1. G.R. No.

L-63915 April 24, 1985

LORENZO M. TAÑADA, ABRAHAM F. SARMIENTO, and MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD,

INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC. [MABINI], petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUAN C. TUVERA, in his capacity as Executive Assistant to the President, HON. JOAQUIN VENUS, in
his capacity as Deputy Executive Assistant to the President , MELQUIADES P. DE LA CRUZ, in his capacity
as Director, Malacañang Records Office, and FLORENDO S. PABLO, in his capacity as Director, Bureau of
Printing, respondents.

ESCOLIN, J.:

Invoking the people's right to be informed on matters of public concern, a right recognized in Section 6, Article IV of
the 1973 Philippine Constitution,   as well as the principle that laws to be valid and enforceable must be published in
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the Official Gazette or otherwise effectively promulgated, petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondent
public officials to publish, and/or cause the publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters
of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation and administrative orders.

Specifically, the publication of the following presidential issuances is sought:

a] Presidential Decrees Nos. 12, 22, 37, 38, 59, 64, 103, 171, 179, 184, 197, 200, 234, 265, 286,
298, 303, 312, 324, 325, 326, 337, 355, 358, 359, 360, 361, 368, 404, 406, 415, 427, 429, 445, 447,
473, 486, 491, 503, 504, 521, 528, 551, 566, 573, 574, 594, 599, 644, 658, 661, 718, 731, 733, 793,
800, 802, 835, 836, 923, 935, 961, 1017-1030, 1050, 1060-1061, 1085, 1143, 1165, 1166, 1242,
1246, 1250, 1278, 1279, 1300, 1644, 1772, 1808, 1810, 1813-1817, 1819-1826, 1829-1840, 1842-
1847.

b] Letter of Instructions Nos.: 10, 39, 49, 72, 107, 108, 116, 130, 136, 141, 150, 153, 155, 161, 173,
180, 187, 188, 192, 193, 199, 202, 204, 205, 209, 211-213, 215-224, 226-228, 231-239, 241-245,
248, 251, 253-261, 263-269, 271-273, 275-283, 285-289, 291, 293, 297-299, 301-303, 309, 312-
315, 325, 327, 343, 346, 349, 357, 358, 362, 367, 370, 382, 385, 386, 396-397, 405, 438-440, 444-
445, 473, 486, 488, 498, 501, 399, 527, 561, 576, 587, 594, 599, 600, 602, 609, 610, 611, 612, 615,
641, 642, 665, 702, 712-713, 726, 837-839, 878-879, 881, 882, 939-940, 964,997,1149-1178,1180-
1278.

c] General Orders Nos.: 14, 52, 58, 59, 60, 62, 63, 64 & 65.

d] Proclamation Nos.: 1126, 1144, 1147, 1151, 1196, 1270, 1281, 1319-1526, 1529, 1532, 1535,
1538, 1540-1547, 1550-1558, 1561-1588, 1590-1595, 1594-1600, 1606-1609, 1612-1628, 1630-
1649, 1694-1695, 1697-1701, 1705-1723, 1731-1734, 1737-1742, 1744, 1746-1751, 1752, 1754,
1762, 1764-1787, 1789-1795, 1797, 1800, 1802-1804, 1806-1807, 1812-1814, 1816, 1825-1826,
1829, 1831-1832, 1835-1836, 1839-1840, 1843-1844, 1846-1847, 1849, 1853-1858, 1860, 1866,
1868, 1870, 1876-1889, 1892, 1900, 1918, 1923, 1933, 1952, 1963, 1965-1966, 1968-1984, 1986-
2028, 2030-2044, 2046-2145, 2147-2161, 2163-2244.

e] Executive Orders Nos.: 411, 413, 414, 427, 429-454, 457- 471, 474-492, 494-507, 509-510, 522,
524-528, 531-532, 536, 538, 543-544, 549, 551-553, 560, 563, 567-568, 570, 574, 593, 594, 598-
604, 609, 611- 647, 649-677, 679-703, 705-707, 712-786, 788-852, 854-857.

f] Letters of Implementation Nos.: 7, 8, 9, 10, 11-22, 25-27, 39, 50, 51, 59, 76, 80-81, 92, 94, 95,
107, 120, 122, 123.

g] Administrative Orders Nos.: 347, 348, 352-354, 360- 378, 380-433, 436-439.
The respondents, through the Solicitor General, would have this case dismissed outright on the ground that
petitioners have no legal personality or standing to bring the instant petition. The view is submitted that in the
absence of any showing that petitioners are personally and directly affected or prejudiced by the alleged non-
publication of the presidential issuances in question   said petitioners are without the requisite legal personality to
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institute this mandamus proceeding, they are not being "aggrieved parties" within the meaning of Section 3, Rule 65
of the Rules of Court, which we quote:

SEC. 3. Petition for Mandamus.—When any tribunal, corporation, board or person unlawfully
neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an
office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use a rd enjoyment of a right or office
to which such other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court
alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the defendant,
immediately or at some other specified time, to do the act required to be done to Protect the rights of
the petitioner, and to pay the damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts of
the defendant.

Upon the other hand, petitioners maintain that since the subject of the petition concerns a public right and its object
is to compel the performance of a public duty, they need not show any specific interest for their petition to be given
due course.

The issue posed is not one of first impression. As early as the 1910 case of Severino vs. Governor General,   this3

Court held that while the general rule is that "a writ of mandamus would be granted to a private individual only in
those cases where he has some private or particular interest to be subserved, or some particular right to be
protected, independent of that which he holds with the public at large," and "it is for the public officers exclusively to
apply for the writ when public rights are to be subserved [Mithchell vs. Boardmen, 79 M.e., 469]," nevertheless,
"when the question is one of public right and the object of the mandamus is to procure the enforcement of a public
duty, the people are regarded as the real party in interest and the relator at whose instigation the proceedings are
instituted need not show that he has any legal or special interest in the result, it being sufficient to show that he is a
citizen and as such interested in the execution of the laws [High, Extraordinary Legal Remedies, 3rd ed., sec. 431].

Thus, in said case, this Court recognized the relator Lope Severino, a private individual, as a proper party to the
mandamus proceedings brought to compel the Governor General to call a special election for the position of
municipal president in the town of Silay, Negros Occidental. Speaking for this Court, Mr. Justice Grant T. Trent said:

We are therefore of the opinion that the weight of authority supports the proposition that the relator is
a proper party to proceedings of this character when a public right is sought to be enforced. If the
general rule in America were otherwise, we think that it would not be applicable to the case at bar for
the reason 'that it is always dangerous to apply a general rule to a particular case without keeping in
mind the reason for the rule, because, if under the particular circumstances the reason for the rule
does not exist, the rule itself is not applicable and reliance upon the rule may well lead to error'

No reason exists in the case at bar for applying the general rule insisted upon by counsel for the
respondent. The circumstances which surround this case are different from those in the United
States, inasmuch as if the relator is not a proper party to these proceedings no other person could
be, as we have seen that it is not the duty of the law officer of the Government to appear and
represent the people in cases of this character.

The reasons given by the Court in recognizing a private citizen's legal personality in the aforementioned case apply
squarely to the present petition. Clearly, the right sought to be enforced by petitioners herein is a public right
recognized by no less than the fundamental law of the land. If petitioners were not allowed to institute this
proceeding, it would indeed be difficult to conceive of any other person to initiate the same, considering that the
Solicitor General, the government officer generally empowered to represent the people, has entered his appearance
for respondents in this case.

Respondents further contend that publication in the Official Gazette is not a sine qua non requirement for
the effectivity of laws where the laws themselves provide for their own effectivity dates. It is thus submitted
that since the presidential issuances in question contain special provisions as to the date they are to take effect,
publication in the Official Gazette is not indispensable for their effectivity. The point stressed is anchored on Article 2
of the Civil Code:

Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the
Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided, ...

The interpretation given by respondent is in accord with this Court's construction of said article. In a long line of
decisions,  this Court has ruled that publication in the Official Gazette is necessary in those cases where the
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legislation itself does not provide for its effectivity date-for then the date of publication is material for determining its
date of effectivity, which is the fifteenth day following its publication-but not when the law itself provides for the date
when it goes into effect.

Respondents' argument, however, is logically correct only insofar as it equates the effectivity of laws with the fact of
publication. Considered in the light of other statutes applicable to the issue at hand, the conclusion is easily reached
that said Article 2 does not preclude [eliminate] the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even if
the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity. Thus, Section 1 of Commonwealth Act 638 provides as
follows:

Section 1. There shall be published in the Official Gazette [1] all important legisiative acts and
resolutions of a public nature of the, Congress of the Philippines; [2] all executive and administrative
orders and proclamations, except such as have no general applicability; [3] decisions or abstracts of
decisions of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals as may be deemed by said courts of
sufficient importance to be so published; [4] such documents or classes of documents as may be
required so to be published by law; and [5] such documents or classes of documents as the
President of the Philippines shall determine from time to time to have general applicability and legal
effect, or which he may authorize so to be published. ...

The clear object of the above-quoted provision is to give the general public adequate notice of the various laws
which are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. Without such notice and publication, there would be no
basis for the application of the maxim "ignorantia legis non excusat." It would be the height of injustice to punish or
otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law of which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a
constructive one.

Perhaps at no time since the establishment of the Philippine Republic has the publication of laws taken so vital
significance that at this time when the people have bestowed upon the President a power heretofore enjoyed solely
by the legislature. While the people are kept abreast by the mass media of the debates and deliberations in the
Batasan Pambansa—and for the diligent ones, ready access to the legislative records—no such publicity
accompanies the law-making process of the President. Thus, without publication, the people have no means of
knowing what presidential decrees have actually been promulgated, much less a definite way of informing
themselves of the specific contents and texts of such decrees. As the Supreme Court of Spain ruled: "Bajo la
denominacion generica de leyes, se comprenden tambien los reglamentos, Reales decretos, Instrucciones,
Circulares y Reales ordines dictadas de conformidad con las mismas por el Gobierno en uso de su potestad. 5

The very first clause of Section I of Commonwealth Act 638 reads: "There shall be published in the Official
Gazette ... ." The word "shall" used therein imposes upon respondent officials an imperative duty. That duty must be
enforced if the Constitutional right of the people to be informed on matters of public concern is to be given
substance and reality. The law itself makes a list of what should be published in the Official Gazette. Such listing, to
our mind, leaves respondents with no discretion whatsoever as to what must be included or excluded from such
publication.

The publication of all presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is mandated by law.
Obviously, presidential decrees that provide for fines, forfeitures or penalties for their violation or otherwise impose a
burden or. the people, such as tax and revenue measures, fall within this category. Other presidential issuances
which apply only to particular persons or class of persons such as administrative and executive orders need not be
published on the assumption that they have been circularized to all concerned.  6
It is needless to add that the publication of presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is a
requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound by law, he must first be officially
and specifically informed of its contents. As Justice Claudio Teehankee said in Peralta vs. COMELEC  : 7

In a time of proliferating decrees, orders and letters of instructions which all form part of the law of
the land, the requirement of due process and the Rule of Law demand that the Official Gazette as
the official government repository promulgate and publish the texts of all such decrees, orders and
instructions so that the people may know where to obtain their official and specific contents.

The Court therefore declares that presidential issuances of general application, which have not been published,
shall have no force and effect. Some members of the Court, quite apprehensive about the possible unsettling effect
this decision might have on acts done in reliance of the validity of those presidential decrees which were published
only during the pendency of this petition, have put the question as to whether the Court's declaration of invalidity
apply to P.D.s which had been enforced or implemented prior to their publication. The answer is all too familiar. In
similar situations in the past this Court had taken the pragmatic and realistic course set forth in Chicot County
Drainage District vs. Baxter Bank   to wit:
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The courts below have proceeded on the theory that the Act of Congress, having been found to be
unconstitutional, was not a law; that it was inoperative, conferring no rights and imposing no duties,
and hence affording no basis for the challenged decree. Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425,
442; Chicago, 1. & L. Ry. Co. v. Hackett, 228 U.S. 559, 566. It is quite clear, however, that such
broad statements as to the effect of a determination of unconstitutionality must be taken with
qualifications. The actual existence of a statute, prior to such a determination, is an operative fact
and may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by
a new judicial declaration. The effect of the subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to be
considered in various aspects-with respect to particular conduct, private and official. Questions of
rights claimed to have become vested, of status, of prior determinations deemed to have finality and
acted upon accordingly, of public policy in the light of the nature both of the statute and of its
previous application, demand examination. These questions are among the most difficult of those
which have engaged the attention of courts, state and federal and it is manifest from numerous
decisions that an all-inclusive statement of a principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be
justified.

Consistently with the above principle, this Court in Rutter vs. Esteban   sustained the right of a party under the
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Moratorium Law, albeit said right had accrued in his favor before said law was declared unconstitutional by this
Court.

Similarly, the implementation/enforcement of presidential decrees prior to their publication in the Official Gazette is
"an operative fact which may have consequences which cannot be justly ignored. The past cannot always be erased
by a new judicial declaration ... that an all-inclusive statement of a principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot
be justified."

From the report submitted to the Court by the Clerk of Court, it appears that of the presidential decrees sought by
petitioners to be published in the Official Gazette, only Presidential Decrees Nos. 1019 to 1030, inclusive, 1278, and
1937 to 1939, inclusive, have not been so published.   Neither the subject matters nor the texts of these PDs can be
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ascertained since no copies thereof are available. But whatever their subject matter may be, it is undisputed that
none of these unpublished PDs has ever been implemented or enforced by the government. In Pesigan vs.
Angeles,   the Court, through Justice Ramon Aquino, ruled that "publication is necessary to apprise the public of the
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contents of [penal] regulations and make the said penalties binding on the persons affected thereby. " The cogency
of this holding is apparently recognized by respondent officials considering the manifestation in their comment that
"the government, as a matter of policy, refrains from prosecuting violations of criminal laws until the same shall have
been published in the Official Gazette or in some other publication, even though some criminal laws provide that
they shall take effect immediately.

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish in the Official Gazette all unpublished presidential
issuances which are of general application, and unless so published, they shall have no binding force and effect.
2.) G.R. No. 46623 December 7, 1939

MARCIAL KASILAG, petitioner,
vs.
RAFAELA RODRIGUEZ, URBANO ROQUE, SEVERO MAPILISAN and IGNACIO DEL ROSARIO, respondents.

