G. R. No. 129306 - March 14, 2003 removing his blindfold and untying him.

removing his blindfold and untying him. His daughter Lucy Ngo then entered the room. He
was asked if he wanted to go to the hospital but he declined. 2
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. JAMES PATANO Y MARCAIDA, RAMIL
MADRIAGA Y LAGONOY AND ROSENDO MADRIAGA Y BANAAG, appellants. On cross-examination, Uy stated that when his blindfold was removed, he saw two
handcuffed men. He pointed to appellant Rosendo Madriaga who was in the courtroom,
but Uy declared that he is not certain that Rosendo was the one he had seen handcuffed
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
because the one he saw was wearing a moustache and Rosendo does not have one. 3

For automatic review is the decision dated April 30, 1997, rendered by the Regional Trial
Chief Inspector Gilbert Cruz, in-charge of operations of the Presidential Anti-Crime
Court of Pasig City, Branch 262 in Criminal Case No. 110089-H convicting appellants
Commission's (PACC) Task Force Habagat, testified as follows -- On March 27, 1996, his
James Patano, Ramil Madriaga and Rosendo Madriaga of the crime of Kidnapping for
superior, Supt. Calinisan instructed him to proceed to the residence of Uy as the former
Ransom and imposing upon them the supreme penalty of death.
received a call from Lucy telling him that there was someone in the house of Virginia
Avelita, Uy's common-law wife, who claims to know the location of the victim. He went to
The Amended Information, dated May 15, 1996, charged appellants James Patano, Ramil the house of Lucy and they agreed that he will pose as the family's lawyer. They then
Madriaga and Rosendo Madriaga as well as Oswaldo Banaag, Manolo Babac, Allan Duarte went to the house of Virginia. There, he was introduced to appellant Ramil Madriaga who
and Jose Doe, with the crime of Kidnapping for Ransom, committed as follows: told them that Uy was under the custody of the Antipolo police because he was arrested
for swimming without authority at the Villa Cristina Resort (resort for brevity), Antipolo,
That on or about March 25, 1996, in Mandaluyong City, and within the jurisdiction of this Rizal, now Antipolo City. Upon his instructions, verification was made by a certain Chief
Honorable Court, the aforenamed accused grouping themselves together, conspiring, Insp. Quidato4 who had gone to the resort and learned that the information was false.
confederating and mutually helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully Together with Lucy and appellant Ramil, Maj. Cruz proceeded to the resort. Upon reaching
and feloniously detain/kidnap and/otherwise deprived VICENTE UY Y CHUA (NGO LIT the resort, Ramil "dashed" towards cottage no. 2 but Maj. Cruz stopped Ramil. In front of
POON) of his liberty for the purpose of extorting ransom, as in fact demand therefore in the cottage was a certain Richard Dimal to whom Cruz identified himself as a police
the amount of TEN MILLION (P10,000,000.00) PESOS had been made by the above- officer. He found appellant Rosendo and victim Uy inside the cottage. Dimal and appellant
named accused, while detaining said victim in Antipolo, Rizal, until his rescue on March Rosendo were then arrested, handcuffed and brought to the headquarters where they
27, 1996. identified a certain Oswaldo Banaag as the "tipster" of the group. 5

CONTRARY TO LAW.1 Lucy Ngo's testimony is as follows -- In the morning of March 26, 1996, she received a
call from Virginia Avelita telling her that a certain Ramil Madriaga was at her place with
information regarding the whereabouts of her father Vicente Uy, also known as Ngo Lip
All three appellants together with Oswaldo Banaag pleaded not guilty to the crime as Poon. She called Maj. Gilbert Cruz and together, they went to Virginia's house. There, they
charged. Their other co-accused Manolo Babac, Allan Duarte and Jose Doe remain at met appellant Ramil who informed them that he received a beeper message from his
large. Trial ensued. cousin, appellant Rosendo, telling him that the Antipolo police picked up their group and
Uy was recovered. Maj. Cruz then instructed Maj. Winnie Quidato to check with the
The prosecution presented six witnesses. Antipolo police if there was really an arrest made on that day and it was learned that there
was none. Maj. Cruz instructed Quidato to proceed to the resort which they also did
together with Lucy's uncles and aunts. At the resort, appellant Ramil got off the car and
Kidnap victim Vicente Uy testified as follows -- On March 25, 1996, at around 10:30 in the talked to Maj. Cruz who instructed Ramil: "(O)kay but slowly, do not run or make any
evening, he was along Wilson St., San Juan, Metro Manila, on his way home driving his move." Halfway towards his cousin, appellant Ramil ran and met appellant Rosendo. Maj.
Nissan Sentra when a black Pajero bumped his car on the left door, driver's side. Both he Cruz then ran, followed by his staff. Lucy and her companions were left waiting in the car
and the driver of the Pajero got off their respective vehicles. When he told the driver that until Quidato returned and told her that her father is safe, and they proceeded to the
they have to call a police officer, he was told that the passengers inside the Pajero were cottage. Appellant Ramil approached Lucy and asked her not to include his cousin Rosendo
police officers. He was asked to look inside the Pajero. When he did so, the driver in the case because of Ramil's help in the rescue of her father. 6
suddenly pushed him inside the vehicle while the four other passengers grabbed him. He
was blindfolded and his feet and hands were tied. After traveling for about 30 minutes, the
vehicle stopped and he was transferred to the baggage compartment of another vehicle. Richard Dimal who was arrested by Maj. Cruz on March 27, 1996, testified as follows -- In
An object was placed on top of him and he was told that it was an armalite. They traveled the evening of March 25, 1996, he was renting some VHS tapes at the Star Gazer video
again for 30 minutes, after which, he was moved, placed on a "hard object" and covered shop located at Pasig City where he saw his friend Nadel Francisco. They chatted until 12
with "something". He was asked if he has ten million pesos (P10,000,000.00) to which he o'clock midnight. Appellant Ramil passed by in his white Toyota Corolla car between 12
replied in the negative. They bargained for a while until the ransom money was pegged at o'clock and 1 o'clock in the morning of March 26, 1996 and invited Dimal "to go around"
five million pesos (P5,000,000.00). They asked for his telephone number which he gave. to which the latter acceded. They went to the house of Dimal at Cainta, Rizal. Dimal saw a
After some hours, Uy felt somebody lifting him up, telling him that he was already safe, black Nissan Patrol parked in front of his house. Appellant Ramil then called up a
passenger of the Nissan Patrol on his mobile phone and told the latter, "we can't do it
here, we must find a darker place." Then they proceeded to Taytay, Rizal and stopped First to be presented was accused Oswaldo Banaag, family driver of a certain Beverly Tan.
behind its new market. Appellant Ramil alighted from the car and went to the Nissan He denied any complicity in the crime. Banaag testified that: he was arrested in White
Patrol. Thereafter, Dimal saw them put something inside the trunk of the car of Ramil. Plains, Quezon City, on March 29, 1996 by Maj. Cruz and was brought to Camp Crame; it
They left Taytay, Rizal and roamed around, with the Nissan Patrol tailing them. When they was only when he was transferred to a detention cell that he met his co-accused; although
reached Bulacan, they stopped and Ramil talked to the passengers of the Nissan Patrol. he knew victim Uy, he thought that he was being charged with the killing of his employer,
Ramil returned to his car and told Dimal that they will go to Antipolo, Rizal. Upon reaching Reynaldo Tan; he was surprised when he learned that he was being implicated in the
Antipolo, the passengers of the Nissan Patrol transferred to the car of Ramil. They left the kidnapping of Uy.11
Nissan Patrol behind. Dimal identified Manolo Babac as the driver of the Nissan Patrol and
both appellants Rosendo Madriaga and James Patano as well as the two co-accused who
Nadel Francisco, a college student taking up Management course, testified that at "around
are still at-large, Alan Duarte and Jose Doe, as its passengers. When they reached the
4 o'clock to 5 o'clock in the afternoon" of March 25, 1996, Richard Dimal visited him at his
resort located in Antipolo, Rizal, between 5 o'clock and 6 o'clock in the morning (March
house at de Castro, Pasig City. They chatted for about one hour. Dimal invited him to go
26, 1996), appellant Ramil opened the trunk of his car. Jose and appellant Patano lifted a
swimming in Villa Cristina Resort but he declined because he has an examination the
person out of the trunk and brought him inside cottage no. 2. Dimal asked appellant Ramil
following day. Francisco belied Dimal's statement that they were together until 12 o'clock
if he could go home but Ramil said that they will all leave together. Ramil and Duarte then
midnight as he was already asleep in his house at that time. He further stated that he did
left the place. Dimal, appellants Rosendo and Patano, and Jose were left inside the
not see appellant Ramil Madriaga on said day.12 On cross-examination, Francisco admitted
cottage. They all went to sleep. When Dimal woke up, it was between 12 o'clock and 1
that appellant Ramil's girlfriend asked him to testify but he clarified that he was testifying
o'clock in the afternoon (March 26, 1996). He went to the resort's restaurant and stayed
not because of such request, but because of the subpoena issued to him. 13
there for about 30 minutes. When he went back to the cottage, the others were not there
anymore. While waiting for Ramil and the others to come back, he took his dinner
between 7 o'clock and 8 o'clock in the evening of "March 26, 1996" and he laid down up to Appellant Rosendo Madriaga testified thus -- At around 8 o'clock in the evening of March
"1 o'clock early morning" of "March 27, 1996". When he went out of the cottage to call up 25, 1996, Richard Dimal, together with a certain Nestor, went to his house and invited
somebody because he was confused having been left alone, appellant Rosendo arrived him for a swim in Antipolo, Rizal, as it was Nestor's birthday. They arrived at Villa Cristina
together with Jose. Jose left again at 6 o'clock in the morning (March 27, 1996) leaving Resort at around 10 o'clock in the evening and rented a "cottage table" near the pool.
Dimal and appellant Rosendo inside the cottage. They took their lunch in front of the While he and Nestor were swimming, he saw Dimal talk to some men and then go
cottage and waited until "around 3 o'clock to 4 o'clock in the afternoon" when appellant upstairs. Later, he noticed that Nestor was no longer around. Afterwards, Dimal came
Ramil arrived with several companions who he later learned to be the kin of Uy and some back and invited him to drink. They went to a veranda and there, he saw Nestor drinking
police officers. Dimal and appellant Rosendo were left inside the cottage together with Fundador with the same men he previously saw talking to Dimal. Appellant Rosendo
some police officers to wait for their (Dimal's and Rosendo's) other companions. At 7 recalls the names of two of the men as Allan and Bong. At around 4 o'clock in the morning
o'clock in the evening, appellant Patano arrived. They stayed in the resort until the (March 26, 1996), Dimal confided to him that they were going to actually stand guard
afternoon of the next day and they were brought by the policemen to Camp Crame. 7 over a person. Dimal pulled him towards a room where Rosendo saw a person with bound
feet and hands lying on his belly on the floor. When Rosendo told Dimal that he wanted to
leave, he was told that Bong's group had men posted at the gate and he might be killed if
On cross-examination, Dimal admitted that he was arrested that afternoon of March 27;
he left. Scared, he stayed inside the room. Per instructions of Dimal, Rosendo burned all
that he was wearing a moustache at the time of the arrest and that he was the one who
the things belonging to the captive but Rosendo kept a PLDT bill. When Dimal had gone
fed victim Uy.8
asleep, Rosendo went to the resort's canteen and called the number of Virginia Avelita
reflected on the PLDT bill but the person answering the phone hung up on him several
Virginia "Virgie" Avelita, Uy's common-law wife, corroborated the testimony of Lucy and times. He then called up his cousin, appellant Ramil Madriaga, and asked for his help.
Maj. Cruz regarding appellant Ramil's contact with her. Virginia further testified that Ramil initially didn't want to intervene but eventually agreed to help him. He gave the
appellant Ramil related to her the whole kidnapping scenario; that Ramil informed her that number on the phone bill and appellant Ramil assured him that he will contact such
the kidnappers were demanding one hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) ransom; that person. He then went back to the veranda where he slept. The next day (March 27, 1996),
Oswaldo Banaag is the gang's tipster; and that Ramil requested her not to involve his between 3 o'clock and 4 o'clock in the afternoon, he heard somebody calling his name,
cousin Rosendo.9 and saw appellant Ramil who was with several armed men, running towards him. Dimal
then ran and threw a gun near the trees.14
The last witness for the prosecution, Chief Inspector Winnie Quidato, Chief of the
Intelligence and Operation Division of the Task Force Habagat, corroborated some portions Appellant Rosendo further testified that he saw appellant James Patano for the first time
of the testimony of Maj. Cruz on the episode at the resort. He also testified that appellant in the afternoon of March 28 on board a van at the resort,15 while he saw Oswaldo Banaag
Patano arrived at the resort at around 9 o'clock to 10 o'clock in the evening of March 27, for the first time at the PACC office.16 Rosendo avers that Dimal implicated him because
1996 bringing with him one thousand pesos (P1,000.00) as payment for the cottage the latter thinks he was the one who caused his arrest.17 Further, Rosendo testified that in
rental.10 the room where he, Patano and Dimal were brought by Maj. Cruz, victim Uy only pointed
to Dimal as the one who kidnapped him.18
The defense presented five witnesses.
Appellant James Patano recounted that: on March 28, 1996, after having gone for a swim, illegal detention defined and penalized under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code.
Maj. Quidato arrested him while he was urinating in one of the corners in the resort; he Accordingly, said accused are hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of death, as provided
was brought inside a comfort room in one of the cottages where he was asked if he knew for under said Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, to suffer the appropriate accessory
Dimal or appellant Rosendo; when he was brought out of the room, he was already penalties consequent thereto, and to proportionally pay the costs.
unconscious as he was mauled and a plastic bag was placed on his head; he regained
consciousness inside a vehicle; from the resort, he was brought to the PACC office; at the
SO ORDERED.22
PACC office, Dimal's kin, particularly Dimal's sister Arlene and her husband Willie Pangan,
asked him to testify against the Madriagas, but he turned them down; and he was also
asked to sign an affidavit but he likewise refused. Patano further denied knowing his co- Appellants insist that they are innocent of the crime of Kidnapping for Ransom, arguing
accused in the case.19 that:

Appellant Ramil Madriaga asserts his innocence of the crime charged. He testified as I THE TRIAL COURT ERRED GROSSLY IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANTS WITHOUT
follows -- In the early morning of March 26, 1996, his cousin Rosendo called him up BEING IDENTIFIED AS THE ABDUCTORS/KIDNAPPERS OR CULPRITS OF THE ALLEGED
asking for his help. Rosendo told Ramil that he was in the resort and was unexpectedly KIDNAPPING.
mixed up in a kidnapping; that he could not get out of the resort because there were
"look-outs" posted in the area. Rosendo gave Ramil a name and a number written in a II THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANTS SOLELY ON THE
PLDT bill. Appellant Ramil was hesitant because the results of the Bar examinations were BASIS OF THE LONE AND UNCORROBORATED TESTIMONY OF THE CO-CONSPIRATOR. 23
coming out that day; but nevertheless, he went to see a certain Lt. Capitulo in Camp
Aguinaldo and told him about his cousin's predicament.20 The next day, March 27, 1996,
Ramil went to see Virginia Avelita, the name given by appellant Rosendo written on the Bearing in mind that it devolves upon the State to establish by proof all the essential
PLDT bill. He showed her his school I.D. and asked her if she knows anybody who is elements of the crime with which appellants are charged and to establish beyond
missing, and the latter replied, "si Vicente ko." He was then made to talk over the phone reasonable doubt that they are guilty of said crime,24 the Court, after a meticulous
to Vicente Uy's daughter, who asked him to wait. Virginia, meanwhile, told him that she examination of the evidence of the prosecution, finds that appellants James Patano, Ramil
was going out. After an hour, Virginia, Lucy, three old women, their driver, PACC Madriaga and Rosendo Madriaga should have been acquitted by the trial court. The
operatives and Maj. Cruz arrived. After a short conversation, they left for the resort, prosecution failed to overthrow the constitutional presumption of innocence in favor of
leaving Virginia behind. He asked the latter to look after his white Toyota Corolla car appellants. It failed to adduce the quantum of proof necessary to convict them.
which he left in her residence. Upon reaching the resort, they were approached by Maj.
Quidato who asked him questions. He got off the car when he saw his cousin Rosendo In convicting appellants, the trial court gave great weight and evidentiary value to the
near the pool with Dimal. He pointed the two to Maj. Cruz who instructed his men to uncorroborated testimony of prosecution witness Richard Dimal on appellants' alleged
scatter. He then started walking towards his cousin, and when appellant Rosendo saw participation in the crime. It stated that Dimal's testimony is "direct, straightforward and
him, he told the latter, "mga kasama natin ito, huwag kang matakot." When he got to spontaneous" thus justifying the conclusion that appellants acted in concert in carrying
Rosendo, he pulled him and they leaned on the wall for fear that they might get shot. into effect the kidnapping of Vicente Uy. The trial court totally disregarded appellants'
Dimal ran upstairs while Rosendo pointed to the place where Uy was being kept. They testimonies on the ground that they failed to support their versions of the incident.
went inside the cottage and Ramil removed the plaster bindings on Uy. 21
It is well settled that the testimony of a single witness is sufficient to support a conviction
The trial court convicted appellants James Patano, Ramil Madriaga and Rosendo Madriaga so long as it is clear, straightforward and worthy of evidence by the trial court. 25 It is
of the crime of Kidnapping for Ransom, but acquitted their co-accused Oswaldo Banaag. likewise a settled doctrine that when it comes to credibility of witnesses, the findings of a
trial court on such matter will not be disturbed unless the lower court overlooked, ignored,
The dispositive portion of the assailed decision, reads: misapprehended, or misinterpreted certain facts or circumstances which are so material
such as to affect the outcome of the case.26

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

Although the trial court described the testimony of Dimal as "direct, straightforward and
spontaneous", it should not automatically endow outright probative weight to his
1. With respect to the Criminal Case No. 110090, on the ground of insufficiency of testimony or its veracity, to the exclusion of the testimonies of other witnesses. Many
evidence, all the accused are ACQUITTED. witnesses can give testimonies that are blatant lies, even if they appeared poker-faced
and did not bat their eyelashes.
2. With respect to Criminal Case No. 110089-H, on the ground of insufficiency of evidence,
accused OSWALDO P. BANAAG is hereby ACQUITTED. The jail warden of Mandaluyong After a careful scrutiny of the testimony of prosecution witness Dimal, the Court finds that
City is hereby directed to immediately release his person unless there are other legal the trial court failed to consider some significant facts and circumstances which affect his
grounds to justify his continued detention. However, with respect to accused ROSENDO B. credibility. His version of the incident is so incredible that a complete reversal of the
MADRIAGA, JAMES M. PATANO, and RAMIL L. MADRIAGA, judgment is hereby rendered findings of the trial court is warranted.
finding them GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of kidnapping and serious
To begin with, Dimal testified that he was with Nadel Francisco on the night of the A         I did not go with him, sir.
kidnapping when appellant Ramil passed by and invited him "to go around". 27 Dimal
likewise declared in his Sworn Statement dated April 1, 1996 that he was with Francisco
Q         Why?
when appellant Ramil Madriaga invited him at around 12 o'clock midnight, viz.:

A         I have an examination on the following day, sir.

SAGOT     -     13. Noong ganap na ika-pito ng gabi ng Marso 25, 1996, ako ay nagpunta
sa Star Gazer Video Shop sa Azucena Street, De Castro, Pasig upang mag-arkila ng VHS
tapes. Mayamaya ay nagkita kami doon ng kaibigan ko na si NADEL FRANCISCO at Q         I am showing to you a statement of Mr. Ricard Dimal attached to the records of
nagkuwentuhan kami doon sa tapat ng nasabing video shop hanggang bandang alas-dose this case found on page 64 consisting of 6 pages, on page 65 or the second page of the
ng hatinggabi. Habang nagkukuwentuhan kami ay napadaan sa harapan namin si statement of Richard Dimal, question #13 and the answer thereto, I'm reading it to you
kuya Amel na lulan ng isang kotse at niyaya niya akong sumama sa kanya at and please listen. "Maaari bang ikuwento mo dito kung paano ka nadamay sa nasabing
sinabing mayroon daw kaming happenings.28 (Emphasis Ours) kaso? And the answer, "Noong ganap na ika-pito ng gabi ng Marso 25, 1996, ako ay
nagpunta sa Star GazarVideo Shop sa Azucena St., De Castro, Pasig upang mag-arkila ng
VHS tapes. Mayamaya ay nagkita kami doon ng kaibigan ko na si Nedel Francisco at
But defense witness Francisco categorically denied Dimal's assertions. While he admitted
nagkuwentuhan kami sa tapat ng nasabing video shop hanggang bandang alas-dose ng
that he saw Dimal that day, he testified that they merely chatted for only about one and a
hatinggabi. Habang nagkukuwentuhan kami ay napadaan sa harapan namin si Kuya Amel
half (1 ) hours and parted ways at around 5:30 o'clock in the afternoon. Francisco testified
na lulan ng isang kotse at niyaya niya akong sumama sa kanya at sinabing mayroon day
thus:
kaming happenings". Did you hear what I read?

Q         You said you talked with Richard Dimal for one hour, more or less, will you tell this
A         Yes, sir.
Honorable Court what time did Richard and you started to talk?

Q         Did you understand what I read?

A         Approximately 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon, sir.

A         Yes, sir.
Q         It lasted around 5:30 o'clock?

Q         What can you say about what I have read which is the statement of Richard
A         Yes, sir.
Dimal?

Q         What subject matter did you talk with Richard Dimal?

A         I do not know about that alleged happening, sir.

A         I cannot remember anymore, we just chat about the lives of our friends, sir.
Q         On that date, around 12:00 o'clock midnight, where were you?

Q         Who among your friends were talked about?

A         I was already sleeping during that time, sir.

A         I cannot remember anymore, sir.

Q         During your conversation with Richard Dimal from 4:00 to 5:30 o'clock in the
afternoon of March 25, 1996, tell this Honorable Court whether you saw Kuya Amel?
Q         Before you and Ricard Dimal parted ways, what did Dimal tell you, if any?
A         I did not see him that day, sir.29
A         He invited me to go with him for swimming, sir.
The trial court chose to ignore Francisco's testimony. It did not explain in its decision why
Q         Will you tell this Honorable Court what place he is going to have swimming? it opted not to consider his testimony, why it relied on the testimony of Dimal despite
Francisco's explicit testimony that he and Dimal talked only up to 5:30 o'clock in the
afternoon and that it is not true that he saw Ramil with his car around midnight or at any
A         Villa Cristina, sir.
time of that day. The Court is confounded why the trial court entirely overlooked or
disregarded the testimony of Francisco who is a disinterested witness and had nothing to
Q         Tell this Honorable Court what was your reaction to the invitation of Ricahrd Dimal gain from belying Dimal's claim. Dimal regards Francisco as his friend; 30 and Francisco
to go with him at Villa Cristina? considers Dimal as a closer friend of his than Ramil's.31 Thus, when Francisco repudiated
Dimal's testimony, there was no reason for him to discredit Dimal except to tell the truth.
The credibility of Dimal is thereby eroded. There is no reason for the trial court to discredit
the testimony of Francisco. One may assert that while it may be true that after Francisco victim and the family of the victims; that the incredible happenings narrated by Dimal only
and Dimal parted ways at 5:30 o'clock in the afternoon, it could have happened that highlight his knowledge of the details of the facts surrounding the kidnapping for ransom.
Dimal and appellant Ramil had met at midnight. But this posture could not be upheld This may be so if the credibility of Dimal on the fact that he and Ramil had met that night
because of the testimony of Dimal himself that Francisco was present when Ramil invited of the kidnapping is beyond question.
him to roam around at about midnight, which could not be believed because Francisco
was, in fact, not present. In effect, from the start, Dimal is shown to be concocting his
In any event, if a set of facts admits of two interpretations, then the one consistent with
version of the kidnapping incident.
the presumption of innocence and in favor of the accused should prevail. 38

Furthermore, the trial court erred in accepting Dimal's testimony as gospel truth
The trial court declared that "there was never any positive identification made on any of
considering that his account of the events that transpired is replete with incredible
the accused, and that the prosecution presented evidence which are circumstantial in
happenings that should not have been accepted by the trial court as part of ordinary
nature to support the charge."39
human experience and common sense. For example, Dimal testified that he went with
Ramil upon the invitation of the latter and they went to his (Dimal's) house located at No.
046 Blk. I, PFCI Brgy. San Andres, Cainta, Rizal;32 that through a cellular phone, Ramil It is a hornbook doctrine that conspiracy must be proved by positive and convincing
told the passengers of the Nissan Patrol parked in front of Dimal's house that they could evidence. The prosecution miserably fell short of this requirement.
not do what they have to do in that place and that they have to find a darker place. 33 Why
then did Ramil have to meet the passengers of the Nissan Patrol in front of Dimal's house The trial court explicitly declared that the prosecution witness is not a co-conspirator and
when the place is not suitable to his (Ramil's) plans in the first place? Why did Ramil have therefore his testimony may be taken in evidence against all the appellants without
to go to Dimal's house when he could have used the cellular to tell them the place where running counter to Section 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.40
he thought would be a better place to meet them? There is nothing in Dimal's testimony
to explain said incongruities.
The court a quo seriously erred in this aspect. Based on Dimal's sworn statement, marked
as Exhibit "A",41 and his testimony, Dimal admitted and confessed as to his participation. 42
In addition, Dimal testified that they went to Taytay, Rizal and stopped behind the new
market place where Dimal saw something transferred from the Nissan Patrol to the trunk
of the Toyota Corolla of Ramil;34 that thereafter, from Taytay, Rizal, they roamed around In addition, the following manifestation of Atty. Marcelino Arias, to wit:
and then went to Bulacan with the Nissan Patrol still tailing Ramil's car; that upon
reaching Bulacan, Ramil alighted from his car and talked with the passengers of the Atty. Arias     Before the prosecution starts the direct examination, as per record, I
Nissan Patrol; that Ramil went back to his car and told Dimal that they will go to Antipolo, learned that his Richard Dimal is one of the suspects and he was arrested in all these
Rizal; that upon reaching Antipolo, the passengers of the Nissan Patrol transferred to cases but he was not included as one of the suspects, I want to put that on record, as far
Ramil's car35 and then they proceeded to Villa Cristina Resort in Antipolo, Rizal. From as the record is concern, he is one of those who allegedly took the victim, he confessed by
Taytay, Rizal, why do they have to roam around, go to Bulacan and then back to Rizal? means of an affidavit, now he is a witness and not one of the accused, your Honor.
From past midnight to 6 o'clock in the morning, why did Dimal, Ramil and the passengers
of the Nissan Patrol have to go around killing time when the final destination of all of them
together is the resort in Antipolo, Rizal? Why did the Nissan Patrol have to tail them all the Court     Everything you have said will be put on record, and for your own information
while from Taytay, Rizal to Bulacan after the victim was transferred to the car of Ramil defense counsel, that is the prerogative of the prosecution and no longer of the defense.
only to go to Antipolo, Rizal, a nearby town of Taytay, Rizal? Said acts are so preposterous
that no amount of stretching of imagination could bring the same within the realm of Atty. Arias     Considering that I noticed that the prosecution is in possession of an
human understanding. Affidavit of this witness which was not included in the records of this case, may I ask to be
furnished of this affidavit.
The test to determine the value of the testimony of a witness is whether such is in
conformity with knowledge and consistent with the experience of mankind; whatever is Fiscal Abesamis     The purpose of the testimony of Richard Dimal is to show the
repugnant to these standards becomes incredible and lies outside of judicial circumstances before, during and after the kidnapping of Mr. Vicente Uy, to show the
cognizance.36 Further, absent any other evidence to explain or corroborate such conspiracy acts of the accused in this case of said kidnapping and to identify some
implausible actuations, the trial court committed a reversible error in considering the evidence and thereafter to identify the accused in this case. With the permission of this
testimony of Dimal credible enough to sustain a conviction of all appellants. Evidence to Honorable Court.43
be believed must not only come from the mouth of a credible witness but must also be
credible in itself.37
was not refuted by the prosecution.

It may be posited that in the commission of the crime of kidnapping with ransom, the
Section 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides:
culprits usually adopt and pursue unfamiliar schemes or strategies not only to avoid easy
detection or monitoring of their movements, but to confuse the police authorities, the
SECTION 30. Admission by conspirator. The act or declaration of a conspirator relating to There could not be any misinterpretation in the meaning of the above testimonies. If the
the conspiracy and during its existence, may be given in evidence against the co- testimony of Dimal is taken in its entirety, it mainly revolved around events that allegedly
conspirator after the conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such act of declaration. occurred after the abduction was already consummated. As such, one would readily
conclude that Dimal did not really see the act of kidnapping and therefore, he did not see
any of the appellants perform the actual act of kidnapping. Besides, the trial court itself
Thus, conspiracy must be proven by evidence other than the testimony of Dimal.
declared that "there was never any positive identification made on any of the accused." 49

Proof of conspiracy need not rest on direct evidence as the felonious covenant itself may
Further, the prosecution evidence failed to sufficiently prove overt acts on the part of
be inferred from the conduct of the parties before, during, and after the commission of the
appellants that will convincingly show their direct participation or complicity in the
crime disclosing a common understanding between them relative to its commission. 44
kidnapping.

