disagree insofar as it holds that such notice shall be by publication in the Court affirmed the necessity for the publication of some of these decrees, declaring in the
Official Gazette. dispositive portion as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur. "WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish to the Official Gazette all
unpublished presidential issuances which are of general application, and unless so published,
GUTIERREZ, Jr., J., concurring: they shall have no binding force and effect."cralaw virtua1aw library
I concur insofar as publication is necessary but reserve my vote as to the necessity of such
The petitioners are now before us again, this time to move for reconsideration/clarification of that
publication being in the Official Gazette.
decision. 1 Specifically, they ask the following questions:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
DE LA FUENTE, J., concurring:
1. What is meant by "law of public nature" or "general applicability" ?
I concur insofar as the opinion declares the unpublished decrees and issuances of a public
nature or general applicability ineffective, until due publication thereof. 2. Must a distinction be made between laws of general applicability and laws which are not?

3. What is meant by "publication" ?

4. Where is the publication to be made?

5. When is the publication to be made?

Resolving their own doubts, the petitioners suggest that there should be no distinction between
laws of general applicability and those which are not; that publication means complete
publication; and that the publication must be made forthwith in the Official Gazette. 2 

In the Comment 3 required of the then Solicitor General, he claimed first that the motion was a
request for an advisory opinion and should therefore be dismissed, and, on the merits, that the
clause "unless it is otherwise provided" in Article 2 of the Civil Code meant that the publication
required therein was not always imperative; that publication, when necessary, did not have to be law without any bearing on the public would be invalid as an intrusion of privacy or as class
made in the Official Gazette; and that in any case the subject decision was concurred in only by legislation or as an ultra vires act of the legislature. To be valid, the law must invariably affect the
three justices and consequently not binding. This elicited a Reply 4 refuting these arguments. public interest even if it might be directly applicable only to one individual, or some of the people
Came next the February Revolution and the Court required the new Solicitor General to file a only, and not to the public as a whole.
Rejoinder in view of the supervening events, under Rule 3, Section 18, of the Rules of Court.
Responding, he submitted that issuances intended only for the interval administration of a We hold therefore that all statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be
government agency or for particular persons did not have to be published; that publication when published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication
necessary must be in full and in the Official Gazette; and that, however, the decision under unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.chanrobles.com:cralaw:red
reconsideration was not binding because it was not supported by eight members of this Court. 5 
Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the
The subject of contention is Article 2 of the Civil Code providing as President in the exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated by the
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph legislature or, at present, directly conferred by the Constitution. Administrative rules and
regulations must also be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law
"ART. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in pursuant also to a valid delegation.
the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. This Code shall take effect one year after
such publication."cralaw virtua1aw library Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the
personnel of the administrative agency and not the public, need not be published. Neither is
After a careful study of this provision and of the arguments of the parties, both on the original publication required of the so-called letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors
petition and on the instant motion, we have come to the conclusion, and so hold, that the clause concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of
"unless it is otherwise provided" refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of their duties.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not mean that the
legislature may make the law effective immediately upon approval, or on any other date, without Accordingly, even the charter of a city must be published notwithstanding that it applies to only a
its previous publication.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary portion of the national territory and directly affects only the inhabitants of that place. All
presidential decrees must be published, including even, say, those naming a public place after a
Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its discretion provide that favored individual or exempting him from certain prohibitions or requirements. The circulars
the usual fifteen-day period shall be shortened or extended. An example, as pointed out by the issued by the Monetary Board must be published if they are meant not merely to interpret but to
present Chief Justice in his separate concurrence in the original decision, 6 is the Civil Code "fill in the details" of the Central Bank Act which that body is supposed to enforce.
which did not become effective after fifteen days from its publication in the Official Gazette but
"one year after such publication." The general rule did not apply because it was "otherwise However, no publication is required of the instructions issued by, say, the Minister of Social
provided."cralaw virtua1aw library Welfare on the case studies to be made in petitions for adoption or the rules laid down by the
head of a government agency on the assignments or workload of his personnel or the wearing of
It is not correct to say that under the disputed clause publication may be dispensed with office uniforms. Parenthetically, municipal ordinances are not covered by this rule but by the
altogether. The reason is that such omission would offend due process insofar as it would deny Local Government Code.
the public knowledge of the laws that are supposed to govern it. Surely, if the legislature could
validly provide that a law shall become effective immediately upon its approval notwithstanding We agree that the publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its purpose is to
the lack of publication (or after an unreasonably short period after publication), it is not unlikely inform the public of the contents of the laws. As correctly pointed out by the petitioners, the mere
that persons not aware of it would be prejudiced as a result; and they would be so not because mention of the number of the presidential decree, the title of such decree, its whereabouts (e.g.,
of a failure to comply with it but simply because they did not know of its existence. Significantly, "with Secretary Tuvera"), the supposed date of effectivity, and in a mere supplement of the
this is not true only of penal laws as is commonly supposed. One can think of many non-penal Official Gazette cannot satisfy the publication requirement. This is not even substantial
measures, like a law on prescription, which must also be communicated to the persons they may compliance. This was the manner, incidentally, in which the General Appropriations Act for FY
affect before they can begin to operate.cralawnad 1975, a presidential decree undeniably of general applicability and interest, was "published" by
We note at this point the conclusive presumption that every person knows the law, which of the Marcos administration. 7 The evident purpose was to withhold rather than disclose
course presupposes that the law has been published if the presumption is to have any legal information on this vital law.
justification at all. It is no less important to remember that Section 6 of the Bill of Rights
recognizes "the right of the people to information on matters of public concern," and this certainly Coming now to the original decision, it is true that only four justices were categorically for
applies to, among others, and indeed especially, the legislative enactments of the government. publication in the Official Gazette 8 and that six others felt that publication could be made
elsewhere as long as the people were sufficiently informed. 9 One reserved his vote 10 and
The term "laws" should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for strictly another merely acknowledged the need for due publication without indicating where it should be
speaking all laws relate to the people in general albeit there are some that do not apply to them made, 11 It is therefore necessary for the present membership of this Court to arrive at a clear
directly. An example is a law granting citizenship to a particular individual, like a relative of consensus on this matter and to lay down a binding decision supported by the necessary vote.
President Marcos who was decreed instant naturalization. It surely cannot be said that such a
law does not affect the public although it unquestionably does not apply directly to all the people. There is much to be said of the view that the publication need not be made in the Official
The subject of such law is a matter of public interest which any member of the body politic may Gazette, considering its erratic releases and limited readership. Undoubtedly, newspapers of
question in the political forums or, if he is a proper party, even in the courts of justice. In fact, a general circulation could better perform the function of communicating the laws to the people as
such periodicals are more easily available, have a wider readership, and come out regularly. Isagani A. Cruz, I would like to add a few observations. Even as a Member of the defunct
The trouble, though, is that this kind of publication is not the one required or authorized by Batasang Pambansa, I took a strong stand against the insidious manner by which the previous
existing law. As far as we know, no amendment has been made of Article 2 of the Civil Code. dispensation had promulgated and made effective thousands of decrees, executive orders,
The Solicitor General has not pointed to such a law, and we have no information that it exists. If letters of instructions, etc. Never has the law-making power which traditionally belongs to the
it does, it obviously has not yet been published. legislature been used and abused to satisfy the whims and caprices of a one-man legislative mill
as it happened in the past regime. Thus, in those days, it was not surprising to witness the sad
At any rate, this Court is not called upon to rule upon the wisdom of a law or to repeal or modify spectacle of two presidential decrees bearing the same number, although covering two different
it if we find it impractical. That is not our function. That function belongs to the legislature. Our subject matters. In point is the case of two presidential decrees bearing number 1686 issued on
task is merely to interpret and apply the law as conceived and approved by the political March 19, 1980, one granting Philippine citizenship to Michael M. Keon, the then President’s
departments of the government in accordance with the prescribed procedure. Consequently, we nephew and the other imposing a tax on every motor vehicle equipped with air-conditioner. This
have no choice but to pronounce that under Article 2 of the Civil Code, the publication of laws was further exacerbated by the issuance of PD No. 1686-A also on March 19, 1980 granting
must be made in the Official Gazette, and not elsewhere, as a requirement for their effectivity Philippine citizenship to basketball players Jeffrey Moore and Dennis George
after fifteen days from such publication or after a different period provided by the Still.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
legislature.chanrobles law library
The categorical statement by this Court on the need for publication before any law may be made
We also hold that the publication must be made forthwith, or at least as soon as possible, to give effective seeks to prevent abuses on the part of the lawmakers and, at the same time, ensures
effect to the law pursuant to the said Article 2. There is that possibility, of course, although not to the people their constitutional right to due process and to information on matters of public
suggested by the parties that a law could be rendered unenforceable by a mere refusal of the concern.
executive, for whatever reason, to cause its publication as required. This is a matter, however,
that we do not need to examine at this time. FELICIANO, J., concurring:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Finally, the claim of the former Solicitor General that the instant motion is a request for an I agree entirely with the opinion of the court so eloquently written by Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz.
advisory opinion is untenable, to say the least, and deserves no further comment. At the same time, I wish to add a few statements to reflect my understanding of what the Court
is saying.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
The days of the secret laws and the unpublished decrees are over. This is once again an open
society, with all the acts of the government subject to public scrutiny and available always to A statute which by its terms provides for its coming into effect immediately upon approval
public cognizance. This has to be so if our country is to remain democratic, with sovereignty thereof, is properly interpreted as coming into effect immediately upon publication thereof in the
residing in the people and all government authority emanating from them. Official Gazette as provided in Article 2 of the Civil Code. Such statute, in other words, should
not be regarded as purporting literally to come into effect immediately upon its approval or
Although they have delegated the power of legislation, they retain the authority to review the enactment and without need of publication. For so to interpret such statute would be to collide
work of their delegates and to ratify or reject it according to their lights, through their freedom of with the constitutional obstacle posed by the due process clause. The enforcement of
expression and their right of suffrage. This they cannot do if the acts of the legislature are prescriptions which are both unknown to and unknowable by those subjected to the statute, has
concealed. been throughout history a common tool of tyrannical governments. Such application and
enforcement constitutes at bottom a negation of the fundamental principle of legality in the
Laws must come out in the open in the clear light of the sun instead of skulking in the shadows relations between a government and its people.
with their dark, deep secrets. Mysterious pronouncements and rumored rules cannot be
recognized as binding unless their existence and contents are confirmed by a valid publication At the same time, it is clear that the requirement of publication of a statute in the Official
intended to make full disclosure and give proper notice to the people. The furtive law is like a Gazette, as distinguished from any other medium such as a newspaper of general circulation, is
scabbarded saber that cannot feint, parry or cut unless the naked blade is drawn. embodied in a statutory norm and is not a constitutional command. The statutory norm is set out
in Article 2 of the Civil Code and is supported and reinforced by Section 1 of Commonwealth Act
WHEREFORE, it is hereby declared that all laws as above defined shall immediately upon their No. 638 and Section 35 of the Revised Administrative Code. A specification of the Official
approval, or as soon thereafter as possible, be published in full in the Official Gazette, to Gazette as the prescribed medium of publication may therefore be changed. Article 2 of the Civil
become effective only after fifteen days from their publication, or on another date specified by Code could, without creating a constitutional problem, be amended by a subsequent statute
the legislature, in accordance with Article 2 of the Civil Code.chanroblesvirtual|awlibrary providing, for instance, for publication either in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general
circulation in the country. Until such an amendatory statute is in fact enacted, Article 2 of the
SO ORDERED. Civil Code must be obeyed and publication effected in the Official Gazette and not in any other
medium.chanrobles virtualawlibrary chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph

Separate Opinions
FERNAN, J., concurring:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

While concurring in the Court’s opinion penned by my distinguished colleague, Mr. Justice
 Years later, on 16 October 1987, President Corazon C. Aquino (President Aquino) issued
Proclamation No. 172 which substantially reiterated Proclamation No. 2476, as published, but
this time excluded Lots 1 and 2 of Western Bicutan from the operation of Proclamation No. 423
G.R. No. 187587, June 5, 2013 and declared the said lots open for disposition under the provisions of R.A. 274 and 730.
NAGKAKAISANG MARALITA NG SITIO MASIGASIG, INC., Petitioner, 
Memorandum Order No. 119, implementing Proclamation No. 172, was issued on the same day.
vs.
MILITARY SHRINE SERVICES - PHILIPPINE VETERANS AFFAIRS OFFICE, DEPARTMENT Through the years, informal settlers increased and occupied some areas of Fort Bonifacio
OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, Respondent. including portions of the Libingan ng mga Bayani. Thus, Brigadier General Fredelito Bautista
issued General Order No. 1323 creating Task Force Bantay (TFB), primarily to prevent further
x-----------------------x
unauthorized occupation and to cause the demolition of illegal structures at Fort Bonifacio.
G.R. No. 187654
On 27 August 1999, members of petitioner Nagkakaisang Maralita ng Sitio Masigasig, Inc.
WESTERN BICUTAN LOT OWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC., represented by its Board of (NMSMI) filed a Petition with the Commission on Settlement of Land Problems (COSLAP),
Directors, Petitioner,  where it was docketed as COSLAP Case No. 99-434. The Petition prayed for the following: (1)
vs. the reclassification of the areas they occupied, covering Lot 3 of SWO-13-000-298 of Western
MILITARY SHRINE SERVICES - PHILIPPINE VETERANS AFFAIRS OFFICE, DEPARTMENT Bicutan, from public land to alienable and disposable land pursuant to Proclamation No. 2476;
OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, Respondent. (2) the subdivision of the subject lot by the Director of Lands; and (3) the Land Management
Bureau’s facilitation of the distribution and sale of the subject lot to its bona fide occupants.4
DECISION
On 1 September 2000, petitioner Western Bicutan Lot Owners Association, Inc. (WBLOAI) filed
SERENO, CJ.: a Petition-in-Intervention substantially praying for the same reliefs as those prayed for by
NMSMI with regard to the area the former then occupied covering Lot 7 of SWO-00-001302 in
Before us are consolidated Petitions for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing Western Bicutan.5
the Decision1promulgated on 29 April 2009 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 97925.
Thus, on 1 September 2006, COSLAP issued a Resolution6 granting the Petition and declaring
THE FACTS the portions of land in question alienable and disposable, with Associate Commissioner Lina
Aguilar-General dissenting.7
The facts, as culled from the records, are as follows:
The COSLAP ruled that the handwritten addendum of President Marcos was an integral part of
On 12 July 1957, by virtue of Proclamation No. 423, President Carlos P. Garcia reserved parcels Proclamation No. 2476, and was therefore, controlling. The intention of the President could not
of land in the Municipalities of Pasig, Taguig, Parañaque, Province of Rizal and Pasay City for a be defeated by the negligence or inadvertence of others. Further, considering that Proclamation
military reservation. The military reservation, then known as Fort William McKinley, was later on
renamed Fort Andres Bonifacio (Fort Bonifacio). No. 2476 was done while the former President was exercising legislative powers, it could not be
amended, repealed or superseded, by a mere executive enactment. Thus, Proclamation No. 172
On 28 May 1967, President Ferdinand E. Marcos (President Marcos) issued Proclamation No. could not have superseded much less displaced Proclamation No. 2476, as the latter was
208, amending Proclamation No. 423, which excluded a certain area of Fort Bonifacio and issued on October 16, 1987 when President Aquino’s legislative power had ceased.
reserved it for a national shrine. The excluded area is now known as Libingan ng mga Bayani,
which is under the administration of herein respondent Military Shrine Services – Philippine In her Dissenting Opinion, Associate Commissioner Lina AguilarGeneral stressed that pursuant
Veterans Affairs Office (MSS-PVAO). to Article 2 of the Civil Code, publication is indispensable in every case. Likewise, she held that
when the provision of the law is clear and unambiguous so that there is no occasion for the court
Again, on 7 January 1986, President Marcos issued Proclamation No. 2476, further amending to look into legislative intent, the law must be taken as it is, devoid of judicial addition or
Proclamation No. 423, which excluded barangaysLower Bicutan, Upper Bicutan and Signal subtraction.8 Finally, she maintained that the Commission had no authority to supply the
Village from the operation of Proclamation No. 423 and declared it open for disposition under the addendum originally omitted in the published version of Proclamation No. 2476, as to do so
provisions of Republic Act Nos. (R.A.) 274 and 730. would be tantamount to encroaching on the field of the legislature.
At the bottom of Proclamation No. 2476, President Marcos made a handwritten addendum, Herein respondent MSS-PVAO filed a Motion for Reconsideration,9 which was denied by the
which reads: COSLAP in a Resolution dated 24 January 2007.10
"P.S. – This includes Western Bicutan MSS-PVAO filed a Petition with the Court of Appeals seeking to reverse the COSLAP
Resolutions dated 1 September 2006 and 24 January 2007.
(SGD.) Ferdinand E. Marcos"2
Thus, on 29 April 2009, the then Court of Appeals First Division rendered the assailed Decision
The crux of the controversy started when Proclamation No. 2476 was published in the Official granting MSS-PVAO’s Petition, the dispositive portion of which reads:
Gazette3 on 3 February 1986, without the above-quoted addendum.
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The Resolutions However, it is undisputed that the handwritten addendum was not included when Proclamation
dated September 1, 2006 and January 24, 2007 issued by the Commission on the Settlement of No. 2476 was published in the Official Gazette.
Land Problems in COSLAP Case No. 99-434 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. In lieu
thereof, the petitions of respondents in COSLAP Case No. 99-434 are DISMISSED, for lack of The resolution of whether the subject lots were declared as reclassified and disposable lies in
merit, as discussed herein. Further, pending urgent motions filed by respondents are likewise the determination of whether the handwritten addendum of President Marcos has the force and
effect of law. In relation thereto, Article 2 of the Civil Code expressly provides:
DENIED. SO ORDERED.11 (Emphasis in the original)
ART. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in
Both NMSMI12 and WBLOAI13 appealed the said Decision by filing their respective Petitions for the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. This Code shall take effect one year after
Review with this Court under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. such publication.

THE ISSUES Under the above provision, the requirement of publication is indispensable to give effect to the
law, unless the law itself has otherwise provided. The phrase "unless otherwise provided" refers
Petitioner NMSMI raises the following issues: to a different effectivity date other than after fifteen days following the completion of the law’s
publication in the Official Gazette, but does not imply that the requirement of publication may be
I dispensed with. The issue of the requirement of publication was already settled in the landmark
case Tañada v. Hon. Tuvera,16 in which we had the occasion to rule thus:
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN
RULING THAT PROCLAMATION NO. 2476 DID NOT INCLUDE ANY PORTION OF WESTERN Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its discretion provide that
BICUTAN AS THE HANDWRITTEN NOTATION BY PRESIDENT MARCOS ON THE SAID the usual fifteen-day period shall be shortened or extended. An example, as pointed out by the
PROCLAMATION WAS NOT PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL GAZETTE. present Chief Justice in his separate concurrence in the original decision, is the Civil Code which
did not become effective after fifteen days from its publication in the Official Gazette but "one
II
year after such publication." The general rule did not apply because it was "otherwise provided."
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN
It is not correct to say that under the disputed clause publication may be dispensed with
RULING THAT PROCLAMATION NO. 172 LIKEWISE EXCLUDED THE PORTION OF LAND
altogether. The reason is that such omission would offend due process insofar as it would deny
OCCUPIED BY MEMBER OF HEREIN PETITIONER.
the public knowledge of the laws that are supposed to govern it. Surely, if the legislature could
III validly provide that a law shall become effective immediately upon its approval notwithstanding
the lack of publication (or after an unreasonably short period after publication), it is not unlikely
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT that persons not aware of it would be prejudiced as a result; and they would be so not because
CONSIDERING THAT THE HON. COSLAP HAS BROAD POWERS TO RECOMMEND TO of a failure to comply with it but simply because they did not know of its existence. Significantly,
THE PRESIDENT >INNOVATIVE MEASURES TO RESOLVE EXPEDITIOUSLY VARIOUS this is not true only of penal laws as is commonly supposed. One can think of many non-penal
LAND CASES.14 measures, like a law on prescription, which must also be communicated to the persons they may
affect before they can begin to operate.
On the other hand, petitioner WBLOAI raises this sole issue:
xxxx
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
THE SUBJECT PROPERTY WAS NOT DECLARED ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE BY The term "laws" should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for strictly
VIRTUE OF PROCLAMATION NO. 2476 BECAUSE THE HANDWRITTEN ADDENDUM OF speaking all laws relate to the people in general albeit there are some that do not apply to them
PRESIDENT FERDINAND E. MARCOS INCLUDING WESTERN BICUTAN IN directly. An example is a law granting citizenship to a particular individual, like a relative of
PROCLAMATION NO. 2476 WAS NOT INCLUDED IN THE PUBLICATION.15 President Marcos who was decreed instant naturalization. It surely cannot be said that such a
law does not affect the public although it unquestionably does not apply directly to all the people.
Both Petitions boil down to the principal issue of whether the Court of Appeals erred in ruling The subject of such law is a matter of public interest which any member of the body politic may
that the subject lots were not alienable and disposable by virtue of Proclamation No. 2476 on the question in the political forums or, if he is a proper party, even in the courts of justice. In fact, a
ground that the handwritten addendum of President Marcos was not included in the publication law without any bearing on the public would be invalid as an intrusion of privacy or as class
of the said law. legislation or as an ultra vires act of the legislature. To be valid, the law must invariably affect the
public interest even if it might be directly applicable only to one individual, or some of the people
THE COURT’S RULING only, and not to the public as a whole.
We deny the Petitions for lack of merit. We hold therefore that all statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be
published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication
Considering that petitioners were occupying Lots 3 and 7 of Western Bicutan (subject lots), their
unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.
claims were anchored on the handwritten addendum of President Marcos to Proclamation No.
2476. They allege that the former President intended to include all Western Bicutan in the Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the
reclassification of portions of Fort Bonifacio as disposable public land when he made a notation President in the exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated by the
just below the printed version of Proclamation No. 2476. legislature or, at present, directly conferred by the Constitution. Administrative rules and
regulations must also be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law hereby LIFTED. Likewise, all pending motions to cite respondent in contempt is DENIED, having
pursuant also to a valid delegation. been rendered moot. No costs.

xxxx SO ORDERED.

Accordingly, even the charter of a city must be published notwithstanding that it applies to only a MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
portion of the national territory and directly affects only the inhabitants of that place. All Chief Justice, Chairperson
presidential decrees must be published, including even, say, those naming a public place after a
favored individual or exempting him from certain prohibitions or requirements. The circulars WE CONCUR:
issued by the Monetary Board must be published if they are meant not merely to interpret but to
"fill in the details" of the Central Bank Act which that body is supposed to enforce.

xxxx

We agree that the publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its purpose is to
inform the public of the contents of the laws. As correctly pointed out by the petitioners, the mere
mention of the number of the presidential decree, the title of such decree, its whereabouts (e.g., G.R. No. 173976, February 27, 2009
"with Secretary Tuvera"), the supposed date of effectivity, and in a mere supplement of the
Official Gazette cannot satisfy the publication requirement.1âwphi1 This is not even substantial METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, INC., Petitioner, 
compliance. This was the manner, incidentally, in which the General Appropriations Act for FY vs.
1975, a presidential decree undeniably of general applicability and interest, was "published" by EUGENIO PEÑAFIEL, for himself and as Attorney-in-Fact of ERLINDA
the Marcos administration. The evident purpose was to withhold rather than disclose information PEÑAFIEL, Respondents.
on this vital law.
DECISION
xxxx
NACHURA, J.:
Laws must come out in the open in the clear light of the sun instead of skulking in the shadows
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated July
with their dark, deep secrets. Mysterious pronouncements and rumored rules cannot be
29, 2005 and Resolution dated July 31, 2006. The assailed decision nullified the extrajudicial
recognized as binding unless their existence and contents are confirmed by a valid publication
foreclosure sale of respondents’ properties because the notice of sale was published in a
intended to make full disclosure and give proper notice to the people. The furtive law is like a
newspaper not of general circulation in the place where the properties were located.
scabbarded saber that cannot feint, parry or cut unless the naked blade is drawn. (Emphases
supplied) Respondent Erlinda Peñafiel and the late Romeo Peñafiel are the registered owners of two
parcels of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. (350937) 6195 and TCT No.
Applying the foregoing ruling to the instant case, this Court cannot rely on a handwritten note
0085, both issued by the Register of Deeds of Mandaluyong City. On August 1, 1991, the
that was not part of Proclamation No. 2476 as published. Without publication, the note never
Peñafiel spouses mortgaged their properties in favor of petitioner Metropolitan Bank and Trust
had any legal force and effect.
Company, Inc. The mortgage deed was amended on various dates as the amount of the loan
Furthermore, under Section 24, Chapter 6, Book I of the Administrative Code, "the publication of covered by said deed was increased.
any law, resolution or other official documents in the Official Gazette shall be prima facie
The spouses defaulted in the payment of their loan obligation. On July 14, 1999, petitioner
evidence of its authority." Thus, whether or not President Marcos intended to include Western
instituted an extrajudicial foreclosure proceeding under Act No. 3135 through Diego A. Alleña,
Bicutan is not only irrelevant but speculative. Simply put, the courts may not speculate as to the
Jr., a notary public. Respondent Erlinda Peñafiel received the Notice of Sale, stating that the
probable intent of the legislature apart from the words appearing in the law.17 This Court cannot
public auction was to be held on September 7, 1999 at ten o’clock in the morning, at the main
rule that a word appears in the law when, evidently, there is none. In Pagpalain Haulers, Inc. v.
entrance of the City Hall of Mandaluyong City. The Notice of Sale was published in Maharlika
Hon. Trajano,18 we ruled that "under Article 8 of the Civil Code, 'judicial decisions applying or
Pilipinas on August 5, 12 and 19, 1999, as attested to by its publisher in his Affidavit of
interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of the Philippines.'
Publication.2Copies of the said notice were also posted in three conspicuous places in
This does not mean, however, that courts can create law. The courts exist for interpreting the
Mandaluyong City.3
law, not for enacting it. To allow otherwise would be violative of the principle of separation of
powers, inasmuch as the sole function of our courts is to apply or interpret the laws, particularly At the auction sale, petitioner emerged as the sole and highest bidder. The subject lots were
where gaps or lacunae exist or where ambiguities becloud issues, but it will not arrogate unto sold to petitioner for ₱6,144,000.00. A certificate of sale4 was subsequently issued in its favor.
itself the task of legislating." The remedy sought in these Petitions is not judicial interpretation,
but another legislation that would amend the law ‘to include petitioners' lots in the On August 8, 2000, respondent Erlinda Peñafiel, through her attorney-in-fact, Eugenio Peñafiel,
reclassification. filed a Complaint5praying that the extrajudicial foreclosure of the properties be declared null and
void. They likewise sought (a) to enjoin petitioner and the Register of Deeds from consolidating
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petitions are hereby DENIED for lack of ownership, (b) to enjoin petitioner from taking possession of the properties, and (c) to be paid
merit. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 97925 dated 29 April attorney’s fees.
2009 is AFFIRMED in toto. Accordingly, this Court's status quo order dated 17 June 2009 is
On June 30, 2003, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) rendered judgment in favor of petitioner: week for at least three consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the
municipality or city.10
ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
We hold in the negative.
1. The extrajudicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage instituted by defendants Metrobank and
Notary Public Diego A. Alleña, Jr. over the two parcels of land covered by TCT Nos. (350937) Petitioner insists that Maharlika Pilipinas is a newspaper of general circulation since it is
6195 and TCT No. 0085 is hereby declared VALID; and published for the dissemination of local news and general information, it has a bona fide
subscription list of paying subscribers, and it is published at regular intervals. It asserts that the
2. The counterclaim of herein defendants are hereby DISMISSED for insufficiency of evidence. publisher’s Affidavit of Publication attesting that Maharlika Pilipinas is a newspaper of general
circulation is sufficient evidence of such fact.11 Further, the absence of subscribers in
SO ORDERED.6 Mandaluyong City does not necessarily mean that Maharlika Pilipinas is not circulated therein;
on the contrary, as testified to by its publisher, the said newspaper is in fact offered to persons
Respondents appealed to the CA, raising, among others, the issue of whether petitioner
other than its subscribers. Petitioner stresses that the publisher’s statement that Maharlika
complied with the publication requirement for an extrajudicial foreclosure sale under Act No.
Pilipinas is also circulated in Rizal and Cavite was in response to the question as to where else
3135.
the newspaper was circulated; hence, such testimony does not conclusively show that it is not
On this issue, the CA agreed with respondents. The CA noted that the law requires that circulated in Mandaluyong City.12
publication be made in a newspaper of general circulation in the municipality or city where the
Petitioner entreats the Court to consider the fact that, in an Order13 dated April 27, 1998, the
property is situated. Based on the testimony of the publisher of Maharlika Pilipinas, it concluded
Executive Judge of the RTC of Mandaluyong City approved the application for accreditation of
that petitioner did not comply with this requirement, since the newspaper was not circulated in
Maharlika Pilipinas as one of the newspapers authorized to participate in the raffle of judicial
Mandaluyong City where the subject properties were located. Thus, in its Decision dated July
notices/orders effective March 2, 1998. Nonetheless, petitioner admits that this was raised for
29, 2005, the CA reversed the RTC Decision, thus:
the first time only in its Motion for Reconsideration with the CA.14
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. A new one is hereby
The accreditation of Maharlika Pilipinas by the Presiding Judge of the RTC is not decisive of
entered declaring the extrajudicial foreclosure sale of the properties covered by TCT Nos.
whether it is a newspaper of general circulation in Mandaluyong City. This Court is not bound to
(350937) 6195 and 0085 NULL and VOID.
adopt the Presiding Judge’s determination, in connection with the said accreditation, that
SO ORDERED.7 Maharlika Pilipinas is a newspaper of general circulation. The court before which a case is
pending is bound to make a resolution of the issues based on the evidence on record.1avvphi1
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration8 of the decision which the CA denied on July 31,
2006. To prove that Maharlika Pilipinas was not a newspaper of general circulation in Mandaluyong
City, respondents presented the following documents: (a) Certification15 dated December 7,
Petitioner now brings before us this petition for review on certiorari, raising the following issues: 2001 of Catherine de Leon Arce, Chief of the Business Permit and Licensing Office of
Mandaluyong City, attesting that Maharlika Pilipinas did not have a business permit in
I. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED WHEN Mandaluyong City; and (b) List of Subscribers16 of Maharlika Pilipinas showing that there were
IT RULED TO APPLY THE PROVISIONS ON THE PUBLICATION OF JUDICIAL NOTICES no subscribers from Mandaluyong City.
UNDER SECTION 1 OF P.D. NO. 1079 TO THE EXTRAJUDICIAL FORECLOSURE OF THE
MORTGAGE BY NOTARY PUBLIC OVER THE PROPERTIES COVERED BY TCT NO. In addition, respondents also presented Mr. Raymundo Alvarez, publisher of Maharlika Pilipinas,
(350927) 6195 AND TCT NO. 0085. as a witness. During direct examination, Mr. Alvarez testified as follows:

II. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED WHEN Atty. Mendoza: And where is your principal place of business? Where you actually publish.
IT RULED THAT "MAHARLIKA PILIPINAS" IS NOT A NEWSPAPER OF GENERAL
CIRCULATION IN MANDALUYONG CITY. Witness: At No. 80-A St. Mary Avenue, Provident Village, Marikina City.

III. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED Atty. Mendoza: Do you have any other place where you actually publish Maharlika Pilipinas?
WHEN IT REVERSED AND SET ASIDE THE DECISION DATED JUNE 30, 2003 ISSUED BY
Witness: At No. 37 Ermin Garcia Street, Cubao, Quezon City.
THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANDALUYONG CITY, BRANCH 208 AND DECLARED
THE EXTRAJUDICIAL FORECLOSURE SALE OF THE PROPERTIES COVERED BY TCT NO. Atty. Mendoza: And you have a mayor’s permit to operate?
(350937) 6195 AND TCT NO. 0085 NULL AND VOID.9
Witness: Yes.
This controversy boils down to one simple issue: whether or not petitioner complied with the
publication requirement under Section 3, Act No. 3135, which provides: Atty. Mendoza: From what city?

SECTION 3. Notice shall be given by posting notices of the sale for not less than twenty days in Witness: Originally, it was from Quezon City, but we did not change anymore our permit.
at least three public places of the municipality or city where the property is situated, and if such
property is worth more than four hundred pesos, such notice shall also be published once a Atty. Mendoza: And for the year 1996, what city issued you a permit?
Witness: Quezon City. is to achieve a "reasonably wide publicity" of the auction sale. This is why publication in a
newspaper of general circulation is required. The Court has previously taken judicial notice of
Atty. Mendoza: What about this current year? the "far-reaching effects" of publishing the notice of sale in a newspaper of general circulation.20

Witness: Still from Quezon City. True, to be a newspaper of general circulation, it is enough that it is published for the
dissemination of local news and general information, that it has a bona fide subscription list of
Atty. Mendoza: So, you have no mayor’s permit from Marikina City? paying subscribers, and that it is published at regular intervals.21 Over and above all these, the
newspaper must be available to the public in general, and not just to a select few chosen by the
Witness: None, it’s only our residence there.
publisher. Otherwise, the precise objective of publishing the notice of sale in the newspaper will
Atty. Mendoza: What about for Mandaluyong City? not be realized.

Witness: We have no office in Mandaluyong City. In fact, to ensure a wide readership of the newspaper, jurisprudence suggests that the
newspaper must also be appealing to the public in general. The Court has, therefore, held in
Atty. Mendoza: Now, you said that you print and publish Maharlika Pilipinas in Marikina and several cases that the newspaper must not be devoted solely to the interests, or published for
Quezon City? the entertainment, of a particular class, profession, trade, calling, race, or religious
denomination. The newspaper need not have the largest circulation so long as it is of general
Witness: Yes. circulation.22

Atty. Mendoza: Where else do you circulate your newspaper? Thus, the Court doubts that the publication of the notice of sale in Maharlika Pilipinas effectively
caused widespread publicity of the foreclosure sale.
Witness: In Rizal and in Cavite.
Noticeably, in the Affidavit of Publication, Mr. Alvarez attested that he was the "Publisher of
Atty. Mendoza: In the subpoena[,] you were ordered to bring the list of subscribers. Maharlika Pilipinas, a newspaper of general circulation, published every Thursday." Nowhere is
it stated in the affidavit that Maharlika Pilipinas is in circulation in Mandaluyong City. To recall,
Witness: Yes.
Sec. 3 of Act No. 3135 does not only require that the newspaper must be of general circulation;
xxxx it also requires that the newspaper be circulated in the municipality or city where the property is
located. Indeed, in the cases23 wherein the Court held that the affidavit of the publisher was
Atty. Mendoza: How do these subscribers listed here in this document became (sic) regular sufficient proof of the required publication, the affidavit of the publisher therein distinctly stated
subscribers? that the newspaper was generally circulated in the place where the property was located.