Luis M. Kasilag for petitioner.

Fortunato de Leon for respondents.

IMPERIAL, J.:

This is an appeal taken by the defendant-petitioner from the decision of the Court of Appeals which modified that
rendered by the court of First Instance of Bataan in civil case No. 1504 of said court and held: that the contract
Exhibit "1" is entirely null and void and without effect; that the plaintiffs-respondents, then appellants, are the owners
of the disputed land, with its improvements, in common ownership with their brother Gavino Rodriguez, hence, they
are entitled to the possession thereof; that the defendant-petitioner should yield possession of the land in their favor,
with all the improvements thereon and free from any lien; that the plaintiffs-respondents jointly and severally pay to
the defendant-petitioner the sum of P1,000 with interest at 6 percent per annum from the date of the decision; and
absolved the plaintiffs-respondents from the cross-complaint relative to the value of the improvements claimed by
the defendant-petitioner. The appealed decision also ordered the registrar of deeds of Bataan to cancel certificate of
title No. 325, in the name of the deceased Emiliana Ambrosio and to issue in lieu thereof another certificate of title in
favor of the plaintiffs-respondents and their brother Gavino Rodriguez, as undivided owners in equal parts, free of all
liens and incumbrances except those expressly provided by law, without special pronouncement as to the costs.

The respondents, children and heirs of the deceased Emiliana Ambrosio, commenced the aforesaid civil case to the
end that they recover from the petitioner the possession of the land and its improvements granted by way of
homestead to Emiliana Ambrosio under patent No. 16074 issued on January 11, 1931, with certificate of title No.
325 issued by the registrar of deeds of Bataan on June 27, 1931 in her favor, under section 122 of Act No. 496,
which land was surveyed and identified in the cadastre of the municipality of Limay, Province of Bataan, as lot No.
285; that the petitioner pay to them the sum of P650 being the approximate value of the fruits which he received
from the land; that the petitioner sign all the necessary documents to transfer the land and its possession to the
respondents; that he petitioner be restrained, during the pendency of the case, from conveying or encumbering the
land and its improvements; that the registrar of deeds of Bataan cancel certificate of title No. 325 and issue in lieu
thereof another in favor of the respondents, and that the petitioner pay the costs of suit.

The petitioner denied in his answer all the material allegations of the complaint and by way of special defense
alleged that he was in possession of the land and that he was receiving the fruits thereof by virtue of a mortgage
contract, entered into between him and the deceased Emiliana Ambrosio on May 16, 1932, which was duly ratified
by a notary public; and in counterclaim asked that the respondents pay him the sum of P1,000 with 12 per cent
interest per annum which the deceased owed him and that, should the respondents be declared to have a better
right to the possession of the land, that they be sentenced to pay him the sum of P5,000 as value of all the
improvements which he introduced upon the land. lawphil.net

On May 16, 1932 Emiliana Ambrosio, in life, and the petitioner executed the following public deed:

"This agreement, made and entered into this 16th day of May, 1932, by and between Emiliana Ambrosio, Filipino, of
legal age, widow and resident of Limay, Bataan, P.L., hereinafter called the party of the first part, and Marcial
Kasilag, Filipino, of legal age, married to Asuncion Roces, and resident at 312 Perdigon Street, Manila, P.L.,
hereinafter called party of the second part.

WITNESSETH: That the parties hereto hereby covenant and agree to and with each other as follows:
 ARTICLE I. That the party of the first part is the absolute registered owner of a parcel of land in the barrio of
Alngan, municipality of Limay, Province of Bataan, her title thereto being evidenced by homestead certificate
of title No. 325 issued by the Bureau of Lands on June 11, 1931, said land being lot No. 285 of the Limay
Cadastre, General Land Registration Office Cadastral Record No. 1054, bounded and described as follows:

Beginning at point marked 1 on plan E-57394, N. 84º 32' W. 614.82 m. from B.B.M. No. 3, thence N. 66º 35' E.
307.15 m. to point "2"; S. 5º 07' W. to point "5"; S.6º 10' E. 104.26 m. to point "4"; S. 82º 17' W. to point "5"; S. 28º
53' W. 72.26 m. to point "6"; N. 71º 09' W. to point "7"; N. 1º 42' E. 173.72 m. to point 1, point of beginning,
"Containing an area of 6.7540 hectares. "Points 1,2,6 and 7, B.L.; points 3,4 and 5, stakes; points 4, 5 and 6 on
bank of Alangan River. "Bounded on the North, by property claimed by Maria Ambrosio; on the East, by Road; on
the South, by Alangan River and property claimed by Maxima de la Cruz; and on the West, by property claimed by
Jose del Rosario. "Bearing true. Declination 0º 51' E. "Surveyed under authority of sections 12-22, Act No. 2874 and
in accordance with existing regulations of the Bureau of Lands, by Mamerto Jacinto, public land surveyor, on July 8,
1927 and approved on February 25, 1931.

ARTICLE II. That the improvements on the above described land consist of the following:

Four (4) mango trees, fruit bearing: one hundred ten (110) hills of bamboo trees; one (1) tamarind and six
(6) boñga trees.

ARTICLE III. That the assessed value of the land is P940 and the assessed value of the improvements is
P860, as evidenced by tax declaration No. 3531 of the municipality of Limay, Bataan.

ARTICLE IV. That for and in consideration of the sum of one thousand pesos (P1,000) Philippine currency,
paid by the party of second part to the party of the first part, receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, the
party of the first part hereby encumbers and hypothecates, by way of mortgage, only the improvements
described in Articles II and III hereof, of which improvements the party of the first part is the absolute owner.

ARTICLE V. That the condition of said mortgage is such that if the party of the first part shall well and truly
pay, or cause to paid to the party of the second part, his heirs, assigns, or executors, on or before the 16th
day of November, 1936, or four and one-half (4½) years after date of the execution of this instrument, the
aforesaid sum of one thousand pesos (P1,000) with interest at 12 per cent per annum, then said mortgage
shall be and become null and void; otherwise the same shall be and shall remain in full force and effect, and
subject to foreclosure in the manner and form provided by law for the amount due thereunder, with costs
and also attorney's fees in the event of such foreclosure. lawphil.net

ARTICLE VI. That the party of the first part shall pay all taxes and assessments which are or may become
due on the above described land and improvements during the term of this agreement.

ARTICLE VII. That within thirty (30) days after date of execution of this agreement, the party of the first part
shall file a motion before the Court of First Instance at Balanga, Bataan, P. I., requesting cancellation of
Homestead Certificate of Title No. 325 referred to in Article I hereof and the issuance, in lieu thereof, of a
certificate of title under the provisions of Land Registration Act No. 496, as amended by Act 3901.

ARTICLE III. It if further agreed that if upon the expiration of the period of time (4½) years stipulated in this
mortgage, the mortgagor should fail to redeem this mortgage, she would execute a deed of absolute sale of
the property herein described for the same amount as this mortgage, including all unpaid interests at the
rate of 12 per cent per annum, in favor of the mortgagee.

ARTICLE IX. That in the event the contemplated motion under Article VII hereof is not approved by the
Court, the foregoing contract of sale shall automatically become null and void, and the mortgage stipulated
under Article IV and V shall remain in full force and effect.

In testimony whereof, the parties hereto have hereunto set their hands the day and year first herein before
written.

(Sgd.) MARCIAL KASILAG

 (Sgd.) EMILIANA AMBROSIO

Signed in the presence of:

(Sgd.) ILLEGIBLE

(Sgd.) GAVINO RODRIGUEZ.

PHILIPPINE ISLANDS } ss.

BALANGA, BATAAN } ss.

Before me this day personally appeared Emiliana Ambrosio without cedula by reason of her sex, to me
known and known to me to be the person who signed the foregoing instrument, and acknowledged to me
that she executed the same as her free and voluntary act and deed.

I hereby certify that this instrument consists of three (3) pages including this page of the acknowledgment
and that each page thereof is signed by the parties to the instrument and the witnesses in their presence
and in the presence of each other, and that the land treated in this instrument consists of only one parcel.

In witness whereof I have hereunto set my hand and affixed my notarial seal, this 16th day of May, 1932.

(Sgd.) NICOLAS NAVARRO

Notary Public

My commission expires December 31, 1933.

Doc. No. 178

Page 36 of my register
Book No. IV

One year after the execution of the aforequoted deed, that is, in 1933, it came to pass that Emiliana Ambrosio was
unable to pay the stipulated interests as well as the tax on the land and its improvements. For this reason, she and
the petitioner entered into another verbal contract whereby she conveyed to the latter the possession of the land on
condition that the latter would not collect the interest on the loan, would attend to the payment of the land tax, would
benefit by the fruits of the land, and would introduce improvements thereon. By virtue of this verbal contract, the
petitioner entered upon the possession of the land, gathered the products thereof, did not collect the interest on the
loan, introduced improvements upon the land valued at P5,000, according to him and on May 22, 1934 the tax
declaration was transferred in his name and on March 6, 1936 the assessed value of the land was increased from
P1,020 to P2,180.

After an analysis of the conditions of Exhibit "1" the Court of Appeals came to the conclusion and so held that the
contract entered into by and between the parties, set out in the said public deed, was one of absolute purchase and
sale of the land and its improvements. And upon this ruling it held null and void and without legal effect the entire
Exhibit 1 as well as the subsequent verbal contract entered into between the parties, ordering, however, the
respondents to pay to the petitioner, jointly and severally, the loan of P1,000 with legal interest at 6 per cent per
annum from the date of the decision. In this first assignment of error the petitioner contends that the Court of
Appeals violated the law in holding that Exhibit 1 is an absolute deed of sale of the land and its improvements and
that it is void and without any legal effect.

The cardinal rule in the interpretation of contracts is to the effect that the intention of the contracting parties should
always prevail because their will has the force of law between them. Article 1281 of the Civil Code consecrates this
rule and provides, that if the terms of a contract are clear and leave no doubt as to the intention of the contracting
parties, the literal sense of its stipulations shall be followed; and if the words appear to be contrary to the evident
intention of the contracting parties, the intention shall prevail. The contract set out in Exhibit 1 should be interpreted
in accordance with these rules. As the terms thereof are clear and leave no room for doubt, it should be interpreted
according to the literal meaning of its clauses. The words used by the contracting parties in Exhibit 1 clearly show
that they intended to enter into the principal contract of loan in the amount of P1,000, with interest at 12 per cent per
annum, and into the accessory contract of mortgage of the improvements on the land acquired as homestead, the
parties having moreover, agreed upon the pacts and conditions stated in the deed. In other words, the parties
entered into a contract of mortgage of the improvements on the land acquired as homestead, to secure the payment
of the indebtedness for P1,000 and the stipulated interest thereon. In clause V the parties stipulated that Emiliana
Ambrosio was to pay, within four and a half years, or until November 16, 1936, the debt with interest thereon, in
which event the mortgage would not have any effect; in clause VI the parties agreed that the tax on the land and its
improvements, during the existence of the mortgage, should be paid by the owner of the land; in clause VII it was
covenanted that within thirty days from the date of the contract, the owner of the land would file a motion in the
Court of First Instance of Bataan asking that certificate of title No. 325 be cancelled and that in lieu thereof another
be issued under the provisions of the Land Registration Act No. 496, as amended by Act No. 3901; in clause VIII the
parties agreed that should Emiliana Ambrosio fail to redeem the mortgage within the stipulated period of four years
and a half, she would execute an absolute deed of sale of the land in favor of the mortgagee, the petitioner, for the
same amount of the loan of P1,000 including unpaid interest; and in clause IX it was stipulated that in case the
motion to be presented under clause VII should be disapproved by the Court of First Instance of Bataan, the
contract of sale would automatically become void and the mortgage would subsist in all its force.

Another fundamental rule in the interpretation of contracts, not less important than those indicated, is to the effect
that the terms, clauses and conditions contrary to law, morals and public order should be separated from the valid
and legal contract and when such separation can be made because they are independent of the valid contract
which expresses the will of the contracting parties. Manresa, commenting on article 1255 of the Civil Code and
stating the rule of separation just mentioned, gives his views as follows:

On the supposition that the various pacts, clauses or conditions are valid, no difficulty is presented; but
should they be void, the question is as to what extent they may produce the nullity of the principal obligation.
Under the view that such features of the obligation are added to it and do not go to its essence, a criterion
based upon the stability of juridical relations should tend to consider the nullity as confined to the clause or
pact suffering therefrom, except in case where the latter, by an established connection or by manifest
intention of the parties, is inseparable from the principal obligation, and is a condition, juridically speaking, of
that the nullity of which it would also occasion. (Manresa, Commentaries on the Civil Code, Volume 8, p.
575.)

The same view prevails in the Anglo-American law, as condensed in the following words:

Where an agreement founded on a legal consideration contains several promises, or a promise to do

several things, and a part only of the things to be done are illegal, the promises which can be separated, or
the promise, so far as it can be separated, from the illegality, may be valid. The rule is that a lawful promise
made for a lawful consideration is not invalid merely because an unlawful promise was made at the same
time and for the same consideration, and this rule applies, although the invalidity is due to violation of a
statutory provision, unless the statute expressly or by necessary implication declares the entire contract
void. . . . (13 C. J., par. 470, p. 512; New York Cent. etc. R. Co. v. Gray, 239 U.S., 583; 60 Law ed., 451;
U.S. v. Mora, 97 U.S., 413, 24 Law. ed., 1017; U.S. v. Hodson, 10 Wall, 395; 19 Law ed. 937; Gelpcke v.
Dubuque, 1 Wall. 175, 17 Law ed., 520; U.S. v. Bradly, 10 Pet. 343, 9 Law. ed., 448; Borland v. Prindle, 144
Fed 713; Western Union Tel. Co. v. Kansas Pac. R. Co., 4 Fed., 284; Northern Pac. R. Co. v. U.S., 15 Ct.
Cl., 428.)

Addressing ourselves now to the contract entered into by the parties, set out in Exhibit 1, we stated that the principal
contract is that of loan and the accessory that of mortgage of the improvements upon the land acquired as a
homestead. There is no question that the first of these contract is valid as it is not against the law. The second, or
the mortgage of the improvements, is expressly authorized by section 116 of Act No. 2874, as amended by section
23 of Act No. 3517, reading:

SEC. 116. Except in favor of the Government or any of its branches, units or institutions, or legally
constituted banking corporations, lands acquired under the free patent or homestead provisions shall not be
 subject to encumbrance or alienation from the date of the approval of the application and for a term of five
years from and after the date of issuance of the patent or grant, nor shall they become liable to the
satisfaction of any debt contracted prior to the expiration of said period; but the improvements or crops on
the land may be mortgaged or pledged to qualified persons, associations, or corporations.

