G.R. No.

L-63915 April 24, 1985

LORENZO M. TAÑADA, ABRAHAM F. SARMIENTO, and MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR

BROTHERHOOD, INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC. [MABINI], petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUAN C. TUVERA, in his capacity as Executive Assistant to the President, HON.
JOAQUIN VENUS, in his capacity as Deputy Executive Assistant to the President ,
MELQUIADES P. DE LA CRUZ, in his capacity as Director, Malacañang Records Office, and
FLORENDO S. PABLO, in his capacity as Director, Bureau of Printing, respondents.

ESCOLIN, J.:

Invoking the people's right to be informed on matters of public concern, a right recognized in Section
6, Article IV of the 1973 Philippine Constitution,   as well as the principle that laws to be valid and
1

enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette or otherwise effectively promulgated,

petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish, and/or cause
the publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general
orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation and administrative orders.

Specifically, the publication of the following presidential issuances is sought:

a] Presidential Decrees Nos. 12, 22, 37, 38, 59, 64, 103, 171, 179, 184, 197, 200,
234, 265, 286, 298, 303, 312, 324, 325, 326, 337, 355, 358, 359, 360, 361, 368, 404,
406, 415, 427, 429, 445, 447, 473, 486, 491, 503, 504, 521, 528, 551, 566, 573, 574,
594, 599, 644, 658, 661, 718, 731, 733, 793, 800, 802, 835, 836, 923, 935, 961,
1017-1030, 1050, 1060-1061, 1085, 1143, 1165, 1166, 1242, 1246, 1250, 1278,
1279, 1300, 1644, 1772, 1808, 1810, 1813-1817, 1819-1826, 1829-1840, 1842-
1847.

b] Letter of Instructions Nos.: 10, 39, 49, 72, 107, 108, 116, 130, 136, 141, 150, 153,
155, 161, 173, 180, 187, 188, 192, 193, 199, 202, 204, 205, 209, 211-213, 215-224,
226-228, 231-239, 241-245, 248, 251, 253-261, 263-269, 271-273, 275-283, 285-
289, 291, 293, 297-299, 301-303, 309, 312-315, 325, 327, 343, 346, 349, 357, 358,
362, 367, 370, 382, 385, 386, 396-397, 405, 438-440, 444- 445, 473, 486, 488, 498,
501, 399, 527, 561, 576, 587, 594, 599, 600, 602, 609, 610, 611, 612, 615, 641, 642,
 665, 702, 712-713, 726, 837-839, 878-879, 881, 882, 939-940, 964,997,1149-
1178,1180-1278.

c] General Orders Nos.: 14, 52, 58, 59, 60, 62, 63, 64 & 65.

d] Proclamation Nos.: 1126, 1144, 1147, 1151, 1196, 1270, 1281, 1319-1526, 1529,
1532, 1535, 1538, 1540-1547, 1550-1558, 1561-1588, 1590-1595, 1594-1600, 1606-
1609, 1612-1628, 1630-1649, 1694-1695, 1697-1701, 1705-1723, 1731-1734, 1737-
1742, 1744, 1746-1751, 1752, 1754, 1762, 1764-1787, 1789-1795, 1797, 1800,
1802-1804, 1806-1807, 1812-1814, 1816, 1825-1826, 1829, 1831-1832, 1835-1836,
1839-1840, 1843-1844, 1846-1847, 1849, 1853-1858, 1860, 1866, 1868, 1870,
1876-1889, 1892, 1900, 1918, 1923, 1933, 1952, 1963, 1965-1966, 1968-1984,
1986-2028, 2030-2044, 2046-2145, 2147-2161, 2163-2244.

e] Executive Orders Nos.: 411, 413, 414, 427, 429-454, 457- 471, 474-492, 494-507,
509-510, 522, 524-528, 531-532, 536, 538, 543-544, 549, 551-553, 560, 563, 567-
568, 570, 574, 593, 594, 598-604, 609, 611- 647, 649-677, 679-703, 705-707, 712-
786, 788-852, 854-857.

f] Letters of Implementation Nos.: 7, 8, 9, 10, 11-22, 25-27, 39, 50, 51, 59, 76, 80-81,
92, 94, 95, 107, 120, 122, 123.

g] Administrative Orders Nos.: 347, 348, 352-354, 360- 378, 380-433, 436-439.

The respondents, through the Solicitor General, would have this case dismissed outright on the
ground that petitioners have no legal personality or standing to bring the instant petition. The view is
submitted that in the absence of any showing that petitioners are personally and directly affected or
prejudiced by the alleged non-publication of the presidential issuances in question   said petitioners
2

are without the requisite legal personality to institute this mandamus proceeding, they are not being
"aggrieved parties" within the meaning of Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which we quote:

SEC. 3. Petition for Mandamus.—When any tribunal, corporation, board or person

unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a
duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the
use a rd enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, and there is no
other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the person
aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court alleging the facts
 with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the defendant,
immediately or at some other specified time, to do the act required to be done to
Protect the rights of the petitioner, and to pay the damages sustained by the
petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts of the defendant.

Upon the other hand, petitioners maintain that since the subject of the petition concerns a public
right and its object is to compel the performance of a public duty, they need not show any specific
interest for their petition to be given due course.

The issue posed is not one of first impression. As early as the 1910 case of Severino vs. Governor
General,   this Court held that while the general rule is that "a writ of mandamus would be granted to
3

a private individual only in those cases where he has some private or particular interest to be
subserved, or some particular right to be protected, independent of that which he holds with the
public at large," and "it is for the public officers exclusively to apply for the writ when public rights are
to be subserved [Mithchell vs. Boardmen, 79 M.e., 469]," nevertheless, "when the question is one of
public right and the object of the mandamus is to procure the enforcement of a public duty, the
people are regarded as the real party in interest and the relator at whose instigation the proceedings
are instituted need not show that he has any legal or special interest in the result, it being sufficient
to show that he is a citizen and as such interested in the execution of the laws [High, Extraordinary
Legal Remedies, 3rd ed., sec. 431].

Thus, in said case, this Court recognized the relator Lope Severino, a private individual, as a proper
party to the mandamus proceedings brought to compel the Governor General to call a special
election for the position of municipal president in the town of Silay, Negros Occidental. Speaking for
this Court, Mr. Justice Grant T. Trent said:

We are therefore of the opinion that the weight of authority supports the proposition
that the relator is a proper party to proceedings of this character when a public right
is sought to be enforced. If the general rule in America were otherwise, we think that
it would not be applicable to the case at bar for the reason 'that it is always
dangerous to apply a general rule to a particular case without keeping in mind the
reason for the rule, because, if under the particular circumstances the reason for the
rule does not exist, the rule itself is not applicable and reliance upon the rule may
well lead to error'

No reason exists in the case at bar for applying the general rule insisted upon by
counsel for the respondent. The circumstances which surround this case are different
 from those in the United States, inasmuch as if the relator is not a proper party to
these proceedings no other person could be, as we have seen that it is not the duty
of the law officer of the Government to appear and represent the people in cases of
this character.

The reasons given by the Court in recognizing a private citizen's legal personality in the
aforementioned case apply squarely to the present petition. Clearly, the right sought to be enforced
by petitioners herein is a public right recognized by no less than the fundamental law of the land. If
petitioners were not allowed to institute this proceeding, it would indeed be difficult to conceive of
any other person to initiate the same, considering that the Solicitor General, the government officer
generally empowered to represent the people, has entered his appearance for respondents in this
case.

Respondents further contend that publication in the Official Gazette is not a sine qua non
requirement for the effectivity of laws where the laws themselves provide for their own effectivity
dates. It is thus submitted that since the presidential issuances in question contain special provisions
as to the date they are to take effect, publication in the Official Gazette is not indispensable for their
effectivity. The point stressed is anchored on Article 2 of the Civil Code:

Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their
publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided, ...

The interpretation given by respondent is in accord with this Court's construction of said article. In a
long line of decisions,  this Court has ruled that publication in the Official Gazette is necessary in
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those cases where the legislation itself does not provide for its effectivity date-for then the date of
publication is material for determining its date of effectivity, which is the fifteenth day following its
publication-but not when the law itself provides for the date when it goes into effect.

Respondents' argument, however, is logically correct only insofar as it equates the effectivity of laws
with the fact of publication. Considered in the light of other statutes applicable to the issue at hand,
the conclusion is easily reached that said Article 2 does not preclude the requirement of publication
in the Official Gazette, even if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity. Thus, Section 1 of
Commonwealth Act 638 provides as follows:

Section 1. There shall be published in the Official Gazette [1] all important legisiative
acts and resolutions of a public nature of the, Congress of the Philippines; [2] all
executive and administrative orders and proclamations, except such as have no
 general applicability; [3] decisions or abstracts of decisions of the Supreme Court
and the Court of Appeals as may be deemed by said courts of sufficient importance
to be so published; [4] such documents or classes of documents as may be required
so to be published by law; and [5] such documents or classes of documents as the
President of the Philippines shall determine from time to time to have general
applicability and legal effect, or which he may authorize so to be published. ...

The clear object of the above-quoted provision is to give the general public adequate notice of the
various laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. Without such notice and
publication, there would be no basis for the application of the maxim "ignorantia legis non excusat."
It would be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a
law of which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.

Perhaps at no time since the establishment of the Philippine Republic has the publication of laws
taken so vital significance that at this time when the people have bestowed upon the President a
power heretofore enjoyed solely by the legislature. While the people are kept abreast by the mass
media of the debates and deliberations in the Batasan Pambansa—and for the diligent ones, ready
access to the legislative records—no such publicity accompanies the law-making process of the
President. Thus, without publication, the people have no means of knowing what presidential
decrees have actually been promulgated, much less a definite way of informing themselves of the
specific contents and texts of such decrees. As the Supreme Court of Spain ruled: "Bajo la
denominacion generica de leyes, se comprenden tambien los reglamentos, Reales decretos,
Instrucciones, Circulares y Reales ordines dictadas de conformidad con las mismas por el Gobierno
en uso de su potestad. 5

The very first clause of Section I of Commonwealth Act 638 reads: "There shall be published in the
Official Gazette ... ." The word "shall" used therein imposes upon respondent officials an imperative
duty. That duty must be enforced if the Constitutional right of the people to be informed on matters of
public concern is to be given substance and reality. The law itself makes a list of what should be
published in the Official Gazette. Such listing, to our mind, leaves respondents with no discretion
whatsoever as to what must be included or excluded from such publication.

The publication of all presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is
mandated by law. Obviously, presidential decrees that provide for fines, forfeitures or penalties for
their violation or otherwise impose a burden or. the people, such as tax and revenue measures, fall
within this category. Other presidential issuances which apply only to particular persons or class of
persons such as administrative and executive orders need not be published on the assumption that
they have been circularized to all concerned.  6

It is needless to add that the publication of presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general
applicability" is a requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound
by law, he must first be officially and specifically informed of its contents. As Justice Claudio
Teehankee said in Peralta vs. COMELEC  : 7

In a time of proliferating decrees, orders and letters of instructions which all form part
of the law of the land, the requirement of due process and the Rule of Law demand
that the Official Gazette as the official government repository promulgate and publish
the texts of all such decrees, orders and instructions so that the people may know
where to obtain their official and specific contents.

The Court therefore declares that presidential issuances of general application, which have not been
published, shall have no force and effect. Some members of the Court, quite apprehensive about the
possible unsettling effect this decision might have on acts done in reliance of the validity of those
presidential decrees which were published only during the pendency of this petition, have put the
question as to whether the Court's declaration of invalidity apply to P.D.s which had been enforced
or implemented prior to their publication. The answer is all too familiar. In similar situations in the
past this Court had taken the pragmatic and realistic course set forth in Chicot County Drainage
District vs. Baxter Bank   to wit:
8

The courts below have proceeded on the theory that the Act of Congress, having
been found to be unconstitutional, was not a law; that it was inoperative, conferring
no rights and imposing no duties, and hence affording no basis for the challenged
decree. Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425, 442; Chicago, 1. & L. Ry. Co. v.
Hackett, 228 U.S. 559, 566. It is quite clear, however, that such broad statements as
to the effect of a determination of unconstitutionality must be taken with
qualifications. The actual existence of a statute, prior to such a determination, is an
operative fact and may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The past
cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The effect of the subsequent
ruling as to invalidity may have to be considered in various aspects-with respect to
particular conduct, private and official. Questions of rights claimed to have become
vested, of status, of prior determinations deemed to have finality and acted upon
accordingly, of public policy in the light of the nature both of the statute and of its
 previous application, demand examination. These questions are among the most
difficult of those which have engaged the attention of courts, state and federal and it
is manifest from numerous decisions that an all-inclusive statement of a principle of
absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified.

Consistently with the above principle, this Court in Rutter vs. Esteban   sustained the right of a party
9

under the Moratorium Law, albeit said right had accrued in his favor before said law was declared
unconstitutional by this Court.

Similarly, the implementation/enforcement of presidential decrees prior to their publication in the

Official Gazette is "an operative fact which may have consequences which cannot be justly ignored.
The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration ... that an all-inclusive statement of a
principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified."

From the report submitted to the Court by the Clerk of Court, it appears that of the presidential
decrees sought by petitioners to be published in the Official Gazette, only Presidential Decrees Nos.
1019 to 1030, inclusive, 1278, and 1937 to 1939, inclusive, have not been so published.   Neither
10

the subject matters nor the texts of these PDs can be ascertained since no copies thereof are
available. But whatever their subject matter may be, it is undisputed that none of these unpublished
PDs has ever been implemented or enforced by the government. In Pesigan vs. Angeles,   the 11

Court, through Justice Ramon Aquino, ruled that "publication is necessary to apprise the public of
the contents of [penal] regulations and make the said penalties binding on the persons affected
thereby. " The cogency of this holding is apparently recognized by respondent officials considering
the manifestation in their comment that "the government, as a matter of policy, refrains from
prosecuting violations of criminal laws until the same shall have been published in the Official
Gazette or in some other publication, even though some criminal laws provide that they shall take
effect immediately.

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish in the Official Gazette all
unpublished presidential issuances which are of general application, and unless so published, they
shall have no binding force and effect.

SO ORDERED.

Relova, J., concurs.

Aquino, J., took no part.

Concepcion, Jr., J., is on leave.

Separate Opinions

FERNANDO, C.J., concurring (with qualification):

There is on the whole acceptance on my part of the views expressed in the ably written opinion of
Justice Escolin. I am unable, however, to concur insofar as it would unqualifiedly impose the
requirement of publication in the Official Gazette for unpublished "presidential issuances" to have
binding force and effect.

I shall explain why.

1. It is of course true that without the requisite publication, a due process question would arise if
made to apply adversely to a party who is not even aware of the existence of any legislative or
executive act having the force and effect of law. My point is that such publication required need not
be confined to the Official Gazette. From the pragmatic standpoint, there is an advantage to be
gained. It conduces to certainty. That is too be admitted. It does not follow, however, that failure to
do so would in all cases and under all circumstances result in a statute, presidential decree or any
other executive act of the same category being bereft of any binding force and effect. To so hold
would, for me, raise a constitutional question. Such a pronouncement would lend itself to the
interpretation that such a legislative or presidential act is bereft of the attribute of effectivity unless
published in the Official Gazette. There is no such requirement in the Constitution as Justice Plana
so aptly pointed out. It is true that what is decided now applies only to past "presidential issuances".
Nonetheless, this clarification is, to my mind, needed to avoid any possible misconception as to what
is required for any statute or presidential act to be impressed with binding force or effectivity.

2. It is quite understandable then why I concur in the separate opinion of Justice Plana. Its first
paragraph sets forth what to me is the constitutional doctrine applicable to this case. Thus: "The
Philippine Constitution does not require the publication of laws as a prerequisite for their effectivity,
unlike some Constitutions elsewhere. It may be said though that the guarantee of due process
requires notice of laws to affected Parties before they can be bound thereby; but such notice is not
necessarily by publication in the Official Gazette. The due process clause is not that precise.   I am
1

likewise in agreement with its closing paragraph: "In fine, I concur in the majority decision to the
extent that it requires notice before laws become effective, for no person should be bound by a law
without notice. This is elementary fairness. However, I beg to disagree insofar as it holds that such
notice shall be by publication in the Official Gazette. 2

3. It suffices, as was stated by Judge Learned Hand, that law as the command of the government
"must be ascertainable in some form if it is to be enforced at all.   It would indeed be to reduce it to
3

the level of mere futility, as pointed out by Justice Cardozo, "if it is unknown and
unknowable.   Publication, to repeat, is thus essential. What I am not prepared to subscribe to is the
4

doctrine that it must be in the Official Gazette. To be sure once published therein there is the
ascertainable mode of determining the exact date of its effectivity. Still for me that does not dispose
of the question of what is the jural effect of past presidential decrees or executive acts not so
published. For prior thereto, it could be that parties aware of their existence could have conducted
themselves in accordance with their provisions. If no legal consequences could attach due to lack of
publication in the Official Gazette, then serious problems could arise. Previous transactions based
on such "Presidential Issuances" could be open to question. Matters deemed settled could still be
inquired into. I am not prepared to hold that such an effect is contemplated by our decision. Where
such presidential decree or executive act is made the basis of a criminal prosecution, then, of
course, its ex post facto character becomes evident.   In civil cases though, retroactivity as such is
5

not conclusive on the due process aspect. There must still be a showing of arbitrariness. Moreover,
where the challenged presidential decree or executive act was issued under the police power, the
non-impairment clause of the Constitution may not always be successfully invoked. There must still
be that process of balancing to determine whether or not it could in such a case be tainted by
infirmity.   In traditional terminology, there could arise then a question of unconstitutional application.
6

That is as far as it goes.

4. Let me make therefore that my qualified concurrence goes no further than to affirm that
publication is essential to the effectivity of a legislative or executive act of a general application. I am
not in agreement with the view that such publication must be in the Official Gazette. The Civil Code
itself in its Article 2 expressly recognizes that the rule as to laws taking effect after fifteen days
following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette is subject to this exception,
"unless it is otherwise provided." Moreover, the Civil Code is itself only a legislative enactment,
Republic Act No. 386. It does not and cannot have the juridical force of a constitutional command. A
later legislative or executive act which has the force and effect of law can legally provide for a
different rule.
5. Nor can I agree with the rather sweeping conclusion in the opinion of Justice Escolin that
presidential decrees and executive acts not thus previously published in the Official Gazette would
be devoid of any legal character. That would be, in my opinion, to go too far. It may be fraught, as
earlier noted, with undesirable consequences. I find myself therefore unable to yield assent to such a
pronouncement.

I am authorized to state that Justices Makasiar, Abad Santos, Cuevas, and Alampay concur in this
separate opinion.

Makasiar, Abad Santos, Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.

TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:

I concur with the main opinion of Mr. Justice Escolin and the concurring opinion of Mme. Justice
Herrera. The Rule of Law connotes a body of norms and laws published and ascertainable and of
equal application to all similarly circumstances and not subject to arbitrary change but only under
certain set procedures. The Court has consistently stressed that "it is an elementary rule of fair play
and justice that a reasonable opportunity to be informed must be afforded to the people who are
commanded to obey before they can be punished for its violation,  citing the settled principle based
1

on due process enunciated in earlier cases that "before the public is bound by its contents,
especially its penal provisions, a law, regulation or circular must first be published and the people
officially and specially informed of said contents and its penalties.

Without official publication in the Official Gazette as required by Article 2 of the Civil Code and the
Revised Administrative Code, there would be no basis nor justification for the corollary rule of Article
3 of the Civil Code (based on constructive notice that the provisions of the law are ascertainable
from the public and official repository where they are duly published) that "Ignorance of the law
excuses no one from compliance therewith.

Respondents' contention based on a misreading of Article 2 of the Civil Code that "only laws which
are silent as to their effectivity [date] need be published in the Official Gazette for their effectivity" is
manifestly untenable. The plain text and meaning of the Civil Code is that "laws shall take effect after
fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise
provided, " i.e. a different effectivity date is provided by the law itself. This proviso perforce refers to
a law that has been duly published pursuant to the basic constitutional requirements of due process.
The best example of this is the Civil Code itself: the same Article 2 provides otherwise that it "shall
take effect [only] one year [not 15 days] after such publication.   To sustain respondents' misreading
2

that "most laws or decrees specify the date of their effectivity and for this reason, publication in the
Official Gazette is not necessary for their effectivity   would be to nullify and render nugatory the Civil
3

Code's indispensable and essential requirement of prior publication in the Official Gazette by the
simple expedient of providing for immediate effectivity or an earlier effectivity date in the law
itself before the completion of 15 days following its publication which is the period generally fixed by
the Civil Code for its proper dissemination.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring:

I agree. There cannot be any question but that even if a decree provides for a date of effectivity, it
has to be published. What I would like to state in connection with that proposition is that when a date
of effectivity is mentioned in the decree but the decree becomes effective only fifteen (15) days after
its publication in the Official Gazette, it will not mean that the decree can have retroactive effect to
the date of effectivity mentioned in the decree itself. There should be no retroactivity if the
retroactivity will run counter to constitutional rights or shall destroy vested rights.

PLANA, J., concurring (with qualification):

The Philippine Constitution does not require the publication of laws as a prerequisite for their
effectivity, unlike some Constitutions elsewhere. * It may be said though that the guarantee of due process requires
notice of laws to affected parties before they can be bound thereby; but such notice is not necessarily by publication in the Official Gazette.
The due process clause is not that precise. Neither is the publication of laws in the Official Gazette required by any statute as a prerequisite
for their effectivity, if said laws already provide for their effectivity date.

Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that "laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the
completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided " Two things
may be said of this provision: Firstly, it obviously does not apply to a law with a built-in provision as
to when it will take effect. Secondly, it clearly recognizes that each law may provide not only a
different period for reckoning its effectivity date but also a different mode of notice. Thus, a law may
prescribe that it shall be published elsewhere than in the Official Gazette.
Commonwealth Act No. 638, in my opinion, does not support the proposition that for their
effectivity, laws must be published in the Official Gazette. The said law is simply "An Act to Provide
for the Uniform Publication and Distribution of the Official Gazette." Conformably therewith, it
authorizes the publication of the Official Gazette, determines its frequency, provides for its sale and
distribution, and defines the authority of the Director of Printing in relation thereto. It also enumerates
what shall be published in the Official Gazette, among them, "important legislative acts and
resolutions of a public nature of the Congress of the Philippines" and "all executive and
administrative orders and proclamations, except such as have no general applicability." It is
noteworthy that not all legislative acts are required to be published in the Official Gazette but only
"important" ones "of a public nature." Moreover, the said law does not provide that publication in the
Official Gazette is essential for the effectivity of laws. This is as it should be, for all statutes are equal
and stand on the same footing. A law, especially an earlier one of general application such as
Commonwealth Act No. 638, cannot nullify or restrict the operation of a subsequent statute that has
a provision of its own as to when and how it will take effect. Only a higher law, which is the
Constitution, can assume that role.

In fine, I concur in the majority decision to the extent that it requires notice before laws become
effective, for no person should be bound by a law without notice. This is elementary fairness.
However, I beg to disagree insofar as it holds that such notice shall be by publication in the Official
Gazette.

Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.

GUTIERREZ, Jr., J., concurring:

I concur insofar as publication is necessary but reserve my vote as to the necessity of such
publication being in the Official Gazette.

DE LA FUENTE, J., concurring:

I concur insofar as the opinion declares the unpublished decrees and issuances of a public nature or
general applicability ineffective, until due publication thereof.