In its assessment, the trial court declared that the evidence for the prosecution is purely
In the case of appellant James Patano, he was condemned to death for his presence in the
circumstantial,45 on which basis it ruled that appellants conspired in perpetrating the crime
resort. The trial court held that since appellant Patano failed to corroborate his excuse that
of kidnapping with ransom.
he was just there for a swim with friends, then, the same must be ignored. 50 The Court
disagrees. If at all, what the prosecution was able to establish is that appellant Patano
For circumstantial evidence to be sufficient to support a conviction, all the circumstances knocked on the door of cottage no. 2, and Maj. Quidato heard him say: "(P)are kaibigan
must be consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty and at the same time ninyo ito, dala ko ang pera".51 Such alleged statement by Patano, even if true, is equivocal
inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is innocent, and with every other rational and ambiguous. He did not state for what purpose the money is to be used. No probative
hypothesis except that of guilt. 46 The following elements must concur: (1) there must be weight may be given to the testimony of Maj. Quidato that the amount of one thousand
more than one circumstance; (2) the facts on which the inference of guilt is based must pesos (P1,000.00) is for the payment of the cottage because it is a mere conclusion on his
be proved; and (3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a part based on his bare claim that the security guard and the official of the resort were
conviction beyond reasonable doubt.47 preventing the victim from leaving because the cottage has not been paid yet. Quidato did
not testify that he heard appellant Patano say that the alleged money he had with him
In the present case, the totality of the pieces of circumstantial evidence presented by the was for the rental of the cottage. In other words, even if appellant Patano really brought
prosecution is not sufficient to establish the guilt of appellants. Not one of the prosecution money to the cottage, the prosecution failed to connect the participation of Patano in the
witnesses saw the actual abduction. Witness Dimal admitted during cross-examination commission of the crime of Kidnapping for Ransom. Absent any other proof of overt act
that he did not see appellants actually kidnap or abduct Uy, viz.: necessary or essential to the perpetration of the kidnapping, Patano's alleged presence
and utterance cannot be a valid basis for his conviction. The Court cannot accept the trial
court's sweeping conclusion against Patano. The mere presence of appellant Patano at the
Q         You know that you never saw Ramil kidnapped Vicente Uy? resort after the commission of the crime does not imply conspiracy. Mere knowledge,
acquiescence to or agreement to cooperate, is not enough to constitute one as a party to
A         No, sir. a conspiracy, absent any active participation in the commission of the crime, with a view
to the furtherance of the common design and purpose. 52 Conspiracy transcends
companionship.53 Neither can the Court rely on the uncorroborated testimony of Dimal
Q         You never saw your Kuya Sendong kidnapped kidnapped (sic) Mr. Uy? whose testimony at the outset had been found not to be credible. The failure of appellant
Patano to present the friends he was with is not sufficient to support a finding of guilt
A         Yes, sir. beyond reasonable doubt. An accused should be found guilty on the basis of the strength
of prosecution evidence and not on the weakness of the defense. 54
Q         You never saw Oswaldo Banaag kidnapped Mr. Uy?
Settled is the rule that conviction should rest on the strength of the evidence of the
prosecution and not on the weakness of the defense. The identity of the offender, like the
A         No. sir.
crime itself, must be proved beyond reasonable doubt. Even though appellant Patano
invokes the inherently weak defense of denial, such defense nonetheless acquired
Q         You never saw James Patano kidnapped Mr. Uy? commensurate strength in the instant case where no positive and proper identification has
been made by the prosecution witnesses of the offender, as the prosecution still has
A         No, sir. the onus probandi in establishing the guilt of the accused. The weakness of the defense
does not relieve the prosecution of this responsibility. Besides, the Court has held that the
testimony of witness Dimal is not credible and not worthy of belief. There is reasonable
Q         Never did you see Mr. Ramil Madriaga kidnapped Mr. Uy? doubt as to his guilt or participation in the commission of the crime of Kidnapping for
Ransom. The doubt should therefore be resolved in favor of appellant James Patano. 55
A         Yes, sir.48
As regards appellant Ramil Madriaga, the trial court refused to accept his testimony and The testimonies of prosecution witnesses Maj. Cruz, Virginia Avelita and Chief Inspector
found his claim that he was responsible for the rescue of Uy to be "beyond ordinary Quidato were all based on what appellant Ramil had purportedly told them. The veracity of
human comprehension deserving of no evidentiary value".56 Instead, it banked on the what they claimed was told them by Ramil is highly dubious in view of the testimony of
suspicions entertained by the police operatives that appellant Ramil's actuations during prosecution witness Lucy Ngo, daughter of the victim, affirming that appellant Ramil was
the rescue were suspect, and that the latter failed to present Lts. Capitulo and Lim, often the one who was "nagmamagandang-loob" and who told them about the kidnapping of her
referred to by him in his testimony.57 The Court does not agree. Mere suspicion, father and where he could be found.
speculation, relationship, association and companionship do not prove conspiracy. 58
The Court went over the testimonies of prosecution witnesses Cruz, Avelita and Quidato
The Court scrutinized the testimony of appellant Ramil Madriaga and there is nothing and it found that certain portions thereof were tailored to suit the charges against
therein which is beyond ordinary understanding or which indicates any suspicious behavior appellants.
on his part that would create doubt on his account of what really transpired. In fact,
appellant Ramil exhibited candor and sincerity when he admitted that he was initially
Both Cruz and Quidato testified that appellant Ramil rushed to the cottage as soon as they
ambivalent in helping out his cousin Rosendo because of fear and of the fact that the
arrived at the resort and that they found appellant Rosendo inside the cottage with victim
results of the Bar examinations were coming out that day.59 Also, the victim's daughter,
Uy, giving the impression that appellant Ramil knew exactly where the victim was and,
Lucy Ngo, did not sense any suspicious behavior on the part of appellant Ramil, and she
therefore, appellants Ramil and Rosendo were two of the kidnappers. 63 However, Lucy Ngo
testified that she even believed that the latter was trying to help them, thus:
contradicted their testimonies. Lucy, instead, confirmed the testimonies of appellants
Ramil and Rosendo that the latter was outside the cottage and that Ramil rushed to
Q         Will you tell us what do you mean by that? Rosendo only after getting instructions from Maj. Cruz.64

A         'Nagmamagandang loob is parang tumutulong siya,' sir. The Court is likewise wary of the testimony of Virginia Avelita insinuating appellant Ramil's
complicity for knowing the details of the crime. If it were true that she suspected Ramil,
then there was utterly no reason for her to tell Lucy Ngo when she called up the latter that
xxx
there was a certain person who was offering his assistance ("nagmamagandang-loob") in
locating Uy.65 Instead, she would have forewarned Ngo about appellant Ramil.
Q         The man who was 'nagmamagandang loob'. Are you referring to Ramil Madriaga
as the one who was 'nagmamagandang loob'?
Consequently, the Court cannot give much weight to the testimonies of these prosecution
witnesses as they suffer from infirmities.
A         He is the one who was 'nagmamagandang loob'. Yes, sir.
Besides, it is a settled rule that the testimony of a witness who merely recites what
Q         Even before, you knew Ramil Madriaga was incarcerated and one of the accused in someone else has told him, whether orally or in writing is hearsay and has no probative
this case, were you surprised to know that Ramil Madriaga who according to you value66 under Section 36, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. Neither could the same be validly
'nagmamagandang loob' is now one of the accused in this case? regarded as an exception to the hearsay rule considering that the details testified to by
said witnesses were directly refuted by appellant Ramil when he testified in court and
A         Yes, sir.60 asserted the fact that appellant Ramil merely went to Avelita's house to tell her of the
location of her common-law husband, Vicente Uy, and to help his cousin, co-appellant
Rosendo; which fact is confirmed by prosecution witness Lucy Ngo.
It cannot be denied that appellant Ramil played a major part in the rescue of Vicente Uy.
The testimonies of Lucy Ngo, Virginia Avelita and Maj. Cruz all show that it was through
the information given by appellant Ramil that they were able to locate Vicente Uy. If it The failure of appellant Ramil to present Lts. Capitulo and Lim does not denigrate the
were really true that appellant Ramil was one of the conspirators of the crime of credibility of his own testimony. As stated above, the prosecution must rely on the
Kidnapping for Ransom, it is absolutely incredible that Ramil would openly go to the house strength of its own evidence and not on the weakness of that of the defense.
of the victim's common-law wife and place himself at the risk of being identified as one of
the conspirators when he could have accomplished the same purpose by other means at Thus, the Court finds that the prosecution evidence lacks that degree of conclusiveness
the same time protect himself from being identified by witnesses. Neither did Virginia required to convict appellant Ramil Madriaga.
Avelita nor Lucy Ngo testify that Ramil asked for ransom. What then could be the motive
of Ramil in going to the house of Avelita if not to help his cousin out of his predicament?
With regard to appellant Rosendo Madriaga, the Court also finds that there is no sufficient
Whatever suspicions the police operatives entertained were pure speculations, insufficient
evidence proving beyond reasonable doubt that he was involved in the kidnapping of
to warrant the conclusion that appellant Ramil participated in the kidnapping. The required
Vicente Uy. As with appellant Patano, there is lack of adequate evidence of conspiracy
quantum of evidence is proof beyond reasonable doubt. 61 "The sea of suspicion has no
insofar as appellant Rosendo is concerned. No proof was adduced by the prosecution to
shore, and the court that embarks upon it is without rudder or compass." 62
show that Rosendo knew about the kidnapping and that he had actively participated in its
execution. When victim Uy identified Rosendo in the courtroom as the person he saw
handcuffed after his blindfold was removed, Uy admitted that he was not sure of RESOLUTION
Rosendo's identity as the latter is without a moustache. The testimony of prosecution
witness Dimal in this regard is quite revealing. Dimal admitted that he was the one who In G.R. No. L-409, Anastacio Laurel vs. Eriberto Misa, etc., the Court, acting on the petition
fed the victim and that he was wearing a moustache at the time of his arrest on March 27, for habeas corpus filed by Anastacio Laurel and based on a theory that a Filipino citizen who
1996.67 adhered to the enemy giving the latter aid and comfort during the Japanese occupation
cannot be prosecuted for the crime of treason defined and penalized by article 114 of the
Appellant Rosendo testified that he called up his cousin Ramil and asked for his help as he Revised Penal Code, for the reason (1) that the sovereignty of the legitimate government in
got unintentionally mixed up in a kidnapping.68 Appellant Rosendo convincingly explained the Philippines and, consequently, the correlative allegiance of Filipino citizens thereto was
then suspended; and (2) that there was a change of sovereignty over these Islands upon the
that he could not do anything because he was afraid. 69 Such is not far-fetched or
proclamation of the Philippine Republic:
improbable. The Court is cognizant of the fact that fear is an effective anesthetic that can
paralyze one into inaction. Rosendo's failure to report his predicament with the police is
not an indicium or positive proof that he actively took part in the crime and, therefore, it (1) Considering that a citizen or subject owes, not a qualified and temporary, but an absolute
could not be a valid basis for a finding of guilt for the crime of kidnapping for ransom. and permanent allegiance, which consists in the obligation of fidelity and obedience to his
What is clear is that appellant Rosendo called up his cousin, appellant Ramil, for help government or sovereign; and that this absolute and permanent allegiance should not be
because he was in a predicament over which he had no control. confused with the qualified and temporary allegiance which a foreigner owes to the
government or sovereign of the territory wherein he resides, so long as he remains there, in
return for the protection he receives, and which consists in the obedience to the laws of the
All told, while the crime of Kidnapping for Ransom has been proven, appellants' government or sovereign. (Carlisle vs. Unite States, 21 Law. ed., 429; Secretary of State
participation therein had not been adequately proven beyond reasonable doubt. Hence, all Webster Report to the President of the United States in the case of Thraser, 6 Web. Works,
three appellants must be acquitted. 526);

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 262 in Criminal Considering that the absolute and permanent allegiance of the inhabitants of a territory
Case No. 110089-H convicting appellants JAMES PATANO y MARCAIDA, RAMIL MADRIAGA occupied by the enemy of their legitimate government or sovereign is not abrogated or
y LAGONOY and ROSENDO MADRIAGA is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and another is severed by the enemy occupation, because the sovereignty of the government or
hereby rendered ACQUITTING them of the crime of Kidnapping for Ransom as charged for sovereign de jure is not transferred thereby to the occupier, as we have held in the cases
failure of the prosecution to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. of Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon (75 Phil., 113) and of Peralta vs. Director of
Prisons (75 Phil., 285), and if it is not transferred to the occupant it must necessarily remain
vested in the legitimate government; that the sovereignty vested in the titular government
The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is directed to cause the immediate release of (which is the supreme power which governs a body politic or society which constitute the
appellants, unless they are being lawfully held for another cause, and to inform this Court state) must be distinguished from the exercise of the rights inherent thereto, and may be
of the date of their release or the ground for their continued confinement, within five (5) destroyed, or severed and transferred to another, but it cannot be suspended because the
days from notice of this decision. existence of sovereignty cannot be suspended without putting it out of existence or divesting
the possessor thereof at least during the so-called period of suspension; that what may be
suspended is the exercise of the rights of sovereignty with the control and government of the
The Director of the National Bureau of Investigation and the Director- General of the territory occupied by the enemy passes temporarily to the occupant; that the subsistence of
Philippine National Police are directed to cause the arrest of accused Manolo Babac and the sovereignty of the legitimate government in a territory occupied by the military forces of
Allan Duarte who have remained-at-large as well as other persons who appear criminally the enemy during the war, "although the former is in fact prevented from exercising the
responsible for herein subject crime. The prosecution must exert more diligent efforts next supremacy over them" is one of the "rules of international law of our times"; (II Oppenheim,
time. 6th Lauterpacht ed., 1944, p. 482), recognized, by necessary implication, in articles 23, 44,
45, and 52 of Hague Regulation; and that, as a corollary of the conclusion that the
sovereignty itself is not suspended and subsists during the enemy occupation, the allegiance
Costs de oficio.
of the inhabitants to their legitimate government or sovereign subsists, and therefore there is
no such thing as suspended allegiance, the basic theory on which the whole fabric of the
SO ORDERED. petitioner's contention rests;

G.R. No. L-409             January 30, 1947 Considering that the conclusion that the sovereignty of the United State was suspended in
Castine, set forth in the decision in the case of United States vs. Rice, 4 Wheaton, 246, 253,
decided in 1819, and quoted in our decision in the cases of Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan
ANASTACIO LAUREL, petitioner, Keh and Dizon and Peralta vs. Director of Prisons, supra, in connection with the question,
vs. not of sovereignty, but of the existence of a government de facto therein and its power to
ERIBERTO MISA, respondent. promulgate rules and laws in the occupied territory, must have been based, either on the
theory adopted subsequently in the Hague Convention of 1907, that the military occupation of
Claro M. Recto and Querube C. Makalintal for petitioner. an enemy territory does not transfer the sovereignty to the occupant; that, in the first case,
First Assistant Solicitor General Reyes and Solicitor Hernandez, Jr., for respondent. the word "sovereignty" used therein should be construed to mean the exercise of the rights of
sovereignty, because as this remains vested in the legitimate government and is not army, subject to the restrictions or limitations imposed by the Hague Regulations, the usages
transferred to the occupier, it cannot be suspended without putting it out of existence or established by civilized nations, the laws of humanity and the requirements of public
divesting said government thereof; and that in the second case, that is, if the said conclusion conscience (Peralta vs. Director of Prisons, supra; 1940 United States Rules of Land Warfare
or doctrine refers to the suspension of the sovereignty itself, it has become obsolete after the 76, 77); and that, consequently, all acts of the military occupant dictated within these
adoption of the Hague Regulations in 1907, and therefore it can not be applied to the present limitations are obligatory upon the inhabitants of the territory, who are bound to obey them,
case; and the laws of the legitimate government which have not been adopted, as well and those
which, though continued in force, are in conflict with such laws and orders of the occupier,
shall be considered as suspended or not in force and binding upon said inhabitants;
Considering that even adopting the words "temporarily allegiance," repudiated by Oppenheim
and other publicists, as descriptive of the relations borne by the inhabitants of the territory
occupied by the enemy toward the military government established over them, such Considering that, since the preservation of the allegiance or the obligation of fidelity and
allegiance may, at most, be considered similar to the temporary allegiance which a foreigner obedience of a citizen or subject to his government or sovereign does not demand from him a
owes to the government or sovereign of the territory wherein he resides in return for the positive action, but only passive attitude or forbearance from adhering to the enemy by giving
protection he receives as above described, and does not do away with the absolute and the latter aid and comfort, the occupant has no power, as a corollary of the preceding
permanent allegiance which the citizen residing in a foreign country owes to his own consideration, to repeal or suspend the operation of the law of treason, essential for the
government or sovereign; that just as a citizen or subject of a government or sovereign may preservation of the allegiance owed by the inhabitants to their legitimate government, or
be prosecuted for and convicted of treason committed in a foreign country, in the same way compel them to adhere and give aid and comfort to him; because it is evident that such action
an inhabitant of a territory occupied by the military forces of the enemy may commit treason is not demanded by the exigencies of the military service or not necessary for the control of
against his own legitimate government or sovereign if he adheres to the enemies of the latter the inhabitants and the safety and protection of his army, and because it is tantamount to
by giving them aid and comfort; and that if the allegiance of a citizen or subject to his practically transfer temporarily to the occupant their allegiance to the titular government or
government or sovereign is nothing more than obedience to its laws in return for the sovereign; and that, therefore, if an inhabitant of the occupied territory were compelled
protection he receives, it would necessarily follow that a citizen who resides in a foreign illegally by the military occupant, through force, threat or intimidation, to give him aid and
country or state would, on one hand, ipso facto acquire the citizenship thereof since he has comfort, the former may lawfully resist and die if necessary as a hero, or submit thereto
enforce public order and regulate the social and commercial life, in return for the protection without becoming a traitor;
he receives, and would, on the other hand, lose his original citizenship, because he would not
be bound to obey most of the laws of his own government or sovereign, and would not
Considering that adoption of the petitioner's theory of suspended allegiance would lead to
receive, while in a foreign country, the protection he is entitled to in his own;
disastrous consequences for small and weak nations or states, and would be repugnant to
the laws of humanity and requirements of public conscience, for it would allow invaders to
Considering that, as a corollary of the suspension of the exercise of the rights of sovereignty legally recruit or enlist the Quisling inhabitants of the occupied territory to fight against their
by the legitimate government in the territory occupied by the enemy military forces, because own government without the latter incurring the risk of being prosecuted for treason, and
the authority of the legitimate power to govern has passed into the hands of the occupant even compel those who are not aid them in their military operation against the resisting
(Article 43, Hague Regulations), the political laws which prescribe the reciprocal rights, duties enemy forces in order to completely subdue and conquer the whole nation, and thus deprive
and obligation of government and citizens, are suspended or in abeyance during military them all of their own independence or sovereignty — such theory would sanction the action
occupation (Co Kim cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and dizon, supra), for the only reason that as of invaders in forcing the people of a free and sovereign country to be a party in the nefarious
they exclusively bear relation to the ousted legitimate government, they are inoperative or not task of depriving themselves of their own freedom and independence and repressing the
applicable to the government established by the occupant; that the crimes against national exercise by them of their own sovereignty; in other words, to commit a political suicide;
security, such as treason and espionage; inciting to war, correspondence with hostile country,
flight to enemy's country, as well as those against public order, such as rebellion, sedition,
(2) Considering that the crime of treason against the government of the Philippines defined
and disloyalty, illegal possession of firearms, which are of political complexion because they
and penalized in article 114 of the Penal Code, though originally intended to be a crime
bear relation to, and are penalized by our Revised Penal Code as crimes against the
against said government as then organized by authority of the sovereign people of the United
legitimate government, are also suspended or become inapplicable as against the occupant,
States, exercised through their authorized representative, the Congress and the President of
because they can not be committed against the latter (Peralta vs. Director of Prisons, supra);
the United States, was made, upon the establishment of the Commonwealth Government in
and that, while the offenses against public order to be preserved by the legitimate
1935, a crime against the Government of the Philippines established by authority of the
government were inapplicable as offenses against the invader for the reason above stated,
people of the Philippines, in whom the sovereignty resides according to section 1, Article II, of
unless adopted by him, were also inoperative as against the ousted government for the latter
the Constitution of the Philippines, by virtue of the provision of section 2, Article XVI thereof,
was not responsible for the preservation of the public order in the occupied territory, yet
which provides that "All laws of the Philippine Islands . . . shall remain operative, unless
article 114 of the said Revised Penal Code, was applicable to treason committed against the
inconsistent with this Constitution . . . and all references in such laws to the Government or
national security of the legitimate government, because the inhabitants of the occupied
officials of the Philippine Islands, shall be construed, in so far as applicable, to refer to the
territory were still bound by their allegiance to the latter during the enemy occupation;
Government and corresponding officials under this constitution;

Considering that, although the military occupant is enjoined to respect or continue in force,
Considering that the Commonwealth of the Philippines was a sovereign government, though
unless absolutely prevented by the circumstances, those laws that enforce public order and
not absolute but subject to certain limitations imposed in the Independence Act and
regulate the social and commercial life of the country, he has, nevertheless, all the powers
incorporated as Ordinance appended to our Constitution, was recognized not only by the
of de facto government and may, at his pleasure, either change the existing laws or make
Legislative Department or Congress of the United States in approving the Independence Law
new ones when the exigencies of the military service demand such action, that is, when it is
above quoted and the Constitution of the Philippines, which contains the declaration that
necessary for the occupier to do so for the control of the country and the protection of his
 "Sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them" Mr. Charles Fahy, Sol. Gen., of Washington, D.C., for respondent.
(section 1, Article II), but also by the Executive Department of the United States; that the late
President Roosevelt in one of his messages to Congress said, among others, "As I stated on Argument of Counsel from page 2 intentionally omitted
August 12, 1943, the United States in practice regards the Philippines as having now the
status as a government of other independent nations — in fact all the attributes of complete TOP
and respected nationhood" (Congressional Record, Vol. 29, part 6, page 8173); and that it is
a principle upheld by the Supreme Court of the United States in many cases, among them in
the case of Jones vs. United States (137 U.S., 202; 34 Law. ed., 691, 696) that the question
of sovereignty is "a purely political question, the determination of which by the legislative and
executive departments of any government conclusively binds the judges, as well as all other
officers, citizens and subjects of the country. Mr. Justice JACKSON delivered the opinion of the Court.

Anthony Cramer, the petitioner, stands convicted of violating Section 1 of the Criminal
Considering that section I (1) of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution which provides Code, which provides: 'Whoever, owing allegiance to the United States, levies war against
that pending the final and complete withdrawal of the sovereignty of the United States "All them or adheres to their enemies, giving them aid and comfort within the United States or
citizens of the Philippines shall owe allegiance to the United States", was one of the few elsewhere, is guilty of treason.'1
limitations of the sovereignty of the Filipino people retained by the United States, but these
limitations do not away or are not inconsistent with said sovereignty, in the same way that the Cramer owed allegiance to the United States. A German by birth, he had been a resident
people of each State of the Union preserves its own sovereignty although limited by that of of the United States since 1925 and was naturalized in 1936. Prosecution resulted from his
the United States conferred upon the latter by the States; that just as to reason may be association with two of the German saboteurs who in June 1942 landed on our shores
committed against the Federal as well as against the State Government, in the same way from enemy submarines to disrupt industry in the United States and whose cases we
treason may have been committed during the Japanese occupation against the sovereignty considered in Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 63 S.Ct. 1, 87 L.Ed. 3. One of those, spared
of the United States as well as against the sovereignty of the Philippine Commonwealth; and
from execution, appeared as a government witness on the trial of Cramer. He testified
that the change of our form of government from Commonwealth to Republic does not affect
that Werner Thiel and Edward Kerling were members of that sabotage crew, detailed their
the prosecution of those charged with the crime of treason committed during the
Commonwealth, because it is an offense against the same government and the same plot, and described their preparations for its consummation.
sovereign people, for Article XVIII of our Constitution provides that "The government
Cramer was conscripted into and served in the German Army against the United States in
established by this constitution shall be known as the Commonwealth of the Philippines.
1918. After the war he came to this country, intending to remain permanently. So far as
Upon the final and complete withdrawal of the sovereignty of the United States and the
proclamation of Philippine independence, the Commonwealth of the Philippines shall appears, he has been of good behavior, never before in trouble with the law. He was
thenceforth be known as the Republic of the Philippines"; studious and intelligent, earning $45 a week for work in a boiler room and living
accordingly.