It will be recalled that by clause VIII of Exhibit 1 the parties agreed that should Emiliana Ambrosio fail to redeem the
mortgage within the stipulated period of four and a half years, by paying the loan together with interest, she would
execute in favor of the petitioner an absolute deed of sale of the land for P1,000, including the interest stipulated
and owing. The stipulation was verbally modified by the same parties after the expiration of one year, in the sense
that the petitioner would take possession of the land and would benefit by the fruits thereof on condition that he
would condone the payment of interest upon the loan and he would attend to the payment of the land tax. These
pacts made by the parties independently were calculated to alter the mortgage a contract clearly entered into,
converting the latter into a contract of antichresis. (Article 1881 of the Civil Code.) The contract of antichresis, being
a real encumbrance burdening the land, is illegal and void because it is legal and valid.

The foregoing considerations bring us to the conclusion that the first assignment of error is well-founded and that
error was committed in holding that the contract entered into between the parties was one of absolute sale of the
land and its improvements and that Exhibit 1 is null and void. In the second assignment of error the petitioner
contends that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that he is guilty of violating the Public Land Act because he
entered into the contract, Exhibit 1. The assigned error is vague and not specific. If it attempts to show that the said
document is valid in its entirety, it is not well-founded because we have already said that certain pacts thereof are
illegal because they are prohibited by section 116 of Act No. 2874, as amended.

In the third assignment of error the petitioner insists that his testimony, as to the verbal agreement entered into
between him and Emiliana Ambrosio, should have been accepted by the Court of Appeals; and in the fourth and last
assignment of error the same petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that he acted in bad
faith in taking possession of the land and in taking advantage of the fruits thereof, resulting in the denial of his right
to be reimbursed for the value of the improvements introduced by him.

We have seen that subsequent to the execution of the contract, Exhibit 1, the parties entered into another verbal
contract whereby the petitioner was authorized to take possession of the land, to receive the fruits thereof and to
introduce improvements thereon, provided that he would renounce the payment of stipulated interest and he would
assume payment of the land tax. The possession by the petitioner and his receipt of the fruits of the land,
considered as integral elements of the contract of antichresis, are illegal and void agreements because, as already
stated, the contract of antichresis is a lien and such is expressly prohibited by section 116 of Act No. 2874, as
amended. The Court of Appeals held that the petitioner acted in bad faith in taking possession of the land because
he knew that the contract he made with Emiliana Ambrosio was an absolute deed of sale and, further, that the latter
could not sell the land because it is prohibited by section 116. The Civil Code does not expressly define what is
meant by bad faith, but section 433 provides that "Every person who is unaware of any flaw in his title, or in the
manner of its acquisition, by which it is invalidated, shall be deemed a possessor in good faith"; and provides
further, that "Possessors aware of such flaw are deemed possessors in bad faith". Article 1950 of the same Code,
covered by Chapter II relative to prescription of ownership and other real rights, provides, in turn, that "Good faith on
the part of the possessor consists in his belief that the person from whom he received the thing was the owner of the
same, and could transmit the title thereto." We do not have before us a case of prescription of ownership, hence, the
last article is not squarely in point. In resume, it may be stated that a person is deemed a possessor in bad faith
when he knows that there is a flaw in his title or in the manner of its acquisition, by which it is invalidated.

Borrowing the language of Article 433, the question to be answered is whether the petitioner should be deemed a
possessor in good faith because he was unaware of any flaw in his title or in the manner of its acquisition
by which it is invalidated. It will be noted that ignorance of the flaw is the keynote of the rule. From the facts found
established by the Court of Appeals we can neither deduce nor presume that the petitioner was aware of a flaw in
his title or in the manner of its acquisition, aside from the prohibition contained in section 116. This being the case,
the question is whether good faith may be premised upon ignorance of the laws. Manresa, commenting on
article 434 in connection with the preceding article, sustains the affirmative. He says:

"We do not believe that in real life there are not many cases of good faith founded upon an error of law. When the
acquisition appears in a public document, the capacity of the parties has already been passed upon by competent
authority, and even established by appeals taken from final judgments and administrative remedies against the
qualification of registrars, and the possibility of error is remote under such circumstances; but, unfortunately, private
documents and even verbal agreements far exceed public documents in number, and while no one should be
ignorant of the law, the truth is that even we who are called upon to know and apply it fall into error not infrequently.
However, a clear, manifest, and truly unexcusable ignorance is one thing, to which undoubtedly refers article 2, and
another and different thing is possible and excusable error arising from complex legal principles and from the
interpretation of conflicting doctrines.

But even ignorance of the law may be based upon an error of fact, or better still, ignorance of a fact is
possible as to the capacity to transmit and as to the intervention of certain persons, compliance with certain
formalities and appreciation of certain acts, and an error of law is possible in the interpretation of doubtful
doctrines. (Manresa, Commentaries on the Spanish Civil Code. Volume IV, pp. 100, 101 and 102.)

According to this author, gross and inexcusable ignorance of law may not be the basis of good faith, but possible,
excusable ignorance may be such basis. It is a fact that the petitioner is not conversant with the laws because he is
not a lawyer. In accepting the mortgage of the improvements he proceeded on the well-grounded belief that he was
not violating the prohibition regarding the alienation of the land. In taking possession thereof and in consenting to
receive its fruits, he did not know, as clearly as a jurist does, that the possession and enjoyment of the fruits are
attributes of the contract of antichresis and that the latter, as a lien, was prohibited by section 116. These
considerations again bring us to the conclusion that, as to the petitioner, his ignorance of the provisions of section
116 is excusable and may, therefore, be the basis of his good faith. We do not give much importance to the change
of the tax declaration, which consisted in making the petitioner appear as the owner of the land, because such an
act may only be considered as a sequel to the change of possession and enjoyment of the fruits by the petitioner, to
about which we have stated that the petitioner's ignorance of the law is possible and excusable. We, therefore, hold
that the petitioner acted in good faith in taking possession of the land and enjoying its fruits.

The petitioner being a possessor in good faith within the meaning of article 433 of the Civil Code and having
introduced the improvements upon the land as such, the provisions of article 361 of the same Code are applicable;
wherefore, the respondents are entitled to have the improvements and plants upon indemnifying the petitioner the
value thereof which we fix at P3,000, as appraised by the trial court; or the respondents may elect to compel the
petitioner to have the land by paying its market value to be fixed by the court of origin.

The respondents also prayed in their complaint that the petitioner be compelled to pay them the sum of P650, being
the approximate value of the fruits obtained by the petitioner from the land. The Court of Appeals affirmed the
judgment of the trial court denying the claim or indemnity for damages, being of the same opinion as the trial court
that the respondents may elect to compel the petitioner to have the land. The Court of Appeals affirmed the
judgment of the trial court that the respondents have not established such damages. Under the verbal contract
between the petitioner and the deceased Emiliana Ambrosio, during the latter's lifetime, the former would take
possession of the land and would receive the fruits of the mortgaged improvements on condition that he would no
longer collect the stipulated interest and that he would attend to the payment of the land tax. This agreement, at
bottom, is tantamount to the stipulation that the petitioner should apply the value of the fruits of the land to the
payment of stipulated interest on the loan of P1,000 which is, in turn, another of the elements characterizing the
contract of antichresis under article 1881 of the Civil Code. It was not possible for the parties to stipulate further that
the value of the fruits be also applied to the payment of the capital, because the truth was that nothing remained
after paying the interest at 12% per annum. This interest, at the rate fixed, amounted to P120 per annum, whereas
the market value of the fruits obtainable from the land hardly reached said amount in view of the fact that the
assessed value of said improvements was, according to the decision, P860. To this should be added the fact that,
under the verbal agreement, from the value of the fruits had to be taken a certain amount to pay the annual land tax.
We mention these data here to show that the petitioner is also not bound to render an accounting of the value of the
fruits of the mortgaged improvements for the reason stated that said value hardly covers the interest earned by the
secured indebtednes.

For all the foregoing considerations, the appealed decision is reversed, and we hereby adjudge: (1) that the contract
of mortgage of the improvements, set out in Exhibit 1, is valid and binding; (2) that the contract of antichresis agreed
upon verbally by the parties is a real incumbrance which burdens the land and, as such, is a null and without effect;
(3) that the petitioner is a possessor in good faith; (4) that the respondents may elect to have the improvements
introduced by the petitioner by paying the latter the value thereof, P3,000, or to compel the petitioner to buy and
have the land where the improvements or plants are found, by paying them its market value to be filed by the court
of origin, upon hearing the parties; (5) that the respondents have a right to the possession of the land and to enjoy
the mortgaged improvements; and (6) that the respondents may redeem the mortgage of the improvements by
paying to the petitioner within three months the amount of P1,000, without interest, as that stipulated is set off by the
value of the fruits of the mortgaged improvements which petitioner received, and in default thereof the petitioner
may ask for the public sale of said improvements for the purpose of applying the proceeds thereof to the payment of
his said credit. Without special pronouncement as to the costs in all instances. So ordered.
3.) G.R. No. 137873       April 20, 2001

D. M. CONSUNJI, INC., petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and MARIA J. JUEGO, respondents.

KAPUNAN, J.:

At around 1:30 p.m., November 2, 1990, Jose Juego, a construction worker of D. M. Consunji, Inc., fell 14 floors
from the Renaissance Tower, Pasig City to his death.

PO3 Rogelio Villanueva of the Eastern Police District investigated the tragedy and filed a report dated November 25,
1990, stating that:

x x x. [The] [v]ictim was rushed to [the] Rizal Medical Center in Pasig, Metro Manila where he was
pronounced dead on arrival (DOA) by the attending physician, Dr. Errol de Yzo[,] at around 2:15 p.m. of the
same date.

Investigation disclosed that at the given time, date and place, while victim Jose A. Juego together with
Jessie Jaluag and Delso Destajo [were] performing their work as carpenter[s] at the elevator core of the
14th floor of the Tower D, Renaissance Tower Building on board a [p]latform made of channel beam (steel)
measuring 4.8 meters by 2 meters wide with pinulid plywood flooring and cable wires attached to its four
corners and hooked at the 5 ton chain block, when suddenly, the bolt or pin which was merely inserted to
connect the chain block with the [p]latform, got loose xxx causing the whole [p]latform assembly and the
victim to fall down to the basement of the elevator core, Tower D of the building under construction thereby
crushing the victim of death, save his two (2) companions who luckily jumped out for safety.

It is thus manifest that Jose A. Juego was crushed to death when the [p]latform he was then on board and
performing work, fell. And the falling of the [p]latform was due to the removal or getting loose of the pin
which was merely inserted to the connecting points of the chain block and [p]latform but without a safety
lock.1

On May 9, 1991, Jose Juego’s widow, Maria, filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig a complaint for
damages against the deceased’s employer, D.M. Consunji, Inc. The employer raised, among other defenses, the
widow’s prior availment of the benefits from the State Insurance Fund.

After trial, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of the widow Maria Juego. The dispositive portion of the RTC
decision reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering defendant to pay plaintiff, as follows:

1. P50,000.00 for the death of Jose A. Juego.

2. P10,000.00 as actual and compensatory damages.

3. P464,000.00 for the loss of Jose A. Juego’s earning capacity.

4. P100,000.00 as moral damages.

5. P20,000.00 as attorney’s fees, plus the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED. 2

On appeal by D. M. Consunji, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the decision of the RTC in toto.
D. M. Consunji now seeks the reversal of the CA decision on the following grounds:

 THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE POLICE REPORT WAS ADMISSIBLE
EVIDENCE OF THE ALLEGED NEGLIGENCE OF PETITIONER.

 THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE DOCTRINE OF RES IPSA
LOQUITOR [sic] IS APPLICABLE TO PROVE NEGLIGENCE ON THE PART OF PETITIONER.

 THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONER IS PRESUMED NEGLIGENT

UNDER ARTICLE 2180 OF THE CIVIL CODE, AND

 THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT RESPONDENT IS NOT PRECLUDED

FROM RECOVERING DAMAGES UNDER THE CIVIL CODE. 3

Petitioner maintains that the police report reproduced above is hearsay and, therefore, inadmissible. The CA ruled
otherwise. It held that said report, being an entry in official records, is an exception to the hearsay rule.

The Rules of Court provide that a witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of his personal knowledge,
that is, which are derived from his perception. A witness, therefore, may not testify as what he merely learned from
4 

others either because he was told or read or heard the same. Such testimony is considered hearsay and may not be
received as proof of the truth of what he has learned. 5 This is known as the hearsay rule.

Hearsay is not limited to oral testimony or statements; the general rule that excludes hearsay as evidence applies to
written, as well as oral statements.6

The theory of the hearsay rule is that the many possible deficiencies, suppressions, sources of error and
untrustworthiness, which lie underneath the bare untested assertion of a witness, may be best brought to light and
exposed by the test of cross-examiantion.7 The hearsay rule, therefore, excludes evidence that cannot be tested by
cross-examination.8

The Rules of Court allow several exceptions to the rule, 9 among which are entries in official records. Section 44,
Rule 130 provides:

Entries in official records made in the performance of his duty made in the performance of his duty by a
public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law
are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated.

In Africa, et al. vs. Caltex (Phil.), Inc., et al., this Court, citing the work of Chief Justice Moran, enumerated the
10 

requisites for admissibility under the above rule:

(a) that the entry was made by a public officer or by another person specially enjoined by law to do so;

(b) that it was made by the public officer in the performance of his duties, or by such other person in the
performance of a duty specially enjoined by law; and

(c) that the public officer or other person had sufficient knowledge of the facts by him stated, which must
have been acquired by him personally or through official information.

The CA held that the police report meets all these requisites. Petitioner contends that the last requisite is not
present.