Witness: They are friends of our friends and I offered them to become subscribers. Finally, petitioner argues that the CA, in effect, applied P.D. No. 107924 when it cited Fortune
Motors (Phils.) Inc. v. Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company,25 which involved an extrajudicial
Atty. Mendoza: Other than this list of subscribers, you have no other subscribers? foreclosure sale by a sheriff. Petitioner avers that the general reference to "judicial notices" in
P.D. No. 1079, particularly Section 226 thereof, clearly shows that the law applies only to
Witness: No more. extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings conducted by a sheriff, and not by a notary public.27 P.D.
No. 1079 allegedly applies only to notices and announcements that arise from court litigation.28
Atty. Mendoza: Do you offer your newspaper to other persons other than the subscribers listed
here? The Court does not agree with petitioner that the CA applied P.D. 1079 to the present case. The
appellate court cited Fortune Motors merely to emphasize that what is important is that the
Witness: Yes, but we do not just offer it to anybody.17 (Emphasis supplied.)
newspaper is actually in general circulation in the place where the properties to be foreclosed
It bears emphasis that, for the purpose of extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage, the party are located.
alleging non-compliance with the requisite publication has the burden of proving the
In any case, petitioner’s concern that the CA may have applied P.D. 1079 to the present case is
same.18 Petitioner correctly points out that neither the publisher’s statement that Maharlika
trifling. While P.D. No. 1079 requires the newspaper to be "published, edited and circulated in
Pilipinas is being circulated in Rizal and Cavite, nor his admission that there are no subscribers
the same city and/or province where the requirement of general circulation applies," the Court, in
in Mandaluyong City proves that said newspaper is not circulated in Mandaluyong City.
Fortune Motors, did not make a literal interpretation of the provision. Hence, it brushed aside the
Nonetheless, the publisher’s testimony that they "do not just offer [Maharlika Pilipinas] to argument that New Record, the newspaper where the notice of sale was published, was not a
anybody" implies that the newspaper is not available to the public in general. This statement, newspaper of general circulation in Makati since it was not published and edited therein, thus:
taken in conjunction with the fact that there are no subscribers in Mandaluyong City, convinces
The application given by the trial court to the provisions of P.D. No. 1079 is, to our mind, too
us that Maharlika Pilipinas is, in fact, not a newspaper of general circulation in Mandaluyong
narrow and restricted and could not have been the intention of the said law. Were the
City.
interpretation of the trial court (sic) to be followed, even the leading dailies in the country like the
The object of a notice of sale is to inform the public of the nature and condition of the property to "Manila Bulletin," the "Philippine Daily Inquirer," or "The Philippine Star" which all enjoy a wide
be sold, and of the time, place and terms of the sale. Notices are given for the purpose of circulation throughout the country, cannot publish legal notices that would be honored outside
securing bidders and to prevent a sacrifice of the property.19 The goal of the notice requirement the place of their publication. But this is not the interpretation given by the courts. For what is
important is that a paper should be in general circulation in the place where the properties to be
foreclosed are located in order that publication may serve the purpose for which it was For information and guidance.
intended.29
Pursuant to DO No. 182, the complaints of petitioners were forwarded by the Office of the City
Therefore, as it stands, there is no distinction as to the publication requirement in extrajudicial Prosecutor of Davao City to the Secretariat of the Special Panel of the DOJ.3
foreclosure sales conducted by a sheriff or a notary public. The key element in both cases is still
general circulation of the newspaper in the place where the property is located. Aggrieved by such turn of events, petitioners have directly come to the Court via petition for
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, ascribing to respondent Secretary of Justice grave abuse
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals Decision of discretion in issuing DO No. 182. They claim that DO No. 182 violated their right to due
dated July 29, 2005 and Resolution dated July 31, 2006 in CA-G.R. CV No. 79862 are process, their right to the equal protection of the laws, and their right to the speedy disposition of
AFFIRMED. cases. They insist that DO No. 182 was an obstruction of justice and a violation of the rule
against enactment of laws with retroactive effect.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioners also challenge as unconstitutional the issuance of DOJ Memorandum dated March 2,
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA 2009 exempting from the coverage of DO No. No. 182 all the cases for syndicated estafa
Associate Justice already filed and pending in the Office of the City Prosecutor of Cagayan de Oro City. They aver
that DOJ Memorandum dated March 2, 2009 violated their right to equal protection under the
WE CONCUR: Constitution.

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), representing respondent Secretary of Justice,
maintains the validity of DO No. 182 and DOJ Memorandum dated March 2, 2009, and prays
G.R. No. 188056, January 8, 2013 that the petition be dismissed for its utter lack of merit.

SPOUSES AUGUSTO G. DACUDAO AND OFELIA R. DACUDAO, Petitioners,  Issues

vs.
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE RAUL M. GONZALES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF The following issues are now to be resolved, to wit:
JUSTICE, Respondent.
1. Did petitioners properly bring their petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus directly to
DECISION the Court?

BERSAMIN, J.: 2. Did respondent Secretary of Justice commit grave abuse of discretion in issuing DO No. 182?

Petitioners - residents of Bacaca Road, Davao City - were among the investors whom Celso G. 3. Did DO No. 182 and DOJ Memorandum dated March 2, 2009 violate petitioners’
Delos Angeles, Jr. and his associates in the Legacy Group of Companies (Legacy Group) constitutionally guaranteed rights?
allegedly defrauded through the Legacy Group's "buy back agreement" that earned them check
payments that were dishonored. After their written demands for the return of their investments Ruling
went unheeded, they initiated a number of charges for syndicated estafa against Delos Angeles,
Jr., et al. in the Office of the City Prosecutor of Davao City on February 6, 2009. Three of the The petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, being bereft of substance and merit, is
cases were docketed as NPS Docket No. XI-02-INV.-09-A-00356, Docket No. XI-02-INV.-09-C- dismissed.
00752, and Docket No. XI-02-INV.-09-C-00753.1
Firstly, petitioners have unduly disregarded the hierarchy of courts by coming directly to the
On March 18, 2009, the Secretary of Justice issued Department of Justice (DOJ) Order No. 182 Court with their petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus without tendering therein any
(DO No. 182), directing all Regional State Prosecutors, Provincial Prosecutors, and City special, important or compelling reason to justify the direct filing of the petition.
Prosecutors to forward all cases already filed against Delos Angeles, Jr., et al. to the Secretariat
We emphasize that the concurrence of jurisdiction among the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals
of the DOJ Special Panel in Manila for appropriate action.
and the Regional Trial Courts to issue the writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo
DO No. 182 reads:2 warranto, habeas corpus and injunction did not give petitioners the unrestricted freedom of
choice of court forum.4 An undue disregard of this policy against direct resort to the Court will
All cases against Celso G. delos Angeles, Jr., et al. under Legacy Group of Companies, may be cause the dismissal of the recourse. In Bañez, Jr. v. Concepcion,5 we explained why, to wit:
filed with the docket section of the National Prosecution Service, Department of Justice, Padre
Faura, Manila and shall be forwarded to the Secretariat of the Special Panel for assignment and The Court must enjoin the observance of the policy on the hierarchy of courts, and now affirms
distribution to panel members, per Department Order No. 84 dated February 13, 2009. that the policy is not to be ignored without serious consequences. The strictness of the policy is
designed to shield the Court from having to deal with causes that are also well within the
However, cases already filed against Celso G. delos Angeles, Jr. et al. of Legacy group of competence of the lower courts, and thus leave time to the Court to deal with the more
Companies in your respective offices with the exemption of the cases filed in Cagayan de Oro fundamental and more essential tasks that the Constitution has assigned to it. The Court may
City which is covered by Memorandum dated March 2, 2009, should be forwarded to the act on petitions for the extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus only when
Secretariat of the Special Panel at Room 149, Department of Justice, Padre Faura, Manila, for absolutely necessary or when serious and important reasons exist to justify an exception to the
proper disposition. policy. This was why the Court stressed in Vergara, Sr. v. Suelto:
x x x. The Supreme Court is a court of last resort, and must so remain if it is to satisfactorily on the hierarchy of courts, the observance of which is explicitly defined and enjoined in Section
perform the functions assigned to it by the fundamental charter and immemorial tradition. It 4 of Rule 65, Rules of Court, viz:
cannot and should not be burdened with the task of dealing with causes in the first instance. Its
original jurisdiction to issue the so-called extraordinary writs should be exercised only where Section 4. When and where petition filed. - The petition shall be filed not later than sixty (60)
absolutely necessary or where serious and important reasons exist therefor. Hence, that days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution. In case a motion for reconsideration or
jurisdiction should generally be exercised relative to actions or proceedings before the Court of new trial is timely filed, whether such motion is required or not, the sixty (60) day period shall be
Appeals, or before constitutional or other tribunals, bodies or agencies whose acts for some counted from notice of the denial of the said motion.
reason or another are not controllable by the Court of Appeals. Where the issuance of an
extraordinary writ is also within the competence of the Court of Appeals or a Regional Trial The petition shall be filed in the Supreme Court or, if it relates to the acts or omissions of a lower
Court, it is in either of these courts that the specific action for the writ’s procurement must be court or of a corporation, board, officer or person, in the Regional Trial Court exercising
presented. This is and should continue to be the policy in this regard, a policy that courts and jurisdiction over the territorial area as defined by the Supreme Court. It may also be filed in the
lawyers must strictly observe. (Emphasis supplied) Court of Appeals whether or not the same is in the aid of its appellate jurisdiction, or in the
Sandiganbayan if it is in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. If it involves the acts or omissions of a
In People v. Cuaresma, the Court has also amplified the need for strict adherence to the policy quasi-judicial agency, unless otherwise provided by law or these rules, the petition shall be filed
of hierarchy of courts. There, noting "a growing tendency on the part of litigants and lawyers to in and cognizable only by the Court of Appeals.
have their applications for the so-called extraordinary writs, and sometimes even their appeals,
passed upon and adjudicated directly and immediately by the highest tribunal of the land," the In election cases involving an act or an omission of a municipal or a regional trial court, the
Court has cautioned lawyers and litigants against taking a direct resort to the highest tribunal, petition shall be filed exclusively with the Commission on Elections, in aid of its appellate
viz: jurisdiction.6

x x x. This Court’s original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari (as well as prohibition, Secondly, even assuming arguendo that petitioners’ direct resort to the Court was permissible,
mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction) is not exclusive. It is shared by this the petition must still be dismissed.
Court with Regional Trial Courts x x x, which may issue the writ, enforceable in any part of their
The writ of certiorari is available only when any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or
respective regions. It is also shared by this Court, and by the Regional Trial Court, with the Court
quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave
of Appeals x x x, although prior to the effectivity of Batas Pambansa Bilang 129 on August 14,
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, nor any
1981, the latter's competence to issue the extraordinary writs was restricted to those "in aid of its
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.7"The sole office of the writ of
appellate jurisdiction." This concurrence of jurisdiction is not, however, to be taken as according
certiorari," according to Delos Santos v. Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company:8
to parties seeking any of the writs an absolute, unrestrained freedom of choice of the court to
which application therefor will be directed. There is after all a hierarchy of courts. That hierarchy x x x is the correction of errors of jurisdiction, which includes the commission of grave abuse of
is determinative of the venue of appeals, and should also serve as a general determinant of the discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. In this regard, mere abuse of discretion is not enough
appropriate forum for petitions for the extraordinary writs. A becoming regard for that judicial to warrant the issuance of the writ. The abuse of discretion must be grave, which means either
hierarchy most certainly indicates that petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs against that the judicial or quasi-judicial power was exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by
first level ("inferior") courts should be filed with the Regional Trial Court, and those against the reason of passion or personal hostility, or that the respondent judge, tribunal or board evaded a
latter, with the Court of Appeals. A direct invocation of the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction positive duty, or virtually refused to perform the duty enjoined or to act in contemplation of law,
to issue these writs should be allowed only when there are special and important reasons such as when such judge, tribunal or board exercising judicial or quasi-judicial powers acted in a
therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition. This is established policy. It is a policy capricious or whimsical manner as to be equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.
that is necessary to prevent inordinate demands upon the Court’s time and attention which are
better devoted to those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent further over- For a special civil action for certiorari to prosper, therefore, the following requisites must concur,
crowding of the Court's docket. Indeed, the removal of the restriction on the jurisdiction of the namely: (a) it must be directed against a tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-
Court of Appeals in this regard, supra— resulting from the deletion of the qualifying phrase, "in judicial functions; (b) the tribunal, board, or officer must have acted without or in excess of
aid of its appellate jurisdiction" — was evidently intended precisely to relieve this Court pro tanto jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (c)
of the burden of dealing with applications for the extraordinary writs which, but for the expansion there is no appeal nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
of the Appellate Court corresponding jurisdiction, would have had to be filed with it.1âwphi1 law.9 The burden of proof lies on petitioners to demonstrate that the assailed order was issued
without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
xxxx of jurisdiction.
The Court therefore closes this decision with the declaration for the information and evidence of Yet, petitioners have not shown a compliance with the requisites. To start with, they merely
all concerned, that it will not only continue to enforce the policy, but will require a more strict alleged that the Secretary of Justice had acted without or in excess of his jurisdiction. Also, the
observance thereof. (Emphasis supplied) petition did not show that the Secretary of Justice was an officer exercising judicial or quasi-
judicial functions. Instead, the Secretary of Justice would appear to be not exercising any judicial
Accordingly, every litigant must remember that the Court is not the only judicial forum from which
or quasi-judicial functions because his questioned issuances were ostensibly intended to ensure
to seek and obtain effective redress of their grievances. As a rule, the Court is a court of last
his subordinates’ efficiency and economy in the conduct of the preliminary investigation of all the
resort, not a court of the first instance. Hence, every litigant who brings the petitions for the
cases involving the Legacy Group. The function involved was purely executive or administrative.
extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus should ever be mindful of the policy
The fact that the DOJ is the primary prosecution arm of the Government does not make it a or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to
quasi-judicial office or agency. Its preliminary investigation of cases is not a quasi-judicial which such other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
proceeding. Nor does the DOJ exercise a quasi-judicial function when it reviews the findings of a ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper
public prosecutor on the finding of probable cause in any case. Indeed, in Bautista v. Court of court."12 The main objective of mandamus is to compel the performance of a ministerial duty on
Appeals,10 the Supreme Court has held that a preliminary investigation is not a quasi-judicial the part of the respondent. Plainly enough, the writ of mandamus does not issue to control or
proceeding, stating: review the exercise of discretion or to compel a course of conduct,13 which, it quickly seems to
us, was what petitioners would have the Secretary of Justice do in their favor. Consequently,
x x x the prosecutor in a preliminary investigation does not determine the guilt or innocence of their petition has not indicated how and where the Secretary of Justice’s assailed issuances
the accused. He does not exercise adjudication nor rule-making functions. Preliminary excluded them from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which they were
investigation is merely inquisitorial, and is often the only means of discovering the persons who unquestionably entitled.
may be reasonably charged with a crime and to enable the fiscal to prepare his complaint or
information. It is not a trial of the case on the merits and has no purpose except that of Thirdly, there is no question that DO No. 182 enjoyed a strong presumption of its validity. In
determining whether a crime has been committed and whether there is probable cause to ABAKADA Guro Party List v. Purisima,14 the Court has extended the presumption of validity to
believe that the accused is guilty thereof. While the fiscal makes that determination, he cannot legislative issuances as well as to rules and regulations issued by administrative agencies,
be said to be acting as a quasi-court, for it is the courts, ultimately, that pass judgment on the saying:
accused, not the fiscal.11
Administrative regulations enacted by administrative agencies to implement and interpret the law
There may be some decisions of the Court that have characterized the public prosecutor’s which they are entrusted to enforce have the force of law and are entitled to respect. Such rules
power to conduct a preliminary investigation as quasi-judicial in nature. Still, this characterization and regulations partake of the nature of a statute and are just as binding as if they have been
is true only to the extent that the public prosecutor, like a quasi-judicial body, is an officer of the written in the statute itself. As such, they have the force and effect of law and enjoy the
executive department exercising powers akin to those of a court of law. presumption of constitutionality and legality until they are set aside with finality in an appropriate
case by a competent court.15
But the limited similarity between the public prosecutor and a quasi-judicial body quickly
endsthere. For sure, a quasi-judicial body is an organ of government other than a court of law or DO No. 182 was issued pursuant to Department Order No. 84 that the Secretary of Justice had
a legislative office that affects the rights of private parties through either adjudication or rule- promulgated to govern the performance of the mandate of the DOJ to "administer the criminal
making; it performs adjudicatory functions, and its awards and adjudications determine the rights justice system in accordance with the accepted processes thereof"16 as expressed in Republic
of the parties coming before it; its decisions have the same effect as the judgments of a court of Act No. 10071 (Prosecution Service Act of 2010) and Section 3, Chapter I, Title III and Section
law. In contrast, that is not the effect whenever a public prosecutor conducts a preliminary 1, Chapter I, Title III of Book IV of Executive Order 292 (Administrative Code of 1987).
investigation to determine probable cause in order to file a criminal information against a person
properly charged with the offense, or whenever the Secretary of Justice reviews the public To overcome this strong presumption of validity of the questioned issuances, it became
prosecutor’s orders or resolutions. incumbent upon petitioners to prove their unconstitutionality and invalidity, either by showing that
the Administrative Code of 1987 did not authorize the Secretary of Justice to issue DO No. 182,
Petitioners have self-styled their petition to be also for prohibition. However, we do not see how or by demonstrating that DO No. 182 exceeded the bounds of the Administrative Code of 1987
that can be. They have not shown in their petition in what manner and at what point the and other pertinent laws. They did not do so. They must further show that the performance of
Secretary of Justice, in handing out the assailed issuances, acted without or in excess of his the DOJ’s functions under the Administrative Code of 1987 and other pertinent laws did not call
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. On the for the impositions laid down by the assailed issuances. That was not true here, for DO No 182
other hand, we already indicated why the issuances were not infirmed by any defect of did not deprive petitioners in any degree of their right to seek redress for the alleged wrong done
jurisdiction. Hence, the blatant omissions of the petition transgressed Section 2, Rule 65 of the against them by the Legacy Group. Instead, the issuances were designed to assist petitioners
Rules of Court, to wit: and others like them expedite the prosecution, if warranted under the law, of all those
responsible for the wrong through the creation of the special panel of state prosecutors and
Section 2. Petition for prohibition. — When the proceedings of any tribunal, corporation, board, prosecution attorneys in order to conduct a nationwide and comprehensive preliminary
officer or person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions, are without or investigation and prosecution of the cases. Thereby, the Secretary of Justice did not act
in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess arbitrarily or oppressively against petitioners.
of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper Fourthly, petitioners attack the exemption from the consolidation decreed in DO No. 182 of the
court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the cases filed or pending in the Office of the City Prosecutor of Cagayan de Oro City, claiming that
respondent to desist from further proceedings in the action or matter specified therein, or the exemption traversed the constitutional guaranty in their favor of the equal protection of
otherwise granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require. law.17

The petition shall likewise be accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment, order or The exemption is covered by the assailed DOJ Memorandum dated March 2, 2009, to wit:
resolution subject thereof, copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent thereto,
and a sworn certification of non-forum shopping as provided in the third paragraph of section 3, It has come to the attention of the undersigned that cases for syndicated estafa were filed with
Rule 46. (2a) Similarly, the petition could not be one for mandamus, which is a remedy available your office against officers of the Legacy Group of Companies. Considering the distance of the
only when "any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the place of complainants therein to Manila, your Office is hereby exempted from the directive
performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust,
previously issued by the undersigned requiring prosecution offices to forward the records of all Sixthly, petitioners assert that the assailed issuances should cover only future cases against
cases involving Legacy Group of Companies to the Task Force. Delos Angeles, Jr., et al., not those already being investigated. They maintain that DO No. 182
was issued in violation of the prohibition against passing laws with retroactive effect.
Anent the foregoing, you are hereby directed to conduct preliminary investigation of all cases
involving the Legacy Group of Companies filed in your office with dispatch and to file the Petitioners’ assertion is baseless.
corresponding informations if evidence warrants and to prosecute the same in court.
As a general rule, laws shall have no retroactive effect. However, exceptions exist, and one such
Petitioners’ attack deserves no consideration. The equal protection clause of the Constitution exception concerns a law that is procedural in nature. The reason is that a remedial statute or a
does not require the universal application of the laws to all persons or things without distinction; statute relating to remedies or modes of procedure does not create new rights or take away
what it requires is simply equality among equals as determined according to a valid vested rights but only operates in furtherance of the remedy or the confirmation of already
classification.18 Hence, the Court has affirmed that if a law neither burdens a fundamental right existing rights.25 A statute or rule regulating the procedure of the courts will be construed as
nor targets a suspect class, the classification stands as long as it bears a rational relationship to applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of its passage. All procedural laws
some legitimate government end.19 are retroactive in that sense and to that extent. The retroactive application is not violative of any
right of a person who may feel adversely affected, for, verily, no vested right generally attaches
That is the situation here. In issuing the assailed DOJ Memorandum dated March 2, 2009, the to or arises from procedural laws.
Secretary of Justice took into account the relative distance between Cagayan de Oro, where
many complainants against the Legacy Group resided, and Manila, where the preliminary Finally, petitioners have averred but failed to establish that DO No. 182 constituted obstruction
investigations would be conducted by the special panel. He also took into account that the cases of justice. This ground of the petition, being unsubstantiated, was unfounded.
had already been filed in the City Prosecutor’s Office of Cagayan de Oro at the time he issued
DO No. 182. Given the considerable number of complainants residing in Cagayan de Oro City, Nonetheless, it is not amiss to reiterate that the authority of the Secretary of Justice to assume
the Secretary of Justice was fully justified in excluding the cases commenced in Cagayan de jurisdiction over matters involving the investigation of crimes and the prosecution of offenders is
Oro from the ambit of DO No. 182. The classification taken into consideration by the Secretary fully sanctioned by law. Towards that end, the Secretary of Justice exercises control and
of Justice was really valid. Resultantly, petitioners could not inquire into the wisdom behind the supervision over all the regional, provincial, and city prosecutors of the country; has broad
exemption upon the ground that the non-application of the exemption to them would cause them discretion in the discharge of the DOJ’s functions; and administers the DOJ and its adjunct
some inconvenience. offices and agencies by promulgating rules and regulations to carry out their objectives, policies
and functions.
Fifthly, petitioners contend that DO No. 182 violated their right to the speedy disposition of cases
guaranteed by the Constitution. They posit that there would be considerable delay in the Consequently, unless and until the Secretary of Justice acts beyond the bounds of his authority,
resolution of their cases that would definitely be "a flagrant transgression of petitioners’ or arbitrarily, or whimsically, or oppressively, any person or entity who may feel to be thereby
constitutional rights to speedy disposition of their cases."20 aggrieved or adversely affected should have no right to call for the invalidation or nullification of
the rules and regulations issued by, as well as other actions taken by the Secretary of Justice.
We cannot favor their contention.
WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the omnibus petition for certiorari, prohibition, and
In The Ombudsman v. Jurado,21 the Court has clarified that although the Constitution mandamus for lack of merit.
guarantees the right to the speedy disposition of cases, such speedy disposition is a flexible
concept. To properly define that concept, the facts and circumstances surrounding each case Petitioners shall pay the costs of suit.
must be evaluated and taken into account. There occurs a violation of the right to a speedy
disposition of a case only when the proceedings are attended by vexatious, capricious, and SO ORDERED.
oppressive delays, or when unjustified postponements of the trial are sought and secured, or
when, without cause or justifiable motive, a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the
party having his case tried.22 It is cogent to mention that a mere mathematical reckoning of the  
time involved is not determinant of the concept.23

The consolidation of the cases against Delos Angeles, Jr., et al. was ordered obviously to obtain
G.R. No. 120295, June 28, 1996
expeditious justice for the parties with the least cost and vexation to them. Inasmuch as the
JUAN G. FRIVALDO, petitioner, 
cases filed involved similar or related questions to be dealt with during the preliminary
vs.
investigation, the Secretary of Justice rightly found the consolidation of the cases to be the most
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and RAUL R. LEE, respondents.
feasible means of promoting the efficient use of public resources and of having a comprehensive
investigation of the cases. G.R. No. 123755 June 28, 1996
On the other hand, we do not ignore the possibility that there would be more cases reaching the RAUL R. LEE, petitioner, 
DOJ in addition to those already brought by petitioners and other parties. Yet, any delays in vs.
petitioners’ cases occasioned by such other and subsequent cases should not warrant the COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JUAN G. FRIVALDO, respondents.
invalidation of DO No. 182. The Constitution prohibits only the delays that are unreasonable,
arbitrary and oppressive, and tend to render rights nugatory.24 In fine, we see neither undue  
delays, nor any violation of the right of petitioners to the speedy disposition of their cases.
PANGANIBAN, J.:p Juan G. Frivaldo 73,440

The ultimate question posed before this Court in these twin cases is: Who should be declared Raul R. Lee 53,304
the rightful governor of Sorsogon -
Isagani P. Ocampo 1,925
(i) Juan G. Frivaldo, who unquestionably obtained the highest number of votes in three
successive elections but who was twice declared by this Court to be disqualified to hold such On June 9, 1995, Lee filed in said SPA No. 95-028, a (supplemental) petition9 praying for his
office due to his alien citizenship, and who now claims to have re-assumed his lost Philippine proclamation as the duly-elected Governor of Sorsogon.
citizenship thru repatriation;
In an order10 dated June 21, 1995, but promulgated according to the petition "only on June 29,
(ii) Raul R. Lee, who was the second placer in the canvass, but who claims that the votes cast in 1995," the Comelec en banc directed "the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Sorsogon to
favor of Frivaldo should be considered void; that the electorate should be deemed to have reconvene for the purpose of proclaiming candidate Raul Lee as the winning gubernatorial
intentionally thrown away their ballots; and that legally, he secured the most number candidate in the province of Sorsogon on June 29, 1995 . . ." Accordingly, at 8:30 in the evening
of valid votes; or of June 30, 1995, Lee was proclaimed governor of Sorsogon.

(iii) The incumbent Vice-Governor, Oscar G. Deri, who obviously was not voted directly to the On July 6, 1995, Frivaldo filed with the Comelec a new petition,11 docketed as SPC No. 95-317,
position of governor, but who according to prevailing jurisprudence should take over the said praying for the annulment of the June 30, 1995 proclamation of Lee and for his own
post inasmuch as, by the ineligibility of Frivaldo, a "permanent vacancy in the contested office proclamation. He alleged that on June 30, 1995, at 2:00 in the afternoon, he took his oath of
has occurred"? allegiance as a citizen of the Philippines after "his petition for repatriation under P.D. 725 which
he filed with the Special Committee on Naturalization in September 1994 had been granted". As
In ruling for Frivaldo, the Court lays down new doctrines on repatriation, such, when "the said order (dated June 21, 1995) (of the Comelec) . . . was released and
clarifies/reiterates/amplifies existing jurisprudence on citizenship and elections, and upholds the received by Frivaldo on June 30, 1995 at 5:30 o'clock in the evening, there was no more legal
superiority of substantial justice over pure legalisms. impediment to the proclamation (of Frivaldo) as governor . . ." In the alternative, he averred that
pursuant to the two cases of Labo vs. Comelec,12 the Vice-Governor - not Lee - should occupy
G.R. No. 123755 said position of governor.

This is a special civil action under Rules 65 and 58 of the Rules of Court for certiorari and On December 19, 1995, the Comelec First Division promulgated the herein assailed
preliminary injunction to review and annul a Resolution of the respondent Commission on Resolution13 holding that Lee, "not having garnered the highest number of votes," was not
Elections (Comelec), First Division,1 promulgated on December 19, 19952 and another legally entitled to be proclaimed as duly-elected governor; and that Frivaldo, "having garnered
Resolution of the Comelec en banc promulgated February 23, 19963 denying petitioner's motion the highest number of votes,
for reconsideration. and . . . having reacquired his Filipino citizenship by repatriation on June 30, 1995 under the
provisions of Presidential Decree No. 725 . . . (is) qualified to hold the office of governor of
The Facts Sorsogon"; thus:
On March 20, 1995, private respondent Juan G. Frivaldo filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Commission (First Division), therefore RESOLVES to GRANT
office of Governor of Sorsogon in the May 8, 1995 elections. On March 23, 1995, petitioner Raul the Petition.
R. Lee, another candidate, filed a petition4 with the Comelec docketed as SPA No. 95-028
praying that Frivaldo "be disqualified from seeking or holding any public office or position by Consistent with the decisions of the Supreme Court, the proclamation of Raul R. Lee as
reason of not yet being a citizen of the Philippines", and that his Certificate of Candidacy be Governor of Sorsogon is hereby ordered annulled, being contrary to law, he not having garnered
canceled. On May 1, 1995, the Second Division of the Comelec promulgated a the highest number of votes to warrant his proclamation.
Resolution5 granting the petition with the following disposition6:
Upon the finality of the annulment of the proclamation of Raul R. Lee, the Provincial Board of
WHEREFORE, this Division resolves to GRANT the petition and declares that respondent is Canvassers is directed to immediately reconvene and, on the basis of the completed canvass,
DISQUALIFIED to run for the Office of Governor of Sorsogon on the ground that he is NOT a proclaim petitioner Juan G. Frivaldo as the duly elected Governor of Sorsogon having garnered
citizen of the Philippines. Accordingly, respondent's certificate of candidacy is canceled. the highest number of votes, and he having reacquired his Filipino citizenship by repatriation on
June 30, 1995 under the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 725 and, thus, qualified to hold
The Motion for Reconsideration filed by Frivaldo remained unacted upon until after the May 8, the office of Governor of Sorsogon.
1995 elections. So, his candidacy continued and he was voted for during the elections held on
said date. On May 11, 1995, the Comelec en banc7 affirmed the aforementioned Resolution of Conformably with Section 260 of the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881), the Clerk of the
the Second Division. Commission is directed to notify His Excellency the President of the Philippines, and the
Secretary of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Sorsogon of this resolution
The Provincial Board of Canvassers completed the canvass of the election returns and a immediately upon the due implementation thereof.
Certificate of Votes8 dated May 27, 1995 was issued showing the following votes obtained by
the candidates for the position of Governor of Sorsogon: On December 26, 1995, Lee filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the
Comelec en banc in its Resolution 14 promulgated on February 23, 1996. On February 26,
Antonio H. Escudero, Jr. 51,060 1996, the present petition was filed. Acting on the prayer for a temporary restraining order, this
Court issued on February 27, 1996 a Resolution which inter alia directed the parties "to maintain By Resolution on March 12, 1996, the Court consolidated G.R. Nos. 120295 and 123755 since
the status quo prevailing prior to the filing of this petition." they are intimately related in their factual environment and are identical in the ultimate question
raised, viz., who should occupy the position of governor of the province of Sorsogon.
The Issues in G.R. No. 123755
On March 19, 1995, the Court heard oral argument from the parties and required them thereafter
Petitioner Lee's "position on the matter at hand may briefly be capsulized in the following to file simultaneously their respective memoranda.
propositions"15:
The Consolidated Issues
First -- The initiatory petition below was so far insufficient in form and substance to warrant the
exercise by the COMELEC of its jurisdiction with the result that, in effect, the COMELEC acted From the foregoing submissions, the consolidated issues may be restated as follows:
without jurisdiction in taking cognizance of and deciding said petition;
1. Was the repatriation of Frivaldo valid and legal? If so, did it seasonably cure his lack of
Second -- The judicially declared disqualification of respondent was a continuing condition and citizenship as to qualify him to be proclaimed and to hold the Office of Governor? If not, may it
rendered him ineligible to run for, to be elected to and to hold the Office of Governor; be given retroactive effect? If so, from when?

Third -- The alleged repatriation of respondent was neither valid nor is the effect thereof 2. Is Frivaldo's "judicially declared" disqualification for lack of Filipino citizenship a continuing bar
retroactive as to cure his ineligibility and qualify him to hold the Office of Governor; and to his eligibility to run for, be elected to or hold the governorship of Sorsogon?

Fourth -- Correctly read and applied, the Labo Doctrine fully supports the validity of petitioner's 3. Did the respondent Comelec have jurisdiction over the initiatory petition in SPC No. 95-317
proclamation as duly elected Governor of Sorsogon. considering that said petition is not "a pre-proclamation case, an election protest or a quo
warranto case"?
G.R. No. 120295
4. Was the proclamation of Lee, a runner-up in the election, valid and legal in light of existing
This is a petition to annul three Resolutions of the respondent Comelec, the first two of which jurisprudence?
are also at issue in G.R. No. 123755, as follows:
5. Did the respondent Commission on Elections exceed its jurisdiction in promulgating the
1. Resolution16 of the Second Division, promulgated on May 1, 1995, disqualifying Frivaldo from assailed Resolutions, all of which prevented Frivaldo from assuming the governorship of
running for governor of Sorsogon in the May 8, 1995 elections "on the ground that he is not a Sorsogon, considering that they were not rendered within the period referred to in Section 78 of
citizen of the Philippines"; the Omnibus Election Code, viz., "not later than fifteen days before the elections"?

2. Resolution17 of the Comelec en banc, promulgated on May 11, 1995; and The First Issue: Frivaldo's Repatriation

3. Resolution18 of the Comelec en banc, promulgated also on May 11, 1995 suspending the The validity and effectivity of Frivaldo's repatriation is the lis mota, the threshold legal issue in
proclamation of, among others, Frivaldo. this case. All the other matters raised are secondary to this.