G.R. No. 80718 January 29, 1988

FELIZA P. DE ROY and VIRGILIO RAMOS, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and LUIS BERNAL, SR., GLENIA BERNAL, LUIS BERNAL, JR., HEIRS
OF MARISSA BERNAL, namely, GLICERIA DELA CRUZ BERNAL and LUIS BERNAL,
SR., respondents.

RESOLUTION

CORTES, J.:

This special civil action for certiorari seeks to declare null and void two (2) resolutions of the Special First Division of the Court of Appeals in
the case of Luis Bernal, Sr., et al. v. Felisa Perdosa De Roy, et al., CA-G.R. CV No. 07286. The first resolution promulgated on 30
September 1987 denied petitioners' motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration and directed entry of judgment since the
decision in said case had become final; and the second Resolution dated 27 October 1987 denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration for
having been filed out of time.

At the outset, this Court could have denied the petition outright for not being verified as required by
Rule 65 section 1 of the Rules of Court. However, even if the instant petition did not suffer from this
defect, this Court, on procedural and substantive grounds, would still resolve to deny it.

The facts of the case are undisputed. The firewall of a burned-out building owned by petitioners
collapsed and destroyed the tailoring shop occupied by the family of private respondents, resulting in
injuries to private respondents and the death of Marissa Bernal, a daughter. Private respondents had
been warned by petitioners to vacate their shop in view of its proximity to the weakened wall but the
former failed to do so. On the basis of the foregoing facts, the Regional Trial Court. First Judicial
Region, Branch XXXVIII, presided by the Hon. Antonio M. Belen, rendered judgment finding
petitioners guilty of gross negligence and awarding damages to private respondents. On appeal, the
decision of the trial court was affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals in a decision promulgated on
August 17, 1987, a copy of which was received by petitioners on August 25, 1987. On September 9,
1987, the last day of the fifteen-day period to file an appeal, petitioners filed a motion for extension of
time to file a motion for reconsideration, which was eventually denied by the appellate court in the
Resolution of September 30, 1987. Petitioners filed their motion for reconsideration on September
24, 1987 but this was denied in the Resolution of October 27, 1987.

This Court finds that the Court of Appeals did not commit a grave abuse of discretion when it denied
petitioners' motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration, directed entry of
judgment and denied their motion for reconsideration. It correctly applied the rule laid down
in Habaluyas Enterprises, Inc. v. Japzon, [G.R. No. 70895, August 5, 1985,138 SCRA 461, that the
fifteen-day period for appealing or for filing a motion for reconsideration cannot be extended. In its
Resolution denying the motion for reconsideration, promulgated on July 30, 1986 (142 SCRA 208),
this Court en banc restated and clarified the rule, to wit:

Beginning one month after the promulgation of this Resolution, the rule shall be strictly enforced that
no motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration may be filed with the Metropolitan
or Municipal Trial Courts, the Regional Trial Courts, and the Intermediate Appellate Court. Such a
motion may be filed only in cases pending with the Supreme Court as the court of last resort, which
may in its sound discretion either grant or deny the extension requested. (at p. 212)

Lacsamana v. Second Special Cases Division of the intermediate Appellate Court, [G.R. No. 73146-
53, August 26, 1986, 143 SCRA 643], reiterated the rule and went further to restate and clarify the
modes and periods of appeal.

Bacaya v. Intermediate Appellate Court, [G.R. No. 74824, Sept. 15, 1986,144 SCRA 161],stressed
the prospective application of said rule, and explained the operation of the grace period, to wit:

In other words, there is a one-month grace period from the promulgation on May 30,
1986 of the Court's Resolution in the clarificatory Habaluyas case, or up to June 30,
1986, within which the rule barring extensions of time to file motions for new trial or
reconsideration is, as yet, not strictly enforceable.

Since petitioners herein filed their motion for extension on February 27, 1986, it is still
within the grace period, which expired on June 30, 1986, and may still be allowed.

This grace period was also applied in Mission v. Intermediate Appellate Court [G.R. No. 73669,
October 28, 1986, 145 SCRA 306].]

In the instant case, however, petitioners' motion for extension of time was filed on September 9,
1987, more than a year after the expiration of the grace period on June 30, 1986. Hence, it is no
longer within the coverage of the grace period. Considering the length of time from the expiration of
the grace period to the promulgation of the decision of the Court of Appeals on August 25, 1987,
petitioners cannot seek refuge in the ignorance of their counsel regarding said rule for their failure to
file a motion for reconsideration within the reglementary period.
Petitioners contend that the rule enunciated in the Habaluyas case should not be made to apply to
the case at bar owing to the non-publication of the Habaluyas decision in the Official Gazette as of
the time the subject decision of the Court of Appeals was promulgated. Contrary to petitioners' view,
there is no law requiring the publication of Supreme Court decisions in the Official Gazette before
they can be binding and as a condition to their becoming effective. It is the bounden duty of counsel
as lawyer in active law practice to keep abreast of decisions of the Supreme Court particularly where
issues have been clarified, consistently reiterated, and published in the advance reports of Supreme
Court decisions (G. R. s) and in such publications as the Supreme Court Reports Annotated (SCRA)
and law journals.

This Court likewise finds that the Court of Appeals committed no grave abuse of discretion in
affirming the trial court's decision holding petitioner liable under Article 2190 of the Civil Code, which
provides that "the proprietor of a building or structure is responsible for the damage resulting from its
total or partial collapse, if it should be due to the lack of necessary repairs.

Nor was there error in rejecting petitioners argument that private respondents hwad the "last clear
chance" to avoid the accident if only they heeded the. warning to vacate the tailoring shop and ,
therefore, petitioners prior negligence should be disregarded, since the doctrine of "last clear
chance," which has been applied to vehicular accidents, is inapplicable to this case.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court Resolved to DENY the instant petition for lack of
merit.

Fernan (Chairman), Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano and Bidin, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 105364*            June 28, 2001

PHILIPPINE VETERANS BANK EMPLOYEES UNION-N.U.B.E. and PERFECTO V.

FERNANDEZ, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE BENJAMIN VEGA, Presiding Judge of Branch 39 of the REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT of Manila, the CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE LIQUIDATOR OF THE
PHILIPPINE VETERANS BANK, respondents

KAPUNAN, J.:
May a liquidation court continue with liquidation proceedings of the Philippine Veterans Bank (PVB)
when Congress had mandated its rehabilitation and reopening?

This is the sole issue raised in the instant Petition for Prohibition with Petition for Preliminary
Injunction and application for Ex Parte Temporary Restraining Order.

The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:

Sometime in 1985, the Central Bank of the Philippines (Central Bank, for brevity) filed with Branch
39 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila a Petition for Assistance in the Liquidation of the Philippine
Veterans Bank, the same docketed as Case No. SP-32311. Thereafter, the Philipppine Veterans
Bank Employees Union-N.U.B.E., herein petitioner, represented by petitioner Perfecto V. Fernandez,
filed claims for accrued and unpaid employee wages and benefits with said court in SP-32311.1

After lengthy proceedings, partial payment of the sums due to the employees were made. However,
due to the piecemeal hearings on the benefits, many remain unpaid.2

On March 8, 1991, petitioners moved to disqualify the respondent judge from hearing the above
case on grounds of bias and hostility towards petitioners. 3

On January 2, 1992, the Congress enacted Republic Act No. 7169 providing for the rehabilitation of
the Philippine Veterans Bank.4

Thereafter, petitioners filed with the labor tribunals their residual claims for benefits and for
reinstatement upon reopening of the bank.5

Sometime in May 1992, the Central Bank issued a certificate of authority allowing the PVB to
reopen.6

Despite the legislative mandate for rehabilitation and reopening of PVB, respondent judge continued
with the liquidation proceedings of the bank. Moreover, petitioners learned that respondents were set
to order the payment and release of employee benefits upon motion of another lawyer, while
petitioners’ claims have been frozen to their prejudice.

Hence, the instant petition.

Petitioners argue that with the passage of R.A. 7169, the liquidation court became functus officio,
and no longer had the authority to continue with liquidation proceedings.
In a Resolution, dated June 8, 1992, the Supreme Court resolved to issue a Temporary Restraining
Order enjoining the trial court from further proceeding with the case.

On June 22, 1992, VOP Security & Detective Agency (VOPSDA) and its 162 security guards filed a
Motion for Intervention with prayer that they be excluded from the operation of the Temporary
Restraining Order issued by the Court. They alleged that they had filed a motion before Branch 39 of
the RTC of Manila, in SP-No. 32311, praying that said court order PVB to pay their backwages and
salary differentials by authority of R.A. No 6727, Wage Orders No. NCR-01 and NCR-01-Ad and
Wage Orders No. NCR-02 and NCR-02-A; and, that said court, in an Order dated June 5, 1992,
approved therein movants’ case and directed the bank liquidator or PVB itself to pay the backwages
and differentials in accordance with the computation incorporated in the order. Said intervenors
likewise manifested that there was an error in the computation of the monetary benefits due them.

On August 18, 1992, petitioners, pursuant to the Resolution of this Court, dated July 6, 1992, filed
their Comment opposing the Motion for Leave to File Intervention and for exclusion from the
operation of the T.R.O. on the grounds that the movants have no legal interest in the subject matter
of the pending action; that allowing intervention would only cause delay in the proceedings; and that
the motion to exclude the movants from the T.R.O. is without legal basis and would render moot the
relief sought in the petition.

On September 3, 1992, the PVB filed a Petition-In-Intervention praying for the issuance of the writs
of certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court in connection with the issuance by
respondent judge of several orders involving acts of liquidation of PVB even after the effectivity of
R.A. No. 7169. PVB further alleges that respondent judge clearly acted in excess of or without
jurisdiction when he issued the questioned orders.

We find for the petitioners.

Republic Act No. 7169 entitled "An Act To Rehabilitate The Philippine Veterans Bank Created Under
Republic Act No. 3518, Providing The Mechanisms Therefor, And For Other Purposes", which was
signed into law by President Corazon C. Aquino on January 2, 1992 and which was published in the
Official Gazette on February 24, 1992, provides in part for the reopening of the Philippine Veterans
Bank together with all its branches within the period of three (3) years from the date of the reopening
of the head office.7 The law likewise provides for the creation of a rehabilitation committee in order to
facilitate the implementation of the provisions of the same. 8
Pursuant to said R.A. No. 7169, the Rehabilitation Committee submitted the proposed Rehabilitation
Plan of the PVB to the Monetary Board for its approval. Meanwhile, PVB filed a Motion to Terminate
Liquidation of Philippine Veterans Bank dated March 13, 1992 with the respondent judge praying
that the liquidation proceedings be immediately terminated in view of the passage of R.A. No. 7169.

On April 10, 1992, the Monetary Board issued Monetary Board Resolution No. 348 which approved
the Rehabilitation Plan submitted by the Rehabilitaion Committee.

Thereafter, the Monetary Board issued a Certificate of Authority allowing PVB to reopen.

On June 3, 1992, the liquidator filed A Motion for the Termination of the Liquidation Proceedings of
the Philippine Veterans Bank with the respondent judge.

As stated above, the Court, in a Resolution dated June 8, 1992, issued a temporary restraining order
in the instant case restraining respondent judge from further proceeding with the liquidation of PVB.

On August 3, 1992, the Philippine Veterans Bank opened its doors to the public and started regular
banking operations.

Clearly, the enactment of Republic Act No. 7169, as well as the subsequent developments has
rendered the liquidation court functus officio. Consequently, respondent judge has been stripped of
the authority to issue orders involving acts of liquidation.

Liquidation, in corporation law, connotes a winding up or settling with creditors and debtors.9 It is the
winding up of a corporation so that assets are distributed to those entitled to receive them. It is the
process of reducing assets to cash, discharging liabilities and dividing surplus or loss.

On the opposite end of the spectrum is rehabilitation which connotes a reopening or reorganization.
Rehabilitation contemplates a continuance of corporate life and activities in an effort to restore and
reinstate the corporation to its former position of successful operation and solvency. 10

It is crystal clear that the concept of liquidation is diametrically opposed or contrary to the concept of
rehabilitation, such that both cannot be undertaken at the same time. To allow the liquidation
proceedings to continue would seriously hinder the rehabilitation of the subject bank.

Anent the claim of respondents Central Bank and Liquidator of PVB that R.A. No. 7169 became
effective only on March 10, 1992 or fifteen (15) days after its publication in the Official Gazette; and,
the contention of intervenors VOP Security, et. al. that the effectivity of said law is conditioned on the
approval of a rehabilitation plan by the Monetary Board, among others, the Court is of the view that
both contentions are bereft of merit.

While as a rule, laws take effect after fifteen (15) days following the completion of their publication in
the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines, the legislature has the
authority to provide for exceptions, as indicated in the clause "unless otherwise provided."

In the case at bar, Section 10 of R.A. No. 7169 provides:

Sec. 10. Effectivity. - This Act shall take effect upon its approval.

Hence, it is clear that the legislature intended to make the law effective immediately upon its
approval. It is undisputed that R.A. No. 7169 was signed into law by President Corazon C. Aquino on
January 2, 1992. Therefore, said law became effective on said date.

Assuming for the sake of argument that publication is necessary for the effectivity of R.A. No. 7169,
then it became legally effective on February 24, 1992, the date when the same was published in the
Official Gazette, and not on March 10, 1992, as erroneously claimed by respondents Central Bank
and Liquidator.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is hereby GIVEN DUE COURSE and
GRANTED. Respondent Judge is hereby PERMANENTLY ENJOINED from further proceeding with
Civil Case No. SP- 32311.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno, Pardo, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.

* This case was transferred to the ponente pursuant to the resolution in AM No. 00-9-03-SC. Re:
Creation of Special Committee on Case Backlog dated February 27, 2001.

G.R. No. 147817             August 12, 2004

FELICISIMO RIETA, petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
 DECISION

PANGANIBAN, J.:

Corpus delicti refers to the fact of the commission of the crime. It may be proven by the credible
testimonies of witnesses, not necessarily by physical evidence. In-court identification of the offender
is not essential, as long as the identity of the accused is determined with certainty by relevant
evidence. In the present case, there is no doubt that petitioner was the same person apprehended
by the authorities and mentioned in the Information. His possession of the smuggled cigarettes
carried the prima facie presumption that he was engaged in smuggling. Having failed to rebut this
presumption, he may thus be convicted of the crime charged.

The Case

Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to set aside the
1 

December 22, 2000 Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CR No. 17338. The CA
2 

affirmed with modification the February 18, 1994 Consolidated Judgment of the Regional Trial Court
3 

(RTC) of Manila (Branch 46) in Criminal Case Nos. CCC-VI-137(79) and CCC-VI-138(79), finding
4 

Felicisimo Rieta guilty of smuggling. The assailed CA Decision disposed as follows:

"WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision is hereby MODIFIED as follows:

(a) The Court AFFIRMS the decision of the trial court finding Felicisimo Rieta, Arturo
Rimorin, Pacifico Teruel and Carmelo Manaois GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT of the crime charged.

(b) Appellants Ernesto Miaco, Guillermo Ferrer, Fidel Balita, Robartolo Alincastre and
Ernesto de Castro are ACQUITTED as recommended by the Solicitor General." 5

Reconsideration was denied in the April 16, 2001 CA Resolution, which petitioner also assails.
6 
Petitioner and his six co-accused -- Arturo Rimorin, Fidel Balita, Gonzalo Vargas, Robartolo
Alincastre, Guillermo Ferrer and Ernesto Miaco -- were charged in an Information, which reads:

"That on or about October 15, 1979, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused,
conspiring and confederating together and helping one another, with the evident intent to
defraud the government of the Republic of the Philippines of the legitimate duties accruing to
it from merchandise imported into this country, did then and there [willfully], unlawfully [and]
fraudulently import or bring into the Philippines or assist in so doing contrary to law, three
hundred five (305) cases of assorted brands of blue seal cigarettes which are foreign articles
valued at P513,663.47 including duties and taxes, and/or buy, sell, transport or assist and
facilitate the buying, selling and transporting of the above-named foreign articles after
importation knowing the same to have been imported contrary to law which was found in the
possession of said accused and under their control which articles said accused fully well
knew have not been properly declared and that the duties and specific taxes thereon have
not been paid to the proper authorities in violation of said Sec. 3601 of the Tariff and
Customs Code of the Philippines, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 34, in relation to
Sec. 3602 of said Code and Sec. 184 of the National Internal Revenue Code." 7

The Facts
Version of the Prosecution (Respondent)

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) presents the prosecution's version of the facts as follows:
8 

"On October 12, 1979, Col. Panfilo Lacson, the[n] Chief of the Police Intelligence Branch of
the Metrocom Intelligence and Security Group (MISG for brevity), received information that
certain syndicated groups were engaged in smuggling activities somewhere in Port Area,
Manila. It was further revealed that the activities [were being] done at nighttime and the
smuggled goods in a delivery panel and delivery truck [were] being escorted by some police
and military personnel. He fielded three surveillance stake-out teams the following night
along Roxas Boulevard and Bonifacio Drive near Del Pan Bridge, whereby they were to
watch out for a cargo truck with Plate No. T-SY-167 bound for Malabon. Nothing came out of
it. On the basis of his investigation, [it was discovered that] the truck was registered in the
name of Teresita Estacio of Pasay City.

"At around 9:00 o'clock in the evening of October 14, 1979, Col. Lacson and his men
returned to the same area, with Col. Lacson posting himself at the immediate vicinity of the
2nd COSAC Detachment in Port Area, Manila, because as per information given to him, the
said cargo truck will come out from the premises of the 2nd COSAC Detachment. COSAC
stands for Constabulary Off-Shore Anti-Crime Battalion. The night watch lasted till the wee
hours of the following morning. About 3:00 a.m. an Isuzu panel came out from the place of
the 2nd COSAC Detachment. It returned before 4:00 a.m. of [the] same day.

"At around 5 minutes before 4:00 o'clock that morning, a green cargo truck with Plate No. T-
SY-167 came out from the 2nd COSAC Detachment followed and escorted closely by a light
brown Toyota Corona car with Plate No. GR-433 and with 4 men on board. At that time, Lt.
Col. Panfilo Lacson had no information whatsoever about the car, so he gave an order by
radio to his men to intercept only the cargo truck. The cargo truck was intercepted. Col.
Lacson noticed that the Toyota car following the cargo truck suddenly made a sharp U-turn
towards the North, unlike the cargo truck [that] was going south. Almost by impulse, Col.
Lacson's car also made a U-turn and gave chase to the speeding Toyota car, which was
running between 100 KPH to 120 KPH. Col. Lacson sounded his siren. The chase lasted for
less than 5 minutes until said car made a stop along Bonifacio Drive, at the foot of Del Pan
Bridge. Col. Lacson and his men searched the car and they found several firearms,
particularly: three (3) .45 cal. Pistols and one (1) armalite M-16 rifle. He also discovered that
T/Sgt. Ernesto Miaco was the driver of the Toyota car, and his companions inside the car
were Sgt. Guillermo Ferrer, Sgt. Fidel Balita and Sgt. Robartolo Alincastre, [all] belonging to
the 2nd COSAC Detachment. They were found not to be equipped with mission orders.

"When the cargo truck with Plate No. T-SY-167 was searched, 305 cases of blue seal or
untaxed cigarettes were found inside. The cargo truck driver known only as 'Boy' was able to
escape while the other passengers or riders of said truck were apprehended, namely: Police
Sgt. Arturo Rimorin of Pasay City Police Force, Pat. Felicisimo Rieta of Kawit Police Force,
and Gonzalo Vargas, a civilian.

"x x x       x x x       x x x

"Lacson's men hauled the intercepted vehicles, the arrested men and confiscated goods to
Camp Crame, Quezon City. All the 371 cases (305 + 66) of blue seal cigarettes were turned
over to the Bureau of Customs. Sgt. Bienvenido Balaba executed an Affidavit of Arrest
together with Arnel Acuba. The Booking and Information Sheet of Ernesto de Castro showed
that he was arrested by the MISG after delivering assorted blue seal cigarettes at 185
Sanciangco St., Tonsuya, Malabon." 9

Version of the Defense (Petitioner)

Petitioner, on the other hand, denied any knowledge of the alleged smuggling of the blue-seal
cigarettes. He sets forth his version of the facts as follows:

"Petitioner Rieta testified that he was a policeman assigned at Kawit Cavite. In the early
morning of October 15, 1979, he was in Manila together with Boy. He met Boy in 1978 when
the latter figured in a vehicular accident in Kawit, Cavite. x x x After a week, Boy visited him
at the Kawit Police Station and thereafter, met him four to five times. He learned that Boy
was a businessman hauling slippers, fish and vegetables from Divisoria. For several times,
he had accompanied Boy on his business trips when [the latter] hauled fish, vegetables and
slippers from Divisoria to Cavite. He was requested by Boy to accompany him on his various
trips because there were times when policemen on patrol were demanding money from [the
latter]. At other times, other policemen accompanied Boy aside from him, on his trips.

"In the early morning of October 15, 1979 he met Boy in front of the Kawit Town Hall. He
learned that Boy will haul household appliances from Divisoria. They boarded a jeep driven
by Boy and they proceeded to Cartimar, Pasay City. At Cartimar, Boy left him at a gasoline
station, and told him to standby because Boy will get the cargo truck they will use. When Boy
returned, he had companions, who were introduced to him as Gonzalo Vargas and Sgt.
Rimorin, the petitioner's co-accused in Criminal Case No. CC-VI-138 (79). From Cartimar,
the four (4) of them proceeded to Divisoria and they passed under the Del Pan Bridge. While
passing therein, he told Boy that he was hungry, so that when they passed by a small
restaurant, he alighted and Sgt. Rimorin followed. Boy told them that he and Gonzalo will
proceed to the Port Area and will be back. After thirty to forty five minutes, Boy and Gonzalo
returned, and he and Sgt. Rimorin boarded the truck and proceeded to Roxas Boulevard.
While they were along Roxas Boulevard near the Daily Express Building, two (2) vehicles
intercepted them and ordered them to pull-over. The passengers of the said vehicles
introduced themselves as Metrocom soldiers, and ordered them to alight and to raise their
hands while poking guns at them. They were ordered to l[ie down] flat on their belly on the
pavement and were bodily frisked and searched. The Metrocom soldiers did not find
anything from their bodies. Thereafter, they (Rieta, Rimorin and Gonzalo) were ordered by
the Metrocom soldiers to transfer to a jeep. While they were aboard the jeep, he overheard
from the Metrocom soldiers that their driver was able to escape. Likewise, they were also
informed by the Metrocom soldiers that the cargo truck was loaded with blue seal cigarettes.
The cargo truck was not opened in their presence, nor were the contents thereof shown to
them upon their apprehension. From the time he boarded the cargo truck in Cartimar until he
and Sgt. Rimorin alighted to take their snacks, up to the time they were apprehended by the
Metrocom soldiers, he had not seen a pack of blue cigarette in the cargo truck. He did not
notice whether the Metrocom soldiers opened the cargo truck. At Camp Crame, he was
investigated without the benefit of counsel, but, nonetheless, he executed and signed a
statement because as far as he was concerned he has done nothing wrong. He was
detained at Bicutan for more than a year.

"In the early morning of October 15, 1979 he was not carrying any firearm because he has
no mission order to do so, and besides Manila was not his jurisdiction. He was suspended
from the service, but was reinstated in January 1981. After he was released from Bicutan, he
looked for Boy so that he could clear the matter, but he [did not find] Boy anymore.