This Court resolves, without prejudice to write later on a more extended opinion, to deny the There was no evidence, and the Government makes no claim, that he had foreknowledge
petitioner's petition, as it is hereby denied, for the reasons above set forth and for others to be that the saboteurs were coming to this country or that he came into association with them
stated in the said opinion, without prejudice to concurring opinion therein, if any. Messrs. by prearrangement. Cramer, however, had known intimately the saboteur Werner Thiel
Justices Paras and Hontiveros dissent in a separate opinion. Mr. justice Perfecto concurs in a while the latter lived in this country. They had worked together, roomed together, and
separate opinion. jointly had ventured in a small and luckless delicatessen enterprise. Thiel early and frankly
avowed adherence to the National Socialist movement in Germany; he foresaw the war
and returned in 1941 for the purpose of helping Germany. Cramer did not do so. How
much he sympathized with the doctrines of the Nazi Party is not clear. He became at one
325 U.S. 1 (65 S.Ct. 918, 89 L.Ed. 1441) time, in Indiana, a member and officer of the Friends of New Germany, which was a
predecessor of the Bund. However, he withdrew in 1935 before it became the Bund. He
CRAMER v. UNITED STATES. says there was some swindle about it that he did not like and also that he did not like
their drilling and 'radical activities.' In 1936 he made a trip to Germany, attended the
No. 13. Olympic Games, and saw some of the Bundsmen from this country who went there at that
Reargued: Nov. 6, 1944. time for conferences with Nazi Party officials. There is no suggestion that Cramer while
there had any such associations. He does not appear to have been regarded as a person
Decided: April 23, 1945. of that consequence. His friends and associates in this country were largely German. His
social life in New York City, where he recently had lived, seems to have been centered
around Kolping House, a German-Catholic recreational center.
 opinion, JACKSON [HTML]
 dissent, DOUGLAS, BLACK, REED [HTML] Cramer retained a strong affection for his fatherland. He corresponded in German with his
family and friends there. Before the United States entered the war he expressed strong
Mr. Harold R. Medina, of New York City, for petitioner. sympathy with Germany in its conflict with other European powers. Before the attack upon
Pearl Harbor, Cramer openly opposed participation by this country in the war against
Germany. He refused to work on war materials. He expressed concern about being drafted than accorded a season of repentance before the crime should be complete. Lord Reading
into our army and 'misused' for purposes of 'world conquest.' There is no proof, however, in his charge in Casement's Case uses language which accords with my understanding:
except for the matter charged in the indictment, of any act or utterance disloyal to this
country after we entered the war. "Overt acts are such acts as manifest a criminal intention and tend towards the
accomplishment of the criminal object. They are acts by which the purpose is manifested
Coming down to the time of the alleged treason, the main facts, as related on the witness and the means by which it is intended to be fulfilled." 4
stand by Cramer, are not seriously in dispute. He was living in New York and in response
to a cryptic note left under his door, which did not mention Thiel, he went to the Grand The Government, however, contends for, and the court below has affirmed, this conviction
Central Station. There Thiel appeared. Cramer had supposed that Thiel was in Germany, upon a contrary principle.5 It said 'We believe in short that no more need be laid for an
knowing that he had left the United States shortly before the war to go there. Together overt act of treason than for an overt act of conspiracy. * * * Hence we hold the overt
they went to public places and had some drinks. Cramer denies that Thiel revealed his acts relied on were sufficient to be submitted to the jury, even though they perhaps may
mission of sabotage. Cramer said to Thiel that he must have come to America by have appeared as innocent on their face.' A similar conclusion was reached in United
submarine, but Thiel refused to confirm it, although his attitude increased Cramer's States v. Fricke;6 it is: 'An overt act in itself may be a perfectly innocent act standing by
suspicion. Thiel promised to tell later how he came to this country. Thiel asked about a girl itself; it must be in some manner in furtherance of the crime.'
who was a mutual acquaintance and whom Thiel had engaged to marry previous to his
As lower courts thus have taken conflicting positions, or, where the issue was less clearly
going to Germany. Cramer knew where she was, and offered to and did write to her to
drawn, have dealt with the problem ambiguously, 7 we granted certiorari8 and after
come to New York, without disclosing in the letter that Thiel had arrived. Thiel said that he
argument at the October 1943 Term we invited reargument addressed to specific
had in his possession about $3600, but did not disclose that it was provided by the
questions.9 Since our primary question here is the meaning of the Constitutional provision,
German Government, saying only that one could get money in Germany if he had the
we turn to its solution before considering its application to the facts of this case.
right connections. Thiel owed Cramer an old debt of $200. He gave Cramer his money belt
containing some $3600, from which Cramer was to be paid. Cramer agreed to and did When our forefathers took up the task of forming an independent political organization for
place the rest in his own safe deposit box, except a sum which he kept in his room in case New World society, no one of them appears to have doubted that to bring into being a
Thiel should want it quickly. new government would originate a new allegiance for its citizens and inhabitants. Nor
were they reluctant to punish as treason any genuine breach of allegiance, as every
After the second of these meetings Thiel and Kerling, who was present briefly at one
government time out of mind had done. The betrayal of Washington by Arnold was fresh
meeting, were arrested. Cramer's expectation of meeting Thiel later and of bringing him
in mind. They were far more awake to powerful enemies with designs on this continent
and his fiancee together was foiled. Shortly thereafter Cramer was arrested, tried, and
than some of the intervening generations have been. England was entrenched in Canada
found guilty. The trial judge at the time of sentencing said:
to the north and Spain had repossessed Florida to the south, and each had been the scene
'I shall not impose the maximum penalty of death. It does not appear that this defendant of invasion of the Colonies; the King of France had but lately been dispossessed in the
Cramer was aware that Thiel and Kerling were in possession of explosives or other means Ohio Valley; Spain claimed the Mississippi Valley; and, except for the seaboard, the
for destroying factories and property in the United States or planned to do that. settlements were surrounded by Indians—not negligible as enemies themselves, and
especially threatening when allied to European foes. The proposed national government
'From the evidence it appears that Cramer had no more guilty knowledge of any could not for some years become firmly seated in the tradition or in the habits of the
subversive purposes on the part of Thiel or Kerling than a vague idea that they came here people. There is no evidence that the forefathers intended to withdraw the treason offense
for the purpose of organizing pro-German propaganda and agitation. If there were any from use as an effective instrument of the new nation's security against treachery that
proof that they had confided in him what their real purposes were, or that he knew, or would aid external enemies.
believed what they really were, I should not hesitate to impose the death penalty.'
The forefathers also had suffered from disloyalty. Success of the Revolution had been
Cramer's case raises questions as to application of the Constitutional provision that threatened by the adherence of a considerable part of the population to the King. The
'Treason against the United States shall consist only in levying War against them, or in Continental Congress adopted a resolution after a report by its 'Committee on
adhering to their Enemies, giving them Aid and Comfort. No Person shall be convicted of Spies'10 which in effect declared that all persons residing within any colony owed
Treason unless on the Testimony of two Witnesses to the same overt Act, or on allegiance to it, and that if any such persons adhered to the King of Great Britain, giving
Confession in open Court.'2 him aid and comfort, they were guilty of treason, and which urged the colonies to pass
laws for punishment of such offenders 'as shall be provably attainted of open
Cramer's contention may be well stated in words of Judge Learned Hand in United States deed.'11 Many of the colonies complied, and a variety of laws, mostly modeled on English
v. Robinson:3 law, resulted.12 Some of the legislation in later years became so broad and loose as to
make treason of mere utterance of opinion.13 Many a citizen in a time of unsettled and
'Nevertheless a question may indeed be raised whether the prosecution may lay as an
shifting loyalties was thus threatened under English law which made him guilty of treason
overt act a step taken in execution of the traitorous design, innocent in itself, and getting
if he adhered to the government of his colony and also under colonial law which made him
its treasonable character only from some covert and undeclared intent. It is true that in
guilty of treason if he adhered to his King.14 Not a few of these persons were subjected to
prosecutions for conspiracy under our federal statute it is well settled that any step in
confiscation of property or other harsh treatment by the Revolutionists under local laws;
performance of the conspiracy is enough, though it is innocent except for its relations to
none, however, so far as appears, to capital punishment. 15
the agreement. I doubt very much whether that rule has any application to the case of
treason, where the requirement affected the character of the pleading and proof, rather
Before this revolutionary experience there were scattered treason prosecutions in the revolutionary doctrine that the people have the right to alter or abolish their government
colonies16 usually not well reported. Some colonies had adopted treason statutes modeled relaxed the loyalty which governments theretofore had demanded—dangerously diluted it,
on English legislation.17 But the earlier colonial experience seems to have been regarded as the ruling classes of Europe thought, for in their eyes the colonists not only committed
as of a piece with that of England and appears not to have much influenced the framers in treason, they exalted it.27 The idea that loyalty will ultimately be given to a government
their dealings with the subject. only so long as it deserves loyalty and that opposition to its abuses is not treason 28 has
made our government tolerant of opposition based on differences of opinion that in some
However, their experience with treason accusations had been many-sided. More than a parts of the world would have kept the hangman busy. But the basic law of treason in this
few of them were descendants of those who had fled from measures against sedition and country was framed by men who, as we have seen, were taught by experience and by
its ecclesiastic counterpart, heresy. Now the treason offense was under revision by a history to fear abuse of the treason charge almost as much as they feared treason itself.
Convention whose members almost to a man had themselves been guilty of treason under The interplay in the Convention of their two fears accounts for the problem which faces us
any interpretation of British law.18 They not only had levied war against their King today.
themselves, but they had conducted a lively exchange of aid and comfort with France,
then England's ancient enemy. Every step in the great work of their lives from the first We turn then to the proceedings of the Constitutional Convention of 1787 so far as we
mild protests against kingly misrule to the final act of separation had been taken under have record of them. The plan presented by Pinckney evidently proposed only that
the threat of treason charges.19 The Declaration of Independence may seem cryptic in Congress should have exclusive power to declare what should be treason and misprision of
denouncing George III 'for transporting us beyond Seas to be tried for pretended offenses' treason against the United States.29 The Committee on Detail, apparently not specifically
but the specific grievance was recited by the Continental Congress nearly two years before instructed on the subject, reported a draft Constitution which left no such latitude to
in saying that '* * * it has lately been resolved in Parliament, that by force of a statute, create new treasons. It provided that: 'Treason against the United States shall consist
made in the thirty-fifth year of the reign of king Henry the eighth, colonists may be only in levying war against the United States, or any of them; and in adhering to the
transported to England, and tried there upon accusations for treasons, and misprisions, or enemies of the United States, or any of them. The Legislature of the United States shall
concealments of treasons committed in the colonies; and by a late statute, such trials have power to declare the punishment of treason. No person shall be convicted of treason,
have been directed in cases therein mentioned.' 20 unless on the testimony of two witnesses. No attainder of treason shall work corruption of
bloods, nor forfeiture, except during the life of the person attained.' 30
The Convention numbered among its members men familiar with government in the Old
World, and they looked back upon a long history of use and abuse of the treason This clause was discussed on August 20, 1787. Mr. Madison, who opened the discussion,
charge.21 The English stream of thought concerning treasons began to flow in fairly 'thought the definition too narrow. It did not appear to go as far as the Stat. of Edwd III.
definable channels in 1351 with the enactment of the great Treason Act, 25 Edw. III, Stat. He did not see why more latitude might not be left to the Legislature. It wd. be as safe in
5, Ch. 2.22 That was a monumental piece of legislation several times referred to in the the hands of State legislatures; and it was inconvenient to bar a discretion which
deliberations of the Convention. It cut a bench-mark by which the English-speaking world experience might enlighten, and which might be applied to good purposes as well as be
tested the level of its thought on the subject 23 until our own abrupt departure from it in abused.'31 Mr. Mason was in favor of following the language of the Statute of Edward III.
1789, and after 600 years it still is the living law of treason in England. Roger Casement in The discussion shows some confusion as to the effect of adding the words 'giving them aid
1917 forfeited his life for violating it.24 We, of course, can make no independent judgment and comfort,' some thinking their effect restrictive and others that they gave a more
as to the inward meanings of the terms used in a six-century-old statute, written in a form extensive meaning. However, 'Col Mason moved to insert the words 'giving (them) aid
of Norman French that had become obsolete long before our Revolution. We can read this comfort', as restrictive of 'adhering to their Enemies, &c'—the latter he thought would be
statute only as our forebears read it—through the eyes of succeeding generations of otherwise too indefinite.' The motion prevailed.
English judges, to whom it has been the core of all decision, and of common-law
commentators, to whom it has been the text. 25 Mr. Dickenson 'wished to know what was meant by the 'testimony of two witnesses',
whether they were to be witnesses to the same overt act or to different overt acts. He
Adjudicated cases in English history generally have dealt with the offense of compassing thought also that proof of an overt-act ought to be expressed as essential to the case.'
the monarch's death; only eleven reported English cases antedating the Constitution are Doctor Johnson also 'considered * * * that something should be inserted in the definition
cited as involving distinct charges of adherence to the King's enemies. 26 When concerning overt acts.'
constructive treasons were not joined on the face of the indictment, it is not possible to
say how far they were joined in the minds of the judges. No decision appears to have When it was moved to insert 'to the same overt act' after the two-witnesses requirement,
been a factor in the deliberations of our own Constitutional Convention. Nor does any Madison notes that 'Doc'r. Franklin wished this amendment to take place—prosecutions for
squarely meet our issue here, and for good reason—the Act of Edward III did not contain treason were generally virulent; and perjury too easily made use of against innocence.'
the two-witnesses-to-the-same-overt act requirement which precipitates the issue here. James Wilson observed that 'Much may be said on both sides. Treason may sometimes be
practiced in such a manner, as to render proof extremely difficult—as in a traitorous
Historical materials are, therefore, of little help; necessity as well as desire taught a correspondence with an Enemy.'32 But the motion carried.
concept that differed from all historical models in the drafting of our treason clause.
Treason statutes theretofore had been adapted to a society in which the state was By this sequence of proposals the treason clause of the Constitution took its present form.
personified by a king, on whose person were focused the allegiances and loyalties of the The temper and attitude of the Convention toward treason prosecutions is unmistakable.
subject. When government was made representative of the whole body of the governed It adopted every limitation that the practice of governments had evolved or that politico-
there was none to say 'I am the State' and a concept of treason as compassing or legal philosophy to that time had advanced.33 Limitation of the treason of adherence to
imagining a ruler's death was no longer fitting. Nor can it be gainsaid that the the enemy to cases where aid and comfort were given and the requirement of an overt act
were both found in the Statute of Edward III praised in the writings of Coke and act which weakens or tends to weaken the power of the King and of the country to resist
Blackstone, and advocated in Montesquieu's Spirit of Laws. Likewise, the two-witness or to attack the enemies of the King and the country * * * is * * * giving of aid and
requirement had been used in other statutes,34 was advocated by Montesquieu in all comfort.' Lord Reading explained it, as we think one must, in terms of an 'act.' It is not
capital cases,35 and was a familiar precept of the New Testament,36 and of Mosaic easy, if indeed possible, to think of a way in which 'aid and comfort' and be 'given' to an
law.37 The framers combined all of these known protections and added two of their own enemy except by some kind of action. Its very nature partakes of a deed or physical
which had no precedent. They wrote into the organic act of the new government a activity as opposed to a mental operation.
prohibition of legislative or judicial creation of new treasons. And a venerable safeguard
against false testimony was given a novel application by requiring two witnesses to the Thus the crime of treason consists of two elements: adherence to the enemy; and
same overt act. rendering him aid and comfort. A citizen intellectually or emotionally may favor the enemy
and harbor sympathies or convictions disloyal to this country's policy or interest, but so
District of treason prosecutions was not just a transient mood of the Revolutionists. In the long as he commits no act of aid and comfort to the enemy, there is no treason. On the
century and a half of our national existence not one execution on a federal treason other hand, a citizen may take actions, which do aid and comfort the enemy—making a
conviction has taken place. Never before has this Court had occasion to review a speech critical of the government or opposing its measures, profiteering, striking in
conviction. In the few cases that have been prosecuted the treason clause has had its only defense plants or essential work, and the hundred other things which impair our cohesion
judicial construction by individual Justices of this Court presiding at trials on circuit or by and diminish our strength but if there is no adherence to the enemy in this, if there is no
district or circuit judges.38 After constitutional requirements have been satisfied, and after intent to betray, there is no treason.
juries have convicted and courts have sentenced, Presidents again and again have
intervened to mitigate judicial severity or to pardon entirely. We have managed to do Having thus by definition made treason consist of something outward and visible and
without treason prosecutions to a degree that probably would be impossible except while a capable of direct proof, the framers turned to safeguarding procedures of trial and
people was singularly confident of external security and internal stability. 39 ordained that 'No Person shall be convicted of Treason unless on the Testimony of two
Witnesses to the same overt Act, or on Confession in open Court.' This repeats in
Historical materials aid interpretation chiefly in that they show two kinds of dangers procedural terms the concept that thoughts and attitudes alone cannot make a treason. It
against which the framers were concerned to guard the treason offense: (1) Perversion by need not trouble us that we find so dominant a purpose emphasized in two different ways.
established authority to repress peaceful political opposition; and (2) conviction of the But does the procedural requirement add some limitation not already present in the
innocent as a result of perjury, passion, or inadequate evidence. The first danger could be definition of the crime, and if so, what? While to prove giving of aid and comfort would
diminished by closely circumscribing the kind of conduct which should be treason making require the prosecution to show actions and deeds, if the Constitution stopped there, such
the constitutional definition exclusive, making it clear, and making the offense one not acts could be inferred from circumstantial evidence. This the framers thought would not
susceptible of being inferred from all sorts of insubordinations. The second danger lay in do.41 So they added what in effect is a command that the overt acts must be established
the manner of trial and was one which would be diminished mainly by procedural by direct evidence, and the direct testimony must be that of two witnesses instead of one.
requirements—mainly but not wholly, for the hazards of trial also would be diminished by In this sense the overt act procedural provision adds something, and something
confining the treason offense to kinds of conduct susceptible of reasonably sure proof. The important, to the definition.
concern uppermost in the framers' minds, that mere mental attitudes or expressions
should not be treason, influenced both definition of the crime and procedure for its trial. In Our problem begins where the Constitution ends. That instrument omits to specify what
the proposed Constitution the first sentence of the treason article undertook to define the relation the indispensable overt act must sustain to the two elements of the offense as
offense; the second, to surround its trial with procedural safeguards. defined: viz., adherence and giving aid and comfort. It requires that two witnesses testify
to the same overt act, and clearly enough the act must show something toward treason,
'Compassing' and like loose concepts of the substance of the offense had been useful tools but what? Must the act be one of giving aid and comfort? If so, how must adherence to
for tyranny. So one of the obvious things to be put into the definition of treason not the enemy, the disloyal state of mind, be shown?
consisting of actual levying of war was that it must consist of doing something. This the
draft Constitution failed to provide, for, as we have pointed out, it defined treason 40 as The defendant especially challenges the sufficiency of the overt acts to prove treasonable
merely 'adhering to the enemies of the United States, or any of them.' intention. Questions of intent in a treason case are even more complicated than in most
criminal cases because of the peculiarity of the two different elements which together
Treason of adherence to an enemy was old in the law. It consisted of breaking allegiance make the offense. Of course the overt acts of aid and comfort must be intentional as
to one's own King by forming an attachment to his enemy. Its scope was comprehensive, distinguished from merely negligent or undesigned ones. Intent in that limited sense is not
its requirements indeterminate. It might be predicated on intellecutal or emotional in issue here. But to make treason the defendant not only must intend the act, but he
sympathy with the for, or merely lack of zeal in the cause of one's own country. That was must intend to betray his country by means of the act. It is here that Cramer defends. The
not the kind of disloyalty the framers thought should constitute treason. They promptly issue is joined between conflicting theories as to how this treacherous intention and
accepted the proposal to restrict it to cases where also there was conduct which was treasonable purpose must be made to appear.
'giving them aid and comfort.'
Bearing in mind that the constitutional requirement in effect in one of direct rather than
'Aid and comfort' was defined by Lord Reading in the Casement trial comprehensively, as circumstantial evidence, we must give it a reasonable effect in the light of its purpose both
it should be, and yet probably with as much precision as the nature of the matter will to preserve the offense and to protect citizens from its abuse. What is designed in the
permit: '* * * an act which strengthens or tends to strengthen the enemies of the King in mind of an accused never is susceptible of proof by direct testimony. If we were to hold
the conduct of a war against the King, that is in law the giving of aid and comfort' and 'an that the disloyal and treacherous intention must be proved by the direct testimony of two
witnesses, it would be to hold that it is never provable. It seems obvious that adherence others and of facts which are not acts, will help to determine which among possible
to the enemy, in the sense of a disloyal state of mind, cannot be, and is not required to inferences as to the actor's knowledge, motivation, or intent are the true ones. But the
be, proved by deposition of two witnesses. protection of the two-witness rule extends at least to all acts of the defendant which are
used to draw incriminating inferences that aid and comfort have been given.
Since intent must be inferred from conduct of some sort, we think it is permissible to draw
usual reasonable inferences as to intent from the overt acts. The law of treason, like the The controversy before us has been waged in terms of intentions, but this, we think, is the
law of lesser crimes, assumes every man to intend the natural consequences which one reflection of a more fundamental issue as to what is the real function of the overt act in
standing in his circumstances and possessing his knowledge would reasonably expect to convicting of treason. The prisoner's contention that it alone and on its face must manifest
result from his acts. Proof that a citizen did give aid and comfort to an enemy may well be a traitorous intention, apart from an intention to do the act itself, would place on the overt
in the circumstances sufficient evidence that he adhered to that enemy and intended and act the whole burden of establishing a complete treason. On the other hand, the
purposed to strike at his own country.42 It may be doubted whether it would be what the Government's contention that it may prove by two witnesses an apparently commonplace
founders intended, or whether it would well serve any of the ends they cherished, to hold and insignificant act and from other circumstances create an inference that the act was a
the treason offense available to punish only those who make their treacherous intentions step in treason and was done with treasonable intent really is a contention that the
more evident than may be done by rendering aid and comfort to an enemy. Treason function of the overt act in a treason prosecution is almost zero. It is obvious that the
insidious and dangerous treason—is the work of the shrewd and crafty more often than of function we ascribe to the overt act is significant chiefly because it measures the two-
the simple and impulsive. witness rule protection to the accused and its handicap to the prosecution. If the over act
or acts must go all the way to make out the complete treason, the defendant is protected
While of course it must be proved that the accused acted with an intention and purpose to at all points by the two-witness requirement. If the act may be an insignificant one, then
betray or there is no treason, we think that in some circumstances at least the overt act the constitutional safeguards are shrunk en so as to be applicable only at a point where
itself will be evidence of the treasonable purpose and intent. But that still leaves us with they are least needed.
exceedingly difficult problems. How decisively must treacherous intention be made
manifest in the act itself? Will a scintilla of evidenc of traitorous intent suffice? Or must it The very minimum function that an overt act43 must perform in a treason prosecution is
be sufficient to convince beyond reasonable doubt? Or need it show only that treasonable that it show sufficient action by the accused, in its setting, to sustain a finding that the
intent was more probable than not? Must the overt act be appraised for legal sufficiency accused actually gave44 aid and comfort to the enemy. Every act, movement, deed, and
only as supported by the testimony of two witnesses, or may other evidence be thrown word of the defendant charged to constitute treason must be supported by the testimony
into the scales to create inferences not otherwise reasonably to be drawn or to reinforce of two witnesses. The two-witness principle is to interdict imputation of incriminating acts
those which might be drawn from the act itself? to the accused by circumstantial evidence or by the testimony of a single witness. The
prosecution cannot rely on evidence which does not meet the constitutional test for overt
It is only overt acts by the accused which the Constitution explicitly requires to be proved acts to create any inference that the accused did other acts or did something more than
by the testimony of two witnesses. It does not make other common-law evidence was shown in the overt act, in order to make a giving of aid and comfort to the enemy.
inadmissible nor deny its inherent powers of persuasion. It does not forbid judging by the The words of the Constitution were chosen, not to make it hard to prove merely routine
usual process by which the significance of conduct often will be determined by facts which and everyday acts, but to make the proof of acts that convict of treason as sure as trial
are not acts. Actions of the accused are set in time and place in many relationships. processes may. When the prosecution's case is thus established, the Constitution does not
Environment illuminates the meaning of acts, as context does that of words. What a man prevent presentation of corroborative or cumulative evidence of any admissible character
is up to may be clear from considering his bare acts by themselves; often it is made clear either to strengthen a direct case or to rebut the testimony or inferences on behalf of
when we know the reciprocity and sequence of his acts with those of others, the defendant. The Government is not prevented from making a strong case; it is denied a
interchange between him and another, the give and take of the situation. conviction on a weak one.
It would be no contribution to certainty of judgment, which is the object of the provision, It may be that in some cases the overt acts, sufficient to prove giving of aid and comfort,
to construe it to deprive a trial court of the aid of testimony under the ordinary sanctions will fall short of showing intent to betray and that questions will then be raised as to
of verity, provided, of course, resort is not had to evidence of less than the constitutional permissible methods of proof that we do not reach in this case. But in this and some cases
standard to supply deficiencies in the constitutional measure of proof of overt acts. For it we have cited where the sufficiency of the overt acts has been challenged because they
must be remembered that the constitutional provision establishes a minimum of proof of were colorless as to intent, we are persuaded the reason intent was left in question was
incriminating acts, without which there can be no conviction, but it is not otherwise a that the acts were really indecisive as a giving of aid and comfort. When we deal with acts
limitation on the evidence with which a jury may be persuaded that it ought to convict. that are trivial and commonplace and hence are doubtful as to whether they gave aid and
The Constitution does not exclude or set up standards to test evidence which will show the comfort to the enemy, we are most put to it to find in other evidence a treacherous intent.
relevant acts of persons other than the accused or their identity or enemy character or
other surrounding circumstances. Nor does it preclude any proper evidence, of non- We proceed to consider the application of these principles to Cramer's case.
incriminating facts about a defendant, such for example as his nationality, naturalization,
and residence. The indictment charged Cramer with adhering to the enemies of the United States, giving
them aid and comfort, and set forth ten overt acts. The prosecution withdrew seven, and
From duly proven overt acts of aid and comfort to the enemy in their setting, it may well three were submitted to the jury. The overt acts which present the principal issue 45 are
be that the natural and reasonable inference of intention to betray will be warranted. The alleged in the following language:
two-witness evidence of the acts accused, together with commonlaw evidence of acts of
'1. Anthony Cramer, the defendant herein, on or about June 23, 1942, at the Southern The shortcomings of the overt act submitted are emphasized by contrast with others
District of New York and within the jurisdiction of this Court, did meet with Werner Thiel which the indictment charged but which the prosecution withdrew for admitted
and Edward John Kerling, enemies of the United States, at the Twin Oaks Inn at Lexington insufficiency of proof. It appears that Cramer took from Thiel for safekeeping a money belt
Avenue and 44th Street, in the City and State of New York, and did confer, treat, and containing about $3,600, some $160 of which he held in his room concealed in books for
counsel with said Werner Thiel and Edward John Kerling for a period of time for the Thiel's use as needed. An old indebtedness of Thiel to Cramer of $200 was paid from the
purpose of giving and with intent to give aid and comfort to said enemies, Werner Thiel fund, and the rest Cramer put in his safe-deposit box in a bank for safekeeping. All of this
and Edward John Kerling. was at Thiel's request. That Thiel would be aided by having the security of a safe-deposit
box for his funds, plus availability of smaller amounts, and by being relieved of the risks of
'2. Anthony Cramer, the defendant herein, on or about June 23, 1942, at the Southern carrying large sums on his person—without disclosing his presence or identity to a bank—
District of New York and within the jurisdiction of this Court, did accompany, confer, treat, seems obvious. The inference of intent from such act is also very different from the intent
and counsel with Werner Thiel, an enemy of the United States, for a period of time at the manifest by drinking and talking together. Taking what must have seemed a large sum of
Twin Oaks Inn at Lexington Avenue and 44th Street, and at Thompson's Cafeteria on 42nd money for safekeeping is not a usual amenity of social intercourse. That such
Street between Lexington and Vanderbilt Avenues, both in the City and State of New York, responsibilities are undertaken and such trust bestowed without the scratch of a pen to
for the purpose of giving and with intent to give aid and comfort to said enemy, Werner show it, implies some degree of mutuality and concert from which a jury could say that
Thiel.' aid and comfort was given and was intended. If these acts had been submitted as overt
acts of treason, and we were now required to decide whether they had been established
At the present stage of the case we need not weight their sufficiency as a matter of
as required, we would have a quite different case. We would then have to decide whether
pleading. Whatever the averments might have permitted the Government to prove, we
statements on the witness stand by the defendant are either 'confession in open court' or
now consider their adequacy on the proof as made.
may be counted as the testimony of one of the required two witnesses to make out
It appeared upon the trial that at all times involved in these acts Kerling and Thiel were otherwise insufficiently proved 'overt acts.' But this transaction was not proven as the
under surveiliance of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. By direct testimony of two or Government evidently hoped to do when the indictment was obtained. The overt acts
more agents it was established that Cramer met Thiel and Kerling on the occasions and at based on it were expressly withdrawn from the jury, and Cramer has not been convicted
the places charged and that they drank together and engaged long and earnestly in of treason on account of such acts. We cannot sustain a conviction for the acts submitted
conversation. This is the sum of the overt acts as established by the testimony of two on the theory that, even if insufficient, some unsubmitted ones may be resorted to as
witnesses. There is no two-witness proof of what they said nor in what language they proof of treason. Evidence of the money transaction serves only to show how much went
conversed. There is no showing that Cramer gave them any information whatever of value out of the case when it was withdrawn.
to their mission or indeed that he had any to give. No effort at secrecy is shown, for they
The Government contends that outside of the overt acts, and by lesser degree of proof, it
met in public places. Cramer furnished them no shelter, nothing that can be called
has shown a treasonable intent on Cramer's part in meeting and talking with Thiel and
sustance or supplies, and there is no evidence that he gave them encouragement or
Kerling. But if it showed him disposed to betray, and showed that he had opportunity to
counsel, or even paid for their drinks.
do so, it still has not proved in the manner required that he did any acts submitted to the
The Government recognizes the weakness of its proof of aid and comfort, but on this jury as a basis for conviction which had the effect of betraying by giving aid and comfort.
scope it urges: 'Little imagination is required to perceive the advantage such meeting To take the intent for the deed would carry us back to constructive treasons.
would afford to enemy spies not yet detected. Even apart from the psychological comfort
It is outside of the commonplace overt acts as proved that we must find all that convicts
which the meetings furnished Thiel and Kerling by way of social intercourse with one who
or convinces either that Cramer gave aid and comfort or that he had a traitorous
they were confident would not report them to the authorities, as a loyal citizen should, the
intention. The prosecution relied chiefly upon the testimony of Norma Kopp, the fiancee of
meetings gave them a source of information and an avenue for contact. It enabled them
Thiel, as to incriminating statements made by Cramer to her, 46 upon admissions made by
to be seen in public with a citizen above suspicion and thereby to be mingling normally
Cramer after his arrest to agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, 47 upon letters and
with the citizens of the country with which they were at war.' The difficulty with this
documents found on search of his room by permission after his arrest, 48 and upon
argument is that the whole purpose of the constitutional provision is to make sure that
testimony that Cramer had curtly refused to buy Government bonds. 49 After denial of
treason conviction shall rest on direct proof of two witnesses and not on even a little
defendant's motion to dismiss at the close of the prosecution's case, defendant became a
imagination. And without the use of some imagination it is difficult to perceive any
witness in his own behalf and the Government obtained on cross-examination some
advantage which this meeting afforded to Thiel and Kerling as enemies or how it
admissions of which it had the benefit on submission.50
strengthened Germany or weakened the United States in any way whatever. It may be
true that the saboteurs were cultivating cramer as a potential 'source of information and It is not relevant to our issue to appraise weight or credibility of the evidence apart from
an avenue for contact.' But there is no proof either by two witnesses or by even one determining its constitutional sufficiency. Nor is it necessary in the view we take of the
witness or by any circumstance that Cramer gave them information or established any more fundamental issues, to discuss the reservations which all of us entertain as to the
'contact' for them with any person other than an attempt to bring about a rendezvous admissibility of some of it or those which some entertain as to other of it. We could
between Thiel and a girl, or that being 'seen in public with a citizen above suspicion' was conclude in favor of affirmance only if all questions of admissibility were resolved against
of any assistance to the enemy. Meeting with Cramer in public drinking places to tipple the prisoner. At all events much of the evidence is of the general character whose
and trifle was no part of the saboteurs' mission and did not advance it. It may well have infirmities were feared by the framers and sought to be safeguarded against.
been a digression which jeopardized its success.
Most damaging is the testimony of Norma Kopp, a friend of Cramer's and one with whom, affect the safety of both. * * * It is therefore more safe as well as more consonant to the
if she is to be believed, he had been most indiscreetly confidential. Her testimony went principles of our constitution, that the crime of treason should not be extended by
considerably beyond that of the agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation as to construction to doubtful cases; and that crimes not clearly within the constitutional
admissions of guilty knowledge of Thiel's hostile mission and of Cramer's sympathy with it. definition, should receive such punishment as the legislature in its wisdom may provide.'
To the extent that his conviction rests upon such evidence, and it does to an unknown but Ex parte Bollman, 4 Cranch 75, 125, 127, 2 L.Ed. 554.
considerable extent, it rests upon the uncorroborated testimony of one witness not
without strong emotional interest in the drama of which Cramer's trial was a part. Other It is not difficult to find grounds upon which to quarrel with this Constitutional provision.
evidence relates statements by Cramer before the United States was at war with Perhaps the framers placed rather more reliance on direct testimony than modern
Germany. At the time they were uttered, however, they were not treasonable. To use pre- researches in psychology warrant. Or it may be considered that such a quantitative
war expressions of opposition to entering a war to convict of treason during the war is a measure of proof, such a mechanical calibration of evidence is a crude device at best or
dangerous procedure at best. The same may be said about the inference of disloyal that its protection of innocence is too fortuitous to warrant so unselective an obstacle to
attitude created by showing that he refused to buy bonds and closed the door in the conviction. Certainly the treason rule, whether wisely or not, is severely restrictive. It
salesman's face. Another class of evidence consists of admissions to agents of the Federal must be remembered, however, that the Constitutional Convention was warned by James
Bureau of Investigation. They are of course, not 'confession in open court.' The Wilson that 'Treason may sometimes be practiced in such a manner, as to render proof
Government does not contend and could not well contend that admissions made out of extremely difficult—as in a traitorous correspondence with an Enemy.' 55 The provision was
court, if otherwise admissible, can supply a deficiency in proof of the overt act itself. adopted not merely in spite of the difficulties it put in the way of prosecution but because
of them. And it was not by whim or by accident, but because one of the most venerated of
The Government has urged that our initial interpretation of the treason clause should be that venerated group considered that 'prosecutions for treason were generally virulent.'
less exacting, lest treason be too hard to prove and the Government disabled from Time has not made the accusation of treachery less poisonous, nor the task of judging one
adequately combating the techniques of modern warfare. But the treason offense is not charged with betraying the country, including his triers, less susceptible to the influence of
the only nor can it well serve as the principal legal weapon to vindicate our national suspicion and rancor. The innovations made by the forefathers in the law of treason were
cohesion and security. In debating this provision, Rufus King observed to the Convention conceived in a faith such as Paine put in the maxim that 'He that would make his own
that the 'controversy relating to Treason might be of less magnitude than was supposed; liberty secure must guard even his enemy from oppression; for if he violates this duty he
as the legislature might punish capitally under other names than Treason.' 51 His statement establishes a precedent that will reach himself.'56 We still put trust in it.
holds good today. Of course we do not intimate that Congress could dispense with the
two-witness rule merely by giving the same offense another name. But the power of We hold that overt acts 1 and 2 are insufficient as proved to support the judgment of
Congress is in no way limited to enact prohibitions of specified acts thought detrimental to conviction, which accordingly is
our wartime safety. The loyal and the disloyal alike may be forbidden to do acts which
Reversed.
place our security in peril, and the trial thereof may be focussed upon defendant's specific
intent to do those particular acts52 thus eliminating the accusation of treachery and of TOP
general intent to betray which have such passion-rousing potentialities. Congress
repeatedly has enacted prohibitions of specific acts thought to endanger our security 53 and
the practice of foreign nations with defense problems more acute than our own affords
examples of others.54