The Facts and the Issue The Local Government Code of 199119 expressly requires Philippine citizenship as a
qualification for elective local officials, including that of provincial governor, thus:
The facts of this case are essentially the same as those in G.R. No. 123755. However, Frivaldo
assails the above-mentioned resolutions on a different ground: that under Section 78 of the Sec. 39. Qualifications. -- (a) An elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines; a
Omnibus Election Code, which is reproduced hereinunder: registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or province or, in the case of a member of the
sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod, or sangguniang bayan, the district where
Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy. -- A verified petition he intends to be elected; a resident therein for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the
seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by any person day of the election; and able to read and write Filipino or any other local language or dialect.
exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained therein as required under
Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days (b) Candidates for the position of governor, vice governor or member of the sangguniang
from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after notice and panlalawigan, or mayor, vice mayor or member of the sangguniang panlungsod of highly
hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election. (Emphasis supplied.) urbanized cities must be at least twenty-three (23) years of age on election day.

the Comelec had no jurisdiction to issue said Resolutions because they were not rendered x x x           x x x          x x x
"within the period allowed by law" i.e., "not later than fifteen days before the election."
Inasmuch as Frivaldo had been declared by this Court20 as a non-citizen, it is therefore
Otherwise stated, Frivaldo contends that the failure of the Comelec to act on the petition for incumbent upon him to show that he has reacquired citizenship; in fine, that he possesses the
disqualification within the period of fifteen days prior to the election as provided by law is a qualifications prescribed under the said statute (R.A. 7160).
jurisdictional defect which renders the said Resolutions null and void.
Under Philippine law,21 citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of Congress, by
naturalization or by repatriation. Frivaldo told this Court in G.R. No. 10465422 and during the
oral argument in this case that he tried to resume his citizenship by direct act of Congress, but
that the bill allowing him to do so "failed to materialize, notwithstanding the endorsement of issuance in terms that clearly indicated the intention of "the present government, in the exercise
several members of the House of Representatives" due, according to him, to the "maneuvers of of prudence and sound discretion" to leave the matter of repeal to the new Congress. Any other
his political rivals." In the same case, his attempt at naturalization was rejected by this Court interpretation of the said Presidential Memorandum, such as is now being proffered to the Court
because of jurisdictional, substantial and procedural defects. by Lee, would visit unmitigated violence not only upon statutory construction but on common
sense as well.
Despite his lack of Philippine citizenship, Frivaldo was overwhelmingly elected governor by the
electorate of Sorsogon, with a margin of 27,000 votes in the 1988 elections, 57,000 in 1992, and Second, Lee also argues that "serious congenital irregularities flawed the repatriation
20,000 in 1995 over the same opponent Raul Lee. Twice, he was judicially declared a non- proceedings," asserting that Frivaldo's application therefor was "filed on June 29, 1995 . . . (and)
Filipino and thus twice disqualified from holding and discharging his popular mandate. Now, he was approved in just one day or on June 30, 1995 . . .", which "prevented a judicious review and
comes to us a third time, with a fresh vote from the people of Sorsogon and a favorable decision evaluation of the merits thereof." Frivaldo counters that he filed his application for repatriation
from the Commission on Elections to boot. Moreover, he now boasts of having successfully with the Office of the President in Malacañang Palace on August 17, 1994. This is confirmed by
passed through the third and last mode of reacquiring citizenship: by repatriation under P.D. No. the Solicitor General. However, the Special Committee was reactivated only on June 8, 1995,
725, with no less than the Solicitor General himself, who was the prime opposing counsel in the when presumably the said Committee started processing his application. On June 29, 1995, he
previous cases he lost, this time, as counsel for co-respondent Comelec, arguing the validity of filled up and re-submitted the FORM that the Committee required. Under these circumstances, it
his cause (in addition to his able private counsel Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr.). That he took his oath of could not be said that there was "indecent haste" in the processing of his application.
allegiance under the provisions of said Decree at 2:00 p.m. on June 30, 1995 is not disputed.
Hence, he insists that he -- not Lee -- should have been proclaimed as the duly-elected governor Anent Lee's charge that the "sudden reconstitution of the Special Committee on Naturalization
of Sorsogon when the Provincial Board of Canvassers met at 8:30 p.m. on the said date since, was intended solely for the personal interest of respondent,"27 the Solicitor General explained
clearly and unquestionably, he garnered the highest number of votes in the elections and since during the oral argument on March 19, 1996 that such allegation is simply baseless as there
at that time, he already reacquired his citizenship. were many others who applied and were considered for repatriation, a list of whom was
submitted by him to this Court, through a Manifestation28 filed on April 3, 1996.
En contrario, Lee argues that Frivaldo's repatriation is tainted with serious defects, which we
shall now discuss in seriatim. On the basis of the parties' submissions, we are convinced that the presumption of regularity in
the performance of official duty and the presumption of legality in the repatriation of Frivaldo
First, Lee tells us that P.D. No. 725 had "been effectively repealed", asserting that "then have not been successfully rebutted by Lee. The mere fact that the proceedings were speeded
President Corazon Aquino exercising legislative powers under the Transitory Provisions of the up is by itself not a ground to conclude that such proceedings were necessarily tainted. After all,
1987 Constitution, forbade the grant of citizenship by Presidential Decree or Executive the requirements of repatriation under P.D. No. 725 are not difficult to comply with, nor are they
Issuances as the same poses a serious and contentious issue of policy which the present tedious and cumbersome. In fact, P.D.
government, in the exercise of prudence and sound discretion, should best leave to the 72529 itself requires very little of an applicant, and even the rules and regulations to implement
judgment of the first Congress under the 1987 Constitution", adding that in her memorandum the said decree were left to the Special Committee to promulgate. This is not unusual since,
dated March 27, 1987 to the members of the Special Committee on Naturalization constituted unlike in naturalization where an alien covets a first-time entry into Philippine political life, in
for purposes of Presidential Decree No. 725, President Aquino directed them "to cease and repatriation the applicant is a former natural-born Filipino who is merely seeking to reacquire his
desist from undertaking any and all proceedings within your functional area of responsibility as previous citizenship. In the case of Frivaldo, he was undoubtedly a natural-born citizen who
defined under Letter of Instructions (LOI) No. 270 dated April 11, 1975, as amended."23 openly and faithfully served his country and his province prior to his naturalization in the United
States -- a naturalization he insists was made necessary only to escape the iron clutches of a
This memorandum dated March 27, 198724 cannot by any stretch of legal hermeneutics be dictatorship he abhorred and could not in conscience embrace -- and who, after the fall of the
construed as a law sanctioning or authorizing a repeal of P.D. No. 725. Laws are repealed only dictator and the re-establishment of democratic space, wasted no time in returning to his country
by subsequent ones 25 and a repeal may be express or implied. It is obvious that no express of birth to offer once more his talent and services to his people.
repeal was made because then President Aquino in her memorandum -- based on the copy
furnished us by Lee -- did not categorically and/or impliedly state that P.D. 725 was being So too, the fact that ten other persons, as certified to by the Solicitor General, were granted
repealed or was being rendered without any legal effect. In fact, she did not even mention it repatriation argues convincingly and conclusively against the existence of favoritism vehemently
specifically by its number or text. On the other hand, it is a basic rule of statutory construction posited by Raul Lee. At any rate, any contest on the legality of Frivaldo's repatriation should
that repeals by implication are not favored. An implied repeal will not be allowed "unless it is have been pursued before the Committee itself, and, failing there, in the Office of the President,
convincingly and unambiguously demonstrated that the two laws are clearly repugnant and pursuant to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies.
patently inconsistent that they cannot co-exist".26
Third, Lee further contends that assuming the assailed repatriation to be valid, nevertheless it
The memorandum of then President Aquino cannot even be regarded as a legislative could only be effective as at 2:00 p.m. of June 30, 1995 whereas the citizenship qualification
enactment, for not every pronouncement of the Chief Executive even under the Transitory prescribed by the Local Government Code "must exist on the date of his election, if not when the
Provisions of the 1987 Constitution can nor should be regarded as an exercise of her law- certificate of candidacy is filed," citing our decision in G.R. 10465430 which held that "both the
making powers. At best, it could be treated as an executive policy addressed to the Special Local Government Code and the Constitution require that only Philippine citizens can run and be
Committee to halt the acceptance and processing of applications for repatriation pending elected to public office." Obviously, however, this was a mere obiter as the only issue in said
whatever "judgment the first Congress under the 1987 Constitution" might make. In other words, case was whether Frivaldo's naturalization was valid or not -- and NOT the effective date
the former President did not repeal P.D. 725 but left it to the first Congress -- once created -- to thereof. Since the Court held his naturalization to be invalid, then the issue of when an aspirant
deal with the matter. If she had intended to repeal such law, she should have unequivocally said for public office should be a citizen was NOT resolved at all by the Court. Which question we
so instead of referring the matter to Congress. The fact is she carefully couched her presidential shall now directly rule on.
Under Sec. 39 of the Local Government Code, "(a)n elective local official must be: being a citizen first. It also stands to reason that the voter requirement was included as another
qualification (aside from "citizenship"), not to reiterate the need for nationality but to require that
* a citizen of the Philippines; the official be registered as a voter IN THE AREA OR TERRITORY he seeks to govern, i.e., the
law states: "a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or province . . . where he
* a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or province . . . where he intends to be intends to be elected." It should be emphasized that the Local Government Code requires an
elected; elective official to be a registered voter. It does not require him to vote actually. Hence,
registration -- not the actual voting -- is the core of this "qualification". In other words, the law's
* a resident therein for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election;
purpose in this second requirement is to ensure that the prospective official is actually registered
* able to read and write Filipino or any other local language or dialect. in the area he seeks to govern -- and not anywhere else.

* In addition, "candidates for the position of governor . . . must be at least twenty-three (23) Before this Court, Frivaldo has repeatedly emphasized -- and Lee has not disputed -- that he
years of age on election day. "was and is a registered voter of Sorsogon, and his registration as a voter has been sustained
as valid by judicial declaration . . . In fact, he cast his vote in his precinct on May 8, 1995."36
From the above, it will be noted that the law does not specify any particular date or time when
the candidate must possess citizenship, unlike that for residence (which must consist of at So too, during the oral argument, his counsel steadfastly maintained that "Mr. Frivaldo has
least one year's residency immediately preceding the day of election) and age (at least twenty always been a registered voter of Sorsogon. He has voted in 1987, 1988, 1992, then he voted
three years of age on election day). again in 1995. In fact, his eligibility as a voter was questioned, but the court dismissed (sic) his
eligibility as a voter and he was allowed to vote as in fact, he voted in all the previous elections
Philippine citizenship is an indispensable requirement for holding an elective public office,31 and including on May 8, 1995."3 7
the purpose of the citizenship qualification is none other than to ensure that no alien, i.e., no
person owing allegiance to another nation, shall govern our people and our country or a unit of It is thus clear that Frivaldo is a registered voter in the province where he intended to be elected.
territory thereof. Now, an official begins to govern or to discharge his functions only upon his
There is yet another reason why the prime issue of citizenship should be reckoned from the date
proclamation and on the day the law mandates his term of office to begin. Since Frivaldo re-
of proclamation, not necessarily the date of election or date of filing of the certificate of
assumed his citizenship on June 30, 1995 -- the very day32 the term of office of governor (and
candidacy. Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code 38 gives any voter, presumably including
other elective officials) began -- he was therefore already qualified to be proclaimed, to hold
the defeated candidate, the opportunity to question the ELIGIBILITY (or the disloyalty) of a
such office and to discharge the functions and responsibilities thereof as of said date. In short, at
candidate. This is the only provision of the Code that authorizes a remedy on how to contest
that time, he was already qualified to govern his native Sorsogon. This is the liberal
before the Comelec an incumbent's ineligibility arising from failure to meet the qualifications
interpretation that should give spirit, life and meaning to our law on qualifications consistent with
enumerated under Sec. 39 of the Local Government Code. Such remedy of Quo Warranto can
the purpose for which such law was enacted. So too, even from a literal (as distinguished
be availed of "within ten days after proclamation" of the winning candidate. Hence, it is only at
from liberal) construction, it should be noted that Section 39 of the Local Government Code
such time that the issue of ineligibility may be taken cognizance of by the Commission. And
speaks of "Qualifications" of "ELECTIVE OFFICIALS", not of candidates. Why then should such
since, at the very moment of Lee's proclamation (8:30 p.m., June 30, 1995), Juan G. Frivaldo
qualification be required at the time of election or at the time of the filing of the certificates of
was already and indubitably a citizen, having taken his oath of allegiance earlier in the afternoon
candidacies, as Lee insists? Literally, such qualifications -- unless otherwise expressly
of the same day, then he should have been the candidate proclaimed as he unquestionably
conditioned, as in the case of age and residence -- should thus be possessed when the "elective
garnered the highest number of votes in the immediately preceding elections and such oath had
[or elected] official" begins to govern, i.e., at the time he is proclaimed and at the start of his term
already cured his previous "judicially-declared" alienage. Hence, at such time, he was no longer
-- in this case, on June 30, 1995. Paraphrasing this Court's ruling in Vasquez vs. Giap and Li
ineligible.
Seng Giap & Sons, 33 if the purpose of the citizenship requirement is to ensure that our people
and country do not end up being governed by aliens, i.e., persons owing allegiance to another But to remove all doubts on this important issue, we also hold that the repatriation of Frivaldo
nation, that aim or purpose would not be thwarted but instead achieved by construing the RETROACTED to the date of the filing of his application on August 17, 1994.
citizenship qualification as applying to the time of proclamation of the elected official and at the
start of his term. It is true that under the Civil Code of the Philippines, 39 "(l)aws shall have no retroactive effect,
unless the contrary is provided." But there are settled exceptions40 to this general rule, such as
But perhaps the more difficult objection was the one raised during the oral argument34 to the when the statute is CURATIVE or REMEDIAL in nature or when it CREATES NEW RIGHTS.
effect that the citizenship qualification should be possessed at the time the candidate (or for that
matter the elected official) registered as a voter. After all, Section 39, apart from requiring the According to Tolentino,41 curative statutes are those which undertake to cure errors and
official to be a citizen, also specifies as another item of qualification, that he be a "registered irregularities, thereby validating judicial or administrative proceedings, acts of public officers, or
voter". And, under the law35 a "voter" must be a citizen of the Philippines. So therefore, Frivaldo private deeds and contracts which otherwise would not produce their intended consequences by
could not have been a voter -- much less a validly registered one -- if he was not a citizen at the reason of some statutory disability or failure to comply with some technical requirement. They
time of such registration. operate on conditions already existing, and are necessarily retroactive in operation.
Agpalo,42 on the other hand, says that curative statutes are
The answer to this problem again lies in discerning the purpose of the requirement. If the law "healing acts . . . curing defects and adding to the means of enforcing existing obligations . . .
intended the citizenship qualification to be possessed prior to election consistent with the (and) are intended to supply defects, abridge superfluities in existing laws, and curb certain
requirement of being a registered voter, then it would not have made citizenship a SEPARATE evils. . . . By their very nature, curative statutes are retroactive . . . (and) reach back to past
qualification. The law abhors a redundancy. It therefore stands to reason that the law intended
CITIZENSHIP to be a qualification distinct from being a VOTER, even if being a voter presumes
events to correct errors or irregularities and to render valid and effective attempted acts which vested right or violate some constitutional guaranty."46 This is all the more true of P.D. 725,
would be otherwise ineffective for the purpose the parties intended." which did not specify any restrictions on or delimit or qualify the right of repatriation granted
therein.
On the other hand, remedial or procedural laws, i.e., those statutes relating to remedies or
modes of procedure, which do not create new or take away vested rights, but only operate in At this point, a valid question may be raised: How can the retroactivity of P.D. 725 benefit
furtherance of the remedy or confirmation of such rights, ordinarily do not come within the legal Frivaldo considering that said law was enacted on June 5, 1975, while Frivaldo lost his Filipino
meaning of a retrospective law, nor within the general rule against the retrospective operation of citizenship much later, on January 20, 1983, and applied for repatriation even later, on August
statutes.43 17, 1994?

A reading of P.D. 725 immediately shows that it creates a new right, and also provides for a new While it is true that the law was already in effect at the time that Frivaldo became an American
remedy, thereby filling certain voids in our laws. Thus, in its preamble, P.D. 725 expressly citizen, nevertheless, it is not only the law itself (P.D. 725) which is to be given retroactive effect,
recognizes the plight of "many Filipino women (who) had lost their Philippine citizenship by but even the repatriation granted under said law to Frivaldo on June 30, 1995 is to be deemed to
marriage to aliens" and who could not, under the existing law (C.A. No. 63, as amended) avail of have retroacted to the date of his application therefor, August 17, 1994. The reason for this is
repatriation until "after the death of their husbands or the termination of their marital status" and simply that if, as in this case, it was the intent of the legislative authority that the law should
who could neither be benefitted by the 1973 Constitution's new provision allowing "a Filipino apply to past events -- i.e., situations and transactions existing even before the law came into
woman who marries an alien to retain her Philippine citizenship . . ." because "such provision of being -- in order to benefit the greatest number of former Filipinos possible thereby enabling
the new Constitution does not apply to Filipino women who had married aliens before said them to enjoy and exercise the constitutionally guaranteed right of citizenship, and such
constitution took effect." Thus, P.D. 725 granted a new right to these women -- the right to re- legislative intention is to be given the fullest effect and expression, then there is all the more
acquire Filipino citizenship even during their marital coverture, which right did not exist prior to reason to have the law apply in a retroactive or retrospective manner to situations, events and
P.D. 725. On the other hand, said statute also provided a new remedy and a new right in favor transactions subsequent to the passage of such law. That is, the repatriation granted to Frivaldo
of other "natural born Filipinos who (had) lost their Philippine citizenship but now desire to re- on June 30, 1995 can and should be made to take effect as of date of his application. As earlier
acquire Philippine citizenship", because prior to the promulgation of P.D. 725 such former mentioned, there is nothing in the law that would bar this or would show a contrary intention on
Filipinos would have had to undergo the tedious and cumbersome process of naturalization, but the part of the legislative authority; and there is no showing that damage or prejudice to anyone,
with the advent of P.D. 725 they could now re-acquire their Philippine citizenship under the or anything unjust or injurious would result from giving retroactivity to his repatriation. Neither
simplified procedure of repatriation. has Lee shown that there will result the impairment of any contractual obligation, disturbance of
any vested right or breach of some constitutional guaranty.
The Solicitor General44 argues:
Being a former Filipino who has served the people repeatedly, Frivaldo deserves a liberal
By their very nature, curative statutes are retroactive, (DBP vs. CA, 96 SCRA 342), since they interpretation of Philippine laws and whatever defects there were in his nationality should now
are intended to supply defects, abridge superfluities in existing laws (Del Castillo vs. Securities be deemed mooted by his repatriation.
and Exchange Commission, 96 Phil. 119) and curb certain evils (Santos vs. Duata, 14 SCRA
1041). Another argument for retroactivity to the date of filing is that it would prevent prejudice to
applicants. If P.D. 725 were not to be given retroactive effect, and the Special Committee
In this case, P.D. No. 725 was enacted to cure the defect in the existing naturalization law, decides not to act, i.e., to delay the processing of applications for any substantial length of time,
specifically C.A. No. 63 wherein married Filipino women are allowed to repatriate only upon the then the former Filipinos who may be stateless, as Frivaldo -- having already renounced his
death of their husbands, and natural-born Filipinos who lost their citizenship by naturalization American citizenship -- was, may be prejudiced for causes outside their control. This should not
and other causes faced the difficulty of undergoing the rigid procedures of C.A. 63 for be. In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is to be presumed that the law-
reacquisition of Filipino citizenship by naturalization. making body intended right and justice to prevail.4 7

Presidential Decree No. 725 provided a remedy for the aforementioned legal aberrations and And as experience will show, the Special Committee was able to process, act upon and grant
thus its provisions are considered essentially remedial and curative. applications for repatriation within relatively short spans of time after the same were filed.48 The
fact that such interregna were relatively insignificant minimizes the likelihood of prejudice to the
In light of the foregoing, and prescinding from the wording of the preamble, it is unarguable that government as a result of giving retroactivity to repatriation. Besides, to the mind of the Court,
the legislative intent was precisely to give the statute retroactive operation. "(A) retrospective direct prejudice to the government is possible only where a person's repatriation has the effect of
operation is given to a statute or amendment where the intent that it should so operate clearly wiping out a liability of his to the government arising in connection with or as a result of his being
appears from a consideration of the act as a whole, or from the terms thereof."45 It is obvious to an alien, and accruing only during the interregnum between application and approval, a situation
the Court that the statute was meant to "reach back" to those persons, events and transactions that is not present in the instant case.
not otherwise covered by prevailing law and jurisprudence. And inasmuch as it has been held
that citizenship is a political and civil right equally as important as the freedom of speech, liberty And it is but right and just that the mandate of the people, already twice frustrated, should now
of abode, the right against unreasonable searches and seizures and other guarantees enshrined prevail. Under the circumstances, there is nothing unjust or iniquitous in treating Frivaldo's
in the Bill of Rights, therefore the legislative intent to give retrospective operation to P.D. 725 repatriation as having become effective as of the date of his application, i.e., on August 17,
must be given the fullest effect possible. "(I)t has been said that a remedial statute must be so 1994. This being so, all questions about his possession of the nationality qualification -- whether
construed as to make it effect the evident purpose for which it was enacted, so that if the reason at the date of proclamation (June 30, 1995) or the date of election (May 8, 1995) or date of filing
of the statute extends to past transactions, as well as to those in the future, then it will be so his certificate of candidacy (March 20, 1995) would become moot.
applied although the statute does not in terms so direct, unless to do so would impair some
Based on the foregoing, any question regarding Frivaldo's status as a registered voter would not a citizen of the Philippines." This declaration of the Supreme Court, however, was in
also be deemed settled. Inasmuch as he is considered as having been repatriated -- i.e., his connection with the 1992 elections.
Filipino citizenship restored -- as of August 17, 1994, his previous registration as a voter is
likewise deemed validated as of said date. Indeed, decisions declaring the acquisition or denial of citizenship cannot govern a person's
future status with finality. This is because a person may subsequently reacquire, or for that
It is not disputed that on January 20, 1983 Frivaldo became an American. Would the retroactivity matter lose, his citizenship under any of the modes recognized by law for the purpose. Hence,
of his repatriation not effectively give him dual citizenship, which under Sec. 40 of the Local in Lee vs. Commissioner of Immigration,56 we held:
Government Code would disqualify him "from running for any elective local position?"49 We
answer this question in the negative, as there is cogent reason to hold that Frivaldo was really Everytime the citizenship of a person is material or indispensable in a judicial or administrative
STATELESS at the time he took said oath of allegiance and even before that, when he ran for case, whatever the corresponding court or administrative authority decides therein as to such
governor in 1988. In his Comment, Frivaldo wrote that he "had long renounced and had long citizenship is generally not considered res judicata, hence it has to be threshed out again and
abandoned his American citizenship -- long before May 8, 1995. At best, Frivaldo was stateless again, as the occasion demands.
in the interim -- when he abandoned and renounced his US citizenship but before he was
repatriated to his Filipino citizenship."50 The Third Issue: Comelec's Jurisdiction
Over The Petition in SPC No. 95-317
On this point, we quote from the assailed Resolution dated December 19, 1995:51
Lee also avers that respondent Comelec had no jurisdiction to entertain the petition in SPC No.
By the laws of the United States, petitioner Frivaldo lost his American citizenship when he took 95-317 because the only "possible types of proceedings that may be entertained by the
his oath of allegiance to the Philippine Government when he ran for Governor in 1988, in 1992, Comelec are a pre-proclamation case, an election protest or a quo warranto case". Again, Lee
and in 1995. Every certificate of candidacy contains an oath of allegiance to the Philippine reminds us that he was proclaimed on June 30, 1995 but that Frivaldo filed SPC No. 95-317
Government." questioning his (Lee's) proclamation only on July 6, 1995 -- "beyond the 5-day reglementary
period." Hence, according to him, Frivaldo's "recourse was to file either an election protest or
These factual findings that Frivaldo has lost his foreign nationality long before the elections of a quo warranto action."
1995 have not been effectively rebutted by Lee. Furthermore, it is basic that such findings of the
Commission are conclusive upon this Court, absent any showing of capriciousness or This argument is not meritorious. The Constitution57 has given the Comelec ample power to
arbitrariness or "exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections, returns and
abuse.52 qualifications of all elective . . . provincial . . . officials." Instead of dwelling at length on the
various petitions that Comelec, in the exercise of its constitutional prerogatives, may entertain,
The Second Issue: Is Lack of Citizenship suffice it to say that this Court has invariably recognized the Commission's authority to hear and
a Continuing Disqualification? decide petitions for annulment of proclamations -- of which SPC No. 95-317 obviously is
one.58 Thus, in Mentang vs. COMELEC,59 we ruled:
Lee contends that the May 1, 1995 Resolution 53 of the Comelec Second Division in SPA No.
95-028 as affirmed in toto by Comelec En Banc in its Resolution of May 11, 1995 "became final The petitioner argues that after proclamation and assumption of office, a pre-proclamation
and executory after five (5) days or on May 17, 1995, no restraining order having been issued by controversy is no longer viable. Indeed, we are aware of cases holding that pre-proclamation
this Honorable Court.54 Hence, before Lee "was proclaimed as the elected governor on June controversies may no longer be entertained by the COMELEC after the winning candidate has
30, 1995, there was already a final and executory judgment disqualifying" Frivaldo. Lee adds been proclaimed. (citing Gallardo vs. Rimando, 187 SCRA 463; Salvacion vs. COMELEC, 170
that this Court's two rulings (which Frivaldo now concedes were legally "correct") declaring SCRA 513; Casimiro vs. COMELEC, 171 SCRA 468.) This rule, however, is premised on an
Frivaldo an alien have also become final and executory way before the 1995 elections, and assumption that the proclamation is no proclamation at all and the proclaimed candidate's
these "judicial pronouncements of his political status as an American citizen absolutely and for assumption of office cannot deprive the COMELEC of the power to make such declaration of
all time disqualified (him) from running for, and holding any public office in the Philippines." nullity. (citing Aguam vs. COMELEC, 23 SCRA 883; Agbayani vs. COMELEC, 186 SCRA 484.)

We do not agree. The Court however cautioned that such power to annul a proclamation must "be done within ten
(10) days following the proclamation." Inasmuch as Frivaldo's petition was filed only six (6) days
It should be noted that our first ruling in G.R. No. 87193 disqualifying Frivaldo was rendered in after Lee's proclamation, there is no question that the Comelec correctly acquired jurisdiction
connection with the 1988 elections while that in G.R. No. 104654 was in connection with the over the same.
1992 elections. That he was disqualified for such elections is final and can no longer be
changed. In the words of the respondent Commission (Second Division) in its assailed The Fourth Issue: Was Lee's Proclamation Valid?
Resolution:55
Frivaldo assails the validity of the Lee proclamation. We uphold him for the following reasons:
The records show that the Honorable Supreme Court had decided that Frivaldo was not a
Filipino citizen and thus disqualified for the purpose of the 1988 and 1992 elections. However, First. To paraphrase this Court in Labo vs. COMELEC,60 "the fact remains that he (Lee) was not
there is no record of any "final judgment" of the disqualification of Frivaldo as a candidate for the the choice of the sovereign will," and in Aquino vs. COMELEC,61 Lee is "a second placer, . . .
May 8, 1995 elections. What the Commission said in its Order of June 21, 1995 (implemented just that, a second placer."
on June 30, 1995), directing the proclamation of Raul R. Lee, was that Frivaldo was not a
Filipino citizen "having been declared by the Supreme Court in its Order dated March 25, 1995, In spite of this, Lee anchors his claim to the governorship on the pronouncement of this Court in
the aforesaid Labo62 case, as follows:
The rule would have been different if the electorate fully aware in fact and in law of a candidate's This claim is now moot and academic inasmuch as these resolutions are deemed superseded
disqualification so as to bring such awareness within the realm of notoriety, would nonetheless by the subsequent ones issued by the Commission (First Division) on December 19, 1995,
cast their votes in favor of the ineligible candidate. In such case, the electorate may be said to affirmed en banc63 on February 23, 1996; which both upheld his election. At any rate, it is
have waived the validity and efficacy of their votes by notoriously misapplying their franchise or obvious that Section 78 is merely directory as Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 authorizes the
throwing away their votes, in which case, the eligible candidate obtaining the next higher number Commission to try and decide petitions for disqualifications even after the elections, thus:
of votes may be deemed elected.
Sec. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. -- Any candidate who has been declared by final
But such holding is qualified by the next paragraph, thus: judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be
counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be
But this is not the situation obtaining in the instant dispute. It has not been shown, and none was disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the
alleged, that petitioner Labo was notoriously known as an ineligible candidate, much less the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or protest and
electorate as having known of such fact. On the contrary, petitioner Labo was even allowed by upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the
no less than the Comelec itself in its resolution dated May 10, 1992 to be voted for the office of suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.
the city Payor as its resolution dated May 9, 1992 denying due course to petitioner Labo's (emphasis supplied)
certificate of candidacy had not yet become final and subject to the final outcome of this case.
Refutation of
The last-quoted paragraph in Labo, unfortunately for Lee, is the ruling appropriate in this case Mr. Justice Davide's Dissent
because Frivaldo was in 1995 in an identical situation as Labo was in 1992 when the Comelec's
cancellation of his certificate of candidacy was not yet final on election day as there was in both In his dissenting opinion, the esteemed Mr. Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. argues that President
cases a pending motion for reconsideration, for which reason Comelec issued an (omnibus) Aquino's memorandum dated March 27, 1987 should be viewed as a suspension (not a repeal,
resolution declaring that Frivaldo (like Labo in 1992) and several others can still be voted for in as urged by Lee) of P.D. 725. But whether it decrees a suspension or a repeal is a purely
the May 8, 1995 election, as in fact, he was. academic distinction because the said issuance is not a statute that can amend or abrogate an
existing law.
Furthermore, there has been no sufficient evidence presented to show that the electorate of The existence and subsistence of P.D. 725 were recognized in the first Frivaldo case;64 viz.,
Sorsogon was "fully aware in fact and in law" of Frivaldo's alleged disqualification as to "bring "(u)nder CA No. 63 as amended by CA No. 473 and P.D. No. 725, Philippine citizenship maybe
such awareness within the realm of notoriety;" in other words, that the voters intentionally reacquired by . . . repatriation". He also contends that by allowing Frivaldo to register and to
wasted their ballots knowing that, in spite of their voting for him, he was ineligible. If Labo has remain as a registered voter, the Comelec and in effect this Court abetted a "mockery" of our
any relevance at all, it is that the vice-governor -- and not Lee -- should be pro- claimed, since in two previous judgments declaring him a non-citizen. We do not see such abetting or mockery.
losing the election, Lee was, to paraphrase Labo again, "obviously not the choice of the people" The retroactivity of his repatriation, as discussed earlier, legally cured whatever defects there
of Sorsogon. This is the emphatic teaching of Labo: may have been in his registration as a voter for the purpose of the 1995 elections. Such
retroactivity did not change his disqualifications in 1988 and 1992, which were the subjects of
The rule, therefore, is: the ineligibility of a candidate receiving majority votes does not entitle the such previous rulings.
eligible candidate receiving the next highest number of votes to be declared elected. A minority
or defeated candidate cannot be deemed elected to the office. Mr. Justice Davide also believes that Quo Warranto is not the sole remedy to question the
ineligibility of a candidate, citing the Comelec's authority under Section 78 of the Omnibus
Second. As we have earlier declared Frivaldo to have seasonably reacquired his citizenship and Election Code allowing the denial of a certificate of candidacy on the ground of a false material
inasmuch as he obtained the highest number of votes in the 1995 elections, he -- not Lee -- representation therein as required by Section 74. Citing Loong, he then states his disagreement
should be proclaimed. Hence, Lee's proclamation was patently erroneous and should now be with our holding that Section 78 is merely directory. We really have no quarrel. Our point is that
corrected. Frivaldo was in error in his claim in G.R. No. 120295 that the Comelec Resolutions promulgated
on May 1, 1995 and May 11, 1995 were invalid because they were issued "not later than fifteen
The Fifth Issue: Is Section 78 of the
days before the election" as prescribed by Section 78. In dismissing the petition in G.R. No.
Election Code Mandatory?
120295, we hold that the Comelec did not commit grave abuse of discretion because "Section 6
In G.R. No. 120295, Frivaldo claims that the assailed Resolution of the Comelec (Second of R.A. 6646 authorizes the Comelec to try and decide disqualifications even after the elections."
Division) dated May 1, 1995 and the confirmatory en banc Resolution of May 11, 1995 In spite of his disagreement with us on this point, i.e., that Section 78 "is merely directory", we
disqualifying him for want of citizenship should be annulled because they were rendered beyond note that just like us, Mr. Justice Davide nonetheless votes to "DISMISS G.R. No. 120295". One
the fifteen (15) day period prescribed by Section 78, of the Omnibus Election Code which reads other point. Loong, as quoted in the dissent, teaches that a petition to deny due course under
as follows: Section 78 must be filed within the 25-day period prescribed therein. The present case however
deals with the period during which the Comelec may decide such petition. And we hold that it
Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy. -- A verified petition may be decided even after the fifteen day period mentioned in Section 78. Here, we rule that a
seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by any person decision promulgated by the Comelec even after the elections is valid but Loong held that a
exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained therein as required under petition filed beyond the 25-day period is out of time. There is no inconsistency nor conflict.
Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days
from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided after notice and Mr. Justice Davide also disagrees with the Court's holding that, given the unique factual
hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election. (Emphasis supplied.) circumstances of Frivaldo, repatriation may be given retroactive effect. He argues that such
retroactivity "dilutes" our holding in the first Frivaldo case. But the first (and even the second
Frivaldo) decision did not directly involve repatriation as a mode of acquiring citizenship. If we applying election laws, it would be far better to err in favor of popular sovereignty than to be right
may repeat, there is no question that Frivaldo was not a Filipino for purposes of determining his in complex but little understood legalisms. Indeed, to inflict a thrice rejected candidate upon the
qualifications in the 1988 and 1992 elections. That is settled. But his supervening repatriation electorate of Sorsogon would constitute unmitigated judicial tyranny and an unacceptable
has changed his political status -- not in 1988 or 1992, but only in the 1995 elections. assault upon this Court's conscience.