"In corroboration with the testimony of petitioner Rieta, accused Rimorin, a policeman
assigned at Pasay City, testified that the first time he met Boy was in 1978 in the wake and
internment of the Late Police Officer Ricardo Escobal. Thereafter, Boy dropped by on several
occasions at the Pasay Police Station to request for assistance. Prior to October 15, 1979,
Boy again dropped by at the police station and asked him if he had an appointment on the
next day. He told Boy that he had no appointment, and the latter requested to accompany
him to Sta. Maria, Bulacan to get some rice. Prior thereto, in one of their casual
conversations, he learned that Boy was a businessman engaged in hauling various
merchandise. He agreed to the request of Boy to accompany him to Sta. Maria, Bulacan. At
Sta. Maria, Bulacan, they proceeded to a warehouse containing bags of rice, and they
hauled several bags into a truck, and thereafter, proceed[ed] to Quezon City. As
compensation Boy gave him a sack of rice. The said transaction was followed by another on
October 15, 1979. In the afternoon of October 14, 1979, Boy again dropped by at the police
station and requested him to accompany him to haul household fixtures. They usually haul
vegetables and rice early in the morning to avoid the traffic and that was the reason why they
met in the early morning of October 15, 1979. He told [Boy] that he will see if he will have
[the] time, but just the same they made arrangements that they will see each other at
Cartimar, Pasay City not later than 2:30 a.m. in the early morning of October 15, 1979. At the
appointed time and place, he met Boy with a companion, who was introduced to him as
Gonzalo Vargas, his co-accused in the instant case. Thereafter, they proceeded to a
gasoline station nearby. At the gasoline station, at the corner of Taylo and Taft Avenue, near
Cartimar, they picked up another person who was later on introduced to him as Felicisimo
Rieta. Then the four of them (Boy, Gonzalo, Rieta and Rimorin) boarded the cargo truck and
they proceeded to Divisoria. It was Boy who drove the cargo truck, while petitioner was
seated next to Boy while accused Rimorin and Gonzalo to his right. While enroute to
Divisoria, along Roxas Boulevard before reaching Del Pan Bridge, Boy turned right under the
bridge. He commented that it was not the route to Divisoria, and Boy answered 'meron lang
ikakarga dito'. On the other hand, Rieta told Boy that he was hungry, and thus, Boy pulled-
over at a carinderia at Del Pan Bridge near Delgado Bros. When Rieta alighted he followed,
while Boy and Gonzalo proceeded. After less than an hour, Boy and Gonzalo returned. They
then proceeded towards Roxas Boulevard, Bonifacio Drive, and Boy drove straight at the
corner of Aduana to Roxas Boulevard. When he noticed that the truck was not bound for
Divisoria as earlier informed, he asked Boy why they were not taking the route going to
Divisoria. Boy replied 'bukas na lang wala ng espasyo'. Immediately, they were intercepted
by two vehicles and one of the occupants thereof ordered the driver to pull over. The driver
pulled over, and they were ordered to raise their hands and to lay flat on their belly on the
pavement right in front of the truck, and they were bodily frisked but they found nothing. He
asked the Metrocom soldiers what was it all about, but the Metrocom soldiers were shouting
'asan ang blue seal'. Then they were ordered to board a jeep owned by the Metrocom
soldiers, and they were brought to Camp Crame. Before they left the area, he did not see the
Metrocom soldiers open the cargo truck. He was brought to the MISG at Camp Crame.
When they arrived at Camp Crame, the soldiers thereat were clapping their hands, thus he
asked 'ano ba talaga ito' and he got an answer from Barrameda, 'yun ang dahilan kung bakit
ka makukulong', pointing to a truck. When he saw the truck, it was not the same truck they
boarded in the early morning of October 15, 1979. The truck they boarded was galvanized
iron pale sheet covered with canvass while the one at Camp Crame was color red and not
covered. He entertained the idea that they were being framed-up. Two days after, he was
interrogated and the alleged blue seal cigarettes were shown to him, and he was informed
by the investigator that the same blue seal cigarettes were the contents of the cargo truck.
When the alleged blue seal cigarettes were taken out of the cargo truck, he was not asked to
be present. He asked for the whereabouts of Boy, but he was informed that the latter
escaped. The more he believed that there was something fishy or wrong in their
apprehension. It was very [conspicuous] that the driver was able to escape because at the
time they were apprehended they were the only people at Bonifacio Drive, and thus the
possibility of escape was very remote, considering that they were unarmed and the
Metrocom soldiers were all fully armed. In both cases at bar, there were about three Pasay
policemen who were apprehended. He was detained at Camp Bagong Diwa for more than a
year. He knew nothing about the charge against him. When he was at Camp Crame he tried
getting in touch with a lawyer and his family, but the MISG did not let him use the telephone."

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Affirming the RTC, the CA noted that while petitioner and his co-accused had mainly raised
questions of fact, they had nonetheless failed to point out specific errors committed by the trial court
in upholding the credibility of the prosecution's witnesses. The defense of denial proffered by
petitioner was considered weak and incapable of overturning the overwhelming testimonial and
documentary evidence of respondent. Further, the appellate court ruled that the non-presentation in
court of the seized blue-seal cigarettes was not fatal to respondent's cause, since the crime had
sufficiently been established by other competent evidence.

The CA rejected the belated claim of petitioner that his arrest was irregular. It ruled that the alleged
defect could not be raised for the first time on appeal, especially in the light of his voluntary
submission to and participation in the proceedings before the trial court.

The appellate court, however, found no sufficient evidence against the other co-accused who, unlike
petitioner, had not been found to be in possession of blue-seal cigarettes.

Hence, this Petition. 11

Issues

In his Memorandum, petitioner submits the following issues for the Court's consideration:

"1. The respondents trial and appellate courts committed grave abuse of discretion
tantamount to lack and/or excess of jurisdiction when [they] convicted herein petitioner
notwithstanding the prosecution's failure to prove the guilt of the petitioner beyond
reasonable doubt.

"2. The evidence obtained against the accused is inadmissible in evidence because
petitioner and his co-accused were arrested without a warrant but by virtue of an arrest and
seizure order (ASSO) which was subsequently declared illegal and invalid by this Honorable
Supreme Court." 12

The Court's Ruling

The Petition has no merit.

First Issue:
Sufficiency of Evidence
Petitioner contends that the existence of the untaxed blue seal cigarettes was not established,
because the prosecution had not presented them as evidence. He further argues that there was no
crime committed, as the corpus delicti was never proven during the trial.

Corpus Delicti Established

by Other Evidence

We do not agree. Corpus delicti refers to the specific injury or loss sustained. It is the fact of the
13 

commission of the crime that may be proved by the testimony of eyewitnesses. In its legal
14  15 

sense, corpus delicti does not necessarily refer to the body of the person murdered, to the firearms
16 

in the crime of homicide with the use of unlicensed firearms, to the ransom money in the crime of
17 

kidnapping for ransom, or -- in the present case -- to the seized contraband cigarettes.
18  19

In Rimorin v. People, the petitioner therein similarly equated the actual physical evidence -- 305
20 

cases of blue-seal cigarettes -- with the corpus delicti. The appellate court allegedly erred in not
acquitting him on reasonable doubt arising from the non-presentation in court of the confiscated
contraband cigarettes. Holding that corpus delicti could be established by circumstantial evidence,
the Court debunked his argument thus:

"Since the corpus delicti is the fact of the commission of the crime, this Court has ruled that
even a single witness' uncorroborated testimony, if credible, may suffice to prove it and
warrant a conviction therefor. Corpus delicti may even be established by circumstantial
evidence.

"Both the RTC and the CA ruled that the corpus delicti had been competently established by
respondent's evidence, which consisted of the testimonies of credible witnesses and the
Custody Receipt issued by the Bureau of Customs for the confiscated goods.

"Col. Panfilo Lacson's testimony on the apprehension of petitioner and on the seizure of the
blue seal cigarettes was clear and straightforward. He categorically testified as follows:

Q       Let us go back to the truck after you apprehended the COSAC soldiers on
board the [C]orona car, what did you do thereafter?

A       We took them to the place where the cargo truck was intercepted, Sir.

Q       What did you notice thereat?

A       Inside the truck were hundreds of cases of blue seal cigarettes, and I also
found out that my men were able to apprehend the occupants of the cargo truck
although they reported to me that the driver managed to make good escape, Sir.

Q       Now you stated that a search was made on the truck and you found how many
cases of blue seal cigarettes?

A       Three hundred five (305) cases, Sir.

Q       Blue seal cigarettes?

A       Yes, Sir.

Q       What do you mean by blue seal cigarettes?

A       Blue seal cigarettes are untaxed cigarettes, Sir.

Q       Did you find out how many were there on board the truck which was
intercepted by your men per your order?

A       Yes, Sir, [there] were three.

Q       Who?

A       They were P/Sgt. Arturo Rimorin, Sr.

Q       P/Sgt. Of what department?

A       Of Pasay City Police Force, Sir, and Pat. Felicisimo Rieta.

Q       Of that police department?

A       Of Kawit, Cavite Police Force, and Gonzalo Vargas, Sir.

Q       Who is this Gonzalo Vargas?

A       Civilian Sir.

xxx   xxx   xxx
Fiscal Macaraeg:

I am showing to you a Custody Receipt dated October 15, 1979, which

states: Received from Lt. Col. Rolando N. Abadilla, AC of S, M2/CC, MISG.
PC METROCOM

(Thru S/Sgt. Rodolfo Bucao, PC) THREE HUNDRED SEVENTY ONE (371)
cases of assorted brands of 'Blue Seal' Cigarettes, which were intercepted
and confiscated by elements of the MISG, PC METROCOM on or about
0400 15 October 79 along Bonifacio Drive, Manila, which for [purposes] of
identification we respectfully request that it be marked [on] evidence as
Exhibit 'A'.

COURT:

Mark it Exhibit 'A'.

Fiscal Macaraeg:

Q       Will you please do examine Exhibit 'A' and tell us whether this is the same
receipt?

A       This is the same receipt, Sir.

Q       By the way, were photographs taken of the car as well as the vehicle involved
in this case, together with the blue seal cigarettes that were confiscated?

A       Yes, Sir.

Q       Do you have copies of these photographs?

A       The copies are with our evidence custodian, Sir.

Q       Can you bring those pictures if required next time?

A       Yes, Sir.
 "So, too, did Gregorio Abrigo –customs warehouse storekeeper of the Bureau –categorically
testify that the MISG had turned over to him the seized blue seal cigarettes, for which he
issued a Custody Receipt dated October 15, 1979.

"We find no reason to depart from the oft repeated doctrine of giving credence to the
narration of prosecution witnesses, especially when they are public officers who are
presumed to have performed their duties in a regular manner." 21

Petitioner argues that the receipt issued by Abrigo, a customs official, was beset with doubt
because: 1) it did not state specifically that the blue-seal cigarettes identified therein had been
confiscated from petitioner and turned over to Abrigo by Colonel Lacson and/or his men; and 2) it
mentioned 371 (instead of 305) cases of confiscated blue-seal cigarettes.

We note, however, that Colonel Lacson himself identified the Custody Receipt as the same one
issued for the 305 cases of cigarettes found in the cargo truck, in which petitioner and his co-
accused rode, and from which the 66 cases of cigarettes -- subject of Criminal Case No. CCC-VI-
138(79) -- were confiscated in Malabon, Metro Manila. This fact (305 plus 66) explains why 371
22 

cases were indicated therein. At any rate, petitioner argues on minor discrepancies that do not affect
the integrity of the Receipt, issued in due course by a customs official who was duty-bound to put the
seized contraband cigarettes in safekeeping.

The existence of the 305 cases of blue-seal cigarettes found in the possession of petitioner and his
co-accused was duly proven by the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses -- Lacson and Abrigo.
They had testified in compliance with their duty as enforcers of the law. Their testimonies were
rightly entitled to full faith and credit, especially because there was no showing of any improper
motive on their part to testify falsely against petitioner. Further, the Court accords great respect to
23 

the factual conclusions drawn by the trial court, especially when affirmed by the appellate court as in
this case. 24

Absurd is the claim of petitioner that, because Colonel Lacson was not the officer who had actually
intercepted the cargo truck in which the former rode, the latter's testimony was therefore hearsay.
The testimony of the colonel on his participation in the apprehension of the truck sufficiently rebutted
this contention.

Lacson testified that he had personally received information regarding the smuggling activities being
conducted by a syndicated group in that place. He was also informed that smuggled items would be
transported from the 2nd COSAC Detachment in the Port Area to Malabon by a cargo truck with
Plate No. T-SY-167. During the stakeout surveillance on the night of October 14, 1979, he saw --
from his post within the vicinity of the 2nd COSAC Detachment -- the identified cargo truck coming
out of the Port Area. While trailing behind, he radioed his men posted along Roxas Boulevard to stop
the truck. Later in court, he described how his men had actually intercepted it. 25

Petitioner insists that Colonel Lacson, who had given chase to a Toyota car and was not among the
officers who had intercepted the truck, could not have seen him as one of the passengers of the
latter vehicle. Notably, however, the chase of the Toyota car had lasted no more than 5 minutes, and
the colonel's team immediately returned to the subject truck after the chase. Lacson, however,
26 

categorically said that he had seen 305 cases of blue-seal cigarettes inside the cargo vehicle, and
that petitioner was one of its passengers.

It should be borne in mind that Colonel Lacson -- as head of that particular surveillance operation --
had full knowledge, control and supervision of the whole process. He had organized the surveillance
teams and given orders to his men prior to the apprehension of the vehicles suspected of carrying
smuggled items. Furthermore, he was present during the surveillance operations until the
apprehension of the cargo truck. Thus, he was clearly competent to testify on the matter.

The denial by petitioner that he was among the occupants of the truck is highly self-serving and
riddled with inconsistencies. He had been directly identified as one of its passengers. Besides, he
himself admitted that he had been on board the vehicle when it was intercepted, and that there were
no other person in the area.

Courtroom Identification Unnecessary

Next, petitioner belabors the failure of the prosecution to ask Colonel Lacson to identify him in open
court. However, the colonel's positive and categorical testimony pointing to him as one of the
passengers of the cargo truck, as well as petitioner's own admission of his presence therein,
dispelled the need for a courtroom identification. In People v. Quezada, the Court said:

"x x x. While positive identification by a witness is required by the law to convict an accused,
it need not always be by means of a physical courtroom identification. As the Court held
in People v. Paglinawan:

'x x x. Although it is routine procedure for witnesses to point out the accused in open
court by way of identification, the fact that the witness x x x did not do so in this case
was because the public prosecutor failed to ask her to point out appellant, hence
 such omission does not in any way affect or diminish the truth or weight of her
testimony.'

"In-court identification of the offender is essential only when there is a question or doubt on
whether the one alleged to have committed the crime is the same person who is charged in
the information and subject of the trial." 27

In the present case, there is no doubt that petitioner was a passenger of the truck, that he was
apprehended by the authorities, and that he was the same individual charged under the Information
in Criminal Case No. CCC-VI-137(79).

Prima Facie Proof of

Nonpayment of Taxes Sufficient

There is no merit, either, in the claim of petitioner that the prosecution failed to prove the
nonpayment of the taxes and duties on the confiscated cigarettes. There is an exception to the
general rule requiring the prosecution to prove a criminal charge predicated on a negative allegation,
or a negative averment constituting an essential element of a crime. In People v. Julian-Fernandez,
we held:

"Where the negative of an issue does not permit of direct proof, or where the facts are more
immediately within the knowledge of the accused, the onus probandi rests upon him. Stated
otherwise, it is not incumbent upon the prosecution to adduce positive evidence to
support a negative averment the truth of which is fairly indicated by established
circumstances and which, if untrue, could readily be disproved by the production of
documents or other evidence within the defendant's knowledge or control. For
example, where a charge is made that a defendant carried on a certain business without a
license x x x, the fact that he has a license is a matter which is peculiar[ly] within his
knowledge and he must establish that fact or suffer conviction." (Emphasis supplied)
28 

The truth of the negative averment that the duties and specific taxes on the cigarettes were not paid
to the proper authorities is fairly indicated by the following circumstances that have been
established: (1) the cargo truck, which carried the contraband cigarettes and some passengers
including petitioner, immediately came from the 2nd COSAC Detachment; (2) the truck was
intercepted at the unholy hour of 4:00 a.m.; (3) it fitted the undisclosed informer's earlier description
of it as one that was carrying contraband; and (4) the driver ran away. Hence, it was up to petitioner
to disprove these damning circumstances, simply by presenting the receipts showing payment of the
taxes. But he did not do so; all that he could offer was his bare and self-serving denial.

Knowledge of the Illegal

Nature of Goods

The fact that 305 cases of blue-seal cigarettes were found in the cargo truck, in which petitioner and
his co-accused were riding, was properly established. Nonetheless, he insists that his presence
there was not enough to convict him of smuggling, because the element of illegal possession had
not been duly proved. He adds that he had no knowledge that untaxed cigarettes were in the truck.

Petitioner's contention is untenable. Persons found to be in possession of smuggled items are

presumed to be engaged in smuggling, pursuant to the last paragraph of Section 3601 of the

Tariff and Customs Code. The burden of proof is thus shifted to them. To rebut this presumption, it
29 

is not enough for petitioner to claim good faith and lack of knowledge of the unlawful source of the
cigarettes. He should have presented evidence to support his claim and to convince the court of his
non-complicity.

In the case adverted to earlier, Rimorin v. People, we held thus:

"In his discussion of a similarly worded provision of Republic Act No. 455, a criminal law
authority explained thus:

'In order that a person may be deemed guilty of smuggling or illegal importation
under the foregoing statute three requisites must concur: (1) that the merchandise
must have been fraudulently or knowingly imported contrary to law; (2) that the
defendant, if he is not the importer himself, must have received, concealed, bought,
sold or in any manner facilitated the transportation, concealment or sale of the
merchandise; and (3) that the defendant must be shown to have knowledge that the
merchandise had been illegally imported. If the defendant, however, is shown to
have had possession of the illegally imported merchandise, without satisfactory
explanation, such possession shall be deemed sufficient to authorize
conviction.'" (Emphasis supplied)
30 

In the present case, the explanation given by petitioner was found to be unacceptable and incredible
by both the RTC and the CA, which said:
 "Now on the explanations of Police Sgt. Rimorin of Pasay City Police Force and Pat. Rieta of
Kawit Police Force, riders in the loaded cargo truck driven by 'Boy.' Their claim that they did
not have any knowledge about the cargo of blue seal cigarettes is not given credence by the
court. They tried to show lack of knowledge by claiming that along the way, 'Boy' and
Gonzalo Vargas left them behind at a certain point for snacks and picked them up later after
the cargo had been loaded. The Court cannot see its way through how two policemen,
joining 'Boy' in the dead of the night, explicitly to give him and his goods some protection,
which service would be paid, yet would not know what they are out to protect. And neither
could the Court see reason in 'Boy's' leaving them behind when he was going to pick up and
load the blue seal cigarettes. 'Boy' knew the risks. He wanted them for protection, so why will
he discard them? How so unnatural and so contrary to reason." 31

Being contrary to human experience, his version of the facts is too pat and stereotyped to be
accepted at face value. Evidence, to be believed, not only must proceed from the mouth of a
credible witness; it must also be credible in itself, as when it conforms to common experience and
observation of humankind. 32

The absence of any suspicious reaction on the part of petitioner was not in accordance with human
nature. The involvement or participation he and his co-accused had in the smuggling of the goods
was confirmed by their lack of proper and reasonable justification for the fact that they had been
found inside the cargo truck, seated in front, when it was intercepted by the authorities. Despite his
protestation, it is obvious that petitioner was aware of the strange nature of the transaction, and that
he was willing to do his part in furtherance thereof. The evidence presented by the prosecution
established his work of guarding and escorting the contraband to facilitate its transportation from the
Port Area to Malabon, an act punishable under Section 3601 of the Tax Code.

Second Issue:
Validity of the Search and Seizure

Petitioner contends that his arrest by virtue of Arrest Search and Seizure Order (ASSO) No. 4754
was invalid, as the law upon which it was predicated -- General Order No. 60, issued by then
President Ferdinand E. Marcos -- was subsequently declared by the Court, in Tañada v. Tuvera, to 33 

have no force and effect. Thus, he asserts, any evidence obtained pursuant thereto is inadmissible
in evidence.
We do not agree. In Tañada, the Court addressed the possible effects of its declaration of the
invalidity of various presidential issuances. Discussing therein how such a declaration might affect
acts done on a presumption of their validity, the Court said:

"x x x. In similar situations in the past this Court had taken the pragmatic and realistic course
set forth in Chicot County Drainage District vs. Baxter Bank to wit:

'The courts below have proceeded on the theory that the Act of Congress, having
been found to be unconstitutional, was not a law; that it was inoperative, conferring
no rights and imposing no duties, and hence affording no basis for the challenged
decree. x x x It is quite clear, however, that such broad statements as to the effect of
a determination of unconstitutionality must be taken with qualifications. The actual
existence of a statute, prior to [the determination of its invalidity], is an operative fact
and may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot
always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The effect of the subsequent ruling
as to invalidity may have to be considered in various aspects –with respect to
particular conduct, private and official. Questions of rights claimed to have become
vested, of status, of prior determinations deemed to have finality and acted upon
accordingly, of public policy in the light of the nature both of the statute and of its
previous application, demand examination. These questions are among the most
difficult of those which have engaged the attention of courts, state and federal, and it
is manifest from numerous decisions that an all-inclusive statement of a principle of
absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified.'

xxxx   xx   xxx

"Similarly, the implementation/enforcement of presidential decrees prior to their publication in

the Official Gazette is 'an operative fact which may have consequences which cannot be
justly ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration x x x that an
all-inclusive

statement of a principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified.'" 34

The Chicot doctrine cited in Tañada advocates that, prior to the nullification of a statute, there is an

imperative necessity of taking into account its actual existence as an operative fact negating the
acceptance of "a principle of absolute retroactive invalidity." Whatever was done while the legislative
or the executive act was in operation should be duly recognized and presumed to be valid in all
respects. The ASSO that was issued in 1979 under General Order No. 60 -- long before our
35 

Decision in Tañada and the arrest of petitioner -- is an operative fact that can no longer be disturbed
or simply ignored.

Furthermore, the search and seizure of goods, suspected to have been introduced into the country
in violation of customs laws, is one of the seven doctrinally accepted exceptions to the constitutional
36 

provision. Such provision mandates that no search or seizure shall be made except by virtue of a
warrant issued by a judge who has personally determined the existence of probable cause. 37

Under the Tariff and Customs Code, a search, seizure and arrest may be made even without a
warrant for purposes of enforcing customs and tariff laws. Without mention of the need to priorly
obtain a judicial warrant, the Code specifically allows police authorities to enter, pass through or
search any land, enclosure, warehouse, store or building that is not a dwelling house; and also to
inspect, search and examine any vessel or aircraft and any trunk, package, box or envelope or any
person on board; or to stop and search and examine any vehicle, beast or person suspected of
holding or conveying any dutiable or prohibited article introduced into the Philippines contrary to
law. 38

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED, and the assailed Decision AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Sandoval-Gutierrez,* Corona, and Carpio Morales, JJ., concur.

SAN ROQUE POWER CORPORATION, PETITIONER, VS. COMMISSIONER OF

INTERNAL REVENUE, RESPONDENT.

DECISION
MARTIRES, J.:
The application of the 120-day and 30-day periods provided in Section 112 (D) [later renumbered as Section 112 (C)]
of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC) is at the heart of the present case.

In Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Aichi Forging Company of Asia, Inc. (Aichi),[1] the Court considered whether
the simultaneous filing of both the administrative claim (before the Bureau of Internal Revenue [BIR]) and judicial
claim (before the Court of Tax Appeals [CTA]) for refund/credit of input VAT under the cited law is permissible. In that
case, the respondent asserted that the non-observance of the 120-day period is not fatal to the filing of a judicial
claim as long as both the administrative and the judicial claims are filed within the two-year prescriptive period. We
held that the premature filing of respondent's claim for refund/credit before the CTA warrants a dismissal inasmuch as
no jurisdiction was acquired by that court.