The Court notes that PO3 Villanueva, who signed the report in question, also testified before the trial court.
In Rodriguez vs. Court of Appeals, which involved a Fire Investigation Report, the officer who signed the fire report
11 

also testified before the trial court. This Court held that the report was inadmissible for the purpose of proving the
truth of the statements contained in the report but admissible insofar as it constitutes part of the testimony of the
officer who executed the report.
 x x x. Since Major Enriquez himself took the witness stand and was available for cross-examination, the
portions of the report which were of his personal knowledge or which consisted of his perceptions and
conclusions were not hearsay. The rest of the report, such as the summary of the statements of the parties
based on their sworn statements (which were annexed to the Report) as well as the latter, having been
included in the first purpose of the offer [as part of the testimony of Major Enriquez], may then be considered
as independently relevant statements which were gathered in the course of the investigation and may thus
be admitted as such, but not necessarily to prove the truth thereof. It has been said that:

"Where regardless of the truth or falsity of a statement, the fact that it has been made is relevant, the
hearsay rule does not apply, but the statement may be shown. Evidence as to the making of such
statement is not secondary but primary, for the statement itself may constitute a fact in issue, or be
circumstantially relevant as to the existence of such a fact."

When Major Enriquez took the witness stand, testified for petitioners on his Report and made himself
available for cross-examination by the adverse party, the Report, insofar as it proved that certain utterances
were made (but not their truth), was effectively removed from the ambit of the aforementioned Section 44 of
Rule 130. Properly understood, this section does away with the testimony in open court of the officer who
made the official record, considers the matter as an exception to the hearsay rule and makes the entries in
said official record admissible in evidence as prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. The underlying
reasons for this exceptionary rule are necessity and trustworthiness, as explained in Antillon v. Barcelon.

The litigation is unlimited in which testimony by officials is daily needed; the occasions in which the
officials would be summoned from his ordinary duties to declare as a witness are numberless. The
public officers are few in whose daily work something is not done in which testimony is not needed
from official sources. Were there no exception for official statements, hosts of officials would be
found devoting the greater part of their time to attending as witnesses in court or delivering
deposition before an officer. The work of administration of government and the interest of the public
having business with officials would alike suffer in consequence. For these reasons, and for many
others, a certain verity is accorded such documents, which is not extended to private documents. (3
Wigmore on Evidence, Sec. 1631).

The law reposes a particular confidence in public officers that it presumes they will discharge their
several trusts with accuracy and fidelity; and, therefore, whatever acts they do in discharge of their
duty may be given in evidence and shall be taken to be true under such a degree of caution as to the
nature and circumstances of each case may appear to require.

It would have been an entirely different matter if Major Enriquez was not presented to testify on his report. In
that case the applicability of Section 44 of Rule 143 would have been ripe for determination, and this Court
would have agreed with the Court of Appeals that said report was inadmissible since the aforementioned
third requisite was not satisfied. The statements given by the sources of information of Major Enriquez failed
to qualify as "official information," there being no showing that, at the very least, they were under a duty to
give the statements for record.

Similarly, the police report in this case is inadmissible for the purpose of proving the truth of the statements
contained therein but is admissible insofar as it constitutes part of the testimony of PO3 Villanueva.

In any case, the Court holds that portions of PO3 Villanueva’s testimony which were of his personal knowledge
suffice to prove that Jose Juego indeed died as a result of the elevator crash. PO3 Villanueva had seen Juego’s
remains at the morgue, making the latter’s death beyond dispute. PO3 Villanueva also conducted an ocular
12 

inspection of the premises of the building the day after the incident and saw the platform for himself. He observed
13  14 

that the platform was crushed and that it was totally damaged. PO3 Villanueva also required Garcia and Fabro to
15  16 

bring the chain block to the police headquarters. Upon inspection, he noticed that the chain was detached from the
lifting machine, without any pin or bolt. 17

What petitioner takes particular exception to is PO3 Villanueva’s testimony that the cause of the fall of the platform
was the loosening of the bolt from the chain block. It is claimed that such portion of the testimony is mere opinion.
Subject to certain exceptions, the opinion of a witness is generally not admissible. 19
18 
Petitioner’s contention, however, loses relevance in the face of the application of res ipsa loquitur by the CA. The
effect of the doctrine is to warrant a presumption or inference that the mere fall of the elevator was a result of the
person having charge of the instrumentality was negligent. As a rule of evidence, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is
peculiar to the law of negligence which recognizes that prima facie negligence may be established without direct
proof and furnishes a substitute for specific proof of negligence. 20

The concept of res ipsa loquitur has been explained in this wise:

While negligence is not ordinarily inferred or presumed, and while the mere happening of an accident or
injury will not generally give rise to an inference or presumption that it was due to negligence on defendant’s
part, under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, which means, literally, the thing or transaction speaks for itself,
or in one jurisdiction, that the thing or instrumentality speaks for itself, the facts or circumstances
accompanying an injury may be such as to raise a presumption, or at least permit an inference of negligence
on the part of the defendant, or some other person who is charged with negligence.

x x x where it is shown that the thing or instrumentality which caused the injury complained of was under the
control or management of the defendant, and that the occurrence resulting in the injury was such as in the
ordinary course of things would not happen if those who had its control or management used proper care,
there is sufficient evidence, or, as sometimes stated, reasonable evidence, in the absence of explanation by
the defendant, that the injury arose from or was caused by the defendant’s want of care. 21

One of the theoretical based for the doctrine is its necessity, i.e., that necessary evidence is absent or not
available.22

The res ipsa loquitur doctrine is based in part upon the theory that the defendant in charge of the
instrumentality which causes the injury either knows the cause of the accident or has the best opportunity of
ascertaining it and that the plaintiff has no such knowledge, and therefore is compelled to allege negligence
in general terms and to rely upon the proof of the happening of the accident in order to establish negligence.
The inference which the doctrine permits is grounded upon the fact that the chief evidence of the true cause,
whether culpable or innocent, is practically accessible to the defendant but inaccessible to the injured
person.

It has been said that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur furnishes a bridge by which a plaintiff, without
knowledge of the cause, reaches over to defendant who knows or should know the cause, for any
explanation of care exercised by the defendant in respect of the matter of which the plaintiff complains. The
res ipsa loquitur doctrine, another court has said, is a rule of necessity, in that it proceeds on the theory that
under the peculiar circumstances in which the doctrine is applicable, it is within the power of the defendant
to show that there was no negligence on his part, and direct proof of defendant’s negligence is beyond
plaintiff’s power. Accordingly, some court add to the three prerequisites for the application of the res ipsa
loquitur doctrine the further requirement that for the res ipsa loquitur doctrine to apply, it must appear that
the injured party had no knowledge or means of knowledge as to the cause of the accident, or that the party
to be charged with negligence has superior knowledge or opportunity for explanation of the accident. 23

The CA held that all the requisites of res ipsa loquitur are present in the case at bar:

There is no dispute that appellee’s husband fell down from the 14 th floor of a building to the basement while
he was working with appellant’s construction project, resulting to his death. The construction site is within
the exclusive control and management of appellant. It has a safety engineer, a project superintendent, a
carpenter leadman and others who are in complete control of the situation therein. The circumstances of any
accident that would occur therein are peculiarly within the knowledge of the appellant or its employees. On
the other hand, the appellee is not in a position to know what caused the accident. Res ipsa loquitur is a rule
of necessity and it applies where evidence is absent or not readily available, provided the following
requisites are present: (1) the accident was of a kind which does not ordinarily occur unless someone is
negligent; (2) the instrumentality or agency which caused the injury was under the exclusive control of the
person charged with negligence; and (3) the injury suffered must not have been due to any voluntary action
or contribution on the part of the person injured. x x x.
 No worker is going to fall from the 14th floor of a building to the basement while performing work in a
construction site unless someone is negligent[;] thus, the first requisite for the application of the rule of res
ipsa loquitur is present. As explained earlier, the construction site with all its paraphernalia and human
resources that likely caused the injury is under the exclusive control and management of appellant[;] thus[,]
the second requisite is also present. No contributory negligence was attributed to the appellee’s deceased
husband[;] thus[,] the last requisite is also present. All the requisites for the application of the rule of res ipsa
loquitur are present, thus a reasonable presumption or inference of appellant’s negligence arises. x x x. 24

Petitioner does not dispute the existence of the requisites for the application of res ipsa loquitur, but argues that the
presumption or inference that it was negligent did not arise since it "proved that it exercised due care to avoid the
accident which befell respondent’s husband."

Petitioner apparently misapprehends the procedural effect of the doctrine. As stated earlier, the defendant’s
negligence is presumed or inferred when the plaintiff establishes the requisites for the application of res ipsa
25 

loquitur. Once the plaintiff makes out a prima facie case of all the elements, the burden then shifts to defendant to
explain. The presumption or inference may be rebutted or overcome by other evidence and, under appropriate
26 

circumstances disputable presumption, such as that of due care or innocence, may outweigh the inference. It is not 27 

for the defendant to explain or prove its defense to prevent the presumption or inference from arising. Evidence by
the defendant of say, due care, comes into play only after the circumstances for the application of the doctrine has
been established. 1âwphi1.nêt

In any case, petitioner cites the sworn statement of its leadman Ferdinand Fabro executed before the police
investigator as evidence of its due care. According to Fabro’s sworn statement, the company enacted rules and
regulations for the safety and security of its workers. Moreover, the leadman and the bodegero inspect the chain
block before allowing its use.

It is ironic that petitioner relies on Fabro’s sworn statement as proof of its due care but, in arguing that private
respondent failed to prove negligence on the part of petitioner’s employees, also assails the same statement for
being hearsay.

Petitioner is correct. Fabro’s sworn statement is hearsay and inadmissible. Affidavits are inadmissible as evidence
under the hearsay rule, unless the affiant is placed on the witness stand to testify thereon. The inadmissibility of this
28 

sort of evidence is based not only on the lack of opportunity on the part of the adverse party to cross-examine the
affiant, but also on the commonly known fact that, generally, an affidavit is not prepared by the affiant himself but by
another who uses his own language in writing the affiant’s statements which may either be omitted or
misunderstood by the one writing them. Petitioner, therefore, cannot use said statement as proof of its due care any
29 

more than private respondent can use it to prove the cause of her husband’s death. Regrettably, petitioner does not
cite any other evidence to rebut the inference or presumption of negligence arising from the application of res ipsa
loquitur, or to establish any defense relating to the incident.

Next, petitioner argues that private respondent had previously availed of the death benefits provided under the
Labor Code and is, therefore, precluded from claiming from the deceased’s employer damages under the Civil
Code.

Article 173 of the Labor Code states:

Article 173. Extent of liability. – Unless otherwise provided, the liability of the State Insurance Fund under
this Title shall be exclusive and in place of all other liabilities of the employer to the employee, his
dependents or anyone otherwise entitled to receive damages on behalf of the employee or his dependents.
The payment of compensation under this Title shall not bar the recovery of benefits as provided for in
Section 699 of the Revised Administrative Code, Republic Act Numbered Eleven hundred sixty-one, as
amended, Republic Act Numbered Six hundred ten, as amended, Republic Act Numbered Forty-eight
hundred sixty-four as amended, and other laws whose benefits are administered by the System or by other
agencies of the government.

The precursor of Article 173 of the Labor Code, Section 5 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, provided that:
 Section 5. Exclusive right to compensation. – The rights and remedies granted by this Act to an employee by
reason of a personal injury entitling him to compensation shall exclude all other rights and remedies
accruing to the employee, his personal representatives, dependents or nearest of kin against the employer
under the Civil Code and other laws because of said injury x x x.

Whether Section 5 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act allowed recovery under said Act as well as under the Civil
Code used to be the subject of conflicting decisions. The Court finally settled the matter in Floresca vs.Philex Mining
Corporation, which involved a cave-in resulting in the death of the employees of the Philex Mining Corporation.
30 

Alleging that the mining corporation, in violation of government rules and regulations, failed to take the required
precautions for the protection of the employees, the heirs of the deceased employees filed a complaint against
Philex Mining in the Court of First Instance (CFI). Upon motion of Philex Mining, the CFI dismissed the complaint for
lack of jurisdiction. The heirs sought relief from this Court.

Addressing the issue of whether the heirs had a choice of remedies, majority of the Court En Banc, following the
31 

rule in Pacaña vs. Cebu Autobus Company, held in the affirmative.

WE now come to the query as to whether or not the injured employee or his heirs in case of death have a
right of selection or choice of action between availing themselves of the worker’s right under the Workmen’s
Compensation Act and suing in the regular courts under the Civil Code for higher damages (actual, moral
and exemplary) from the employers by virtue of the negligence or fault of the employers or whether they
may avail themselves cumulatively of both actions, i.e., collect the limited compensation under the
Workmen’s Compensation Act and sue in addition for damages in the regular courts.

In disposing of a similar issue, this Court in Pacaña vs. Cebu Autobus Company, 32 SCRA 442, ruled
that an injured worker has a choice of either to recover from the employer the fixed amounts set by the
Workmen’s Compensation Act or to prosecute an ordinary civil action against the tortfeasor for higher
damages but he cannot pursue both courses of action simultaneously. [Underscoring supplied.]

Nevertheless, the Court allowed some of the petitioners in said case to proceed with their suit under the Civil Code
despite having availed of the benefits provided under the Workmen’s Compensation Act. The Court reasoned:

With regard to the other petitioners, it was alleged by Philex in its motion to dismiss dated May 14, 1968
before the court a quo, that the heirs of the deceased employees, namely Emerito Obra, Larry Villar, Jr.,
Aurelio Lanuza, Lorenzo Isla and Saturnino submitted notices and claims for compensation to the Regional
Office No. 1 of the then Department of Labor and all of them have been paid in full as of August 25, 1967,
except Saturnino Martinez whose heirs decided that they be paid in installments x x x. Such allegation was
admitted by herein petitioners in their opposition to the motion to dismiss dated may 27, 1968 x x x in the
lower court, but they set up the defense that the claims were filed under the Workmen’s Compensation Act
before they learned of the official report of the committee created to investigate the accident which
established the criminal negligence and violation of law by Philex, and which report was forwarded by the
Director of Mines to then Executive Secretary Rafael Salas in a letter dated October 19, 1967 only x x x.

