Book Review

Neither a Hawk Nor a Dove

By Khurshid Mahmud Kasuri

Published in 2015 by Oxford University; No.38, Sector 15, Korangi Industrial

Reviewed by Air Commodore (R) Khalid Iqbal, Consultant IPRI

[A variant of this text was carried by the Journal of Current Affairs, (Vol 1, Nos 1&2: 2016.)138-142.
published by Islamabad Policy Research Institute (IPRI), Islamabad, Pakistan]

The book chronicles a comprehensive account of Pakistan’s foreign policy and it’s execution
by a former Pakistani Foreign Minister, Mr Khurshid Mahmud Kasuri (2002-07). Treatise is a
political memoir, meshed with pieces of autobiography (pp.3-19). First person narration,
through-out the text, further reinforces the autobiographic intent of the writer. President
Musharraf appointed Khurshid to head the ministry of foreign affairs when country
confronted crucial challenges on multiple foreign policy quandaries. During his tenure as
foreign minister, besides handling post 9/11 quagmire, Kasuri ventured into (re)starting a
peace process with India. Author has, ever since, publically owned it as the flagship
achievement of his tenure as foreign minister, and terms its discontinuation as an
unfortunate event for both the countries as well as for the South Asian region. Khurshid has
continued with the tradition set by some of his predecessors like Mr Abdul Sattar (1999-
2002) and Mr Sartaj Aziz (1998-99), who have documented their tenures in their books titled:
“Pakistan’s Foreign Policy 1947-2005”, and “Between Dreams and Realities: Some
Milestones in Pakistan's History”, respectively.
To set the context, Kasuri has summarised Pakistan’s security dilemmas and corresponding
efforts for peace since partition till his assumption of office as foreign minister. While doing
so, he, by and large, sticks to mainstream official version of historic diplomatic processes
(pp-77-86). For his vision of foreign policy, Kasuri is indebted to and inspired by “Henry
Kissinger, for whom a realist does not reject the importance of ideals, or values, but insists
on a careful even unsentimental weighing of the balance of material forces, together with an
understanding of the history, culture, and economics of the societies comprising the
international system”(pp.119-120).
According to Kasuri, foreign policy’s objective was not to provide a shoulder for the people to
cry over indignation, or be joyous over hope. Rather, it is to adapt to actual events as they
happen or are likely to happen. And that in this context, foreign policy of a typical nation
state was directly related to its domestic political and economic situation; and that no foreign
policy could succeed unless it enjoyed support of the people. Writer is, rightly, of the view
that there needs to be some connection between the foreign policy objectives and ground
realities; and “unless Pakistan and India resolved their differences on the basis of a just
peace, both countries have developed major fault lines which could be exploited by others”
(p.119).

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Writer is of the view that Pakistan had been unable to employ the instrument of its strategic
importance, resulting into failure in capitalising its real potential. Gap between the public
aspiration and official foreign policy has been a perpetual inhibitor of bold initiatives by the
handlers of foreign policy, be it Kashmir or Pakistan-US relations. Grand public standing in
Pakistan is emotionally entangled in historic wrangling and any effort to cut lose from it is
quickly termed as a “sell-out”. Kasuri era’s unsuccessful back channel initiative on Kashmir
had also not gone down well amongst the Pakistani public; which ‘Kasuri the politician’ could
not afford; hence he might have ventured to write this book in an attempt to clear the dust. If
so, he has failed. Details revealed in the book indicate that Pakistan was well on its way to
appease India without accruing worthwhile reciprocity. Notwithstanding, Kasuri drives home
a pertinent conclusion that street mood and opposition parties, of both sides, yield impelling
negative influence on forward traction of India-Pakistan relations; which is a formidable
obstacle to circumvent. Writer is of the view that excessive partisanship of political parties,
both in Pakistan and India, on core issues related to Indo-Pak relations had often averted the
two countries from resolving their issues. He suggests that, for the sake of substantial and
sustainable progress, both the governments should break open the straitjacket imposed by
domestic blow-back effect.