In the case before us, San Roque Power Corporation (petitioner) brought its judicial claims before the CTA prior to
the promulgation of the Aichi  ruling. Yet, the lower court (CTA En Banc)  dismissed the petitioner's judicial claims on
the ground of prematurity, a decision that happily coincided with the Court's ruling in Aichi. In its petition, San Roque
Power Corporation rues the retroactive application of Aichi  to taxpayers who merely relied on the alleged prevailing
rule of procedure antecedent to Aichi that allowed the filing of judicial claims before the expiration of the 120-day
period.

We hold that there is no established precedence prior to Aichi  that permits the simultaneous filing of administrative
and judicial claims for refund/credit under Section 112 of the NIRC. Nonetheless, we concede that the CTA has
jurisdiction over the claims in this case in view of our pronouncement in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. San
Roque Power Corporation (San Roque).[2] In said case, the Court, while upholding Aichi,  recognized an exception to
the mandatory and jurisdictional character of the 120-day period: taxpayers who relied on BIR Ruling DA-489-03,
issued on 10 December 2003, until its reversal in Aichi  on 6 October 2010, are shielded from the vice of prematurity.
The said ruling expressly stated that "a taxpayer-claimant need not wait for the lapse of the 120-day period before it
could seek judicial relief with the CTA by way of a Petition for Review."

THE FACTS

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the 4 April 2012 Decision[3] of
the CTA En Banc in CTA EB No. 657. The CTA En Banc dismissed the petitioner's judicial claims on the ground of
prematurity, thus, setting aside the CTA Second Division's partial grant of the refund claims in the consolidated CTA
Case Nos. 7424 and 7492. In the subsequent 17 August 2012 Resolution[4] of the CTA En Banc, the court a
quo denied the petitioner's motion for reconsideration.

The Antecedents

San Roque Power Corporation is a VAT-registered taxpayer which was granted by the BIR a zero-rating on its sales
of electricity to National Power Corporation (NPC) effective 14 January 2004, up to 31 December 2004.[5]

On 22 December 2005 and 27 February 2006, the petitioner filed two separate administrative claims for refund of its
alleged unutilized input tax for the period 1 January 2004 up to 31 March 2004, and 1 April 2004 up to 31 December
2004, respectively.[6]

Due to the inaction of respondent CIR, the petitioner filed petitions for review before the CTA (raffled to the Second
Division): (1) on 30 March 2006, for its unutilized input VAT for the period 1 January 2004 to 31 March 2004,
amounting to P17,017,648.31, docketed as CTA Case No. 7424; and (2) on 20 June 2006, for the unutilized input
VAT for the period 1 April 2004 to 31 December 2004, amounting to P14,959,061.57, docketed as CTA Case No.
7492.
The Ruling of the CTA Division

During trial, the petitioner presented documentary and testimonial evidence to prove its claim. On the other hand,
respondent CIR was deemed to have waived its right to present evidence due to its failure to appear in the two
scheduled hearings on the presentation of evidence for the defense. In due course, the CTA Division partially granted
the refund claim of the petitioner in the total amount of P29,931,505.18 disposing as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petitions for Review are hereby PARTIALLY

GRANTED. Accordingly, respondent Commissioner of Internal Revenue is hereby ORDERED TO REFUND or TO
ISSUE A TAX CREDIT CERTIFICATE in the reduced amount of TWENTY-NINE MILLION NINE HUNDRED
THIRTY-ONE THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED FIVE PESOS AND 18/100 (P29,931,505.18) in favor of petitioner,
representing unutilized input VAT attributable effectively zero-rated sales of electricity to NPC for the four quarters of
2004.

SO ORDERED.[7]

The CIR moved for reconsideration but to no avail. Thus, on 4 August 2010, the CIR filed a petition for review with the
CTA En Banc.

The Petition for Review before

the CTA En Banc

Among other issues, the CIR questioned the claimant's judicial recourse to the CTA as inconsistent with the
procedure prescribed in Section 112 (D) of the NIRC. The CIR asserted that the petitions for review filed with the CTA
were premature, and thus, should be dismissed.

The Ruling of the CTA En Banc

The CTA En Banc sided with the CIR in ruling that the judicial claims of the petitioner were prematurely filed in
violation of the 120-day and 30-day periods prescribed in Section 112 (D) of the NIRC. The court held that by reason
of prematurity of its petitions for review, San Roque Power Corporation failed to exhaust administrative remedies
which is fatal to its invocation of the court's power of review. The dispositive portion of the CTA En Banc's assailed
decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review filed by petitioner Commissioner of Internal Revenue is

hereby GRANTED. Accordingly, the Petition for Review filed by respondent on March 30, 2006 docketed as CTA
Case No. 7424, as well as the Petition tor Review filed on June 20,  2006 docketed as CTA Case No. 7492 are
hereby DISMISSED on ground of prematurity.

SO ORDERED.[8]
 The Present Petition for Review

The petitioner argues that at the time it filed the petitions for review before the CTA on 30 March 2006 and 20 June
2006, no ruling yet was laid down by the Supreme Court concerning the 120-day and 30-day periods provided in
Section 112 of the NIRC. Instead, taxpayers such as the petitioner were guided only by the rulings of the CTA[9] which
consistently adopted the interpretation that a claimant is not bound by the 120-day and 30-day periods but by the two-
year prescriptive period as provided in Section 112 (A) of the NIRC. Such CTA decisions, according to the petitioner,
are recognized interpretations of Philippines' tax laws.

The petitioner also asserts that the CTA En Banc erred in applying retroactively the Aichi  ruling as regards the 120-
day and 30-day periods under Section 112 of the NIRC for the following reasons: (1)  the Aichi ruling laid down a new
rule of procedure which cannot be given retroactive effect without impairing vested rights; (2) a judicial ruling
overruling a previous one cannot be applied retroactively before its abandonment; and (3) a judicial decision which
declares an otherwise permissible act as impermissible violates the ex post facto rule under the Constitution.

THE COURT'S RULING

We grant the petition.

I.

No retroactive application of
the Aichi ruling

At the outset, it bears stressing that while Aichi was already firmly established at the time the CTA En Banc
promulgated the assailed decision, nowhere do we find in such assailed decision, however, that the court a quo cited
or mentioned the Aichi  case as basis for dismissing the subject petitions for review. As we see it, the CTA En Banc
merely relied on Section 112 (D) of the NIRC, which provides –

SEC. 112. Refunds or Tax Credits of Input Tax. –

(A) Zero-rated or Effectively Zero-rated Sales.- Any VAT-registered person, whose sales are zero-rated or effectively
zero-rated may, within two (2) years after the close of the taxable quarter when the sales were made, apply for
the issuance of a tax credit certificate or refund of creditable input tax due or paid attributable to such sales, except
transitional input tax, to the extent that such input tax has not been applied against output tax:
xxxx

(D) Period within which Refund or Tax Credit of Input Taxes shall be Made. - In proper cases, the Commissioner shall
grant a refund or issue the tax credit certificate for creditable input taxes within one hundred twenty (120) days
from the date of submission of complete documents  in support of the application filed in accordance with
Subsections (A) and (B) hereof:

In case of full or partial denial of the claim tor tax refund or tax credit, or the failure on the part of the
Commissioner to act on the application within the period prescribed above, the taxpayer affected may, within
thirty (30) days from the receipt of the decision denying the claim or after the expiration of the one hundred
twenty-day period, appeal the decision or the unacted claim with the Court of Tax Appeals. (emphases
supplied)

– correctly interpreting the 120-day and 30-day periods prescribed therein as mandatory and jurisdictional. Thus, it
cannot appropriately be insisted that the CTA En Banc's imputed error may be traced to a misplaced invocation
of Aichi.

Be that as it may, the petitioner cannot find solace in the various CTA decisions that allegedly dispense with the
timeliness of the judicial claim for as long as it is within the two-year prescriptive period. Such legal posturing has
already been passed upon.

Thus, in San Roque,[10] a case involving the same parties and substantially the same factual antecedents as in the
present petition, we rejected the claim that the CTA decisions may be relied upon as binding precedents. We said –

There is also the claim that there are numerous CTA decisions allegedly supporting the argument that the filing dates
of the administrative and judicial claims are inconsequential, as long as they are within the two-year prescriptive
period. Suffice it to state that CTA decisions do not constitute precedents, and do not bind this Court or the public.
That is why CTA decisions are appealable to this Court, which may affirm, reverse or modify the CTA decisions as
the facts and the law may warrant. Only decisions of this Court constitute binding precedents, forming part of the
Philippine legal system. As held by this Court in The Philippine Veterans Affairs Office v. Segundo:

x x x Let it be admonished that decisions or the Supreme Court "applying or interpreting the laws or the
Constitution . . . form part of the legal system of the Philippines," and, as it were, "laws" by their own right because
they interpret what the laws say or mean. Unlike rulings of the lower courts, which bind the parties to specific
cases alone, our judgments are universal in their scope and application, and equally mandatory in
character. Let it be warned that to defy our decisions is to court contempt.[11] (emphasis supplied)

We further held in said case that Article 8 of the Civil Code[12] enjoins adherence to judicial precedents. The law
requires courts to follow a rule already established in a final decision of the Supreme Court. Contrary to the
petitioner's view, the decisions of the CTA are not given the same level of recognition.

Concerning the 120-day period in Section 112 (D) of the NIRC, there was no jurisprudential rule prior
to Aichi  interpreting such provision as permitting the premature filing of a judicial claim before the expiration of the
120-day period. The alleged CTA decisions that entertained the judicial claims despite their prematurity are not to be
relied upon because they are not final decisions of the Supreme Court worthy of according binding precedence.
That Aichi  was yet to be promulgated at that time did not mean that the premature filing of a petition for review before
the CTA was a permissible act.

It was only in Aichi that this Court directly tackled the 120-day period in Section 112 (D) of the NIRC and declared it
to be mandatory and jurisdictional. In particular, Aichi  brushed aside the contention that the non-observance of the
120-day period is not fatal to the filing of a judicial claim as long as both the administrative and judicial claims are filed
within the two-year prescriptive period provided in Section 112 (A) of the NIRC.

The mandatory and jurisdictional nature of the 120-day period first expressed in Aichi,  however, is not a new  rule of
procedure to be followed in pursuit of a refund claim of unutilized creditable input VAT attributable to zero-rated sales.
As suggested above, the pronouncement in Aichi  regarding the mandatory and jurisdictional nature of the 120-day
period was the Court's interpretation of Section 112 (D) of the NIRC. It is that law, Section 112 (D) of the NIRC, that
laid the rule of procedure for maintaining a refund claim of unutilized creditable input VAT attributable to zero-rated
sales. In said provision, the Commissioner has 120 days to act on an administrative claim.

Hence, from the effectivity of the 1997 NIRC on 1 January 1998, the procedure has always been definite: the 120-day
period is mandatory and jurisdictional. Accordingly, a taxpayer can file a judicial claim (1) only within thirty days
after the Commissioner partially or fully denies the claim within the 120-day period, or (2) only within thirty
days from the expiration of the 120- day period  if the Commissioner does not act within such period.[13] This is the
rule of procedure beginning 1 January 1998 as  interpreted in Aichi.

Given all the foregoing, it is indubitable that, subject to our discussion below on the reason why the present petition
should nonetheless be granted, the petitioner's arguments have no leg to stand on –

(1) The Aichi ruling laid down a new rule of procedure which cannot be given retroactive effect
without impairing vested rights.

- Section 112 (D) of the NIRC, not the Aichi ruling, lays down the rule of procedure governing
refund claims of unutilized creditable input VAT attributable to zero-rated sales; Aichi is
merely an interpretation of an existing law; there is no vested right to speak of respecting a
wrong construction of the law[14] (permitting a premature filing of judicial claim);

(2) A judicial ruling overruling a previous one cannot be applied retroactively before its
abandonment.

- There was no established doctrine abandoned or overturned by Aichi; the petitioner

merely harps on CTA decisions that cannot be relied on as binding precedents; and
(3) A judicial decision which declares an otherwise permissible act as impermissible violates the
ex post facto rule under the Constitution –

- Prior to Aichi, there was no law or jurisprudence permitting the premature filing of a

judicial claim of creditable input VAT; Aichi did not declare as impermissible that
which was previously recognized by law or jurisprudence as a permissible act; it is,
therefore, inconsequential to consider the ex post facto provision of the Constitution.

To reiterate, the 120-day and 30-day periods, as held in the case of Aichi,  are mandatory and jurisdictional. Thus,
noncompliance with the mandatory 120+30-day period renders the petition before the CTA void. The ruling in said
case as to the mandatory and jurisdictional character of said periods was reiterated in San Roque and a host of
succeeding similar cases.

Significantly, a taxpayer can file a judicial claim only within thirty (30) days from the expiration of the 120-day
period if the Commissioner does not act within the 120-day period. The taxpayer cannot file such judicial claim prior
to the lapse of the 120-day period, unless the CIR partially or wholly denies the claim within such period. The
taxpayer-claimant must strictly comply with the mandatory period by filing an appeal to the CTA within thirty days
from such inaction; otherwise, the court cannot validly acquire jurisdiction over it.

In this case, the petitioner timely filed its administrative claims for refund/credit of its unutilized input VAT for the first
quarter of 2004, and for the second to fourth quarters of the same year, on 22 December 2005 and 27 February
2006, respectively, or within the two-year prescriptive period. Counted from such dates of submission of the claims
(with supporting documents), the CIR had 120 days, or until 13 April 2006, with respect to the first administrative
claim, and until 27 June 2006, on the second administrative claim, to decide.

However, the petitioner, without waiting for the full expiration of the 120-day periods and without any decision by the
CIR, immediately filed its petitions for review with the CTA on 30 March 2006, or a mere ninety-eight (98) days for
the first administrative claim; and on 20 June 2006, or only one hundred thirteen (113) days for the second
administrative claim, from the submission of the said claims. In other words, the judicial claims of the petitioner were
prematurely filed as correctly found by the CTA En Banc.

II.

Ordinarily, a prematurely filed appeal is to be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction in line with our ruling in Aichi. But, as
stated in the premises, we shall accord to the CTA jurisdiction over the claims in this case due to our ruling in San
Roque.
BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03
constitutes an exception to
the mandatory and
jurisdictional nature of the
120+30-day period.

In the consolidated cases of San Roque , the Court en banc recognized an exception to the mandatory and
jurisdictional nature of the 120+30-day period. It was noted that BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03, which expressly stated –

[A] taxpayer-claimant need not wait for the lapse of the 120-day period before it could seek judicial relief with the CTA
by way of Petition for Review.

– is a general interpretative rule issued by the CIR pursuant to its power under Section 4 of the NIRC, hence,
applicable to all taxpayers. Thus, taxpayers can rely on this ruling from the time of its issuance on 10 December
2003. The conclusion is impelled by the principle of equitable estoppel enshrined in Section 246[15] of the NIRC which
decrees that a BIR regulation or ruling cannot adversely prejudice a taxpayer who in good faith relied on the BIR
regulation or ruling prior to its reversal.

Then, in Taganito Mining Corporation v. CIR,[16] the Court further clarified the doctrines in Aichi and San
Roque explaining that during the window period from 10 December 2003, upon the issuance of BIR Ruling No. DA-
489-03 up to 6 October 2010, or date of promulgation of Aichi,  taxpayers need not observe the stringent 120-day
period.[17]

In other words, the 120+30-day period is generally mandatory and jurisdictional from the effectivity of the 1997 NIRC
on 1 January 1998, up to the present. By way of an exception, judicial claims filed during the window period from 10
December 2003 to 6 October 2010, need not wait for the exhaustion of the 120-day period. The exception in San
Roque has been applied consistently in numerous decisions of this Court.

In this case, the two judicial claims filed by the petitioner fell within the window period, thus, the CTA can take
cognizance over them.

The petitioner is similarly situated as Taganito Mining Corporation (Taganito)  in the consolidated cases of San
Roque. In that case, Taganito prematurely filed on 14 February 2007 its petition for review with the CTA, or within the
window period from 10 December 2003, with the issuance of BIR Ruling DA-489-03 and 6 October 2010,
when Aichi was promulgated. The Court considered Taganito to have filed its administrative claim on time. Similarly,
the judicial claims in this case were filed on 30 March 2006 and 20 June 2006, or within the said window period.
Consequently, the exception to the mandatory and jurisdictional character of the 120-day and 30-day periods is
applicable.

What this means is that the CTA can validly take cognizance over the two judicial claims filed in this case. The CTA
Division, in fact, did this, which eventually led to the partial grant of the refund claims in favor of the petitioner. In
reversing the CTA Division for lack of jurisdiction, the CTA En Banc failed to consider BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03.

III.

It is imperative, however, to point out that the petitioner did not actually invoke BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03 in all its
pleadings to justify the timeliness of its judicial claims with the CTA. To recall, the petitioner vociferously insisted on
the propriety of its judicial claims in view of the prevailing interpretations of the CTA prior to Aichi  that allowed
premature filing of petitions for review before the CTA. This apparently also explains the silence on the end of the
CTA En Banc regarding such BIR ruling in disposing of the matter on jurisdiction.

Hence, whether the petitioner can benefit from BIR Ruling DA-489-03 even if it did not invoke it is a question worthy
of consideration.

The beneficiaries of BIR

Ruling No. DA-489-03 include
those who did not specifically
invoke it.

We resolve to apply the exception recognized in San Roque, which we quote, viz:

x x x BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03 is a general interpretative rule. Thus, all taxpayers can rely on BIR Ruling No. DA-
489-03 from the time of its issuance on 10 December 2003 up to its reversal by this Court in Aichi on 6 October 2010,
where this Court held that the 120+30-day periods are mandatory and jurisdictional.[18] (emphasis supplied)

As previously stated, San Roque  has been consistently applied in a long line of cases that recognized the exception
to the mandatory and jurisdictional nature of the 120+30-day period. To limit the application of BIR Ruling No. DA-
489-03 only to those who invoked it specifically would unduly strain the pronouncements in San Roque.  To provide
jurisprudential stability, it is best to apply the benefit of BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03 to all taxpayers who filed their
judicial claims within the window period from 10 December 2003 until 6 October 2010.

We said the same in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Air Liquide Philippines. Inc.,[19] thus –

The Court agrees with ALPI in its survey of cases which shows that BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03 was applied even
though the taxpayer did not specifically invoke the same. As long as the judicial claim was filed between December
10, 2003 and October 6, 2010, then the taxpayer would not be required to wait for the lapse of 120-day period. This
doctrine has been consistently upheld in the recent decisions of the Court. On the other hand, in Nippon Express v.
CIR, Applied Food Ingredients v. CIR  and Silicon Philippines v. CIR, the taxpayer did not benefit from BIR Ruling No.
DA-489-03 because they filed their precipitate judicial claim before December 10, 2003.
Indeed, BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03 is a general interpretative law and it applies to each and every taxpayer. To
subscribe to the contention of the CIR would alter the Court's ruling in San Roque.  It will lead to an unreasonable
classification of the beneficiaries of BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03 and further complicate the doctrine. ALPI cannot be
faulted for not specifically invoking BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03 as the rules for its application were not definite until
the San Roque case was promulgated.

In the furtherance of the doctrinal pronouncements in San Roque, the better approach would be to apply BIR Ruling
No. DA-489-03 to all taxpayers who filed their judicial claim for VAT refund within the period of exception from
December 10, 2003 to October 6, 2010.[20] (citations omitted)

Moreover, in Procter and Gamble Asia Pte Ltd. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,[21] we considered as
insignificant the failure of a taxpayer to invoke BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03 before the CTA. Our reason was that the
said ruling is an official act emanating from the BIR. We can take judicial notice of such issuance and its consistent
application in past rulings of the Court relating to the timeliness of judicial claims which makes it even more
mandatory in taking cognizance of the same.

All told, the CTA has jurisdiction over the judicial claims filed by the petitioner in this case. The CTA En Banc, thus,
erred in setting aside the decision of the CTA Division on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. Consequently, the
decision of the CTA Division partially granting the claim for refund/credit in favor of the petitioner must be reinstated.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The 4 April 2012 Decision and 17 August 2012 Resolution of the Court of
Tax Appeals En Banc in CTA EB No. 657 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The 8 January 2010 Decision and 28
June 2010 Resolution of the CTA Former Second Division in CTA Cases Nos. 7424 and 7492 are
hereby REINSTATED.

The public respondent Commissioner of Internal Revenue is hereby ORDERED TO REFUND or, in the

alternative, TO ISSUE A TAX CREDIT CERTIFICATE in favor of the petitioner in the total sum of Twenty-Nine Million
Nine Hundred Thirty-One Thousand Five Hundred Five Pesos and 18/100 Centavos (P29,931,505.18) representing
unutilized input VAT attributable to zero-rated sales to the NPC for the four taxable quarters of2004.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-20216 and L-20217      November 29, 1967

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
TIBURCIO BALBAR, defendant-appellee.

Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellant.

Pedro M. Belmi for defendant-appellee.
MAKALINTAL, J.:

On August 20, 1960 defendant-appellee Tiburcio Balbar allegedly entered the room where
schoolteacher Ester Gonzales, complainant herein, was conducting her classes. Without warning
and right after complainant had finished writing on the blackboard, defendant allegedly placed his
arms around her and kissed her on the eye. Shocked, complainant instinctively pushed Balbar away
and tried to flee. Defendant allegedly brought out his "daga" (a local dagger) and pursued
complainant, catching up with her before she was able to get out of the room. Defendant embraced
her again, at the same time holding on to his "daga". They both fell to the floor, as a result of which
complainant sustained slight physical injuries.

Two informations, one for Direct Assault Upon A Person in Authority and another for Acts of
Lasciviousness (Criminal Cases Nos. 823 and 841 respectively) were filed by the Assistant
Provincial Fiscal against defendant before the Court of First Instance of Batangas, the latter charge
upon written complaint filed by the offended party duly sworn to before the Clerk of Court.

The information for Direct Assault Upon A Person in Authority is hereunder quoted:

The undersigned Assistant Provincial Fiscal accuses Tiburcio Balbar of the crime of Assault
upon a Person in Authority, committed as follows:

That on or about the 29th day of August, 1960, in Barrio Camba, Municipality of Lian,
Province of Batangas, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above named accused did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault Miss
Ester Gonzales, a public school teacher in the school building of Lian, duly qualified and
appointed as such and while in the performance of her official duties or on the occasion
therefor, by then and there pulling his dagger, braced and kissed, and repeatedly trying to
embrace and kiss the said teacher, Miss Ester Gonzales. That the crime was committed with
the aggravating circumstances of having committed it inside the public school building and
during school classes.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

The information for Acts of Lasciviousness reads:

At the instance of the offended party in the above-entitled case the undersigned Assistant Provincial
Fiscal accuses TIBURCIO BALBAR of the crime of acts of lasciviousness committed as follows:
 That on or about the 29th day of August, 1960, in the Barrio of Cumba, Municipality of Lian,
Province of Batangas, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused with the deliberate intent to satisfy his lust, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously commit an act of lasciviousness on the person of Miss Ester
Gonzales, a public school teacher, by then and there placing himself close to her, embracing
and kissing her against her will and by means of force, and as a consequence thereof said
offended party fell to the floor resulting to her injury which caused her pain and tenderness
on the right side of the trunk on the posterior surface of the right arm which injuries may
require 3 to 4 days to heal; that the crime was committed with the aggravating circumstance
that the same was perpetrated inside the public school building and during class hour.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

The accused filed separate motions to quash, contending that "(a) with respect to Criminal Case No.
823 for Direct Assault, the information does not charge a sufficient cause of action and that it
charges two offenses in a single complaint; and (b) with respect to Criminal Case No. 841 for Acts of
Lasciviousness, . . . that the accused would be placed in double jeopardy and that the complaint
charges two offenses." On August 16, 1962, over the opposition of the Assistant Provincial Fiscal,
the court a quo issued an order quashing the two informations. Said the court:

After reading the informations in both criminal cases, the Court agrees with counsel that the
acts committed by the accused as alleged in the two informations constitute one offense.