WE hold that although the other petitioners had received the benefits under the Workmen’s Compensation
Act, such my not preclude them from bringing an action before the regular court because they became
cognizant of the fact that Philex has been remiss in its contractual obligations with the deceased miners only
after receiving compensation under the Act. Had petitioners been aware of said violation of government
rules and regulations by Philex, and of its negligence, they would not have sought redress under the
Workmen’s Compensation Commission which awarded a lesser amount for compensation. The choice of
the first remedy was based on ignorance or a mistake of fact, which nullifies the choice as it was not an
intelligent choice. The case should therefore be remanded to the lower court for further proceedings.
However, should the petitioners be successful in their bid before the lower court, the payments made under
the Workmen’s Compensation Act should be deducted from the damages that may be decreed in their favor.
[Underscoring supplied.]

The ruling in Floresca providing the claimant a choice of remedies was reiterated in Ysmael Maritime Corporation
vs. Avelino, Vda. De Severo vs. Feliciano-Go, and Marcopper Mining Corp. vs. Abeleda. In the last case, the Court
32  33  34 

again recognized that a claimant who had been paid under the Act could still sue under the Civil Code. The Court
said:
 In the Robles case, it was held that claims for damages sustained by workers in the course of their
employment could be filed only under the Workmen’s Compensation Law, to the exclusion of all further
claims under other laws. In Floresca, this doctrine was abrogated in favor of the new rule that the claimants
may invoke either the Workmen’s Compensation Act or the provisions of the Civil Code, subject to the
consequence that the choice of one remedy will exclude the other and that the acceptance of compensation
under the remedy chosen will preclude a claim for additional benefits under the other remedy. The exception
is where a claimant who has already been paid under the Workmen’s Compensation Act may still sue for
damages under the Civil Code on the basis of supervening facts or developments occurring after he opted
for the first remedy. (Underscoring supplied.)

Here, the CA held that private respondent’s case came under the exception because private respondent was
unaware of petitioner’s negligence when she filed her claim for death benefits from the State Insurance Fund.
Private respondent filed the civil complaint for damages after she received a copy of the police investigation report
and the Prosecutor’s Memorandum dismissing the criminal complaint against petitioner’s personnel. While stating
that there was no negligence attributable to the respondents in the complaint, the prosecutor nevertheless noted in
the Memorandum that, "if at all," the "case is civil in nature." The CA thus applied the exception in Floresca:

x x x We do not agree that appellee has knowledge of the alleged negligence of appellant as early as
November 25, 1990, the date of the police investigator’s report. The appellee merely executed her sworn
statement before the police investigator concerning her personal circumstances, her relation to the victim,
and her knowledge of the accident. She did not file the complaint for "Simple Negligence Resulting to
Homicide" against appellant’s employees. It was the investigator who recommended the filing of said case
and his supervisor referred the same to the prosecutor’s office. This is a standard operating procedure for
police investigators which appellee may not have even known. This may explain why no complainant is
mentioned in the preliminary statement of the public prosecutor in her memorandum dated February 6,
1991, to wit: "Respondent Ferdinand Fabro x x x are being charged by complainant of "Simple Negligence
Resulting to Homicide." It is also possible that the appellee did not have a chance to appear before the
public prosecutor as can be inferred from the following statement in said memorandum: "Respondents who
were notified pursuant to Law waived their rights to present controverting evidence," thus there was no
reason for the public prosecutor to summon the appellee. Hence, notice of appellant’s negligence cannot be
imputed on appellee before she applied for death benefits under ECC or before she received the first
payment therefrom. Her using the police investigation report to support her complaint filed on May 9, 1991
may just be an afterthought after receiving a copy of the February 6, 1991 Memorandum of the Prosecutor’s
Office dismissing the criminal complaint for insufficiency of evidence, stating therein that: "The death of the
victim is not attributable to any negligence on the part of the respondents. If at all and as shown by the
records this case is civil in nature." (Underscoring supplied.) Considering the foregoing, We are more
inclined to believe appellee’s allegation that she learned about appellant’s negligence only after she applied
for and received the benefits under ECC. This is a mistake of fact that will make this case fall under the
exception held in the Floresca ruling.35

The CA further held that not only was private respondent ignorant of the facts, but of her rights as well:

x x x. Appellee [Maria Juego] testified that she has reached only elementary school for her educational
attainment; that she did not know what damages could be recovered from the death of her husband; and
that she did not know that she may also recover more from the Civil Code than from the ECC. x x x.36

Petitioner impugns the foregoing rulings. It contends that private respondent "failed to allege in her complaint that
her application and receipt of benefits from the ECC were attended by ignorance or mistake of fact. Not being an
issue submitted during the trial, the trial court had no authority to hear or adjudicate that issue."

Petitioner also claims that private respondent could not have been ignorant of the facts because as early as
November 28, 1990, private respondent was the complainant in a criminal complaint for "Simple Negligence
Resulting to Homicide" against petitioner’s employees. On February 6, 1991, two months before the filing of the
action in the lower court, Prosecutor Lorna Lee issued a resolution finding that, although there was insufficient
evidence against petitioner’s employees, the case was "civil in nature." These purportedly show that prior to her
receipt of death benefits from the ECC on January 2, 1991 and every month thereafter, private respondent also
knew of the two choices of remedies available to her and yet she chose to claim and receive the benefits from the
ECC.
When a party having knowledge of the facts makes an election between inconsistent remedies, the election is final
and bars any action, suit, or proceeding inconsistent with the elected remedy, in the absence of fraud by the other
party. The first act of election acts as a bar. Equitable in nature, the doctrine of election of remedies is designed to
37 

mitigate possible unfairness to both parties. It rests on the moral premise that it is fair to hold people responsible for
their choices. The purpose of the doctrine is not to prevent any recourse to any remedy, but to prevent a double
redress for a single wrong.38

The choice of a party between inconsistent remedies results in a waiver by election. Hence, the rule in Floresca that
a claimant cannot simultaneously pursue recovery under the Labor Code and prosecute an ordinary course of
action under the Civil Code. The claimant, by his choice of one remedy, is deemed to have waived the other.

Waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right.39

[It] is an act of understanding that presupposes that a party has knowledge of its rights, but chooses not to
assert them. It must be generally shown by the party claiming a waiver that the person against whom the
waiver is asserted had at the time knowledge, actual or constructive, of the existence of the party’s rights or
of all material facts upon which they depended. Where one lacks knowledge of a right, there is no basis
upon which waiver of it can rest. Ignorance of a material fact negates waiver, and waiver cannot be
established by a consent given under a mistake or misapprehension of fact.

A person makes a knowing and intelligent waiver when that person knows that a right exists and has
adequate knowledge upon which to make an intelligent decision.

Waiver requires a knowledge of the facts basic to the exercise of the right waived, with an awareness of its
consequences. That a waiver is made knowingly and intelligently must be illustrated on the record or by the
evidence.40

That lack of knowledge of a fact that nullifies the election of a remedy is the basis for the exception in Floresca.

It is in light of the foregoing principles that we address petitioner’s contentions.

Waiver is a defense, and it was not incumbent upon private respondent, as plaintiff, to allege in her complaint that
she had availed of benefits from the ECC. It is, thus, erroneous for petitioner to burden private respondent with
raising waiver as an issue. On the contrary, it is the defendant who ought to plead waiver, as petitioner did in pages
2-3 of its Answer; otherwise, the defense is waived. It is, therefore, perplexing for petitioner to now contend that the
41 

trial court had no jurisdiction over the issue when petitioner itself pleaded waiver in the proceedings before the trial
court.

Does the evidence show that private respondent knew of the facts that led to her husband’s death and the rights
pertaining to a choice of remedies?

It bears stressing that what negates waiver is lack of knowledge or a mistake of fact. In this case, the "fact" that
served as a basis for nullifying the waiver is the negligence of petitioner’s employees, of which private respondent
purportedly learned only after the prosecutor issued a resolution stating that there may be civil liability. In Floresca, it
was the negligence of the mining corporation and its violation of government rules and regulations. Negligence, or
violation of government rules and regulations, for that matter, however, is not a fact, but a conclusion of law, over
which only the courts have the final say. Such a conclusion binds no one until the courts have decreed so. It
appears, therefore, that the principle that ignorance or mistake of fact nullifies a waiver has been misapplied
in Floresca and in the case at bar.

In any event, there is no proof that private respondent knew that her husband died in the elevator crash when on
November 15, 1990 she accomplished her application for benefits from the ECC. The police investigation report is
dated November 25, 1990, 10 days after the accomplishment of the form. Petitioner filed the application in her
behalf on November 27, 1990.

There is also no showing that private respondent knew of the remedies available to her when the claim before the
ECC was filed. On the contrary, private respondent testified that she was not aware of her rights.
Petitioner, though, argues that under Article 3 of the Civil Code, ignorance of the law excuses no one from
compliance therewith. As judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution form part of the
Philippine legal system (Article 8, Civil Code), private respondent cannot claim ignorance of this Court’s ruling
in Floresca allowing a choice of remedies.

The argument has no merit. The application of Article 3 is limited to mandatory and prohibitory laws. This may be
42 

deduced from the language of the provision, which, notwithstanding a person’s ignorance, does not excuse his or
her compliance with the laws. The rule in Floresca allowing private respondent a choice of remedies is neither
mandatory nor prohibitory. Accordingly, her ignorance thereof cannot be held against her.

Finally, the Court modifies the affirmance of the award of damages. The records do not indicate the total amount
private respondent ought to receive from the ECC, although it appears from Exhibit "K" that she received P3,581.85
43 

as initial payment representing the accrued pension from November 1990 to March 1991. Her initial monthly
pension, according to the same Exhibit "K," was P596.97 and present total monthly pension was P716.40. Whether
the total amount she will eventually receive from the ECC is less than the sum of P644,000.00 in total damages
awarded by the trial court is subject to speculation, and the case is remanded to the trial court for such
determination. Should the trial court find that its award is greater than that of the ECC, payments already received
by private respondent under the Labor Code shall be deducted from the trial court'’ award of damages. Consistent
with our ruling in Floresca, this adjudication aims to prevent double compensation.

WHEREFORE, the case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City to determine whether the award
decreed in its decision is more than that of the ECC. Should the award decreed by the trial court be greater than
that awarded by the ECC, payments already made to private respondent pursuant to the Labor Code shall be
deducted therefrom. In all other respects, the Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.
4.) G.R. No. 192383               December 4, 2013

ISABELO C. DELA CRUZ, Petitioner,

vs.
LUCILA C. DELA CRUZ, Respondent.

DECISION

ABAD, J.:

This case deals with the right of a person to whom an immovable property has been unconditionally given to
demand its participation.

The Facts and the Case

Petitioner Isabelo C. Dela Cruz (Isabelo) claimed that in 1975 he and his sister, respondent Lucila C. Dela Cruz and
(Lucila) and Cornelia C. Dela Cruz (Cornelia), bought on installment a 240-square meter land in Las Piñas from
Gatchalian Realty, Inc. Isabelo and Cornelia paid the down payment and religiously paid the monthly
amortizations.  On the following year, Isabelo constructed a residential house on the subject lot.
1 2

Because of Lucia’s plea for the siblings to help their cousin, Corazon L. Victoriano (Corazon), who was in financial
distress, Isabelo agreed to have the lot they bought used as collateral for the loan that Corazon planned to secure
from the Philippine Veterans Bank. To make this posible, Lucila paid the ₱8,000.00 that they still owed Gatchalian
Realty, Inc. On January 18, 1979 the Register of Deeds issued Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) S-80735 in Lucila’s
name  and this was mortgaged for Corazon’s benefit. But, since Corazon failed to pay her loan, the bank foreclosed
3

on the property on March 1, 1989 for ₱286,000.00. Lucila redeemed it on March 27, 1992. 4

On October 7, 2002 Lucila executed an affidavit of waiver  relinquishing all her share, interest, and participation to
5

half of the lot to Isabelo and the other half to her niece, Emelinda C. Dela Cruz (Emelinda). On even date, Isabelo
and Emelinda executed a Kasunduan  acknowledging their respective rights in the property. Claiming ownership of
6

half of the subject property by virtue of Lucila’s affidavit of waiver, on August 22, 2005 Isabelo filed an action for
partition before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Las Piñas City in SCA 05-0008, seeking the segregation of his
portion of the land and the issuance of the corresponding title in his name. But Lucila countered that the property,
including the house built on it, belonged to her since she paid for the same out of her income as pawnshop general
manager and from selling jewelry. 7

She claimed that her affidavit of waiver did not cede ownership of half of the property to Isabelo since the affidavit
made clear that her waiver would take effect only if the problems that beset their family were resolved. Since this
condition had not been met, she had every right to revoke that waiver as in fact she did so on September 24, 2004
in the Kasulatan ng Pagpawalang Bisa ng "Affidavit Waiver." 8

On February 7, 2008 the RTC rendered a Decision  denying Isabelo’s complaint for lack of merit. It also ordered him
9

to pay Lucila ₱50,000.00 as attorney’s fees and to bear the costs of suit.10

The RTC ruled that Lucila’s ownership was evidenced by the tax declaration, the real property tax payment order,
and the title to the land in her name. Isabelo’s testimony on cross-examination conclusively also showed that Lucila
owned the property. 11

Isabelo’s contention that it was he and Cornelia who paid for the monthly amortization of the property cannot be
believed since Cornelia herself testified that Lucila paid for all the amortizations on the land.12

Further, the RTC held that Lucila’s affidavit of waiver did not confer title over the property on Isabelo considering
that, absent an annotation on TCT S-80735, the waiver cannot ripen into an adverse claim. More importantly, Lucila
already cancelled the waiver through the Kasulatan that she subsequently executed. 13
The RTC was also unconvinced that the house belonged to Isabelo. It noted that the receipts for the construction
materials and survey plan that he presented did not prove ownership. Recovery of property, not partition was the
proper remedy. Isabelo appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV 90797. On December 18, 2009 the
latter court rendered a Decision  affirming the RTC ruling that Isabelo failed to established his right to half of the
14

subject property as would entitle him to have the same partitioned. But the CA deleted the award of attorney’s fees
and costs for failure of Lucila to justify her claims and for the RTC’s failure to state in its decision the rationale for the
awards. Isabelo moved for reconsideration but the CA denied it. 15

Issue Presented

The sole issue presented in this case is whether or not the CA erred in failing to rule that Lucila’s cession of half of
the property to Isabelo through waiver did not have the effect of making him part owner of the property with a right to
demand partition.