The framers' effort to compress into two sentences the law of one of the most intricate of Mr. Justice DOUGLAS, with whom the CHIEF JUSTICE, Mr. Justice BLACK and Mr. Justice
crimes gives a superficial appearance of clarity and simplicity which proves illusory when it REED concur, dissenting.
is put to practical application. There are few subjects on which the temptation to utter
abstract interpretative generalizations is greater or on which they are more to be The opinion of the Court is written on a hypothetical state of facts, not on the facts
distrusted. The little clause is packed with controversy and difficulty. The offense is one of presented by the record. It states a rule of law based on an interpretation of the
subtlety, and it is easy to demonstrate lack of logic in almost any interpretation by Constitution which is not only untenable but is also unnecessary for the decision. It
hypothetical cases, to which real treasons rarely will conform. The protection of the two- disregards facts essential to a determination of the question presented for decision. It
witness requirement, limited as it is to overt acts, may be wholly unrelated to the real overlooks the basis issue on which our disposition of the case must turn. In order to reach
controversial factors in a case. We would be understood as speaking only in the light of that issue we must have a more exact appreciation of the facts than can be gleaned from
the facts and of the issues raised in the case under consideration, although that leaves the opinion of the Court.
many undetermined grounds of dispute which, after the method of the common law, we
may defer until they are presented by facts which may throw greater light on their Cramer is a naturalized citizen of the United States, born in Germany. He served in the
significance. Although nothing in the conduct of Cramer's trial evokes it, a repetition of German army in the last war, coming to this country in 1925. In 1929 he met Thiel who
Chief Justice Marshall's warning can never be untimely: had come to this country in 1927 from a place in Germany not far from petitioner's
birthplace. The two became close friends; they were intimate associates during a twelve-
'As there is no crime which can more excite and agitate the passions of men than treason, year period. In 1933 Cramer found work in Indiana. Thiel joined him there. Both became
no charge demands more from the tribunal before which it is made, a deliberate and members of the Friends of New Germany, predecessor of the German-American Bund.
temperate inquiry. Whether this inquiry be directed to the fact or to the law, none can be Cramer was an officer of the Indiana local. He resigned in 1935 but Thiel remained a
more, solemn, none more important to the citizen or to the government; none can more member and was known as a zealous Nazi. In 1936 Cramer visited Germany. On his
return he received his final citizenship papers. He and Thiel returned to New York in 1937 So they agreed to meet at the Twin Oaks Inn at 8 P.M. on the following evening, June 23,
and lived either together or in close proximity for about four years. Thiel left for Germany 1942. At this meeting Kerling joined them. Cramer had met Kerling in this country and
in the spring of 1941, feeling that war between the United States and Germany was knew he had returned to Germany. Kerling and Thiel told Cramer that they had come over
imminent. According to Cramer, Thiel was 'up to his ears' is Nazi ideology. Cramer together. Cramer had a 'hunch' that Kerling was here for the same purpose as Thiel.
corresponded with Thiel in Germany. Prior to our declaration of war, he was sympathetic Kerling left Thiel and Cramer after about an hour and a half. Kerling was followed and
with the German cause and critical of our attitude. Thus in November, 1941, he wrote arrested. Cramer and Thiel stayed on at the tavern for about another hour. After Kerling
Thiel saying he had declined a job in Detroit 'as I don't was to dirty my fingers with war left, Thiel agreed to entrust his money to Cramer for safekeeping. He told Cramer to take
material'; that 'We sit here in pitiable comfort, when we should be in the battle—as out $200 which Thiel owed him. But he asked Cramer not to put all of the balance in the
Nietzsche says—I want the man, I want the woman, the one fit for war, the other fit for safe deposit box—that he should keep some of it out 'in the event I need it in a hurry.'
bearing.' In the spring of 1942 he wrote another friend in reference to the possibility of Thiel went to the washroom to remove the money belt. He handed it to Cramer on the
being drafted: 'Personally I should not care at all to be misused by the American army as street when they left the tavern. From the Twin Oaks Thiel and Cramer went to
a world conqueror.' Cramer listened to short-wave broadcasts of Lord Haw-Haw and other Thompson's Cafeteria where they conversed for about fifteen minutes. They agreed to
German propagandists. He knew that the theme of German propaganda was that England meet there at 8 P.M. on June 25th. They parted. Thiel was followed and arrested.
and the United States were fighting a war of aggression and seeking to conquer the world.
Cramer returned home. He put Thiel's money belt in a shoe box. He put some of the
So much for the background. What followed is a sequel to Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 63 money between the pages of a book. Later he put the balance in his bank, some in a
S.Ct. 2, 87 L.Ed. 3. savings account, most of it in his safe deposit box. He and Thiel had talked of Thiel's
fiance e, Norma Kopp. At the first meeting Cramer had offered to write her on Thiel's
Thiel entered the German army and in 1942 volunteered with seven other German soldiers behalf. He did so. He did not mention Thiel's name but asked her to come to his room,
who had lived in the United States for a special mission to destroy the American aluminum saying he had 'sensational' news for her. Cramer appeared at Thompson's Cafeteria at 8
industry. They were brought here by German submarines in two groups. Kerling was the P. M. June 25th to keep his appointment with Thiel. He waited about an hour and a half.
leader and Thiel a member of one group which landed by rubber boat near Jacksonville, He returned the next night, June 26th, and definitely suspected Thiel had been arrested.
Florida on June 17, 1942. They buried their explosives and proceeded to New York City, Though he knew Thiel was registered at the Hotel Commodore, he made no attempt to get
where on June 21st they registered at the Hotel Commodore under the assumed names of in touch with him there. When he returned to his room that night, Norma Kopp was
Edward Kelly and William Thomas. waiting for him. She testified that he told her that Thiel was here; that 'they came about
six men with a U-boat, in a rubber boat, and landed in Florida'; that they 'brought so
The next morning a strange voice called Cramer's name from the hall of the rooming
much money along from Germany, from the German government' he was keeping it in a
house where he lived. On his failure to reply an unsigned note was slipped under his door.
safe deposit box; and that they 'get instructions from the sitz (hideout) in the Bronx what
It read, 'Be at the Grand Central station tonight at 8 o'clock, the upper platform near the
to do, and where to go'. The next morning Cramer left a note for 'William Thomas' at the
information booth, Franz from Chicago has come into town and wants to see you; don't
Commodore saying that Norma Kopp had arrived and suggested a rendezvous. Later in
fail to be there.' Cramer said he knew no Franz from Chicago. But nevertheless he was on
the day Cramer was arrested. He told the agents of the F.B.I. that the name of the man
hand at the appointed hour and place. Thiel shortly appeared. They went to the Twin Oaks
who had been with him at Thompson's Cafeteria on the evening of June 23rd was 'William
Inn where they talked for two hours. Cramer admitted that he knew Thiel had come from
Thomas', that 'Thomas' had been working in a factory on the West Coast since March,
Germany; and of course, he knew that at that time men were not freely entering this
1941, and had not been out of the United States since then. He was asked if 'Thomas' was
country from Germany. He asked Thiel, 'Say, how have you come over, have you come by
not Thiel. He then admitted he was, saying that Thiel had used an assumed name, as he
submarine?' Thiel looked startled, smiled, and said, 'Some other time I am going to tell
was having difficulties with his draft board. He also stated that the money belt Thiel gave
you all about this.' Thiel told him that he had taken the assumed name of William Thomas
him contained only $200 which Thiel owed him and that the $3500 in his safe deposit box
and had a forged draft card. Thiel admonished him to remember that he, Thiel, was 'anti-
belonged to him and were the proceeds from the sale of securities. After about an hour or
Nazi'—a statement Cramer doubted because he knew Thiel was a member of the Nazi
so of the falsehoods Cramer asked to speak to one of the agents alone. The request was
party. thiel indicated he had come from the coast of Florida. Cramer inquired if he had
granted. He then recanted his previous false statements and stated that he felt sure that
used a rubber boat. When Thiel said that the only time he was 'scared to death was when
Thiel had come from Germany by submarine on a mission for the German Government
I came over here we got bombed,' Cramer replied, 'Then you have come over by
and that he thought that mission was 'to stir up unrest among the people and probably
submarine, haven't you?' Thiel told Cramer that he had 'three and a half or four thousand
spread propaganda.' He stated he had lied in order to protect Thiel.
dollars' with him and that 'if you have the right kind of connection you can even get
dollars in Germany.' Cramer offered to keep Thiel's money for him. Thiel agreed but The Court holds that this evidence is insufficient to sustain the conviction of Cramer under
nothing was done about it that evening. Cramer admitted he had a 'hunch' that Thiel was the requirements of the Constitution. We disagree.
here on a mission for the German government. He asked Thiel 'whether he had come over
here to spread rumors and incite unrest.' Cramer after his arrest told agents of the F.B.I. Article III, Sec. 3 of the Constitution defines treason as follows: 'Treason against the
that he had suspected that Thiel had received the money from the German government, United States, shall consist only in levying War against them, or in adhering to their
that Thiel in fact had told him that he was on a mission for Germany, and that 'whatever Enemies, giving them Aid and Comfort. No Person shall be convicted of Treason unless on
his mission was, I thought that he was serious in his undertaking.' Thiel from the the Testimony of two Witnesses to the same overt Act, or on Confession in open Court.'
beginning clothed his actions with secrecy; was unwilling to be seen at Cramer's room
('because I have too many acquaintances there and I don't want them to see me'); and The charge against Cramer was that of adhering. The essential elements of the crime are
cautioned Cramer against conversing loudly with him in the public tavern. that Cramer (1) with treasonable intent (2) gave aid and comfort to the enemy. 1
There was ample evidence for the jury that Cramer had a treasonable intent. The trial present case is much stronger. For Cramer claims he believed the enemy agent's objective
court charged the jury that 'criminal intent and knowledge, being a mental state, are not was to destroy national morale by propaganda and not to blow up war factories.
susceptible of being proved by direct evidence, and therefore you must infer the nature of Propaganda designed to cause disunity among adversaries is one of the older weapons
the defendant's intent and knowledge from all the circumstances.' It charged that proof of known to warfare, and upon occasion one of the most effective. No one can read this
criminal intent and knowledge is sufficient if proved beyond a reasonable doubt, and that record without concluding that the defendant Cramer knew this. He is an intelligent, if
the two witnesses are not necessary for any of the facts other than the overt acts. On that misguided, man. He has a quick wit sharpened by considerable learing of its kind. He is
there apparently is no disagreement. It also charged: 'Now gentlemen, motive should not widely read and a student of history and philosophy, particularly Ranke and Nietzsche. He
be confused with intent. If the defendant knowingly gives aid and comfort to one who he had been an officer of a pro-German organization, and his closest associate had been a
knows or believes is an enemy, then he must be taken to intend the consequences of his zealous Nazi. He also had listened to German propagandists over the short wave. But, in
own voluntary act, and the fact that his motive might not have been to aid the enemy is any event, it is immaterial whether Cramer was acquainted with the efficacy of
no defense. In other words, one cannot do an act which he knows will give aid and propaganda in modern warfare. Undoubtedly he knew that the German Government
comfort to a person he knows to be an enemy of the United States, and then seek to thought it efficacious. When he was shown consciously and voluntarily to have assisted
disclaim criminal intent and knowledge by saying that one's motive was not to aid the this enemy program his traitorous intent was then and there sufficiently proved.
enemy. So if you believe that the defendant performed acts which by their nature gave aid
and comfort to the enemy, knowing or believing him to be an enemy, then you must find The Court does not purport to set aside the conviction for lack of sufficient evidence of
that he had criminal intent, since he intended to do the act forbidden by the law. The fact traitorous intent. It frees Cramer from this treason charge solely on the ground that the
that you may believe that his motive in so doing was, for example, merely to help a overt acts charged are insufficient under the constitutional requirement.
friend, or possibly for financial gain, would not change the fact that he had a criminal
The overt acts alleged were (1) that Cramer met with Thiel and Kerling on June 23rd,
intent.' On that there apparently is no disagreement. A man who voluntarily assists one
1942, at the Twin Oaks Inn and 'did confer, treat, and counsel' with them 'for the purpose
known or believed to be an enemy agent may not defend on the ground that he betrayed
of giving and with the intent to give aid and comfort' to the enemy; (2) that Cramer 'did
his country for only thirty pieces of silver. See Hanauer v. Doane, 12 Wall. 342, 347, 20
accompany, confer, treat, and counsel with' Thiel at the Twin Oaks Inn and at Thompson's
L.Ed. 439; Sprott v. United States, 20 Wall. 459, 463, 22 L.Ed. 371. 'The consequences of
Cafeteria on June 23rd, 1942, 'for the purpose of giving and with intent to give aid and
his acts are too serious and enormous to admit of such a plea. He must be taken to intend
comfort' to the enemy; and (3) that Cramer gave false information of the character which
the consequences of his own voluntary act.' Hanauer v. Doane, supra (12 Wall. 347, 20
has been enumerated to agents of the F.B.I. 'for the purpose of concealing the identity
L.Ed. 439). For the same reasons a man cannot slip through our treason law because his
and mission' of Thiel and 'for the purpose of giving and with intent to give aid and comfort'
aid to those who would destroy his country was prompted by a desire to 'accommodate a
to the enemy.
friend.'2 Loyalty to country cannot be subordinated to the amenities of personal friendship.
The Court concedes that an overt act need not manifest on its face a traitorous intention.
Cramer had a traitorous intent if he knew or believed that Thiel and Kerling were enemies
By that concession it rejects the defense based on the treason clause which Cramer has
and were working here in the interests of the German Reich. The trial court charged that
made here. The Court says an overt act must 'show sufficient action by the accused, in its
mere suspicion was not enough; but that it was not necessary for Cramer to have known
setting, to sustain a finding that the accused actually gave aid and comfort to the enemy.'
all their plans. There apparently is no disagreement on that. By that test the evidence
It says, however, that the 'protection of the two-witness rule extends at least to all acts of
against Cramer was overwhelming. The conclusion is irresistible that Cramer believed, if
the defendant which are used to draw incriminating inferences that aid and comfort have
he did not actually know, that Thiel and Kerling were here on a secret mission for the
been given.' It adds, 'Every act, movement, deed, and word of the defendant charged to
German Reich with the object of injuring the United States and that the money which Thiel
constitute treason must be supported by the testimony of two witnesses. The two-witness
gave him for safekeeping had been supplied by Germany to facilitate the project of the
principle is to interdict imputation of incriminating acts to the accused by circumstantial
enemy. The trial court charged that if the jury found that Cramer had no purpose or
evidence or by the testimony of a single witness. The prosecution cannot rely on evidence
intention of assisting the German Reich in its prosecution of the war or in hampering the
which does not meet the constitutional test for overt acts to create any inference that the
United States in its prosecution of the war but acted solely for the purpose of assisting
accused did other acts or did something more than was shown in the overt act, in order to
Kerling and Thiel as individuals, Cramer should be acquitted. There was ample evidence
make a giving of aid and comfort to the enemy.' And when it comes to the overt acts of
for the jury's conclusion that the assistance Cramer rendered was assistance to the
meeting and conferring with Thiel and Kerling the Court holds that they are inadequate
German Reich, not merely assistance to Kerling and Thiel as individuals.
since there was 'no two-witness proof of what they said nor in what language they
The trial judge stated when he sentenced Cramer that it did not appear that Cramer knew conversed.' That is to say, reversible error is found because the two witnesses who
that Thiel and Kerling were in possession of explosives or other means for destroying testified to the fact that Cramer met twice with the saboteurs did not testify that Cramer
factories in this country or that they planned to do that. He stated that if there had been gave them information of 'value to their mission' such as shelter, sustenance, supplies,
direct proof of such knowledge he would have sentenced Cramer to death rather than to encouragement or counsel.
forty-five years in prison. But however relevant such particular knowledge may have been
That conclusion, we submit, leads to ludicrous results. The present case is an excellent
to fixing the punishment for Cramer's acts of treason, it surely was not essential to proof
example.
of his traitorous intent. A defendant who has aided an enemy agent in this country may
not escape conviction for treason on the ground that he was not aware of the enemy's It is conceded that if the two witnesses had testified not only that they saw Cramer
precise objectives. Knowing or believing that the agent was here on a mission on behalf of conferring with Thiel and Kerling but also heard him agree to keep Thiel's money and saw
a hostile government, he could not, by simple failure to ask too many questions, assume him take it, the result would be different. But the assumption is that since the two
that this mission was one of charity and benevolence toward the United States. But the
witnesses could not testify as to what happened at the meetings, we must appraise the joining a person at a table, stepping into a boat, or carrying a parcel of food. That alone is
meetings in isolation from the other facts of the record. Therein lies the fallacy of the insufficient. It must be established beyond a reasonable doubt that the act was part of the
argument. treasonable project and done in furtherance of it. Its character and significance are to be
judged by its place in the effectuation of the project. That does not mean that where the
In the first place, we fully agree that under the constitutional provision there can be no treasonable scheme involves several treasonable acts, and the overt act which is charged
conviction of treason without proof of two witnesses of an overt act of treason. We also has been proved by two witnesses, that all the other acts which tend to show the
agree that the act so proved need not itself manifest on its face the treasonable intent. treasonable character of the overt act and the treasonable purpose with which it was
And as the Court states, such intent need not be proved by two witnesses. It may even be committed must be proved by two witnesses. The Constitution does not so declare. There
established by circumstantial evidence. For it is well established that the overt act and the is no historical support for saying that the phrase 'two Witnesses to the same overt Act'
intent are separate and distinct elements of the crime. 3 The 'intent may be proved by one may be or can be read as meaning two witnesses to all the acts involved in the
witness, collected from circumstances, or even by a single fact.' Case of Fries, 9 Fed.Cas. treasonable scheme of the accused. Obviously one overt act proved by two witnesses is
pages 826, 909, No. 5,126; Respublica v. Roberts, 1 Dall. 39, 1 L.Ed. 27; United States v. enough to sustain a conviction even though the accused has committed many other acts
Lee, 26 Fed.Cas. page 907, No. 15,584; Trial of David Maclane, 26 How.St.Tr. 721, 795— which can be proved by only one witness or by his own admission in open court. Hence, it
798. Acts innocent on their face, when judged in the light of their purpose and of related is enough that the overt act which is charged be proved by two witnesses. As the Court
events, may turn out to be acts of aid and comfort committed with treasonable purpose. It concedes, its treasonable character need not be manifest upon its face. We say that its
is the overt act charged as such in the indictment which must be proved by two witnesses true character may be proved by any competent evidence sufficient to sustain the verdict
and not the related events which make manifest its treasonable quality and purpose. This, of a jury. Any other conclusion lands to such absurd results as to preclude the supposition
we think, is the correct and necessary conclusion to be drawn from the concession that that the two witness rule was intended to have the meaning attributed to it.
the overt act need not on its face manifest the guilty purpose. The grossest and most
dangerous act of treason may be, as in this case, and often is, innocent on its face. But When we apply that test to the facts of this case it is clear to us that the judgment of
the ruling of the Court that the related acts and events which show the true character of conviction against Cramer should not be set aside. The historical materials which we have
the overt act charged must be proved by two witnesses is without warrant under the set forth in the Appendix to this opinion establish that a meeting with the enemy may be
constitutional provisions, and is so remote from the practical realities of proving the adequate as an overt act of treason. Hale, Kelyng and Foster establish that beyond
offense, as to render the constitutional command unworkable. The treasonable intent or peradventure of doubt. Such a meeting might be innocent on its face. It might also be
purpose which it is said may be proved by a single witness or circumstantial evidence innocent in its setting, as Hale, Kelying and Foster point out, where, for example, it was
must, in the absence of a confession of guilt in open court, be inferred from all the facts accidental. We would have such a case here if Cramer's first meeting with Thiel was
and circumstances which surround and relate to the overt act. Inference of the charged as an overt act. For, as we have seen, Cramer went to the meeting without
treasonable purpose from events and acts related to or surrounding the overt act knowledge that he would meet and confer with Thiel. But the subsequent meetings were
necessarily includes the inference that the accused committed the overt act with the arranged between them. They were arranged in furtherance of Thiel's designs. Cramer
knowledge or understanding of its treasonable character. To say that the treasonable was not only on notice that Thiel was here on a mission inimical to the interests of this
purpose with which the accused committed the overt act may be inferred from related nation. He had agreed at the first meeting to hide Thiel's money. He had agreed to contact
events proved by a single witness, and at the same time to say that so far as they show Norma Kopp. He knew that Thiel wanted his identity and presence in New York concealed.
the treasonable character of the overt act, they must be proved by two witnesses, is a This was the setting in which the later meetings were held. The meetings take on their
contradiction in terms. The practical effect of such a doctrine is to require proof by two true character and significance from that setting. They constitute acts. They demonstrate
witnesses, not only of the overt act charged which the Constitution requires but of every that Cramer had a liking for Thiel's design to the extent of aiding him in it. They show
other fact and circumstance relied upon to show the treasonable character of the overt act beyond doubt that Cramer had more than a treasonable intent; that that intent had
and the treasonable purpose with which it was committed which the Constitution plainly moved from the realm of thought into the realm of action. Since two witnesses proved
does not require. Here, as in practically all cases where there is no confession in open that the meetings took place, their character and significance might be proved by any
court, the two are inseparable, save only in the single instance where the overt act competent evidence.
manifests its treasonable character on its face. The court thus in substance adopts the
contention of the respondent, which it has rejected in words, and for all practical purposes In the second place, this judgment of conviction should be sustained even though we
requires proof by two witnesses, not only of the overt act but of all other elements of the assume, arguendo, that Cramer's motion to dismiss at the end of the government's case
crime save only in the case where the accused confesses in open court. It thus confuses should have been granted. To concern of the Court is that acts innocent on their face may
proof of the overt act with proof of the purpose or intent with which the overt act was be transformed into sinister or guilty acts by circumstantial evidence, by inference, by
committed and, without historical support, expands the constitutional requirement so as speculation. The rule announced by the Court is based on a desire for trust-worthy
to include an element of proof not embraced by its words. evidence in determining the character and significance of the overt acts. But this is not a
case where an act innocent on its face is given a sinister aspect and made a part of a
We have developed in the Appendix to this opinion the historic function of the overt act in treasonous design by circumstantial evidence, by inference, or by the testimony of a
treason cases. It is plain from those materials that the requirement of an overt act is single witness for the prosecution. We know from Cramer's own testimony—from his
designed to preclude punishment for treasonable plans or schemes or hopes which have admissions at the trial—exactly what happened.
never moved out of the realm of thought or speech. It is made a necessary ingredient of
the crime to foreclose prosecutions for constructive treason. The treasonable project is We know the character of the meetings from Cramer's own admissions. We know from his
complete as a crime only when the traitorous intent has ripened into a physical and own lips that they were not accidental or casual conferences, or innocent, social meetings.
observable act. The act standing alone may appear to be innocent or indifferent, such as He arranged them with Thiel. When he did so he believed that Thiel was here on a secret
mission for the German Reich with the object of injuring this nation. He also knew that open court to the overt acts charged in the indictment was not an adequate substitute for
Thiel was looking for a place to hide his money. Cramer had offered to keep it for Thiel the testimony of two witnesses where the accused denied treasonable purpose. We need
and Thiel had accepted the offer. Cramer had also offered to write Norma Kopp, Thiel's not go so far as to say that if the whole crime may be proved by an admission by the
fiance e, without mentioning Thiel's name. Cramer also knew that Thiel wanted his accused in open court, one of the ingredients of the offense may be established in like
identity and his presence in New York concealed. Cramer's admissions at the trial gave manner. See Respublica v. Roberts, supra. We do not say that if the government
character and significance to those meetings. Those admissions plus the finding of completely fails to prove an overt act or proves it by one witness only, the defect can be
treasonable intent place beyond a reasonable doubt the conclusion that those meetings cured by the testimony of other witnesses or by the admissions of the accused. We do say
were steps in and part and parcel of the treasonable project. that a meeting with the enemy is an act and may in its setting be an overt act of treason.
We agree that overt acts innocent on their face should not be lightly transformed into
Nor need we guess or speculate for knowledge of what happened at the meetings. We incriminating acts. But so long as overt acts of treason need not manifest treason on their
need not rely on circumstantial evidence, draw inferences from other facts, or resort to face, as the Court concedes, the sufficiency of the evidence to establish the treasonable
secondary sources. Again we know from Cramer's testimony at the trial—from his own character of the act, like the evidence of trasonable intent, depends on the quality of that
admissions—precisely what transpired. evidence whatever the number of witnesses who supplied it. There can be no doubt in this
case on that score. Certainly a person who takes the stand in defense of a treason charge
Cramer told the whole story in open court. He admitted he agreed to act and did act as
against him will not be presumed to commit perjury when he makes admissions against
custodian of the saboteur Thiel's money. He agreed to hold it available for Thiel's use
self-interest. Admissions against self-interest have indeed always been considered as the
whenever Thiel might need it. It is difficult to imagine what greater aid one could give a
highest character of evidence. When two witnesses testify to the overt acts, why then are
saboteur unless he participated in the sabotage himself. Funds were as essential to Thiel's
not admissions of the accused in open court adequate to establish their true character?
plans as the explosives he buried in the sands of Florida. Without funds the mission of all
Could the testimony of any number of witnesses more certainly or conclusively establish
the saboteurs would have soon ended or been seriously crippled. Cramer did not stop
the significance of what was done? Take the case where two witnesses testify that the
here. Preservation of secrecy was essential to this invasion of the enemy. It was vital if
accused delivered a package to the enemy, the accused admitting in open court that the
the project was to be successful. In this respect Cramer also assisted Thiel. He cooperated
package contained guns or ammunition. Or two witnesses testify that the accused sent the
with Thiel in the concealment of Thiel's identity and presence in New York City. He did his
enemy a message, innocuous on its face, the accused admitting in open court that the
best to throw federal officers off the trail and to mislead them. He made false statements
message was a code containing military information. Must a conviction be set aside
to them saying that Thiel's true name was 'Thomas' and that Thiel had not been not of the
because the two witnesses did not testify to what the accused admitted in open court? We
country since the war began.
say no. In such circumstances we have no examples of constructive treason. The intent is
If Cramer had not testified, we would then be confronted with the questions discussed in not taken for the deed. Proof of the overt act plus proof of a treasonable intent make clear
the opinion of the Court. But he took the stand and told the whole story. It is true that at that the treasonable design has moved out of the realm of thought into the filed of action.
the end of the government's case Cramer moved to dismiss on the ground that the crime And any possibility that an act innocent on its face has been transformed into a sinister or
charged had not been made out. That motion was denied and an exception taken. If guilty act is foreclosed. For the significance and character of the act are supplied by the
Cramer had rested there, the case submitted to the jury and a judgment of conviction admissions from the lips of the accused in open court. The contrary result could be
rendered, we would have before us the problem presented in the opinion of the Court. But reached only if it were necessary that the overt act manifest treason on its face. That
Cramer did not rest on that motion. He took the stand and told the whole story. Any theory is rejected by the Court. But once rejected it is fatal to the defense.
defect in the proof was cured by that procedure. As stated in Bogk v. Gassert, 149 U.S.
Cramer's counsel could not defend on the grounds advanced by the Court for the simple
17, 23, 13 S.Ct. 738, 739, 37 L.Ed. 631, 'A defendant has an undoubted right to stand
reason that the government having proved by two witnesses that Cramer met and
upon his motion for a nonsuit, and have his writ of error, if it be refused; but he has no
conferred with the saboteurs, any possible insufficiency in the evidence which it adduced
right to insist upon his exception after having subsequently put in his testimony, and
to show the character and significance of the meetings was cured by Cramer's own
made his case upon the merits, since the court and jury have the right to consider the
testimony. Cramer can defend only on the ground that the overt act must manifest
whole case as made by the testimony. It not infrequently happens that the defendant
treason, which the Court rejects, or on the ground that he had no treasonable intent,
himself, by his own evidence, supplies the missing link'. And see Sigafus v. Porter, 179
which the jury found against him on an abundance of evidence. Those are the only
U.S. 116, 121, 21 S.Ct. 34, 36, 45 L.Ed. 113; McCabe & Steen Const. Co. v. Wilson, 209
alternatives because concededly conferences with saboteurs here on a mission for the
U.S. 275, 276, 28 S.Ct. 558, 559, 52 L.Ed. 788; Bates v. Miller, 2 Cir., 133 F.2d 645, 647,
enemy may be wholly adequate as overt acts under the treason clause. They were proved
648; 9 Wigmore on Evidence (3d ed. 1940) § 2496. And the rule obtains in criminal as
by two witnesses as required by the Constitution. Any possible doubt as to their character
well as in civil cases. Sheridan v. United States, 9 Cir., 112 F.2d 503, 504, reversed on
and significance as parts of a treasonable project were removed by the defendant's own
other grounds 312 U.S. 654, 61 S.Ct. 619, 85 L.Ed. 1104; Edwards v. United States, 8
admissions in open court. To say that we are precluded from considering those admissions
Cir., 7 F.2d 357, 359; Baldwin v. United States, 9 Cir., 72 F.2d 810, 812.
in weighing the sufficiency of the evidence of the true character and significance of the
Why then must we disregard Cramer's admissions at the trial? Why must we assume, as overt acts is neither good sense nor good law. Such a result makes the way easy for the
does this Court, that those admissions are out of the case and that our decision must traitor, does violence to the Constitution and makes justice truly blind.
depend solely on the evidence presented by the government?
Appendix
The Constitution says that a 'confession in open Court' is sufficient to sustain a conviction
The most relevant source of materials for interpretation of the treason clause of the
of treason. It was held in United States v. Magtibay, 2 Philippine 703, that a confession in
Constitution is the statute of 25 Edw. III, Stat. 5, ch. 2 (1351) and the construction which
was given it. It was with that body of law and the English and colonial experience under it meeting with previous notice of the design to plot the death of the king or a return to a
that the Framers were acquainted. That statute specified seven offenses as constituting meeting after knowledge is gained of its treasonable purpose is treason, though bare
treason. As respects the three offenses relevant to our present discussion, it provided as concealment would not be if the defendant met the conspirators 'accidentally or upon
follows: if a man 'doth compass or imagine the death' of the king, or 'if a man do levy war' some indifferent occasion'. Id., p. 195.
against the king in his realm, or if he 'be adherent to the king's enemies in his realm,
giving to them aid and comfort in the realm, or elsewhere, and thereof be probably It is true that these observations related to the offense of compassing or imagining the
attainted of open deed', he shall be guilty of treason. death of the king. But Foster indicates that the same test applies to make out the offense
of adherence to the king's enemies. He says, 'The offense of inciting foreigners to invade
Coke makes clear that the requirement of an overt act under the statute applies to all of the kingdom is a treason of signal enormity. In the lowest estimation of things and in all
the offenses included in the category of treason. See Coke, Institutes of the Laws of possible events, it is an attempt, on the part of the offender, to render his country the
England, Third Part (5th ed. London, 1671), p. 5. There are indications by Coke that the seat of blood and desolation.' Id., pp. 196—197. This was said in connection with his
overt act was a separate element of the offense and that its function was to show that the discussion of Lord Preston's case, 12 How.St.Tr. 645, a landmark in the law of treason.
treasonable design had moved from thought to action. Id., pp. 5, 12, 14, 38. Hale is Lord Preston was indicted both for compassing the death of the king and for adherence to
somewhat more explicit. In discussing the offense of compassing the king's death he his enemies. England was at war with France. The indictment alleged as an overt act of
indicates that the overt act may be 'indifferent' in character. He says, 'That words may treason that on December 30, 1690, Lord Preston and others hired a small boat in the
expound an overt-act to make good an indictment of treason of compassing the king's County of Middlesex to take them to another vessel which would carry them to France.
death, which overt-act possibly of itself may be indifferent and unapplicable to such an The indictment alleged that the defendants were en route to France to communicate
intent.' 1 Hale, History of the Pleas of the Crown (Emlyn ed., London, 1736), p. 115. And military information to the enemy. After the vessel set sail for France and when the vessel
he noted that 'If there be an assembling together to consider how they may kill the king, was in the County of Kent, the defendants were arrested. Papers containing information of
this assembling is an overt-act to make good an indictment of compassing the king's value to the enemy were found on the person of Lord Preston's servant. Lord Preston
death.' Id., p. 119. Kelying states the same view. He cites Sir Everard Digby's Case, 1 contended that since the indictment laid the treason in Middlesex there was no showing
St.Tr. 234, for the proposition that the meeting of persons and their consulting to destroy that a legally sufficient overt act of treason had been committed in that county. The court
the king was itself an overt act. 'It was resolved that where a Person knowing of the held, however, that the act of boarding the boat in Middlesex was a sufficient overt act of
Design does meet with them, and hear them discourse of their traitorous Designs, and say treason. Lord Chief Justice Holt ruled, 'Now the question is, whether your lordship had a
or act nothing; This is High-Treason in that Party, for it is more than a bare Concealment, design to go to France with these papers? If you had, and if your lordship did go on ship-
which is Misprision, because it sheweth his liking and approving of their Design.' He says board in order to it, your taking boat in Middlesex in order to go on ship-board, is a fact
that if a person not knowing their intent met with them, heard their plans, but said done in the county of Middlesex.' 12 How.St.Tr., p. 728.
nothing and never met again, that would be only misprision of treason. 'But if he after
meet with them again, and hear their Consultations, and then conceal it, this is High- Foster in his analysis of that case makes clear that taking the boat was an overt act
Treason. For it sheweth a liking, and an approving of their Design.' Kelyng, A Report of sufficient not only to the crime of compassing the death of the king but also adherence to
Divers Cases in Pleas of the Crown (3d ed., London, 1873), p. *17. And see p. *21. the enemies of the king. Foster, op. cit., pp. 197-198. Yet on its face and standing alone
the overt act of taking the boat was completely innocent and harmless. Only when it was
Foster is even more explicit. Like Coke he asserts that an overt act is required for each related to other activities and events did it acquire a treasonable significance. Foster gives
branch of treason covered by the Statute of Edward III. Foster, A Report of Some other indications that in case of adherence to the enemy the function of the overt act is no
Proceedings on the Commission for the Trial of the Rebels in the Year 1746 in the County different than when the offense of compassing is charged. The crime of adherence is made
of Surry, and of other Crown Cases (2d ed., London 1791), pp. 207, 237. He makes clear out where the defendant attempts to send money, provisions, or information to the enemy
that an overt act is required not to corroborate the proof of a traitorous intent but to show 'though the money or intelligence should happen to be intercepted; for the party in
that the treasonable project has left the realm of thought and moved into the realm of sending did all he could; the treason was complete on his part, though it had not the
action. As respects the offense of compassing the death of the king, he says that the effect he intended.' Id., p. 217.
indictment 'must charge, that the defendant did traitorously compass and imagine &c, and
then go on and charge the several overt-acts as the means employed by the defendant for Blackstone emphasizes the desirability of a restrictive interpretation of the offense of
executing his traitorous purposes. For the compassing is considered as the treason, the treason, condemning 'constructive' treason and 'newfangled treasons' which imperil the
overt-acts as the means made use of to effectuate the intentions and imaginations of the liberty of the people. 4 Blackstone, Commentaries (6th ed. Dublin 1775), pp. 75, 83, 85,
heart.' Id., p. 194. He refers to Crohagan's Case (Cro.Car. 332) where the defendant said 86. Blackstone recognizes the distinction between evidence of intent and the overt act:
'I will kill the King of England, if I can come at him' and the indictment added that he 'But, as this compassing or imagination is an act of the mind, it cannot possibly fall under
came to England for that purpose. 'The traitorous intention, proved by his words, any judicial cognizance, unless it be demonstrated by some open, or overt act. And yet
converted an action, innocent in itself, into an overt-act of treason.' Id., p. 202. And he the tyrant Dionysius is recorded to have executed a subject, barely for dreaming that he
also points out that 'Overt-acts undoubtedly do discover the man's intentions; but, I had killed him; which was held for a sufficient proof, that he had thought thereof in his
conceive, they are not to be considered merely as evidence, but as the means made use waking hours. But such is not the temper of the English law; and therefore, in this, and
of to effectuate the purposes of the heart.' Id., p. 203. And he adds, 'Upon this principle the three next species of treason, it is necessary that there appear an open or overt act of
words of advice or encouragement, and, above all, consultations for destroying the King, a more full and explicit nature, to convict the traitor upon.' Id., p. 79. When it comes to
very properly come under the notion of means made use of for the purpose. But loose the offense of adherence to the enemy he gives examples of adequate overt acts, some of
words not relative to facts are, at the worst, no more than bare indications of the which may be innocent standing by themselves. 'This must likewise be provided by some
malignity of the heart.' Id., p. 204. He follows Kelyng in saying that attendance at a overt act, as by giving them intelligence, by sending them provisions, by selling them
arms, by treacherously surrendering a fortress, or the like.' Id., pp. 82—83. His analysis if in its setting it reflected a treasonable project. It need not entail material aid; comfort or
supports the views of Foster that the function of the overt act is to show that the encouragement was sufficient. The only requirement was that it definitely translate
traitorous project has moved out of the realm of thought into the realm of action. treasonable thought into action which plainly tended to give aid and comfort to the
enemy.
The English cases prior to 1790 support this thesis. We have mentioned Lord Preston's
case. In the case of Captain Vaughn, 13 How.St.Tr. 485, the principal charge against the These materials likewise support the contention of the government that the overt act need
defendant was adhering to the enemy, though levying war was also alleged. The not manifest treason on its face.
substance of the overt act of adherence was that when France and England were at war
the defendant cruised in a small ship of war, in English waters, in the service of France The history of treason in this country down to the Constitution has been recently
with intent to take the king's ships. It was objected that the overt act alleged was developed in Hurst, Treason in the United States, (1944) 58 Harv.L.Rev. 226. We do not
insufficient 'for it is said only he went a-cruising; whereas they ought to have alleged that stop to explore that field. But Professor Hurst's researches make plain that prior to the
he did commit some acts of hostility, and attempted to take some of the king's ships; for revolution the influence of 25 Edw. III was strong in the colonies and that, if anything, the
cruising alone cannot be an overt-act; for he might be cruising to secure the French scope of the offense was somewhat broadened. The Revolution changed matters. The
merchantships from being taken, or for many other purposes, which will not be an overt- Continental Congress recommended more restrictive legislation to the colonies which
act of treason.' p.531. But Lord Chief Justice Holt ruled: 'I beg your pardon. Suppose the limited treason to levying war and adhering to the enemy, giving him aid and comfort. Id.,
French king, with forces, should come to Dunkirk with a design to invade England; if any p. 247. No form of treason by compassing was retained. Id., p. 252. Distrust of
one should send him victuals, or give him intelligence, or by any other way contribute to constructive treason was beginning to be voiced (id., pp. 253, 254) though in some
their assistance, it would be high-treason in adhering to the king's enemies.' p. 531. And colonies treason was so broadly defined as to include mere utterances of opinions. Id., pp.
Lord Chief Justice Treby added: 'The indictment is laid for adhering to, and comforting and 266 et seq.
aiding the king's enemies. You would take that to be capable to be construed adhering to
The proceedings of the Constitutional Convention of 1787 have been related in the opinion
the king's enemies in other respects; but I take it to be a reasonable construction of the
of the Court. And see Hurst, Treason in the United States, 58 Harv.L.Rev. 395. As the
indictment, to be adhering to the king's enemies in their enmity. What is the duty of every
Court points out the Framers were anxious to guard against convictions of the innocent by
subject? It is to fight with, subdue, and weaken the king's enemies: and contrary to this,
perjury and to remove treason from the realm of domestic, political disputes. Franklin
if he confederate with, and strengthen the king's enemies, he expressly contradicts this
expressed concern on the first in his statement that 'prosecutions for treason were
duty of his allegiance, and is guilty of this treason of adhering to them. But then you say
generally virulent; and perjury too easily made use of against innocence.' 2 Farrand,
here is no aiding unless there was something done, some act of hostility. Now here is
Records of the Federal Convention, p. 348. Madison and Jefferson 2 both expressed distrust
going aboard with an intention to do such acts; and is not that comforting and aiding?
of treason for its long history of abuse in the political field. Madison said in language
Certainly it is. Is not the French king comforted and aided, when he has got so many
somewhat reminiscent of Blackstone: 'As treason may be committed against the United
English subjects to go a cruising upon our ships?' pp. 532, 533. And he went on to say
States, the authority of the United States ought to be enabled to punish it. But as new-
that acts which 'give the enemy heart and courage to go on with the war' are acts of
fangled and artifical treasons have been the great engines by which violent factions, the
adherence even though the whole project was 'an unprosperous attempt.' p. 533. He
natural offspring of free government, have usually wreaked their alternate malignity on
emphasized that the lack of success was immaterial, for 'if they have success enough, it
each other, the convention have, with great judgment, opposed a barrier to this peculiar
will be too late to question them.' p. 533. This is plain recognition not only that the aid
danger, by inserting a constitutional definition of the crime, fixing the proof necessary for
and comfort may be given though the project is thwarted1 but also that aid and comfort is
conviction of it, and restraining the Congress, even in punishing it, from extending the
given when the enemy is encouraged and his morale bolstered as well as when materials
consequences of guilt beyond the person of its author.' The Federalist, No. XLIII.
are furnished.
The requirement of two wotnesses was not novel. England had long had that rule. 9
The case of Francis De la Motte, 21 How.St.Tr. 687, is also somewhat illuminating. The
Holdsworth, A History of English Law (2d ed. 1938) p. 207. The novelty was in the
indictment charged compassing and adhering. The overt acts included writing and causing
requirement that there be two witnesses to the 'same' overt act. Moreover, there was no
to be written documents conveying intelligence to the enemy, procuring a messenger to
novely in the offenses which were included in the definition of treason. Adhering to the
cary the documents, and hiring a person to gather and to send the intelligence. Mr. Justice
enemy, giving him aid and comfort, like levying war, had long been embraced in the
Buller in his charge to the jury said: 'The sending intelligence, or collecting intelligence, for
English crime of treason as we have seen. But there was novelty in the narrow definition
the purpose of sending it to an enemy, to enable them to annoy us or to defend
of treason which was adopted—a restrictive definition born of the fear of constructive
themselves, though it be never delivered to the enemy; or the hiring a person for that
treason and distrust of treason as a political instrument.
purpose, is an overt act of both the species of treason which I am stating to you from this
indictment.' p. 808. There is, however, no evidence whatever that the offense of adhering to the enemy giving
him aid and comfort was designed to encompass a narrower field than that indicated by its
These materials indicate that the function of the overt act was to make certain that before
accepted and settled meaning. Nor is there the slightest indication that the kind or
a conviction for the high crime of treason may be had more than a treasonable design
character of overt acts required were any different than those which had long been
must be established; it must be shown that action pursuant to that design has been
recognized or accepted as adequate. The overt act was of course 'intended as a distinct
taken. The treason of adherence was defined essentially in terms of conduct for it involved
element of proof of the offense in addition to intent.' Hurst, op. cit., pp. 415 416. But any
giving aid and comfort. Yet the attempt alone was sufficient; the aid and comfort need not
suggested difference from the body of law which preceded vanishes when two witnesses
have been received by the enemy. Conduct amounting to aid and comfort might be
to the same overt act are produced. As respects the point vital for our decision it is
innocent by itself—such as collecting information or stepping into a boat. It was sufficient
therefore quite inaccurate for the Court to conclude that our treason clause 'taught a 1988 inquired on his whereabouts from relatives and friends. In the course of such
concept that differed from all historical models.' That would be true only if there was a inquiry, a certain Arnel Villarama revealed that the lifeless body of her husband was
purpose to depart from the concept of adhering to the enemy or the concept of overt acts discovered on the diversion road at Barangay Malinao in Atimonan. Forthwith, they
which had become ingrained in the antecedent English law. We find no such purpose proceeded to the said place and found him sprawled on the ground with fourteen stab
wounds in different parts of his body.
G.R. No. 117321 February 11, 1998
Meanwhile, relying on the information that an abandoned sidecar of a tricycle was sighted
at Barangay Malinao, Lucena Philippine National Police (PNP) led by Lt. Carlos Santos
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. HERSON TAN y
proceeded to the scene of the crime and recovered a blue sidecar which they brought back
VERZO, Accused-Appellant.
with them to their headquarters. Subsequently, Lt. Santos, Cpl. Numeriano Aguilar and
Pat. Rolando Alandy invited appellant in connection with the instant case and with respect
  to two other robbery cases reported in Lucena City. During their conversation, appellant
allegedly gave an explicit account of what actually transpired in the case at bar. He
ROMERO, J.: narrated that he and co-accused Amido were responsible for the loss of the motorcycle
and the consequent death of Saavedra. Moreover, he averred that they sold the
motorcycle to a certain Danny Teves of Barrio Summit, Muntinlupa for a sum of
May the confession of an accused, given before a police investigator upon invitation and P4,000.00. With the help of appellant as a guide, the Lucena PNP immediately dispatched
without the benefit of counsel, be admissible in evidence against him? a team to retrieve the same.