As regards the motion to quash filed in Criminal Case No. 841, the grounds alleged in
support thereof are: (1) that the accused would be placed in double jeopardy; and (2) that
the criminal complaint charges two offenses. Without discussing the merits of these grounds
above-quoted, the Court believes that the information filed in Criminal Case No. 841 should
be dismissed or quashed for the reason that the offense charged therein is already absorbed
in the offense charged in Criminal Case No. 823.

Thus, the dispositive portion of the order reads:

WHEREFORE, it is the opinion of this Court that the information in Criminal Case No. 823
which charges only unjust vexation or physical injuries should be quashed for the reason that
the same is within the original jurisdiction of the Justice of the Peace. And, as to the
information in criminal Case No. 841, the same should likewise be quashed on the ground
that the acts complained of is already included in Criminal No. 823.
From this order, the Government interposed the present appeal.

Stated differently in the rationale of its order, the court a quo quashed Criminal Case No. 823 on the
following ground: That "while the offense is designated as direct assault, nevertheless the main
allegations of the information may at most constitute unjust vexation for the reason that an important
element of the crime of direct assault is conspicuously absent in the information. This essential
element is the knowledge of the accused that the victim is a person in authority. . . .This being the
case and since . . . sufficient allegations are contained in the information in question to hold the
accused responsible for an offense, the Court believes that the information is sufficient in substance
to at least constitute unjust vexation or physical injuries."

Direct assault is committed "by any person or persons who, without a public uprising, . . . shall
attack, employ force, or seriously intimidate or resist any person in authority or any of his agents,
while engaged in the performance of official duties or on occasion of such performance." (See Art.
148, Revised Penal Code.)

By express provision of law (Com. Act No. 578, now part of Article 152 of the Revised Penal Code,
as amended by Republic Act No. 1978), "teachers, professors, and persons charged with the
supervision of public or duly recognized private schools, colleges and universities shall be deemed
persons in authority, in applying the provisions of Article 148." This special classification is obviously
intended to give teachers protection, dignity, and respect while in the performance of their official
duties. The lower court, however, dismissed the information on the ground that there is no express
allegation in the information that the accused had knowledge that the person attacked was a person
in authority. This is clearly erroneous.

Complainant was a teacher. The information sufficiently alleges that the accused knew that fact,
since she was in her classroom and engaged in the performance of her duties. He therefore knew
that she was a person in authority, as she was so by specific provision of law. It matters not that
such knowledge on his part is not expressly alleged, complainant's status as a person in authority
being a matter of law and not of fact, ignorance whereof could not excuse non-compliance on his
part (Article 3, Civil Code). This article applies to all kinds of domestic laws, whether civil or penal
(De Luna vs. Linatoc, 74 Phil. 15) and whether substantive or remedial (Zulueta vs. Zulueta, 1 Phil.
254) for reasons of expediency, policy and necessity.

With respect to the dismissal of the information for Acts of Lasciviousness, we agree with the
conclusion reached by the court a quo. Although it is true that the same acts may constitute more
than one offense, we are of the opinion, upon an examination of the events which gave rise to the
filing of the two aforementioned informations, that the offense of Acts of Lasciviousness does not
appear to have been committed at all.

It would be somewhat difficult to lay down any rule specifically establishing just what conduct
makes one amendable to the provisions of article 439 (now article 336) of the Penal Code.
What constitutes lewd or lascivious conduct must be determined from the circumstances of
each case. It may be quite easy to determine in a particular case that certain acts are lewd
and lascivious, and it may be extremely difficult in another case to say where the line of
demarcation lies between such conduct and the amorous advances of an ardent lover. (U. S.
v. Gomez, 30 Phil. 22, 25)

The presence or absence of lewd designs is inferred from the nature of the acts themselves and the
environmental circumstances. In the instant case, considering the manner, place and time under
which the acts complained of were done, even as alleged in the information itself, lewd designs can
hardly be attributed to accused. The factual setting, i.e., a schoolroom in the presence of
complainant's students and within hearing distance of her co-teachers, rules out a conclusion that
the accused was actuated by a lustful design or purpose or that his conduct was lewd or lascivious.
It may be that he did embrace the girl and kiss her but, this of itself would not necessarily bring the
case within the provision of Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code.

WHEREFORE, the order of the court a quo quashing the information for Direct Assault is hereby set
aside and this case is remanded to the lower court for trial on the merits; and with respect to the
dismissal of the information for Acts of Lasciviousness, the same is hereby affirmed. No
pronouncement as to costs.

Dizon, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro, Angeles and Fernando, JJ., concur.
Concepcion, C.J., and Reyes, J.B.L., J., took no part.

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. NO. 149285 : August 30, 2006]

 GODOFREDO MORALES, Petitioner, v. SKILLS INTERNATIONAL COMPANY
AND/OR MAHER DAAS AND MARIVIC DAAS AND/OR WALLAN AL
WALLAN, Respondents.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari  assailing the Court of Appeals'
Decision 1 dated 28 November 2000 in CA-G.R. SP No. 58795. The Court of Appeals'
Decision dismissed petitioner's Petition for Certiorari  and had, in effect, affirmed the
Resolution 2 of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) which in turn sustained
the findings of the Labor Arbiter 3 that petitioner did not have a cause of action against
respondent Skills International Company (Skills International).

The antecedent facts are as follows:

On 1 September 1997, petitioner filed a Complaint against respondent Skills

International before the NLRC claiming that he was illegally dismissed from service by
his foreign employer, Wallan Al Wallan. In his Complaint, 4 petitioner sought the
payment of the following: unpaid salaries for one and one-half months; refund of his
plane fare; illegal deductions; attorney's fees and litigation expenses; and moral and
exemplary damages. The complaint was amended on 2 October 1997 5 to implead
respondents Maher Daas, Marivic Daas, and Wallan Al Wallan. Petitioner likewise sought
the payment of these items: the six and one-half months unexpired portion of his
contract; refund of the amount of 5,000.00 Saudi Riyals allegedly deducted from his
salary; unpaid overtime pay and medical care.

In his Position Paper, 6 petitioner alleged that his employment was illegally terminated
on 14 April 1997 in gross violation of the Constitution and of the Labor Code. Because
of this, he claimed that he was entitled to receive payment for the unexpired portion of
his employment agreement as well as moral, exemplary, and nominal damages, and
attorney's fees.

For its part, respondent Skills International alleged that it previously deployed
petitioner for work abroad in April 1995 until he came home in July 1996. Later on,
petitioner met his new employer at respondent Skills International's office in Malate,
Manila. Respondent Skills International, however, clarified that petitioner's new
employer, Wallan Al Wallan, was not its accredited principal. This being the case, it
argued that petitioner did not have any cause of action against it because as a
recruitment agency, it could only be held solidarily liable with the employer if the latter
is an accredited principal of the agency. Respondent Skills International also averred
that petitioner's deployment was processed under the Balik Manggagawa  program of
the government so that he could immediately return to work abroad.7

On 31 July 1998, Labor Arbiter Felipe Pati rendered a Decision 8 dismissing the case for
lack of merit stating that if there was anyone liable for petitioner's illegal dismissal, it
was none other than his foreign employer, Wallan Al Wallan.

Petitioner then filed an appeal with the NLRC but the same was resolved against
him 9 prompting petitioner to elevate his case to the Court of Appeals. In the Decision
now assailed before us, the Court of Appeals dismissed his Petition for Certiorari with
the decretal portion of the Decision stating:

WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the instant petition is DISMISSED.10

In sustaining the NLRC, the Court of Appeals stated that petitioner's arguments were a
mere reiteration of those he earlier presented before the NLRC and which were already
passed upon by the latter.11 The Court of Appeals also held that petitioner failed to
present any basis to support his argument that the NLRC committed grave abuse of
discretion in resolving the case in favor of respondent Skills International.12

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration but this was denied; 13 hence, the present
recourse where petitioner argues that the Court of Appeals erred in its findings that:

A. ) There is no formal, valid and signed contract of employment that binds the
petitioner and the private respondents;

b.) Petitioner was hired directly by his foreign employer and was processed as a Balik-
Manggagawa; and
c.) Petitioner did not pay any placement fee and he did not mention that he was
deducted placement fee by the respondent [Skills International].14

Petitioner claims that the relationship between Wallan Al Wallan and respondent Skills
International was sufficiently established when the latter stated in its Position Paper
that it was in its office in Malate, Manila, where petitioner met his new employer.
Petitioner insists that if Wallan Al Wallan were not an accredited principal of respondent
Skills International, then he had no business being in the latter's office. But since as
petitioner and Wallan Al Wallan met each other within the confines of respondent Skills
International's office, it can be said that respondent Skills International had a hand in
their meeting. More than this, it was respondent Skills International which handled his
deployment for work abroad as a balik-manggagawa.

Petitioner also points out that in the medical examination report dated 6 September
1996 issued by Angelina Apostol Punzalan Medical Clinic, 15 it is clearly stated that it
was respondent Skills International which recommended him for physical examination.
He argues that the medical clinic would not have attended to him had it not been for
the referral of respondent Skills International as under Section 3, Rule VII, Book II of
the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration Rules and Regulations Governing
Overseas Employment, 16 "[m]edical examination of workers for overseas employment
shall be conducted only after the agency and/or its principal shall have interviewed and
trade tested or have pre-qualified the worker for an existing overseas position duly
covered by an approved job order." 17

Likewise, in the Standard Employment Contract for Various Skills 18 which petitioner

signed, it is stated that his local placement agency is respondent Skills International
while his principal in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, is Wallan Al Wallan. Petitioner claims that
while he signed and even affixed his thumbmark on said contract, he avers that he
could not explain why no responsible officer or employee of respondent Skills
International signed said document.

In addition, petitioner maintains that he does not fall within the category of balik-
manggagawa as the term refers to "a landbased contract worker who is on vacation or
on emergency leave, and who is returning to the same work site to resume his
employment." 19 Obviously then, he should not have been considered as a balik-
manggagawa since he was neither here on vacation nor on emergency leave; instead,
he went back abroad under an entirely new employment contract.

As for the lack of placement fee he paid to respondent Skills International, petitioner
claims that the Labor Arbiter, the NLRC, and the Court of Appeals failed to take notice
of the receipt, written in Saudi Arabian language, showing that his employer abroad
deducted 5,000 Saudi Riyals from his salary as placement fee.20

Given these circumstances, petitioner concludes that respondent Skills International

should be held liable to him for the illegal dismissal perpetuated by its accredited
principal, Wallan Al Wallan, as provided for under Section [60] of the Rules and
Regulations Implementing the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of
1995 21 which states:

Section 60. Solidary Liability. -  The liability of the principal/employer and the

recruitment/placement agency on any and all claims under this Rule shall be joint and
solidary. This liability shall be incorporated in the contract for overseas employment
and shall be a condition precedent for its approval. The performance bond to be filed by
the recruitment/placement agency, as provided by law, shall be answerable for all
money claims or damages that may be awarded to the workers.

If the recruitment/placement agency is a juridical being, the corporate officers and

directors and partners as the case may be, shall themselves be jointly and solidarily
liable with the corporation or partnership for the aforesaid claims and damages.

Such liabilities shall continue during the entire period or duration of the employment
contract and shall not be affected by any substitution, amendment or modification
made locally or in a foreign country of the said contract.

On the other hand, respondent Skills International insists that this Petition should be
dismissed as it seeks a review of the factual findings of the Labor Arbiter, the NLRC,
and the Court of Appeals - a task which clearly does not fall within the ambit of a
Petition for Review on Certiorari. Nevertheless, respondent Skills International
proceeded to address the matters stated in the Petition. It contends that although it
had previously deployed petitioner abroad, such deployment was for its accredited
principal, the Saudi Automotive Services Company and not for Wallan Al Wallan. While
it may be true that Wallan Al Wallan and petitioner met one another at its office,
respondent Skills International argues that this does not readily lead to the conclusion
that Wallan Al Wallan was its accredited principal. As one of its officers is from the
Middle East, respondent Skills International avers that it is customary that it invites
visitors from said region to come to their office.

Anent the medical examination which was undergone by petitioner, respondent Skills
International claims that it could not have possibly recommended him for such a
procedure as precisely, there was no job order as far as Wallan Al Wallan's company
was concerned.

Respondent Skills International also denies having facilitated petitioner's deployment as

an alleged balik-manggagawa as petitioner's Balik-Manggagawa Information Sheet does
not indicate the name of any local placement or recruitment agency. Moreover, on 19
June 1998, POEA Administrator Felicisimo Joson issued an Order, 22 the pertinent
portion of which reads:

The issue posed for Our resolution is whether or not the respondent agency (herein
respondent) should be held liable for withholding worker's salaries should be resolved in
the negative. As discussed, complainant (herein petitioner) was hired directly by his
employer and the respondent agency had no participation whatsoever in his overseas
employment. Wanting in factual and legal [bases], the charged offense must be
dismissed.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, let the instant case be, as it is hereby ordered
DISMISSED for lack of merit.23

Respondent Skills International also insists that it did not receive placement fee from
petitioner for the simple reason that it did not deploy him to work abroad for Wallan Al
Wallan and that only petitioner and said employer are the ones privy to the
circumstances surrounding the alleged salary deductions committed by the latter.

The petition must fail.

At the outset, it must be stressed that the resolution of the issue of whether respondent
Skills International could be held solidarily liable for the alleged illegal dismissal of
petitioner necessarily hinges on the primordial question of whether respondent Skills
International was the one responsible for his deployment abroad. This indubitably raises
a question of fact which is not a proper subject of a Petition for Review on Certiorari.  It
is axiomatic that in an appeal by certiorari, only questions of law may be reviewed.24

The distinction between a question of law and a question of fact was comprehensively
discussed in the case of Microsoft Corporation v. Maxicorp, Inc., 25 thus:

The distinction between questions of law and questions of fact is settled. A question of
law exists when the doubt or difference centers on what the law is on a certain state of
facts. A question of fact exists if the doubt centers on the truth or falsity of the alleged
facts. Though this delineation seems simple, determining the true nature and extent of
the distinction is sometimes problematic. For example, it is incorrect to presume that all
cases where the facts are not in dispute automatically involve purely questions of law.

There is a question of law if the issue raised is capable of being resolved without need
of reviewing the probative value of the evidence. The resolution of the issue must rest
solely on what the law provides on the given set of circumstances. Once it is clear that
the issue invites a review of the evidence presented, the question posed is one of fact.
If the query requires a re-evaluation of the credibility of witnesses, or the existence or
relevance of surrounding circumstances and their relation to each other, the issue in
that query is factual.26

In this case, the issues brought for our consideration calls for the re-examination of the
evidence presented by the parties and the determination of whether the Labor Arbiter,
the NLRC, and the Court of Appeals erred in their respective evaluation of the same.
This we cannot do without blurring the difference between a question of fact and a
question of law - a significant distinction as far as the remedy of appeal by certiorari  is
concerned.

Furthermore, factual findings of administrative agencies that are affirmed by the Court
of Appeals are conclusive on the parties and not reviewable by this Court.27 This is so
because of the special knowledge and expertise gained by these quasi-judicial agencies
from presiding over matters falling within their jurisdiction.28 So long as these factual
findings are supported by substantial evidence, this Court will not disturb the same.29

As earlier stated, in this case, the Labor Arbiter, the NLRC, and the Court of Appeals are
unanimous in their factual conclusions that Wallan Al Wallan is not an accredited
principal of respondent Skills International and we sustain said findings. As aptly
observed by the NLRC'

In the instant case, the alleged Employment Contract, Annex "A" for the complainant
(herein petitioner) appears to be one which is not perfected by herein parties, because
said contract does not bear the signatures of the respondents or any of their authorized
representatives. It only bears the signature and thumbmark of the complainant. On its
face, the Employment Contract readily shows that respondent agency has neither
participated nor is it a [privy] to any party who executed the contract binding it to the
terms and conditions of the same.

Even in the Complainant's Overseas Employment Certificate No. 144592-A, the name of
respondent agency does not appear to be the one that recruited and deployed the
complainant. Likewise, the Balikbayan Info Sheet of complainant does not indicated
that herein respondent agency is the contracting agency in the Philippines. x x x.

Complainant failed to submit evidence to disprove the allegations of the [respondents]

that they neither participated in the contract of employment of complainant (Annex "A"
for the complainant) nor were they privy to the terms and conditions appearing therein.
The evidence submitted are not sufficient to hold respondent agency liable. The copy of
the receipt for the alleged placement fee was not issued by the respondent agency but
by the employer of complainant which is not its accredited principal - another fact which
was never controverted by the complainant. This being the case, complainant has no
cause of action against herein respondent and therefore, his money claims could not
prosper in the instant case.

The Solidary Liability under Section [60] of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the
Migrant Workers and Overseas and Filipino Act of 1995, will only apply if there is an
existing valid contract and signed by the parties concerned.30
To this, we add our own observations. Petitioner insists that he does not qualify as
a balik-manggagawa as the term is defined under the law. Nevertheless, it does not
escape us that in his pleadings, 31 he asserts that respondent Skills International
handled his deployment as a balik-manggagawa to expedite his deployment abroad. In
addition, he never denied having filled-up the entries in the Balik-
Manggagawa  Information Sheet leaving the portion pertaining to the name of the
placement or recruitment agency blank. To our mind, it is clear that petitioner utilizes
the Balik-Manggagawa program of the government whenever it is convenient for him.
Thus, he availed himself of said program in order to fast-track his deployment abroad
and yet now that said Info Sheet is being used against him, he claims that he could not
have been processed as a balik-manggagawa as defined by law. We simply cannot
countenance such trifling regard for the law by awarding to petitioner the money claims
he is seeking in the present case.

As for the medical examination result which petitioner belatedly presented before the
Court of Appeals, the law clearly requires that there should first be a job order relating
to an existing overseas position before a worker shall be subjected to a medical
examination. In this case, as petitioner is the one insisting that a job order exists, he
bears the burden of producing the same. After all, the rule is settled that he who
alleges must prove.32 Petitioner miserably failed to discharge this burden.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present petition is hereby DENIED and the
Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 28 November 2000 in CA-G.R. SP. No. 58795,
affirming the Resolution of the National Labor Relations Commission dated 31 January
2000, is AFFIRMED. No costs.

Facts:
On 1 September 1997, petitioner filed a Complaint against respondent Skills
International before the NLRC claiming that he was illegally dismissed from
service by his foreign employer, Wallan Al Wallan.
In his Position Paper,[6] petitioner alleged that his employment was illegally
terminated on 14 April 1997 in gross violation of the Constitution and of the
Labor Code. Because of this, he claimed that he was entitled to receive payment
for the unexpired... portion of his employment agreement as well as moral,
exemplary, and nominal damages, and attorney's fees.
For its part, respondent Skills International alleged that it previously deployed
petitioner for work abroad in April 1995 until he came home in July 1996
Later on, petitioner met his new employer at respondent Skills International's
office in Malate, Manila. Respondent Skills
International, however, clarified that petitioner's new employer, Wallan Al
Wallan, was not its accredited principal. This being the case, it argued that
petitioner did not have any cause of action against it because as a recruitment
agency, it could only be held solidarily... liable with the employer if the latter is
an accredited principal of the... e agency.
On 31 July 1998, Labor Arbiter Felipe Pati rendered a Decision[8] dismissing the
case for lack of merit stating that if there was anyone liable for petitioner's
illegal dismissal, it was none other than his foreign employer, Wallan Al Wallan.
Petitioner then filed an appeal with the NLRC but the same was resolved against
him[9] prompting petitioner to elevate his case to the Court of Appeals. In the
Deci... titioner then filed an appeal with the NLRC but the same was resolved
against him[9] prompting petitioner to elevate his case to the Court of Appeals.
In the Decision now assailed before us, the Court of Appeals dismissed his
Petition for
Certiorari with the decretal portion of the Decision stating:
Petitioner then filed an appeal with the NLRC but the same was resolved against
him[9] prompting petitioner to elevate his case to the Court of Appeals. In the
Decision now assailed before us, the Court of Appeals dismissed his Petition for
Certiorari with the decretal portion of the Decision stating:... merit... merit,... In
sustaining the NLRC, the Court of Appeals stated that petitioner's arguments
were a mere reiteration of those he earlier presented before the NLRC and
which were already passed upon by the latter.[
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration but this was denie... hence, the
present recourse
On the other hand, respondent Skills International insists that this Petition
should be dismissed as it seeks a review of the factual findings of the Labor
Arbiter, the NLRC, and the Court of Appeals
Nevertheless, respondent Skills International proceeded to address the matters
stated in the Petition. It contends that although it had previously deployed
petitioner abroad, such deployment was for its accredited principal, the Saudi
Automotive Services
Company and not for Wallan Al Wallan
Issues:
whether respondent Skills International could be held solidarily liable for the
alleged illegal dismissal of petitioner necessarily hinges on the primordial
question of whether respondent Skills International... was the one responsible
for his deployment abroad.
Ruling:
The distinction between a question of law and a question of fact was
comprehensively discussed in the case of Microsoft Corporation v. Maxicorp,
Inc.,... The distinction between questions of law and questions of fact is settled.
A question of fact exists if the doubt centers on the truth or falsity of the...
alleged facts.
There is a question of law if the issue raised is capable of being resolved without
need of reviewing the probative value of the evidence.
In this case, the issues brought for our consideration calls for the re-
examination of the evidence presented by the parties and the determination of
whether the Labor Arbiter, the NLRC, and the Court of Appeals erred in their
respective evaluation of the same. This we cannot do... without blurring the
difference between a question of fact and a question of law a significant
distinction as far as the remedy of appeal by certiorari is concerned.
Furthermore, factual findings of administrative agencies that are affirmed by the
Court of Appeals are conclusive on the parties and not reviewable by this Court.
So long as these factual findings are supported by substantial evidence, this
Court will not disturb the same.[29]
Complainant failed to submit evidence to disprove the allegations of the
[respondents] that they neither participated in the contract of employment of
complainant (Annex "A" for the complainant) nor were they privy to the terms
and conditions appearing therein. The evidence... submitted are not sufficient to
hold respondent agency liable. The copy of the receipt for the alleged placement
fee was not issued by the respondent agency but by the employer of
complainant which is not its accredited principal another fact which was never
controverted by the... complainant. This being the case, complainant has no
cause of action against herein respondent and therefore, his money claims could
not prosper in the instant case.

SO ORDERED.

IN RE: PETITION TO SIGN IN THE ROLL OF ATTORNEYS MICHAEL A.

MEDADO, Petitioner.
 RESOLUTION

SERENO, C.J.:

We resolve the instant Petition to Sign in the Roll of Attorneys filed by petitioner
Michael A. Medado (Medado).