Ruling of the Court

In partition, the court must first determine the existence of co-ownership. The action will not lie if the plaintiff has no
proprietary interest in the subject property. Indeed, the rules  require him to set forth in his complaint the nature and
16

extent of his title to the property. It would be premature to order partition until the question of ownership is first
definitely resolved. 17

At bottom, the question is: did Lucila’s affidavit of waiver ceding to Isabelo half of the subject property conveys to
him a right of ownership over that half? The CA agreed with the RTC that Lucila’s affidavit of waiver did not vest any
property right to Isabelo since the condition she set in that affidavit had not been fulfilled. This then gave Lucila the
right in the meantime to rescind the waiver, something that she eventually did. But, contrary to the position that the
CA and the RTC had taken, Lucila’s waiver was absolute and contained no precondition. The pertinent portion of
the affidavit of waiver reads:

That to put everything in proper order, I hereby waive all my share, interest and participation in so far as it refer to
the one half portion (120 SQ. M.) of the above-parcel of land, with and in favor of my brother ISABELO C. DELA
CRUZ, of legal age, married, Filipino and residing at Las Pinas City, and the other half portion (120 SQ. M.) in favor
of my niece, EMELINDA C. DELA CRUZ, also of legal age, single, Filipino and residing at Sto. Rosario Hagonoy,
Bulacan; x x x x 18

Evidently, Lucila would not have used the terms "to put everything in proper order, I hereby waive…" if her intent
was to set a precondition to her waiver covering the property, half to Isabelo and half to Emelinda. If that were her
intention, she could have stated, "subject to the condition that everything is put in proper order, I hereby waive..." or
something to that effect. When she instead said, "That to put everything in proper order, I hereby waive my share,
interest and participation" in the two halves of the subject property in favor of Isabelo and Emelinda, Lucila merely
disclosed what motivated her in ceding the property to them. She wanted to put everything in proper order, thus she
was driven to make the waiver in their favor. Lucila did not say, "to put everything in proper order, I promise to waive
my right" to the property, which is a future undertaking, one that is demandable only when everything is put in
proper order. But she instead said, "to put everything in proper order, I hereby waive" etc. The phrase "hereby
waive" means that Lucila was, by executing the affidavit, already waiving her right to the property, irreversibly
divesting herself of her existing right to the same. After he and his co-owner Emelinda accepted the donation,
Isabelo became the owner of half of the subject property having the right to demand its partition.

WHEREFORE, THE Court:

1. GRANTS the petition;

2. SETS ASIDE the Decision dated December 18, 2009 and resolution dates May 25, 2010 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV 90797 as well as the Decision dated February 7, 2008 of the Regional Trial Court of
Las Piñas in SCA 05-0008;

3. ORDERS the partition of the subject property between petitioner Isabelo C. Dela Cruz and Emelinda C.
Dela Cruz;
4. ORDERS the remand of the records of SCA 05-0008 to the Regional Trial Court of Las Piñas; and

5. DIRECTS the latter court to proceed with the partition proceedings in the case in accordance with Section
2, Rule 69 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.
5.) G.R. No. 201931               February 11, 2015

DOÑA ADELA  EXPORT INTERNATIONAL, INC., Petitioner,

1

vs.
TRADE AND INVESTMENT DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION (TIDCORP), AND THE BANK OF THE
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS (BPI), Respondents.

DECISION

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended,
assailing the Decision  dated November 15, 2011 and the Order  dated May 14, 2012 of the Regional Trial Court
2 3

(RTC) of Mandaluyong City, Branch 211 in SEC Case No. MC06-103 for Voluntary Insolvency. The RTC approved
the Joint Motion to Approve Agreement filed by respondents Trade and Investment Development Corporation of the
Philippines (TIDCORP) and the Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI). Respondents stipulated in their agreement that
petitioner shall waive its rights to confidentiality under the provisions of the Law on Secrecy of Bank Deposits and
the General Banking Law of 2000.

The facts follow:

On August 23, 2006, petitioner Doña Adela Export International, Inc., (petitioner, for brevity) filed a Petition for
Voluntary Insolvency.  The case was docketed as SEC Case No. MC06-103 and raffled off to the RTC of
4

Mandaluyong City, Branch 211.

On August 28, 2006, the RTC, after finding the petition sufficient in form and substance, issued an order declaring
petitioner as insolvent and staying all civil proceedings against petitioner. In the same order, the RTC set the initial
hearing on October 19, 2006. 5

Thereafter, Atty. Arlene Gonzales was appointed as receiver. After taking her oath, Atty. Gonzales proceeded to
make the necessary report, engaged appraisers and required the creditors to submit proof of their respective claims.

On October 22, 2010, Atty. Gonzales filed a Motion for Parties to Enter Into Compromise Agreement  incorporating
6

therein her proposed terms of compromise, the pertinent portion of which reads:

1. The remaining assets of the Petitioner Dona Adela Export Int’l., Inc., (Dona Adela) consists of the
following:

Asset Appraised Value Remarks

1.1 Land ₱5,616,000 w/ REM to TRC

1.2 Building 6,480,000 w/ REM to TRC

1.3 Sewing machines 942,000 w/o chattel mortgage to TRC (sic)

1.4 Sewing machines 755,000 w/chattel mortgage

1.5 Furnitures and Fixtures w/o appraised value

The detailed list of the abovementioned assets and the corresponding appraised value is attached hereto as
Annex A;

2. The claims of the creditors of Petitioner previously submitted with their respective proofs of claim are
shown below:
 NAME OF CREDITOR AMOUNT

Technology Resource Center 29,546,342.45

BPI 11,069,575.82

*TIDCORP

City of Mandaluyong as of 3/25/09 1,061,370.12

*TIDCORP has not yet submitted its peso amount of claim

xxxx

WHEREFORE, undersigned receiver respectfully proposed for the concerned parties of this (sic) proceedings to
enter into a compromise Agreement under the following terms and conditions:

a. That the remaining assets of the Petitioner mentioned under 1 above be assigned and applied to their
respective claims in the following manner:

a.1. The real estate property mentioned under 1.1 and 1.2 above with real estate mortgage (REM) to
Technology Resource Center (TRC) be assigned and applied to its credit. All costs and expenses for
the transfer of the registration of the said property, including its unpaid real estate taxes due to the
City of Mandaluyong, and cost for cancellation of real estate mortgage shall be borne by TRC.

a.2. For TRC to assign and waive its rights over the sewing machines and equipments under chattel
mortgage to it mentioned under 1.3 above as its share for the administrative costs of this
proceedings.

a.3. To assign to BPI and TIDCORP the sewing machines and equipments mentioned under 1.3 and
1.4 above in proportion with their credits.

a.4. All other remaining assets of Petitioner under 1.5 above be assigned to the Court-appointed
receiver, Atty. Arlene T. Gonzales for payment of receiver’s fees.

a.5. All other administrative expenses, if any, shall be for the account of TRC, BPI and TIDCORP, in
proportion to their respective credits.

b. That for the abovementioned purpose mentioned under 3.a. above, the appraisal value of the property (as
appraised by Royal Asia Appraisers which was previously submitted to the Honorable Court) be made as
the basis in determining the value of the properties; and the amount of the claims that will be approved by
this Honorable Court be made as the basis in the determination of the amount of credits due to the
respective creditors.

c. Furthermore, that the Compromise Agreement being proposed herein shall be without prejudice to rights
of the creditors to enforce actions against other debtors who are jointly and solidarily liable with the
petitioner.

d. Finally, that the petitioner, Dona Adela Int’l., Inc., be discharged from its debts to the party-creditors by
virtue of the Compromise Agreement as being proposed herein. 7

On May 26, 2011, petitioner, through its President Epifanio C. Ramos, Jr., and Technology Resource Center (TRC)
entered into a Dacion En Pagoby Compromise Agreement  wherein petitioner agreed to transfer a 351-square meter
8

parcel of land covered by TCT No. 10027 with existing improvements situated in the Barrio of Jolo, Mandaluyong
City, in favor of TRC in full payment of petitioner’s obligation. The agreement bears the conformity of Atty. Gonzales
as receiver. TRC filed on May 26, 2011 a Compliance, Manifestation and Motion to Approve Dacion En Pago by
Compromise Agreement. 9
On August 11, 2011, creditors TIDCORP and BPI also filed a Joint Motion to Approve Agreement  which contained
10

the following terms:

1. OBLIGATION OF PETITIONER.– The parties agree that the outstanding principal obligation of petitioner
to TIDCORP shall be in the amount of NINE MILLION FORTY-FOUR THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED
EIGHT & 15/100 PESOS (₱9,044,708.15), while to BPI in the amount of ELEVEN MILLION SIXTY NINE
THOUSAND FIVE HUNDREDSEVENTY FIVE & 82/100 PESOS (₱11,069,575.82).

2. SETTLEMENT.– TIDCORP and BPI both hereby agree to accept all the machineries in petitioner’s
inventory set aside pursuant to the Motion for Parties to Enter Into Compromise Agreement dated 18
October 2010 filed by the Receiver, Atty. Arlene T. Gonzales. The said machineries valued at THREE
HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (₱350,000.00)shall be divided equally between TIDCORP and BPI.

3. SETTLEMENT OF CLAIMS. – TIDCORP and BPI hereby agree that acceptance of the
abovementioned settlement shall constitute payment of petitioner’s aforesaid obligation pursuant to
Act No. 1956 (Insolvency Act). However, the benefit of payment under the said Insolvency Act shall only be
in favor of petitioner and shall not in any manner affect the claims of TIDCORP and BPI as against its
sureties and/or guarantors.

4. EXPENSES AND TAXES.– All necessary expenses, including but not limited to, fees of the Receiver,
documentation and notarization, as well as all fees incurred or to be incurred in connection to the full
implementation of this Agreement shall be for the account of Mr. Epifanio C. Ramos, Jr.

All taxes and fees incurred or to be incurred including but not limited to gross receipts tax shall be for the
account of the petitioner.

5. WAIVER OF CONFIDENTIALITY. – The petitioner and the members of its Board of Directors shall waive
all rights to confidentiality provided under the provisions of Republic Act No. 1405, as amended, otherwise
known as the Law on Secrecy of Bank Deposits, and Republic Act No. 8791, otherwise known as The
General Banking Law of 2000. Accordingly, the petitioner and the members of its Board of Directors by
these presents grant TIDCORP and BPI access to any deposit or other accounts maintained by them with
any bank.

For this purpose, the petitioner and the members of its Board of Directors shall authorize TIDCORP and BPI to
make, sign, execute and deliver any document of whatever kind or nature which may be necessary or proper to
allow them access to such deposits or other accounts.

TIDCORP and BPI shall be further authorized to delegate to any person, who may exercise in their stead, any or all
of the powers and authority herein granted to them or substitute any person in their place to do and perform said
powers and authority.

18. HOLD FREE AND HARMLESS. – The petitioner shall indemnify and hold TIDCORP and BPI, their respective
Board of Directors, and officers free and harmless against any liability or claim of whatever kind or nature which may
arise from, or in connection with, or in relation to this Agreement.  (Underscoring supplied)
11

Epifanio Ramos, Jr. filed a Manifestation and Motion to the Proposed Compromise Agreement  of TIDCORP and
12

BPI wherein he stated that petitioner has a personality separate and distinct from its stockholders and officers. He
argued that he cannot be held liable for the expenses and taxes as a consequence of the auction or
distribution/payment of said machineries to the creditors; hence, his name should be deleted as a party to the
Compromise Agreement.

Likewise, Atty. Gonzales filed a Manifestation and Comment (On Dacion En Pago by Compromise Agreement with
TRC and Joint Motion to Approve Agreement of BPI and TIDCORP) with Motion for Payment of Administrative
Expenses and Receiver’s Fees.  Atty. Gonzales manifested that she is entitled to payment of administrative
13

expenses and receiver’s fees in the total amount of ₱740,200.00. She further stated that it is just and fair for her to
ask her due for services rendered as officer of the Court from TRC who benefitted the most from the insolvency
proceedings; and, that she is waiving the administrative expenses and receiver’s fees due from TIDCORP and BPI.
In its Comment,  TRC requested that the receiver’s fee be reduced to ₱106,000.00. In her Reply,  Atty. Gonzales
14 15

said that she will accept the amount of ₱106,000.00 being offered by TRC.

On November 15, 2011, the RTC rendered the assailed Decision approving the Dacion En Pagoby Compromise
Agreement and the Joint Motion to Approve Agreement, to wit: WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is
hereby rendered based on the foregoing exchange of pleadings, as follows:

1. Finding the aforequoted Dacion En Pago by Compromise Agreement dated May 26, 2011 executed by
and between Dona Adela Export International, Inc., represented by its president Epifanio C. Ramos, Jr., and
Technology Resource Center, represented by its Director General Dennis L. Cunanan, to be in order and
not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy, and the fact that the Court-
Appointed Receiver in her Reply filed on October 24, 2011 intimated her conformity to the Dacion En Pago
by Compromise Agreement, the same is hereby APPROVED and is made the basis of this judgment;

2. As regards the Joint Motion to Approve Agreement dated July 29, 2011, filed by creditors Trade and
Investment Development Corporation of the Philippines and the Bank of the Philippine Islands, with the
exception of paragraph 4 thereof pertaining to Expenses and Taxes, the same is likewise APPROVED, for
the same is not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy, and the fact that the
Court-Appointed Receiver in her Reply filed on October 24, 2011 intimated her conformity to said Joint
Motion to Approve Agreement;

3. Pursuant to its Comment filed on October 19, 2011, Technology Resource Center is hereby ordered to
pay the Court-Appointed Receiver, Atty. Arlene T. Gonzales the sum of ₱106,000.00, representing its
proportionate share of the administrative expenses incurred by the receiver with legal interest from date of
termination of this insolvency proceedings.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission who is directed to cause the
removal of petitioner Dona Adela Export International, Inc., from the list of registered legal entities and to make a
report to this Court of its Compliance within fifteen (15) days from said elimination so that the Court could terminate
the instant insolvency proceedings and release the Court-Appointed receiver from her duties and responsibilities.

SO ORDERED. 16

Petitioner filed a motion for partial reconsideration  and claimed that TIDCORP and BPI’s agreement imposes on it
17

several obligations such as payment of expenses and taxes and waiver of confidentiality of its bank deposits but it is
not a party and signatory to the said agreement.