Accused-appellant Herson Tan, along with Lito Amido, were charged with the crime of After admitting that it was purchased from both the accused and upon failure to present
highway robbery with murder before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 62, of Gumaca, any document evidencing the purported sale, Teves voluntarily surrendered it to the police
Quezon Province, under an information 1 dated February 8, 1989, which reads as follows: who turned it over, together with the sidecar, to the Atimonan Police Station for
safekeeping.
That on or about the 5th day of December 1988, along the Maharlika Highway at
Barangay Tinandog, Municipality of Atimonan, Province of Quezon, Philippines, and within Lt. Carlos, on cross-examination, testified that when he invited appellant to their
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and headquarters, he had no warrant for his arrest. In the course thereof, he informed the
confederating together and mutually helping each other, armed with bladed and pointed latter that he was a suspect, not only in the instant case, but also in two other robbery
weapons, with intent to gain, by means of force, violence, threats and intimidation, did cases allegedly committed in Lucena City. In the belief that they were merely conversing
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and carry away from one inside the police station, he admitted that he did not inform appellant of his constitutional
Freddie Saavedra, a Honda TMX motorcycle with a sidecar bearing Plate No. DW 9961 rights to remain silent and to the assistance of counsel; nor did he reduce the supposed
valued at THIRTY THOUSAND PESOS (P30,000.00) Philippine currency, belonging to the confession to writing. 2
said Freddie Saavedra, to the damage and prejudice of the latter in the aforesaid amount;
and that on the occasion of said robbery and by reason thereof, the said accused, with
intent to kill, with evident premeditation and treachery, and taking advantage of their Appellant, on the other hand, alleged that he had no participation in the offense charged
superior strength and in pursuance of their conspiracy, did then and there willfully, and contended that his only involvement in the matter was the referral of accused Amido
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab with the said weapon said Freddie to Teves. He recounted that sometime in December 1988, Amido sought him at his house
Saavedra, thereby inflicting upon the latter multiple stab wounds on the different parts of and told him that the motorcycle he was riding on was being offered for sale. Upon proof
his body, which directly caused his death. shown that it was indeed registered under Amido's name, he accompanied the latter to
Manila on board the said motorcycle and they approached Antonio Carandang. The latter,
thereafter, brought them to a certain Perlita Aguilar and Danilo Teves with whom the sale
Contrary to law. was finally consummated. He allegedly received P150.00 as his commission.

On arraignment, the accused pleaded not guilty to the charge. Amido presented alibi as his defense. He alleged that although a tricycle driver by
occupation, he was at Barangay Malusak, Atimonan on the day in question, some seven
The relevant facts established by the prosecution are as follows: kilometers from the town, busy assisting in the renovation of his mother's house. He
narrated that the victim was his friend and, therefore, he could not have participated in
the gruesome death of the latter.
On December 5, 1988, at about 7:00 o'clock p.m., tricycle driver Freddie Saavedra went
to see his wife, Delfa, at Our Lady of Angeles Academy in Atimonan, Quezon, where the
latter is a third year high school student, to inform her that he will drive both accused to In a decision dated April 21, 1994, the trial court convicted appellant, the dispositive
Barangay Maligaya. It was the last time, however, that Freddie was seen alive. When the portion of which reads:
latter failed to return that evening, Delfa, as early as 4:30 o'clock a.m. of December 6,
WHEREFORE, premised in the foregoing considerations, this Court finds Herson Tan Custodial investigation involves any questioning initiated by law enforcement authorities
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Highway Robbery with Murder and after a person is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any
hereby sentences him to suffer an imprisonment of RECLUSION PERPETUA. He is further significant manner. The rules on custodial investigation begin to operate as soon as the
ordered to indemnify the family of the deceased in the amount of Thirty Thousand Pesos investigation ceases to be a general inquiry into an unsolved crime and begins to focus a
(P30,000.00). particular suspect, the suspect is taken into custody, and the police carries out a process
of interrogations that tends itself to eliciting incriminating statements that the rule begins
to operate. 6
Due to insufficiency of evidence, Lito Amido is hereby ACQUITTED of the charges against
him and the Provincial Warden of Quezon, Provincial Jail, Lucena City, is hereby ordered to
release from custody the person of said Lito Amido, unless he is being detained thereat for Furthermore, not only does the fundamental law impose, as a requisite function of the
some other lawful cause. investigating officer, the duty to explain those rights to the accused but also that there
must correspondingly be a meaningful communication to and understanding thereof by
the accused. A mere perfunctory reading by the constable of such rights to the accused
SO ORDERED. 3
would thus not suffice. 7

Appellant assails the finding of conviction despite failure of the prosecution to positively
Under the Constitution and existing law and jurisprudence, a confession to be admissible
identify him as the culprit of the crime and to present clear and convincing circumstantial
must satisfy the following requirements: (1) it must be voluntary; (2) it must be made
evidence that would overcome his innocence.
with the assistance of competent and independent counsel; (3) it must be express; and
(4) it must be in writing. 8
In light of the above facts and circumstances, the appealed decision is set aside and
appellant acquitted on the ground that his constitutional rights were violated.
While the Constitution sanctions the waiver of the right to counsel, it must, however, be
"voluntary, knowing and intelligent, and must be made in the presence and with the
It is well-settled that the Constitution abhors an uncounselled confession or admission and assistance of counsel." 9 To reiterate, in People v. Javar, 10 it was ruled therein that any
whatever information is derived therefrom shall be regarded as inadmissible in evidence statement obtained in violation of the constitution, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, in
against the confessant. Article III, Section 12, paragraphs (1) and (3) of the Constitution whole or in part, shall be inadmissible in evidence. Even if the confession contains a grain
provides: of truth, if it was made without the assistance of counsel, it becomes inadmissible in
evidence, regardless of the absence of coercion or even if it had been voluntarily given.
xxx xxx xxx
The records of this case do not indicate that appellant was assisted by counsel when he
Sec. 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have made such waiver, a finding evident from the testimony of Lt. Santos on cross-
the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and examination, thus:
independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services
of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing Q Now, when you brought Herson Tan to the Headquarters, did you tell him that he is one
and in the presence of counsel. of the suspects in the robbery slain (sic) that took place in Atimonan on December 5,
1988?
xxx xxx xxx
A Yes, sir, and he was also suspect to the robbery case which was investigated at Lucena
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall Police Station. There were two (2) cases which were investigated on Herson Tan.
be inadmissible against him.
Q Now, so in addition to the Atimonan case, you also took Herson Tan to your custody in
Republic Act No. 7438 (R.A. No. 7438), 4 approved on May 15, 1992, reenforced the connection with another case that happened in Lucena?
constitutional mandate protecting the rights of persons under custodial investigation, a
pertinent provision 5 of which reads: A Yes, sir.

As used in this Act, "custodial investigation" shall include the practice of issuing an Q And you happened to have Herson Tan in your list as suspect in both cases because
"invitation" to a person who is investigated in connection with an offense he is suspected Herson was previously incarcerated at Lucena City Jail in connection with a certain case, is
to have committed, without prejudice to the liability of the "inviting" officer for any it not?
violation of law.
A Yes, sir.
Q Just for curiosity sake, you invited him in your headquarters, is that what happened in Mario Guariña for appellant.
this case? Attorney-General Villa Real for appellee.

A Yes, sir.

Q And it just happened that without applying third degree to him he gave you that
information? MALCOLM, J.:

A Yes, sir. Isaac Perez, the municipal secretary of Pilar, Sorsogon, and Fortunato Lodovice, a citizen of that
municipality, happening to meet on the morning of April 1, 1992, in the presidencia of Pilar, they
became engaged in a discussion regarding the administration of Governor-General Wood, which
Q Did you notify him of his constitutional right to counsel before you propounded
resulted in Perez shouting a number of times: "The Filipinos, like myself, must use bolos for cutting off
questions to him?
Wood's head for having recommended a bad thing for the Filipinos, for he has killed our
independence." Charged in the Court of First Instance of Sorsogon with a violation of article 256 of the
A No, sir, because we are asking question only to him. Penal Code having to do with contempt of ministers of the Crown or other persons in authority, and
convicted thereof, Perez has appealed the case to this court. The question presented for decision is,
What crime, if any, did the accused commit?
Q Before propounding question or information you sought to elicit from him, did you
inform him of his constitutional right not to testify against himself because he is a suspect
in these two (2) cases? A logical point of departure is the information presented in this case. It reads in translation as follows:

A No, sir, because we were just conversing. 11 (Emphasis supplied) That on or about April 1, 1922, in the municipality of Pilar, Province of Sorsogon, Philippine
Islands, the said accused, Isaac Perez, while holding a discussion with several persons on
political matters, did criminally, unlawfully and wilfully and with knowledge that Honorable
The evidence for the prosecution shows that when appellant was invited for questioning at Leonard Wood was the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands and in the discharge of
the police headquarters, he allegedly admitted his participation in the crime. This will not his functions as such authority, insult by word, without his presence, said Governor-General,
suffice to convict him, however, of said crime. The constitutional rights of appellant, uttering in a loud voice and in the presence of many persons, and in a public place, the
particularly the right to remain silent and to counsel, are impregnable from the moment following phrases: "Asin an mangña filipinos na caparejo co, maninigong gumamit nin
he is investigated in connection with an offense he is suspected to have committed, even sundang asin haleon an payo ni Wood huli can saiyang recomendacion sa pag raot con
if the same be initiated by mere invitation. "This Court values liberty and will always insist Filipinas," which in English, is as follows: "And the Filipinos, like myself, must use bolos for
on the observance of basic constitutional rights as a condition sine qua non against the cutting off Wood's head for having recommended a bad thing for the Philippines.
awesome investigative and prosecutory powers of government."  12
Contrary to article 256 of the Penal Code.
What remains of the evidence for the prosecution is inadequate to warrant a conviction.
Considering the circumstances attendant in the conduct of appellant's investigation which At the trial of the case, two witnesses were called on behalf of the prosecution and three witnesses on
fell short of compliance with constitutional safeguards, we are constrained to acquit the behalf of the defense. According to the first witness for the Government, Juan Lumbao, the municipal
appellant. president of Pilar, what Perez said on the occasion in question was this:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Gumaca, "The Filipinos, like myself, should get a bolo and cut off the head of Governor-General Wood, because
Quezon (Branch 62) is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Appellant HERSON TAN y VERZO is he has recommended a bad administration in these Islands and has not made a good recommendation;
hereby ACQUITTED of the crime charged and his immediate release from confinement is on the contrary, he has assassinated the independence of the Philippines and for this reason, we have
hereby ordered, unless there is any other lawful cause for continued detention. Costs de not obtained independence and the head of that Governor-General must be cut off." Higinio J. Angustia,
oficio. justice of the peace of Pilar, in a written statement, and Gregorio Cresencio, another witness for the
prosecution, corroborated the testimony of the first witness. Cresencio understood that Perez invited
the Filipinos including himself to get their bolos and cut off the head of Governor-General Wood and
SO ORDERED. throw it into the sea.

G.R. No. L-21049 December 22, 1923 The witnesses for the defense did not deny that an altercation took place on the morning of April 1,
1922, in which the accused participated. But they endeavored to explain that the discussion was
between Perez and one Severo Madrid, the latter maintaining that the fault was due to the Nacionalista
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
Party, while Perez argued that the Governor-General was to blame. The accused testified that the
vs.
discussion was held in a peaceful manner, and that what he wished to say was that the Governor-
ISAAC PEREZ, defendant-appellant.
General should be removed and substituted by another. On the witness stand, he stated that his words the laws, or the subversion of the Constitution. (2 Bouvier's Law Dictionary, 974; U.S. vs. Abad [1902],
were the following: "We are but blaming the Nacionalista Party which is in power but do not take into 1 Phil., 437; People vs. Cabrera [1922], 43 Phil., 64.)
account that above the representatives there is Governor-General Wood who controls everything, and I
told him that the day on which the Democrats may kill that Governor-General, then we, the Filipinos will
It is of course fundamentally true that the provisions of Act No. 292 must not be interpreted so as to
install the government we like whether you Democratas want to pay or not to pay taxes."
abridge the freedom of speech and the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the
Government for redress of grievances. Criticism is permitted to penetrate even to the foundations of
The trial judge found as a fact, and we think with abundant reason, that it had been proved beyond a Government. Criticism, no matter how severe, on the Executive, the Legislature, and the Judiciary, is
reasonable doubt that the accused made use of the language stated in the beginning of this decision within the range of liberty of speech, unless the intention and effect be seditious. But when the intention
and set out in the information. The question of fact thus settled, the question of law recurs as to the and effect of the act is seditious, the constitutional guaranties of freedom of speech and press and of
crime of which the accused should be convicted. assembly and petition must yield to punitive measures designed to maintain the prestige of constituted
authority, the supremacy of the constitution and the laws, and the existence of the State. (III Wharton's
Criminal Law, pp. 2127 et seq.; U.S. vs. Apurado [1907], 7 Phil., 422; People vs. Perfecto, supra.)
It should be recalled that the fiscal named, in the information, article 256 of the Penal Code as having
been infringed and the trial judge so found in his decision. The first error assigned by counsel for the
appellant is addressed to this conclusion of the lower court and is to the effect that article 256 of the Here, the person maligned by the accused is the Chief Executive of the Philippine Islands. His official
Penal Code is no longer in force. position, like the Presidency of the United States and other high offices, under a democratic form of
government, instead, of affording immunity from promiscuous comment, seems rather to invite abusive
attacks. But in this instance, the attack on the Governor-General passes the furthest bounds of free
In the case of United States vs. Helbig ([1920], R. G. No. 14705 1), the accused was charged with
speech was intended. There is a seditious tendency in the words used, which could easily produce
having uttered the following language: "To hell with the President of the United States and his
disaffection among the people and a state of feeling incompatible with a disposition to remain loyal to
proclamation!" Mr. Helbig was prosecuted under article 256, and though the case was eventually sent
the Government and obedient to the laws.
back to the court of origin for a new trial, the appellate court by majority vote held as a question of law
that article 256 is still in force.
The Governor-General is an executive official appointed by the President of the United States by and
with the advice and consent of the Senate of the United States, and holds in his office at the pleasure of
In the case of People vs. Perfecto ([1922], 43 Phil., 887), the accused was charged with having
the President. The Organic Act vests supreme executive power in the Governor-General to be
published an article reflecting on the Philippine Senate and its members in violation of article 256 of the
exercised in accordance with law. The Governor-General is the representative of executive civil
Penal Code. In this court, Mr. Perfecto was acquitted by unanimous vote, with three members of the
authority in the Philippines and of the sovereign power. A seditious attack on the Governor-General is
court holding that article 256 was abrogated completely by the change from Spanish to American
an attack on the rights of the Filipino people and on American sovereignty. (Concepcion vs. Paredes
sovereignty over the Philippines, and with six members holding that the Libel Law had the effect of
[1921], 42 Phil., 599; U.S. vs. Dorr [1903], 2 Phil., 332.)
repealing so much of article 256 as relates to written defamation, abuse, or insult, and that under the
information and the facts, the defendant was neither guilty of a violation of article 256 of the Penal Code
nor of the libel Law. In the course of the main opinion in the Perfecto case, is found this significant Section 8 of Act No. 292 of the Philippine Commission, as amended by Act No. 1692, appears to have
sentence: "Act No. 292 of the Philippine Commission, the Treason and Sedition Law, may also have been placed on the statute books exactly to meet such a situation. This section reads as follows:
affected article 256, but as to this point, it is not necessary to make a pronouncement."
Every person who shall utter seditious words or speeches, or who shall write, publish or
It may therefore be taken as settled doctrine, to which those of us who retain a contrary opinion must circulate scurrilous libels against the Government of the United States or against the
bow with as good grace as we can muster, that until otherwise decided by higher authority, so much of Government of the Philippine Islands, or who shall print, write, publish utter or make any
article 256 of the Penal Code as does not relate to ministers of the Crown or to writings coming under statement, or speech, or do any act which tends to disturb or obstruct any lawful officer in
the Libel Law, exist and must be enforced. To which proposition, can properly be appended a corollary, executing his office or in performing his duty, or which tends to instigate others to cabal or
namely: Seditious words, speeches, or libels, constitute a violation of Act No. 292, the Treason and meet together for unlawful purposes, or which suggests or incites rebellious conspiracies or
Sedition Law, and to this extent, both the Penal Code and the Libel Law are modified. which tends to stir up the people against the lawful authorities, or which tends to disturb the
peace of the community or the safety or order of the Government, or who shall knowingly
conceal such evil practices from the constituted authorities, shall be punished by a fine not
Accepting the above statements relative to the continuance and status of article 256 of the Penal Code,
exceeding two thousand dollars United States currency or by imprisonment not exceeding
it is our opinion that the law infringed in this instance is not this article but rather a portion of the
two years, or both, in the discretion of the court.
Treason and Sedition Law. In other words, as will later appear, we think that the words of the accused
did not so much tend to defame, abuse, or insult, a person in authority, as they did to raise a
disturbance in the community. In the words of the law, Perez has uttered seditious words. He has made a statement and done an act
which tended to instigate others to cabal or meet together for unlawful purposes. He has made a
statement and done an act which suggested and incited rebellious conspiracies. He has made a
In criminal law, there are a variety of offenses which are not directed primarily against individuals, but
statement and done an act which tended to stir up the people against the lawful authorities. He has
rather against the existence of the State, the authority of the Government, or the general public peace.
made a statement and done an act which tended to disturb the peace of the community and the safety
The offenses created and defined in Act No. 292 are distinctly of this character. Among them is
or order of the Government. All of these various tendencies can be ascribed to the action of Perez and
sedition, which is the raising of commotions or disturbances in the State. It is a revolt against legitimate
may be characterized as penalized by section 8 of Act No. 292 as amended.
authority. Though the ultimate object of sedition is a violation of the public peace or at least such a
course of measures as evidently engenders it, yet it does not aim at direct and open violence against
A judgment and sentence convicting the accused of a violation of section 8 of Act No. 292 as amended, American to town on a sled pulled by a carabao; that on the way, the accused walked behind the sled
is, in effect, responsive to, and based upon, the offense with which the defendant is charged. The and asked the prisoner if the sled was faster than the airplane; that the American was taken to the
designation of the crime by the fiscal is not conclusive. The crime of which the defendant stands Kempetai headquarters, after which he did not know what happened to the flier. Valentin Cuison, the
charged is that described by the facts stated in the information. In accordance with our settled rule, an next witness, testified that one day in March, 1945, he saw the accused following an American and the
accused may be found guilty and convicted of a graver offense than that designated in the information, accused were Japanese and other Filipinos.
if such graver offense is included or described in the body of the information, and is afterwards justified
by the proof presented during the trial. (Guevarra's Code of Criminal Procedure, p. 9; De Joya's Code
These witnesses evidently referred to two different occasions. The last witness stated that the American
of Criminal Procedure, p. 9.)
was walking as well as his captors. And there was no sled, he said, nor did he see Juanito Albano,
except at night when he and Albano had a drink of tuba together.
The penalty meted out by the trial court falls within the limits provided by the Treason and Sedition Law,
and will, we think, sufficiently punish the accused.
This evidence does not testify the two-witness principle. The two witnesses failed to corroborate each
other not only on the whole overt act but on any part of it. (People vs. Adriano, 44 Off. Gaz., 4300;
That we have given more attention to this case than it deserves, may be possible. Our course is Cramer vs. U. S., 65 S. Ct. 918.)
justified when it is recalled that only last year, Mr. Chief Justice Taft of the United States Supreme
Court, in speaking of an outrageous libel on the Governor of the Porto Rico, observed: "A reading of the
The lower court believes that the accused is "guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of treason
two articles removes the slightest doubt that they go far beyond the "exuberant expressions of
complexed by murder and physical injuries," with "the aggravating circumstances mentioned above."
meridional speech," to use the expression of this court in a similar case in Gandia vs. Pettingill (222
Apparently, the court has regarded the murders and physical injuries charged in the information, not
U.S. , 452, 456). Indeed they are so excessive and outrageous in their character that they suggest the
only as crimes distinct from treason but also as modifying circumstances. The Solicitor General agrees
query whether their superlative vilification has not overleapt itself and become unconsciously
with the decision except as to technical designation of the crime. In his opinion, the offense committed
humorous." (Balzac vs. Porto Rico [1922], 258 U.S., 298.) While our own sense of humor is not entirely
by the appellant is a "complex crime of treason with homicide."
blunted, we nevertheless entertain the conviction that the courts should be the first to stamp out the
embers of insurrection. The fugitive flame of disloyalty, lighted by an irresponsible individual, must be
dealt with firmly before it endangers the general public peace. Counts 1, 2, 3 and 7 are as follows:

The result is to agree with the trial Judge in his findings of fact, and on these facts to convict the 1. On or about October 15, 1944, in the municipality of Mandaue, Province of Cebu,
accused of a violation of section 8 of Act No. 292 as amended. With the modification thus indicated, Philippines, said accused being a member of the Japanese Military Police and acting as
judgment is affirmed, it being understood that, in accordance with the sentence of the lower court, the undercover man for the Japanese forces with the purpose of giving and with the intent to give
defendant and appellant shall suffer 2 months and 1 day's imprisonment and pay the costs. So ordered. aid and comfort to the enemy did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and
treasonably lead, guide and accompany a patrol of Japanese soldiers and Filipino
undercovers to the barrio of Poknaon, for the purpose of apprehending guerrillas and locating
PEOPLE V ALUNAN
their hideouts; that said accused and his companions did apprehended Abraham Puno, tie
his hands behind him and give him fist blows; thereafter said Abraham Puno was taken by
G.R. No. L-399             January 29, 1948 the accused and his Japanese companions to Yati, Liloan, Cebu, where he was severely
tortured by placing red hot iron on his shoulders, legs and back and from there he was sent
back to the Japanese detention camp in Mandaue and detained for 7 days;
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
EDUARDO PRIETO (alias EDDIE VALENCIA), defendant-appellant. 2. On or about October 28, 1944, in the municipality of Mandaue, Province of Cebu,
Philippines, said accused acting as an informer and agent for the Japanese Military Police,
with the purpose of giving and with the intent to give aid and comfort to the enemy, did, the,
Alfonso E. Mendoza for appellant. and there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably lead, guide and accompany a
First Assistant Solicitor General Roberto A. Gianzon and Solicitor Isidro C. Borromeo for appellee. group of Filipino undercovers for the purpose of apprehending guerrillas and guerrilla
suspects; that the herein accused and his companions did in fact apprehend Guillermo Ponce
TUASON, J.: and Macario Ponce from their house; that said accused and his companions did tie the hands
of said Guillermo Ponce and Macario Ponce behind their backs, giving them first blows on the
face and in other parts of the body and thereafter detained them at the Kempei Tai
The appellant was prosecuted in the People's Court for treason on 7 counts. After pleading not guilty he Headquarters; that Guillermo Ponce was released the following day while his brother was
entered a plea of guilty to counts 1, 2, 3 and 7, and maintained the original plea to counts 4, 5, and 6. detained and thereafter nothing more was heard of him nor his whereabouts known;
The special prosecutor introduced evidence only on count 4, stating with reference to counts 5 and 6
that he did not have sufficient evidence to sustain them. The defendant was found guilty on count 4 as
well as counts 1, 2, 3, and 7 and was sentenced to death and to pay the fine of P20,000. 3. Sometime during the month of November, 1944, in the Municipality of Mandaue, Province
of Cebu, Philippines, for the purpose of giving and with the intent to give aid and comfort to
the enemy and her military forces, said accused acting as an enemy undercover did, then
Two witnesses gave evidence on count 4 but their statements do not coincide on any single detail. and there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously, and treasonably lead, guide and accompany a
Juanito Albano, the first witness, testified that in March, 1945, the accused with other Filipino patrol of some 6 Filipinos and 2 Japanese soldiers to barrio Pakna-an, municipality of
undercovers and Japanese soldiers caught an American aviator and had the witness carry the Mandaue for the purpose of apprehending guerrillas and guerrilla suspects, and said patrol
 did in fact apprehend as guerrilla suspects Damian Alilin and Santiago Alilin who were in the court below did no necessarily imply that he did not perform his duty to protect the interest of the
forthwith tied with a rope, tortured and detained for 6 days; that on the 7th day said Damian accused. As a matter of fact, the present counsel "sincerely believes that the said Attorney Carin did his
Alilin and Santiago Alilin were taken about 1/2 kilometer from their home and the accused did best, although it was not the best of a willing worker." We do not discern in the record any indication
bayonet them to death; that the former counsel did not conduct the defense to the best of his ability. if Attorney Carin did his
best as a sworn member of the bar, as the present attorney admits, that was enough; his sentiments
did not cut any influence in the result of the case and did not imperil the rights of the appellant.
7. In or about November 16, 1944, in Mandaue, in conspiracy with the enemy and other
Filipinos undercovers, said accused did cause the torture of Antonio Soco and the killing of
Gil Soco for guerrilla activities. In conclusion, we find the defendant not guilty of count 4 and guilty of treason as charged in counts
1,2,3 and 7. There being an aggravating circumstance, the penalty to be imposed is reclusion perpetua.
The judgment of the lower court will be modified in this respect accordingly. In all other particulars, the
The execution of some of the guerrilla suspects mentioned in these counts and the infliction of physical
same will be affirmed. it is so ordered, with costs of this instance against the appellant.
injuries on others are not offenses separate from treason. Under the Philippine treason law and under
the United States constitution defining treason, after which the former was patterned, there must concur
both adherence to the enemy and giving him aid and comfort. One without the other does not make G.R. No. L-369             March 13, 1947
treason.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
In the nature of things, the giving of aid and comfort can only be accomplished by some kind of action. vs.
Its very nature partakes of a deed or physical activity as opposed to a mental operation. (Cramer vs. CARMELITO VICTORIA, defendant-appellant.
U.S., ante.) This deed or physical activity may be, and often is, in itself a criminal offense under another
penal statute or provision. Even so, when the deed is charged as an element of treason it becomes
Luis Atienza Bijis for appellant.
identified with the latter crime and can not be the subject of a separate punishment, or used in
Assistant Solicitor General Kapunan, Jr. and Solicitor Bautista for appellee.
combination with treason to increase the penalty as article 48 of the Revised Penal Code provides. Just
as one can not be punished for possessing opium in a prosecution for smoking the identical drug, and a
robber cannot be held guilty of coercion or trespass to a dwelling in a prosecution for robbery, because PERFECTO, J.:
possession of opium and force and trespass are inherent in smoking and in robbery respectively, so
may not a defendant be made liable for murder as a separate crime or in conjunction with another
Sentenced to the supreme penalty of death and to pay a fine of twenty thousand pesos and costs,
offense where, as in this case, it is averred as a constitutive ingredient of treason. This rule would not,
Carmelito Victoria comes to us to seek for the reversal of the decision of the People's Court.
of course, preclude the punishment of murder or physical injuries as such if the government should
elect to prosecute the culprit specifically for those crimes instead on relying on them as an element of
treason. it is where murder or physical injuries are charged as overt acts of treason that they can not be He is accused of treason in an information which reads as follows:
regarded separately under their general denomination.
The undersigned Special Prosecutor accuses Carmelito Victoria alias Carlito Victoria, Carling
However, the brutality with which the killing or physical injuries were carried out may be taken as an Victoria, Carlos Victoria of the crime of treason under article 114 of the Revised Penal Code
aggravating circumstance. Thus, the use of torture and other atrocities on the victims instead of the committed as follows:
usual and less painful method of execution will be taken into account to increase the penalty under the
provision of article 14, paragraph 21, of the Revised Penal Code, since they, as in this case,
augmented the sufferings of the offended parties unnecessarily to the attainment of the criminal That during the period compromised between March, 1942 to December, 1944, more
objective. specifically on or about the dates hereinbelow mentioned, in the different places hereunder
stated, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accussed not being a
foreigner but a Filipino citizen owing allegiance to the United States and the Commonwealth
This aggravating circumstance is compensated by the mitigating circumstance of plea of guilty. it is true of the Philippines, in violation of his said duty of allegiance, wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously
that the accused pleaded not guilty to counts 4, 5 and 6 but count 4 has not be substantiated while and treasonably did knowingly adhere to their enemy, the Empire of Japan and the Imperial
counts 5 and 6 were abandoned. Japanese Forces in the Philippines, with which the United States and the Commonwealth of
the Philippines were then at war, giving to said enemy aid and/or comfort, in the following
manner, to wit:
In this first assignment of error, counsel seeks reversal of the judgment because of the trial court's
failure to appoint "another attorney de oficio for the accused in spite of the manifestation of the attorney
de oficio (who defended the accused at the trial) that he would like to be relieved for obvious reasons." 1. That on or about October 6, 1944, the accused, a member of the Intelligence Unit attached
to the Kempei Tai in Lucena, Tayabas, for the purpose of giving and with the intent to give
said enemy aid and comfort, joined an armed enemy patrol composed of about eight spies
The appellate tribunal will indulge reasonable presumptions in favor of the legality and regularity of all
and a Japanese soldier, which went to the house of Federico Unson in the barrio of Malaking
the proceedings of the trial court, including the presumption that the accused was not denied the right to
Labak Bocohan, Lucena, Tayabas, and accused Federico Unson of hiding guerrillas; that
have counsel. (U.S. vs. Labial, 27 Phil., 82.) It is presumed that the procedure prescribed by law has
said patrol was arresting said Federico Unson when some guerrillas appeared and killed one
been observed unless it is made to appear expressly to the contrary. (U.S. vs. Escalante, 36 Phil., 743.)
of the spies and the patrol left; that said accused directed several men in the patrol in picking
The fact that the attorney appointed by the trial court to aid the defendant in his defense expressed
up the dead spy and carrying him away; and that, in the afternoon of the same day, the same
reluctance to accept the designation because, as the present counsel assumes, he did not sympathize
party of spies, including the accused and eight members of the Japanese Military Police,
with the defendant's cause, is not sufficient to overcome this presumption. The statement of the counsel
went again to the house of Federico Unson and did feloniously, willfully, unlawfully and That the commission of the above-mentioned acts was attended by the aggravating
treasonably arrest him, together with Isaias Perez and Ruben Godoy, who happened to be at circumstances of treachery, the aid of armed persons to insure or afford impunity, and
the house; that with their hands bound, the three were tortured and then taken along by said deliberately augmenting the crimes by causing other wrongs not necessary in the
patrol after setting fire on the house of Federico Unson and that of Isaias Perez were found commission thereof.
lying nearby with numerous bayonet wounds; and that Ruben Godoy was taken to the
Japanese garrison in Lucena, Tayabas, and there killed.
Upon the testimonies of Mrs. Federico Unson, Jr. and Dolores Kalakasan, the lower court found that the
mutilated corpses of Federico Unson, Jr. and of Isaias Perez were found rotting in the vicinity of the
2. That on or about December 21, 1944, the accused, accompanied by other Japanese spies, houses of the victims which were burned and looted by the same hands, on the day following the arrest,
Pedro Raviñera, Jose Bondoc, Jacinto Pineda, Alberto Calawit, Bernardo Santiago, and effected by the accused in the company of a Japanese soldier and several spies of the enemy. The
others who were all armed, for the purpose of giving and with the intent to give said enemy body of Unson which was still tied to a tree showed that it had been disemboweled by several bayonet
aid and comfort, went to the house of Jose Unson, in Lucena, Tayabas, and arrested said thrusts and the corpse of Perez appeared ankleless and mutilated. Ruben Godoy, who was arrested at
Jose Unson and brought him to the Japanese garrison on the charge that he had a short the same times as Unson and Perez, since he was imprisoned in the garrison of the Japanese kempei,
wave radio; that he was furnishing radio information to the guerrillas and at the same time was never heard of. Appellant's testimony to the fact that, although admitting his presence in the
supporting them; that said Unson was released on the same day, but on the next day he was previous morning raid, he did not come along with party that conducted the afternoon raid in which the
again arrested and brought to the Japanese garrison at Lucena, Tayabas; that said Jose actual arrest of Unson, Perez and Godoy took place, was not given by the lower court enough weight to
Unson never returned. prevail over that of the prosecuting witnesses, thus finding the accused guilty on the first count.

3. That on or about February 10, 1945, the accused, in company with Jacinto Pineda, With respect to the second count, the lower court states that the accused admitted having taken part in
Leonardo Coronel, Jose Bondoc, Abelardo Calawit, and Pedro Raviñera, all members of the the raid of the house of Jose Unson and in the latter's arrest, but claims that he tried to save Unson,
Intelligence Unit of the Kempei Tai, were all armed, for the purpose of giving and with the only the latter was accepted by the lower court, in view of appellant's behaviour as recalled by
intent to give said enemy aid and comfort, went to the house of Felixberto Romulo in San witnesses Mercedes Unson, Alejandro Unson, and Eugenio Ramon Unson. The last that was seen of
Pablo, Laguna, placed him under arrest as a guerrilla suspect, and turned him over to the Jose Unson, was his skull as exhumed in a school yard in Lukban, several months after the arrest, the
Japanese Military Police who on that occasion were concealing themselves near the house of exhumation having been effected with the aid of those who claimed to have seen how his life was
Romulo; and that, since the arrest of said Romulo, nothing was heard of him. ended. These facts relate to the second count.

4. That on or about December 21, 1944, at about 5 o'clock in the morning, the accused, With respect to the third count, upon the declarations of Elena Romulo and Enriqueta Alviar, the lower
accompanied by two Japanese Military Police and two undercover operatives, for the court found that on February 10, 1945, in the company of Japanese kempei and Filipino spies, the
purpose of giving and with the intent to give said enemy aid and comfort, went to the house of accused raided the house of Felixberto Romulo in San Pablo and arrested him as alleged guerrilla. The
Hermogenes Calauag in Lucena, Tayabas, and apprehended said Hermogenes Calauag; accused simply alleged in his defense the alibi that on said date he was in Gagalañgin, Manila.
that said two Japanese Military Police and the accused conducted a search of the house and
afterwards brought Calauag to the Japanese garrison where he was subjected to inhuman
In regard to the fourth count, the accused alleged that he was merely asked by the Japanese kempei to
torture on the charge being pro-American and adviser of the Hunters ROTC Guerrillas.
accompany them in the raid on Hermogenes Caluag's house and admitted that he was present
throughout the investigation and torture of Caluag who, according to the accused himself, was tied
5. That on or about March 9, 1944, at about 5 o'clock in the morning, the accused then acting suspended in the air for fully twenty minutes, but the lower court did not accept this defense,
as an informer of the Japanese Kempei Tai, with intent to aid said enemy, did wilfully, considering it rather as corroborative of the facts alleged in the information and proved by the witnesses
feloniously and treasonably cause the Japanese Military police to arrest and apprehended for the prosecution.
Antonio San Agustin, a guerrilla officer, who was thereupon brought to Fort Santiago and
there torture and unlawfully detained up to September 20, 1944.
Appellant's participation in the arrest of Melecio Labalan, alleged in the sixth count, according to the
lower court, has been abundantly established, disbelieving appellant's feigned ignorance of the arrest
6. That on or about June, 1944, the accused accompanied by an armed group of undercover because appellant himself testified that he promised to see what he could do about Labalan and
operatives, for the purpose of giving and with intent to give said enemy aid and comfort, went accepted three chickens from the latter's wife which he gave to the interpreter at the kempei office.
to the house of Melecio Labalan, Sr., and arrested and brought him to the Japanese garrison
in Lucena, Tayabas, where he was tortured on the charge of being a guerrilla.
Counts five and seven were not proven.

7. That on or about February, 1945, the accused, a member of the Ganap, a pro-Japanese
Upon the record, it appears that the lower court's conclusions on the overt acts alleged in counts one,
party, wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably joined the Makapili organization
two, three, four, and six of the information are fully supported by the evidence. A perusal of appellant's
designed to support the Imperial Japanese Forces in levying war against their enemies; that
brief alone, in taken. It is highly significant that, although appellant's brief compromises one hundred
he took military training from the Japanese and bore arms and joined the enemy forces as a
thirty printed pages, it failed completely to point out any specific error in the conclusions of fact of the
Makapili soldier, taking orders from the Japanese; that he participated in the raid and burning
lower court, counsel limiting himself into raising legal questions, maintaining that the penalty imposed is
of the barrio of Bautista, San Pablo, Laguna, upon orders of the Japanese; that he carried
unjustified, and that the acts committed by the accused do not constitute treason but ordinary crimes
ammunitions and foodstuffs for the Japanese Army from Bautista to the mountains of Susong
against the victimized persons.
Dalaga and Mt. Malipuño, Laguna; that he performed sentry duty for the Japanese Army in
Mount Malipuño, where he was stationed with Japanese and other Makapili soldiers.
Admitting that appellant's conduct during the Japanese occupation has not been impeccable, counsel For all the foregoing, there being no unanimity of all the members of this Court in the imposition of the
wants us to consider what the accused did in behalf of the guerrillas in mitigation of his criminal death penalty, the People's Court's decision is modified, and appellant is sentenced to reclusion
responsibility, and that the purpose of a penalty, not being to satisfy public vengeance, but to attain the perpetua and to pay a fine of P15,000 and costs.
correction of the guilty person, such purpose will not be attained with appellant's death as decreed by
the lower court.
G.R. No. L-1006 June 28, 1949

Appellant tried to show in his testimony that he was not a spy; that he joined the Japanese in their raids
only because he was forced to do so; that in the instances he had to go to the Japanese garrison he did THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appelle, vs. FILEMON
it either in obedience to a summon of his friend Captain Yuki or to intercede in behalf of some ESCLETO, Defendant-Appellant.
prisoners; that he remained in Lucena heeding the advice of Sor Constancia, who appealed to him not
to go to the mountains so he may continue helping those who were detained by the Japanese; and that Assistant Solicitor General Ruperto Kapunan, Jr., and Solicitor Augusto M. Luciano for
in October 1943, he was arrested by the Japanese for aiding the guerrillas, and that he was released appellee.
only after he had been made to promise to indicate who the guerrillas were but, notwithstanding the
involuntary promise exacted from him, he did not cause the arrest of any guerrilla. Even if we accept
this testimony of appellant it cannot overthrow the clear, positive, and straightforward declarations of TUASON, J.:
the witnesses, for the prosecution. Appellant's claim that he, too, was a guerrilla, had helped the
resistance movement, and in fact, succeeded in interceding for some Filipino prisoners, does not
The appellant, Filemon Escleto, was charged in the former People's Court with treason on
relieve him from criminal responsibility for the acts he had committed as alleged in the counts in the
three counts, namely:
information which were declared proven by the People's Court.

The performance of righteous action, no matter how meritorious they may be, is not, as correctly stated 1. That during the period of Japanese military occupation of the Philippines, in the
by the Solicitor General, a justifying, exempting, or mitigating circumstance in the commission of municipality of Lopez, Province of Tayabas, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
wrongs, and although appellant had saved the lives of a thousand and one persons, if he had caused Honorable Court, the above named accused, Filemon Escleto, with intent to give aid or
the killing of a single human being to give aid and comfort to the enemy, he is, nonetheless, a traitor. It comfort to Imperial Japanese Forces in the Philippines, then enemies of the United States
was already said that: "For whosoever shall keep the whole law, and yet offend in one point, he is guilty and of the Commonwealth of the Philippines, did wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and
of all" (James 2:10). treasonably collaborate, associate and fraternize with the Imperial Japanese Forces, going
out with them in patrols in search of guerrillas and guerrilla hideouts, and of persons
aiding or in sympathy with the resistance movements in the Philippines; bearing arms
We do not find any merit in appellant's allegations that the acts committed by him are not punishable as
treason and that the People's Court who tried him had no jurisdiction, they being merely upshots of the against the American and guerrilla forces in the furtherance of the war efforts of the
wrong theory of suspended allegiance and sovereignty. Imperial Japanese Forces against the United States and the Commonwealth of the
Philippines, and mounting guard and performing guard duty for the Imperial Japanese
Forces in their garrison in the municipality of Lopez, Province of Tayabas,
Although this Court is unanimous in finding appellant guilty of treason as found by the lower court, there Philippines.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
is disagreement as to the penalty that should be imposed, because, while nine of the ten members
taking part in the decision of this case voted for the affirmance of the death penalty imposed by the
lower court, the writer of this opinion takes the position that the penalty the accused deserves is that 2. That during the period of Japanese military occupation of the Philippines, in the
of reclusion perpetua, the medium penalty provided by law. municipality of Lopez, Province of Tayabas, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of the
Honorable Court, the above named accused, Filemon Escleto, with intent to give aid or
comfort to the Imperial Japanese Forces in the Philippines, then enemies of the United
The Solicitor General recommends the imposition of the supreme penalty of death in view of the
presence of the aggravating circumstances alleged in the information as follows: States and of the Commonwealth of the Philippines, did wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously
and treasonably accompany, join, and go out on patrols with Japanese soldiers in and
around the municipality of Lopez, Province of Tayabas, in search of guerrillas and guerrilla
That the commission of the above-mentioned acts was attended by the aggravating hideouts, and of persons aiding or in sympathy with the resistance movement in the
circumstances of treachery, the aid of armed persons to insure or afford impunity, and Philippines.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
deliberately augmenting the crimes by causing other wrongs not necessary in the
commission thereof.
3. That on or about the 18th day of March, 1944, in the municipality of Lopez, Province of
Tayabas, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
The majority are of the opinion that these circumstances should be considered as aggravating, while
accused, Filemon Escleto, with intent to give aid or comfort to the Imperial Japanese
the undersigned maintains that in appellant's case, the circumstances in question are essential
Forces in the Philippines, then enemies of the United States and of the Commonwealth of
elements of the treason he has committed. The crime is of such a nature that it may be committed by
one single act, by a series of acts, or by several series thereof, not only in a single time, but in different the Philippines, did wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably arrest and/or cause to
times, it being a continuous crimes as was held by this Court in Guinto vs. Veluz (77 Phil., 801), so be arrested one Antonio Conducto as a guerrilla and did turn him over and deliver to the
much so that there are some accused of treason for just one count and there are others for several Japanese military authorities in their garrison, since which time, that is, since the said
counts, their number not changing the nature of the offense committed. 18th day of March, 1944, nothing has been heard from said Antonio Conducto and is
considered by his family to have been killed by the Japanese military authorities.
The court found "no concrete evidence as to defendant's membership in the U. N. or convenient as part of his duty to make a list of the people under his jurisdiction who
Makapili organization nor on what the patrols he accompanied actually did once they were heeded the Japanese order.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
out of town", and so was, "constrained to rule that the evidence of the prosecution fails to
establish, in connection with counts 1 and 2, any true overt act of treason." We may add
It was not necessary for the defendant to write Conducto's name in order to report on
that no two witnesses coincided in any specific act of the defendant. The People's Court,
him. The two men appeared to be from the same barrio, Escleto knew Conducto
believed, however, "that the same evidence is sufficient to prove beyond question
intimately, and the latter was on his way to town to present himself. If the accused had a
defendant's adherence to the enemy."chanrobles virtual law library
treasonable intent against Conducto, he could have furnished his name and identity to the
enemy by word of mouth. This step would have the added advantage of concealing the
As to the 3rd count, the opinion of the People's Court was that it had been fully defendant's traitorous action from his town mates and of not appraising Conducto of what
substantiated..chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library was in store for him, knowledge of which might impel Conducto to
escape.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The record shows that on or about, March 11, 1944, Japanese patrol composed of
seventeen men and one officer was ambushed and totally liquidated by guerrillas in barrio That the list was not used for the purpose assumed by the prosecution is best
Bibito, Lopez, Province of Tayabas, now Quezon. As a result, some of inhabitants of Bibito demonstrated by the fact that it included, according to witnesses, Conducto's wife and
and neighboring barrios, numbering several hundred, were arrested and others were parents and many others who were discharged the next day. The fact that, according to
ordered to report at the poblacion. Among the latter were Antonio Conducto, a guerrilla the evidence of the prosecution, spies wearing masks were utilized in the screening of
and former USAFFE, Conducto's wife, parents and other guerrillas adds to the doubt that the defendant had a hand in Conducto's
relatives.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library misfortune.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Sinforosa Mortero, 40 years old, testified that on March 18, 1944, at about 5 o'clock in the In short, Escleto's making note of persons who went to the poblacion as evidence of overt
afternoon, obedience to the Japanese order, she and the rest of her family went to the act is weak, vague and uncertain.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
town from barrio Danlagan. Still in Danlagan, in front of Filemon Escleto's house, Escleto
told them to stop and took down their names. With her were her daughter-in-law, Patricia
The only evidence against the appellant that might be considered direct and damaging is
Araya, her son Antonio Conductor, and three grandchildren. After writing their names,
Patricia Araya's testimony that Escleto told a Philippine Constabulary soldier, "This is
Escleto conducted them to the PC garrison in the poblacion where they were questioned
Antonio Conducto who has firearm." But the prosecution did not elaborate on this
by some whose name she did not know. This man asked her if she heard gunshots and
testimony, nor was any other witness made to corroborate it although Patricia Araya was
she said yes but did not know where they were. The next day they were allowed to go
with her husband, parents and relatives who would have heard the statement if the
home with many others, but Antonio Conducto was not released. Since then she had not
defendant had uttered it.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
seen her son. On cross-examination she said that when Escleto took down their names
Antonio Conducto asked the accused if anything would happen to him and his family, and
Escleto answered, "Nothing will happen to you because I am to accompany you in going to Leaving aside the question of Patricia's veracity, the failure to corroborate her testimony
town."chanrobles virtual law library just mentioned makes it ineffective and unavailing as proof of an overt act of treason. In a
juridical sense, this testimony is inoperative as a corroboration of the defendant's taking
down of the name of Conducto and others, or vice-versa. It has been seen that the
Patricia Araya declared that before reaching the town, Filemon Escleto stopped her, her
testimony was not shown to have been made for a treasonable purpose nor did it
mother-in-law, her husband, her three children, her brother-in-law and the latter's wife
necessarily have that implication. This process of evaluating evidence might sound like a
and took down their names; that after taking their names Escleto and the Philippine
play of words but, as we have said in People vs. Adriano (44 Off. Gaz., 4300 1 ) the
Constabulary soldier took them to the PC garrison; that her husband asked Escleto what
authors of the two-witness provision in the American Constitution, from which the
would happen to him and his family, and Escleto said "nothing" and assured Conducto that
Philippine treason law was taken, purposely made it "severely restrictive" and conviction
he and his family would soon be allowed to go home; that Escleto presented them to a PC
for treason difficult. In that case we adverted to the following authorities, among others:
and she heard him tell the latter, "This is Antonio Conducto who has firearm;" that
afterward they were sent upstairs and she did not know what happened to her
husband.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Each of the witnesses must testify to the whole overt act; or if it is separable, there must
be two witnesses to each part of the overt act. (VII Wigmore on Evidence, 3rd ed., Sec.
2038, p. 271.).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The foregoing evidence fails to support the lower court's findings. It will readily be seen
from a cursory examination thereof that the only point on which the two witnesses,
Patricia Araya and Sinforosa Mortero, agree is that the accused took down the names of It is necessary to produce two direct witnesses to the whole overt act. It may be possible
Conducto and of the witnesses, among others, and came along with them to the town. to piece bits together of the same overt act; but, if so, each bit must have the support of
Granting the veracity of this statement, it does not warrant the inference that the two oaths;. . . . (Opinion of Judge Learned Hand quoted as footnote in Wigmore on
defendant betrayed Conducto or had the intention of doing so. What he allegedly did was Evidence, ante.)chanrobles virtual law library
compatible with the hypothesis that, being lieutenant of his barrio, he thought it
The very minimum function that an overt act must perform in a treason prosecution is The children were placed in a separate group from the men and women — the prosecution star
that it show sufficient action by the accused, in its setting, to sustain a finding that the witnesses, Maria Paulino and Clarita Perez, were among the children (pp. 3, 40, t.s.n. ). Presently, the
accused actually gave aid and comfort to the enemy. Every action, movement, deed, Japanese and their Filipino comrades set the surrounding houses on fire (pp. 14, 48, 70, 71, 103,
and word of the defendant charged to constitute treason must be supported by the t.s.n.), and proceeded to butcher all the persons assembled, excepting the small children, thus killing,
testimony of two witnesses. (Cramer vs. U.S. of A., 65 S. Ct., 918; 89 Law. ed., 1441.) among others, those known by the following names: Patricia, Dodi, Banda, Tana, Uyang, Mina, Marta,
Sana, Eufemia, Doroteo, Andres, Perly, Tisiang, Urado, Pisan, Dorang, Felisa, and Eulalia (pp. 8, 10,
13, 14, 31, 32, 47, 48, 61, 63, t.s.n.).
"It is not difficult to find grounds upon which to quarrel with this Constitutional provision.
Perhaps the framers placed rather more reliance on direct testimony than modern
Appellant alone killed about six women, two of whom were Patricia and Dodi whom he bayoneted to
researches in psychology warrant. Or it may be considered that such a quantitative
death in the presence of their daughters, Maria Paulino and Clarita Perez, respectively (pp. 8, 10, 13,
measure of proof, such a mechanical calibration of evidence is a crude device at best or
31, 32, 35, 47, 48, t.s.n.). Patricia and Dodi pleaded with appellant for mercy, he being their relative, but
that its protection of innocence is too fortuitous to warrant so unselective an obstacle to he gave the callous answer that no mercy would be given them because they were wives of guerrillas
conviction. Certainly the treason rule, whether wisely or not, is severely restrictive. It (pp. 10, 42, 43, 49, t.s.n.).
must be remembered, however, that the Constitutional Convention was warned by James
Wilson that "Treason may sometimes be practiced in such a manner, as to render proof
extremely difficult-as in a traitorous correspondence with an Enemy." The provision was Appellant would also have killed the small children including Clarita Perez and Maria Paulino if he had
adopted not merely in spite of the difficulties it put in the way of prosecution but because been allowed to have his way. For when all but the small ones had been butchered, he proposed to kill
them too, but the Japanese soldiers interceded, saying that the children knew nothing of the matter (pp.
of them. And it was not by whim or by accident, but because one of the most venerated of
15, 49, 51, 66, 67, t.s.n.). Appellant insisted in his proposal, arguing that the children would be wives of
that venerated group considered that "prosecution for treason were generally virulent."
guerrillas later when they grew up, but the Japanese decided to spare them (p. 22, t.s.n.).
(Cramer vs. U.S. of A., supra.)chanrobles virtual law library