Medado graduated from the University of the Philippines with the degree of Bachelor of
Laws in 19791 and passed the same year’s bar examinations with a general weighted
average of 82.7.2 cralaw virtualaw library

On 7 May 1980, he took the Attorney’s Oath at the Philippine International Convention
Center (PICC) together with the successful bar examinees.3 He was scheduled to sign in
the Roll of Attorneys on 13 May 1980,4 but he failed to do so on his scheduled date,
allegedly because he had misplaced the Notice to Sign the Roll of Attorneys5 given by
the Bar Office when he went home to his province for a vacation.6 cralaw virtualaw library

Several years later, while rummaging through his old college files, Medado found the
Notice to Sign the Roll of Attorneys. It was then that he realized that he had not signed
in the roll, and that what he had signed at the entrance of the PICC was probably just
an attendance record.7 cralaw virtualaw library

By the time Medado found the notice, he was already working. He stated that he was
mainly doing corporate and taxation work, and that he was not actively involved in
litigation practice. Thus, he operated “under the mistaken belief [that] since he ha[d]
already taken the oath, the signing of the Roll of Attorneys was not as urgent, nor as
crucial to his status as a lawyer”;8 and “the matter of signing in the Roll of Attorneys
lost its urgency and compulsion, and was subsequently forgotten.”9 cralaw virtualaw library

In 2005, when Medado attended Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE)

seminars, he was required to provide his roll number in order for his MCLE compliances
to be credited.10 Not having signed in the Roll of Attorneys, he was unable to provide
his roll number.
About seven years later, or on 6 February 2012, Medado filed the instant Petition,
praying that he be allowed to sign in the Roll of Attorneys.11 cralaw virtualaw library

The Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) conducted a clarificatory conference on the
matter on 21 September 201212 and submitted a Report and Recommendation to this
Court on 4 February 2013.13 The OBC recommended that the instant petition be denied
for petitioner’s gross negligence, gross misconduct and utter lack of merit.14 It
explained that, based on his answers during the clarificatory conference, petitioner
could offer no valid justification for his negligence in signing in the Roll of Attorneys.15 cralaw virtualaw library

After a judicious review of the records, we grant Medado’s prayer in the instant petition,
subject to the payment of a fine and the imposition of a penalty equivalent to
suspension from the practice of law.

At the outset, we note that not allowing Medado to sign in the Roll of Attorneys would
be akin to imposing upon him the ultimate penalty of disbarment, a penalty that we
have reserved for the most serious ethical transgressions of members of the Bar.

In this case, the records do not show that this action is warranted.

For one, petitioner demonstrated good faith and good moral character when he finally
filed the instant Petition to Sign in the Roll of Attorneys. We note that it was not a third
party who called this Court’s attention to petitioner’s omission; rather, it was Medado
himself who acknowledged his own lapse, albeit after the passage of more than 30
years. When asked by the Bar Confidant why it took him this long to file the instant
petition, Medado very candidly replied: chanrobles virtua1aw 1ibrary

Mahirap hong i-explain yan pero, yun bang at the time, what can you say? Takot ka
kung anong mangyayari sa ‘yo, you don’t know what’s gonna happen. At the same
time, it’s a combination of apprehension and anxiety of what’s gonna happen. And,
finally it’s the right thing to do. I have to come here … sign the roll and take the oath as
necessary.16

For another, petitioner has not been subject to any action for disqualification from the
practice of law,17 which is more than what we can say of other individuals who were
successfully admitted as members of the Philippine Bar. For this Court, this fact
demonstrates that petitioner strove to adhere to the strict requirements of the ethics of
the profession, and that he has prima facie shown that he possesses the character
required to be a member of the Philippine Bar.

Finally, Medado appears to have been a competent and able legal practitioner, having
held various positions at the Laurel Law Office,18 Petron, Petrophil Corporation, the
Philippine National Oil Company, and the Energy Development Corporation.19 cralaw virtualaw library

All these demonstrate Medado’s worth to become a full-fledged member of the

Philippine Bar. While the practice of law is not a right but a privilege,20 this Court will
not unwarrantedly withhold this privilege from individuals who have shown mental
fitness and moral fiber to withstand the rigors of the profession.

That said, however, we cannot fully exculpate petitioner Medado from all liability for his
years of inaction.

Petitioner has been engaged in the practice of law since 1980, a period spanning more
than 30 years, without having signed in the Roll of Attorneys.21 He justifies this
behavior by characterizing his acts as “neither willful nor intentional but based on a
mistaken belief and an honest error of judgment.”22 cralaw virtualaw library

We disagree.

While an honest mistake of fact could be used to excuse a person from the legal
consequences of his acts23 as it negates malice or evil motive,24 a mistake of law cannot
be utilized as a lawful justification, because everyone is presumed to know the law and
its consequences.25  Ignorantia facti excusat; ignorantia legis neminem excusat.

Applying these principles to the case at bar, Medado may have at first operated under
an honest mistake of fact when he thought that what he had signed at the PICC
entrance before the oath-taking was already the Roll of Attorneys. However, the
moment he realized that what he had signed was merely an attendance record, he
could no longer claim an honest mistake of fact as a valid justification. At that point,
Medado should have known that he was not a full-fledged member of the Philippine Bar
because of his failure to sign in the Roll of Attorneys, as it was the act of signing therein
that would have made him so.26 When, in spite of this knowledge, he chose to continue
practicing law without taking the necessary steps to complete all the requirements for
admission to the Bar, he willfully engaged in the unauthorized practice of law.

Under the Rules of Court, the unauthorized practice of law by one’s assuming to be an
attorney or officer of the court, and acting as such without authority, may constitute
indirect contempt of court,27 which is punishable by fine or imprisonment or
both.28 Such a finding, however, is in the nature of criminal contempt29 and must be
reached after the filing of charges and the conduct of hearings.30 In this case, while it
appears quite clearly that petitioner committed indirect contempt of court by knowingly
engaging in unauthorized practice of law, we refrain from making any finding of liability
for indirect contempt, as no formal charge pertaining thereto has been filed against
him.

Knowingly engaging in unauthorized practice of law likewise transgresses Canon 9 of

the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides: chanrobles virtua1aw 1ibrary

CANON 9 – A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, assist in the unauthorized practice
of law.

While a reading of Canon 9 appears to merely prohibit lawyers from assisting in the
unauthorized practice of law, the unauthorized practice of law by the lawyer himself is
subsumed under this provision, because at the heart of Canon 9 is the lawyer’s duty to
prevent the unauthorized practice of
law. This duty likewise applies to law students and Bar candidates. As aspiring
members of the Bar, they are bound to comport themselves in accordance with the
ethical standards of the legal profession.

Turning now to the applicable penalty, previous violations of Canon 9 have warranted
the penalty of suspension from the practice of law.31 As Medado is not yet a full-fledged
lawyer, we cannot suspend him from the practice of law. However, we see it fit to
impose upon him a penalty akin to suspension by allowing him to sign in the Roll of
Attorneys one (1) year after receipt of this Resolution. For his transgression of the
prohibition against the unauthorized practice of law, we likewise see it fit to fine him in
the amount of P32,000. During the one year period, petitioner is warned that he is not
allowed to engage in the practice of law, and is sternly warned that doing any act that
constitutes practice of law before he has signed in the Roll of Attorneys will be dealt
with severely by this Court.

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition to Sign in the Roll of Attorneys is hereby GRANTED.

Petitioner Michael A. Medado is ALLOWED to sign in the Roll of Attorneys ONE (1)
YEAR after receipt of this Resolution. Petitioner is likewise ORDERED to pay a FINE of
P32,000 for his unauthorized practice of law. During the one year period, petitioner
is NOT ALLOWED to practice law, and is STERNLY WARNED that doing any act that
constitutes practice of law before he has signed in the Roll of Attorneys will be dealt
with severely by this Court.

Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the Office of the Court Administrator for
circulation to all courts in the country. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

SO ORDERED.

MARSH THOMSON, Petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and THE AMERICAN

CHAMPER OF COMMERCE OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC, Respondents.

QUISUMBING, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking the reversal of the Decision 1 of

the Court of Appeals on May 19, 1994, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, THE DECISION APPEALED FROM IS HEREBY SET ASIDE. ANOTHER
JUDGMENT IS ENTERED ORDERING DEFENDANT-APPELLEE MARSH THOMSON TO
TRANSFER THE SAID MPC [Manila Polo Club] SHARE TO THE NOMINEE OF THE
APPELLANT.

The facts of the case are:

Petitioner Marsh Thomson (Thomson) was the Executive Vice-President and, later
on, the Management Consultant of private respondent, the American Chamber of
Commerce of the Philippines, Inc. (AmCham) for over ten years, 1979-1989.

While petitioner was still working with private respondent, his superior, A. Lewis
Burridge, retired as AmCham's President. Before Burridge decided to return to his
home country, he wanted to transfer his proprietary share in the Manila Polo Club
(MPC) to petitioner. However, through the intercession of Burridge, private
respondent paid for the share but had it listed in petitioner's name. This was made
clear in an employment advice dated January 13, 1986, wherein petitioner was
informed by private respondent as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

11. If you so desire, the Chamber is willing to acquire for your use a membership in
the Manila Polo Club. The timing of such acquisition shall be subject to the
discretion of the Board based on the Chamber's financial position. All dues and
other charges relating to such membership shall be for your personal account. If
the membership is acquired in your name, you would execute such documents as
necessary to acknowledge beneficial ownership thereof by the Chamber. 2

xxx xxx xxx

On April 25, 1986, Burridge transferred said proprietary share to petitioner, as

confirmed in a letter 3 of notification to the Manila Polo Club.

Upon his admission as a new member of the MPC, petitioner paid the transfer fee of
P40,000.00 from his own funds; but private respondent subsequently reimbursed
this amount. On November 19, 1986, MPC issued Proprietary Membership
Certificate Number 3398 in favor of petitioner. But petitioner, however, failed to
execute a document recognizing private respondent's beneficial ownership over said
share.

Following AmCham's policy and practice, there was a yearly renewal of employment
contract between the petitioner and private respondent. Separate letters of
employment advice dated October 1, 1986 4, as well March 4, 1988 5 and January 7,
1989 6, mentioned the MPC share. But petitioner never acknowledged that private
respondent is the beneficial owner of the share as requested in follow-up requests,
particularly one dated March 4, 1988 as follows:

Dear Marsh:
 xxx xxx xxx

All other provisions of your compensation/benefit package will remain the same and
are summarized as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

9) The Manila Polo Club membership provided by the Chamber for you and your
family will continue on the same basis, to wit: all dues and other charges relating to
such membership shall be for your personal account and, if you have not already
done so,  you will execute such documents as are necessary to acknowledge that
the Chamber is the beneficial owner of your membership in the
Club. 7

When petitioner's contract of employment was up for renewal in 1989, he notified

private respondent that he would no longer be available as Executive Vice President
after September 30, 1989. Still, the private respondent asked the petitioner to stay
on for another six (6) months. Petitioner indicated his acceptance of the
consultancy arrangement with a counter-proposal in his letter dated October 8,
1989, among others as follows:

11.) Retention of the Polo Club share, subject to my reimbursing the purchase price
to the Chamber, or one hundred ten thousand pesos (P110,000.00). 8

Private respondent rejected petitioner's counter-proposal.

Pending the negotiation for the consultancy arrangement, private respondent

executed on September 29, 1989 a Release and Quitclaim, 9 stating that "AMCHAM,
its directors, officers and assigns, employees and/or representatives do hereby
release, waive, abandon and discharge J. MARSH THOMSON from any and all
existing claims that the AMCHAM, its directors, officers and assigns, employees
and/or representatives may have against J. MARSH THOMSON." 10 The quitclaim,
expressed in general terms, did not mention specifically the MPC share.

On April 5, 1990, private respondent, through counsel sent a letter to the petitioner
demanding the return and delivery of the MPC share which "it (AmCham) owns and
placed in your (Thomson's) name." 11

Failing to get a favorable response, private respondent filed on May 15, 1990, a
complaint against petitioner praying, inter alia, that the Makati Regional Trial Court
render judgment ordering Thomson "to return the Manila Polo Club share to the
plaintiff and transfer said share to the nominee of plaintiff." 12

On February 28, 1992, the trial court promulgated its decision, 13 thus:

The foregoing considered judgment is rendered as follows:

1) The ownership of the contested Manila Polo Club share is adjudicated in favor of
defendant Marsh Thomson; and;

2) Defendant shall pay plaintiff the sum of P300,000.00

Because both parties thru their respective faults have somehow contributed to the
birth of this case, each shall bear the incidental expenses incurred. 14

In said decision, the trial court awarded the MPC share to defendant (petitioner
now) on the ground that the Articles of Incorporation and By-laws of Manila Polo
Club prohibit artificial persons, such as corporations, to be club members,
ratiocinating in this manner:

An assessment of the evidence adduced by both parties at the trial will show clearly
that it was the intention of the parties that a membership to Manila Polo Club was
to be secured by plaintiff [herein private respondent] for defendant's [herein
petitioner] use. The latter was to execute the necessary documents to acknowledge
ownership of the Polo membership in favor of plaintiff. (Exh. C par 9) However,
when the parties parted ways in disagreement and with some degree of bitterness,
the defendant had second thoughts and decided to keep the membership for
himself. This is evident from the exhibits (E & G) where defendant asked that he
retained the Polo Club membership upon reimbursement of its purchase price; and
where he showed his "profound disappointment, both at the previous Board's unfair
action, and at what I consider to be harsh terms, after my long years of dedication
to the Chamber's interest."

xxx xxx xxx

Notwithstanding all these evidence in favor of plaintiff, however, defendant may not
be declared the owner of the contested membership be compelled to execute
documents transferring the Polo Membership to plaintiff or the latter's nominee for
the reason that this is prohibited by Polo Club's Articles & By-Laws. . . .

It is for the foregoing reasons that the Court rules that the ownership of the
questioned Polo Club membership be retained by defendant. 15 . . . .

Not satisfied with the trial court's decision, private respondent appealed to the
Court of Appeals.

On May 19, 1994, the Court of Appeals (Former Special Sixth Division) promulgated
its decision 16 in said CA-G.R. CV No. 38417, reversing the, trial court's judgment
and ordered herein petitioner to transfer the MPC share to the nominee of private
respondent, reasoning thus:

xxx xxx xxx

The significant fact in the instant case is that the appellant [herein private
respondent] purchased the MPC share for the use of the appellee [herein petitioner]
and the latter expressly conformed thereto as shown in Exhibits A-1, B, B-1, C, C-1,
D, D-1. By such express conformity of the appellee, the former was bound to
recognize the appellant as the owner of the said share for a contract has the force
of law between the parties. (Alim vs. CA, 200 SCRA 450; Sasuhura Company, Inc.,
Ltd. vs. IAC, 205 SCRA 632) Aside from the foregoing, the appellee conceded the
true ownership of the said share to the appellant when (1) he offered to buy the
MPC share from the appellant (Exhs. E and E-1) upon the termination of his
employment; (2) he obliged himself to return the MPC share after his six month
consultancy contract had elapsed, unless its return was earlier requested in writting
(Exh. I); and (3) on cross-examination, he admitted that the proprietary share
listed as one of the assets of the appellant corporation in its 1988 Corporate
Income Tax Return, which he signed as the latter's Executive Vice President (prior
to its filing), refers to the Manila Polo Club Share (tsn., pp. 19-20, August 30,
1991). . . . 17

On 16 June 1994, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration 18 of said decision. By

resolution 19 promulgated on August 4, 1994, the Court of Appeals denied the
motion for reconsideration.

In this petition for review, petitioner alleges the following errors of public
respondent as grounds for our review:

I. The respondent Court of Appeals erred in setting aside the Decision dated 28
February 1992 of the Regional Trial Court, NCJR, Branch 65, Makati, Metro Manila,
in its Civil Case No. 90-1286, and in not confirming petitioner's ownership over the
MPC membership share.

II. The respondent Court of Appeals erred in ruling that "the Quitclaim executed by
AmCham in favor of petitioner of September 29, 1989 was superseded by the
contractual agreement entered into by the parties on October 13, 1989 wherein
again the appellee acknowledged that the appellant owned the MPC share, there
being absolutely no evidence to support such a conclusion and/or such inference is
manifestly mistaken.

III. The respondent Court of Appeals erred in rendering judgment ordering

petitioner to transfer the contested MPC share to a nominee of respondent AmCham
notwithstanding that: (a) AmCham has no standing in the Manila Polo Club (MPG),
and being an artificial person, it is precluded under MPC's Articles of Incorporation
and governing rules and regulations from owning a proprietary share or from
becoming a member thereof: and (b) even under AmCham's Articles of
Incorporation, the purposes for which it is dedicated, becoming a stockholder or
shareholder in other corporation is not one of the express implied powers fixed in
AmCham's said corporate franchise. 20

As posited above, these assigned errors show the disputed matters herein are
mainly factual. As such they are best left to the trial and appellate courts'
disposition. And this Court could have dismissed the petition outright, were it not
for the opposite results reached by the courts below. Moreover, for the enhanced
appreciation of the jural relationship between the parties involving trust, this Court
has given due course to the petition, which we now decide.

After carefully considering the pleadings on record, we find there are two main
issues to be resolved: (1) Did respondent court err in holding that private
respondent is the beneficial owner of the disputed share? (2) Did the respondent
court err in ordering petitioner to transfer said share to private respondent's
nominees?

Petitioner claims ownership of the MPC share, asserting that he merely incurred a
debt to respondent when the latter advanced the funds for the purchase of the
share. On the other hand, private respondent asserts beneficial ownership whereby
petitioner only holds the share in his name, but the beneficial title belongs to
private respondent. To resolve the first issue, we must clearly distinguish a debt
from a trust.

The beneficiary of a trust has beneficial interest in the trust property, while a
creditor has merely a personal claim against the debtor. In trust, there is a fiduciary
relation between a trustee and a beneficiary, but there is no such relation between
a debtor and creditor. While a debt implies merely an obligation to pay a certain
sum of money, a trust refers to a duty to deal with a specific property for the
benefit of another. If a creditor-debtor relationship exists, but not a fiduciary
relationship between the parties, there is no express trust. However, it is
understood that when the purported trustee of funds is entitled to use them as his
or her own (and commingle them with his or her own money), a debtor-creditor
relationship exists, not a trust. 21

In the present case, as the Executive Vice-President of AmCham, petitioner

occupied a fiduciary position in the business of AmCham. AmCham released the
funds to acquire a share in the Club for the use of petitioner but obliged him to
"execute such document as necessary to acknowledge beneficial ownership thereof
by the Chamber". 22 A trust relationship is, therefore, manifestly indicated.

Moreover, petitioner failed to present evidence to support his allegation of being

merely a debtor when the private respondent paid the purchase price of the MPC
share. Applicable here is the rule that a trust arises in favor of one who pays the
purchase money of property in the name of another, because of the presumption
that he who pays for a thing intends a beneficial interest therein for himself. 23

Although petitioner initiated the acquisition of the share, evidence on record shows
that private respondent acquired said share with its funds. Petitioner did not pay for
said share, although he later wanted to, but according to his own terms,
particularly the price thereof.

Private respondent's evident purpose in acquiring the share was to provide

additional incentive and perks to its chosen executive, the petitioner himself. Such
intention was repeated in the yearly employment advice prepared by AmCham for
petitioner's concurrence. In the cited employment advice, dated March 4, 1988,
private respondent once again, asked the petitioner to execute proof to recognize
the trust agreement in writing:

The Manila Polo membership provided by the Chamber for you and your family will
continue on the same basis, to wit: all dues and other charges relating to such
membership shall be for your personal account and, if you have not already done
so, you will execute such documents as are necessary to acknowledge that the
Chamber is the beneficial owner of your membership in the Club. 24

Petitioner voluntarily affixed his signature to conform with the employment advice,
including his obligation stated therein - for him to execute the necessary document
to recognize his employer as the beneficial owner of the MPC share. Now, we
cannot hear him claiming otherwise, in derogation of said undertaking, without
legal and equitable justification.

For private respondent's intention to hold on to its beneficial ownership is not only
presumed; it was expressed in writing at the very outset. Although the share was
placed in the name of petitioner, his title is limited to the usufruct, that is, to enjoy
the facilities and privileges of such membership in the club appertaining to the
share. Such arrangement reflects a trust relationship governed by law and equity.

While private respondent paid the purchase price for the share, petitioner was given
legal title thereto. Thus, a resulting trust is presumed as a matter of law. The
burden then shifted to the transferee to show otherwise, that it was just a loan.
Such resulting trust could have been rebutted by proof of a contrary intention by a
showing that, in fact, no trust was intended. Petitioner could have negated the trust
agreement by contrary, consistent and convincing evidence on rebuttal. However,
on the witness stand, petitioner failed to do so persuasively.

On cross-examination, the petitioner testified as follows:

ATTY. AQUINO (continuing)

Q. Okay, let me go to the cash advance that you mentioned Mr. Witness, is there
any document proving that you claimed cash advance signed by an officer of the
Chamber?

A. I believe the best evidence is the check.

Q. Is there any document?

COURT

Other than the Check?

MR. THOMSON
Nothing more.

ATTY. AQUINO

Is there any application filed in the Chamber to avail of this cash advance?

A. Verbal only.

Q. Nothing written, and can you tell to this Honorable Court what are the
stipulations or conditions, or terms of this transaction of securing this cash advance
or loan?

xxx xxx xxx

COURT

How are you going to repay the cash advance?

MR. THOMSON

The cash advance, we never stipulate when I have to repay it, but I presume that I
would, when able to repay the money. 25

In deciding whether the property was wrongfully appropriated or retained and what
the intent of the parties was at the time of the conveyance, the court must rely
upon its impression of the credibility of the witnesses. 26 Intent is a question of fact,
the determination of which is not reviewable unless the conclusion drawn by the
trier is one which could not reasonably be drawn. 27 Petitioner's denial is not
adequate to rebut the trust. Time and again, we have ruled that denials, if
unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, are deemed negative and self-
serving evidence, unworthy of credence. 28

The trust between the parties having been established, petitioner advanced an
alternative defense that the private respondent waived the beneficial ownership of
MPC share by issuing the Release and Quitclaim in his favor.

This argument is less than persuasive. The quitclaim executed by private

respondent does not clearly show the intent to include therein the ownership over
the MPC share. Private respondent even asserts that at the time the Release and
Quitclaim was executed on September 29, 1989, the ownership of the MPC share
was not controversial nor contested. Settled is the rule that a waiver to be valid and
effective must, in the first place, be couched in clear and unequivocal terms which
leave no doubt as to the intention of a party to give up a right or benefit which
legally pertains to him. 29 A waiver may not be attributed to a person when the
terms thereof do not explicitly and clearly evidence an intent to abandon a right
vested in such person. 30 If we apply the standard rule that waiver must be cast in
clear and unequivocal terms, then clearly the general terms of the cited release and
quitclaim indicates merely a clearance from general accountability, not specifically a
waiver of AmCham's beneficial ownership of the disputed shares.

Additionally, the intention to waive a right or advantage must be shown clearly and
convincingly, and when the only proof of intention rests in what a party does, his
act should be so manifestly consistent with, and indicative of, an intent to
voluntarily relinquish the particular right or advantage that no other reasonable
explanation of his conduct is possible. 31 Considering the terms of the quitclaim
executed by the President of private respondent, the tenor of the document does
not lead to the purported conclusion that be intended to renounce private
respondent's beneficial title over its share in the Manila Polo Club. We, therefore,
find no reversible error in the respondent Court's holding that private respondent,
AmCham, is the beneficial owner of the share in dispute.

Turning now to the second issue, the petitioner contends that the Articles of
Incorporation and By-laws of Manila Polo Club prohibit corporate membership.
However, private respondent does not insist nor intend to transfer the club
membership in its name but rather to its designated nominee. For as properly ruled
by the Court of Appeals:

The matter prayed for does not involve the transfer of said share to the appellant,
an artificial person. The transfer sought is to the appellant's nominee. Even if the
MPC By-Laws and Articles prohibit corporate membership, there would be no
violation of said prohibition for the appellant's nominee to whom the said share is
sought to be transferred would certainly be a natural person. . . .