In its Order  dated May 14, 2012, the RTC denied the motion and held that petitioner’s silence and acquiescence to
18

the joint motion to approve compromise agreement while it was set for hearing by creditors BPI and TIDCORP is
tantamount to admission and acquiescence thereto. There was no objection filed by petitioner to the joint motion to
approve compromise agreement prior to its approval, said the RTC. The RTC also noted that petitioner’s President
attended every hearing of the case but did not interpose any objection to the said motion when its conditions were
being discussed and formulated by the parties and Atty. Gonzales. 19

Hence, this petition.

Petitioner asserts that express and written waiver from the depositor concerned is required by law before
any third person or entity is allowed to examine bank deposits or bank records. According to petitioner, it is
not a party to the compromise agreement between BPI and TIDCORP and its silence or acquiescence is not
tantamount to an admission that binds it to the compromise agreement of the creditors especially the
waiver of confidentiality of bank deposits. Petitioner cites the rule on relativity of contracts which states that
contracts can only bind the parties who entered into it, and it cannot favor or prejudice a third person, even if he is
aware of such contract and has knowledge thereof. Petitioner also maintains that waivers are not presumed, but
must be clearly and convincingly shown, either by express stipulation or acts admitting no other reasonable
explanation.
Respondent BPI counters that petitioner is estopped from questioning the BPI-TIDCORP compromise agreement
because petitioner and its counsel participated in all the proceedings involving the subject compromise agreement
and did not object when the compromise agreement was considered by the RTC.

Respondent TIDCORP contends that the waiver of confidentiality under Republic Act (R.A.) Nos. 1405 and
8791 does not require the express or written consent of the depositor. It is TIDCORP’s position that upon
declaration of insolvency, the insolvency court obtains complete jurisdiction over the insolvent’s property which
includes the authority to issue orders to look into the insolvent’s bank deposits. Since bank deposits are considered
debts owed by the banks to the petitioner, the receiver is empowered to recover them even without petitioner’s
express or written consent, said TIDCORP.

TIDCORP further avers that the BPI-TIDCORP compromise agreement approved by the RTC is binding on
petitioner and its Board of Directors by reason of estoppel. The compromise agreement is not an ordinary contract.
Since it was approved by the insolvency court, the compromise agreement has the force and effect of judgment; it is
immediately executory and not appealable, except for vices of consent or forgery, TIDCORP concluded.

The main issue for our consideration is whether the petitioner is bound by the provision in the BPI-TIDCORP
Joint Motion to Approve Agreement that petitioner shall waive its rights to confidentiality of its bank
deposits under R.A. No. 1405, as amended, otherwise known as the Law on Secrecy of Bank Deposits and
R.A. No. 8791, otherwise known as The General Banking Law of 2000.

The petition is meritorious.

A judgment rendered on the basis of a compromise agreement between the parties in a civil case is final,
unappealable, and immediately executory. 20

However, if one of the parties claims that his consent was obtained through fraud, mistake, or duress, he must file a
motion with the trial court that approved the compromise agreement to reconsider the judgment and nullify or set
aside said contract on any of the said grounds for annulment of contract within 15 days from notice of judgment.
Under Rule 37, said party can either file a motion for new trial or reconsideration. A party can file a motion for new
trial based on fraud, accident or mistake, excusable negligence, or newly discovered evidence. On the other hand, a
party may decide to seek the recall or modification of the judgment by means of a motion for reconsideration on the
ground that "the decision or final order is contrary to law" if the consent was procured through fraud, mistake, or
duress. Thus, the motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration is the readily available remedy for a party to
challenge a judgment if the 15-day period from receipt of judgment for taking an appeal has not yet expired. 21

In this case, petitioner sought partial reconsideration of the decision based on compromise agreement assailing the
waiver of confidentiality provision in the Agreement between its two creditors, TIDCORP and BPI, in which petitioner
was not a party. After the trial court denied the motion on the ground of estoppel, petitioner sought a direct recourse
to this Court.

We stress that a direct recourse to this Court from the decisions, final resolutions and orders of the RTC may be
taken where only questions of law are raised or involved. There is a question of law when the doubt or difference
arises as to what the law is on a certain state of facts, which does not call for an examination of the probative value
of the evidence presented by the parties-litigants. On the other hand, there is a question of fact when the doubt or
controversy arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. Simply put, when there is no dispute as to fact, the
question of whether the conclusion drawn therefrom is correct or not, is a question of law.  Petitioner submits the
22

lone question of law on whether the waiver of confidentiality provision in the Agreement between TIDCORP and BPI
is valid despite petitioner not being a party and signatory to the same. According to petitioner, R.A. No.
1405requires the express and written consent of the depositor to make the waiver effective.

Section 2 of R.A. No. 1405, the Law on Secrecy of Bank Deposits enacted in 1955, was first amended by
Presidential Decree No. 1792 in 1981 and further amended by R.A. No. 7653 in 1993. It now reads:

SEC. 2. All deposits of whatever nature with banks or banking institutions in the Philippines including investments in
bonds issued by the Government of the Philippines, its political subdivisions and its instrumentalities, are hereby
considered as of an absolutely confidential nature and may not be examined, inquired or looked into by any person,
government official, bureau or office, except when the examination is made in the course of a special or general
examination of a bank and is specifically authorized by the Monetary Board after being satisfied that there is
reasonable ground to believe that a bank fraud or serious irregularity has been or is being committed and that it is
necessary to look into the deposit to establish such fraud or irregularity, or when the examination is made by an
independent auditor hired by the bank to conduct its regular audit provided that the examination is for audit
purposes only and the results thereof shall be for the exclusive use of the bank, or upon written permission of the
depositor, or in cases of impeachment, or upon order of a competent court in cases of bribery or dereliction of duty
of public officials, or in cases where the money deposited or invested is the subject matter of the litigation.

R.A. No. 1405 provides for exceptions when records of deposits may be disclosed. These are under any of the
following instances: (a) upon written permission of the depositor, (b) in cases of impeachment, (c) upon order of a
competent court in the case of bribery or dereliction of duty of public officials or, (d) when the money deposited or
invested is the subject matter of the litigation, and (e) in cases of violation of the Anti-Money Laundering Act, the
Anti-Money Laundering Council may inquire into a bank account upon order of any competent court. 23

In this case, the Joint Motion to Approve Agreement was executed by BPI and TIDCORP only. There was no written
consent given by petitioner or its representative, Epifanio Ramos, Jr., that petitioner is waiving the confidentiality of
its bank deposits. The provision on the waiver of the confidentiality of petitioner’s bank deposits was merely inserted
in the agreement. It is clear therefore that petitioner is not bound by the said provision since it was without the
express consent of petitioner who was not a party and signatory to the said agreement.

Neither can petitioner be deemed to have given its permission by failure to interpose its objection during the
proceedings.  It is an elementary rule that the existence of a waiver must be positively demonstrated since a waiver
1âwphi1

by implication is not normally countenanced. The norm is that a waiver must not only be voluntary, but must
have been made knowingly, intelligently, and with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and
likely consequences. There must be persuasive evidence to show an actual intention to relinquish the right.
Mere silence on the part of the holder of the right should not be construed as a surrender thereof; the courts
must indulge every reasonable presumption against the existence and validity of such waiver. 24

In addition, considering that petitioner was already declared insolvent by the RTC, all its property, assets and
belongings were ordered delivered to the appointed receiver or assignee. Thus, in the order of the RTC appointing
Atty. Gonzales as receiver, petitioner was directed to assign and convey to Atty. Gonzales all its real and personal
property, monies, estate and effects with all the deeds, books and papers relating thereto,  pursuant to Section
25

32  of the Insolvency Law.  Such assignment shall operate to vest in the assignee all of the estate of the insolvent
26 27

debtor not exempt by law from execution.  Corollarily, the stipulation in the Joint Motion to Approve Compromise
28

Agreement that petitioner waives its right to confidentiality of its bank deposits requires the approval and conformity
of Atty. Gonzales as receiver since all the property, money, estate and effects of petitioner have been assigned and
conveyed to her  and she has the right to recover all the estate, assets, debts and claims belonging to or due to the
29

insolvent debtor. 30

While it was Atty. Gonzales who filed the Motion for Parties to Enter Into Compromise Agreement, she did not sign
or approve the Joint Motion to Approve Agreement submitted by TIDCORP and BPI. In her Manifestation and
Comment (on Dacion En Pago by Compromise Agreement with TRC and Joint Motion to Approve Agreement of BPI
and TIDCORP) there is no showing that Atty. Gonzales signified her conformity to the waiver of confidentiality of
petitioner’s bank deposits. Atty. Gonzales stated thus:

13. COMPROMISE AGREEMENT OF TIDCORP AND BPI

The undersigned receiver is in conformity with the compromise agreement of TIDCORP and BPI, attached hereto as
Annex C, which they submitted to this Honorable Court under the abovementioned Joint Motion in so far as the
sharing scheme of the sewing machine inventories of Dona Adela is concerned. However, the undersigned receiver
has the following comments on the other provisions of the said compromise agreement:

xxxx

13.2. The undersigned receiver reiterates that Dona Adela has no cash or other assets to source payment for
expenses and taxes provided under no. 4 of the Joint Motion to Approve Agreement. In fact, except for the amount
of ₱5,000.00 she initially asked for administrative expenses and the appraisal fees for the assets of Dona Adela
advanced by MR. EPIFANIO RAMOS, she has been shouldering all the administrative expenses of this insolvency
proceedings.

xxxx

21. As also mentioned under 13.2. above, Dona Adela has no cash to source payment for the abovementioned
administrative expenses and receiver’s fees, and its assets, which should have been the source for payment for
administrative expenses and receiver’s fees before the distribution to the creditors, have already been assigned to
the creditors by compromise agreement.

22. After considering its savings from foreclosure expenses, sheriff’s fees and other related expenses had it pursued
foreclosure proceedings, it is just fair for the undersigned receiver to ask her due for services rendered as officer of
this Honorable Court from TRC who benefitted the most from the insolvency proceedings.  (Emphasis ours)
31

Clearly, the waiver of confidentiality of petitioner’s bank deposits in the BPI-TIDCORP Joint Motion to Approve
Agreement lacks the required written consent of petitioner and conformity of the receiver. We, thus, hold that
petitioner is not bound by the said provision.

It is basic in law that a compromise agreement, as a contract, is binding only upon the parties to the compromise,
and not upon non-parties. This is the doctrine of relativity of contracts.  The rule is based on Article 1311 (1) of the
32

Civil Code which provides that "contracts take effect only between the parties, their assigns and heirs x x x."  The
33

sound reason for the exclusion of non-parties to an agreement is the absence of a vinculum or juridical tie which is
the efficient cause for the establishment of an obligation.  Consistent with this principle, a judgment based entirely
34

on a compromise agreement is binding only on the parties to the compromise the court approved, and not upon the
parties who did not take part in the compromise agreement and in the proceedings leading to its submission and
approval by the court. Otherwise stated, a court judgment made solely on the basis of a compromise agreement
binds only the parties to the compromise, and cannot bind a party litigant who did not take part in the compromise
agreement. 35

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The second paragraph of the November 15,
2011 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Mandaluyong City, Branch 211, in SEC Case No. MC06-103 is hereby
MODIFIED to read as follows:

2. As regards the Joint Motion to Approve Agreement dated July 29, 2011, filed by creditors Trade and Investment
Development Corporation of the Philippines and the Bank of the Philippine Islands, with the exception of paragraph
4 and paragraph 5 thereof pertaining to Expenses and Taxes and Waiver of Confidentiality, the same is likewise
APPROVED, for the same is not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy, and the fact
that the Court-Appointed Receiver in her Reply filed on October 24, 2011 intimated her conformity to said Joint
Motion to Approve Agreement.
 6.) G.R. No. 189516, June 08, 2016

EDNA MABUGAY-OTAMIAS, JEFFREN M. OTAMIAS AND MINOR JEMWEL M. OTAMIAS,

REPRESENTED BY THEIR MOTHER EDNA MABUGAY-OTAMIAS, Petitioners, v. REPUBLIC OF
THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY COL. VIRGILIO O. DOMINGO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS
THE COMMANDING OFFICER OF THE PENSION AND GRATUITY MANAGEMENT CENTER
(PGMC) OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

LEONEN, J.:

A writ of execution lies against the pension benefits of a retired officer of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, which is the subject of a deed of assignment drawn by him granting support to his wife
and five (5) children. The benefit of exemption from execution of pension benefits is a statutory right
that may be waived, especially in order to comply with a husband's duty to provide support under
Article XV of the 1987 Constitution and the Family Code.

Petitioner Edna Mabugay-Otamias (Edna) and retired Colonel Francisco B. Otamias (Colonel Otamias)
were married on June 16, 1978 and had five (5) children.1 ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

On September 2000, Edna and Colonel Otamias separated due to his alleged infidelity.2 Their children
remained with Edna.3 ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

On August 2002, Edna filed a Complaint-Affidavit against Colonel Otamias before the Provost
Marshall Division of the Armed Forces of the Philippines.4 Edna demanded monthly support equivalent
to 75% of Colonel Otamias' retirement benefits.5 Colonel Otamias executed an Affidavit, stating: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

That sometime in August or September 2002, I was summoned at the Office of the Provost Marshal,
Philippine Army, in connection with a complaint affidavit submitted to said Office by my wife Mrs.
Edna M. Otamias signifying her intention 75% of my retirement benefits from the AFP;

That at this point, I can only commit 50% of my retirement benefits to be pro-rated among my wife
and five (5) children;

That in order to implement this compromise, I am willing to enter into Agreement with my wife
covering the same;

That I am executing this affidavit to attest to the truth of the foregoing facts and whatever legal
purpose it may serve.6 cralawred

On February 26, 2003, Colonel Otamias executed a Deed of Assignment where he waived 50% of his
salary and pension benefits in favor of Edna and their children.7 The Deed of Assignment was
considered by the parties as a compromise agreement.8 It stated: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

This Assignment, made and executed unto this 26th day of February 2003 at Fort Bonifacio, Makati
City, by the undersigned LTC Francisco B. Otamias, 0-0-111045 (INP) PA, of legal age, married and
presently residing at Dama De Noche St., Pembo, Makati City.