Our learned colleague also disputes our holding that Frivaldo was stateless prior to his EPILOGUE
repatriation, saying that "informal renunciation or abandonment is not a ground to lose American
citizenship". Since our courts are charged only with the duty of determining who are Philippine In sum, we rule that the citizenship requirement in the Local Government Code is to be
nationals, we cannot rule on the legal question of who are or who are not Americans. It is basic possessed by an elective official at the latest as of the time he is proclaimed and at the start of
in international law that a State determines ONLY those who are its own citizens -- not who are the term of office to which he has been elected. We further hold P.D. No. 725 to be in full force
the citizens of other countries.65 The issue here is: the Comelec made a finding of fact that and effect up to the present, not having been suspended or repealed expressly nor impliedly at
Frivaldo was stateless and such finding has not been shown by Lee to be arbitrary or whimsical. any time, and Frivaldo's repatriation by virtue thereof to have been properly granted and thus
Thus, following settled case law, such finding is binding and final. valid and effective. Moreover, by reason of the remedial or curative nature of the law granting
him a new right to resume his political status and the legislative intent behind it, as well as his
The dissenting opinion also submits that Lee who lost by chasmic margins to Frivaldo in all three unique situation of having been forced to give up his citizenship and political aspiration as his
previous elections, should be declared winner because "Frivaldo's ineligibility for being an means of escaping a regime he abhorred, his repatriation is to be given retroactive effect as of
American was publicly known". First, there is absolutely no empirical evidence for such "public" the date of his application therefor, during the pendency of which he was stateless, he having
knowledge. Second, even if there is, such knowledge can be truepost facto only of the last two given up his U.S. nationality. Thus, in contemplation of law, he possessed the vital requirement
previous elections. Third, even the Comelec and now this Court were/are still deliberating on his of Filipino citizenship as of the start of the term of office of governor, and should have been
nationality before, during and after the 1995 elections. How then can there be such "public" proclaimed instead of Lee. Furthermore, since his reacquisition of citizenship retroacted to
knowledge? August 17, 1994, his registration as a voter of Sorsogon is deemed to have been validated as of
said date as well. The foregoing, of course, are precisely consistent with our holding that lack of
Mr. Justice Davide submits that Section 39 of the Local Government Code refers to the the citizenship requirement is not a continuing disability or disqualification to run for and hold
qualifications of electivelocal officials, i.e., candidates, and not elected officials, and that the public office. And once again, we emphasize herein our previous rulings recognizing the
citizenship qualification [under par. (a) of that section] must be possessed by candidates, not Comelec's authority and jurisdiction to hear and decide petitions for annulment of proclamations.
merely at the commencement of the term, but by election day at the latest. We see it differently.
Section 39, par. (a) thereof speaks of "elective local official" while par. (b) to (f) refer to This Court has time and again liberally and equitably construed the electoral laws of our country
"candidates". If the qualifications under par. (a) were intended to apply to "candidates" and not to give fullest effect to the manifest will of our people,66 for in case of doubt, political laws must
elected officials, the legislature would have said so, instead of differentiating par. (a) from the be interpreted to give life and spirit to the popular mandate freely expressed through the ballot.
rest of the paragraphs. Secondly, if Congress had meant that the citizenship qualification should Otherwise stated, legal niceties and technicalities cannot stand in the way of the sovereign will.
be possessed at election day or prior thereto, it would have specifically stated such detail, the Consistently, we have held:
same way it did in pars. (b) to (f) far other qualifications of candidates for governor, mayor, etc.
. . . (L)aws governing election contests must be liberally construed to the end that the will of the
Mr. Justice Davide also questions the giving of retroactive effect to Frivaldo's repatriation on the people in the choice of public officials may not be defeated by mere technical objections
ground, among others, that the law specifically provides that it is only after taking the oath of (citations omitted).67
allegiance that applicants shall be deemed to have reacquired Philippine citizenship. We do not
question what the provision states. We hold however that the provision should be understood The law and the courts must accord Frivaldo every possible protection, defense and refuge, in
thus: that after taking the oath of allegiance the applicant is deemed to have reacquired deference to the popular will. Indeed, this Court has repeatedly stressed the importance of
Philippine citizenship, which reacquisition (or repatriation) is deemed for all purposes and intents giving effect to the sovereign will in order to ensure the survival of our democracy. In any action
to have retroacted to the date of his application therefor. involving the possibility of a reversal of the popular electoral choice, this Court must exert utmost
effort to resolve the issues in a manner that would give effect to the will of the majority, for it is
In any event, our "so too" argument regarding the literal meaning of the word "elective" in merely sound public policy to cause elective offices to be filled by those who are the choice of
reference to Section 39 of the Local Authority Code, as well as regarding Mr. Justice Davide's the majority. To successfully challenge a winning candidate's qualifications, the petitioner must
thesis that the very wordings of P.D. 725 suggest non-retroactivity, were already taken up rather clearly demonstrate that the ineligibility is so patently antagonistic68 to constitutional and legal
extensively earlier in this Decision. principles that overriding such ineligibility and thereby giving effect to the apparent will of the
people, would ultimately create greater prejudice to the very democratic institutions and juristic
Mr. Justice Davide caps his paper with a clarion call: "This Court must be the first to uphold the traditions that our Constitution and laws so zealously protect and promote. In this undertaking,
Rule of Law." We agree -- we must all follow the rule of law. But that is NOT the issue here. The Lee has miserably failed.
issue is how should the law be interpreted and applied in this case so it can be followed, so it
can rule! In Frivaldo's case. it would have been technically easy to find fault with his cause. The Court
could have refused to grant retroactivity to the effects of his repatriation and hold him still
At balance, the question really boils down to a choice of philosophy and perception of how to ineligible due to his failure to show his citizenship at the time he registered as a voter before the
interpret and apply laws relating to elections: literal or liberal; the letter or the spirit, the naked 1995 elections. Or, it could have disputed the factual findings of the Comelec that he was
provision or its ultimate purpose; legal syllogism or substantial justice; in isolation or in the stateless at the time of repatriation and thus hold his consequent dual citizenship as a
context of social conditions; harshly against or gently in favor of the voters' obvious choice. In disqualification "from running for any elective local position." But the real essence of justice does
not emanate from quibblings over patchwork legal technicality. It proceeds from the spirit's gut public officers . . . must at all times be accountable to the people . . ." Sections 15 and 1 of
consciousness of the dynamic role of law as a brick in the ultimate development of the social Article XIII define the role and rights of people's organizations. Section 5(2) of Article XVI
edifice. Thus, the Court struggled against and eschewed the easy, legalistic, technical and mandates that "[t]he state shall strengthen the patriotic spirit and nationalist consciousness of
sometimes harsh anachronisms of the law in order to evoke substantial justice in the larger the military, and respect for people's rights in the performance of their duty." And section 2 of
social context consistent with Frivaldo's unique situation approximating venerability in Philippine Article XVII provides that "amendments to
political life. Concededly, he sought American citizenship only to escape the clutches of the this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through initiative . . ." All these
dictatorship. At this stage, we cannot seriously entertain any doubt about his loyalty and provisions and more are intended to breathe more life to the sovereignty of our people.
dedication to this country. At the first opportunity, he returned to this land, and sought to serve
his people once more. The people of Sorsogon overwhelmingly voted for him three times. He To be sure, the sovereignty of our people is not a kabalistic principle whose dimensions are
took an oath of allegiance to this Republic every time he filed his certificate of candidacy and buried in mysticism. Its metes and bounds are familiar to the framers of our Constitutions. They
during his failed naturalization bid. And let it not be overlooked, his demonstrated tenacity and knew that in its broadest sense, sovereignty is meant to be supreme, the jus summi imperu,
sheer determination to re-assume his nationality of birth despite several legal set-backs speak the absolute right to govern.3 Former Dean Vicente Sinco4 states that an essential quality of
more loudly, in spirit, in fact and in truth than any legal technicality, of his consuming intention sovereignty is legal omnipotence, viz.: "Legal theory establishes certain essential qualities
and burning desire to re-embrace his native Philippines even now at the ripe old age of 81 inherent in the nature of sovereignty. The first is legal omnipotence. This means that the
years. Such loyalty to and love of country as well as nobility of purpose cannot be lost on this sovereign is legally omnipotent and absolute in relation to other legal institutions. It has the
Court of justice and equity. Mortals of lesser mettle would have given up. After all, Frivaldo was power to determine exclusively its legal competence. Its powers are original, not derivative. It is
assured of a life of ease and plenty as a citizen of the most powerful country in the world. But he the sole judge of what it should do at any given time."5Citing Barker,6 he adds that a more
opted, nay, single-mindedly insisted on returning to and serving once more his struggling but amplified definition of sovereignty is that of "a final power of final legal adjustment of all legal
beloved land of birth. He therefore deserves every liberal interpretation of the law which can be issues." The U.S. Supreme Court expressed the same thought in the landmark case of Yick Wo
applied in his favor. And in the final analysis, over and above Frivaldo himself, the indomitable v. Hopkins,7 where it held that ". . . sovereignty itself is, of course, not subject to law, for it is the
people of Sorsogon most certainly deserve to be governed by a leader of their overwhelming author and source of law; but in our system, while sovereign powers are delegated to the
choice. agencies of government, sovereignty itself remains with the people, by whom and for whom all
government exists and acts."
WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing:
In our Constitution, the people established a representative democracy as distinguished from a
(1) The petition in G.R. No. 123755 is hereby DISMISSED. The assailed Resolutions of the pure democracy. Justice Isagani Cruz explains:8
respondent Commission are AFFIRMED.
xxx xxx xxx
(2) The petition in G.R. No. 120295 is also DISMISSED for being moot and academic. In any
event, it has no merit.No costs. A republic is a representative government, a government run by and for the people. It is not a
pure democracy where the people govern themselves directly. The essence of republicanism is
SO ORDERED.  representation and renovation, the selection by the citizenry of a corps of public functionaries
who derive their mandate from the people and act on their behalf, serving for a limited period
Separate Opinions only, after which they are replaced or retained, at the option of their principal. Obviously, a
republican government is a responsible government whose officials hold and discharge their
PUNO, J., concurring: position as a public trust and shall, according to the Constitution, "at all times be accountable to
the people" they are sworn to serve. The purpose of a republican government it is almost
I concur with the path-breaking ponencia of Mr. Justice Panganiban which is pro-people and needless to state, is the promotion of the common welfare according to the will of the people
pierces the myopia of legalism. Upholding the sovereign will of the people which is the be-all and themselves.
the end-all of republicanism, it rests on a foundation that will endure time and its tempest.
I appreciate the vigorous dissent of Mr. Justice Davide. I agree that sovereignty is indivisible but
The sovereignty of our people is the primary postulate of the 1987 Constitution. For this reason, it need not always be exercised by the people together, all the time.9 For this reason, the
it appears as thefirst in our declaration of principles and state policies. Thus, section 1 of Article Constitution and our laws provide when the entire electorate or only some of them can elect
II of our fundamental law proclaims that "[t]he Philippines is a democratic and republican State. those who make our laws and those who execute our laws. Thus, the entire electorate votes for
Sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them." The same our senators but only our district electorates vote for our congressmen, only our provincial
principle served as the bedrock of our 1973 and 1935 Constitutions.1 It is one of the few electorates vote for the members of our provincial boards, only our city electorates vote for our
principles whose truth has been cherished by the Americans as self-evident. Section 4, Article IV city councilors, and only our municipal electorates vote for our councilors. Also, the entire
of the U.S. Constitution makes it a duty of the Federal government to guarantee to every state a electorate votes for our President and Vice-President but only our provincial electorates vote for
"republican form of government." With understandable fervor, the American authorities imposed our governors, only our city electorates vote for our mayors, and only our municipal electorates
republicanism as the cornerstone of our 1935 Constitution then being crafted by its Filipino vote for our mayors. By defining and delimiting the classes of voters who can exercise the
framers.2 sovereignty of the people in a given election, it cannot be claimed that said sovereignty has
been fragmented.
Borne out of the 1986 people power EDSA revolution, our 1987 Constitution is more people-
oriented. Thus, section 4 of Article II provides as a state policy that the prime duty of the It is my respectful submission that the issue in the case at bar is not whether the people of
Government is "to serve and protect the people." Section 1, Article XI also provides that ". . . Sorsogon should be given the right to defy the law by allowing Frivaldo to sit as their governor.
Rather, the issue is: whether the will of the voters of Sorsogon clearly choosing Frivaldo as I agree with petitioner Lee that Frivaldo's repatriation was void, but not on the ground that
governor ought to be given a decisive value considering the uncertainty of the law on when a President Corazon C. Aquino's 27 March 1987 memorandum "effectively repealed" P.D. No.
candidate ought to satisfy the qualification of citizenship. The uncertainty of law and 725. In my view, the said memorandum only suspended the implementation of the latter decree
jurisprudence, both here and abroad, on this legal issue cannot be denied. In the United by divesting the Special Committee on Naturalization of its authority to further act on grants of
States, 10 there are two (2) principal schools of thought on the matter. One espouses the view citizenship under LOI No. 270, as amended, P.D. No. 836, as amended; P.D. No. 1379; and
that a candidate must possess the qualifications for office at the time of his election. The other "any other related laws, orders, issuances and rules and regulations." A reading of the last
ventures the view that the candidate should satisfy the qualifications at the time he assumes the paragraph of the memorandum can lead to no other conclusion, thus:
powers of the office. I am unaware of any Philippine decision that has squarely resolved this
difficult question of law. The ponencia of Mr. Justice Panganiban adhered to the second school In view of the foregoing, you as Chairman and members of the Special Committee on
of thought while Mr. Justice Davide dissents. Naturalization, are hereby directed to cease and desist from undertaking any and all
proceedings within your functional area of responsibility, as defined in Letter of Instruction No.
I emphasize the honest-to-goodness difference in interpreting our law on the matter for this is 270 dated April 11, 1975, as amended, Presidential Decree No. 836 dated December 3, 1975,
vital to dispel the fear of Mr. Justice Davide that my opinion can bring about ill effects to the as amended, and Presidential Decree No. 1379 dated May 17, 1978, relative to the grant of
State. Mr. Justice Davide's fear is based on the assumption that Frivaldo continues to be citizenship under the said laws, and any other related laws, orders, issuances and rules and
disqualified and we cannot allow him to sit as governor without transgressing the law. I do not regulations. (emphasis supplied)
concede this assumption for as stressed above, courts have been sharply divided by this mind
boggling issue. Given this schism, I do not see how we can derogate on the sovereignty of the It is self-evident that the underscored clause can only refer to those related to LOI No. 270, P.D.
people by according more weight to the votes of the people of Sorsogon. No. 836, and P.D. No. 1379. There is no doubt in my mind that P.D. No. 725 is one such "related
law" as it involves the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship by repatriation and designates the
Mr. Justice Davide warns that should the people of Batanes stage a rebellion, we cannot Special Committee on Naturalization created under LOI No. 270 to receive and act on (i.e.,
prosecute them "because of the doctrine of people's sovereignty." With due respect, the analogy approve or disapprove) applications under the said decree. The power of President Aquino to
is not appropriate. In his hypothetical case, rebellion is concededly a crime, a violation of Article suspend these issuances by virtue of the 27 March 1987 memorandum is beyond question
134 of the Revised Penal Code, an offense against the sovereignty of our people. In the case at considering that under Section 6, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution, she exercised legislative
bar, it cannot be held with certitude that the people of Sorsogon violated the law by voting for power until the Congress established therein convened on the fourth Monday of July 1987.
Frivaldo as governor. Frivaldo's name was in the list of candidates allowed by COMELEC to run
for governor. At that time too, Frivaldo was taking all steps to establish his Filipino citizenship. I disagree with the view expressed in the ponencia that the memorandum of 27 March 1987 was
And even our jurisprudence has not settled the issue when a candidate should possess the merely a declaration of "executive policy," and not an exercise of legislative power. LOI No. 270,
qualification of citizenship. Since the meaning of the law is arguable then and now, I cannot P.D. No. 836, P.D. No. 1379 and "any other related laws," such as P.D. No. 725, were issued by
imagine how it will be disastrous for the State if we tilt the balance in the case at bar in favor of President Ferdinand E. Marcos in the exercise of his legislative powers -- not executive power.
the people of Sorsogon. These laws relate to the acquisition (by naturalization) and reacquisition (by repatriation) of
Philippine citizenship, and in light of Sections 1(4) and 3, Article IV of the 1987 Constitution
In sum, I respectfully submit that the sovereign will of our people should be resolutory of the (naturalization and reacquisition of Philippine citizenship shall be in accordance with law), it is
case at bar which is one of its kind, unprecedented in our political history. For three (3) times, indubitable that these subjects are a matter of legislative prerogative. In the same vein, the
Frivaldo ran as governor of the province of Sorsogon. For two (2) times, he was disqualified on creation of the Special Committee on Naturalization by LOI No. 270 and the conferment of the
the ground of citizenship. The people of Sorsogon voted for him as their governor despite his power to accept and act on applications under P.D. No. 725 are clearly legislative acts.
disqualification. The people never waffled in their support for Frivaldo. In 1988, they gave him a
winning margin of 27,000; in 1992, they gave him a winning spread of 57,000; in 1995, he Accordingly, the revocation of the cease and desist order and the reactivation or revival of the
posted a margin of 20,000. Clearly then, Frivaldo is the overwhelming choice of the people of Committee can be done only by legislative fiat, i.e., by Congress, since the President had long
Sorsogon. In election cases, we should strive to align the will of the legislature as expressed in lost his authority to exercise "legislative power." Considering that Congress has not seen it fit to
its law with the will of the sovereign people as expressed in their ballots. For law to reign, it must do so, the President cannot, in the exercise of executive power, lift the cease and desist order
respect the will of the people. For in the eloquent prose of Mr. Justice Laurel, ". . . an nor reactivate/reconstitute/revive the Committee. A multo fortiori, the Committee cannot validly
enfranchised citizen is a particle of popular sovereignty and is the ultimate source of established accept Frivaldo's application for repatriation and approve it.
authority."11 The choice of the governed on who shall be their governor merits the highest
consideration by all agencies of government. In cases where the sovereignty of the people is at II
stake, we must not only be legally right but also politically correct. We cannot fail by making the
Even assuming arguendo that Frivaldo's repatriation is valid, it did not "cure his lack of
people succeed.
citizenship." I depart from the view in the ponencia that Section 39 of the Local Government
DAVIDE, JR., J., dissenting: Code of 1991 does not specify the time when the citizenship requirement must be met, and that
being the case, then it suffices that citizenship be possessed upon commencement of the term
After deliberating on the re-formulated issues and the conclusions reached by my distinguished of the office involved; therefore, since Frivaldo "re-assumed" his Philippine citizenship at 2:00
colleague, Mr. Justice Artemio V. Panganiban, I find myself unable to join him. p.m. on 30 June 1995 and the term of office of Governor commenced at 12:00 noon of that day,
he had, therefore, complied with the citizenship requirement.
I
In the first place, Section 39 actually prescribes the qualifications of elective local officials and
not those of an elected local official. These adjectives are not synonymous, as
the ponencia seems to suggest. The first refers to the nature of the office, which requires the in the city or municipality wherein he proposes to vote for at least six months immediately
process of voting by the electorate involved; while the second refers to a victorious candidate for preceding the election, may be a registered voter. (emphasis supplied)
an elective office. The section unquestionably refers to elective -- not elected -- local officials. It
falls under Title Two entitled ELECTIVE OFFICIALS; under Chapter 1 entitled Qualifications and It is undisputed that this Court twice voided Frivaldo's election as Governor in the 1988 and 1992
Election; and paragraph (a) thereof begins with the phrase "An elective local official," while elections on the ground that for lack of Philippine citizenship -- he being a naturalized citizen of
paragraphs (b) to (f) thereof speak of candidates. It reads as follows: the United States of America -- he was DISQUALIFIED to be elected as such and to serve the
position (Frivaldo vs. Commission on Elections, 174 SCRA 245 [1989]; Republic of the
Sec. 39. Qualifications. -- (a) An elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines; a Philippines vs. De la Rosa, 232 SCRA 785 [1994]). This disqualification inexorably nullified
registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or province or, in the case of a member of the Frivaldo's registration as a voter and declared it void ab initio. Our judgments therein were self-
sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod, or sangguniang bayan, the district where executory and no further act, e.g., a COMELEC order to cancel his registration as a voter or the
he intends to be elected; a resident therein for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the physical destruction of his voter's certificate, was necessary for the ineffectivity. Thus, he was
day of the election; and able to read and write Filipino or any other local language or dialect. never considered a registered voter for the elections of May 1992, and May 1995, as there is no
showing that Frivaldo registered anew as a voter for the latter elections. Even if he did -- in
(b) Candidates for the position of governor, vice governor or member of the sangguniang obvious defiance of his decreed disqualification -- this did not make him a Filipino citizen, hence
panlalawigan, or mayor, vice mayor or member of the sangguniang panlungsod of highly it was equally void ab initio. That he filed his certificate of candidacy for the 1995 elections and
urbanized cities must be at least twenty-three (23) years of age on election day. was even allowed to vote therein were of no moment. Neither act made him a Filipino citizen nor
nullified the judgments of this Court. On the contrary, said acts made a mockery of our
(c) Candidates for the position of mayor or vice mayor of independent component cities, judgments. For the Court now to validate Frivaldo's registration as a voter despite the judgments
component cities, or municipalities must be at least twenty-one (21) years of age on election of disqualification is to modify the said judgments by making their effectivity and enforceability
day. dependent on a COMELEC order cancelling his registration as a voter, or on the physical
destruction of his certificate of registration as a voter which, of course, was never our intention.
(d) Candidates for the position of member of the sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang
Moreover, to sanction Frivaldo's registration as a voter would be to sacrifice substance in favor
bayan must be at least eighteen (18) years of age on election day.
of form (the piece of paper that is the book of voters or list of voters or voter's ID), and abet the
(e) Candidates for the position of punong barangay or member of the sangguniang barangay COMELEC's incompetence in failing to cancel Frivaldo's registration and allowing him to vote.
must be at least eighteen (18) years of age on election day.
The second reason in the ponencia as to why the citizenship disqualification should be reckoned
(f) Candidates for the sangguniang kabataan must be at least fifteen (15) years of age but not not from the date of the election nor the filing of the certificate of candidacy, but from the date of
more than twenty-one (21) years of age on election day (emphasis supplied) proclamation, is that the only available remedy to question the ineligibility (or disloyalty) of a
candidate is a petition for quo warranto which, under Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code,
It is thus obvious that Section 39 refers to no other than the qualifications of candidates for may be filed only within ten days from proclamation and not earlier.
elective local offices and their election. Hence, in no way may the section be construed to mean
that possession of qualifications should be reckoned from the commencement of the term of I beg to differ.
office of the elected candidate.
Clearly, quo warranto is not the sole remedy available to question a candidate's ineligibility for
For another, it is not at all true that Section 39 does not specify the time when the citizenship public office. Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code allows the filing of a petition to deny due
requirement must be possessed. I submit that the requirement must be satisfied, or that course to or cancel the certificate of candidacy on the ground that any material representation
Philippine citizenship must be possessed, not merely at the commencement of the term, but at contained therein, as required by Section 74, is false. Section 74, in turn, requires that the
an earlier time, the latest being election day itself. Section 39 is not at all ambiguous nor person filing the certificate of candidacy must state, inter alia, that he is eligible for the office,
uncertain that it meant this to be, as one basic qualification of an elective local official is that he which means that he has all the qualifications (including, of course, fulfilling the citizenship
be "A REGISTERED VOTER IN THE BARANGAY, MUNICIPALITY, CITY OR PROVINCE . . . requirement) and none of the disqualifications as provided by law. The petition under Section 78
WHERE HE INTENDS TO VOTE." This simply means that he possesses all the qualifications to may be filed at any time not later than 25 days from the filing of the certificate of candidacy. The
exercise the right of suffrage. The fundamental qualification for the exercise of this sovereign section reads in full as follows:
right is the possession of Philippine citizenship. No less than the Constitution makes it the first
Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. -- A verified petition
qualification, as Section 1, Article V thereof provides:
seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by any person
Sec. 1. Suffrage may be exercised by all citizens of the Philippines not otherwise disqualified by exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained therein as required under
law, who are at least eighteen years of age, and who shall have resided in the Philippines for at Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days
least one year and in the place wherein they propose to vote for at least six months immediately from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after due notice
preceding the election. . . . (emphasis supplied) and hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election.

And Section 117 of the Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines (B.P. Blg. 881) expressly This remedy was recognized in Loong vs. Commission on Elections (216 SCRA 760, 768
provides for the qualifications of a voter. Thus: [1992]), where this Court held:

Sec. 117 Qualifications of a voter. -- Every citizen of the Philippines, not otherwise disqualified Thus, if a person qualified to file a petition to disqualify a certain candidate fails to file the petition
by law, eighteen years of age or over, who shall have resided in the Philippines for one year and within the 25-day period Section 78 of the Code for whatever reasons, the election laws do not
leave him completely helpless as he has another chance to raise the disqualification of the account of any false representation made therein. On the contrary, said Section 7 affirms and
candidate by filing a petition for quo warranto within ten (10) days from the proclamation of the reiterates Section 78 of the Code.
results of the election, as provided under Section 253 of the Code. Section 1, Rule 21 of the
Comelec Rules of Procedure similarly provides that any voter contesting the election of any We note that Section 6 refers only to the effects of a disqualification case which may be based
regional, provincial or city official on the ground of ineligibility or of disloyalty to the Republic of on grounds other than that provided under Section 78 of the Code. But Section 7 of Rep. Act No.
the Philippines may file a petition for quo warranto with the Electoral Contest Adjudication 6646 also makes the effects referred to in Section 6 applicable to disqualification cases filed
Department. The petition may be filed within ten (10) days from the date the respondent is under Section 78 of the Code. Nowhere in Sections 6 and 7 of Rep. Act No. 6646 is mention
proclaimed (Section 2). made of the period within which these disqualification cases may be filed. This is because there
are provisions in the Code which supply the periods within which a petition relating to
Likewise, Rule 25 of the Revised COMELEC Rules of Procedure allows the filing of a petition for disqualification of candidates must be filed, such as Section 78, already discussed, and Section
disqualification on the ground of failure to possess all the qualifications of a candidate as 253 on petitions for quo warranto.
provided by the Constitution or by existing laws, "any day after the last day for filing of
certificates of candidacy but not later than the date of proclamation." Sections 1 and 3 thereof I then disagree with the asseveration in the ponencia that Section 78 is merely directory
provide: because Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 authorizes the COMELEC to try and decide petitions for
disqualification even after elections. I submit that Section 6 refers to disqualifications under
Rule 25 -- Disqualification of Candidates Sections 12 and 68 of the Omnibus Election Code and consequently modifies Section 72
thereof. As such, the proper court or the COMELEC are granted the authority to continue
Sec. 1. Grounds for Disqualification. Any candidate who does not possess all the qualifications hearing the case after the election, and during the pendency of the case, suspend the
of a candidate as provided for by the Constitution or by existing law or who commits any act proclamation of the victorious candidate, if the evidence against him is strong. Sections 12, 68,
declared by law to be grounds for disqualification may be disqualified from continuing as a and 72 of the Code provide:
candidate.
Sec. 12. Disqualifications. Any person who has been declared by competent authority insane or
xxx xxx xxx incompetent, or has been sentenced by final judgment for subversion, insurrection, rebellion or
for any offense for which he has been sentenced to a penalty of more than eighteen months or
Sec. 3. Period to File Petition. The petition shall be filed any day after the last day for filing of for a crime involving moral turpitude, shall be disqualified to be a candidate and to hold any
certificates of candidacy but not later than the date of proclamation. office, unless he has been given plenary pardon or granted amnesty.
While the validity of this rule insofar as it concerns petitions for disqualification on the ground of The disqualifications to be a candidate herein provided shall be deemed removed upon
lack of all qualifications may be doubtful, its invalidity is not in issue here. declaration by competent authority that said insanity or incompetence had been removed or
after the expiration of a period of five years from his service of sentence, unless within the same
In this connection, it would seem appropriate to take up the last issue grappled within
period he again becomes disqualified.
the ponencia, viz., is Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code mandatory? The answer is
provided in Loong. xxx xxx xxx
We also do not find merit in the contention of respondent Commission that in the light of the Sec. 68. Disqualifications. Any candidate who, in an action or protest in which he is a party is
provisions of Sections 6 and 7 of Rep. Act No. 6646, a petition to deny due course to or cancel a declared by final decision of a competent court guilty of, or found by the Commission of having
certificate of candidacy may be filed even beyond the 25-day period prescribed by Section 78 of (a) given money or other material consideration to influence, induce or corrupt the voters or
the Code, as long as it is filed within a reasonable time from the discovery of the ineligibility. public officials performing electoral functions; (b) committed acts of terrorism to enhance his
candidacy; (c) spent in his election campaign an amount in excess of that allowed by this Code;
Sections 6 and 7 of Rep. Act No. 6646 are here re-quoted:
(d) solicited, received or made any contribution prohibited under Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 and
Sec. 6. Effect of Disqualification case. Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment 104; or (e) violated any of Sections 80, 83, 85, 86 and 261, paragraphs d, e, k, v, and cc, sub-
to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for paragraph 6, shall be disqualified from continuing as a candidate, or if he has been elected, from
any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified holding the office. Any person who is a permanent resident of or an immigrant to a foreign
and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or country shall not be qualified to run for any elective office under this Code, unless said person
Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or protest and, upon has waived his status as permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country in accordance
motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the with the residence requirement provided for in the election laws. (Sec. 25, 1971 EC)
suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.
Sec. 72. Effects of disqualification cases and priority. The Commission and the courts shall give
Sec. 7. Petition to Deny Due Course To or Cancel a Certificate of Candidacy. The procedure priority to cases of disqualification by reason of violation of this Act to the end that a final
hereinabove provided shall apply to petitions to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of decision shall be rendered not later than seven days before the election in which the
candidacy as provided in Section 78 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881. disqualification is sought.

It will be noted that nothing in Sections 6 or 7 modifies or alters the 25- day period prescribed by Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for,
Section 78 of the Code for filing the appropriate action to cancel a certificate of candidacy on and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. Nevertheless, if for any reason, a candidate is
not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and
receives the winning number of votes in such election, his violation of the provisions of the statutory disability or irregularity in their own action. They make valid that which, before the
preceding sections shall not prevent his proclamation and assumption to office. enactment of the statute, was invalid. (RUBEN E. AGPALO, Statutory Construction, Second ed.
[1990], 270-271, citations omitted).
III
P.D. No. 725 provides for the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship lost through the marriage of
Still assuming that the repatriation is valid, I am not persuaded by the arguments in support of a Filipina to an alien and through naturalization in a foreign country of natural-born Filipino
the thesis that Frivaldo's repatriation may be given retroactive effect, as such goes against the citizens. It involves then the substantive, nay primordial, right of citizenship. To those for whom it
spirit and letter of P.D. No. 725. The spirit adheres to the principle that acquisition or re- is intended, it means, in reality, the acquisition of "a new right," as the ponencia cannot but
acquisition of Philippine citizenship is not a right, but a mere privilege. Before the advent of P.D. concede. Therefore, it may not be said to merely remedy or cure a defect considering that one
No. 725, only the following could apply for repatriation: (a) Army, Navy, or Air Corps deserters; who has lost Philippine citizenship does not have the right to reacquire it. As earlier stated, the
and (b) a woman who lost her citizenship by reason of her marriage to an alien after the death of Constitution provides that citizenship, once lost, may only be reacquired in the manner provided
her spouse (Section 2[2], C.A. No. 63). P.D. NO. 725 expanded this to include Filipino women by law. Moreover, it has also been observed that:
who lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens even before the death of their alien
husbands, or the termination of their marital status and to natural-born Filipino citizens who lost The idea is implicit from many of the cases that remedial statutes are statutes relating to
their Philippine citizenship but subsequently desired to reacquire the latter. procedure and not substantive rights. (Sutherland, Statutory Construction, Vol. 3, Third ed.
[1943], §5704 at 74, citations omitted).
Turning now to the letter of the law, P.D. No. 725 expressly provides that repatriation takes
effect only after taking the oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, thus: If we grant for the sake of argument, however, that P.D. No. 725 is curative or remedial statute,
it would be an inexcusable error to give it a retroactive effect since it explicitly provides the date
. . . may reacquire Philippine citizenship . . . by applying with the Special Committee on of its effectivity. Thus:
Naturalization created by Letter of Instruction No. 270, and, if their applications are approved,
taking the necessary oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, AFTER WHICH THEY This Decree shall take effect immediately.
SHALL BE DEEMED TO HAVE REACQUIRED PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP. (emphasis and
capitalization supplied) Done in the city of Manila, this 5th day of June, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and
seventy five.
Clearly then, the steps to reacquire Philippine citizenship by repatriation under the decree are:
(1) filing the application; (2) action by the committee; and (3) taking of the oath of allegiance if Nevertheless, if the retroactivity is to relate only to the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship,
the application is approved. It is only UPON TAKING THE OATH OF ALLEGIANCE that the then nothing therein supports such theory, for as the decree itself unequivocally provides, it is
applicant is deemed ipso jure to have reacquired Philippine citizenship. If the decree had only after taking the oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines that the applicant is
intended the oath taking to retroact to the date of the filing of the application, then it should not DEEMED TO HAVE REACQUIRED PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP.
have explicitly provided otherwise.
IV
This theory in the ponencia likewise dilutes this Court's pronouncement in the first Frivaldo case
that what reacquisition of Filipino citizenship requires is an act "formally rejecting [the] adopted Assuming yet again, for the sake of argument, that taking the oath of allegiance retroacted to the
state and reaffirming . . . allegiance to the Philippines." That act meant nothing less than taking date of Frivaldo's application for repatriation, the same could not be said insofar as it concerned
of the oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines. If we now take this revision of the United States of America, of which he was a citizen. For under the laws of the United States
doctrine to its logical end, then it would also mean that if Frivaldo had chosen and reacquired of America, Frivaldo remained an American national until he renounced his citizenship and
Philippine citizenship by naturalization or through Congressional action, such would retroact to allegiance thereto at 2:00 p.m. on 30 June 1995, when he took his oath of allegiance to the
the filing of the petition for naturalization or the bill granting him Philippine citizenship. This is a Republic of the Philippines. Section 401 of the Nationality Act of 1940 of the United States of
proposition which both the first and second Frivaldo cases soundly rejected. America provides that a person who is a national of the United States of America, whether by
birth or naturalization, loses his nationality by, inter alia, "(b) Taking an oath or making an
The other reason adduced in the ponencia in support of the proposition that P.D. No. 725 can be affirmation or other formal declaration of allegiance to a foreign state" (SIDNEY KANSAS, U.S.
given retroactive effect is its alleged curative or remedial nature. Immigration Exclusion and Deportation and Citizenship of the United States of America, Third
ed., [1948] 341-342). It follows then that on election day and until the hour of the
Again, I disagree. In the first place, by no stretch of legal hermeneutics may P.D. No. 725 be commencement of the term for which he was elected - noon of 30 June 1995 as per Section 43
characterized as a curative or remedial statute: of the Local Government Code - Frivaldo possessed dual citizenship, viz., (a) as an American
citizen; and (b) as a Filipino citizen through the adoption of the theory that the effects of his
Curative or remedial statutes are healing acts. They are remedial by curing defects and adding taking the oath of allegiance were retrospective. Hence, he was disqualified to run for Governor
to the means of enforcing existing obligations. The rule in regard to curative statutes is that if the for yet another reason: possession of dual citizenship, in accordance with Section 40 (d) of the
thing omitted or failed to be done, and which constitutes the defect sought to be removed or Local Government Code.
made harmless, is something the legislature might have dispensed with by a previous statute, it
may do so by a subsequent one. V

Curative statutes are intended to supply defects, abridge superfluities in existing laws, and curb The assertion in the ponencia that Frivaldo may be considered STATELESS on the basis of his
certain evils. They are intended to enable a person to carry into effect that which they have claim that he "had long renounced and had long abandoned his American citizenship - long
designed and intended, but has failed of expected legal consequence by reason of some before May 8, 1985" - is untenable, for the following reasons: first, it is based on Frivaldo's
unproven, self-serving allegation; second, informal renunciation or abandonment is not a ground the Chief Executive or the Legislature, wholly or partially, of any of their powers or prerogatives,
to lose American citizenship; and third, simply put, never did the status of a STATELESS person then those who did so -- and which are composed of the vast majority of the people of Batanes
attach to Frivaldo. -- a political subdivision -- cannot be prosecuted for or be held guilty of rebellion in violation of
Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code because of the doctrine of peoples' sovereignty. Indeed,
Statelessness may be either de jure, which is the status of individuals stripped of their nationality the expansion of the doctrine of sovereignty by investing upon the people of a mere political
by their former government without having an opportunity to acquire another; or de facto, which subdivision that which the Constitution places in the entire Filipino people, may be disastrous to
is the status of individuals possessed of a nationality whose country does not give them the Nation.
protection outside their own country, and who are commonly, albeit imprecisely, referred to as
refugees (JORGE R. COQUIA, et al., Conflict of Laws Cases, Materials and Comments, 1995 So it is in this case if we follow the thesis in the concurring opinion. Thus, simply because
ed., 290). Frivaldo had obtained a margin of 20,000 votes over his closest rival, Lee, i.e., a vast majority of
the voters of Sorsogon had expressed their sovereign will for the former, then this Court must
Specifically, under Chapter 1, Article 1 of the United Nations Convention Regarding the Status of yield to that will and must, therefore, allow to be set aside, for Frivaldo, not just the laws on
Stateless Persons (Philippine Treaty Series, Compiled and Annotated by Haydee B. Yorac, vol. qualifications of candidates and elective officials and naturalization and reacquisition of
III, 363), a stateless person is defined as "a person who is not considered as a national by any Philippine citizenship, but even the final and binding decisions of this Court affecting him.
State under the operation of its law." However, it has not been shown that the United States of
America ever ceased to consider Frivaldo its national at any time before he took his oath of This Court must be the first to uphold the Rule of Law. I vote then to DISMISS G.R. No. 120295
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on 30 June 1995. and GRANT G.R. No. 123755.