As to whether or not the transfer of said share the appellant's nominee would be
disapproved by the MPC, is a matter that should be raised at the proper time, which
is only if such transfer is disapproved by the MPC. 32

The Manila Polo Club does not necessarily prohibit the transfer of proprietary shares
by its members. The Club only restricts membership to deserving applicants in
accordance with its rules, when the amended Articles of Incorporation states that:
"No transfer shall be valid  except between the parties, and shall be registered in
the Membership Book unless made in accordance with these Articles and the By-
Laws". 33 Thus, as between parties herein, there is no question that a transfer is
feasible. Moreover, authority granted to a corporation to regulate the transfer of its
stock does not empower it to restrict the right of a stockholder to transfer his
shares, but merely authorizes the adoption of regulations as to the formalities and
procedure to be followed in effecting transfer. 34

In this case, the petitioner was the nominee of the private respondent to hold the
share and enjoy the privileges of the club. But upon the expiration of petitioner's
employment as officer and consultant of AmCham, the incentives that go with the
position, including use of the MPC share, also ceased to exist. It now behooves
petitioner to surrender said share to private respondent's next nominee, another
natural person. Obviously this arrangement of trust and confidence cannot be
defeated by the petitioner's citation of the MPC rules to shield his untenable
position, without doing violence to basic tenets of justice and fair dealing.

However, we still have to ascertain whether the rights of herein parties to the trust
still subsist. It has been held that so long as there has been no denial or
repudiation of the trust, the possession of the trustee of an express and continuing
trust is presumed to be that of the beneficiary, and the statute of limitations does
not run between them. 35 With regard to a constructive or a resulting trust, the
statute of limitations does not begin to run until the trustee clearly repudiates or
disavows the trust and such disavowal is brought home to the other party, "cestui
que trust". 36 The statute of limitations runs generally from the time when the act
was done by which the party became chargeable as a trustee by operation of law or
when the beneficiary knew that he had a cause of action, 37 in the absence of fraud
or concealment.

Noteworthy in the instant case, there was no declared or explicit repudiation of the
trust existing between the parties. Such repudiation could only be inferred as
evident when the petitioner showed his intent to appropriate the MPC share for
himself. Specifically, this happened when he requested to retain the MPC share
upon his reimbursing the purchase price of P110,000, a request denied promptly by
private respondent. Eventually, petitioner refused to surrender the share despite
the written demand of private respondent. This act could then be construed as
repudiation of the trust. The statute of limitation could start to set in at this point in
time. But private respondent took immediate positive action. Thus, on May 15,
1990, private respondent filed an action to recover the MPC share. Between the
time of implicit repudiation of the trust on October 9, 1989, as evidenced by
petitioner's letter of said date, and private respondent's institution of the action to
recover the MPC share on May 15, 1990, only about seven months bad lapsed. Our
laws on the matter provide that actions to recover movables shall prescribe eight
years from the time the possession thereof is lot, 38 unless the possessor has
acquired the ownership by prescription for a less period of four years if in good
faith. 39 Since the private respondent filed the necessary action on time and the
defense of good faith is not available to the petitioner, there is no basis for any
purported claim of prescription, after repudiation of the trust, which will entitle
petitioner to ownership of the disputed share. As correctly held by the respondent
court, petitioner has the obligation to transfer now said share to the nominee of
private respondent.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is DENIED. The Decision of the
Court of Appeals of May 19, 1994, is AFFIRMED.

COSTS against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

ARTICLE 9
 G.R. No. L-10010 August 1, 1916

CHU JAN, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. LUCIO BERNAS, Defendant-Appellant.

Sulpicio V. Cea for appellant.

On the afternoon of June 26, 1913, a match was held in the cockpit of the
municipality of Tabaco, Albay, between two cocks belonging to the plaintiff and to
the defendant respectively. Each of said persons had put up a wager of P160; and
as the referee of the cockpit had declared the defendant’s cock the winner in the
bout, the plaintiff brought suit against the defendant in the justice of the peace
court of the said pueblo, asking that his own rooster be declared the winner. The
justice of the peace court decided that the bout was a draw. From this judgment
the defendant appealed to the Court of First Instance of the province. For the
purposes of the appeal, the plaintiff filed his complaint and prayed this court to
render judgment ordering the defendant to abide by and comply with the rules and
regulations governing cockfights, to pay the stipulated wager of P160; to return the
other like amount (both sums of wager being held for safe-keeping by the cockpit
owner, Tomas Almonte) and to assess the costs of both instances against the
defendant.

The defendant denied each and all of the allegations of the complaint and moved to
dismiss with the costs against the plaintiff. On September 11, 1913, the said Court
of First Instance rendered judgment dismissing the appeal without special finding as
to costs. The defendant excepted to this judgment as well as to an order dictated
by the same court on November 8th of the same year, on the plaintiff’s motion,
ordering the provincial treasurer of Albay and, if necessary, the municipal treasurer
of Tabaco of the same province, to release the deposit of P160 and return it to its
owner, the plaintiff Chinaman, Chu Jan. These proceedings have come before us on
appeal by means of the proper bill of exceptions.

The grounds for the dismissal pronounced by the lower court in the judgment
appealed from ere that the court has always dismissed cases of this nature, that he
is not familiar with the rules governing cockfights and the duties of referees
thereof; that he does not know where to find the law on the subject and, finally,
that he knows of no law whatever that governs the rights to the plaintiff and the
defendant in questions concerning cockfights.

ISSUE:

Can the court or judge dismiss a case if there is no law that governs it?

HELD:

No. The ignorance of the court or his lack of knowledge regarding the law applicable
to a case submitted to him for decision, the fact that the court does not know the
rules applicable to a certain matter that is the subject of an appeal which must be
decided by him and his not knowing where to find the law relative to the case, are
not reasons that can serve to excuse the court for terminating the proceedings by
dismissing them without deciding the issues. Such an excuse is the less acceptable
because, foreseeing that a case might arise to which no law would be exactly
applicable, the Civil Code, in the second paragraph of article 6, provides that the
customs of the place shall be observed, and, in the absence thereof, the general
principles of law.

Therefore the judgment and the order appealed from, herein before mentioned, are
reversed and to record of the proceedings shall remanded to the court from whence
they came for due trial and judgment as provided by law. No special finding is
made with regard to costs.***

Floresca v. Philex G.R. No. L-30642 (1985)

Topic. Purpose of Construction: Limitation on the power of courts to construe

Case. Petition to review lower court decision dismissing a civil complaint lodged
against Philex

Facts. It is alleged that prior to the accident, Philex failed to address safety
concerns in the mining site. Much water accumulated in an open pit area which
caused pressure in the working shafts below. As a result, said area collapsed. Out
of 48, 5 escaped, 22 rescued within the week. But 21 were left to die due to
Philex’s order to stop rescue mission.

Heirs of the 21 filed a civil complaint in CFI. Philex filed a motion to dismiss arguing
that the accident falls under the Workers’ Compensation Act (WCA) and thus
outside of CFI jurisdiction.

WCA provides that (1) such work-connected deaths are within the jurisdiction of
Workmen’s Compensation Commission (WCC) and (2) if the employer is negligent,
employer shall pay the compensation plus 50% of same compensation. But in
essence, the respondents invoke Section 5 of the WCA which states: “Exclusive
right to compensation — The rights and remedies granted by this Act to an
employee by reason of a personal injury entitling him to compensation shall exclude
all other rights and remedies accruing to the employee, his personal
representatives, dependents or nearest of kin against the employer under the Civil
Code and other laws because of said injury.” Because the heirs have already
received compensation, they are no longer entitled to a damage suit.

The heirs of the deceased filed the present petition.

Issue. (1) Does CFI has jurisdiction? -Yes

(2) Whether the petitioners can only avail of WCA action or have a choice between
WCA action and civil damage in regular court or can avail of both WCA and civil
damage? –Choose either one but not both.

Ratio. To answer the two issues, (2) should be addressed before (1). (2) Generally,
petitioners must choose between a WCA action and civil suit. This is what the
Section 5 of WCA provides and what has been applied in various court decisions.
But the court decided to render leeway to the petitioners given the peculiarity of
the instances. Petitioners have already received compensation under the WCA.
Afterwards, they learned of the true cause of the accident which was Philex’s
negligence. And then they filed a civil suit. The court reasoned that had the
petitioners learned of the cause much sooner, petitioners would have filed for a civil
suit instead. Petitioners’ initial resort to WCA action, the court said, is based on
ignorance or mistake of fact. Because petitioners were not informed of the true
cause, they had not the choice between a WCA and a civil suit. This then creates an
exception to Section 5 of WCA. Hence, court remanded the case to lower court for
proper judgment. (1) CFI now has jurisdiction because of the court’s making an
exception of the case.

Doctrine:  The topic, limitation on the power of courts to construe, can be found
within court’s discussion of the second issue. The two dissenting opinions posit that
a careful reading of Section 5 of WCA would demonstrate that when a complainant
has already availed of compensation via WCA, his/her right to sue in civil or other
courts are understood to have been extinguished. After passage of WCA, legislature
had plenty of occasion to modify relevant provision but did not do so. This,
according to dissent, is manifest of legislative’s continuing intent to retain the
exclusivity provided therein. In the majority opinion’s decision to allow petitioners
to file case despite having received their WCA compensation, dissent argues that
the court has exercised a power outside of its capacities, i.e. that it has legislated.

To this, the majority opinion enunciates that it has not legislated. What it did was a
mere implementation of the Constitution and relevant statutes. Secs. 6, 7, and 9 of
Art. II of 1973 Constitution guarantees social justice, establishes adequate services
in employment, and protects labor. With these provisions, the present court only
gave effect to the rights petitioners are entitled to. No legislation occurred, because
the principles are already present and need only be applied.

ARTICLE 14

G.R. No. L-18924             October 19, 1922

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
WONG CHENG (alias WONG CHUN), defendant-appellee.

Attorney-General Villa-Real for appellant.

Eduardo Gutierrez Repide for appellee.
ROMUALDEZ, J.:

In this appeal the Attorney-General urges the revocation of the order of the Court
of First Instance of Manila, sustaining the demurrer presented by the defendant to
the information that initiated this case and in which the appellee is accused of
having illegally smoked opium, aboard the merchant vessel Changsa of English
nationality while said vessel was anchored in Manila Bay two and a half miles from
the shores of the city.

The demurrer alleged lack of jurisdiction on the part of the lower court, which so
held and dismissed the case.

The question that presents itself for our consideration is whether such ruling is
erroneous or not; and it will or will not be erroneous according as said court has or
has no jurisdiction over said offense.

The point at issue is whether the courts of the Philippines have jurisdiction over
crime, like the one herein involved, committed aboard merchant vessels anchored
in our jurisdiction waters. 

There are two fundamental rules on this particular matter in connection with
International Law; to wit, the French rule, according to which crimes committed
aboard a foreign merchant vessels should not be prosecuted in the courts of the
country within whose territorial jurisdiction they were committed, unless their
commission affects the peace and security of the territory; and the English rule,
based on the territorial principle and followed in the United States, according to
which, crimes perpetrated under such circumstances are in general triable in the
courts of the country within territory they were committed. Of this two rules, it is
the last one that obtains in this jurisdiction, because at present the theories and
jurisprudence prevailing in the United States on this matter are authority in the
Philippines which is now a territory of the United States.

In the cases of The Schooner Exchange vs. M'Faddon and Others (7 Cranch [U. S.],
116), Chief Justice Marshall said:
. . . When merchant vessels enter for the purposes of trade, it would be obviously
inconvenient and dangerous to society, and would subject the laws to continual
infraction, and the government to degradation, if such individuals or merchants did
not owe temporary and local allegiance, and were not amenable to the jurisdiction
of the country. . . .

In United States vs. Bull (15 Phil., 7), this court held:

. . . No court of the Philippine Islands had jurisdiction over an offense or crime

committed on the high seas or within the territorial waters of any other country, but
when she came within three miles of a line drawn from the headlands, which
embrace the entrance to Manila Bay, she was within territorial waters, and a new
set of principles became applicable. (Wheaton, International Law [Dana ed.], p.
255, note 105; Bonfils, Le Droit Int., secs. 490 et seq.; Latour, La Mer Ter., ch. 1.)
The ship and her crew were then subject to the jurisdiction of the territorial
sovereign subject to such limitations as have been conceded by that sovereignty
through the proper political agency. . . .

It is true that in certain cases the comity of nations is observed, as in Mali and
Wildenhus vs. Keeper of the Common Jail (120 U.., 1), wherein it was said that:

. . . The principle which governs the whole matter is this: Disorder which disturb
only the peace of the ship or those on board are to be dealt with exclusively by the
sovereignty of the home of the ship, but those which disturb the public peace may
be suppressed, and, if need be, the offenders punished by the proper authorities of
the local jurisdiction. It may not be easy at all times to determine which of the two
jurisdictions a particular act of disorder belongs. Much will undoubtedly depend on
the attending circumstances of the particular case, but all must concede that
felonious homicide is a subject for the local jurisdiction, and that if the proper
authorities are proceeding with the case in the regular way the consul has no right
to interfere to prevent it.

Hence in United States vs. Look Chaw (18 Phil., 573), this court held that:

Although the mere possession of an article of prohibited use in the Philippine

Islands, aboard a foreign vessel in transit in any local port, does not, as a general
rule, constitute a crime triable by the courts of the Islands, such vessels being
considered as an extension of its own nationality, the same rule does not apply
when the article, the use of which is prohibited in the Islands, is landed from the
vessels upon Philippine soil; in such a case an open violation of the laws of the land
is committed with respect to which, as it is a violation of the penal law in force at
the place of the commission of the crime, no court other than that established in
the said place has jurisdiction of the offense, in the absence of an agreement under
an international treaty.

As to whether the United States has ever consented by treaty or otherwise to

renouncing such jurisdiction or a part thereof, we find nothing to this effect so far
as England is concerned, to which nation the ship where the crime in question was
committed belongs. Besides, in his work "Treaties, Conventions, etc.," volume 1,
page 625, Malloy says the following:

There shall be between the territories of the United States of America, and all the
territories of His Britanic Majesty in Europe, a reciprocal liberty of commerce. The
inhabitants of the two countries, respectively, shall have liberty freely and securely
to come with their ships and cargoes to all such places, ports and rivers, in the
territories aforesaid, to which other foreigners are permitted to come, to enter into
the same, and to remain and reside in any parts of the said territories, respectively;
also to hire and occupy houses and warehouses for the purposes of their
commerce; and, generally, the merchants and traders of each nation respectively
shall enjoy the most complete protection and security for their commerce, but
subject always to the laws and statutes of the two countries, respectively. (Art. 1,
Commerce and Navigation Convention.)

We have seen that the mere possession of opium aboard a foreign vessel in transit
was held by this court not triable by or courts, because it being the primary object
of our Opium Law to protect the inhabitants of the Philippines against the disastrous
effects entailed by the use of this drug, its mere possession in such a ship, without
being used in our territory, does not being about in the said territory those effects
that our statute contemplates avoiding. Hence such a mere possession is not
considered a disturbance of the public order.
But to smoke opium within our territorial limits, even though aboard a foreign
merchant ship, is certainly a breach of the public order here established, because it
causes such drug to produce its pernicious effects within our territory. It seriously
contravenes the purpose that our Legislature has in mind in enacting the aforesaid
repressive statute. Moreover, as the Attorney-General aptly observes:

. . . The idea of a person smoking opium securely on board a foreign vessel at

anchor in the port of Manila in open defiance of the local authorities, who are
impotent to lay hands on him, is simply subversive of public order. It requires no
unusual stretch of the imagination to conceive that a foreign ship may come into
the port of Manila and allow or solicit Chinese residents to smoke opium on board.

The order appealed from is revoked and the cause ordered remanded to the court
of origin for further proceedings in accordance with law, without special findings as
to costs. So ordered.

Araullo, C.J., Street, Malcolm, Avanceña, Villamor, Ostrand and Johns, JJ., concur.

ARTICLE 15,16,17

G.R. No. L-19671           November 29, 1965

PASTOR B. TENCHAVEZ, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
VICENTA F. ESCAÑO, ET AL., defendants-appellees.
I. V. Binamira & F. B. Barria for plaintiff-appellant.
Jalandoni & Jarnir for defendants-appellees.

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

Direct appeal, on factual and legal questions, from the judgment of the Court of
First Instance of Cebu, in its Civil Case No. R-4177, denying the claim of the
plaintiff-appellant, Pastor B. Tenchavez, for legal separation and one million pesos
in damages against his wife and parents-in-law, the defendants-appellees, Vicente,
Mamerto and Mena,1 all surnamed "Escaño," respectively.2

The facts, supported by the evidence of record, are the following:

Missing her late afternoon classes on 24 February 1948 in the University of San
Carlos, Cebu City, where she was then enrolled as a second year student of
commerce, Vicenta Escaño, 27 years of age (scion of a well-to-do and socially
prominent Filipino family of Spanish ancestry and a "sheltered colegiala"),
exchanged marriage vows with Pastor Tenchavez, 32 years of age, an engineer, ex-
army officer and of undistinguished stock, without the knowledge of her parents,
before a Catholic chaplain, Lt. Moises Lavares, in the house of one Juan Alburo in
the said city. The marriage was the culmination of a previous love affair and was
duly registered with the local civil register.

Vicenta's letters to Pastor, and his to her, before the marriage, indicate that the
couple were deeply in love. Together with a friend, Pacita Noel, their matchmaker
and go-between, they had planned out their marital future whereby Pacita would be
the governess of their first-born; they started saving money in a piggy bank. A few
weeks before their secret marriage, their engagement was broken; Vicenta
returned the engagement ring and accepted another suitor, Joseling Lao. Her love
for Pastor beckoned; she pleaded for his return, and they reconciled. This time they
planned to get married and then elope. To facilitate the elopement, Vicenta had
brought some of her clothes to the room of Pacita Noel in St. Mary's Hall, which was
their usual trysting place.

Although planned for the midnight following their marriage, the elopement did not,
however, materialize because when Vicente went back to her classes after the
marriage, her mother, who got wind of the intended nuptials, was already waiting
for her at the college. Vicenta was taken home where she admitted that she had
already married Pastor. Mamerto and Mena Escaño were surprised, because Pastor
never asked for the hand of Vicente, and were disgusted because of the great
scandal that the clandestine marriage would provoke (t.s.n., vol. III, pp. 1105-06).
The following morning, the Escaño spouses sought priestly advice. Father Reynes
suggested a recelebration to validate what he believed to be an invalid marriage,
from the standpoint of the Church, due to the lack of authority from the Archbishop
or the parish priest for the officiating chaplain to celebrate the marriage. The
recelebration did not take place, because on 26 February 1948 Mamerto Escaño
was handed by a maid, whose name he claims he does not remember, a letter
purportedly coming from San Carlos college students and disclosing an amorous
relationship between Pastor Tenchavez and Pacita Noel; Vicenta translated the
letter to her father, and thereafter would not agree to a new marriage. Vicenta and
Pastor met that day in the house of Mrs. Pilar Mendezona. Thereafter, Vicenta
continued living with her parents while Pastor returned to his job in Manila. Her
letter of 22 March 1948 (Exh. "M"), while still solicitous of her husband's welfare,
was not as endearing as her previous letters when their love was aflame.

Vicenta was bred in Catholic ways but is of a changeable disposition, and Pastor
knew it. She fondly accepted her being called a "jellyfish." She was not prevented
by her parents from communicating with Pastor (Exh. "1-Escaño"), but her letters
became less frequent as the days passed. As of June, 1948 the newlyweds were
already estranged (Exh. "2-Escaño"). Vicenta had gone to Jimenez, Misamis
Occidental, to escape from the scandal that her marriage stirred in Cebu society.
There, a lawyer filed for her a petition, drafted by then Senator Emmanuel Pelaez,
to annul her marriage. She did not sign the petition (Exh. "B-5"). The case was
dismissed without prejudice because of her non-appearance at the hearing (Exh.
"B-4").

On 24 June 1950, without informing her husband, she applied for a passport,
indicating in her application that she was single, that her purpose was to study, and
she was domiciled in Cebu City, and that she intended to return after two years.
The application was approved, and she left for the United States. On 22 August
1950, she filed a verified complaint for divorce against the herein plaintiff in the
Second Judicial District Court of the State of Nevada in and for the County of
Washoe, on the ground of "extreme cruelty, entirely mental in character." On 21
October 1950, a decree of divorce, "final and absolute", was issued in open court by
the said tribunal.

In 1951 Mamerto and Mena Escaño filed a petition with the Archbishop of Cebu to
annul their daughter's marriage to Pastor (Exh. "D"). On 10 September 1954,
Vicenta sought papal dispensation of her marriage (Exh. "D"-2).

On 13 September 1954, Vicenta married an American, Russell Leo Moran, in

Nevada. She now lives with him in California, and, by him, has begotten children.
She acquired American citizenship on 8 August 1958.

But on 30 July 1955, Tenchavez had initiated the proceedings at bar by a complaint
in the Court of First Instance of Cebu, and amended on 31 May 1956, against
Vicenta F. Escaño, her parents, Mamerto and Mena Escaño, whom he charged with
having dissuaded and discouraged Vicenta from joining her husband, and alienating
her affections, and against the Roman Catholic Church, for having, through its
Diocesan Tribunal, decreed the annulment of the marriage, and asked for legal
separation and one million pesos in damages. Vicenta claimed a valid divorce from
plaintiff and an equally valid marriage to her present husband, Russell Leo Moran;
while her parents denied that they had in any way influenced their daughter's acts,
and counterclaimed for moral damages.

The appealed judgment did not decree a legal separation, but freed the plaintiff
from supporting his wife and to acquire property to the exclusion of his wife. It
allowed the counterclaim of Mamerto Escaño and Mena Escaño for moral and
exemplary damages and attorney's fees against the plaintiff-appellant, to the
extent of P45,000.00, and plaintiff resorted directly to this Court.

The appellant ascribes, as errors of the trial court, the following:

1. In not declaring legal separation; in not holding defendant Vicenta F. Escaño

liable for damages and in dismissing the complaint;.
2. In not holding the defendant parents Mamerto Escano and the heirs of Doña
Mena Escaño liable for damages;.

3 In holding the plaintiff liable for and requiring him to pay the damages to the
defendant parents on their counterclaims; and.

4. In dismissing the complaint and in denying the relief sought by the plaintiff.

That on 24 February 1948 the plaintiff-appellant, Pastor Tenchavez, and the

defendant-appellee, Vicenta Escaño, were validly married to each other, from the
standpoint of our civil law, is clearly established by the record before us. Both
parties were then above the age of majority, and otherwise qualified; and both
consented to the marriage, which was performed by a Catholic priest (army
chaplain Lavares) in the presence of competent witnesses. It is nowhere shown that
said priest was not duly authorized under civil law to solemnize marriages.

The chaplain's alleged lack of ecclesiastical authorization from the parish priest and
the Ordinary, as required by Canon law, is irrelevant in our civil law, not only
because of the separation of Church and State but also because Act 3613 of the
Philippine Legislature (which was the marriage law in force at the time) expressly
provided that —

SEC. 1. Essential requisites. Essential requisites for marriage are the legal capacity
of the contracting parties and consent. (Emphasis supplied)

The actual authority of the solemnizing officer was thus only a formal requirement,
and, therefore, not essential to give the marriage civil effects,3 and this is
emphasized by section 27 of said marriage act, which provided the following:

SEC. 27. Failure to comply with formal requirements. No marriage shall be declared

invalid because of the absence of one or several of the formal requirements of this
Act if, when it was performed, the spouses or one of them believed in good faith
that the person who solemnized the marriage was actually empowered to do so,
and that the marriage was perfectly legal.