While discussing the pre-normalization process with India writer narrates the post
Kargil tensions, inconclusive Agra summit and attack on Indian parliament in 2001
leading to nearly a year-long deployment of over one million troops on Pakistan-India
borders. At that time, “the BJP government found it expedient to blame Pakistan
government out of domestic and political compulsions. The objective was to have
Pakistan declared a terrorist state” (p.155).
Later, in a departure from its stance of not dealing with a military ruler, Prime
Minister Vajpayee extended invitation to President Musharraf for Agra summit,
mainly on L.K Advani’s urging. The summit remained inconclusive because the
Indian side had dug its heels that there could not be any significant movement on the
issues that were of concern to Pakistan unless there was sufficient emphasis on
terrorism and acceptance that it must end. Kasuri blames “lack of sufficient
preparation for failure of the summit. This failure highlighted necessity of bipartisan
support for resolving major issues between the two countries” (p.161).
Writer narrates that the breakthrough came via 12 th South Asian Association for
Regional Cooperation (SAARC) summit 2004, held in Islamabad, attended by Prime
Minster Vajpayee. This provided an opportunity for holding bilateral talks that led to
initiation of Composite Dialogue (CD) process a month later. The CD framework with
various brand names continues to be foundation stone of whatever peace process
has or has not crawled forward since then. Writer discusses America’s role in
Pakistan-India peace process: “When I assumed the Foreign Minister’s office, the
Americans were working behind the scenes to ease tension [between India and
Pakistan] because of a nuclearized South Asia and their interests in Afghanistan”
(p.181).
Book also details Musharraf era’s much touted about “Out-Of-The Box Thinking”.
President Musharraf’s notion of setting aside UN resolutions on Kashmir was indeed
a faux pas. Kasuri recalls he knew that “all hell would break loose and that a section
of Pakistan’s hardliners on India would accuse him of staging a U-turn on Kashmir”
(p.189). And that he issued a press statement and gave an interview to clarify that

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Pakistan had in no way given up its demand regarding resolution of dispute in
accordance with UNSC resolutions and elaborated President’s “four point proposal
of (a) Initiating a dialogue, (b) accepting the centrality of Kashmir, (c) eliminating
whatever is not acceptable to Pakistan, India and the Kashmiris, and (d) arriving at a
solution acceptable to all the three stakeholders” (p.189). Indeed these four points
were mutually contradictory, and hence nonstarter. Kasuri under the tutelage of
President Musharraf followed a line of action that could have ended-up in freezing
status quo in Kashmir.
Writer says that due to sensitivity of the issue, governments of India and Pakistan
decided to add a preliminary back channel phase to the process for maintaining
confidentiality—away from media glare to preserve it from derailment attempts. The
idea was to hammer out a draft, acceptable to the people of both side. It was good
idea as long as it did not deviate from the well-established parameters. However, the
details of the draft agreement reveal horrific details to the peril of Pakistan. “It was
therefore agreed that the level of self-governance [in Kashmir] will be same in both
sides. With this objective in view, it was agreed that maximum self-governance
would be granted in legislative, executive, and judicial areas to each of the units”
(p.337); free and fair elections in the respective units would be held regularly. And
that these elections would be made open to international observers and media.
Indians made it clear that any solution would include all areas including Northern
Areas of Pakistan and “despite our desire to separate this region from the rest of
J&K, we decided to show some flexibility on the subject” (p.339). The agreement
also stipulated that J&K could not be made independent; borders could not be
redrawn; the Line of Control should be made irrelevant; and a Joint Mechanism be
setup comprising elected members from each of the two units of Kashmir (p.342).
Book reveals that "It was agreed that this mechanism will meet periodically—at least
twice or thrice a year. It would be entrusted with the responsibility of increasing the
number of crossing points and encourage travel, trade and tourism and streamline
transport services” (pp343-345). The foreign ministers were proposed to meet at
least on yearly basis to monitor the progress (p.344). Book reveals that water issues
were also envisaged to fall under the purview of Joint Commission.
Back Channel was to culminate in signing the “Treaty of Peace, Security and
Friendship” (p.345). It was being contemplated that the Agreement would be subject
to review after 15 years. “In fairness I may note that towards the end of 2006 and the
beginning of 2007, we were negotiating the period after which the review could take
place. I have mentioned fifteen years here, because, it seemed that a compromise
was beginning to emerge on fifteen years” (p. 345).
Writer claims that resolution of the issue of Jammu and Kashmir was just round the
corner. If he is reporting the matter accurately, then Indian side was grossly foolish
not to cease the moment and capitalize on Musharraf-Kasuri strategic faux pas.
Duo’s giving-in strategic concessions to India without accruing a ‘quid pro quo’ was
a gross error of judgment. Change of government in India, in 2007, came as a divine
intervention and saved the day for Pakistan. Congress government had no interest in
carrying forward the BJP initiative.