VI
Separate Opinions
Finally, I find it in order to also express my view on the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Reynato
S. Puno. I am absolutely happy to join him in his statement that "[t]he sovereignty of our people PUNO, J., concurring:
is the primary postulate of the 1987 Constitution" and that the said Constitution is "more people-
I concur with the path-breaking ponencia of Mr. Justice Panganiban which is pro-people and
oriented," "borne [as it is] out of the 1986 people power EDSA revolution." I would even go
pierces the myopia of legalism. Upholding the sovereign will of the people which is the be-all and
further by saying that this Constitution is pro-God (Preamble), pro-people (Article II, Sections 1,
the end-all of republicanism, it rests on a foundation that will endure time and its tempest.
3, 4, 5, 9, 15, 16; Article XI, Section 1, Article XII, Sections 1, 6; Article XIII, Sections 1, 11, 15,
16, 18; Article XVI, Sections 5(2), 6), pro-Filipino (Article XII, Sections 1, 2, 10, 11, 12, 14; Article The sovereignty of our people is the primary postulate of the 1987 Constitution. For this reason,
XIV, Sections 1, 4(2), 13; Article XVI, Section 11), pro-poor (Article II, Sections 9, 10, 18, 21; it appears as thefirst in our declaration of principles and state policies. Thus, section 1 of Article
Article XII, Sections 1, 2(3); Article XIII, Sections 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11, 13), pro-life (Article II, II of our fundamental law proclaims that "[t]he Philippines is a democratic and republican State.
Section 12), and pro-family (Article II, Section 12; Article XV). Sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them." The same
principle served as the bedrock of our 1973 and 1935 Constitutions.1 It is one of the few
Nevertheless, I cannot be with him in carrying out the principle of sovereignty beyond what I
principles whose truth has been cherished by the Americans as self-evident. Section 4, Article IV
perceive to be the reasonable constitutional parameters. The doctrine of people's sovereignty is
of the U.S. Constitution makes it a duty of the Federal government to guarantee to every state a
founded on the principles of democracy and republicanism and refers exclusively to the
"republican form of government." With understandable fervor, the American authorities imposed
sovereignty of the people of the Philippines. Section 1 of Article II is quite clear on this, thus:
republicanism as the cornerstone of our 1935 Constitution then being crafted by its Filipino
Sec. 1. The Philippines is a democratic and republican State. Sovereignty resides in the people framers.2
and all government authority emanates from them.
Borne out of the 1986 people power EDSA revolution, our 1987 Constitution is more people-
And the Preamble makes it clear when it solemnly opens it with a clause "We, the sovereign oriented. Thus, section 4 of Article II provides as a state policy that the prime duty of the
Filipino people . . ." Thus, this sovereignty is an attribute of the Filipino people as one Government is "to serve and protect the people." Section 1, Article XI also provides that ". . .
people, one body. public officers . . . must at all times be accountable to the people . . ." Sections 15 and 1 of
Article XIII define the role and rights of people's organizations. Section 5(2) of Article XVI
That sovereign power of the Filipino people cannot be fragmentized by looking at it as the mandates that "[t]he state shall strengthen the patriotic spirit and nationalist consciousness of
supreme authority of the people of any of the political subdivisions to determine their own the military, and respect for people's rights in the performance of their duty." And section 2 of
destiny; neither can we convert and treat every fragment as the whole. In such a case, this Court Article XVII provides that "amendments to
would provide the formula for the division and destruction of the State and render the this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through initiative . . ." All these
Government ineffective and inutile. To illustrate the evil, we may consider the enforcement of provisions and more are intended to breathe more life to the sovereignty of our people.
laws or the pursuit of a national policy by the executive branch of the government, or the
execution of a judgment by the courts. If these are opposed by the overwhelming majority of the To be sure, the sovereignty of our people is not a kabalistic principle whose dimensions are
people of a certain province, or even a municipality, it would necessarily follow that the law, buried in mysticism. Its metes and bounds are familiar to the framers of our Constitutions. They
national policy, or judgment must not be enforced, implemented, or executed in the said knew that in its broadest sense, sovereignty is meant to be supreme, the jus summi imperu,
province or municipality. More concretely, if, for instance, the vast majority of the people of the absolute right to govern.3 Former Dean Vicente Sinco4 states that an essential quality of
Batanes rise publicly and take up arms against the Government for the purpose of removing sovereignty is legal omnipotence, viz.: "Legal theory establishes certain essential qualities
from the allegiance to the said Government or its laws, the territory of the Republic of the inherent in the nature of sovereignty. The first is legal omnipotence. This means that the
Philippines or any part thereof, or any body of land, naval, or other armed forces, or depriving sovereign is legally omnipotent and absolute in relation to other legal institutions. It has the
power to determine exclusively its legal competence. Its powers are original, not derivative. It is concede this assumption for as stressed above, courts have been sharply divided by this mind
the sole judge of what it should do at any given time."5Citing Barker,6 he adds that a more boggling issue. Given this schism, I do not see how we can derogate on the sovereignty of the
amplified definition of sovereignty is that of "a final power of final legal adjustment of all legal people by according more weight to the votes of the people of Sorsogon.
issues." The U.S. Supreme Court expressed the same thought in the landmark case of Yick Wo
v. Hopkins,7 where it held that ". . . sovereignty itself is, of course, not subject to law, for it is the Mr. Justice Davide warns that should the people of Batanes stage a rebellion, we cannot
author and source of law; but in our system, while sovereign powers are delegated to the prosecute them "because of the doctrine of people's sovereignty." With due respect, the analogy
agencies of government, sovereignty itself remains with the people, by whom and for whom all is not appropriate. In his hypothetical case, rebellion is concededly a crime, a violation of Article
government exists and acts." 134 of the Revised Penal Code, an offense against the sovereignty of our people. In the case at
bar, it cannot be held with certitude that the people of Sorsogon violated the law by voting for
In our Constitution, the people established a representative democracy as distinguished from a Frivaldo as governor. Frivaldo's name was in the list of candidates allowed by COMELEC to run
pure democracy. Justice Isagani Cruz explains:8 for governor. At that time too, Frivaldo was taking all steps to establish his Filipino citizenship.
And even our jurisprudence has not settled the issue when a candidate should possess the
xxx xxx xxx qualification of citizenship. Since the meaning of the law is arguable then and now, I cannot
imagine how it will be disastrous for the State if we tilt the balance in the case at bar in favor of
A republic is a representative government, a government run by and for the people. It is not a the people of Sorsogon.
pure democracy where the people govern themselves directly. The essence of republicanism is
representation and renovation, the selection by the citizenry of a corps of public functionaries In sum, I respectfully submit that the sovereign will of our people should be resolutory of the
who derive their mandate from the people and act on their behalf, serving for a limited period case at bar which is one of its kind, unprecedented in our political history. For three (3) times,
only, after which they are replaced or retained, at the option of their principal. Obviously, a Frivaldo ran as governor of the province of Sorsogon. For two (2) times, he was disqualified on
republican government is a responsible government whose officials hold and discharge their the ground of citizenship. The people of Sorsogon voted for him as their governor despite his
position as a public trust and shall, according to the Constitution, "at all times be accountable to disqualification. The people never waffled in their support for Frivaldo. In 1988, they gave him a
the people" they are sworn to serve. The purpose of a republican government it is almost winning margin of 27,000; in 1992, they gave him a winning spread of 57,000; in 1995, he
needless to state, is the promotion of the common welfare according to the will of the people posted a margin of 20,000. Clearly then, Frivaldo is the overwhelming choice of the people of
themselves. Sorsogon. In election cases, we should strive to align the will of the legislature as expressed in
its law with the will of the sovereign people as expressed in their ballots. For law to reign, it must
I appreciate the vigorous dissent of Mr. Justice Davide. I agree that sovereignty is indivisible but respect the will of the people. For in the eloquent prose of Mr. Justice Laurel, ". . . an
it need not always be exercised by the people together, all the time.9 For this reason, the enfranchised citizen is a particle of popular sovereignty and is the ultimate source of established
Constitution and our laws provide when the entire electorate or only some of them can elect authority."11 The choice of the governed on who shall be their governor merits the highest
those who make our laws and those who execute our laws. Thus, the entire electorate votes for consideration by all agencies of government. In cases where the sovereignty of the people is at
our senators but only our district electorates vote for our congressmen, only our provincial stake, we must not only be legally right but also politically correct. We cannot fail by making the
electorates vote for the members of our provincial boards, only our city electorates vote for our people succeed.
city councilors, and only our municipal electorates vote for our councilors. Also, the entire
electorate votes for our President and Vice-President but only our provincial electorates vote for DAVIDE, JR., J., dissenting:
our governors, only our city electorates vote for our mayors, and only our municipal electorates
vote for our mayors. By defining and delimiting the classes of voters who can exercise the After deliberating on the re-formulated issues and the conclusions reached by my distinguished
sovereignty of the people in a given election, it cannot be claimed that said sovereignty has colleague, Mr. Justice Artemio V. Panganiban, I find myself unable to join him.
been fragmented.
I
It is my respectful submission that the issue in the case at bar is not whether the people of
Sorsogon should be given the right to defy the law by allowing Frivaldo to sit as their governor. I agree with petitioner Lee that Frivaldo's repatriation was void, but not on the ground that
Rather, the issue is: whether the will of the voters of Sorsogon clearly choosing Frivaldo as President Corazon C. Aquino's 27 March 1987 memorandum "effectively repealed" P.D. No.
governor ought to be given a decisive value considering the uncertainty of the law on when a 725. In my view, the said memorandum only suspended the implementation of the latter decree
candidate ought to satisfy the qualification of citizenship. The uncertainty of law and by divesting the Special Committee on Naturalization of its authority to further act on grants of
jurisprudence, both here and abroad, on this legal issue cannot be denied. In the United citizenship under LOI No. 270, as amended, P.D. No. 836, as amended; P.D. No. 1379; and
States, 10 there are two (2) principal schools of thought on the matter. One espouses the view "any other related laws, orders, issuances and rules and regulations." A reading of the last
that a candidate must possess the qualifications for office at the time of his election. The other paragraph of the memorandum can lead to no other conclusion, thus:
ventures the view that the candidate should satisfy the qualifications at the time he assumes the
powers of the office. I am unaware of any Philippine decision that has squarely resolved this In view of the foregoing, you as Chairman and members of the Special Committee on
difficult question of law. The ponencia of Mr. Justice Panganiban adhered to the second school Naturalization, are hereby directed to cease and desist from undertaking any and all
of thought while Mr. Justice Davide dissents. proceedings within your functional area of responsibility, as defined in Letter of Instruction No.
270 dated April 11, 1975, as amended, Presidential Decree No. 836 dated December 3, 1975,
I emphasize the honest-to-goodness difference in interpreting our law on the matter for this is as amended, and Presidential Decree No. 1379 dated May 17, 1978, relative to the grant of
vital to dispel the fear of Mr. Justice Davide that my opinion can bring about ill effects to the citizenship under the said laws, and any other related laws, orders, issuances and rules and
State. Mr. Justice Davide's fear is based on the assumption that Frivaldo continues to be regulations. (emphasis supplied)
disqualified and we cannot allow him to sit as governor without transgressing the law. I do not
It is self-evident that the underscored clause can only refer to those related to LOI No. 270, P.D. (c) Candidates for the position of mayor or vice mayor of independent component cities,
No. 836, and P.D. No. 1379. There is no doubt in my mind that P.D. No. 725 is one such "related component cities, or municipalities must be at least twenty-one (21) years of age on election
law" as it involves the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship by repatriation and designates the day.
Special Committee on Naturalization created under LOI No. 270 to receive and act on (i.e.,
approve or disapprove) applications under the said decree. The power of President Aquino to (d) Candidates for the position of member of the sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang
suspend these issuances by virtue of the 27 March 1987 memorandum is beyond question bayan must be at least eighteen (18) years of age on election day.
considering that under Section 6, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution, she exercised legislative
power until the Congress established therein convened on the fourth Monday of July 1987. (e) Candidates for the position of punong barangay or member of the sangguniang barangay
must be at least eighteen (18) years of age on election day.
I disagree with the view expressed in the ponencia that the memorandum of 27 March 1987 was
merely a declaration of "executive policy," and not an exercise of legislative power. LOI No. 270, (f) Candidates for the sangguniang kabataan must be at least fifteen (15) years of age but not
P.D. No. 836, P.D. No. 1379 and "any other related laws," such as P.D. No. 725, were issued by more than twenty-one (21) years of age on election day (emphasis supplied)
President Ferdinand E. Marcos in the exercise of his legislative powers -- not executive power.
It is thus obvious that Section 39 refers to no other than the qualifications of candidates for
These laws relate to the acquisition (by naturalization) and reacquisition (by repatriation) of
elective local offices and their election. Hence, in no way may the section be construed to mean
Philippine citizenship, and in light of Sections 1(4) and 3, Article IV of the 1987 Constitution
that possession of qualifications should be reckoned from the commencement of the term of
(naturalization and reacquisition of Philippine citizenship shall be in accordance with law), it is
office of the elected candidate.
indubitable that these subjects are a matter of legislative prerogative. In the same vein, the
creation of the Special Committee on Naturalization by LOI No. 270 and the conferment of the For another, it is not at all true that Section 39 does not specify the time when the citizenship
power to accept and act on applications under P.D. No. 725 are clearly legislative acts. requirement must be possessed. I submit that the requirement must be satisfied, or that
Philippine citizenship must be possessed, not merely at the commencement of the term, but at
Accordingly, the revocation of the cease and desist order and the reactivation or revival of the
an earlier time, the latest being election day itself. Section 39 is not at all ambiguous nor
Committee can be done only by legislative fiat, i.e., by Congress, since the President had long
uncertain that it meant this to be, as one basic qualification of an elective local official is that he
lost his authority to exercise "legislative power." Considering that Congress has not seen it fit to
be "A REGISTERED VOTER IN THE BARANGAY, MUNICIPALITY, CITY OR PROVINCE . . .
do so, the President cannot, in the exercise of executive power, lift the cease and desist order
WHERE HE INTENDS TO VOTE." This simply means that he possesses all the qualifications to
nor reactivate/reconstitute/revive the Committee. A multo fortiori, the Committee cannot validly
exercise the right of suffrage. The fundamental qualification for the exercise of this sovereign
accept Frivaldo's application for repatriation and approve it.
right is the possession of Philippine citizenship. No less than the Constitution makes it the first
II qualification, as Section 1, Article V thereof provides:

Even assuming arguendo that Frivaldo's repatriation is valid, it did not "cure his lack of Sec. 1. Suffrage may be exercised by all citizens of the Philippines not otherwise disqualified by
citizenship." I depart from the view in the ponencia that Section 39 of the Local Government law, who are at least eighteen years of age, and who shall have resided in the Philippines for at
Code of 1991 does not specify the time when the citizenship requirement must be met, and that least one year and in the place wherein they propose to vote for at least six months immediately
being the case, then it suffices that citizenship be possessed upon commencement of the term preceding the election. . . . (emphasis supplied)
of the office involved; therefore, since Frivaldo "re-assumed" his Philippine citizenship at 2:00
And Section 117 of the Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines (B.P. Blg. 881) expressly
p.m. on 30 June 1995 and the term of office of Governor commenced at 12:00 noon of that day,
provides for the qualifications of a voter. Thus:
he had, therefore, complied with the citizenship requirement.
Sec. 117 Qualifications of a voter. -- Every citizen of the Philippines, not otherwise disqualified
In the first place, Section 39 actually prescribes the qualifications of elective local officials and
by law, eighteen years of age or over, who shall have resided in the Philippines for one year and
not those of an elected local official. These adjectives are not synonymous, as
in the city or municipality wherein he proposes to vote for at least six months immediately
the ponencia seems to suggest. The first refers to the nature of the office, which requires the
preceding the election, may be a registered voter. (emphasis supplied)
process of voting by the electorate involved; while the second refers to a victorious candidate for
an elective office. The section unquestionably refers to elective -- not elected -- local officials. It It is undisputed that this Court twice voided Frivaldo's election as Governor in the 1988 and 1992
falls under Title Two entitled ELECTIVE OFFICIALS; under Chapter 1 entitled Qualifications and elections on the ground that for lack of Philippine citizenship -- he being a naturalized citizen of
Election; and paragraph (a) thereof begins with the phrase "An elective local official," while the United States of America -- he was DISQUALIFIED to be elected as such and to serve the
paragraphs (b) to (f) thereof speak of candidates. It reads as follows: position (Frivaldo vs. Commission on Elections, 174 SCRA 245 [1989]; Republic of the
Philippines vs. De la Rosa, 232 SCRA 785 [1994]). This disqualification inexorably nullified
Sec. 39. Qualifications. -- (a) An elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines; a
Frivaldo's registration as a voter and declared it void ab initio. Our judgments therein were self-
registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or province or, in the case of a member of the
executory and no further act, e.g., a COMELEC order to cancel his registration as a voter or the
sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod, or sangguniang bayan, the district where
physical destruction of his voter's certificate, was necessary for the ineffectivity. Thus, he was
he intends to be elected; a resident therein for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the
never considered a registered voter for the elections of May 1992, and May 1995, as there is no
day of the election; and able to read and write Filipino or any other local language or dialect.
showing that Frivaldo registered anew as a voter for the latter elections. Even if he did -- in
(b) Candidates for the position of governor, vice governor or member of the sangguniang obvious defiance of his decreed disqualification -- this did not make him a Filipino citizen, hence
panlalawigan, or mayor, vice mayor or member of the sangguniang panlungsod of highly it was equally void ab initio. That he filed his certificate of candidacy for the 1995 elections and
urbanized cities must be at least twenty-three (23) years of age on election day. was even allowed to vote therein were of no moment. Neither act made him a Filipino citizen nor
nullified the judgments of this Court. On the contrary, said acts made a mockery of our
judgments. For the Court now to validate Frivaldo's registration as a voter despite the judgments Sec. 1. Grounds for Disqualification. Any candidate who does not possess all the qualifications
of disqualification is to modify the said judgments by making their effectivity and enforceability of a candidate as provided for by the Constitution or by existing law or who commits any act
dependent on a COMELEC order cancelling his registration as a voter, or on the physical declared by law to be grounds for disqualification may be disqualified from continuing as a
destruction of his certificate of registration as a voter which, of course, was never our intention. candidate.
Moreover, to sanction Frivaldo's registration as a voter would be to sacrifice substance in favor
of form (the piece of paper that is the book of voters or list of voters or voter's ID), and abet the xxx xxx xxx
COMELEC's incompetence in failing to cancel Frivaldo's registration and allowing him to vote.
Sec. 3. Period to File Petition. The petition shall be filed any day after the last day for filing of
The second reason in the ponencia as to why the citizenship disqualification should be reckoned certificates of candidacy but not later than the date of proclamation.
not from the date of the election nor the filing of the certificate of candidacy, but from the date of
proclamation, is that the only available remedy to question the ineligibility (or disloyalty) of a While the validity of this rule insofar as it concerns petitions for disqualification on the ground of
candidate is a petition for quo warranto which, under Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code, lack of all qualifications may be doubtful, its invalidity is not in issue here.
may be filed only within ten days from proclamation and not earlier.
In this connection, it would seem appropriate to take up the last issue grappled within
I beg to differ. the ponencia, viz., is Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code mandatory? The answer is
provided in Loong.
Clearly, quo warranto is not the sole remedy available to question a candidate's ineligibility for
public office. Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code allows the filing of a petition to deny due We also do not find merit in the contention of respondent Commission that in the light of the
course to or cancel the certificate of candidacy on the ground that any material representation provisions of Sections 6 and 7 of Rep. Act No. 6646, a petition to deny due course to or cancel a
contained therein, as required by Section 74, is false. Section 74, in turn, requires that the certificate of candidacy may be filed even beyond the 25-day period prescribed by Section 78 of
person filing the certificate of candidacy must state, inter alia, that he is eligible for the office, the Code, as long as it is filed within a reasonable time from the discovery of the ineligibility.
which means that he has all the qualifications (including, of course, fulfilling the citizenship
Sections 6 and 7 of Rep. Act No. 6646 are here re-quoted:
requirement) and none of the disqualifications as provided by law. The petition under Section 78
may be filed at any time not later than 25 days from the filing of the certificate of candidacy. The Sec. 6. Effect of Disqualification case. Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment
section reads in full as follows: to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for
any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified
Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. -- A verified petition
and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or
seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by any person
Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or protest and, upon
exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained therein as required under
motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the
Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days
suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.
from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after due notice
and hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election. Sec. 7. Petition to Deny Due Course To or Cancel a Certificate of Candidacy. The procedure
hereinabove provided shall apply to petitions to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of
This remedy was recognized in Loong vs. Commission on Elections (216 SCRA 760, 768
candidacy as provided in Section 78 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881.
[1992]), where this Court held:
It will be noted that nothing in Sections 6 or 7 modifies or alters the 25- day period prescribed by
Thus, if a person qualified to file a petition to disqualify a certain candidate fails to file the petition
Section 78 of the Code for filing the appropriate action to cancel a certificate of candidacy on
within the 25-day period Section 78 of the Code for whatever reasons, the election laws do not
account of any false representation made therein. On the contrary, said Section 7 affirms and
leave him completely helpless as he has another chance to raise the disqualification of the
reiterates Section 78 of the Code.
candidate by filing a petition for quo warranto within ten (10) days from the proclamation of the
results of the election, as provided under Section 253 of the Code. Section 1, Rule 21 of the We note that Section 6 refers only to the effects of a disqualification case which may be based
Comelec Rules of Procedure similarly provides that any voter contesting the election of any on grounds other than that provided under Section 78 of the Code. But Section 7 of Rep. Act No.
regional, provincial or city official on the ground of ineligibility or of disloyalty to the Republic of 6646 also makes the effects referred to in Section 6 applicable to disqualification cases filed
the Philippines may file a petition for quo warranto with the Electoral Contest Adjudication under Section 78 of the Code. Nowhere in Sections 6 and 7 of Rep. Act No. 6646 is mention
Department. The petition may be filed within ten (10) days from the date the respondent is made of the period within which these disqualification cases may be filed. This is because there
proclaimed (Section 2). are provisions in the Code which supply the periods within which a petition relating to
disqualification of candidates must be filed, such as Section 78, already discussed, and Section
Likewise, Rule 25 of the Revised COMELEC Rules of Procedure allows the filing of a petition for
253 on petitions for quo warranto.
disqualification on the ground of failure to possess all the qualifications of a candidate as
provided by the Constitution or by existing laws, "any day after the last day for filing of I then disagree with the asseveration in the ponencia that Section 78 is merely directory
certificates of candidacy but not later than the date of proclamation." Sections 1 and 3 thereof because Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 authorizes the COMELEC to try and decide petitions for
provide: disqualification even after elections. I submit that Section 6 refers to disqualifications under
Sections 12 and 68 of the Omnibus Election Code and consequently modifies Section 72
Rule 25 -- Disqualification of Candidates
thereof. As such, the proper court or the COMELEC are granted the authority to continue
hearing the case after the election, and during the pendency of the case, suspend the
proclamation of the victorious candidate, if the evidence against him is strong. Sections 12, 68, . . . may reacquire Philippine citizenship . . . by applying with the Special Committee on
and 72 of the Code provide: Naturalization created by Letter of Instruction No. 270, and, if their applications are approved,
taking the necessary oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, AFTER WHICH THEY
Sec. 12. Disqualifications. Any person who has been declared by competent authority insane or SHALL BE DEEMED TO HAVE REACQUIRED PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP. (emphasis and
incompetent, or has been sentenced by final judgment for subversion, insurrection, rebellion or capitalization supplied)
for any offense for which he has been sentenced to a penalty of more than eighteen months or
for a crime involving moral turpitude, shall be disqualified to be a candidate and to hold any Clearly then, the steps to reacquire Philippine citizenship by repatriation under the decree are:
office, unless he has been given plenary pardon or granted amnesty. (1) filing the application; (2) action by the committee; and (3) taking of the oath of allegiance if
the application is approved. It is only UPON TAKING THE OATH OF ALLEGIANCE that the
The disqualifications to be a candidate herein provided shall be deemed removed upon applicant is deemed ipso jure to have reacquired Philippine citizenship. If the decree had
declaration by competent authority that said insanity or incompetence had been removed or intended the oath taking to retroact to the date of the filing of the application, then it should not
after the expiration of a period of five years from his service of sentence, unless within the same have explicitly provided otherwise.
period he again becomes disqualified.
This theory in the ponencia likewise dilutes this Court's pronouncement in the first Frivaldo case
xxx xxx xxx that what reacquisition of Filipino citizenship requires is an act "formally rejecting [the] adopted
state and reaffirming . . . allegiance to the Philippines." That act meant nothing less than taking
Sec. 68. Disqualifications. Any candidate who, in an action or protest in which he is a party is of the oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines. If we now take this revision of
declared by final decision of a competent court guilty of, or found by the Commission of having doctrine to its logical end, then it would also mean that if Frivaldo had chosen and reacquired
(a) given money or other material consideration to influence, induce or corrupt the voters or Philippine citizenship by naturalization or through Congressional action, such would retroact to
public officials performing electoral functions; (b) committed acts of terrorism to enhance his the filing of the petition for naturalization or the bill granting him Philippine citizenship. This is a
candidacy; (c) spent in his election campaign an amount in excess of that allowed by this Code; proposition which both the first and second Frivaldo cases soundly rejected.
(d) solicited, received or made any contribution prohibited under Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 and
104; or (e) violated any of Sections 80, 83, 85, 86 and 261, paragraphs d, e, k, v, and cc, sub- The other reason adduced in the ponencia in support of the proposition that P.D. No. 725 can be
paragraph 6, shall be disqualified from continuing as a candidate, or if he has been elected, from given retroactive effect is its alleged curative or remedial nature.
holding the office. Any person who is a permanent resident of or an immigrant to a foreign
country shall not be qualified to run for any elective office under this Code, unless said person Again, I disagree. In the first place, by no stretch of legal hermeneutics may P.D. No. 725 be
has waived his status as permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country in accordance characterized as a curative or remedial statute:
with the residence requirement provided for in the election laws. (Sec. 25, 1971 EC)
Curative or remedial statutes are healing acts. They are remedial by curing defects and adding
Sec. 72. Effects of disqualification cases and priority. The Commission and the courts shall give to the means of enforcing existing obligations. The rule in regard to curative statutes is that if the
priority to cases of disqualification by reason of violation of this Act to the end that a final thing omitted or failed to be done, and which constitutes the defect sought to be removed or
decision shall be rendered not later than seven days before the election in which the made harmless, is something the legislature might have dispensed with by a previous statute, it
disqualification is sought. may do so by a subsequent one.

Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, Curative statutes are intended to supply defects, abridge superfluities in existing laws, and curb
and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. Nevertheless, if for any reason, a candidate is certain evils. They are intended to enable a person to carry into effect that which they have
not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and designed and intended, but has failed of expected legal consequence by reason of some
receives the winning number of votes in such election, his violation of the provisions of the statutory disability or irregularity in their own action. They make valid that which, before the
preceding sections shall not prevent his proclamation and assumption to office. enactment of the statute, was invalid. (RUBEN E. AGPALO, Statutory Construction, Second ed.
[1990], 270-271, citations omitted).
III
P.D. No. 725 provides for the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship lost through the marriage of
Still assuming that the repatriation is valid, I am not persuaded by the arguments in support of a Filipina to an alien and through naturalization in a foreign country of natural-born Filipino
the thesis that Frivaldo's repatriation may be given retroactive effect, as such goes against the citizens. It involves then the substantive, nay primordial, right of citizenship. To those for whom it
spirit and letter of P.D. No. 725. The spirit adheres to the principle that acquisition or re- is intended, it means, in reality, the acquisition of "a new right," as the ponencia cannot but
acquisition of Philippine citizenship is not a right, but a mere privilege. Before the advent of P.D. concede. Therefore, it may not be said to merely remedy or cure a defect considering that one
No. 725, only the following could apply for repatriation: (a) Army, Navy, or Air Corps deserters; who has lost Philippine citizenship does not have the right to reacquire it. As earlier stated, the
and (b) a woman who lost her citizenship by reason of her marriage to an alien after the death of Constitution provides that citizenship, once lost, may only be reacquired in the manner provided
her spouse (Section 2[2], C.A. No. 63). P.D. NO. 725 expanded this to include Filipino women by law. Moreover, it has also been observed that:
who lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens even before the death of their alien
husbands, or the termination of their marital status and to natural-born Filipino citizens who lost The idea is implicit from many of the cases that remedial statutes are statutes relating to
their Philippine citizenship but subsequently desired to reacquire the latter. procedure and not substantive rights. (Sutherland, Statutory Construction, Vol. 3, Third ed.
[1943], §5704 at 74, citations omitted).
Turning now to the letter of the law, P.D. No. 725 expressly provides that repatriation takes
effect only after taking the oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, thus:
If we grant for the sake of argument, however, that P.D. No. 725 is curative or remedial statute, VI
it would be an inexcusable error to give it a retroactive effect since it explicitly provides the date
of its effectivity. Thus: Finally, I find it in order to also express my view on the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Reynato
S. Puno. I am absolutely happy to join him in his statement that "[t]he sovereignty of our people
This Decree shall take effect immediately. is the primary postulate of the 1987 Constitution" and that the said Constitution is "more people-
oriented," "borne [as it is] out of the 1986 people power EDSA revolution." I would even go
Done in the city of Manila, this 5th day of June, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and further by saying that this Constitution is pro-God (Preamble), pro-people (Article II, Sections 1,
seventy five. 3, 4, 5, 9, 15, 16; Article XI, Section 1, Article XII, Sections 1, 6; Article XIII, Sections 1, 11, 15,
16, 18; Article XVI, Sections 5(2), 6), pro-Filipino (Article XII, Sections 1, 2, 10, 11, 12, 14; Article
Nevertheless, if the retroactivity is to relate only to the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship, XIV, Sections 1, 4(2), 13; Article XVI, Section 11), pro-poor (Article II, Sections 9, 10, 18, 21;
then nothing therein supports such theory, for as the decree itself unequivocally provides, it is Article XII, Sections 1, 2(3); Article XIII, Sections 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11, 13), pro-life (Article II,
only after taking the oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines that the applicant is Section 12), and pro-family (Article II, Section 12; Article XV).
DEEMED TO HAVE REACQUIRED PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP.
Nevertheless, I cannot be with him in carrying out the principle of sovereignty beyond what I
IV perceive to be the reasonable constitutional parameters. The doctrine of people's sovereignty is
founded on the principles of democracy and republicanism and refers exclusively to the
Assuming yet again, for the sake of argument, that taking the oath of allegiance retroacted to the
sovereignty of the people of the Philippines. Section 1 of Article II is quite clear on this, thus:
date of Frivaldo's application for repatriation, the same could not be said insofar as it concerned
the United States of America, of which he was a citizen. For under the laws of the United States Sec. 1. The Philippines is a democratic and republican State. Sovereignty resides in the people
of America, Frivaldo remained an American national until he renounced his citizenship and and all government authority emanates from them.
allegiance thereto at 2:00 p.m. on 30 June 1995, when he took his oath of allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines. Section 401 of the Nationality Act of 1940 of the United States of And the Preamble makes it clear when it solemnly opens it with a clause "We, the sovereign
America provides that a person who is a national of the United States of America, whether by Filipino people . . ." Thus, this sovereignty is an attribute of the Filipino people as one
birth or naturalization, loses his nationality by, inter alia, "(b) Taking an oath or making an people, one body.
affirmation or other formal declaration of allegiance to a foreign state" (SIDNEY KANSAS, U.S.
Immigration Exclusion and Deportation and Citizenship of the United States of America, Third That sovereign power of the Filipino people cannot be fragmentized by looking at it as the
ed., [1948] 341-342). It follows then that on election day and until the hour of the supreme authority of the people of any of the political subdivisions to determine their own
commencement of the term for which he was elected - noon of 30 June 1995 as per Section 43 destiny; neither can we convert and treat every fragment as the whole. In such a case, this Court
of the Local Government Code - Frivaldo possessed dual citizenship, viz., (a) as an American would provide the formula for the division and destruction of the State and render the
citizen; and (b) as a Filipino citizen through the adoption of the theory that the effects of his Government ineffective and inutile. To illustrate the evil, we may consider the enforcement of
taking the oath of allegiance were retrospective. Hence, he was disqualified to run for Governor laws or the pursuit of a national policy by the executive branch of the government, or the
for yet another reason: possession of dual citizenship, in accordance with Section 40 (d) of the execution of a judgment by the courts. If these are opposed by the overwhelming majority of the
Local Government Code. people of a certain province, or even a municipality, it would necessarily follow that the law,
national policy, or judgment must not be enforced, implemented, or executed in the said
V province or municipality. More concretely, if, for instance, the vast majority of the people of
Batanes rise publicly and take up arms against the Government for the purpose of removing
The assertion in the ponencia that Frivaldo may be considered STATELESS on the basis of his from the allegiance to the said Government or its laws, the territory of the Republic of the
claim that he "had long renounced and had long abandoned his American citizenship - long Philippines or any part thereof, or any body of land, naval, or other armed forces, or depriving
before May 8, 1985" - is untenable, for the following reasons: first, it is based on Frivaldo's the Chief Executive or the Legislature, wholly or partially, of any of their powers or prerogatives,
unproven, self-serving allegation; second, informal renunciation or abandonment is not a ground then those who did so -- and which are composed of the vast majority of the people of Batanes
to lose American citizenship; and third, simply put, never did the status of a STATELESS person -- a political subdivision -- cannot be prosecuted for or be held guilty of rebellion in violation of
attach to Frivaldo. Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code because of the doctrine of peoples' sovereignty. Indeed,
the expansion of the doctrine of sovereignty by investing upon the people of a mere political
Statelessness may be either de jure, which is the status of individuals stripped of their nationality
subdivision that which the Constitution places in the entire Filipino people, may be disastrous to
by their former government without having an opportunity to acquire another; or de facto, which
the Nation.
is the status of individuals possessed of a nationality whose country does not give them
protection outside their own country, and who are commonly, albeit imprecisely, referred to as So it is in this case if we follow the thesis in the concurring opinion. Thus, simply because
refugees (JORGE R. COQUIA, et al., Conflict of Laws Cases, Materials and Comments, 1995 Frivaldo had obtained a margin of 20,000 votes over his closest rival, Lee, i.e., a vast majority of
ed., 290). the voters of Sorsogon had expressed their sovereign will for the former, then this Court must
yield to that will and must, therefore, allow to be set aside, for Frivaldo, not just the laws on
Specifically, under Chapter 1, Article 1 of the United Nations Convention Regarding the Status of
qualifications of candidates and elective officials and naturalization and reacquisition of
Stateless Persons (Philippine Treaty Series, Compiled and Annotated by Haydee B. Yorac, vol.
Philippine citizenship, but even the final and binding decisions of this Court affecting him.
III, 363), a stateless person is defined as "a person who is not considered as a national by any
State under the operation of its law." However, it has not been shown that the United States of This Court must be the first to uphold the Rule of Law. I vote then to DISMISS G.R. No. 120295
America ever ceased to consider Frivaldo its national at any time before he took his oath of and GRANT G.R. No. 123755.
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on 30 June 1995.
 JESUS J. GONZALE[Z], of legal age, Filipino citizen, married to Cristina D. Gonzale[z], residing
at No. 10 2nd Ave., Crame, Quezon City, hereinafter referred to as the VENDOR;

in favor of

FRANCISCO D. (sic) NUNGA, JR., of legal age, single, residing at Poblacion, Masantol,

Pampanga[,] hereinafter referred to as the "PURCHASER";

G.R. No. 178306, December 18, 2008 WITNESSETH:

FRANCISCO R. NUNGA, JR. and VICTOR D. NUNGA, petitioners,  That the VENDOR is the absolute registered owner of several shares of stocks of the RURAL
vs. BANK OF APALIT, INC. located at Apalit, Pampanga, more particularly described as follows:
FRANCISCO N. NUNGA III, respondent.
No. of Shares
Stock Cert. No. Date of Issue Journal Folio
DECISION Represented

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.: 5 250 May, 1978 1

Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court 36 122 Jan., 1991 1
assailing the Decision1dated 31 January 2007 and Resolution2 dated 4 June 2007 of the Court
105 264 Feb., 1991 5
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 78424. The appellate court, in its assailed decision, reversed the
Decision3 dated 25 October 2002 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of the City of San Fernando, 152 487 Nov., 1993 7
Pampanga, Branch 42, in Commercial Case No. 018, which ordered the registration of the
transfer of ownership of the disputed shares of stock in the Rural Bank of Apalit, Inc. (RBA) in 166 8 Feb., 1994 7
favor of petitioners; and in its resolution, denied the Motion for Reconsideration of the
aforementioned decision. 181 525 July, 1994 8

Presented hereunder are the factual antecedents of the case. 213 336    

On 30 January 1996, the RBA conducted its Annual Stockholders’ Meeting at its principal office That the VENDOR has offered to sell the abovestated (sic) shares of stocks and the
in San Vicente, Apalit, Pampanga. Attending the said meeting were stockholders representing PURCHASER has agreed to purchase the same for a total consideration of P200,000;
28,150 out of the 35,956 total outstanding shares of stock of RBA.4 Petitioner Francisco R.
Nunga, Jr. (Francisco Jr.), his son petitioner Victor D. Nunga (Victor), and his nephew That it is hereby agreed that out of the total consideration or contract price, the purchaser will
respondent Francisco N. Nunga III (Francisco III) were among the stockholders of RBA. pay the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00), receipt of which is herein
However, petitioner Francisco Jr. was not present at the meeting, as he was then in the United acknowledged by the purchaser, at the date and place below stated and the remaining balance
States of America where he is a naturalized citizen. of P150,000 will be paid in full on February, (sic) 28, 1996;