The good faith of all the parties to the marriage (and hence the validity of their
marriage) will be presumed until the contrary is positively proved (Lao vs. Dee Tim,
45 Phil. 739, 745; Francisco vs. Jason, 60 Phil. 442, 448). It is well to note here
that in the case at bar, doubts as to the authority of the solemnizing priest arose
only after the marriage, when Vicenta's parents consulted Father Reynes and the
archbishop of Cebu. Moreover, the very act of Vicenta in abandoning her original
action for annulment and subsequently suing for divorce implies an admission that
her marriage to plaintiff was valid and binding.

Defendant Vicenta Escaño argues that when she contracted the marriage she was
under the undue influence of Pacita Noel, whom she charges to have been in
conspiracy with appellant Tenchavez. Even granting, for argument's sake, the truth
of that contention, and assuming that Vicenta's consent was vitiated by fraud and
undue influence, such vices did not render her marriage ab initio void, but merely
voidable, and the marriage remained valid until annulled by a competent civil court.
This was never done, and admittedly, Vicenta's suit for annulment in the Court of
First Instance of Misamis was dismissed for non-prosecution.

It is equally clear from the record that the valid marriage between Pastor
Tenchavez and Vicenta Escaño remained subsisting and undissolved under
Philippine law, notwithstanding the decree of absolute divorce that the wife sought
and obtained on 21 October 1950 from the Second Judicial District Court of Washoe
County, State of Nevada, on grounds of "extreme cruelty, entirely mental in
character." At the time the divorce decree was issued, Vicenta Escaño, like her
husband, was still a Filipino citizen.4 She was then subject to Philippine law, and
Article 15 of the Civil Code of the Philippines (Rep. Act No. 386), already in force at
the time, expressly provided:

Laws relating to family rights and duties or to the status, condition and legal
capacity of persons are binding upon the citizens of the Philippines, even though
living abroad.

The Civil Code of the Philippines, now in force, does not admit absolute
divorce, quo ad vinculo matrimonii; and in fact does not even use that term, to
further emphasize its restrictive policy on the matter, in contrast to the preceding
legislation that admitted absolute divorce on grounds of adultery of the wife or
concubinage of the husband (Act 2710). Instead of divorce, the present Civil Code
only provides for  legal separation (Title IV, Book 1, Arts. 97 to 108), and, even in
that case, it expressly prescribes that "the marriage bonds shall not be severed"
(Art. 106, subpar. 1).

For the Philippine courts to recognize and give recognition or effect to a foreign
decree of absolute divorce betiveen Filipino citizens could be a patent violation of
the declared public policy of the state, specially in view of the third paragraph of
Article 17 of the Civil Code that prescribes the following:

Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have
for their object public order, policy and good customs, shall not be rendered
ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions
agreed upon in a foreign country.

Even more, the grant of effectivity in this jurisdiction to such foreign divorce
decrees would, in effect, give rise to an irritating and scandalous discrimination in
favor of wealthy citizens, to the detriment of those members of our polity whose
means do not permit them to sojourn abroad and obtain absolute divorces outside
the Philippines.

From this point of view, it is irrelevant that appellant Pastor Tenchavez should have
appeared in the Nevada divorce court. Primarily because the policy of our law
cannot be nullified by acts of private parties (Civil Code,Art. 17, jam quot.); and
additionally, because the mere appearance of a non-resident consort cannot confer
jurisdiction where the court originally had none (Area vs. Javier, 95 Phil. 579).

From the preceding facts and considerations, there flows as a necessary

consequence that in this jurisdiction Vicenta Escaño's divorce and second marriage
are not entitled to recognition as valid; for her previous union to plaintiff Tenchavez
must be declared to be existent and undissolved. It follows, likewise, that her
refusal to perform her wifely duties, and her denial of consortium and her desertion
of her husband constitute in law a wrong caused through her fault, for which the
husband is entitled to the corresponding indemnity (Civil Code, Art. 2176). Neither
an unsubstantiated charge of deceit nor an anonymous letter charging immorality
against the husband constitute, contrary to her claim, adequate excuse. Wherefore,
her marriage and cohabitation with Russell Leo Moran is technically "intercourse
with a person not her husband" from the standpoint of Philippine Law, and entitles
plaintiff-appellant Tenchavez to a decree of "legal separation under our law, on the
basis of adultery" (Revised Penal Code, Art. 333).

The foregoing conclusions as to the untoward effect of a marriage after an invalid

divorce are in accord with the previous doctrines and rulings of this court on the
subject, particularly those that were rendered under our laws prior to the approval
of the absolute divorce act (Act 2710 of the Philippine Legislature). As a matter of
legal history, our statutes did not recognize divorces a vinculo before 1917, when
Act 2710 became effective; and the present Civil Code of the Philippines, in
disregarding absolute divorces, in effect merely reverted to the policies on the
subject prevailing before Act 2710. The rulings, therefore, under the Civil Code of
1889, prior to the Act above-mentioned, are now, fully applicable. Of these, the
decision in Ramirez vs. Gmur, 42 Phil. 855, is of particular interest. Said this Court
in that case:

As the divorce granted by the French Court must be ignored, it results that the
marriage of Dr. Mory and Leona Castro, celebrated in London in 1905, could not
legalize their relations; and the circumstance that they afterwards passed for
husband and wife in Switzerland until her death is wholly without legal significance.
The claims of the very children to participate in the estate of Samuel Bishop must
therefore be rejected. The right to inherit is limited to legitimate, legitimated and
acknowledged natural children. The children of adulterous relations are wholly
excluded. The word "descendants" as used in Article 941 of the Civil Code cannot be
interpreted to include illegitimates born of adulterous relations. (Emphasis supplied)

Except for the fact that the successional rights of the children, begotten from
Vicenta's marriage to Leo Moran after the invalid divorce, are not involved in the
case at bar, the Gmur case is authority for the proposition that such union is
adulterous in this jurisdiction, and, therefore, justifies an action for legal separation
on the part of the innocent consort of the first marriage, that stands undissolved in
Philippine law. In not so declaring, the trial court committed error.
True it is that our ruling gives rise to anomalous situations where the status of a
person (whether divorced or not) would depend on the territory where the question
arises. Anomalies of this kind are not new in the Philippines, and the answer to
them was given in Barretto vs. Gonzales, 58 Phil. 667:

The hardship of the existing divorce laws in the Philippine Islands are well known to
the members of the Legislature. It is the duty of the Courts to enforce the laws of
divorce as written by Legislature if they are constitutional. Courts have no right to
say that such laws are too strict or too liberal. (p. 72)

The appellant's first assignment of error is, therefore, sustained.

However, the plaintiff-appellant's charge that his wife's parents, Dr. Mamerto
Escaño and his wife, the late Doña Mena Escaño, alienated the affections of their
daughter and influenced her conduct toward her husband are not supported by
credible evidence. The testimony of Pastor Tenchavez about the Escaño's animosity
toward him strikes us to be merely conjecture and exaggeration, and are belied by
Pastor's own letters written before this suit was begun (Exh. "2-Escaño" and
"Vicenta," Rec. on App., pp. 270-274). In these letters he expressly apologized to
the defendants for "misjudging them" and for the "great unhappiness" caused by
his "impulsive blunders" and "sinful pride," "effrontery and audacity" [sic]. Plaintiff
was admitted to the Escaño house to visit and court Vicenta, and the record shows
nothing to prove that he would not have been accepted to marry Vicente had he
openly asked for her hand, as good manners and breeding demanded. Even after
learning of the clandestine marriage, and despite their shock at such unexpected
event, the parents of Vicenta proposed and arranged that the marriage be
recelebrated in strict conformity with the canons of their religion upon advice that
the previous one was canonically defective. If no recelebration of the marriage
ceremony was had it was not due to defendants Mamerto Escaño and his wife, but
to the refusal of Vicenta to proceed with it. That the spouses Escaño did not seek to
compel or induce their daughter to assent to the recelebration but respected her
decision, or that they abided by her resolve, does not constitute in law an alienation
of affections. Neither does the fact that Vicenta's parents sent her money while she
was in the United States; for it was natural that they should not wish their daughter
to live in penury even if they did not concur in her decision to divorce Tenchavez
(27 Am. Jur. 130-132).

There is no evidence that the parents of Vicenta, out of improper motives, aided
and abetted her original suit for annulment, or her subsequent divorce; she appears
to have acted independently, and being of age, she was entitled to judge what was
best for her and ask that her decisions be respected. Her parents, in so doing,
certainly cannot be charged with alienation of affections in the absence of malice or
unworthy motives, which have not been shown, good faith being always presumed
until the contrary is proved.

SEC. 529. Liability of Parents, Guardians or Kin. — The law distinguishes between

the right of a parent to interest himself in the marital affairs of his child and the
absence of rights in a stranger to intermeddle in such affairs. However, such
distinction between the liability of parents and that of strangers is only in regard to
what will justify interference. A parent isliable for alienation of affections resulting
from his own malicious conduct, as where he wrongfully entices his son or daughter
to leave his or her spouse, but he is not liable unless he acts maliciously, without
justification and from unworthy motives. He is not liable where he acts and advises
his child in good faith with respect to his child's marital relations in the interest of
his child as he sees it, the marriage of his child not terminating his right and liberty
to interest himself in, and be extremely solicitous for, his child's welfare and
happiness, even where his conduct and advice suggest or result in the separation of
the spouses or the obtaining of a divorce or annulment, or where he acts under
mistake or misinformation, or where his advice or interference are indiscreet or
unfortunate, although it has been held that the parent is liable for consequences
resulting from recklessness. He may in good faith take his child into his home and
afford him or her protection and support, so long as he has not maliciously enticed
his child away, or does not maliciously entice or cause him or her to stay away,
from his or her spouse. This rule has more frequently been applied in the case of
advice given to a married daughter, but it is equally applicable in the case of advice
given to a son.
Plaintiff Tenchavez, in falsely charging Vicenta's aged parents with racial or social
discrimination and with having exerted efforts and pressured her to seek annulment
and divorce, unquestionably caused them unrest and anxiety, entitling them to
recover damages. While this suit may not have been impelled by actual malice, the
charges were certainly reckless in the face of the proven facts and circumstances.
Court actions are not established for parties to give vent to their prejudices or
spleen.

In the assessment of the moral damages recoverable by appellant Pastor

Tenchavez from defendant Vicente Escaño, it is proper to take into account, against
his patently unreasonable claim for a million pesos in damages, that (a) the
marriage was celebrated in secret, and its failure was not characterized by publicity
or undue humiliation on appellant's part; (b) that the parties never lived together;
and (c) that there is evidence that appellant had originally agreed to the annulment
of the marriage, although such a promise was legally invalid, being against public
policy (cf. Art. 88, Civ. Code). While appellant is unable to remarry under our law,
this fact is a consequence of the indissoluble character of the union that appellant
entered into voluntarily and with open eyes rather than of her divorce and her
second marriage. All told, we are of the opinion that appellant should recover
P25,000 only by way of moral damages and attorney's fees.

With regard to the P45,000 damages awarded to the defendants, Dr. Mamerto
Escaño and Mena Escaño, by the court below, we opine that the same are
excessive. While the filing of this unfounded suit must have wounded said
defendants' feelings and caused them anxiety, the same could in no way have
seriously injured their reputation, or otherwise prejudiced them, lawsuits having
become a common occurrence in present society. What is important, and has been
correctly established in the decision of the court below, is that said defendants were
not guilty of any improper conduct in the whole deplorable affair. This Court,
therefore, reduces the damages awarded to P5,000 only.

Summing up, the Court rules:

(1) That a foreign divorce between Filipino citizens, sought and decreed after the
effectivity of the present Civil Code (Rep. Act 386), is not entitled to recognition as
valid in this jurisdiction; and neither is the marriage contracted with another party
by the divorced consort, subsequently to the foreign decree of divorce, entitled to
validity in the country;

(2) That the remarriage of divorced wife and her co-habitation with a person other
than the lawful husband entitle the latter to a decree of legal separation
conformably to Philippine law;

(3) That the desertion and securing of an invalid divorce decree by one consort
entitles the other to recover damages;

(4) That an action for alienation of affections against the parents of one consort
does not lie in the absence of proof of malice or unworthy motives on their part.

WHEREFORE, the decision under appeal is hereby modified as follows;

(1) Adjudging plaintiff-appellant Pastor Tenchavez entitled to a decree of legal

separation from defendant Vicenta F. Escaño;

(2) Sentencing defendant-appellee Vicenta Escaño to pay plaintiff-appellant

Tenchavez the amount of P25,000 for damages and attorneys' fees;

(3) Sentencing appellant Pastor Tenchavez to pay the appellee, Mamerto Escaño
and the estate of his wife, the deceased Mena Escaño, P5,000 by way of damages
and attorneys' fees.

Neither party to recover costs.

Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon,

J.P. and Zaldivar, JJ., concur.

TENCHAVEZ VS ESCANO DIGEST

FACTS:

Vicenta Escaño, 27, exchanged marriage vows with Pastor Tenchavez, 32, on
February 24, 1948, before a Catholic chaplain. The marriage was duly registered
with the local civil registrar. However, the two were unable to live together after the
marriage and as of June 1948, they were already estranged. Vicenta left for the
United Stated in 1950. On the same year she filed a verified complaint for divorce
against Tenchavez in the State of Nevada on the ground of “Extreme cruelty,
entirely mental in character.” A decree of divorce, “final and absolute” was issued in
open court by the said tribunal. She married an American, lived with him in
California, had several children with him and, on 1958, acquired American
Citizenship.

On 30 July 1955, Tenchavez filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Cebu,
and amended on 31 May 1956, against Vicenta F. Escaño, her parents, Mamerto
and Mena Escaño whom he charged with having dissuaded and discouraged Vicenta
from joining her husband, and alienating her affections, and against the Roman
Catholic Church, for having, through its Diocesan Tribunal, decreed the annulment
of the marriage, and asked for legal separation and one million pesos in damages.
Vicenta’s parents denied that they had in any way influenced their daughter’s acts,
and counterclaimed for moral damages.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not the divorce sought by Vicenta Escaño is valid and binding upon
courts of the Philippines.

2. Whether or not the parents of Vicenta alienated the affections of their daughter
and influenced her conduct toward her husband.

RULING:

1. No. Vicenta Escaño and Pastor Tenchavez’ marriage remain existent and
undissolved under the Philippine Law.

Pursuant to Article 15 of the Civil Code, laws relating to family rights and duties, or
to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of
the Philippines, even though living abroad.
Escaño’s divorce and second marriage cannot be deemed valid under the Philippine
Law to which Escaño was bound since in the time the divorce decree was issued,
Escaño, like her husband, was still a Filipino citizen. The acts of the wife in not
complying with her wifely duties, deserting her husband without any justifiable
cause, leaving for the United States in order to secure a decree of absolute divorce,
and finally getting married again are acts which constitute a willful infliction of
injury upon the husband’s feelings in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or
public policy, thus entitling Tenchavez to a decree of legal separation under our law
on the basis of adultery.

2. No. There is no evidence that the parents of Vicenta, out of improper motives,
aided and abetted her original suit for annulment, or her subsequent divorce.

A portion of Section 529 reads: The law distinguishes between the right of a parent
to interest himself in the marital affairs of his child and the absence of rights in a
tranger to intermeddle in such affairs. …A parent is liable for alienation of affections
resulting from his own malicious conduct, as where he wrongfully entices his son or
daughter to leave his or her spouse, but he is not liable unless he acts maliciously,
without justification and from unworthy motives.

Therefore, her parents, in respecting Vicenta’s independent decisions, certainly

cannot be charged with alienation of affections in the absence of malice or
unworthy motives.

G.R. No. L-23678             June 6, 1967

TESTATE ESTATE OF AMOS G. BELLIS, deceased.

PEOPLE'S BANK and TRUST COMPANY, executor.
MARIA CRISTINA BELLIS and MIRIAM PALMA BELLIS, oppositors-appellants,
vs.
EDWARD A. BELLIS, ET AL., heirs-appellees.
Vicente R. Macasaet and Jose D. Villena for oppositors appellants.
Paredes, Poblador, Cruz and Nazareno for heirs-appellees E. A. Bellis, et al.
Quijano and Arroyo for heirs-appellees W. S. Bellis, et al.
J. R. Balonkita for appellee People's Bank & Trust Company.
Ozaeta, Gibbs and Ozaeta for appellee A. B. Allsman.

BENGZON, J.P., J.:

This is a direct appeal to Us, upon a question purely of law, from an order of the
Court of First Instance of Manila dated April 30, 1964, approving the project of
partition filed by the executor in Civil Case No. 37089 therein.1äwphï1.ñët

The facts of the case are as follows:

Amos G. Bellis, born in Texas, was "a citizen of the State of Texas and of the United
States." By his first wife, Mary E. Mallen, whom he divorced, he had five legitimate
children: Edward A. Bellis, George Bellis (who pre-deceased him in infancy), Henry
A. Bellis, Alexander Bellis and Anna Bellis Allsman; by his second wife, Violet
Kennedy, who survived him, he had three legitimate children: Edwin G. Bellis,
Walter S. Bellis and Dorothy Bellis; and finally, he had three illegitimate children:
Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis.

On August 5, 1952, Amos G. Bellis executed a will in the Philippines, in which he

directed that after all taxes, obligations, and expenses of administration are paid
for, his distributable estate should be divided, in trust, in the following order and
manner: (a) $240,000.00 to his first wife, Mary E. Mallen; (b) P120,000.00 to his
three illegitimate children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis, Miriam Palma
Bellis, or P40,000.00 each and (c) after the foregoing two items have been
satisfied, the remainder shall go to his seven surviving children by his first and
second wives, namely: Edward A. Bellis, Henry A. Bellis, Alexander Bellis and Anna
Bellis Allsman, Edwin G. Bellis, Walter S. Bellis, and Dorothy E. Bellis, in equal
shares.1äwphï1.ñët

Subsequently, or on July 8, 1958, Amos G. Bellis died a resident of San Antonio,

Texas, U.S.A. His will was admitted to probate in the Court of First Instance of
Manila on September 15, 1958.
The People's Bank and Trust Company, as executor of the will, paid all the bequests
therein including the amount of $240,000.00 in the form of shares of stock to Mary
E. Mallen and to the three (3) illegitimate children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina
Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis, various amounts totalling P40,000.00 each in
satisfaction of their respective legacies, or a total of P120,000.00, which it released
from time to time according as the lower court approved and allowed the various
motions or petitions filed by the latter three requesting partial advances on account
of their respective legacies.

On January 8, 1964, preparatory to closing its administration, the executor

submitted and filed its "Executor's Final Account, Report of Administration and
Project of Partition" wherein it reported, inter alia, the satisfaction of the legacy of
Mary E. Mallen by the delivery to her of shares of stock amounting to $240,000.00,
and the legacies of Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis in
the amount of P40,000.00 each or a total of P120,000.00. In the project of
partition, the executor — pursuant to the "Twelfth" clause of the testator's Last Will
and Testament — divided the residuary estate into seven equal portions for the
benefit of the testator's seven legitimate children by his first and second marriages.

On January 17, 1964, Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis filed their
respective oppositions to the project of partition on the ground that they were
deprived of their legitimes as illegitimate children and, therefore, compulsory heirs
of the deceased.

Amos Bellis, Jr. interposed no opposition despite notice to him, proof of service of
which is evidenced by the registry receipt submitted on April 27, 1964 by the
executor.1

After the parties filed their respective memoranda and other pertinent pleadings,
the lower court, on April 30, 1964, issued an order overruling the oppositions and
approving the executor's final account, report and administration and project of
partition. Relying upon Art. 16 of the Civil Code, it applied the national law of the
decedent, which in this case is Texas law, which did not provide for legitimes.
Their respective motions for reconsideration having been denied by the lower court
on June 11, 1964, oppositors-appellants appealed to this Court to raise the issue of
which law must apply — Texas law or Philippine law.

In this regard, the parties do not submit the case on, nor even discuss, the doctrine
of renvoi, applied by this Court in Aznar v. Christensen Garcia, L-16749, January
31, 1963. Said doctrine is usually pertinent where the decedent is a national of one
country, and a domicile of another. In the present case, it is not disputed that the
decedent was both a national of Texas and a domicile thereof at the time of his
death.2 So that even assuming Texas has a conflict of law rule providing that the
domiciliary system (law of the domicile) should govern, the same would not result
in a reference back (renvoi) to Philippine law, but would still refer to Texas law.
Nonetheless, if Texas has a conflicts rule adopting the situs theory (lex rei sitae)
calling for the application of the law of the place where the properties are situated,
renvoi would arise, since the properties here involved are found in the Philippines.
In the absence, however, of proof as to the conflict of law rule of Texas, it should
not be presumed different from ours.3 Appellants' position is therefore not rested on
the doctrine of renvoi. As stated, they never invoked nor even mentioned it in their
arguments. Rather, they argue that their case falls under the circumstances
mentioned in the third paragraph of Article 17 in relation to Article 16 of the Civil
Code.

Article 16, par. 2, and Art. 1039 of the Civil Code, render applicable the national
law of the decedent, in intestate or testamentary successions, with regard to four
items: (a) the order of succession; (b) the amount of successional rights; (e) the
intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will; and (d) the capacity to succeed. They
provide that —

ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the
country where it is situated.

However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of
succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of
testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose
succession is under consideration, whatever may he the nature of the property and
regardless of the country wherein said property may be found.

ART. 1039. Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation of the
decedent.

Appellants would however counter that Art. 17, paragraph three, of the Civil Code,
stating that —

Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have
for their object public order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered
ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions
agreed upon in a foreign country.

prevails as the exception to Art. 16, par. 2 of the Civil Code afore-quoted. This is
not correct. Precisely, Congress deleted the phrase, "notwithstanding the provisions
of this and the next preceding article" when they incorporated Art. 11 of the old
Civil Code as Art. 17 of the new Civil Code, while reproducing without substantial
change the second paragraph of Art. 10 of the old Civil Code as Art. 16 in the new.
It must have been their purpose to make the second paragraph of Art. 16 a specific
provision in itself which must be applied in testate and intestate succession. As
further indication of this legislative intent, Congress added a new provision, under
Art. 1039, which decrees that capacity to succeed is to be governed by the national
law of the decedent.

It is therefore evident that whatever public policy or good customs may be involved
in our System of legitimes, Congress has not intended to extend the same to the
succession of foreign nationals. For it has specifically chosen to leave, inter alia,
the amount of successional rights, to the decedent's national law. Specific
provisions must prevail over general ones.

Appellants would also point out that the decedent executed two wills — one to
govern his Texas estate and the other his Philippine estate — arguing from this that
he intended Philippine law to govern his Philippine estate. Assuming that such was
the decedent's intention in executing a separate Philippine will, it would not alter
the law, for as this Court ruled in Miciano v. Brimo, 50 Phil. 867, 870, a provision in
a foreigner's will to the effect that his properties shall be distributed in accordance
with Philippine law and not with his national law, is illegal and void, for his national
law cannot be ignored in regard to those matters that Article 10 — now Article 16 —
of the Civil Code states said national law should govern.

The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a citizen of the State of
Texas, U.S.A., and that under the laws of Texas, there are no forced heirs or
legitimes. Accordingly, since the intrinsic validity of the provision of the will and the
amount of successional rights are to be determined under Texas law, the Philippine
law on legitimes cannot be applied to the testacy of Amos G. Bellis.

Wherefore, the order of the probate court is hereby affirmed in toto, with costs
against appellants. So ordered.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez and
Castro, JJ., concur.