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Book illustrates Pakistan’s relations with Afghanistan in a candid way by stating that
there was no country in the world that has greater stake in a peaceful stable and
prosperous Afgnasitan. According to writer, to understand this relationship one has
to understand the context and perspective. Pashtunwali (the honour code by which
Pashtuns live was common in both countries), porous borders provided ample
opportunity for people to people contacts, and the concept of a confederation
between the two countries did not have many opponents. Pakistan’s hosting of
Afghan refugees during the USSR and the US invasions has created enormous good
will at people to people level. However, historic baggage of Durand line and
influence of foreign countries over Afghan governments had kept Pak-Afghan
government-to-government relations instable (pp. 494-507). Kasuri is of the view that
“there is recognition by all sides that Pakistan has the ability to help ensure a final
settlement or to sabotage one. This imposes a great responsibility on Pakistan to do
all that it can to bring about conditions of peace and stability in Afghanistan” (p.545).
Author narrates Pakistan’s relations with Turkey, Iran, and Saudi Arabia (pp.713-
738) in the context of common religious and cultural linkages; and nothing previously
unknown stands revealed. He also handles relations with Russia (pp.705-712) and
Gulf countries in a cursory manner (pp705-733). His narration of meeting with Israeli
foreign minister is interesting. He terms that encounter as “A politically Risky
Enterprise” (p.739). The meeting took place on August 31, 2005, under the good
offices of Turkey and beside the agenda items Kasuri confronted interesting question
from Israeli Foreign Minister Silvan Shalom: “Why are you more Palestinians than
the Palestinians themselves?”(p.739). Kasuri explained the reasons by referring to
Kashmir dispute as an analogy (p.744). Treatment of Pakistan’s relations with the
European Union, Japan, Bangladesh, and Britain (pp749-775) also does not disclose
anything new.
Book discusses Pakistan’s relationship with China quite elaborately (pp.675-699),
covering topics like provision of nuclear power plants, the silk route/economic
corridor, China-India factor etc. He also narrates that ‘Get Closer to China, Call OIC
meeting’ Syndrome reflects the strength of these relations (p.692).
A chapter has been dedicated to the Pakistan-US relations under the caption
“Pakistan and the United States: ‘The Odd Couple’ ”. Writer’s treatment to this
relationship is quite comprehensive. He summarises Pakistan’s reaction to 9/11 as
‘Pakistan Succumbed to Just One Call from Washington’ (p.563). After charting the
chronology and complexities of this relationship, Kasuri is of the view that “whenever
the two countries have engaged with each other meaningfully, they have benefited;
and whenever their relationship have been strained, the interests of both countries
have been hurt. Thus despite difficulties Pakistan and the US are likely to find areas
of convergence and the need to maintain a truly robust bilateral relationship” (p.669).
This is indeed a realistic assessment, this relationship is destined to endure, though
in a roller coaster manner.
Book devotes one chapter to the “The Foreign Office” (Ch-9). Section I elaborates
the way diplomacy is conducted by Pakistan. Section II is devoted to “Media and
Public Diplomacy” and “Role of Personal Relationship in Diplomacy”. This chapter

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fairly illustrates what Pakistan has and has not been able to achieve through
diplomacy and how & why of this. The chapter offers valuable insights into the ways
this institution has evolved since Sir Zafarullah Khan’s days. Kasuri begins the
chapter in a bid to rebuff the common perception that the Foreign Office had been
superseded in the leading role by other agencies; but then he concedes to the notion
because during the 90s, in his view, the governments had suffered systemic failures.
Writer dispels the impression that Pakistan Army is an obstacle to peaceful relations
with India and has reiterated that “Army wants a just and equitable peace with India”
(p.470). Kasuri also ventures into tricky domain of Civil-Military relations and
concludes that it was the non-institutional culture prevalent in running the
government that causes irritants. He is of the view that a potent National Security
Council under the Chief Executive could resolve the issue (p.486).
Kasuri says purpose behind writing the book was to "correct perceptions" amongst
people of the neighbouring nations. However, work is mainly focused on Pakistan-
India and Pakistan-US relations; and is an effort to justify some of the controversial
decisions made during writer’s tenure as foreign minister, rest is fill up material
overshadowed with official narratives on various aspects of Pakistan’s diplomatic
outreach. Over 225 pages of obsession driven account of writer’s pursuit of “peace”
with India amply indicate his underlying current of guilt and repentance, which he
does not wish to acknowledge. Unfortunately, instead of apologizing to the nation on
taking such a non-serious course on core national interests viz.a.viz India, writer is
still adamant that progress achieved through backchannel should not go waste.

Scheme of the book is a collection of compact and exhaustive essays, and their
division into chapters, sections and sub-sections, hence repetitions are not
infrequent. Quality editing could have trimmed the volume substantially.
Notwithstanding, book under review fills a critical void in the literature regarding
Pakistan’s foreign policy and conduct of external affairs. Barring the portions of the
text aimed as self-aggrandizement and absolvement, the book could serve as
reference material for amateur as well as seasoned researchers.