Quorum having been established at the meeting, the stockholders proceeded with the election of That it is further agreed that the VENDOR will execute an authorization in favor of the herein
the RBA Board of Directors to serve for the fiscal year 1996. Francisco III was voted the purchaser or his representative, Victor D. Nunga[,] to retrieve all the corresponding Stocks (sic)
Chairman of the Board; with Ma. Elena Rueda, Ma. Rosario Elena Nacario, Cecilia Viray and Certificates as above indicated from the Apalit Rural Bank, Inc.
Dwight Nunga, the Members. In the same meeting, stockholder Jesus Gonzalez (Gonzalez)
WHEREFORE, for and in consideration of the total amount of P200,000 (sic) receipt in part of
made known his intention to sell his shareholdings.
which is herein acknowledged in the amount of P50,000.00, the vendor hereby agrees to sell,
Victor, thereafter, informed his father, Francisco Jr., of Gonzalez’s intention to sell his shares. cede and transfer all the above stated shares of stocks to the PURCHASER, his heirs[,]
Francisco Jr. then instructed Victor to inquire from Gonzalez the terms of the sale. After a series successors, and assigns, absolutely free from any encumbrance and lien whatsoever.
of negotiations, Gonzalez ultimately agreed to sell his shares of stock to Francisco Jr.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my signature this 19th day of FEBRUARY, (sic)
On 19 February 1996, Gonzalez executed a Contract to Sell5 in favor of Francisco Jr., which 1996, at Quezon City, Philippines.
pertinently provided:
(signed)
CONTRACT TO SELL
JESUS J. GONZALES
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS: Vendor

This CONTRACT TO SELL, executed this 19th day of February, 1996, at Quezon City, by: On even date, Victor gave the initial payment of P50,000.00 to Gonzalez, who duly
acknowledged the same.6 In exchange, Gonzalez handed Victor RBA Stock Certificates No.
105, No. 152 and No. 166. As to the four other certificates that were in the possession of the
RBA, Gonzalez issued a letter7 addressed to Isabel Firme (Firme), the RBA Corporate The next day, on 28 February 1996, Francisco Jr. arrived from the United States of America. He
Secretary, which instructed the latter to turn over to Victor the remaining stock certificates in and Victor then promptly proceeded to the residence of Gonzalez in order to pay the balance
Gonzalez’s name. Upon being presented with Gonzalez’s letter, Firme gave Victor Stock of P150,000.00 of the purchase price stated in their Contract to Sell with Gonzalez. Gonzalez,
Certificate No. 181, but alleged that Stock Certificates No. 5 and No. 36 could no longer be however, informed them that he already sold his shares of stock to Francisco III.12 After
located in the files of RBA. Firme advised Victor to merely reconstitute the missing stock discussing the matter, Gonzalez was somehow convinced to accept the balance of the purchase
certificates.8 A reading of the said Contract to Sell would reveal, however, that the same was price and sign his name at the dorsal portion of the stock certificates to endorse the same to
only notarized on 28 February 1996. Francisco Jr. Gonzalez also executed a Deed of Absolute Sale13 in favor of Francisco Jr., which
states:
Before Francisco Jr. and Victor could pay the balance of the contract price for Gonzalez’s RBA
shares of stock, Gonzalez entered into another contract involving the very same shares. It would DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE
appear that on 27 February 1996, Gonzalez executed a Deed of Assignment9 of his RBA shares
of stock in favor of Francisco III, the relevant terms of which recite: KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:

DEED OF ASSIGNMENT This DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE, executed this 28th day of February, 1996, at SAN JUAN,
M.M. by:
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:
JESUS J. GONZALE[Z], of legal age, Filipino citizen, married to Cristina D. Gonzale[z], residing
For value (sic) consideration received, the undersigned ASSIGNOR JESUS GONZALE[Z], of at No. 10 2nd Ave., Crame, Quezon City, hereinafter referred to as the VENDOR;
legal age, Filipino and resident of #10 2ND AVENUE, CUBAO, QUEZON CITY, METRO
MANILA hereby sells, assigns and transfers unto FRANCISCO N. NUNGA III (AS ASSIGNEE), in favor of
Filipino, of legal age and with postal address at 1122 Alhambra St., Ermita 1000 Metro Manila,
his assigns and successors, all their rights, titles and interests to the following shares of stocks FRANCISCO R. NUNGA, JR., of legal age, married, residing at Poblacion, Masantol,
owned by the ASSIGNOR in Apalit Rural Bank, Inc., with par value of one hundred pesos only Pampanga[,] hereinafter referred to as the "PURCHASER"[;]
(P100.00) per share, free from all liens and encumbrances.
WITNESSETH:
Date SC. No. No. of Shares Amount That the VENDOR is the absolute registered owner of several shares of stocks of the RURAL
BANK OF APALIT, INC. located at Apalit, Pampanga, more particularly described as follows:
May 24, 1969 4 (sic) 250 P 25,000.00

January 02, 1975 36 122 No. of Shares

Stock12,200.00
Cert. No. Date of Issue Journal Folio No.
Represented
February 19, 1991 105 264 26,400.00
250 May, 1978 1
November 10, 1993 152 487 48,700.00
122 Jan., 1991 1
February 22, 1994 166 8 800.00
264 Feb., 1991 5
July 25, 1994 181 525 52,500.00
487 Nov., 1993 7
February 2, 1996 213 336 33,600.00
8 Feb., 1994 7
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the ASSIGNOR have (sic) cause (sic) these presents to be signed
at Quezon City, this 27 day of February, 1996. 525 July, 1994 8

336    
(signed)
That Stock Certificate Nos. 5 and 36 respectively representing 250 and 122 shares of the Rural
JESUS J. GONZALE[Z]
Bank of Apalit[,] Inc. were lost and is (sic) currently in the process of reconstitution;
Assignor
That the VENDOR has offered to sell the abovestated (sic) shares of stocks and the
At the same time the afore-quoted Deed was executed, Francisco III paid in full the agreed
PURCHASER has agreed to purchase the same.
purchase price of P300,000.00 using a BPI (Bank of the Philippine Islands) Family Bank Check
No. 0347505 issued in favor of Gonzalez. An acknowledgment receipt signed by Gonzalez and WHEREFORE, for and in consideration of the total amount of TWO HUNDRED THOUSAND
witnessed by his wife Cristina D. Gonzalez evidenced the payment.10 Since the stock PESOS (P200,000.00), receipt of which in full is herein acknowledged, the VENDOR hereby
certificates covering the shares were already in Victor’s possession, Gonzalez immediately sells, cedes and transfers all the above stated shares of stocks to the PURCHASER, his heirs,
wrote Victor a letter,11 demanding that Victor hand over the said stock certificates to Francisco successors, and assigns, absolutely free from any encumbrance and lien whatsoever.
III, the supposed new owner of the shares.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my signature this 28 day of FEB (sic), 1996, at Francisco Jr. and Victor subsequently filed a Motion to Resolve their Formal Offer of Exhibits,
SAN JUAN, MM, Philippines. which the SEC was not able to act upon. In an Order25 dated 30 April 2002, the RTC admitted
the formal offers of evidence in both cases.
(signed)
On 25 October 2002,26 the RTC promulgated its Decision. With respect to Commercial Case
JESUS J. GONZALE[Z] No. 001, Victor’s Petition, the RTC ruled:
Vendor
The Court, after a careful study on the evidences on record finds that [herein petitioner Victor]
Incidentally, on that same day, Francisco III delivered to Firme the Deed of Assignment which failed to substantiate the allegation in the petition. [Victor] failed to controvert the documentary
Gonzalez executed in his favor, and a copy of Gonzalez’s letter to Victor dated 27 February evidences presented by [herein respondent Francisco III] to wit: Minutes of the Stockholders
1996 demanding the latter to surrender the stock certificates in his possession to Francisco III. Meeting, showing the number of shares present in person or in proxy[;] written Proxy in favor of
Accordingly, on 1 March 1996, Firme wrote Victor a letter14requesting that the latter Dwight N. Nunga in (sic) behalf of deceased Teodorico R. Nunga by virtue of the Extrajudicial
immediately comply with the enclosed 27 February 1996 letter of Gonzalez. Settlement of estate in (sic) behalf of Carmencita Noel Nunga proxy executed by Ma. Del
Carmen N. Leveriza in her capacity as the Judicial Administratrix duly appointed by the RTC
Victor refused to comply with Firme’s request and instead demanded that the sale of shares of Branch 60, Makati[,] Metro Manila in Special Proceedings No. M-146127; Affidavit of respondent
stock by Gonzalez in favor of Francisco Jr. on 28 February 1996 be entered into the Corporate Isabel C. Firme stating thereat the fact that the certificate of stock delivered for registration in the
Book of Transfer of RBA. Firme, in turn, rejected Victor’s demand, alleging that Francisco III Corporate Transfer Book were mere xerox copies thus, the refusal. Thus further, proved
already bought Gonzalez’s shares.15 [Victor’s] lack of cause of action against [Francisco III] and as a result of which damages on the
part of [Francisco III] and Isabel C. Firme who were constrained to hire the services of their
Consequently, on 14 March 1996, Victor filed a Petition16 with the Securities and Exchange
counsel to protect their right (sic). (Emphasis ours.)
Commission (SEC) against Francisco III and Firme, which was docketed as SEC Case No. 03-
96-5288. Victor prayed that the SEC declare null and void the Stockholders’ Meeting held on 30 As regards Commercial Case No. 018,28 Francisco III’s Complaint, the RTC decreed:
January 1996 for lack of the required majority quorum; as well as the votes cast for the shares of
the deceased stockholders, namely, Teodorico R. Nunga, Carmencita N. Nunga and Jesus The Court[,] after a careful study on the aforementioned evidences (sic) on record[,] finds and
Enrico N. Nunga. Victor additionally requested that the transfer of Gonzalez’s RBA holds that [herein petitioner Francisco Jr.] has a better right over the subject shares considering
shareholdings to Francisco Jr. be annotated on the RBA Corporate Transfer Book and new that the Contract to Sell was executed prior to the Deed of Assignment presented by the [herein
stock certificates be issued in favor of Francisco Jr. Victor finally pleaded that Francisco III and respondent Francisco III]. The Court gleaned also from the evidences (sic) that the Deed of
Firme be ordered to jointly pay him P50,000.00 as attorney’s fees, damages and litigation Assignment was executed in bad faith as [Francisco III] is aware of the transaction between
expenses. [herein petitioner Victor] in (sic) behalf of his father and [Gonzalez], thus, the conclusion that the
Deed of Assignment was executed with malice. The Contract to Sell may not be a public
On the same date, Francisco III likewise filed a Complaint17 against Gonzalez, Francisco Jr., instrument29 but being a consensual contract it is, therefore, valid there being a meeting of the
and Victor before the SEC, which was docketed as SEC Case No. 03-96-5292. Francisco III mind (sic) between the parties. Further, there being no contention on (sic) the contrary, on the
sought the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) against Francisco Jr. and Victor, validity of the Deed of Absolute Sale interposed by [Gonzalez] coupled with the proof of full
who were allegedly conspiring to oust him and the other members of the RBA Board of payment and the endorsement of the Stock Certificate at the back by the owner[,] which is the
Directors. Francisco III also prayed, inter alia, for judgment ordering (a) Victor to surrender only operative act of valid transfer of shares of stock certificate provided for by law and
Gonzalez’s stock certificates in order that the same may be transferred to Francisco III’s name; jurisprudence, clearly convinced the Court that the latter honored the transaction between him
and (b) Francisco Jr. and Victor to desist from attempting to register the purported sale by and [Victor] in (sic) behalf of his father [Francisco Jr.] and[,] to bind third parties, the fact of
Gonzales of his RBA shares of stock to Francisco Jr., who had already become a naturalized transfer should be registered with the transfer book of the corporation.
American citizen and was, thus, disqualified from owning shares in RBA.
xxxx
Francisco III and Firme filed their joint Answer18 in SEC Case No. 03-96-5288, while Francisco
Jr. and Victor filed their Answer19 in SEC Case No. 03-96-5292. Gonzalez, however, was Further, with respect to the issue on the citizenship of [Francisco Jr.], not being qualified to own
considered in default in both SEC cases for failure to file his answers despite notice. such share (sic), the Court is inclined to give credence on (sic) the contention of the latter[,] it
being supported by R.A. 8179[,] known as "An Act to Further Liberalize Foreign Investment,["] to
Eventually, Francisco Jr.20 and Victor filed a Motion for Consolidation21 of the two cases wit:
pending before the SEC, alleging that they involved common questions of fact and law, which
required the presentation of similar evidence. Said Motion was granted in an Order22 dated 30 "SEC. 9. Investment Rights of Former Natural-born Filipinos. – For purposes of this Act, former
September 1996. Thereafter, SEC Cases No. 03-96-5288 and No. 03-96-5292 were jointly natural born citizens of the Philippines shall have the same investment rights of a Filipino citizen
heard. in Cooperatives under Republic Act No. 6938, Rural Banks under Republic Act No. 7353, Thrift
Banks and Private Development Banks under Republic Act No. 7906, and Financing Companies
After the parties submitted their respective Offers of Evidence, but before the SEC could rule on under Republic Act No. 5980."
the same, the cases were eventually turned over to the RTC pursuant to Administrative Circular
AM No. 00-11-0323 of the Supreme Court dated 21 November 2000.24 Furthermore, insofar as (sic) [Gonzalez], the same was (sic) considered as in default for failure
to appear and participate despite notice. (Emphasis ours.)
In the RTC, SEC Cases No. 03-96-5288 and No. 03-96-5292 were docketed as Commercial
Cases No. 001 and No. 018, respectively. In the end, the RTC disposed of the two cases in this wise:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered in Commercial Case No. shares of stock of JESUS [Gonzalez] to FRANCISCO, JR., a naturalized American citizen, were
001 ordering the dismissal of the Petition filed by [herein petitioner Victor] against [herein made in patent violation of Republic Act No. 7353. Considering that Republic Act No. 7353 did
respondent Francisco III] and Isabel C. Firme. not contain any provision authorizing the validity of the sale and transfer of the shares of stock to
a foreigner, specifically to a former natural-born citizen of the Philippines, the same should be
Insofar as Commercial Case No. 018[,] judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the [herein deemed null and void pursuant to Article 5 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, which reads:
petitioners Victor and Francisco Jr.] and against [Francisco III] ordering the following:
"ART. 5. Acts executed against the provisions of mandatory or prohibitory laws shall be void,
1) Ordering the Corporate Secretary of the Rural Bank of Apalit, Inc, (sic) to register the fact of except when the law itself authorizes their validity."
the transfer of ownership in favor of [Francisco Jr.] and to cancel Stock certificate (sic) in the
name of Jesus [Gonzalez] and to issue a new one (sic) in the name of [Francisco Jr.] upon x x x The fact that Republic Act No. 8179 expressly granted to former natural-born citizens of the
presentation of Stock Certificate Nos. 105, 152, 166, 181, 213, 5 and 36 duly endorsed by Jesus Philippines investment rights similar to those of citizens of the Philippines bolsters the view that
[Gonzalez]; Republic Act No. 7353 indeed prohibited foreign nationals from owning shares of stock in rural
banks. Had it been necessarily implied from the provisions of Republic Act No. 7353 that foreign
2) The [respondent Francisco III] to pay the [petitioners Victor and Francisco Jr.] the amount nationals could own shares of stock in rural banks, the legislature would not have wasted time
of P100,000.00 [for] moral damages[;] and effort in inserting a new provision granting to former natural-born citizens of the Philippines
equal investment rights in Republic Act No. 8179.
3) The amount of P100,000.00 [for] exemplary damages[;]
Furthermore, there is no merit in the assertion of FRANCISCO JR. and VICTOR that Republic
4) The amount of P50,000.00 [for] attorneys (sic) fees and the cost of suit.30 Act No. 8179 should be given a retroactive effect in accordance with the following rule:
Francisco III filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration31 of the afore-quoted Decision, but it was "The principle that a new law shall not have retroactive effect only governs rights arising from
denied by the RTC in an Order32 dated 31 January 2003. Thus, Francisco III filed with the RTC acts done under the rule of the former law; but if a right be declared for the first time by a new
a Notice of Appeal.33 His appeal before the Court of Appeals was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. law it shall take effect from the time of such declaration, even though it has arisen from acts
78424. subject to the former laws, provided that it does not prejudice another acquired right of the same
origin." x x x.
Before the Court of Appeals, Francisco III argued that the RTC erred in: (1) ruling that Francisco
Jr. had a better right over the disputed shares of stock, considering that the prior contract which Republic Act No. 8179 cannot be applied retroactively insofar as the instant case is concerned,
he had entered into with Gonzalez was a mere contract to sell; (2) finding that the Deed of as its application would prejudice the (sic) FRANCISCO III who had acquired vested right over
Assignment in Francisco III’s favor was executed in bad faith, inasmuch as it was not supported the shares of stock prior to the effectivity of the said law. Such right was vested to him when the
by any of the evidence presented by all the parties; and (3) giving retroactive effect to Republic Deed of Assignment was executed by Jesus in his favor on February 27, 1996. Undoubtedly,
Act No. 8179,34 which grants former natural born citizens (such as Francisco Jr.) equal FRANCISCO III had a better right over the shares of stock of JESUS inasmuch as the validity of
investment rights in rural banks of the Philippines as Philippine citizens. In relation to his third the Deed of Assignment was not affected despite the prior execution of the Contract to Sell in
assignment of error, Francisco III pointed out that Republic Act No. 8179 took effect only on 16 favor of FRANCISCO JR. on February 19, 1996. As previously adverted to, the said Contract, as
April 1996, after Francisco Jr. entered into the questionable contracts with Gonzalez; hence, the well as the Deed of Absolute Sale and the subsequent transfer of the shares of stock to
said statute cannot benefit Francisco Jr. FRANCISCO JR., was null and void for violating a mandatory provision of Republic Act No.
7353. x x x.35
On 31 January 2007, the Court of Appeals rendered its assailed Decision favoring Francisco III.
It held that Francisco Jr. cannot invoke the provisions of Republic Act No. 8179 based on the The Court of Appeals, however, decided to award Francisco III only attorney’s fees and cost of
following ratiocination: suit, but not moral and exemplary damages:
In the instant case, there is nothing in Republic Act No. 8179 [An Act to Further Liberalize We hold that FRANCISCO III is not entitled to moral damages. FRANCISCO III made no
Foreign Investment] which provides that it should retroact to the date of effectivity of Republic mention in his Complaint and during the hearing that he sustained mental anguish, serious
Act No. 7353 [The Rural Banks Act of 1992]. Neither is it necessarily implied from Republic Act anxiety, wounded feelings and other emotional and mental sufferings by reason of the double
No. 8179 that it or any of its provisions should be given a retroactive effect. On the contrary, sale. x x x.
there is an express provision in Republic Act No. 8179 that it "shall take effect fifteen (15) days
after publication in two (2) newspapers of general circulation in the Philippines." Being crystal Likewise, FRANCISCO III is not entitled to exemplary damages. x x x In the instant case,
clear on its prospective application, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without FRANCISCO III failed to sufficiently prove his entitlement to moral, temperate or compensatory
further interpretation (BPI Leasing Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 416 SCRA 4, 13 [2003]). damages. Hence, his claim for exemplary damages must similarly fail.
Republic Act No. 8179 was published on March 31, 1996 at the Manila Times and Malaya;
hence, it took effect on April 15, 1996. x x x. However, as to his claim for attorney’s fees and cost of suit, We find it to be tenable as the
records of the case clearly reveal that FRANCISCO III was compelled to litigate or to incur
Republic Act No. 7353 specifically states that "the capital stock of any rural bank shall be fully expenses to protect his interest because of the double sale. x x x. Under the circumstances
owned and held directly or indirectly by citizens of the Philippines xxx." It bears stressing that the obtaining in the instant case, We deem that the award of P20,000.00 as attorney’s fees is
use of the word "shall" alone, applying the rule on statutory construction, already underscores reasonable.36
the mandatory nature of the law, and hence; (sic) requires adherence thereto. xxx Therefore, it
is Our considered view that the sale and the subsequent transfer on February 28, 1996 of the The fallo of the Court of Appeals Decision thus reads:
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the Decision dated October 25, 2002 of Assignment between Francisco III and Gonzalez did not confer upon Francisco III a vested
Branch 42 of the Regional Trial Court of San Fernando, Pampanga with respect to Commercial interest that could be impaired by the retroactive application of Republic Act No. 8179. The Deed
Case No. 018 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. A new one is hereby was not only executed later in time, but the check issued for its payment was also never
rendered ORDERING the following: encashed. There was, therefore, a total absence of consideration, making the said contract
between Francisco III and Gonzalez inexistent.
1) Victor Nunga to surrender the stock certificates of Jesus Gonzalez to the Corporate Secretary
of Rural Bank of Apalit, Inc.; The Court finds the Petition devoid of merit.

2) [T]he Corporate Secretary of Rural Bank of Apalit, Inc. to register the assignment of shares of As the Court of Appeals declared, Francisco Jr. was disqualified from acquiring Gonzalez’s
stock in favor of Francisco Nunga III, to cancel the stock certificates of Jesus Gonzale[z], and to shares of stock in RBA. The argument of Francisco Jr. and Victor that there was no specific
issue new ones in the name of Francisco Nunga III; and, provision in Republic Act No. 7353 which prohibited the transfer of rural bank shares to
individuals who were not Philippine citizens or declared such transfer void, is both erroneous
3) Jesus Gonzale[z], Francisco Nunga, Jr., and Victor Nunga to pay, jointly and severally, the and unfounded.
sum of P20,000.00 as attorney’s fees, plus the cost of suit.37
Section 4 of Republic Act No. 7353 explicitly provides:
Francisco Jr. and Victor, together with Gonzalez, filed a Motion for Reconsideration38 of the
foregoing Decision. Their Motion, however, was denied by the Court of Appeals in its assailed Section 4. x x x With exception of shareholdings of corporations organized primarily to hold
Resolution dated 4 June 2007. equities in rural banks as provided for under Section 12-C of Republic Act 337, as amended,
and of Filipino-controlled domestic banks, the capital stock of any rural bank shall be fully owned
Refusing to concede, Francisco Jr. and Victor filed the instant Petition,39 which they anchor on and held directly or indirectly by citizens of the Philippines or corporations, associations or
the following assignment of errors: cooperatives qualified under Philippine laws to own and hold such capital stock: x x x.
(Emphasis ours.)
I.
Otherwise stated, the afore-quoted provision categorically provides that only citizens of the
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DECLARING THE SALE OF THE Philippines can own and hold, directly or indirectly, the capital stock of a rural bank, subject only
SHARES OF STOCK OF GONZALE[Z] TO FRANCISCO JR., NULL AND VOID AB INITIO ON to the exception also clearly stated in the same provision. This was the very interpretation of
THE BASIS OF THE ALLEGED DISQUALIFICATION OF FRANCISCO JR. UNDER REPUBLIC Section 4 of Republic Act No. 7353 made by this Court in Bulos, Jr. v. Yasuma,40 on the basis
ACT NO. 7353? of which the Court disqualified therein respondent Yasuma, a foreigner, from owning capital
stock in the Rural Bank of Parañaque. In the instant case, it is undisputed that when Gonzalez
II.
executed the Contract to Sell and the Deed of Absolute Sale covering his RBA shares of stock in
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT favor of Francisco Jr., the latter was already a naturalized citizen of the United States of
FRANCISCO III HAS A VESTED RIGHT TO THE SHARES OF STOCK OF GONZALE[Z], America. Consequently, the acquisition by Francisco Jr. of the disputed RBA shares by virtue of
WHICH WOULD BE IMPAIRED BY THE RETROACTIVE APPLICATION OF REPUBLIC ACT the foregoing contracts is a violation of the clear and mandatory dictum of Republic Act No.
NO. 8179? 7353, which the Court cannot countenance.

III. Even the subsequent enactment of Republic Act No. 8179 cannot benefit Francisco Jr. It is true
that under the Civil Code of the Philippines, laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED [IN] AWARDING contrary is provided.41 But there are settled exceptions to this general rule, such as when the
DAMAGES TO FRANCISCO III AND WITHDRAWING THE AWARD OF NOMINAL DAMAGES statute is CURATIVE or REMEDIAL in nature, or when it CREATES NEW RIGHTS.42 Francisco
TO PETITIONERS BY THE TRIAL COURT? Jr. and Victor assert that, as an exception to the cardinal rule of prospective application of laws,
Republic Act No. 8179 may be retroactively applied, since it creates for the first time a
Essentially, the fundamental issue that this Court is called upon to resolve is who among the substantive right in favor of natural-born citizens of the Philippines. Francisco Jr. and Victor,
parties to this case has a better right to the disputed RBA shares of stock. however, overlooked the vital exception to the exception. While it is true that a law creating new
rights may be given retroactive effect, the same can only be made possible if the new right does
Francisco Jr. and Victor contend that the consummated sale of the RBA shares of stock by not prejudice or impair any vested right.43
Gonzalez to Francisco Jr. gives the latter a superior right over the same, since the transaction
complied with all the elements of a valid sale. Contrary to the ruling of the Court of Appeals, The Court upholds the finding of the Court of Appeals that Republic Act No. 8179 cannot be
Francisco Jr. and Victor claim that there was no provision in Republic Act No. 7353, prior to its applied retroactively to the present case, as to do so would prejudice the vested rights of
amendment, which explicitly prohibited any transfer of shares to individuals who were not Francisco III to the disputed RBA shares of stock. Francisco III, who is undeniably a citizen of
Philippine citizens, or which declared such a transfer void. Hence, there was an implied the Philippines, and who is fully qualified to own shares of stock in a Philippine rural bank, had
recognition by the legislature that to declare the nullity of such acts would be more acquired vested rights to the disputed RBA shares of stock by virtue of the Deed of Assignment
disadvantageous and harmful to the purposes of the law. Moreover, Francisco Jr. and Victor executed in his favor by Gonzalez.
contend that the passage of Republic Act No. 8179, An Act to Further Liberalize Foreign
Investment, cured whatever legal infirmity there may have been in the purchase by Francisco Jr. It would not matter that Gonzalez executed the Contract to Sell in favor of Francisco Jr. prior to
of the RBA shares of stock from Gonzalez. As Republic Act No. 8179 expressly creates and the Deed of Assignment in favor of Francisco III. As established in the previous discussion, the
declares for the first time a substantive right, then it may be given retroactive effect. The Deed of Contract to Sell between Gonzalez and Francisco Jr. was void and without force and effect for
being contrary to law. It intended to effect a transfer, which was prohibited by Republic Act No. a failure to proclaim the winning candidate, petitioners on the other hand, counter that there was
7353. It is even irrelevant that the terms of said Contract to Sell had been fully complied with and merely an erroneous proclamation of the losing candidate; that petitioners forget that in
performed by the parties thereto, and that a Deed of Absolute Sale was already executed by proclaiming an erroneous winner they actually failed to proclaim the winning candidate, in this
Gonzalez in favor of Francisco Jr. A void agreement will not be rendered operative by the case, Erlinda Irigo. Respondents further argue that the situation presented by petitioners would
parties' alleged performance (partial or full) of their respective prestations. A contract that not exculpate them from criminal responsibility for, whichever way the matter may be looked
violates the law is null and void ab initio and vests no rights and creates no obligations. It into, whether as erroneous proclamation of a losing candidate or failure to proclaim the winning
produces no legal effect at all.44 candidate, the result is the same — the winning candidate was not proclaimed, and hence,
injustice is the end result. We agree with the respondents. To go by the explanation as proposed
With respect to the award of damages, the Court agrees in the findings of the Court of Appeals by the petitioner would be tantamount to tolerating and licensing boards of canvassers to "make
that Francisco III failed to establish his entitlement to moral damages in view of the absence of an erroneous proclamation" and still be exculpated by Just putting up the inexcusable defense
proof that he endured physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched that the "foul-up resulted from the erroneous arrangement of the names of candidates" in one
reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, or any similar injury.45 As regards municipality or that "the basis of their proclamation was the erroneous ranking made by the
the grant of exemplary damages, we likewise uphold the ruling of the appellate court that the tabulation committee." That would be a neat apology for allowing the board to be careless in
same was not warranted under the circumstances, as FRANCISCO III was not able to prove that their important task by simply claiming that they cannot be held liable because they did their
he was entitled to moral, temperate or compensatory damages. Exemplary damages are "duty" of proclaiming the winning candidates on the basis of the certificate of canvass — even
imposed by way of example or correction for the public good, in addition to moral, temperate, "erroneous" certificates — which they made. It appears from the resolution of Director Borra in
liquidated or compensatory damages.46In contracts and quasi-contracts, exemplary damages relation to the preliminary investigation conducted that it was difficult to make a mistake in
may be awarded if the defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or selecting the 8 candidates with the highest votes for purposes of making the certificate of
malevolent manner.47 It cannot, however, be considered as a matter of right; the court has to canvass because there was no error in the tabulation of votes as CE Form No. 26-A (which is
decide whether or not such damages should be adjudicated.48 Before the court may consider the statement of votes) shows that Erlinda V. Irigo got 31,129, votes and Pedro T. Pena only
an award for exemplary damages, the plaintiff must first show that he is entitled to moral, 30,679 votes. The mistake could only be made through utter carelessness, if not made
temperate or compensatory damages; but it is not necessary that he prove the monetary value deliberately. This situation only illustrates that the questioned provision cannot be construed in
thereof.49 the manner as argued by petitioners for it would defeat the purpose and spirit for which the law
was enacted, i.e., to achieve the holding of free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections.
As to the contention that the Court of Appeals erred in withdrawing the award of nominal
damages to the petitioners by the RTC, the Court finds the same to be utterly misleading. The 2. ID.; ID.; ID.; TIMELY VERBAL PROTEST, A "PROTEST" UNDER THE CODE. — Petitioners
appellate court did not decree any such withdrawal, as the RTC had not awarded any nominal contend that assuming ex gratia argumenti that the protest made by candidate Irigo’s daughter
damages in favor of the petitioners in the first place. Maribeth Irigo Batitang was the verbal protest contemplated under Sec. 245 of the Omnibus
Election Code, such fact could not be deemed to be a protest made to the Board of Canvassers
However, as Francisco III was indeed compelled to litigate and incur expenses to protect his
itself; and that the failure of the member of the verification/tabulation committee concerned to
interests,50 the Court sustains the award by the Court of Appeals of P20,000.00 as attorney’s
apprise the Board prior to the proclamation cannot be taken against the members of the Board.
fees, plus costs of suit.
We find the above contentions untenable. As aptly Stated by Director Borra in his
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of aforementioned resolution: "The timely verbal protest of the daughter-watcher of Mrs. Erlinda
Court is hereby DENIED. The assailed Decision dated 31 January 2007 and Resolution dated 4 Irigo did not trigger on the part of the PBC (Provincial Board of Canvassers) the responsible
June 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 78424 are hereby AFFIRMED in toto. No action of verifying the basis of the protest. The 3 Members of the PBC could not attribute to the
costs. Committee on Tabulation the blame for their errors as the PBC members themselves were the
ones who certified under oath the said Certificate of Proclamation and the Tabulation Committee
SO ORDERED. members were totally under their direct supervision and control."cralaw virtua1aw library

G.R. No. 106560, August 23, 1996 3. ID.; ID.; ID.; CRIMINAL LIABILITY NOT AFFECTED BY FACT THAT THE BOARD HAS
BECOME "FUNCTUS OFICIO." — Petitioner also raised the issue that it was only after the
FLOREZIL AGUJETAS, and SALVADOR BIJIS, Petitioners, v. COURT OF APPEALS and THE proclamation had been made that the Board was informed of the fact than an error may have
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents. been committed in the tabulation; and that however, having discharged its function of making
canvass and proclamation of the winning candidates, the Board of Canvassers became functus
SYLLABUS oficio and could no longer correct the erroneous proclamation. As to this issue, suffice it to state
that whether or not "the Board of Canvassers became functus oficio" after it proclaimed the
1. POLITICAL LAW; OMNIBUS ELECTION CODE; FAILURE TO PROCLAIM WINNING winning candidates, is beside the point. What matters is whether or not petitioners committed an
CANDIDATE; ERRONEOUS PROCLAMATION, EMBRACED WITHIN THE OFFENSE; CASE election offense. Beside, as stated earlier, Mrs. Irigo’s watcher made a timely verbal protest to
AT BAR. — According to petitioners, the Omnibus Election Code does not punish the the Tabulation Committee.
preparation of an incorrect certificate of canvass, not an erroneous proclamation made by the
Board; what it does punish is that, having thus prepared the corresponding certificate, the board 4. ID.; ID.; ID.; AMPLE EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT CONVICTION IN CASE AT BAR. —
for some reason fails to make the corresponding proclamation on the basis thereof. On the other Petitioners further contend that Maribeth Irigo Batitang, the daughter of candidate Irigo and her
hand, the People’s counsel maintains that petitioners’ challenges on this particular issue is a designated representative during the canvassing proceedings, was never presented as a
question of semantics, a mere play of words; for while the prosecution maintains that there was witness; Erlinda Irigo, upon whose testimony the trial court relied heavily to establish the fact of
protest, was not present during the canvassing proceedings; that Mrs. Irigo’s testimony on this
point is inadmissible as being hearsay and should not have been considered by the trial court; 8. ID.; ID.; APPEALS; ISSUES CAN NOT BE RAISED FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL. —
that no other evidence having been adduced with respect to the protest allegedly made by Points of law, theories, issues and arguments not adequately brought to the attention of the trial
Irigo’s representative, such fact should be deemed as not having been established; and that court need not be, and ordinarily will not be considered by a reviewing court as they cannot be
there was thus no basis, therefore, for the respondent Court of Appeals to hold that the Board raised for the first time on appeal. However, since RA 7166 was enacted after the trial court had
was deemed to have been constructively informed of the verbal protest and that the members rendered its decision, and while the case was already pending appeal in the Court of Appeals,
thereof were liable for having failed to act on the basis thereof. We are not persuaded. Even if and in order to settle the issue once and for all, this court will make a clear-cut ruling on the
we tentatively grant that Mrs. Irigo’s testimony is hearsay evidence, there is still ample evidence issue.
which proves that the Board was deemed to have been informed of the verbal protest and that
the members thereof were liable for having failed to act on the basis thereof. 9. POLITICAL LAW; OMNIBUS ELECTION CODE; NOT EXPRESSLY REPEALED BY R.A.
7166. — See. 231 of the Omnibus Election Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 881) was not expressly
5. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; ADMISSION MADE BY A PARTY IN THE COURSE OF repealed by R.A. 7166 because said Sec. 231 is not among the provisions repealed by Sec. 39
PROCEEDING DOES NOT REQUIRE PROOF; CASE AT BAR. — The resolution of Director of the R.A. 7166.
Borra quoted the questions and answers during the preliminary investigation. The import of
those deliberations show that petitioner Agujetas, as Chairman of the Provincial Board of 10. CIVIL LAW; REPEAL OF LAWS; STATEMENT THAT "ALL LAWS OR PARTS THEREOF
Canvassers, admitted that the tabulation committee was under the supervision of the Board. As WHICH ARE INCONSISTENT WITH THIS ACT ARE HEREBY REPEALED OR MODIFIED
regards petitioner Bijis, Vice Chairman of the Board, he admitted that he signed the minutes of ACCORDINGLY", NOT AN EXPRESS REPEAL. — The statement "All laws or parts thereof
the Board to the effect that on January 22,1988 in the after the proclamation, the Board’s which are inconsistent with this Act are hereby repealed or modified accordingly." certainly is not
business was "reconciliation of entries in the tally sheet," thus showing that the proclamation in an express repealing clause because it fails to identify or designate the act or acts that are
question had been made even before the votes were reconciled on the tally sheets. And as to intended to be repealed. If repeal of particular or specific law or laws is intended, the proper step
accused Miano, Secretary of the Board, he admitted having stated in the minutes that an oral is to so express it.
complaint was made by Mrs. Batitang, representative of Erlinda Irigo, but that the complaint was
lodged with the tabulation committee and not with the Board; and that he did not care to 11. ID.; ID.; REPEAL BY IMPLICATION; HOW EFFECTED. — In order to effect a repeal by
examine the partial results for each provincial candidate, including Erlinda Irigo and Pedro Pena. implication, the later statute must be so irreconcilably inconsistent and repugnant with the
An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of the proceedings in the same existing law that they cannot be made to reconcile and stand together. The clearest case
case, does not require proof. possible must be made before the inference of implied repeal may be drawn, for inconsistency is
never presumed. "It is necessary, says the court in a case, before such repeal is deemed to
6. POLITICAL LAW; OMNIBUS ELECTION CODE; COMPLAINTS MAY BE FILED BY ANY exist that it be shown that the statutes or statutory provisions deal with the same subject matter
COMPETENT PERSON; OFFENDED PARTY NOT MENTIONED IN THE INFORMATION MAY and that the latter be inconsistent with the former. There must be a showing of repugnance clear
CLAIM CIVIL LIABILITY. — On the last error assigned by petitioners, they maintain that the and convincing in character. The language used in the later statute must be such as to render it
present case was filed by Francisco Rabat, the losing gubernatorial candidate in the Province of irreconcilable with what had been formerly enacted. An inconsistency that falls short of that
Davao Oriental; that Mrs. Irigo never joined the Complaint as a party-plaintiff at any stage of the standard does not suffice." For it is a well-settled ruled of statutory construction that repeals of
proceedings; that she was merely presented as a witness; and thus, for the court to have statutes by implication are not favored. The presumption is against inconsistency or repugnance
awarded damages to Mrs. Irigo was a patent error. We find petitioners’ allegations untenable. and, accordingly, against implied repeal. For the legislature is presumed to know the existing
Except where the law specifically provides the contrary, a complaint that a public crime has been laws on the subject and not to have enacted inconsistent or conflicting statutes.
committed may be laid by any competent person. The Omnibus Election Code does not
specifically provide that a particular person must file the complaint and hence, the complaint filed 12. ID.; ID.; ID.; NO IMPLIED REPEAL OF SEC. 231 BY R.A. 6646 AND R.A. 7166. — Neither
by Francisco Rabat, losing gubernatorial candidate, is valid. The counsel for the people points is there an implied repeal of Sec. 231 by the subsequent enactment of RA 6646 and RA 7166.
out and we agree "Even an offended party not mentioned in the Information may claim the civil While Sec. 28 of RA 7166, like Sec. 231 of the Omnibus Election Code (BP 881) pertains to the
liability during the trial if he has not waived it. In the case at bar, Erlinda Irigo clearly, was party Canvassing by the Boards of Canvassers, this fact of itself is it not sufficient to cause an implied
offended or the person whose rights were trample upon, by the indecent haste with which repeal of the prior act. While the two provisions differ in terms, neither is this fact sufficient to
petitioners proclaimed Teodoro Pena (sic) as the winner of the 8th seat of the Sangguniang create repugnance. In the case at bar, the needed manifest indication of legislative purpose to
Panlalawigan. The persistence of Erlinda Irigo’s lawyers to participate, as in fact they repeal is not present. Neither is there any inconsistency between the two subject provisions.
participated, the proceedings a quo as private prosecutors over the vehement objections of
petitioners counsel clearly indicates that Erlinda Irigo intended to claim damages from 13. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; FAVORABLE PROVISIONS OF R.A. NOS. 6646 AND 7166, NOT
petitioners."cralaw virtua1aw library APPLICABLE TO PETITIONERS. — While Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code provides that
penal laws shall have retroactive effect insofar as they favor the person guilty of a felony, this
7. REMEDIAL LAW; ACTIONS; INJURED PARTY WHO HAS NOT EXPRESSLY WAIVED provision cannot be applied to benefit the petitioners because Section 231 of BP 881 was not
CIVIL LIABILITY OR RESERVED RIGHT TO FILE SEPARATE CIVIL ACTION MAY SUBMIT repealed by subsequent legislations, contrary to petitioners contention that Section 231 was so
EVIDENCE OF HIS DAMAGES. — In U.S. v. Heery, this court held that "If the injured party has repealed by R.A. nos. 6646 and 7166.
not expressly waived the civil liability of the accused nor reserved his right to file a separate civil
action, it is error for the court to refuse a request of the injured party during the course of the
criminal prosecution to submit evidence of his damages." Thus, the arguments of the petitioners
notwithstanding, respondent court did not err in awarding damages to Mrs. Irigo. DECISION
TORRES, JR., J.: 7. Justina Yu 32,360 votes