The foregoing facts have been clearly established by the testimony of eye-witnesses — Clarita Paulino,
The decision of the People's Court will be and the same is reversed with the costs de Maria Perez, and Policarpio Tigas — to the ruthless massacre of Banaban. There is a complete
oficio.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library absence of evidence tending to show motive on the part of these witnesses for falsely testifying against
appellant — such a motive is not even insinuated by the defendant. Indeed, appellant's counsel frankly
G.R. No. L-322             July 28, 1947 states (p. 3, brief) that he "does not dispute the findings of fact of the People's Court." Speaking of the
testimony of Clarita and Maria, both aged ten years, the People's Court, who heard, observed and saw
them testify, had the following to say:
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
PEDRO MANAYAO, ET AL., defendants. The testimony of the last two in particular is entitled to very great weight. They are simple
PEDRO MANAYAO, appellant. barrio girls, only ten years old, whose minds have not yet been tainted by feelings of hatred
or revenge or by any desire to be spectacular or to exaggerate. They were straight-forward
and frank in their testimony and did not show any intention to appeal to the sentiments of the
J. Antonio Araneta for appellant. court. They could not have been mistaken as to the presence and identity of the accused for
First Assistant Solicitor General Jose B. L. Reyes and Solicitor Ramon L. Avanceña for appellee. they know him so well that they referred to him by his pet name of "Indong Pintor" or Pedro,
the painter. They could not have erred in the narration of the salient phases of the tragic
HILADO, J.: events of January 29, 1945, in Banaban, for they were forced eye-witnesses to and were
involved in the whole tragedy, the burning of the houses and the massacre committed by the
accused and his Japanese masters took place in broad daylight and were not consummated
Appellant Pedro Manayao and Filomeno Flores and Raymundo Flores were charged with the high in a fleeting moment but during a time sufficient for even girls of tender age to retain a
crime of treason with multiple murder in the People's Court. The Floreses not having been trustworthy mental picture of the unusual event they could not help but witness.
apprehended, only Manayao was tried. Convicted of the offense charged against him with the
aggravating circumstances of (1) the aid of armed men and (2) the employment or presence of a band
in the commission of the crime, he was sentenced to death, to pay a fine of P20,000, an indemnity of Not only this, but the testimony of Clarita Perez and Maria Paulino is so clear, positive and convincing
P2,000 to the heirs of each of the persons named in the third paragraph of the decision, and the costs. that it would be sufficient for conviction without any further corroboration. Yet, there is ample
He has appealed from that decision to this Court. corroborative proof. Thus, Tomas M. Pablo declared that he had seen the corpses of the massacred
residents of Banaban shortly after the happening of the heinous crime (p. 136, t.s.n.). And appellant
himself admitted his participation in the massacre in two sworn statements — one made on August 28,
On or about the 27th of January, 1945, the guerrillas raided the Japanese in Sitio Pulong Tindahan, 1945, before Lt. Jesus Cacahit, Detachment Commander of the Angat 23d MP Command (Exhibit A;
Municipality of Angat, Province of Bulacan. In reprisal, Japanese soldiers and a number of Filipinos pp. 75-77, t.s.n.) and another made on September 5, 1945 before Feliciano F. Torres, Assistant
affiliated with the Makapili, among them the instant appellant, conceived the diabolical idea of killing the Provincial Fiscal of Bulacan (Exhibits C, C-1; pp. 150-159, t.s.n.).
residents of Barrio Banaban of the same municipality (Exhibits A, C, and C-1). Pursuant to this plan,
said Japanese soldiers and their Filipino companions, armed with rifles and bayonets, gathered the
residents of Banaban behind the barrio chapel on January 29, 1945. Numbering about sixty or seventy, In No. 1 of his assignment of errors, appellant's counsel contends that appellant was a member of the
the residents thus assembled included men, women and children — mostly women (Exhibits A, C, amd Armed Forces of Japan, was subject to military law, and not subject to the jurisdiction of the People's
C-1; pp. 3-16, 29, 30, 65, 102, t.s.n.). Court; and in No. 2 he advances the theory that appellant had lost his Philippine citizenship and was
therefore not amenable to the Philippine law of treason. We cannot uphold either contention. We are of This constitutional provision covers both time of peace and time of war, but it is brought more
the considered opinion that the Makapili, although organized to render military aid to the Japanese immediately and peremptorily into play when the country is involved in war. During such a period of
Army in the Philippines during the late war, was not a part of said army. It was an organization of stress, under a constitution enshrining such tenets, the citizen cannot be considered free to cast off his
Filipino traitors, pure and simple. As to loss of Philippine citizenship by appellant, counsel's theory is loyalty and obligations toward the Fatherland. And it cannot be supposed, without reflecting on the
absolutely untenable. He invokes in its support paragraphs 3, 4, and 6 of section 1 of Commonwealth patriotism and intelligence of the Legislature, that in promulgating Commonwealth Act No. 63, under the
Act No. 63, providing: aegis of our Constitution, it intended (but did not declare) that the duties of the citizen solemnly
proclaimed in the above-quoted constitutional precept could be effectively cast off by him even when
his country is at war, by the simple expedient of subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the
. . . A Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship in any of the following ways and/or events:
constitution or laws of a foreign country, and an enemy country at that, or by accepting a commission in
the military, naval or air service of such country, or by deserting from the Philippine Army, Navy, or Air
xxx     xxx     xxx Corps.

(3) By subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the constitution or laws of a foreign It would shock the conscience of any enlightened citizenry to say that this appellant, by the very fact of
country upon attaining twenty-one years of age or more; committing the treasonous acts charged against him, the doing of which under the circumstances of
record he does not deny, divested himself of his Philippine citizenship and thereby placed himself
beyond the arm of our treason law. For if this were so, his very crime would be the shield that would
(4) By accepting commission in the military, naval or air service of a foreign country; protect him from punishment.

xxx     xxx     xxx But the laws do no admit that the bare commission of a crime amounts of itself to a
divestment of the character of citizen, and withdraws the criminal from their coercion. They
(6) By having been declared, by competent authority, a deserter of the Philippine Army, Navy, would never prescribe an illegal act among the legal modes by which a citizen might
or Air Corps in time of war, unless subsequently a plenary pardon or amnesty has been disfranchise himself; nor render treason, for instance, innocent, by giving it the force of a
granted. dissolution of the obligation of the criminal to his country. (Moore, International Law Digest,
Vol. III, p. 731.)
There is no evidence that appellant has subscribed to an oath of allegiance to support the constitution
or laws of Japan. His counsel cites (Brief, 4) the fact that in Exhibit A "he subscribed an oath before he 696. No person, even when he has renounced or incurred the loss of his nationality, shall
was admitted into the Makapili association, "the aim of which was to help Japan in its fight against the take up arms against his native country; he shall be held guilty of a felony and treason, if he
Americans and her allies.'" And the counsel contends from this that the oath was in fact one of does not strictly observe this duty. (Fiore's International Law Codified, translation from Fifth
allegiance to support the constitution and laws of Japan. We cannot uphold such a far-fetched Italian Edition by Borchard.)
deduction. The members of the Makapili could have sworn to help Japan in the war without necessarily
swearing to support her constitution and laws. The famed "Flying Tiger" who so bravely and resolutely As to the third assignment of error, the Solicitor General agrees with counsel that it is improper to
aided China in her war with Japan certainly did not need to swear to support the Chinese constitution separately take into account against appellant he aggravating circumstances of (1) the aid of armed
and laws, even if they had to help China fight Japan. During the first World War the "National men and (2) the employment of a band in appraising the gravity of the crime. We likewise are of the
Volunteers" were organized in the Philippines, pledged to go to Europe and fight on the side of the same opinion, considering that under paragraph 6 of article 14 of the Revised Penal Code providing
Allies, particularly of the United States. In order to carry out that mission — although the war ended that "whenever more than three armed malefactors shall have acted together in the commission of an
before this could be done — they surely did not have to take an oath to support the constitution or laws offense it shall be deemed to have been committed by a band," the employment of more than three
of the United States or any of its allies. We do not multiply these examples, for they illustrate a armed men is an essential element of and inherent in a band. So that in appreciating the existence of a
proposition which seems self-evident. band the employment of more than three armed men is automatically included, there being only the
aggravating circumstance of band to be considered.
Neither is there any showing of the acceptance by appellant of a commission "in the military, naval, or
air service" of Japan. As to appellant's fourth assignment of error, the contention is clearly unacceptable that appellant acted
in obedience to an order issued by a superior and is therefore exempt from criminal liability, because he
Much less is there a scintilla of evidence that appellant had ever been declared a deserter in the allegedly acted in the fulfillment of a duty incidental to his service for Japan as a member of
Philippine Army, Navy or Air Corps — nor even that he was a member of said Army, Navy, or Air Corps. the Makapili. It is obvious that paragraphs 5 and 6 of article 11 of our Revised Penal Code compliance
with duties to or orders from a foreign sovereign, any more than obedience to an illegal order. The
construction contended for by appellant could entail in its potentialities even the destruction of this
Further, appellant's contention is repugnant to the most fundamental and elementary principles Republic.
governing the duties of a citizen toward his country under our Constitution. Article II, section 2, of said
constitution ordains:
The contention that as a member of the Makapili appellant had to obey his Japanese masters under
pain of severe penalty, and that therefore his acts should be considered as committed under the
"SEC. 2. The defense of the State is a prime duty of government, and in the fulfillment of this impulse of an irresistible force or uncontrollable fear of an equal or greater injury, is no less repulsive.
duty all citizens may be required by law to render personal, military or civil service." Appellant voluntarily joined the Makapili with full knowledge of its avowed purpose of rendering military
(Emphasis supplied.). aid to Japan. He knew the consequences to be expected — if the alleged irresistible force or
uncontrollable fear subsequently arose, he brought them about himself freely and voluntarily. But this is from Hongkong in hidding on board the steamship Yuensang; that after his arrival in the
not all; the truth of the matter is, as the Solicitor General well remarks, that "the appellant actually acted Philippines he held a number of meetings in the city of Manila and the adjoining provinces
with gusto during the butchery of Banaban." He was on that occasion even bent on more cruelty than whereat was perfected the above-mentioned conspiracy hatched in Hongkong that at
the very ruthless Japanese masters — so fate willed it — were the very ones who saved the little girls, these meetings new members were taken into the conspiracy and plans made for the
Clarita Perez and Maria Paulino, who were destined to become the star witnesses against him on the enlistment of an army of revolution and the raising of money by national and private loans
day of reckoning. to carry on the campaign; that to this end bonds were issued and commissions as officers
in the revolutionary army were granted to a number of conspirators, empowering the
Conformably to the recommendation of the Solicitor General, we find appellant guilty of the crime of officers thus appointed to raise troops and take command thereof; and that the
treason with multiple murder committed with the attendance of one aggravating circumstance, that of conspirators did in fact take the field and offered armed resistance to the constituted
"armed band," thus discarding the first aggravating circumstance considered by the trial court. A authorities in the Philippines, only failing in their design of overthrowing the Government
majority of the Court voted to affirm the judgment appealed from, imposing the death penalty, convicting because of their failure to combat successfully with the officers of the law who were sent
defendant and appellant to pay a fine of P20,000, an indemnity of P2,000 to the heirs of each of the against them and of the failure of the people to rise en masse in response to their
victims named in the third paragraph of the lower court's decision, and the costs. But due to the dissent propaganda.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
of Mr. Justice Perfecto from the imposition of the death penalty, in accordance with the applicable legal
provisions we modify the judgment appealed from as regards the punishment to be inflicted, and
sentence defendant and appellant Pedro Manayao to the penalty of reclusion perpetua, with the It further appears from the evidence that the appellant Francisco Bautista, a resident of
accessories of article 41 of the Revised Penal Code, to pay a fine of P20,000, an indemnity of P2,000 the city of Manila, was an intimate friend of the said Ricarte; that Ricarte wrote and
to the heirs of each of the victims named in the third paragraph of the lower court's decision, and the notified Bautista of his coming to Manila and that, to aid him in his journey, Bautista
costs. So ordered. forwarded to him secretly 200 pesos; that after the arrival of Ricarte, Bautista was
present, taking part in several of the above-mentioned meetings whereat the plans of the
conspirators were discussed and perfected, and that at one of these meetings Bautista, in
G.R. No. L-2189    November 3, 1906
answer to a question of Ricarte, assured him that the necessary preparations had been
made and that he "held the people in readiness." chanrobles virtual law library
THE UNITED STATES,Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. FRANCISCO BAUTISTA, ET
AL.,Defendants-Appellants.
It further appears that the appellant, Tomas Puzon, united with the conspirators through
the agency of one Jose R. Muñoz, who was proven to have been a prime leader of the
Aguedo Velarde and Pineda and Escueta, for appellants. movement, in the intimate confidence of Ricarte, and by him authorized to distribute
Office of the Solicitor-General Araneta, for appellee. bonds and nominate and appoint certain officials, including a brigadier-general of the
signal corps of the proposed revolutionary forces; that at the time when the conspiracy
CARSON, J.: was being brought to a head in the city of Manila, Puzon held several conferences with the
said Muñoz whereat plans were made for the coming insurrection; that at one of these
conferences Muñoz offered Puzon a commission as brigadier-general of the signal corps
The appellants in this case was convicted in the Court of First Instance of Manila of the and undertook to do his part in organizing the troops; and that at a later conference he
crime of conspiracy to overthrow, put down, and destroy by force the Government of the assured the said Muñoz that he had things in readiness, meaning thereby that he had duly
United States in the Philippine Islands and the Government of the Philippine Islands, as organized in accordance with the terms of his
defined and penalized in section 4 of Act No. 292 of the Philippine commission.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Commission.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Puzon at the trial declared that he had never united himself with the conspirators; that he
The appellant Francisco Bautista was sentenced to four years' imprisonment, with hard had accepted the appointment as brigadier-general of the signal corps of the revolutionary
labor, and $3,000 fine, and Aniceto de Guzman and Tomas Puzon, and each of them, to forces with no intention of ever taking any further action in the matter, and merely
three years' imprisonment, with hard labor, and a fine of $2,000, and all and each of the because he did not wish to vex his friend Muñoz by refusing to do so, and that when
said appellants to pay their proportionate share of the costs of the trial and to undergo Muñoz offered him the appointment as brigadier-general he did so in "a joking tone," and
subsidiary imprisonment in the event of insolvency and failure to pay their respective that he, Puzon, did not know that Ricarte was in Manila organizing the conspiracy at that
fines.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library time.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The evidence of record conclusively establishes that during the latter part of the year 1903 These statements, however (except in so far as they corroborate the testimony of Muñoz
a junta was organized and a conspiracy entered into by a number of Filipinos, resident in as to the fact that he had several interviews with Puzon at which plans were entered into
the city of Hongkong, for the purpose of overthrowing the Government of the United for the advancement of the cause of the conspirators), can not be accepted as true in the
States in the Philippine Islands by force of arms and establishing in its stead a light of a written statement signed by Puzon himself at the time when he was first
government to be known as the Republica Universal Democratica Filipina; that one Prim arrested, part of which is as follows:
Ruiz was recognized as the titular head of this conspiracy and one Artemio Ricarte as chief
of the military forces to the organized in the Philippines in the furtherance of the plans of
the conspirators; that toward the end of December, 1903 the said Ricarte came to Manila
Q. What is your name and what is your age, residence, and occupation? - A. My name is its truth and accuracy in so far it inculpates him is sustained by other evidence of record
Tomas Puzon; born in Binondo in the Province of Manila; 37 years of age; married; by in this case.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
profession a teacher of primary and secondary schools, and residing in Calle Concepcion,
No. 195, district of Quiapo.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
It is contended that the acceptance or possession of an appointment as an officer of the
military forces of the conspiracy should not be considered as evidence against him in the
Q. Do you know Artemio Ricarte? - A. Personally I do not know him, but by name, light of the decisions of this court in the cases of the United States vs. Antonio de los
yes.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Reyes 1 (2 Off. Gaz., 364), United States vs. Silverio Nuñez et al. 2 (3 Off. Gaz., 408), the
United States vs. Eusebio de la Serna et al. 3 (3 Off. Gaz., 528), and United
States vs. Bernardo Manalo et al. 4 (4 Off. Gaz., 570). But the case at bar is to be
Q. Did you have any information that Ricarte was in these Islands and with what object he
distinguished from these and like cases by the fact that the record clearly disclose that the
came here? And if you know it to be true, through whom did you get such information? -
accused actually and voluntarily accepted the apppointment in question and in doing so
A. In the first place I had notice of his coming to the Islands as well as his object by
assumed all the obligations implied by such acceptance, and that the charge in this case is
reading the newspapers of Manila, and secondly because J. R. Muñoz told me the same on
that of conspiracy, and the fact that the accused accepted the appointment is taken into
one occasion when I was in his house to visit him.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
consideration merely as evidence of his criminal relations with the conspirators. In the first
virtual law library
of these cases - the United States vs. De los Reyes - the accused was charged with
treason, and the court found that the mere acceptance of a commission by the defendant,
Q. Did you acquire this information through any other person? - A. No, sir; I have no more nothing else being done either by himself or by his companions, was not an "overt act" of
information than that which I have mentioned.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles treason within the meaning of the law, but the court further expressly held that -
virtual law library
That state of affairs disclosed body of evidence, . . . the playing of the game of
Q. Are you a part of his new revolution presided over by Ricarte? - A. Yes, government like children, the secretaries, colonels, and captains, the pictures of flags and
sir.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library seals and commission, all on proper, for the purpose of duping and misleading the
ignorant and the visionary . . . should not be dignified by the name of treason.
Q. What is the employment ( empleo) which you have in this organization, and who is it
who invited you to join it? - A. J. R. Muñoz, who is general of division of this new In the second case - the United States vs. Nuñez et al. -- wherein the accused were
organization, spoke to me with much instance, asking me to accept employment as charged with brigandage, the court held that, aside from the possession of commissions in
brigadier-general, chief of signal corps, to which I, on account of his request and in view an insurgent band, there was no evidence to show that it they had committed the crime
of the fact that the said Muñoz is a friend of mine from my youth, acceded; nevertheless I and, "moreover, that it appeared that they had never united with any party of brigands
have organized absolutely nothing in respect to this and never had been in any way connected with such parties unless the physical
matter.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library possession of these appointments proved such relation," and that it appeared that each
one of the defendants "were separately approached at different times by armed men while
Q. Did you accept the employment and did they give you any commission for it? - A. Yes, working in the field and were virtually compelled to accept the commissions." chanrobles
sir; I accepted said employment and although they gave me an order to organize in my virtual law library
brigade I did not do it, because I had neither the confidence nor the
will.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library In the case of the United States vs. de la Serna et al. it was contended that de la Serna
had confessed that "he was one of the members of the pulajanes, with a commission as
Q. If you didn't have faith in the said authorization nor the will to carry out what was colonel," but the court was of opinion that the evidence did not sustain a finding that such
intrusted to you, why did you accept employment as general of the brigade? - A. I confession had in fact been made, hence the doctrine laid down in that decision, "that the
accepted it on account of friendship and not to vex a friend, but I never have the intention mere possession of such an appointment, when it is not shown that the possessor
of fulfilling the obligations. executed some external act by the virtue of the same, does not constitute sufficient proof
of the guilt of the defendant," applies only the case of Enrique Camonas, against whom
the only evidence of record was "the fact that a so-called appointment of sergeant was
Puzon, when on the stand in his own behalf, did not deny that he made this statement, found at his house."chanrobles virtual law library
but he attempted to explain it away by saying that when he made it he was so exited that
he did not know just what he was saying. He does not allege that improper means were
taken to procure the confession, and it was proven at the trial that it was freely and In the case of the United States vs. Bernardo Manalo et al. there was testimony that four
voluntarily made and not the result of violence, intimidation, threat, menace, or promise appointments of officials in a revolutionary army were found in a trunk in the house of one
of reward or leniency. The accused appears to be an intelligent man and was for eighteen Valentin Colorado, and the court in said case reaffirmed the doctrine that "the mere
years a school-teacher and later a telegraph operator under the Spanish Government, and possession of the documents of this kind is not sufficient to convict," and held,
during the insurrection he held a commission as an officer in the signal corps of the furthermore, that there was "evidence in the case that at the time these papers were
revolutionary army. His confession is clear and intelligible and in no way supports his received by the appellant, Valentin Colorado, he went to one of the assistant councilmen
pretense that he was so excited as not to know what he was saying when he made it, and of the barrio in which lived, a witness for the Government, showed him the envelope, and
stated to him he had received these papers; that he didn't know what they were and there being no authority in law of such provision, so much of the sentence as undertakes
requested this councilman to open them. The coucilman did not wish to do that but took to impose subsidiary imprisonment is hereby
the envelope and sent it to the councilman Jose Millora. We are satisfied that this reversed.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
envelope contained the appointments in question and that the appellant did not act under
the appointment but immediately reported the receipt of them to the
After ten days let judgment be entered in accordance herewith, when the record will be
authorities." chanrobles virtual law library
returned to the trial court for execution. So ordered.cha

It is quite conceivable that a group of conspirators might appoint a person in no wise G.R. No. 1352            March 29, 1905
connected with them to some high office in the conspiracy, in the hope that such person
would afterwards accept the commission and thus unite himself with them, and it is even
possible that such an appointment might be forwarded in the mail or otherwise, and thus THE UNITED STATES, complainant-appelle,
come into the possession of the person thus nominated, and that such appointment might vs.
be found in his possession, and, notwithstanding all this, the person in whose possession APOLONIO CABALLEROS, ET AL., defendants-appellants.
the appointment was found might be entirely innocent of all intention to join the
conspiracy, never having authorized the conspirators to use his name in this manner nor Hipolito Magsalin for appellants.
to send such a commission to him. Indeed, cases are not unknown in the annals of Office of the Solicitor-General Araneta for appellee.
criminal prosecutions wherein it has been proven that such appointments have been
concealed in the baggage or among the papers of the accused persons, so that when later MAPA, J.:
discovered by the officers of the law they might be used as evidence against the accused.
But where a genuine conspiracy is shown to have existed as in this case, and it is proven
that the accused voluntarily accepted an appointment as an officer in that conspiracy, we The defendants have been sentenced by the Court of First Instance of Cebu to the penalty of seven
think that this fact may properly be taken into consideration as evidence of his relations years of presidio mayor as accessories after the fact in the crime of assassination or murder
with the conspirators.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library perpetrated on the persons of the American school-teachers Louis A. Thomas, Clyde O. France, John
E. Wells, and Ernest Eger, because, without having taken part in the said crime as principals or as
accomplices, they took part in the burial of the corpses of the victims in order to conceal the crime.
Counsel for appellants contend that the constitutional provision requiring the testimony of
at least two witnesses to the same overt act, or confession in open court, to support a
The evidence does not justify, in our opinion, this sentence. As regards Roberto Baculi, although he
conviction for the crime of treason should be applied in this case, but this court has always confessed to having assisted in the burial of the corpses, it appears that he did so because he was
held, in conformance with the decisions of the Federal courts of the United States, that the compelled to do so by the murderers of the four teachers. And not only does the defendant affirm this,
crime of conspiring to commit treason is a separate and distinct offense from the crime of but he is corroborated by the only eyewitness to the crime, Teodoro Sabate, who, by the way, is a
treason, and that this constitutional provision is not applicable in such cases. ( In witness for the prosecution. This witness says he was present when the Americans were killed; that
re Bollman, 4 Cranch, 74; U. S. vs. Mitchell, 2 Dall., 348.)chanrobles virtual law library Roberto Baculi was not a member of the group who killed the Americans, but the he was in a banana
plantation on his property gathering some bananas; that when he heard the shots he began to run; that
The evidence of record does not sustain the conviction of Aniceto de Guzman. The finding he was, however, seen by Damaso and Isidoro, the leaders of the band; that the latter called to him and
striking him with the butts of their guns they forced him to bury the corpses.
of his guilt rest substantially upon his acceptance of a number of bonds from one of the
conspirators, such bonds having been prepared by the conspirators for the purpose of
raising funds for carrying out the plans of the conspiracy, but it does not affirmatively The Penal Code exempts from liability any person who performs the act by reason of irresistible force
appear that he knew anything of the existence of the conspiracy or that, when he received (par. 9, art. 8). Baculi acted, doubtless, under such circumstances when he executed the acts which are
the bonds wrapped in a bundle, he knew what the contents of the bundle was, nor that charged against him.
ever, on any occasion, assumed any obligation with respect to these bonds. He, himself,
states that when he opened the bundle and discovered the nature of the contents he As regards the other defendant, Apolonio Caballeros, there is no proof that he took any part in any way
destroyed them with fire, and that he never had any dealings with the conspirators in in the execution of the crime with which he has been charged; there is conclusive proof to the contrary,
relation to the conspiracy or the object for which it was since Baculi, as well as one of the witnesses for the prosecution, Teodoro Sabate, expressly declare
organized.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library that he, Caballeros, did not take any part in the burial of the aforesaid corpses, nor was he even in the
place of the occurrence when the burial took place. The confession of his supposed liability and guilt,
made before an official of the division of information of the Constabulary, Enrique Calderon, as the
We are of opinion, therefore, that the judgment and sentence before us, in so far as it
latter states when testifying as a witness, can not be considered as legal proof, because the same
affects the said Aniceto de Guzman, should be reversed, with his proportionate share of witness says that Roberto Baculi was the only one of the defendants who made a confession to
the costs of both instances de oficio, and that the said Anecito de Guzman should be him voluntarily. It appears besides, from the statements of another witness for the prosecution, Meliton
acquitted of the crime with which he is charged and set a liberty forthwith, and that the Covarrubias, that the confession of Apolonio Caballeros was made through the promise made to him
judgment and sentence of the trial court, in so far as it applies to Francisco Bautista and and to the other defendants that nothing would be done to them. Confessions which do not appear to
Tomas Puzon, should be, and is hereby, affirmed, except so far as it imposes subsidiary have been made freely and voluntarily, without force, intimidation, or promise of pardon, can not be
imprisonment in the event of insolvency and failure to pay their respective fines, and, accepted as proof on a trial. (Sec. 4, Act No. 619 of the Philippine Commission).
The fact of the defendants not reporting to the authorities the perpetration of the crime, which seems to The proven facts are not disputed. All of the elements of the crime of piracy are present. Piracy is
be one of the motives for the conviction and which the court below takes into consideration in his robbery or forcible depredation on the high seas, without lawful authority and done animo furandi, and
judgment, is not punished by the Penal Code and therefore that can not render the defendants in the spirit and intention of universal hostility.
criminally liable according to law.
It cannot be contended with any degree of force as was done in the lover court and as is again done in
By virtue, then, of the above considerations, and with a reversal of the judgment appealed from, we this court, that the Court of First Instance was without jurisdiction of the case. Pirates are in law hostes
acquit the defendants, appellants, with the costs de oficio in both instances. So ordered. humani generis. Piracy is a crime not against any particular state but against all mankind. It may be
punished in the competent tribunal of any country where the offender may be found or into which he
may be carried. The jurisdiction of piracy unlike all other crimes has no territorial limits. As it is against
G.R. No. 17958             February 27, 1922
all so may it be punished by all. Nor does it matter that the crime was committed within the jurisdictional
3-mile limit of a foreign state, "for those limits, though neutral to war, are not neutral to crimes." (U.S.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee, vs. Furlong [1820], 5 Wheat., 184.)
vs.
LOL-LO and SARAW, defendants-appellants.
The most serious question which is squarely presented to this court for decision for the first time is
whether or not the provisions of the Penal Code dealing with the crime of piracy are still in force. Article
Thos. D. Aitken for appellants. 153 to 156 of the Penal Code reads as follows:
Acting Attorney-General Tuason for appellee.
ART. 153. The crime of piracy committed against Spaniards, or the subjects of another nation
MALCOLM, J.: not at war with Spain, shall be punished with a penalty ranging from cadena
temporal to cadena perpetua.
The days when pirates roamed the seas, when picturesque buccaneers like Captain Avery and Captain
Kidd and Bartholomew Roberts gripped the imagination, when grostesque brutes like Blackbeard If the crime be committed against nonbelligerent subjects of another nation at war with Spain,
flourished, seem far away in the pages of history and romance. Nevertheless, the record before us tells it shall be punished with the penalty of presidio mayor.
a tale of twentieth century piracy in the south seas, but stripped of all touches of chivalry or of
generosity, so as to present a horrible case of rapine and near murder.
ART. 154. Those who commit the crimes referred to in the first paragraph of the next
preceding article shall suffer the penalty of cadena perpetua or death, and those who commit
On or about June 30, 1920, two boats left matuta, a Dutch possession, for Peta, another Dutch the crimes referred to in the second paragraph of the same article, from cadena
possession. In one of the boats was one individual, a Dutch subject, and in the other boat eleven men, temporal to cadena perpetua:
women, and children, likewise subjects of Holland. After a number of days of navigation, at about 7
o'clock in the evening, the second boat arrived between the Islands of Buang and Bukid in the Dutch
1. Whenever they have seized some vessel by boarding or firing upon the same.
East Indies. There the boat was surrounded by six vintas manned by twenty-four Moros all armed. The
Moros first asked for food, but once on the Dutch boat, too for themselves all of the cargo, attacked
some of the men, and brutally violated two of the women by methods too horrible to the described. All 2. Whenever the crime is accompanied by murder, homicide, or by any of the
of the persons on the Dutch boat, with the exception of the two young women, were again placed on it physical injuries specified in articles four hundred and fourteen and four hundred
and holes were made in it, the idea that it would submerge, although as a matter of fact, these people, and fifteen and in paragraphs one and two of article four hundred and sixteen.
after eleven days of hardship and privation, were succored violating them, the Moros finally arrived at
Maruro, a Dutch possession. Two of the Moro marauder were Lol-lo, who also raped one of the women,
3. Whenever it is accompanied by any of the offenses against chastity specified in
and Saraw. At Maruro the two women were able to escape.
Chapter II, Title IX, of this book.