Petitioners Florezil Agujetas and Salvador Bijis, former Chairman and Vice-Chairman, 8. Pedro Pena 30,679 votes
respectively of the Provincial Board of Canvassers for the Province of Davao Oriental assail the
decision of the public respondent Court of Appeals which affirmed the decision of the Regional The eighth board member proclaimed, Pedro Pena, garnered 30,679 votes when another
Trial Court of Mati, Davao Oriental finding them guilty as charged for failure to proclaim a candidate for the Board, Erlinda Irigo, got 31,129 or 450 more votes than Pena.
winning elected candidate. The dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals decision 1 in GA-G.R.
CR No. 09689 reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph Before the proclamation was made, when the certificate of canvass and proclamation
statements of winning candidates were finished, a verbal protest was lodged by Mrs. Maribeth
"WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED with a modification in that the actual Irigo Batitang, daughter of candidate Irigo and her designated representative during the
damages of P50,000.00 are hereby reduced to P40,000.000 and the moral damages of canvassing proceedings, addressed to the Tabulation Committee.
P100,000.00 awarded to Erlinda Irigo are deleted. Costs de oficio.
At 8:00 o’clock in the morning of January 22, 1988, the Board resumed its session and
"SO ORDERED."cralaw virtua1aw library undertook the following activities:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

The antecedents:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library "1. Opening of Ballot Box No. CA-301596 and sealed by Metal Seal No. 204767 at exactly 10:25
a.m.
In the fateful evening of January 21, 1988, the Provincial Board of Canvassers for the Province
of Davao Oriental, composed of 1.) the Provincial Election Supervisor Florezil Agujetas, as "2. Continued preparing all reports called for submissions to COMELEC, Regional Office and
Chairman, 2.) Provincial Prosecutor Salvador Bijis, as Vice Chairman, and 3.) Division Manila.
Superintendent of Public Schools in said province, Benjamin Miano, 2 as member, proclaimed
the winners for the Governor, Vice-Governor, and Provincial Board Members for Davao Oriental "3. Reconciliation of entries in the tally sheets. (Exhs. "E" and "E-1")
in the January 18, 1988 election. The candidates proclaimed were:chanrob1es virtual 1aw
library Considering, however, that the protest was verbal and not officially brought to the attention of
the Provincial Board of Canvassers during official session, the same was not given appropriate
PROCLAIMED CANDIDATES official recognition. (Exh. "7-B", p. 2, Minutes of Provincial Board of Canvassers, January 21,
1988)
Name No. of Votes
The following day, January 23, 1988, Board Member Candidate Erlinda V. Irigo filed her written
For Governor:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library protest 3 with the Board of Canvassers. (Exh. "F")

Leopoldo Lopez 59,309 votes Meanwhile, Francisco Rabat, a losing gubernatorial candidate in Davao Oriental filed with the
COMELEC a complaint against the three board members for violation of BP 881 (Omnibus
Francisco Rabat 51,191 votes Election Code) and RA 6646 (The Electoral Reform Law of 1987). After a preliminary
investigation was conducted by the COMELEC, criminal charges were filed against the Board
For Vice-Governor:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library Members. The pertinent portions of the information in Criminal Case No. 1886 for Violation of
2nd Paragraph of Section 231 in Relation to section 262 of the Omnibus Election Code
Modesto Avellanosa 46,353 votes read:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

Josefina Sibala 54,083 votes "That on or about January 21, 1988, in the Municipality of Mati, Province of Davao Oriental,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused as
For Provincial Board Members Chairman, Vice-Chairman and Third Member, respectively, of the Provincial Board of
Canvassers of Davao Oriental in the January 18, 1988 elections, conspiring with, confederating
1. Cirilo R. Valles 42,394 votes together and mutually helping one another, did, then and there, willfully and unlawfully fail to
proclaim Erlinda Irigo as elected Sangguniang Panlalawigan Member candidate who obtained
2. Ma. Elena Palma Gil 41,557 votes 31,129 votes, the eighth highest number of votes cast in said province but instead proclaimed
candidate Pedro Pena who obtained only 30,699 votes."cralaw virtua1aw library
3. Antonio Alcantara 39,104 votes
"CONTRARY TO LAW" 4 
4. Dr. Capistrano Roflo 37,301 votes
After trial on the merits, the trial court rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which
5. Orlando Rodriguez 34,914 votes reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

6. Alfredo Abayon 34,191 votes "WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing considerations, Criminal Cases Nos. 1885 and 1887
are hereby DISMISSED, with costs de oficio, and the accused considered acquitted. Their bail
bonds are ordered canceled and released. On the other hand, the People’s counsel maintains that petitioners’ challenges on this particular
issue is a question of semantics, a mere play of words; for while the prosecution maintains that
"In Criminal Case No. 1886, the Court finds the accused Florezil Agujetas, Salvador Bijis and there was a failure to proclaim the winning candidate, petitioners on the other hand, counter that
Benjamin Miano GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as principals for violation of Section 231, there was merely an erroneous proclamation of the losing candidate; that petitioners forget that
second paragraph, of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, as amended, otherwise known as the in proclaiming an erroneous winner they actually failed to proclaim the winning candidate, in this
"Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines", and hereby sentences each of them to ONE (1) case, Erlinda Irigo. Respondents further argue that the situation presented by petitioners would
YEAR IMPRISONMENT which shall not be subject to probation. In addition, they are sentenced not exculpate them from criminal responsibility for, whichever way the matter may be looked
to suffer disqualification to hold public office and deprivation of the right of suffrage. Said into, whether as erroneous proclamation of a losing candidate or failure to proclaim the winning
accused are ordered to pay, jointly and severally, Erlinda Irigo the amounts of P50,000.00 as candidate, the result is the same — the winning candidate was not proclaimed, and hence,
actual damages, P15,000.00 as and for attorney’s fees, and P100,000.00 as moral damages, injustice is the end result.
plus the costs of the proceedings.
We agree with the respondents.
"Let copies hereof be furnished the Honorable Chairman, Commission on Elections, and the
Honorable Secretaries of Justice and Education, Culture and Sports. The second paragraph of Section 231 of the Omnibus Election Code
reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"SO ORDERED." (pp. 43-44, Decision)
"The respective board of canvassers shall prepare a certificate of canvass duly signed and
The three accused appealed to the Court of Appeals which rendered the decision assailed in affixed with the imprint of the thumb of the right hand of each member, supported by a statement
this petition. of the votes and received by each candidate in each polling place and, on the basis thereof,
shall proclaim as elected the candidates who obtained the highest number of votes cast in the
Petitioners impute to the respondent court the following errors:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library province, city, municipality or barangay. Failure to comply with this requirement shall constitute
an election offense."cralaw virtua1aw library
I
The Court of Appeals erred in affirming the decision of conviction because:chanrob1es virtual To go by the explanation as proposed by the petitioner would be tantamount to tolerating and
1aw library licensing boards of canvassers to "make an erroneous proclamation" and still be exculpated by
just putting up the inexcusable defense that the "foul-up resulted from the erroneous
a. It is the failure to make a proclamation on the basis of the Certificate of Canvass, and not arrangement of the names of candidates" 5 in one municipality or that "the basis of their
mere erroneous proclamations, which is punishable under Sec. 262 in relation to Sec. 231 (2) of proclamation was the erroneous ranking made by the tabulation committee." That would be a
the Omnibus Election Code. neat apology for allowing the board to be careless in their important task by simply claiming that
they cannot be held liable because they did their "duty" of proclaiming the winning candidates on
b. A protest made to the verification/tabulation committee does not constitute a protest to the the basis of the certificate of canvass — even "erroneous" certificates — which they made.
Board of Canvassers itself.
At this point, it is appropriate to quote certain portions of the Resolution in IPD Case No. 88-100,
c. The functus oficio rule is applicable to the present case. disposing of the complaint filed with the COMELEC issued by Regional Election Director
Resurreccion Borra of Region XI, in relation to the preliminary investigation conducted by him on
d. Credence should not have been given to hearsay testimony to establish the alleged protest to said case. Director Borra testified on this resolution 6 (Exh. "Z") under cross-examination by the
the Board of Canvassers. prosecution, certain portions of which are material to the case:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

II "But there is one incontrovertible fact that the respondents miserably failed to dispute. This
The Court of Appeals erred in awarding damages to a person who is not a party to the case. undeniable fact is conveniently ignored by Respondents’ Memorandum. In the exhibits of the
complainant, the computerized tabulation of votes based from the statements of votes by
We find the petition without merit. precinct in each of the 121 Municipalities of Davao Oriental for all of the 600 precincts and even
admitted by the Respondents that there was no error in the tabulation of votes in CA 26-A.
On the first assigned error, the issue hinges on the question of what is being penalized by the Erlinda V. Irigo got 31,129 votes and Pedro T. Pena only 30,679 votes or a margin of 450 votes
pertinent provision of the Omnibus Election Code. Petitioners argue that they are not liable by Irigo over Pena. From the ranking, Irigo would have been ahead of Pena, and she should
under the said law because they complied with all the requirements of Sec. 231 of the Omnibus have been No. 8 in the winning list of 8 candidates instead of Pena. But in the Certificate of
Election Code — 1. a certificate of canvass was prepared, 2. the same was duly supported by a Canvass of Votes and Proclamation of Winning Candidates for Provincial Offices, Pedro T. Pena
statement of votes of each of the candidates, and 3. it was on the basis of the certificate of was included as No. 8 in the winning list and proclaimed as No. 8 Member of the Sangguniang
canvass that the winners were proclaimed. Only, the certificate was erroneous. Panlalawigan of Davao Oriental by the Provincial Board of Canvassers.

According to petitioners, the Omnibus Election Code does not punish the preparation of an x       x       x
incorrect certificate of canvass, nor an erroneous proclamation made by the Board; what it does
punish is that, having thus prepared the corresponding certificate, the board for some reason "The Complainant, in presenting the computerized summary tabulation of votes for each precinct
fails to make the corresponding proclamation on the basis thereof. per municipality of the Province, admitted that the PBC prepared the statements of votes. . . .
The statements of votes (CE 26-A) should have been the basis for the proclamation of the that however, having discharged its function of making the canvass and proclamation of the
winning candidates for Provincial Offices. Complainant’s documentary and testimonial evidences winning candidates, the Board of Canvassers became functus oficio and could no longer correct
showed that the PBC proclaimed Pedro Pena who was not among those candidates who the erroneous proclamation.
obtained the 8 highest number of votes cast in the province per municipality by precinct which
violated the legal requirement of the 2nd paragraph of Section 231 of BP No. 881 as amended. As to this issue, suffice it to state that whether or not "the Board of Canvassers become functus
oficio" after it proclaimed the winning candidates, is beside the point. What matters is whether or
"The respondents were not able to explain their failure to comply with the requirement that (sic) not petitioners committed an election offense. Besides, as stated earlier, Mrs. Irigo’s watcher
the basis for the proclamation of Pena when he was not among the eight candidates who made a timely verbal protest to the Tabulation Committee.
obtained the highest number of votes as evidenced by the statements of votes. In fact they
admitted that the basis was not the statement of votes but the erroneous ranking by the Petitioners further contend that Maribeth Irigo Batitang, the daughter of candidate Irigo and her
Tabulators. . . ." 7  designated representative during the canvassing proceedings, was never presented as a
witness; that Erlinda Irigo, upon whose testimony the trial court relied heavily to establish the
It appears from the foregoing resolution of Director Borra that it was difficult to make a mistake in fact of protest, was not present during the canvassing proceedings; that Mrs. Irigo’s testimony
selecting the 8 candidates with the highest votes for purposes of making the certificate of on this point is inadmissible as being hearsay and should not have been considered by the trial
canvass because there was no error in the tabulation of votes as CE Form No. 26-A (which is court; that no other evidence having been adduced with respect to the protest allegedly made by
the statement of votes) shows that Erlinda V. Irigo got 31,129 votes and Pedro T. Pena only Irigo’s representative, such fact should be deemed as not having been established; and that
30,679 votes. The mistake could only be made through utter carelessness, if not made there was thus no basis, therefore, for the respondent Court of Appeals to hold that the Board
deliberately. This situation only illustrates that the questioned provision cannot be construed in was deemed to have been constructively informed of the verbal protest and that the members
the manner as argued by petitioners for it would defeat the purpose and spirit for which the law thereof were liable for having failed to act on the basis thereof.
was enacted, i.e., to achieve the holding of free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections.
In Lino Luna v. Rodriguez, 8 the court observed:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph We are not persuaded. Even if we tentatively grant that Mrs. Irigo’s testimony is hearsay
evidence, there is still ample evidence which proves that the Board was deemed to have been
"Experience and observations taught legislature and courts that, at the time of a hotly contested informed of the verbal protest and that the members thereof were liable for having failed to act
election, the partisan spirit of ingenious and unscrupulous politicians will lead them beyond the on the basis thereof.
limits of honesty and decency and by the use of bribery, fraud and intimidation, despoil the purity
of the ballot and defeat the will of the people at the polls. Such experience has led the legislature The resolution 9 of Director Borra quoted the questions and answers during the preliminary
to adopt very stringent rules for the purpose of protecting the voter in the manner of preparing investigation. The import of those deliberations show that petitioner Agujetas, as Chairman of
and casting his ballot to guard the purity of elections." "The infinite ingenuity of violation spirit in the Provincial Board of Canvassers, admitted that the tabulation committee was under the
evading the rules and regulations of elections and the use of bribery, fraud and intimidation has supervision of the Board. 10 As regards petitioner Bijis, Vice Chairman of the Board, he admitted
made necessary the establishment of elaborate and rigid rules for the conduct of elections. The that he signed the minutes of the Board to the effect that on January 22, 1988 in the morning
very elaborateness of these rules has resulted in their frequent violation and the reports of the after the proclamation, the Board’s business was "reconciliation of entries in the tally sheet," 11
courts are replete with cases in which the result of an election has been attacked on the ground thus showing that the proclamation in question had been made even before the votes were
that some provisions of the law have not been complied with. Presumably, all the provisions of reconciled on the tally sheets. And as to accused Miano, Secretary of the Board he admitted
the election laws have a purpose and should be observed."cralaw virtua1aw library having stated in the minutes 12 that an oral complaint was made by Mrs. Batitang,
representative of Erlinda Irigo, but that the complaint was lodged with the tabulation committee
On the second assigned error, petitioners contend that assuming ex gratia argumenti that the and not with the Board; and that he did not care to examine the partial results for each provincial
protest made by candidate Irigo’s daughter Maribeth Irigo Batitang was the verbal protest candidate, including Erlinda Irigo and Pedro Pena. 13 
contemplated under Sec. 245 of the Omnibus Election Code, such fact could not be deemed to
be a protest made to the Board of Canvassers itself; and that the failure of the member of the An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of the proceedings in the same
verification/tabulation committee concerned to apprise the Board prior to the proclamation case, does not require proof. 14 
cannot be taken against the members of the Board.
On the last error assigned by petitioners, they maintain that the present case was filed by
We find the above contentions untenable. As aptly stated by Director Borra in his Francisco Rabat, the losing gubernatorial candidate in the Province of Davao Oriental; that Mrs.
aforementioned resolution:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph Irigo never joined the Complaint as a party-plaintiff at any stage of the proceedings; that she was
merely presented as a witness; and thus, for the court to have awarded damages to Mrs. Irigo
"The timely verbal protest of the daughter-watcher of Mrs. Erlinda Irigo did not trigger on the part was a patent error. We find petitioners’ allegations untenable. Except where the law specifically
of the PBC (Provincial Board of Canvassers) the responsible action of verifying the basis of the provides the contrary, a complaint that a public crime has been committed may be laid by any
protest. The 3 Members of the PBC could not attribute to the Committee on Tabulation the competent person. 15 The Omnibus Election Code does not specifically provide that a particular
blame for their errors as the PBC members themselves were the ones who certified under oath person must file the complaint and hence, the complaint filed by Francisco Rabat is valid.
the said Certificate of Proclamation and the Tabulation Committee members were totally under
their direct supervision and control."cralaw virtua1aw library The counsel for the people points out and we agree —

Petitioners also raised the issue that it was only after the proclamation had been made that the "Even an offended party not mentioned in the Information may claim the civil liability during the
Board was informed of the fact that an error may have been committed in the tabulation; and trial if he has not waived it. 16 
"In the case at bar, Erlinda Irigo clearly, was the party offended or the person whose rights were While Sec. 28 of RA 7166, like Sec. 231 of the Omnibus Election Code (BP 881) pertains to the
trampled upon, by the indecent haste with which petitioners proclaimed Teodoro Pena (sic) as Canvassing by the Boards of Canvassers, this fact of itself is not sufficient to cause an implied
the winner of the 8th seat of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. repeal of the prior act. 21 The provisions of the subject laws are quoted below for
comparison:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The persistence of Erlinda Irigo’s lawyers to participate, as in fact they participated, in the
proceedings a quo as private prosecutors over the vehement objections of petitioners’ counsel "Sec. 231. Canvass by the board. — The board of canvassers shall meet not later than six
clearly indicates that Erlinda Irigo intended to claim damages from petitioners." 17  o’clock in the afternoon of election day at the place designated by the Commission to receive the
election returns and to immediately canvass those that may have already been received. It shall
In U.S. v. Heery, 18 this court held that "If the injured party has not expressly waived the civil meet continuously from day to day until the canvass is completed, and may adjourn but only for
liability of the accused nor reserved his right to file a separate civil action, it is error for the court the purpose of awaiting the other election returns from other polling places within its jurisdiction.
to refuse a request of the injured party during the course of the criminal prosecution to submit Each time the board adjourns, it shall make a total of all the votes canvassed so far for each
evidence of his damages." Thus, the arguments of the petitioners notwithstanding, respondent candidate for each office, furnishing the Commission in Manila by the fastest means of
court did not err in awarding damages to Mrs. Irigo. communication a certified copy thereof, and making available the data contained therein to the
mass media and other interested parties. As soon as the other election returns are delivered, the
After the People’s counsel has filed respondents’ comment, petitioners filed their Reply wherein board shall immediately resume canvassing until all the returns have been canvassed.
they raised for the first time (not even in their Petition), the issue that the crime under which
petitioners were convicted no longer exists because Republic Act Nos. 6646 (the Electoral "The respective board of canvassers shall prepare a certificate of canvass duly signed and
Reforms Law of 1987) and 7166 (Electoral Reforms Law of 1991) were subsequently approved affixed with the imprint of the thumb of the right hand of each member, supported by a statement
on January 5, 1988 and November 26, 1991, respectively; that these two laws amended the of the votes and received by each candidate in each polling place and, on the basis thereof,
Omnibus Election Code by deleting certain provisions thereof or adding new ones; and that shall proclaim as elected the candidates who obtained the highest number of votes cast in the
among those amended was Section 231, which was modified by Section 28 of RA No. 7166 by province, city, municipality or barangay. Failure to comply with this requirement shall constitute
removing the specific manner by which the proclamation of winning candidates by the Board of an election offense.
Canvassers should be made and thereby, in effect, repealing the second paragraph of Sec. 231
of the old Omnibus Election Code under which Petitioners had been convicted. "Subject to reasonable exceptions, the board of canvassers must complete their canvass within
thirty-six hours in municipalities, forty-eight hours in cities and seventy-two hours in provinces.
Points of law, theories, issues and arguments not adequately brought to the attention of the trial Violation hereof shall be an election offense punishable under Section 264 hereof.
court need to be, and ordinarily will not be considered by a reviewing court as they cannot be
raised for the first time on appeal. 19 However, since RA 7166 was enacted after the trial court "With respect to the election for President and Vice-President, the provincial and city boards of
had rendered its decision, and while the case was already pending appeal in the Court of canvassers shall prepare in quintuplicate a certificate of canvass supported by a statement of
Appeals, and in order to settle the issue once and for all, this court will make a clear-cut ruling votes received by each candidate in each polling place and transmit the first copy thereof to the
on the issue. Speaker of the Batasang Pambansa. The second copy shall be transmitted to the Commission,
the third copy shall be kept by the provincial election supervisor or city election registrar; the
Sec. 231 of the Omnibus Election Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 881) was not expressly repealed fourth and the fifth copies to each of the two accredited political parties. (Sec. 169, 1978 EC)."
by R.A. 7166 because said Sec. 231 is not among the provisions repealed by Sec. 39 of R.A. 22 
7166 which we quote:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Sec. 28. Canvassing by Provincial, City, District and Municipal Boards of Canvassers. — (a)
"Sec. 39. Amending and Repealing Clause. — Sections 107, 108 and 245 of the Omnibus The city or municipal board of canvassers shall canvass the election returns for President, Vice-
Election Code are hereby repealed. Likewise, the inclusion in Section 262 of the Omnibus President, Senators and members of the House of Representatives and/or elective provincial
Election Code of the violations of Sections 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111 and 112 as among and city or municipal officials. Upon completion of the canvass, it shall prepare the certificate of
election offenses is also hereby repealed. This repeal shall have retroactive effect. canvass for President, Vice-President, Senators and Members of the House of Representatives
and elective provincial officials and thereafter, proclaim the elected city or municipal officials, as
"Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, Republic Act No. 6646, Executive Order Nos. 144 and 157 and all the case may be.
other laws, orders, decrees, rules and regulations or other issuances, or any part thereof,
inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby amended or repealed accordingly."cralaw "(b) The City board of canvassers of cities comprising one or more legislative districts shall
virtua1aw library canvass the election returns for President, Vice-President, Senators, Members of the House of
Representatives and elective city officials. Upon completion of the canvass, the board shall
The statement "All laws or parts thereof which are inconsistent with this Act are hereby repealed prepare the certificate of canvass for President, Vice-President, and Senators and thereafter,
or modified accordingly." Certainly is not an express repealing clause because it fails to identify proclaim the elected Members of House of Representatives and city officials.
or designate the act or acts that are intended to be repealed. If repeal of particular or specific
law or laws is intended, the proper step is to so express it. 20  "(c)(1) In the Metro Manila Area, each municipality comprising a legislative district shall have a
district board of canvassers which shall canvass the election returns for President, Vice-
Neither is there an implied repeal of Sec. 231 by the subsequent enactment of RA 6646 and RA President, Senators, Members of the House of Representatives and elective municipal officials.
7166. Upon completion of the canvass, it shall prepare the certificate of canvass for President, Vice-
President, and Senators and thereafter, proclaim the elected Members of the House of subsequent legislations, contrary to petitioners contention that Section 231 was so repealed by
Representatives and municipal officials. R.A. Nos. 6646 and 7166.

"(2) Each component municipality in a legislative district in the Metro Manila Area shall have a ACCORDINGLY, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit and the assailed decision of the
municipal board of canvassers which shall canvass the election returns for President, Vice- respondent Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
President, Senators, . . .
SO ORDERED.
"(3) The district board of canvassers of each legislative district comprising two (2) municipalities
in the Metro Manila Area shall canvass the certificates of canvass for President, Vice-
President, . . .
G.R. No. 166471, March 22, 2011
"(d) The provincial board of canvassers shall canvass the certificates of canvass for President,
Vice-President, Senators, Members of the House of Representatives and elective provincial TAWANG MULTI-PURPOSE COOPERATIVE Petitioner, 
officials as well as plebiscite results, if any plebiscite is conducted simultaneously with the same vs.
election, as submitted by the board of canvassers of municipalities and component cities. Upon LA TRINIDAD WATER DISTRICT, Respondent.
completion of the canvass, it shall prepare the certificate of canvass for President, Vice-
President and Senators and thereafter, proclaim the elected Members of the House of DECISION
Representatives and provincial officials as well as the plebiscite results, if any." 23 
CARPIO, J.:
While the two provisions differ in terms, neither is this fact sufficient to create repugnance. In The Case
order to effect a repeal by implication, the later statute must be so irreconcilably inconsistent and
repugnant with the existing law that they cannot be made to reconcile and stand together. The This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The
clearest case possible must be made before the inference of implied repeal may be drawn, for petition1 challenges the 1 October 2004 Judgment2 and 6 November 2004 Order3 of the
inconsistency is never presumed. 24 "It is necessary, says the court in a case, 25 before such Regional Trial Court (RTC), Judicial Region 1, Branch 62, La Trinidad, Benguet, in Civil Case
repeal is deemed to exist that it be shown that the statutes or statutory provisions deal with the No. 03-CV-1878.
same subject matter and that the latter be inconsistent with the former. There must be a showing
or repugnance clear and convincing in character. The language used in the later statute must be The Facts
such as to render it irreconcilable with what had been formerly enacted. An inconsistency that
falls short of that standard does not suffice." 26 For it is a well-settled rule of statutory Tawang Multi-Purpose Cooperative (TMPC) is a cooperative, registered with the Cooperative
construction that repeals of statutes by implication are not favored. 27 The presumption is Development Authority, and organized to provide domestic water services in Barangay Tawang,
against inconsistency or repugnance and, accordingly, against implied repeal. 28 For the La Trinidad, Benguet.
legislature is presumed to know the existing laws on the subject and not to have enacted
La Trinidad Water District (LTWD) is a local water utility created under Presidential Decree (PD)
inconsistent or conflicting statutes. 29 
No. 198, as amended. It is authorized to supply water for domestic, industrial and commercial
purposes within the municipality of La Trinidad, Benguet.
In the case at bar, the needed manifest indication of legislative purpose to repeal is not present.
Neither is there any inconsistency between the two subject provisions. The explanation of a On 9 October 2000, TMPC filed with the National Water Resources Board (NWRB) an
legal scholar 30 subject, particularly on Section 1 of BP 881 is application for a certificate of public convenience (CPC) to operate and maintain a waterworks
enlightening:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph system in Barangay Tawang. LTWD opposed TMPC’s application. LTWD claimed that, under
Section 47 of PD No. 198, as amended, its franchise is exclusive. Section 47 states that:
"The Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines in Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, which was enacted
into law on December 3, 1985. It codified all previous election laws. It has undergone some Sec. 47. Exclusive Franchise. No franchise shall be granted to any other person or agency for
amendments, basically by the 1987 Constitution, Republic Act No. 6646, otherwise known as domestic, industrial or commercial water service within the district or any portion thereof unless
"The Electoral Reform Law of 1987," and Republic Act No. 7166, providing for synchronized and except to the extent that the board of directors of said district consents thereto by resolution
national and local elections on May 11, 1992. duly adopted, such resolution, however, shall be subject to review by the Administration.

"The Omnibus Election Code is the basic law on elections. While legislations have been enacted In its Resolution No. 04-0702 dated 23 July 2002, the NWRB approved TMPC’s application for a
every time an election for elective officials is scheduled, the Omnibus Election Code remains the CPC. In its 15 August 2002 Decision,4 the NWRB held that LTWD’s franchise cannot be
fundamental law on the subject and such pieces of legislations are designed to improve the law exclusive since exclusive franchises are unconstitutional and found that TMPC is legally and
and to achieve the holding of free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections."cralaw financially qualified to operate and maintain a waterworks system. NWRB stated that:
virtua1aw library
With respect to LTWD’s opposition, this Board observes that:
Consistently, while Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code provides that penal laws shall have
1. It is a substantial reproduction of its opposition to the application for water permits previously
retroactive effect insofar as they favor the person guilty of a felony . . ., this provision cannot be
filed by this same CPC applicant, under WUC No. 98-17 and 98-62 which was decided upon by
applied to benefit the petitioners because Section 231 of BP 881 31 was not repealed by
this Board on April 27, 2000. The issues being raised by Oppositor had been already resolved The Court’s Ruling
when this Board said in pertinent portions of its decision:
The petition is meritorious.
"The authority granted to LTWD by virtue of P.D. 198 is not Exclusive. While Barangay Tawang
is within their territorial jurisdiction, this does not mean that all others are excluded in engaging What cannot be legally done directly cannot be done indirectly. This rule is basic and, to a
in such service, especially, if the district is not capable of supplying water within the area. This reasonable mind, does not need explanation. Indeed, if acts that cannot be legally done directly
Board has time and again ruled that the "Exclusive Franchise" provision under P.D. 198 has can be done indirectly, then all laws would be illusory.
misled most water districts to believe that it likewise extends to be [sic] the waters within their
territorial boundaries. Such ideological adherence collides head on with the constitutional In Alvarez v. PICOP Resources, Inc.,8 the Court held that, "What one cannot do directly, he
provision that "ALL WATERS AND NATURAL RESOURCES BELONG TO THE STATE". (Sec. cannot do indirectly."9 In Akbayan Citizens Action Party v. Aquino,10 quoting Agan, Jr. v.
2, Art. XII) and that "No franchise, certificate or authorization for the operation of public [sic] shall Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc.,11 the Court held that, "This Court has long and
be exclusive in character". consistently adhered to the legal maxim that those that cannot be done directly cannot be done
indirectly."12 In Central Bank Employees Association, Inc. v. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas,13the
xxxx Court held that, "No one is allowed to do indirectly what he is prohibited to do directly."14

All the foregoing premises all considered, and finding that Applicant is legally and financially The President, Congress and the Court cannot create directly franchises for the operation of a
qualified to operate and maintain a waterworks system; that the said operation shall redound to public utility that are exclusive in character. The 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions expressly
the benefit of the homeowners/residents of the subdivision, thereby, promoting public service in and clearly prohibit the creation of franchises that are exclusive in character. Section 8, Article
a proper and suitable manner, the instant application for a Certificate of Public Convenience is, XIII of the 1935 Constitution states that:
hereby, GRANTED.5
No franchise, certificate, or any other form of authorization for the operation of a public utility
LTWD filed a motion for reconsideration. In its 18 November 2002 Resolution,6 the NWRB shall be granted except to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or other entities
denied the motion. organized under the laws of the Philippines, sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by
citizens of the Philippines, nor shall such franchise, certificate or authorization be exclusive in
LTWD appealed to the RTC. character or for a longer period than fifty years. (Empahsis supplied)

The RTC’s Ruling Section 5, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution states that:

In its 1 October 2004 Judgment, the RTC set aside the NWRB’s 23 July 2002 Resolution and 15 No franchise, certificate, or any other form of authorization for the operation of a public utility
August 2002 Decision and cancelled TMPC’s CPC. The RTC held that Section 47 is valid. The shall be granted except to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or associations organized
RTC stated that: under the laws of the Philippines at least sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by
such citizens, nor shall such franchise, certificate or authorization be exclusive in character or for
The Constitution uses the term "exclusive in character". To give effect to this provision, a a longer period than fifty years. (Emphasis supplied)
reasonable, practical and logical interpretation should be adopted without disregard to the
ultimate purpose of the Constitution. What is this ultimate purpose? It is for the state, through its Section 11, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution states that:
authorized agencies or instrumentalities, to be able to keep and maintain ultimate control and
supervision over the operation of public utilities. Essential part of this control and supervision is No franchise, certificate, or any other form of authorization for the operation of a public utility
the authority to grant a franchise for the operation of a public utility to any person or entity, and shall be granted except to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or associations organized
to amend or repeal an existing franchise to serve the requirements of public interest. Thus, what under the laws of the Philippines, at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such
is repugnant to the Constitution is a grant of franchise "exclusive in character" so as to preclude citizens, nor shall such franchise, certificate or authorization be exclusive in character or for a
the State itself from granting a franchise to any other person or entity than the present grantee longer period than fifty years. (Emphasis supplied)
when public interest so requires. In other words, no franchise of whatever nature can preclude
the State, through its duly authorized agencies or instrumentalities, from granting franchise to Plain words do not require explanation. The 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions are clear —
any person or entity, or to repeal or amend a franchise already granted. Consequently, the franchises for the operation of a public utility cannot be exclusive in character. The 1935, 1973
Constitution does not necessarily prohibit a franchise that is exclusive on its face, meaning, that and 1987 Constitutions expressly and clearly state that, "nor shall such franchise x x x be
the grantee shall be allowed to exercise this present right or privilege to the exclusion of all exclusive in character." There is no exception.
others. Nonetheless, the grantee cannot set up its exclusive franchise against the ultimate
When the law is clear, there is nothing for the courts to do but to apply it. The duty of the Court is
authority of the State.7
to apply the law the way it is worded. In Security Bank and Trust Company v. Regional Trial
TMPC filed a motion for reconsideration. In its 6 November 2004 Order, the RTC denied the Court of Makati, Branch 61,15 the Court held that:
motion. Hence, the present petition.
Basic is the rule of statutory construction that when the law is clear and unambiguous, the court
Issue is left with no alternative but to apply the same according to its clear language. As we have held
in the case of Quijano v. Development Bank of the Philippines:
TMPC raises as issue that the RTC erred in holding that Section 47 of PD No. 198, as amended,
is valid. "x x x We cannot see any room for interpretation or construction in the clear and unambiguous
language of the above-quoted provision of law. This Court had steadfastly adhered to the
doctrine that its first and fundamental duty is the application of the law according to its express Under the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, if a law or contract violates any norm of the
terms, interpretation being called for only when such literal application is impossible. No process constitution that law or contract whether promulgated by the legislative or by the executive
of interpretation or construction need be resorted to where a provision of law peremptorily calls branch or entered into by private persons for private purposes is null and void and without any
for application. Where a requirement or condition is made in explicit and unambiguous terms, no force and effect. Thus, since the Constitution is the fundamental, paramount and supreme law of
discretion is left to the judiciary. It must see to it that its mandate is obeyed."16(Emphasis the nation, it is deemed written in every statute and contract."32 (Emphasis supplied)
supplied)
To reiterate, the 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions expressly prohibit the creation of franchises
In Republic of the Philippines v. Express Telecommunications Co., Inc.,17 the Court held that, that are exclusive in character. They uniformly command that "nor shall such franchise x x x be
"The Constitution is quite emphatic that the operation of a public utility shall not be exclusive in character." This constitutional prohibition is absolute and accepts no exception. On
exclusive."18 In Pilipino Telephone Corporation v. National Telecommunications the other hand, PD No. 198, as amended, allows the BOD of LTWD and LWUA to create
Commission,19 the Court held that, "Neither Congress nor the NTC can grant an exclusive franchises that are exclusive in character. Section 47 states that, "No franchise shall be granted
‘franchise, certificate, or any other form of authorization’ to operate a public utility."20 In National to any other person or agency x x x unless and except to the extent that the board of directors
Power Corp. v. Court of Appeals,21 the Court held that, "Exclusivity of any public franchise has consents thereto x x x subject to review by the Administration." Section 47 creates a glaring
not been favored by this Court such that in most, if not all, grants by the government to private exception to the absolute prohibition in the Constitution. Clearly, it is patently unconstitutional.
corporations, the interpretation of rights, privileges or franchises is taken against the
grantee."22 In Radio Communications of the Philippines, Inc. v. National Telecommunications Section 47 gives the BOD and the LWUA the authority to make an exception to the absolute
Commission,23 the Court held that, "The Constitution mandates that a franchise cannot be prohibition in the Constitution. In short, the BOD and the LWUA are given the discretion to
exclusive in nature."24 create franchises that are exclusive in character. The BOD and the LWUA are not even
legislative bodies. The BOD is not a regulatory body but simply a management board of a water
Indeed, the President, Congress and the Court cannot create directly franchises that are district. Indeed, neither the BOD nor the LWUA can be granted the power to create any
exclusive in character. What the President, Congress and the Court cannot legally do directly exception to the absolute prohibition in the Constitution, a power that Congress itself cannot
they cannot do indirectly. Thus, the President, Congress and the Court cannot create indirectly exercise.
franchises that are exclusive in character by allowing the Board of Directors (BOD) of a water
district and the Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA) to create franchises that are In Metropolitan Cebu Water District v. Adala,33 the Court categorically declared Section 47 void.
exclusive in character. The Court held that:

In PD No. 198, as amended, former President Ferdinand E. Marcos (President Marcos) created Nonetheless, while the prohibition in Section 47 of P.D. 198 applies to the issuance of CPCs for
indirectly franchises that are exclusive in character by allowing the BOD of LTWD and the LWUA the reasons discussed above, the same provision must be deemed void ab initio for being
to create directly franchises that are exclusive in character. Section 47 of PD No. 198, as irreconcilable with Article XIV, Section 5 of the 1973 Constitution which was ratified on January
amended, allows the BOD and the LWUA to create directly franchises that are exclusive in 17, 1973 — the constitution in force when P.D. 198 was issued on May 25, 1973. Thus, Section
character. Section 47 states: 5 of Art. XIV of the 1973 Constitution reads:

Sec. 47. Exclusive Franchise. No franchise shall be granted to any other person or agency for "SECTION 5. No franchise, certificate, or any other form of authorization for the operation of a
domestic, industrial or commercial water service within the district or any portion thereof unless public utility shall be granted except to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or
and except to the extent that the board of directors of said district consents thereto by resolution associations organized under the laws of the Philippines at least sixty per centum of the capital
duly adopted, such resolution, however, shall be subject to review by the Administration. of which is owned by such citizens, nor shall such franchise, certificate, or authorization be
(Emphasis supplied) exclusive in character or for a longer period than fifty years. Neither shall any such franchise or
right be granted except under the condition that it shall be subject to amendment, alteration, or
In case of conflict between the Constitution and a statute, the Constitution always prevails repeal by the Batasang Pambansa when the public interest so requires. The State shall
because the Constitution is the basic law to which all other laws must conform to. The duty of encourage equity participation in public utiltities by the general public. The participation of
the Court is to uphold the Constitution and to declare void all laws that do not conform to it. foreign investors in the governing body of any public utility enterprise shall be limited to their
proportionate share in the capital thereof."
In Social Justice Society v. Dangerous Drugs Board,25 the Court held that, "It is basic that if a
law or an administrative rule violates any norm of the Constitution, that issuance is null and void This provision has been substantially reproduced in Article XII Section 11 of the 1987
and has no effect. The Constitution is the basic law to which all laws must conform; no act shall Constitution, including the prohibition against exclusive franchises.
be valid if it conflicts with the Constitution."26 In Sabio v. Gordon,27 the Court held that, "the
Constitution is the highest law of the land. It is the ‘basic and paramount law to which all other xxxx
laws must conform.’"28 In Atty. Macalintal v. Commission on Elections,29the Court held that,
"The Constitution is the fundamental and paramount law of the nation to which all other laws Since Section 47 of P.D. 198, which vests an "exclusive franchise" upon public utilities, is clearly
must conform and in accordance with which all private rights must be determined and all public repugnant to Article XIV, Section 5 of the 1973 Constitution, it is unconstitutional and may not,
authority administered. Laws that do not conform to the Constitution shall be stricken down for therefore, be relied upon by petitioner in support of its opposition against respondent’s
being unconstitutional."30 In Manila Prince Hotel v. Government Service Insurance application for CPC and the subsequent grant thereof by the NWRB.
System,31 the Court held that:
WHEREFORE, Section 47 of P.D. 198 is unconstitutional.34 (Emphasis supplied)
The dissenting opinion declares Section 47 valid and constitutional. In effect, the dissenting Constitution."46 In Carlos Superdrug Corp. v. Department of Social Welfare and
opinion holds that (1) President Marcos can create indirectly franchises that are exclusive in Development,47 the Court held that, police power "is ‘the power vested in the legislature by the
character; (2) the BOD can create directly franchises that are exclusive in character; (3) the constitution to make, ordain, and establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws,
LWUA can create directly franchises that are exclusive in character; and (4) the Court should statutes, and ordinances x x x not repugnant to the constitution.’"48 In Metropolitan Manila
allow the creation of franchises that are exclusive in character. Development Authority v. Garin,49 the Court held that, "police power, as an inherent attribute of
sovereignty, is the power vested by the Constitution in the legislature to make, ordain, and
Stated differently, the dissenting opinion holds that (1) President Marcos can violate indirectly establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes and ordinances x x x not
the Constitution; (2) the BOD can violate directly the Constitution; (3) the LWUA can violate repugnant to the Constitution."50
directly the Constitution; and (4) the Court should allow the violation of the Constitution.
There is no question that the effect of Section 47 is the creation of franchises that are exclusive
The dissenting opinion states that the BOD and the LWUA can create franchises that are in character. Section 47 expressly allows the BOD and the LWUA to create franchises that are
exclusive in character "based on reasonable and legitimate grounds," and such creation "should exclusive in character.
not be construed as a violation of the constitutional mandate on the non-exclusivity of a
franchise" because it "merely refers to regulation" which is part of "the government’s inherent The dissenting opinion explains why the BOD and the LWUA should be allowed to create
right to exercise police power in regulating public utilities" and that their violation of the franchises that are exclusive in character — to protect "the government’s investment" and to
Constitution "would carry with it the legal presumption that public officers regularly perform their avoid "a situation where ruinous competition could compromise the supply of public utilities in
official functions." The dissenting opinion states that: poor and remote areas." The dissenting opinion declares that these are "reasonable and
legitimate grounds." The dissenting opinion also states that, "The refusal of the local water
To begin with, a government agency’s refusal to grant a franchise to another entity, based on district or the LWUA to consent to the grant of other franchises would carry with it the legal
reasonable and legitimate grounds, should not be construed as a violation of the constitutional presumption that public officers regularly perform their official functions."
mandate on the non-exclusivity of a franchise; this merely refers to regulation, which the
Constitution does not prohibit. To say that a legal provision is unconstitutional simply because it When the effect of a law is unconstitutional, it is void. In Sabio,51 the Court held that, "A statute
enables a government instrumentality to determine the propriety of granting a franchise is may be declared unconstitutional because it is not within the legislative power to enact; or it
contrary to the government’s inherent right to exercise police power in regulating public utilities creates or establishes methods or forms that infringe constitutional principles; or its purpose
for the protection of the public and the utilities themselves. The refusal of the local water district or effect violates the Constitution or its basic principles."52 The effect of Section 47 violates the
or the LWUA to consent to the grant of other franchises would carry with it the legal presumption Constitution, thus, it is void.
that public officers regularly perform their official functions.
In Strategic Alliance Development Corporation v. Radstock Securities Limited,53 the Court held
The dissenting opinion states two "reasonable and legitimate grounds" for the creation of that, "This Court must perform its duty to defend and uphold the
exclusive franchise: (1) protection of "the government’s investment,"35 and (2) avoidance of "a Constitution."54 In Bengzon,55 the Court held that, "The Constitution expressly confers on the
situation where ruinous competition could compromise the supply of public utilities in poor and judiciary the power to maintain inviolate what it decrees."56 In Mutuc,57 the Court held that:
remote areas."36
The concept of the Constitution as the fundamental law, setting forth the criterion for the validity
There is no "reasonable and legitimate" ground to violate the Constitution. The Constitution of any public act whether proceeding from the highest official or the lowest functionary, is a
should never be violated by anyone. Right or wrong, the President, Congress, the Court, the postulate of our system of government. That is to manifest fealty to the rule of law, with priority
BOD and the LWUA have no choice but to follow the Constitution. Any act, however noble its accorded to that which occupies the topmost rung in the legal hierarchy. The three departments
intentions, is void if it violates the Constitution. This rule is basic. of government in the discharge of the functions with which it is [sic] entrusted have no choice but
to yield obedience to its commands. Whatever limits it imposes must be observed. Congress in
In Social Justice Society,37 the Court held that, "In the discharge of their defined functions, the the enactment of statutes must ever be on guard lest the restrictions on its authority, whether
three departments of government have no choice but to yield obedience to the commands of the substantive or formal, be transcended. The Presidency in the execution of the laws cannot
Constitution. Whatever limits it imposes must be observed."38 In Sabio,39 the Court held that, ignore or disregard what it ordains. In its task of applying the law to the facts as found in
"the Constitution is the highest law of the land. It is ‘the basic and paramount law to which x x deciding cases, the judiciary is called upon to maintain inviolate what is decreed by the
x all persons, including the highest officials of the land, must defer. No act shall be valid, fundamental law. Even its power of judicial review to pass upon the validity of the acts of the
however noble its intentions, if it conflicts with the Constitution.’"40 In Bengzon v. Drilon,41 the coordinate branches in the course of adjudication is a logical corollary of this basic principle that
Court held that, "the three branches of government must discharge their respective functions the Constitution is paramount. It overrides any governmental measure that fails to live up to its
within the limits of authority conferred by the Constitution."42 In Mutuc v. Commission on mandates. Thereby there is a recognition of its being the supreme law.58
Elections,43 the Court held that, "The three departments of government in the discharge of the
functions with which it is [sic] entrusted have no choice but to yield obedience to [the Sustaining the RTC’s ruling would make a dangerous precedent. It will allow Congress to do
Constitution’s] commands. Whatever limits it imposes must be observed."44 indirectly what it cannot do directly. In order to circumvent the constitutional prohibition on
franchises that are exclusive in character, all Congress has to do is to create a law allowing the
Police power does not include the power to violate the Constitution. Police power is the plenary BOD and the LWUA to create franchises that are exclusive in character, as in the present case.
power vested in Congress to make laws not repugnant to the Constitution. This rule is basic.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We DECLARE Section 47 of Presidential Decree No.
In Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v. Viron Transportation Co., Inc.,45 the Court held 198 UNCONSTITUTIONAL. We SET ASIDE the 1 October 2004 Judgment and 6 November
that, "Police power is the plenary power vested in the legislature to make, ordain, and establish 2004 Order of the Regional Trial Court, Judicial Region 1, Branch 62, La Trinidad, Benguet, in
wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes and ordinances, not repugnant to the
Civil Case No. 03-CV-1878 and REINSTATE the 23 July 2002 Resolution and 15 August 2002 candidacy. The petition was sent by facsimile and registered mail on April 29, 1996 to the
Decision of the National Water Resources Board. Commission on Elections National Office, Manila.

SO ORDERED. On May 2, 1996, the same day respondent Rios issued the memorandum to petitioner, the
COMELEC en bancissued an order directing the Board of Election Tellers and Board of
ANTONIO T. CARPIO Canvassers of Barangay San Lorenzo to suspend the proclamation of petitioner in the event she
Associate Justice won in the election. The order reads as follows:

WE CONCUR: Acting on the Fax "Petition for Denial And/Or Cancellation of Certificate of Candidacy" by
petitioner Florencio G. Sales, Jr. against Lynette G. Garvida, received on April 29, 1996, the
pertinent allegations of which reads:

G.R. No. 124893, April 18, 1997 xxx xxx xxx

LYNETTE G. GARVIDA, petitioner,  5. That the said respondent is disqualified to become a voter and a candidate for the SK for the
vs. reason that she will be more than twenty-one (21) years of age on May 6, 1996; that she was
FLORENCIO G. SALES, JR., THE HONORABLE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ELECTION born on June 11, 1974 as can be gleaned from her birth certificate, copy of which is hereto
OFFICER DIONISIO F. RIOS and PROVINCIAL SUPERVISOR NOLI PIPO, respondents. attached and marked as Annex "A";

6. That in filing her certificate of candidacy as candidate for SK of Bgy. San Lorenzo, Bangui,
Ilocos Norte, she made material representation which is false and as such, she is disqualified;
PUNO, J.: that her certificate of candidacy should not be given due course and that said candidacy must be
cancelled;
Petitioner Lynette G. Garvida seeks to annul and set aside the order dated May 2, 1996 of
respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) en banc suspending her proclamation as the xxx xxx xxx
duly elected Chairman of the Sangguniang Kabataan of Barangay San Lorenzo, Municipality of
Bangui, Ilocos Norte. the Commission, it is appearing that the petition is meritorious, hereby DIRECTS the Board of
Election Tellers/Board of Canvassers of Barangay San Lorenzo, Bangui, Ilocos Norte, to
The facts are undisputed. The Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) elections nationwide was scheduled suspend the proclamation of Lynette G. Garvida in the event she garners the highest number of
to be held on May 6, 1996. On March 16, 1996, petitioner applied for registration as member votes for the position of Sangguniang Kabataan [sic].
and voter of the Katipunan ng Kabataan of Barangay San Lorenzo, Bangui, Ilocos Norte. The
Board of Election Tellers, however, denied her application on the ground that petitioner, who Meantime, petitioner is hereby required to submit immediately ten (10) copies of his petition and
was then twenty-one years and ten (10) months old, exceeded the age limit for membership in to pay the filing and legal research fees in the amount of P510.00.
the Katipunan ng Kabataan as laid down in Section 3 [b] of COMELEC Resolution No. 2824.
SO ORDERED. 
On April 2, 1996, petitioner filed a "Petition for Inclusion as Registered Kabataang Member and
Voter" with the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Bangui-Pagudpud-Adams-Damalneg, Ilocos Norte. On May 6, 1996, election day, petitioner garnered 78 votes as against private respondent's
In a decision dated April 18, 1996, the said court found petitioner qualified and ordered her votes of 76. In accordance with the May 2, 1996 order of the COMELEC en banc, the Board of
registration as member and voter in the Katipunan ng Kabataan. The Board of Election Tellers Election Tellers did not proclaim petitioner as the winner. Hence, the instant petition
appealed to the Regional Trial Court, Bangui, Ilocos Norte. The presiding judge of the Regional for certiorari was filed on May 27, 1996.
Trial Court, however, inhibited himself from acting on the appeal due to his close association
with petitioner.  On June 2, 1996, however, the Board of Election Tellers proclaimed petitioner the winner for the
position of SK chairman, Barangay San Lorenzo, Bangui, Ilocos Norte. The proclamation was
On April 23, 1996, petitioner filed her certificate of candidacy for the position of Chairman, "without prejudice to any further action by the Commission on Elections or any other interested
Sangguniang Kabataan, Barangay San Lorenzo, Municipality of Bangui, Province of Ilocos party."  On July 5, 1996, petitioner ran in the Pambayang Pederasyon ng mga Sangguniang
Norte. In a letter dated April 23, 1996, respondent Election Officer Dionisio F. Rios, per advice of Kabataan for the municipality of Bangui, Ilocos Norte. She won as Auditor and was proclaimed
Provincial Election Supervisor Noli Pipo, disapproved petitioner's certificate of candidacy again one of the elected officials of the Pederasyon. 
due to her age. Petitioner, however, appealed to COMELEC Regional Director Filemon A.
Asperin who set aside the order of respondents and allowed petitioner to run.  Petitioner raises two (2) significant issues: the first concerns the jurisdiction of the COMELEC en
banc to act on the petition to deny or cancel her certificate of candidacy; the second, the
On May 2, 1996, respondent Rios issued a memorandum to petitioner informing her of her cancellation of her certificate of candidacy on the ground that she has exceeded the age
ineligibility and giving her 24 hours to explain why her certificate of candidacy should not be requirement to run as an elective official of the SK.
disapproved. Earlier and without the knowledge of the COMELEC officials, private respondent
Florencio G. Sales, Jr., a rival candidate for Chairman of the Sangguniang Kabataan, filed with I
the COMELEC en banc a "Petition of Denial and/or Cancellation of Certificate of Candidacy"
Section 532 (a) of the Local Government Code of 1991 provides that the conduct of the SK
against petitioner Garvida for falsely representing her age qualification in her certificate of
elections is under the supervision of the COMELEC and shall be governed by the Omnibus
Election Code. The Omnibus Election Code, in Section 78, Article IX, governs the procedure to Every pleading before the COMELEC must be printed, mimeographed or typewritten in legal
deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy, viz: size bond paper and filed in at least ten (10) legible copies. Pleadings must be filed directly with
the proper Clerk of Court of the COMELEC personally, or, by registered mail.
Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. — A verified petition
seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by any person In the instant case, the subject petition was not in proper form. Only two (2) copies of the petition
exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained therein as required under were filed with the COMELEC. 19 Also, the COMELEC en banc issued its Resolution on the
Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days basis of the petition transmitted by facsimile, not by registered mail.
from the time of filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after due notice and
hearing, not later than fifteen days before election. A facsimile or fax transmission is a process involving the transmission and reproduction of
printed and graphic matter by scanning an original copy, one elemental area at a time, and
In relation thereto, Rule 23 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure provides that a petition to deny representing the shade or tone of each area by a specified amount of electric current. 20 The
due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy for an elective office may be filed with the Law current is transmitted as a signal over regular telephone lines or via microwave relay and is used
Department of the COMELEC on the ground that the candidate has made a false material by the receiver to reproduce an image of the elemental area in the proper position and the
representation in his certificate. The petition may be heard, and evidence received by any official correct shade. 21 The receiver is equipped with a stylus or other device that produces a printed
designated by the COMELEC after which the case shall be decided by the COMELEC itself. record on paper referred to as a facsimile. 22

Under the same Rules of Procedure, jurisdiction over a petition to cancel a certificate of Filing a pleading by facsimile transmission is not sanctioned by the COMELEC Rules of
candidacy lies with the COMELEC sitting in Division, not en banc. Cases before a Division may Procedure, much less by the Rules of Court. A facsimile is not a genuine and authentic pleading.
only be entertained by the COMELEC en banc when the required number of votes to reach a It is, at best, an exact copy preserving all the marks of an original. 23 Without the original, there
decision, resolution, order or ruling is not obtained in the Division. Moreover, only motions to is no way of determining on its face whether the facsimile pleading is genuine and authentic and
reconsider decisions, resolutions, orders or rulings of the COMELEC in Division are resolved by was originally signed by the party and his counsel. It may, in fact, be a sham pleading. The
the COMELEC en banc. It is therefore the COMELEC sitting in Divisions that can hear and uncertainty of the authenticity of a facsimile pleading should have restrained the COMELEC en
decide election cases. This is clear from Section 3 of the said Rules thus: banc from acting on the petition and issuing the questioned order. The COMELEC en
banc should have waited until it received the petition filed by registered mail.
Sec. 3. The Commission Sitting in Divisions. — The Commission shall sit in two (2) Divisions to
hear and decide protests or petitions in ordinary actions, special actions, special cases, III
provisional remedies, contempt and special proceedings except in accreditation of citizens' arms
of the Commission. To write finis to the case at bar, we shall now resolve the issue of petitioner's age.

In the instant case, the COMELEC en banc did not refer the case to any of its Divisions upon The Katipunan ng Kabataan was originally created by Presidential Decree No. 684 in 1975 as
receipt of the petition. It therefore acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion the Kabataang Barangay, a barangay youth organization composed of all residents of the
when it entertained the petition and issued the order of May 2, 1996.  barangay who were at least 15 years but less than 18 years of age. The Kabataang Barangay
sought to provide its members a medium to express their views and opinions and participate in
II issues of transcendental importance. Its affairs were administered by a barangay youth
chairman together with six barangay youth leaders who were actual residents of the barangay
The COMELEC en banc also erred when it failed to note that the petition itself did not comply and were at least 15 years but less than 18 years of age. In 1983, Batas Pambansa Blg. 337,
with the formal requirements of pleadings under the COMELEC Rules of Procedure. These then the Local Government Code, raised the maximum age of the Kabataang Barangay
requirements are: members from "less than 18 years of age" to "not more than 21 years of age."

Sec. 1. Filing of Pleadings. — Every pleading, motion and other papers must be filed in ten (10) The Local Government Code of 1991 changed the Kabataang Barangay into the Katipunan ng
legible copies. However, when there is more than one respondent or protestee, the petitioner or Kabataan. It, however, retained the age limit of the members laid down in B.P. 337 at 15 but not
protestant must file additional number of copies of the petition or protest as there are additional more than 21 years old. The affairs of the Katipunan ng Kabataan are administered by the
respondents or protestees. Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) composed of a chairman and seven (7) members who are elected
by the Katipunan ng Kabataan. The chairman automatically becomes ex-officio member of the
Sec. 2. How Filed. — The documents referred to in the immediately preceding section must be Sangguniang Barangay. A member of the SK holds office for a term of three (3) years, unless
filed directly with the proper Clerk of Court of the Commission personally, or, unless otherwise sooner removed for cause, or becomes permanently incapacitated, dies or resigns from office.
provided in these Rules, by registered mail. In the latter case, the date of mailing is the date of
filing and the requirement as to the number of copies must be complied with. Membership in the Katipunan ng Kabataan is subject to specific qualifications laid down by the
Local Government Code of 1991, viz:
Sec. 3. Form of Pleadings, etc. — (a) All pleadings allowed by these Rules shall be printed,
mimeographed or typewritten on legal size bond paper and shall be in English or Filipino. Sec. 424. Katipunan ng Kabataan. — The katipunan ng kabataan shall be composed of all
citizens of the Philippines actually residing in the barangay for at least six (6) months, who are
xxx xxx xxx fifteen (15) but not more than twenty-one (21) years of age, and who are duly registered in the
list of the sangguniang kabataan or in the official barangay list in the custody of the barangay
secretary.
A member of the Katipunan ng Kabataan may become a candidate for the Sangguniang admittedly beyond the limit set in Section 3 [b] of COMELEC Resolution No. 2824. Petitioner,
Kabataan if he possesses the following qualifications: however, argues that Section 3 [b] of Resolution No. 2824 is unlawful, ultra vires and beyond the
scope of Sections 424 and 428 of the Local Government Code of 1991. She contends that the
Sec. 428. Qualifications. — An elective official of the sangguniang kabataan must be a citizen of Code itself does not provide that the voter must be exactly 21 years of age on election day. She
the Philippines, a qualified voter of the katipunan ng kabataan, a resident of the barangay for at urges that so long as she did not turn twenty-two (22) years old, she was still twenty-one years
least one (1) year immediately prior to election, at least fifteen (15) years but not more than of age on election day and therefore qualified as a member and voter in the Katipunan ng
twenty-one (21) years of age on the day of his election, able to read and write Filipino, English, Kabataan and as candidate for the SK elections.
or the local dialect, and must not have been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude.
A closer look at the Local Government Code will reveal a distinction between the maximum age
Under Section 424 of the Local Government Code, a member of the Katipunan ng Kabataan of a member in the Katipunan ng Kabataan and the maximum age of an elective SK official.
must be: (a) a Filipino citizen; (b) an actual resident of the barangay for at least six months; (c) Section 424 of the Code sets a member's maximum age at 21 years only. There is no further
15 but not more than 21 years of age; and (d) duly registered in the list of the Sangguniang provision as to when the member shall have turned 21 years of age. On the other hand, Section
Kabataan or in the official barangay list. Section 428 of the Code requires that an elective official 428 provides that the maximum age of an elective SK official is 21 years old "on the day of his
of the Sangguniang Kabataan must be: (a) a Filipino citizen; (b) a qualified voter in the election." The addition of the phrase "or the day of his election" is an additional qualification. The
Katipunan ng Kabataan; (c) a resident of the barangay at least one (1) year immediately member may be more than 21 years of age on election day or on the day he registers as
preceding the election; (d) at least 15 years but not more than 21 years of age on the day of his member of the Katipunan ng Kabataan. The elective official, however, must not be more than 21
election; (e) able to read and write; and (f) must not have been convicted of any crime involving years old on the day of election. The distinction is understandable considering that the Code
moral turpitude. itself provides more qualifications for an elective SK official than for a member of the Katipunan
ng Kabataan. Dissimilum dissimilis est ratio. The courts may distinguish when there are facts
For the May 6, 1996 SK elections, the COMELEC interpreted Sections 424 and 428 of the Local and circumstances showing that the legislature intended a distinction or qualification. 
Government Code of 1991 in Resolution No. 2824 and defined how a member of the Katipunan
ng Kabataan becomes a qualified voter and an elective official. Thus: The qualification that a voter in the SK elections must not be more than 21 years of age on the
day of the election is not provided in Section 424 of the Local Government Code of 1991. In fact
Sec. 3. Qualifications of a voter. — To be qualified to register as a voter in the SK elections, a the term "qualified voter" appears only in COMELEC Resolution No. 2824. Since a "qualified
person must be: voter" is not necessarily an elective official, then it may be assumed that a "qualified voter" is a
"member of the Katipunan ng Kabataan." Section 424 of the Code does not provide that the
a) a citizen of the Philippines;
maximum age of a member of the Katipunan ng Kabataan is determined on the day of the
b) fifteen (15) but not more than twenty-one (21) years of age on election day that is, he must election. Section 3 [b] of COMELEC Resolution No. 2824 is therefore ultra vires insofar as it sets
have been born between May 6, 1975 and May 6, 1981, inclusive; and the age limit of a voter for the SK elections at exactly 21 years on the day of the election.

c) a resident of the Philippines for at least one (1) year and actually residing in the barangay The provision that an elective official of the SK should not be more than 21 years of age on the
wherein he proposes to vote for at least six (6) months immediately preceding the elections. day of his election is very clear. The Local Government Code speaks of years, not months nor
days. When the law speaks of years, it is understood that years are of 365 days each. One born
xxx xxx xxx on the first day of the year is consequently deemed to be one year old on the 365th day after his
birth — the last day of the year. In computing years, the first year is reached after completing the
Sec. 6. Qualifications of elective members. — An elective official of the SK must be: first 365 days. After the first 365th day, the first day of the second 365-day cycle begins. On the
365th day of the second cycle, the person turns two years old. This cycle goes on and on in a
a) a qualified voter; lifetime. A person turns 21 years old on the 365th day of his 21st 365-day cycle. This means on
his 21st birthday, he has completed the entire span of 21 365-day cycles. After this birthday, the
b) a resident in the barangay for at least one (1) year immediately prior to the elections; and
365-day cycle for his 22nd year begins. The day after the 365th day is the first day of the next
c) able to read and write Filipino or any Philippine language or dialect or English. 365-day cycle and he turns 22 years old on the 365th day.

Cases involving the eligibility or qualification of candidates shall be decided by the city/municipal The phrase "not more than 21 years of age" means not over 21 years, not beyond 21 years. It
Election Officer (EO) whose decision shall be final. means 21 365-day cycles. It does not mean 21 years and one or some days or a fraction of a
year because that would be more than 21 365-day cycles. "Not more than 21 years old" is not
A member of the Katipunan ng Kabataan may be a qualified voter in the May 6, 1996 SK equivalent to "less than 22 years old," contrary to petitioner's claims. The law does not state that
elections if he is: (a) a Filipino citizen; (b) 15 but not more than 21 years of age on election the candidate be less than 22 years on election day.
day, i.e., the voter must be born between May 6, 1975 and May 6, 1981, inclusive; and (c) a
resident of the Philippines for at least one (1) year and an actual resident of the barangay at In P.D. 684, the law that created the Kabataang Barangay, the age qualification of a barangay
least six (6) months immediately preceding the elections. A candidate for the SK must: (a) youth official was expressly stated as ". . . at least fifteen years of age or over but less than
possess the foregoing qualifications of a voter; (b) be a resident in the barangay at least one (1) eighteen . . ." This provision clearly states that the youth official must be at least 15 years old
year immediately preceding the elections; and (c) able to read and write. and may be 17 years and a fraction of a year but should not reach the age of eighteen years.
When the Local Government Code increased the age limit of members of the youth organization
Except for the question of age, petitioner has all the qualifications of a member and voter in the to 21 years, it did not reenact the provision in such a way as to make the youth "at least 15 but
Katipunan ng Kabataan and a candidate for the Sangguniang Kabataan. Petitioner 's age is less than 22 years old." If the intention of the Code's framers was to include citizens less than 22
years old, they should have stated so expressly instead of leaving the matter open to confusion Kabataan Chairman "refuses to assume office, fails to qualify, is convicted of a felony, voluntarily
and doubt.  resigns, dies, is permanently incapacitated, is removed from office, or has been absent without
leave for more than three (3) consecutive months."
Former Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, the sponsor and principal author of the Local Government
Code of 1991 declared that one of the reasons why the Katipunan ng Kabataan was created and The question of the age qualification is a question of eligibility.Being "eligible" means being
the Kabataang Barangay discontinued was because most, if not all, Kabataang Barangay "legally qualified; capable of being legally chosen." Ineligibility, on the other hand, refers to the
leaders were already over 21 years of age by the time President Aquino assumed power. They lack of the qualifications prescribed in the Constitution or the statutes for holding public
were not the "youth" anymore. The Local Government Code of 1991 fixed the maximum age office. Ineligibility is not one of the grounds enumerated in Section 435 for succession of the SK
limit at not more than 21 years and the only exception is in the second paragraph of Section 423 Chairman.
which reads:
To avoid a hiatus in the office of SK Chairman, the Court deems it necessary to order that the
Sec. 423. Creation and Election. — vacancy be filled by the SK member chosen by the incumbent SK members of Barangay San
Lorenzo, Bangui, Ilocos Norte by simple majority from among themselves. The member chosen
a) . . . ; shall assume the office of SK Chairman for the unexpired portion of the term, and shall
discharge the powers and duties, and enjoy the rights and privileges appurtenant to said office.
b) A sangguniang kabataan official who, during his term of office, shall have passed the age of
twenty-one (21) years shall be allowed to serve the remaining portion of the term for which he IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is dismissed and petitioner Lynette G. Garvida is declared
was elected.The general rule is that an elective official of the Sangguniang Kabataan must not ineligible for being over the age qualification for candidacy in the May 6, 1996 elections of the
be more than 21 years of age on the day of his election. The only exception is when the official Sangguniang Kabataan, an is ordered to vacate her position as Chairman of the Sangguniang
reaches the age of 21 years during his incumbency. Section 423 [b] of the Code allows him to Kabataan of Barangay San Lorenzo, Bangui, Ilocos Norte. The Sangguniang Kabataan member
serve the remaining portion of the term for which he was elected. According to Senator voted by simple majority by and from among the incumbent Sangguniang Kabataan members of
Pimentel, the youth leader must have "been elected prior to his 21st birthday." Conversely, the Barangay San Lorenzo, Bangui, Ilocos Norte shall assume the office of Sangguniang Kabataan
SK official must not have turned 21 years old before his election. Reading Section 423 [b] Chairman of Barangay San Lorenzo, Bangui, Ilocos Norte for the unexpired portion of the term.
together with Section 428 of the Code, the latest date at which an SK elective official turns 21
years old is on the day of his election. The maximum age of a youth official must therefore be SO ORDERED.
exactly 21 years on election day. Section 3 [b] in relation to Section 6 [a] of COMELEC
Resolution No. 2824 is not ultra vires insofar as it fixes the maximum age of an elective SK
official on the day of his election.

In the case at bar, petitioner was born on June 11, 1974. On March 16, 1996, the day she
registered as voter for the May 6, 1996 SK elections, petitioner was twenty-one (21) years and
nine (9) months old. On the day of the elections, she was 21 years, 11 months and 5 days old.
When she assumed office on June 1, 1996, she was 21 years, 11 months and 20 days old and
was merely ten (10) days away from turning 22 years old. Petitioner may have qualified as a
member of the Katipunan ng Kabataan but definitely, petitioner was over the age limit for
elective SK officials set by Section 428 of the Local Government Code and Sections 3 [b] and 6
of Comelec Resolution No. 2824. She was ineligible to run as candidate for the May 6, 1996
Sangguniang Kabataan elections.

The requirement that a candidate possess the age qualification is founded on public policy and if
he lacks the age on the day of the election, he can be declared ineligible. In the same vein, if the
candidate is over the maximum age limit on the day of the election, he is ineligible. The fact that
the candidate was elected will not make the age requirement directory, nor will it validate his
election.The will of the people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of
ineligibility.

The ineligibility of petitioner does not entitle private respondent, the candidate who obtained the
highest number of votes in the May 6, 1996 elections, to be declared elected.  A defeated
candidate cannot be deemed elected to the office.Moreover, despite his claims, private
respondent has failed to prove that the electorate themselves actually knew of petitioner's
ineligibility and that they maliciously voted for her with the intention of misapplying their
franchises and throwing away their votes for the benefit of her rival candidate. 

Neither can this Court order that pursuant to Section 435 of the Local Government Code
petitioner should be succeeded by the Sangguniang Kabataan member who obtained the next
highest number of votes in the May 6, 1996 elections. Section 435 applies when a Sangguniang