Lol-lo and Saraw later returned to their home in South Ubian, Tawi-Tawi, Sulu, Philippine Islands. There
4. Whenever the pirates have abandoned any persons without means of saving
they were arrested and were charged in the Court of First Instance of Sulu with the crime of piracy. A
themselves.
demurrer was interposed by counsel de officio for the Moros, based on the grounds that the offense
charged was not within the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance, nor of any court of the Philippine
Islands, and that the facts did not constitute a public offense, under the laws in force in the Philippine 5. In every case, the captain or skipper of the pirates.
Islands. After the demurrer was overruled by the trial judge, trial was had, and a judgment was
rendered finding the two defendants guilty and sentencing each of them to life imprisonment (cadena
ART. 155. With respect to the provisions of this title, as well as all others of this code, when
perpetua), to return together with Kinawalang and Maulanis, defendants in another case, to the
Spain is mentioned it shall be understood as including any part of the national territory.
offended parties, the thirty-nine sacks of copras which had been robbed, or to indemnify them in the
amount of 924 rupees, and to pay a one-half part of the costs.
ART. 156. For the purpose of applying the provisions of this code, every person, who,
according to the Constitution of the Monarchy, has the status of a Spaniard shall be
A very learned and exhaustive brief has been filed in this court by the attorney de officio. By a process
considered as such.
of elimination, however, certain questions can be quickly disposed of.
The general rules of public law recognized and acted on by the United States relating to the effect of a limited meaning, which would no longer comprehend all religious, military, and civil officers, but only
transfer of territory from another State to the United States are well-known. The political law of the public officers in the Government of the Philippine Islands.
former sovereignty is necessarily changed. The municipal law in so far as it is consistent with the
Constitution, the laws of the United States, or the characteristics and institutions of the government,
Under the construction above indicated, article 153 of the Penal Code would read as follows:
remains in force. As a corollary to the main rules, laws subsisting at the time of transfer, designed to
secure good order and peace in the community, which are strictly of a municipal character, continue
until by direct action of the new government they are altered or repealed. (Chicago, Rock Islands, etc., The crime of piracy committed against citizens of the United States and citizens of the
R. Co. vs. McGlinn [1885], 114 U.S., 542.) Philippine Islands, or the subjects of another nation not at war with the United States, shall be
punished with a penalty ranging from cadena temporal to cadena perpetua.
These principles of the public law were given specific application to the Philippines by the Instructions
of President McKinley of May 19, 1898, to General Wesley Meritt, the Commanding General of the If the crime be committed against nonbelligerent subjects of another nation at war with the
Army of Occupation in the Philippines, when he said: United States, it shall be punished with the penalty of presidio mayor.

Though the powers of the military occupant are absolute and supreme, and immediately We hold those provisions of the Penal code dealing with the crime of piracy, notably articles 153 and
operate upon the political condition of the inhabitants, the municipal laws of the conquered 154, to be still in force in the Philippines.
territory, such as affect private rights of person and property, and provide for the punishment
of crime, are considered as continuing in force, so far as they are compatible with the new
The crime falls under the first paragraph of article 153 of the Penal Code in relation to article 154. There
order of things, until they are suspended or superseded by the occupying belligerent; and
are present at least two of the circumstances named in the last cited article as authorizing
practice they are not usually abrogated, but are allowed to remain in force, and to be
either cadena perpetua or death. The crime of piracy was accompanied by (1) an offense against
administered by the ordinary tribunals, substantially as they were before the occupations.
chastity and (2) the abandonment of persons without apparent means of saving themselves. It is,
This enlightened practice is so far as possible, to be adhered to on the present occasion.
therefore, only necessary for us to determine as to whether the penalty of cadena perpetua or death
(Official Gazette, Preliminary Number, Jan. 1, 1903, p. 1. See also General Merritt
should be imposed. In this connection, the trial court, finding present the one aggravating circumstance
Proclamation of August 14, 1898.)
of nocturnity, and compensating the same by the one mitigating circumstance of lack of instruction
provided by article 11, as amended, of the Penal Code, sentenced the accused to life imprisonment. At
It cannot admit of doubt that the articles of the Spanish Penal Code dealing with piracy were meant to least three aggravating circumstances, that the wrong done in the commission of the crime was
include the Philippine Islands. Article 156 of the Penal Code in relation to article 1 of the Constitution of deliberately augmented by causing other wrongs not necessary for its commission, that advantage was
the Spanish Monarchy, would also make the provisions of the Code applicable not only to Spaniards taken of superior strength, and that means were employed which added ignominy to the natural effects
but to Filipinos. of the act, must also be taken into consideration in fixing the penalty. Considering, therefore, the
number and importance of the qualifying and aggravating circumstances here present, which cannot be
offset by the sole mitigating circumstance of lack of instruction, and the horrible nature of the crime
The opinion of Grotius was that piracy by the law of nations is the same thing as piracy by the civil law,
committed, it becomes our duty to impose capital punishment.
and he has never been disputed. The specific provisions of the Penal Code are similar in tenor to
statutory provisions elsewhere and to the concepts of the public law. This must necessarily be so,
considering that the Penal Code finds its inspiration in this respect in the Novelas, the Partidas, and The vote upon the sentence is unanimous with regard to the propriety of the imposition of the death
the Novisima Recopilacion. penalty upon the defendant and appellant Lo-lo (the accused who raped on of the women), but is not
unanimous with regard to the court, Mr. Justice Romualdez, registers his nonconformity. In accordance
with provisions of Act No. 2726, it results, therefore, that the judgment of the trial court as to the
The Constitution of the United States declares that the Congress shall have the power to define and
defendant and appellant Saraw is affirmed, and is reversed as to the defendant and appellant Lol-lo,
punish piracies and felonies committed on the high seas, and offenses against the law of nations. (U.S.
who is found guilty of the crime of piracy and is sentenced therefor to be hung until dead, at such time
Const. Art. I, sec. 8, cl. 10.) The Congress, in putting on the statute books the necessary ancillary
and place as shall be fixed by the judge of first instance of the Twenty-sixth Judicial District. The two
legislation, provided that whoever, on the high seas, commits the crime of piracy as defined by the law
appellants together with Kinawalang and Maulanis, defendants in another case, shall indemnify jointly
of nations, and is afterwards brought into or found in the United States, shall be imprisoned for life.
and severally the offended parties in the equivalent of 924 rupees, and shall pay a one-half part of the
(U.S. Crim. Code, sec. 290; penalty formerly death: U.S. Rev. Stat., sec. 5368.) The framers of the
costs of both instances. So ordered.
Constitution and the members of Congress were content to let a definition of piracy rest on its universal
conception under the law of nations.
[G.R. No. 118075. September 5, 1997]
It is evident that the provisions of the Penal Code now in force in the Philippines relating to piracy are
not inconsistent with the corresponding provisions in force in the United States. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. EMILIANO CATANTAN y
TAYONG, Accused-Appellant.
By the Treaty of Paris, Spain ceded the Philippine Islands to the United States. A logical construction of
articles of the Penal Code, like the articles dealing with the crime of piracy, would be that wherever DECISION
"Spain" is mentioned, it should be substituted by the words "United States" and wherever "Spaniards"
are mentioned, the word should be substituted by the expression "citizens of the United States and
citizens of the Philippine Islands." somewhat similar reasoning led this court in the case of United BELLOSILLO, J.:
States vs. Smith ([1919], 39 Phil., 533) to give to the word "authority" as found in the Penal Code a
EMILIANO CATANTAN and JOSE MACVEN URSAL alias "Bimbo" were charged with violation But, as Ursal was transferring to the "new" pumpboat, its outrigger caught the front part
of PD No. 532 otherwise known as the Anti-Piracy and Highway Robbery Law of 1974 for of the pumpboat of the Pilapils so he kicked hard its prow; it broke. The jolt threw Eugene
having on 27 June 1993, while armed with a firearm and a bladed weapon, acting in into the sea and he landed on the water headlong. Juan Jr. then untied his brother's legs
conspiracy with one another, by means of violence and intimidation, wilfully and and the two swam together clinging to their boat. Fortunately another pumpboat passed
feloniously attacked, assaulted and inflicted physical injuries on Eugene Pilapil and Juan by and towed them safely ashore.
Pilapil Jr. who were then fishing in the seawaters of Tabogon, Cebu, and seized their
fishing boat, to their damage and prejudice. 1chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Section 2, par. (d), of PD No. 532, defines piracy as "any attack upon or seizure of any
vessel, or the taking away of the whole or part thereof or its cargo, equipment, or the
The Regional Trial Court of Cebu, after trial, found both accused Emiliano Catantan y personal belongings of the complement or passengers, irrespective of the value thereof,
Tayong and Jose Macven Ursal alias "Bimbo" guilty of the crime charged and sentenced by means of violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon things, committed
them to reclusion perpetua. 2 Of the duo only Emiliano Catantan appealed. by any person, including a passenger or member of the complement of said vessel, in
Philippine waters, shall be considered as piracy. The offenders shall be considered as
pirates and punished as hereinafter provided." And a vessel is construed in Sec. 2, par.
In his appeal, accused Catantan contends that the trial court erred in convicting him of
(b), of the same decree as "any vessel or watercraft used for transport of passengers and
piracy as the facts proved only constitute grave coercion defined in Art. 286 of the Revised
cargo from one place to another through Philippine waters. It shall include all kinds and
Penal Code and not piracy under PD No. 532.
types of vessels or boats used in fishing (underscoring supplied).

The evidence for the prosecution is that at 3:00 o'clock in the morning of 27 June 1993,
On the other hand, grave coercion as defined in Art. 286 of the Revised Penal Code is
the Pilapil brothers Eugene, 21, and Juan Jr., 18, were fishing in the sea some 3
committed by "any person who, without authority of law, shall, by means of violence,
kilometers away from the shores of Tabogon, Cebu. Suddenly, another boat caught up
prevent another from doing something not prohibited by law, or compel him to do
with them. One of them, later identified as the accused Emiliano Catantan, boarded the
something against his will, whether it be right or wrong."
pumpboat of the Pilapils and leveled his gun at Eugene. With his gun, Catantan struck
Eugene on the left cheekbone and ordered him and Juan Jr. to "dapa."  3 Then Catantan
told Ursal to follow him to the pumpboat of the Pilapils. There they hogtied Eugene, forced Accused-appellant argues that in order that piracy may be committed it is essential that
him to lie down at the bottom of the boat, covered him with a tarpaulin up to his neck, there be an attack on or seizure of a vessel. He claims that he and his companion did not
stepped on him and ordered Juan Jr. to ferry them to Daan Tabogon. They left behind the attack or seize the fishing boat of the Pilapil brothers by using force or intimidation but
other pumpboat which the accused had earlier used together with its passengers one of merely boarded the boat, and it was only when they were already on board that they used
whom was visibly tied. force to compel the Pilapils to take them to some other place. Appellant also insists that
he and Ursal had no intention of permanently taking possession or depriving complainants
of their boat. As a matter of fact, when they saw another pumpboat they ordered the
Noting that they were already far out into the sea, Eugene reminded Catantan that they
brothers right away to approach that boat so they could leave the Pilapils behind in their
were now off-course but Catantan told Eugene to keep quiet or he would be killed. Later,
boat. Accordingly, appellant claims, he simply committed grave coercion and not piracy.
the engine conked out and Juan Jr. was directed to row the boat. Eugene asked to be set
free so he could help but was not allowed; he was threatened with bodily harm instead.
We do not agree. Under the definition of piracy in PD No. 532 as well as grave coercion as
penalized in Art. 286 of the Revised Penal Code, this case falls squarely within the purview
Meanwhile Juan Jr. managed to fix the engine, but as they went farther out into the open
of piracy. While it may be true that Eugene and Juan Jr. were compelled to go elsewhere
sea the engine stalled again. This time Eugene was allowed to assist his brother. Eugene's
other than their place of destination, such compulsion was obviously part of the act of
hands were set free but his legs were tied to the outrigger. At the point of a tres
seizing their boat. The testimony of Eugene, one of the victims, shows that the appellant
cantos  4 held by Ursal, Eugene helped row the boat.
actually seized the vessel through force and intimidation. The direct testimony of Eugene
is significant and enlightening -
As they passed the shoreline of Nipa, they saw another boat. Catantan asked whose boat
that was and the Pilapils told him that it was operated by a certain Juanito and that its
Q: Now, while you and your younger brother were fishing at the seawaters of Tabogon at
engine was new. Upon learning this, Catantan ordered the Pilapil brothers to approach the
that time, was there anything unusual that happened?
boat cautioning them however not to move or say anything.

A: Yes.
On the pretext that they were buying fish Catantan boarded the "new" pumpboat. Once
aboard he ordered the operator Juanito to take them to Mungaz, another town of Cebu.
When Juanito tried to beg-off by saying that he would still pull up his net and harvest his Q: Will you please tell the Court what that was?
catch, Catantan drew his revolver and said, "You choose between the two, or I will kill
you." 5 Juanito, obviously terrified, immediately obeyed and Ursal hopped in from the
A: While we were fishing at Tabogon another pumpboat arrived and the passengers of
other pumpboat and joined Catantan.
that pumpboat boarded our pumpboat.
Q: Now, that pumpboat which you said approached you, how many were riding in that Q: To what place did he order you to go?
pumpboat?
A: To Daan Tabogon. 6chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
A: Four.
To sustain the defense and convert this case of piracy into one of grave coercion would be
Q: When you said the passengers of that pumpboat boarded your pumpboat, how did they to ignore the fact that a fishing vessel cruising in Philippine waters was seized by the
do that? accused by means of violence against or intimidation of persons. As Eugene Pilapil
testified, the accused suddenly approached them and boarded their pumpboat and
Catantan aimed his revolver at them as he ordered complaining witness Eugene Pilapil
A: They approached somewhat suddenly and came aboard the pumpboat (underscoring
to "dapa" or lie down with face downwards, and then struck his face with a revolver,
supplied).
hitting the lower portion of his left eye, after which, Catantan told his victims at gun point
to take them to Daan Tabogon.
Q: How many suddenly came aboard your pumpboat?
The incident happened at 3:00 o'clock in the morning. The sudden appearance of another
A: Only one. pumpboat with four passengers, all strangers to them, easily intimidated the Pilapil
brothers that they were impelled to submit in complete surrender to the marauders. The
Q: What did that person do when he came aboard your pumpboat? moment Catantan jumped into the other pumpboat he had full control of his victims. The
sight of a drawn revolver in his hand drove them to submission. Hence the issuance of PD
No. 532 designed to avert situations like the case at bar and discourage and prevent
A: When he boarded our pumpboat he aimed his revolver at us  (underscoring supplied). piracy in Philippine waters. Thus we cite the succeeding "whereas" clauses of the decree -

Q: By the way, when he aimed his revolver to you, did he say anything to you? Whereas, reports from law-enforcement agencies reveal that lawless elements are still
committing acts of depredations upon the persons and properties of innocent and
xxxx defenseless inhabitants who travel from one place to another, thereby disturbing the
peace, order and tranquility of the nation and stunting the economic and social progress of
the people;
A: He said,  "dapa,"  which means lie down (underscoring supplied).

Whereas, such acts of depredations constitute either piracy or highway

COURT: robbery/brigandage which are among the highest forms of lawlessness condemned by the
penal statutes of all countries; and,
Q: To whom did he aim that revolver?
Whereas, it is imperative that said lawless elements be discouraged from perpetrating
A: He aimed the revolver on me. such acts of depredations by imposing heavy penalty on the offenders, with the end in
view of eliminating all obstacles to the economic, social, educational and community
progress of the people.
TRIAL PROS. ECHAVEZ:

The Pilapil brothers are mere fisherfolk whose only means of livelihood is fishing in sea
Q: What else did he do?
waters. They brave the natural elements and contend with the unknown forces of the sea
to bring home a bountiful harvest. It is on these small fishermen that the townspeople
A: Then he ordered his companion to come aboard the pumpboat. depend for the daily bread. To impede their livelihood would be to deprive them of their
very subsistence, and the likes of the accused within the purview of PD No. 532 are the
Q: What did he do with his revolver? obstacle to the "economic, social, educational and community progress of the
people." Had it not been for the chance passing of another pumpboat, the fate of the
Pilapil brothers, left alone helpless in a floundering, meandering outrigger with a broken
A: He struck my face with the revolver, hitting the lower portion of my left eye. prow and a conked-out engine in open sea, could not be ascertained.

Q: Now, after you were struck with the revolver, what did these persons do? While appellant insists that he and Ursal had no intention of depriving the Pilapils
permanently of their boat, proof of which they left behind the brothers with their boat, the
A: We were ordered to take them to a certain place. truth is, Catantan and Ursal abandoned the Pilapils only because their pumpboat broke
down and it was necessary to transfer to another pumpboat that would take them back to
their lair. Unfortunately for the pirates their "new" pumpboat ran out of gas so they were of execution which would have produced the crime of Qualified Piracy with
apprehended by the police soon after the Pilapils reported the matter to the local Quadruple Murder, but which, nevertheless, did not produce it by reasons of
authorities. causes in dependent of their will, that is, said Antonio de Guzman was able to swim
to the shore and hid himself, and due to the timely medical assistance rendered to
said victim, Antonio de Guzman which prevented his death. (Expediente, pp. 1-2.)
The fact that the revolver used by the appellant to seize the boat was not produced in
evidence cannot exculpate him from the crime. The fact remains, and we state it again,
that Catantan and his co-accused Ursal seized through force and intimidation the An order of arrest was issued against all of the accused but only Julaide Siyoh and Omar-kayam Kiram
pumpboat of the Pilapils while the latter were fishing in Philippine waters. were apprehended. (Id, p. 8.)

After trial, the court a quo rendered a decision with the following dispositive portion.
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the decision appealed from, the conviction of
accused-appellant EMILIANO CATANTAN y TAYONG for the crime of piracy penalized under
PD No. 532 and sentencing him accordingly to reclusion perpetua, is AFFIRMED. Costs WHEREFORE, in view of the fore going considerations, this Court finds the
against accused-appellant. accused Omar-kayam Kiram and Julaide Siyoh guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of Qualified Piracy with Triple Murder and Frustrated Murder as defined
and penalized under the provision of Presidential Decree No. 532, and hereby
SO ORDERED. sentences each one of them to suffer the supreme penalty of DEATH. However,
considering the provision of Section 106 of the Code of Mindanao and Sulu, the
G.R. No. L-57292 February 18, 1986 illiteracy or ignorance or extreme poverty of the accused who are members of the
cultural minorities, under a regime of so called compassionate society, a
commutation to life imprisonment is recommended. (Id, p. 130.)
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JULAIDE SIYOH, OMAR-KAYAM KIRAM, NAMLI INDANAN and ANDAW JAMAHALI, accused- In their appeal, Siyoh and Kiram make only one assignment of error:
appellants.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE GUILT OF THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANTS OMAR-KAYAM KIRAM AND JULAIDE SIYOH HAS
BEEN PROVED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT. (Brief, p. 8.)

ABAD SANTOS, J.:
The People's version of the facts is as follows:

This is an automatic review of the decision of the defunct Court of First Instance of Basilan, Judge
Jainal D. Rasul as ponente, imposing the death penalty. Alberto Aurea was a businessman engaged in selling dry goods at the Larmitan
Public Market, in the province of Basilan (pp. 2-3, tsn). On July 7, 1979 and on July
10, 1979, Antonio de Guzman, Danilo Hiolen, Rodolfo de Castro and Anastacio de
In Criminal Case No. 318 of the aforesaid court, JULAIDE SIYOH, OMARKAYAM KIRAM, NAMLI Guzman received goods from his store consisting of mosquito nets, blankets, wrist
INDANAN and ANDAW JAMAHALI were accused of qualified piracy with triple murder and frustrated watch sets and stereophono with total value of P15,000 more or less (pp. 4-6, tsn).
murder said to have been committed according to the information as follows: The goods were received under an agreement that they would be sold by the
above-named persons and thereafter they would pay the value of said goods to
That on or about the 14th day of July, 1979, and within the jurisdiction of this Aurea and keep part of the profits for themselves. However these people neither
Honorable Court, viz., at Mataja Is., Municipality of Lantawan, Province of Basilan, paid the value of the goods to Aurea nor returned the goods to him (pp. 6-7, tsn).
Philippines, the above named accused, being strangers and without lawful On July 15, 1979, Aurea was informed by Antonio de Guzman that his group was
authority, armed with firearms and taking advantage of their superior strength, held up near Baluk- Baluk Island and that his companions were hacked (p. 8, tsn).
conspiring and confederating together, aiding and assisting one with the other, with On July 16, 1979, the bodies of Rodolfo de Castro, Danilo Hiolen and Anastacio de
intent to gain and by the use of violence or intimidation against persons and force Guzman were brought by the PC seaborne patrol to Isabela, Basilan (pp. 17-18,
upon things, did then and there were riding, traveling at that time from the island 29, tsn). Only Antonio de Guzman survived the incident that caused the death of
of Baluk-Baluk towards Pilas, boarded the said pumpboat and take, steal and carry his companions.
away all their cash money, wrist watches, stereo sets, merchandise and other
personal belongings amounting to the total amount of P 18,342.00, Philippine It appears that on July 10, 1979, Antonio de Guzman together with his friends who
Currency; that the said accused, on the occasion of the crime herein above- were also travelling merchants like him, were on their way to Pilas Island, Province
described, taking advantage that the said victims were at their mercy, did then and of Basilan, to sell the goods they received from Alberto Aurea. The goods they
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to kill, ordered them to jump brought with them had a total value of P18,000.00 (pp- 36-37, tsn). They left for
into the water, whereupon, the said accused, fired their guns at them which caused Pilas Island at 2:00 p.m. of July 10, 1979 on a pumpboat. They took their dinner
the death of Rodolfo de Castro, Danilo Hiolen, Anastacio de Guzman and and slept that night in the house of Omar-kayam Kiram at Pilas Island (pp. 37-38,
wounding one Antonio de Guzman; thus the accused have performed all the acts tsn).
The following day, July 11, 1979, de Guzman's group, together with Kiram and tangenital' (Exh. C, prosecution). (pp. 134-136, tsn). Dr. Jaime M. Junio, Provincial
Julaide Siyoh, started selling their goods, They were able to sell goods worth P Health Officer of Basilan, examined the dead bodies of Rodolfo de Castro and
3,500.00. On July 12, 1979, the group, again accompanied by Kiram and Siyoh, Danilo Hiolen and issued the corresponding death certificates (Exhs. D and E,
went to sell their goods at another place, Sangbay, where they sold goods worth P prosecution). (pp. 137-138; 140-141, tsn). (Brief, pp. 5-11.)
12,000.00 (pp. 40-42, tsn). They returned to Pilas Island at 5:00 o'clock in the
afternoon and again slept at Kiram's house. However that night Kiram did not sleep
As can be seen from the lone assignment of error, the issue is the credibility of witnesses. Who should
in his house, and upon inquiry the following day when Antonio de Guzman saw
be believed Antonio de Guzman who was the lone prosecution eye-witness or Siyoh and Kiram the
him, Kiram told the former that he slept at the house of Siyoh.
accused-appellants who claims that they were also the victims of the crime? The trial court which had
the opportunity of observing the demeanor of the witnesses and how they testified assigned credibility
On that day, July 13, 1979, the group of Antonio de Guzman went to Baluk-Baluk, to the former and an examination of the record does not reveal any fact or circumstance of weight and
a place suggested by Kiram. They were able to sell goods worth P3,000.00 (pp. influence which was overlooked or the significance of which was misinterpreted as would justify a
43-46, tsn). They returned to Pilas Island for the night but Kiram did not sleep with reversal of the trial court's determination. Additionally, the following claims of the appellants are not
them (p. 47, tsn). convincing:

The following day, July 14, 1979, the group again went to Baluk-Baluk 1. That if they were the culprits they could have easily robbed their victims at the Kiram house or on any
accompanied by Kiram and Siyoh (pp. 48, 50 t.s.n), They used the pumpboat of of the occasions when they were travelling together. Suffice it to say that robbing the victims at Kiram's
Kiram. Kiram and Siyoh were at that time armed with 'barongs'. They arrived at house would make Kiram and his family immediately suspect and robbing the victims before they had
Baluk-Baluk at about 10:00 o'clock in the morning and upon arrival at the place sold all their goods would be premature. However, robbing and killing the victims while at sea and after
Kiram and Siyoh going ahead of the group went to a house about 15 meters away they had sold all their goods was both timely and provided safety from prying eyes.
from the place where the group was selling its goods (pp. 50-53, tsn). Kiram and
Siyoh were seen by the group talking with two persons whose faces the group saw
2. That the accused immediately reported the incident to the PC. The record does not support this
but could not recognize (pp. 53-54, tsn). After selling their goods, the members of
assertion. For as the prosecution stated: "It is of important consequence to mention that the witness
the group, together with Kiram and Siyoh, prepared to return to Pilas Island. They
presented by the defense are all from Pilas Island and friends of the accused. They claimed to be
rode on a pumpboat where Siyoh positioned himself at the front while Kiram
members of retrieving team for the dead bodies but no PC soldiers were ever presented to attest this
operated the engine. On the way to Pilas Island, Antonio de Guzman saw another
fact. The defense may counter why the prosecution also failed to present the Maluso Police Daily Event
pumpboat painted red and green about 200 meters away from their pumpboat (pp.
book? This matter has been brought by Antonio not to the attention of the PC or Police but to an army
55, tsn). Shortly after" Kiram turned off the engine of their pumpboat. Thereafter
detachment. The Army is known to have no docket book, so why take the pain in locating the army
two shots were fired from the other pumpboat as it moved towards them (pp. 57-
soldiers with whom the report was made? (Memorandum, p. 7.) And Judge Rasul also makes this
58, tsn). There were two persons on the other pumpboat who were armed with
observation: "..., this Court is puzzled, assuming the version of the defense to be true, why the lone
armantes. De Guzman recognized them to be the same persons he saw Kiram
survivor Antonio de Guzman as having been allegedly helped by the accused testified against them.
conversing with in a house at Baluk-Baluk Island. When the boat came close to
Indeed, no evidence was presented and nothing can be inferred from the evidence of the defense so far
them, Kiram threw a rope to the other pumpboat which towed de Guzman's
presented showing reason why the lone survivor should pervert the truth or fabricate or manufacture
pumpboat towards Mataja Island. On the way to Mataja Island, Antonio de Guzman
such heinous crime as qualified piracy with triple murders and frustrated murder? The point which
and his companions were divested of their money and their goods by Kiram (pp.
makes us doubt the version of the defense is the role taken by the PC to whom the report was allegedly
59-61, tsn). Thereafter Kiram and his companions ordered the group of de Guzman
made by the accused immediately after the commission of the offense. Instead of helping the accused,
to undress. Taking fancy on the pants of Antonio de Guzman, Kiram put it on. With
the PC law enforcement agency in Isabela, perhaps not crediting the report of the accused or believing
everybody undressed, Kiram said 'It was good to kill all of you'. After that remark,
in the version of the report made by the lone survivor Antonio de Guzman, acted consistently with the
Siyoh hacked Danilo Hiolen while Kiram hacked Rodolfo de Castro. Antonio de
latter's report and placed the accused under detention for investigation." (Expediente, pp. 127-128.)
Guzman jumped into the water. As he was swimming away from the pumpboat, the
two companions of Kiram fired at him, injuring his back (pp. 62-65, tsn). But he was
able to reach a mangrove where he stayed till nightfall. When he left the mangrove, 3. That the affidavits of Dolores de Guzman, wife of the deceased Anastacio de Guzman, and Primitiva
he saw the dead bodies of Anastacio de Guzman, Danilo Hiolen and Rodolfo de de Castro, wife of the deceased Rodolfo de Castro, state that Antonio de Guzman informed them
Castro. He was picked up by a fishing boat and brought to the Philippine Army shortly after the incident that their husbands were killed by the companions of Siyoh and Kiram. The
station at Maluso where he received first aid treatment. Later he was brought to the thrust of the appellants' claim, therefore, is that Namli Indanan and Andaw Jamahali were the killers and
J.S. Alano Memorial Hospital at Isabela, Basilan province (pp. 66-68, tsn). not the former. But this claim is baseless in the face of the proven conspiracy among the accused for as
Judge Rasul has stated:
On July 15, 1979, while waiting for the dead bodies of his companions at the wharf,
de Guzman saw Siyoh and Kiram. He pointed them out to the PC and the two were It is believed that conspiracy as alleged in the information is sufficiently proved in
arrested before they could run. When arrested, Kiram was wearing the pants he this case. In fact the following facts appear to have been established to show
took from de Guzman and de Guzman had to ask Pat. Bayabas at the Provincial clearly conspiracy: A) On July 14, 1979, while peddling, the survivor-witness Tony
Jail to get back his pants from Kiram (pp. 69-72, tsn). de Guzman noticed that near the window of a dilapidated house, both accused
were talking to two (2) armed strange-looking men at Baluk-Baluk Island; B) When
the pumpboat was chased and overtaken, the survivor-witness Tony de Guzman
Antonio de Guzman was physically examined at the J.S. Alano Memorial Hospital
recognized their captors to be the same two (2) armed strangers to whom the two
at Isabela, Basilan and findings showed: 'gunshot wound, scapular area, bilateral,
accused talked in Baluk- Baluk Island near the dilapidated house; C) The two
 accused, without order from the two armed strangers transferred the unsold goods
to the captors' banca; D) That Tony de Guzman and companion peddlers were
divested of their jewelries and cash and undressed while the two accused
remained unharmed or not molested. These concerted actions on their part prove
conspiracy and make them equally liable for the same crime (People vs. Pedro, 16
SCRA 57; People vs. lndic 10 SCRA 130). The convergence of the will of the
conspirators in the scheming and execution of the crime amply justifies the
imputation of all of them the act of any of them (People vs. Peralta, 25 SCRA, 759).
(Id., pp. 128-129.)

4. That there is no evidence Anastacio de Guzman was killed together with Rodolfo de Castro and
Danilo Hiolen because his remains were never recovered. There is no reason to suppose that
Anastacio de Guzman is still alive or that he died in a manner different from his companions. The
incident took place on July 14, 1979 and when the trial court decided the case on June 8, 1981
Anastacio de Guzman was still missing. But the number of persons killed on the occasion of piracy is
not material. P.D. No. 532 considers qualified piracy, i.e. rape, murder or homicide is committed as a
result or on the occasion of piracy, as a special complex crime punishable by death regardless of the
number of victims.

5. That the death certificates are vague as to the nature of the injuries sustained by the victims; were
they hacked wounds or gunshot wounds? The cause of death stated for Rodolfo de Castro and Danilo
Hiolen is: "Hemorrhage due to hacked wounds, possible gunshot wounds." (Exhs. D and E.) The cause
is consistent with the testimony of Antonio de Guzman that the victims were hacked; that the appellants
were armed with "barongs" while Indanan and Jamahali were armed with armalites.

WHEREFORE, finding the decision under review to be in accord with both the facts and the law, it is
affirmed with the following modifications: (a) for lack of necessary votes the penalty imposed shall
be reclusion perpetua; and (b) each of the appellants shall pay in solidum to the heirs of each of the
deceased indemnity in the amount of P30,000.00. No special pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.