WITNESSETH

WHEREAS, the undersigned affiant is the legal husband of EDNA M. OTAMIAS and the father of Julie
Ann, Jonathan, Jennifer, Jeffren and Jemwel all residing at Patag, Cagayan de Oro City;

WHEREAS, the undersigned will be retiring from the military service and expects to receive
retirement benefits from the Armed Forces of the Philippines;

WHEREAS, the undersigned had expressed his willingness to give a share in his retirement benefits to
my wife and five (5) abovenamed children,

NOW, THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the foregoing premises, the undersigned hereby
stipulated the following:

1. That the undersigned will give to my legal wife and five (5) children FIFTY PERCENT (50%) of my
retirement benefits to be pro� rated among them.

2. That a separate check(s) be issued and to be drawn and encash [sic] in the name of the legal wife
and five (5) children pro-rating the fifty (50%) percent of my retirement benefits.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this 26th day of February 2003 at Fort
Bonifacio, Makati City.9 cralawred

Colonel Otamias retired on April 1, 2003.10 ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

The agreement was honored until January 6, 2006.11 Edna alleged that "the A[rmed] F[orces] [of
the] Philippines] suddenly decided not to honor the agreement"12 between Colonel Otamias and his
legitimate family.

In a letter13 dated April 3, 2006, the Armed Forces of the Philippines Pension and Gratuity
Management Center (AFP PGMC) informed Edna that a court order was required for the AFP PGMC to
recognize the Deed of Assignment.14 ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

In another letter15 dated April 17, 2006, the AFP PGMC reiterated that it could not act on Edna's
request to receive a portion of Colonel Otamias' pension "unless ordered by [the] appropriate
court."16
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Heeding the advice of the AFP PGMC, Edna, on behalf of herself and Jeffren M. Otamias and Jemwel
M. Otamias (Edna, et al.), filed before the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro, Misamis Oriental
an action for support, docketed as F.C. Civil Case No. 2006-039.17 ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

The trial court's Sheriff tried to serve summons on Colonel Otamias several times, to no
avail.18 Substituted service was resorted to.19 Colonel Otamias was subsequently declared in default
for failure to file a responsive pleading despite order of the trial court.20 ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

The trial court ruled in favor of Edna, et al. and ordered the automatic deduction of the amount of
support from the monthly pension of Colonel Otamias.21 ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

The dispositive portion of the trial court's Decision stated: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

ALL THE FOREGOING CONSIDERED, and in consonance with the legal obligation of the defendant to
the plaintiffs, the Armed Forces of the Philippines, through its Finance Center and/or appropriate
Finance Officer thereof, is thereby ordered to release to Edna Mabugay Otamias and minor Jemwel M.
Otamias, herein represented by his mother Edna, their fifty (50%) per cent share of each of the
monthly pension due to Colonel Francisco B. Otamias, AFP PA (Retired).

Defendant Francisco Otamias is also ordered to pay plaintiff Edna M. Otamias, fifty (50%) per cent of
whatever retirement benefits he has already received from the Armed Forces of the Philippines AND
the arrears in support, effective January 2006 up to the time plaintiff receives her share direct from
the Finance Center of the Armed Forces of the Philippines.

IT IS SO ORDERED.22 cralawred

The Armed Forces of the Philippines, through the Office of the Judge Advocate General, filed a
Manifestation/Opposition23 to the Decision of the trial court, but it was not given due course due to its
late filing.24 ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Edna, et al., through counsel, filed a Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution25 dated February 22,
2008. The trial court granted the Motion, and a writ of execution was issued by the trial court on April
10, 2008.26 ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

The Armed Forces of the Philippines Finance Center (AFP Finance Center), tlirough the Office of the
Judge Advocate General, filed a Motion to Quash27 the writ of execution and argued that the AFP
Finance Center's duty to disburse benefits is ministerial. It releases benefits only upon the AFP
PGMC's approval.28 ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

The trial court denied the Motion to Quash and held that: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Under the law and existing jurisprudence, the "right to support" is practically equivalent to the "right
to life." The "right to life" always takes precedence over "property rights." The "right to support/life"
is also a substantive right which always takes precedence over technicalities/procedural rules. It
being so, technical rules must yield to substantive justice. Besides, this Court's Decision dated
February 27, 2007 has long acquired finality, and as such, is ripe for enforcement/execution.

THE FOREGOING CONSIDERED, the instant Motion is hereby DENIED.29 cralawred

The AFP PGMC moved for reconsideration of the order denying the Motion to Quash,30 but the Motion
was also denied by the trial court in the Order31 dated August 6, 2008.

A Notice of Garnishment was issued by the trial court on July 15, 2008 and was received by the AFP
PGMC on September 9, 2008.32 ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

The AFP PGMC filed before the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition.33 ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

The Court of Appeals granted34 the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition and partially nullified the
trial court's Decision insofar as it directed the automatic deduction of support from the pension
benefits of Colonel Otamias.

The Court of Appeals discussed that Section 3135 of Presidential Decree No. 1638, otherwise known
as the AFP Military Personnel Retirement and Separation Decree of 1979, "provides for the exemption
of the monthly pension of retired military personnel from execution and attachment[,]"36 while Rule
39, Section 13 of the Rules of Court provides: chanRoblesvirt ualLawlibrary

SEC. 13. Property exempt from execution. Except as otherwise expressly provided by law, the
following property, and no other, shall be exempt from execution:

....

(1) The right to receive legal support, or money or property obtained as such support, or any pension
or gratuity from the Government[.] cralawred

The Court of Appeals also cited Pacific Products, Inc. vs. Ong:37

[M]oneys sought to be garnished, as long as they remain in the hands of the disbursing officer of the
Government, belong to the latter, although the defendant in garnishment may be entitled to a
specific portion thereof. And still another reason which covers both of the foregoing is that every
consideration of public policy forbids it.38 cralawred

In addition, the AFP PGMC was not impleaded as a party in the action for support; thus, it is not
bound by the Decision.39 ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

The dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals Decision reads: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
19, Cagayan de Oro City dated February 27, 2007 in Civil Case No. 2006-039 is PARTIALLY
NULLIFIED in so far as it directs the Armed Forces of the Philippines Finance Center to automatically
deduct the financial support in favor of private respondents, Edna Otamias and her children Jeffren
and Jemwel Otamias, from the pension benefits of Francisco Otamias, a retired military officer. The
Order dated June 10, 2008, Order dated August 6, 2008 and Writ of Execution dated April 10, 2008,
all issued by the court a quo are likewise SET ASIDE. Perforce, let a writ of permanent injunction
issue enjoining the implementation of the assailed Writ of Execution dated April 10, 2008 and the
corresponding Notice of Garnishment dated July 15, 2008. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.40 (Emphasis in the original) cralawred

Edna, et al. moved for reconsideration, but the Motion was denied by the Court of Appeals.41 ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Edna, et al. filed before this Court a Petition for Review on Certiorari42 on November 11, 2009. In the
Resolution43 dated January 20, 2010, this Court required respondent to comment.

In the Resolution44 dated August 4, 2010, this Court noted the Comment filed by the Office of the
Solicitor General and required Edna, et al. to file a reply.45 ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

A Reply46 was filed on September 27, 2010.

Edna, et al. argue that the Deed of Assignment Colonel Otamias executed Is valid and legal.47 ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

They claim that Section 31 of Presidential Decree No. 163848 "does not include support";49 hence, the
retirement benefits of Colonel Otamias can be executed upon.

Edna, et al. also argue that the Court of Appeals erred in granting respondent's Petition because it
effectively rendered the Deed of Assignment of no force and effect.50 On the other hand, the trial
court's Decision implements the Deed of Assignment and Edna, et al.'s right to support.51 ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Further, the AFP PGMC had already recognized the validity of the agreement and had made payments
to them until it suddenly stopped payment.52 After Edna, et al. obtained a court order, the AFP PGMC
still refused to honor the Deed of Assignment.53 ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

The Armed Forces of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General, argues that it was
not a party to the case filed by Edna, et al.54 Thus, "it cannot be compelled to release part of the
monthly pension benefits of retired Colonel Otamias in favor of [Edna, et al]."55 ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

The Office of the Solicitor General avers that the AFP PGMC never submitted itself to the jurisdiction
of the trial court.56 It was not a party to the case as the trial court never acquired jurisdiction over
the AFP PGMC.57 ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

The Office of the Solicitor General also argues that Section 31 of Presidential Decree No. 1638 and
Rule 39, Section 13(1) of the Rules of Court support the Court of Appeals Decision that Colonel
Otamias' pension benefits are exempt from execution.58 ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Section 31 of Presidential Decree No. 1638 "does not deprive the survivor/s of a retired or separated
officer or enlisted man of their right to support."59 Rather, "[w]hat is prohibited is for respondent
[AFP PGMC] to segregate a portion of the pension benefit in favor of the retiree's family while still in
the hands of the A[rmed] F[orces] [of the] Philippines]."60 ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Thus, the AFP PGMC "cannot be compelled to directly give or issue a check in favor of [Edna, et al.]
out of the pension gratuity of Col. Otamias."61 ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

In their Reply,62 Edna, et al. argue that the Armed Forces of the Philippines should not be allowed to
question the legal recourse they took because it was an officer of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
who had advised them to file an action for support.63 ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

They argue that the phrase "while in the active service" in Section 31 of Presidential Decree No. 1638
refers to the "time when the retired officer incurred his accountabilities in favor of a private
creditor[,]"64 who is a third person. The phrase also "serves as a timeline designed to separate the
debts incurred by the retired officer after his retirement from those which he incurred prior
thereto."65 ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Further, the accountabilities referred to in Section 31 of Presidential Decree No. 1638 refer to debts
or loans, not to support.66 ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

The issues for resolution are:

First, whether the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the AFP Finance Center cannot be directed to
automatically deduct the amount of support needed by the legitimate family of Colonel Otamias; and

Second, whether Colonel Otamias' pension benefits can be executed upon for the financial support of
his legitimate family.

The Petition is granted.

Article 6 of the Civil Code provides: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Article 6. Rights may be waived, unless the waiver is contrary to law, public order, public
policy, morals or good customs, or prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by
law.cralawred

The concept of waiver has been defined by this Court as: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

a voluntary and intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known existing legal right,

advantage, benefit, claim or privilege, which except for such waiver the party would have enjoyed;
the voluntary abandonment or surrender, by a capable person, of a right known by him to
exist, with the intent that such right shall be surrendered and such person forever
deprived of its benefit; or such conduct as warrants an inference of the relinquishment of such
right; or the intentional doing of an act inconsistent with claiming it.67 cralawred

In determining whether a statutory right can be waived, this Court is guided by the following
pronouncement: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

[T]he doctrine of waiver extends to rights and privileges of any character, and, since the word
'waiver' covers every conceivable right, it is the general rule that a person may waive any matter
which affects his property, and any alienable right or privilege of which he is the owner or which
belongs to him or to which he is legally entitled, whether secured by contract, conferred with statute,
or guaranteed by constitution, provided such rights and privileges rest in the individual, are
intended for his sole benefit, do not infringe on the rights of others, and further provided
the waiver of the right or privilege is not forbidden by law, and does not contravene public
policy; and the principle is recognized that everyone has a right to waive, and agree to waive, the
advantage of a law or rule made solely for the benefit and protection of the individual in his private
capacity, if it can be dispensed with and relinquished without infringing on any public right, and
without detriment to the community at large[.]68 (Emphasis in the original) cralawred

When Colonel Otamias executed the Deed of Assignment, he effectively waived his right to claim that
his retirement benefits are exempt from execution. The right to receive retirement benefits belongs
to Colonel Otamias. His decision to waive a portion of his retirement benefits does not infringe on the
right of third persons, but even protects the right of his family to receive support.

In addition, the Deed of Assignment should be considered as the law between the parties, and its
provisions should be respected in the absence of allegations that Colonel Otamias was coerced or
defrauded in executing it. The general rule is that a contract is the law between parties and parties
are free to stipulate terms and conditions that are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public
order, or public policy.69 ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

The Deed of Assignment executed by Colonel Otamias was not contrary to law; it was in accordance
with the provisions on support in the Family Code. Hence, there was no reason for the AFP PGMC not
to recognize its validity.

Further, this Court notes that the AFP PGMC granted the request for support of the wives of other
retired military personnel in a similar situation as that of petitioner in this case. Attached to the
Petition are the affidavits of the wives of retired members of the military, who have received a
portion of their husbands' pensions.70 ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

One affidavit stated: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

4. That when I consulted and appeared before the Office of PGMC, I was instructed to submit a
Special Power of Authority from my husband so they can release part of his pension to me;

5. That my husband signed the Special Power of Attorney at the PGMC ceding 50% of his pension
to me; the SPA form was given to us by the PGMC and the same was signed by my husband at
the PGMC;. . .

....

7. That the amount was deposited directly to my account by the PGMC- Finance Center AFP out
of the pension of my husband;

8. That only the Special Power of Attorney was required by the PGMC in order for them to
segregate my share of my husband's pension and deposit the same to my account[.]71

The other affidavit stated: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

8. That my husband signed the Special Power of Attorney at the PGMC ceding 50% of his pension
to me; the SPA form was given to us by the PGMC and the same was signed by my husband at
the PGMC[.]72

In addition, the AFP PGMC's website informs the public of the following procedure: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Tanong: My husband-retiree cut-off my allotment. How can I have it restored?

Sagot: Pension benefits are separate properties of the retiree and can not [sic] be subject of a Ocurt
[sic] Order for execution nor can they be assigned to any third party (Sec 31, PD 1638, as
amended). However, a valid Special Power of Attorney (SPA) by the retiree himself empowering the
AFP Finance Center to deduct certain amount from his lumpsum [sic] or pension pay as the case
maybe, as a rule, is a valid waiver of rights which can be effectively implemented by the AFP
F[inance] C[enter].73 cralawred

Clearly, the AFP PGMC allows deductions from a retiree's pension for as long as the retiree executes a
Special Power of Attorney authorizing the AFP PGMC to deduct a certain amount for the benefit of the
retiree's beneficiary.

It is curious why Colonel Otamias was allowed to execute a Deed of Assignment by the administering
officer when, in the first place, the AFP PGMC's recognized procedure was to execute a Special Power
of Attorney, which would have been the easier remedy for Colonel Otamias' family.

Instead, Colonel Otamias' family was forced to incur litigation expenses just to be able to receive the
financial support that Colonel Otamias was willing to give to Edna, et al.

II

Section 31 of Presidential Decree No. 1638 provides: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Section 31. The benefits authorized under this Decree, except as provided herein, shall not be
subject to attachment, garnishment, levy, execution or any tax whatsoever; neither shall they be
assigned, ceded, or conveyed to any third person: Provided, That if a retired or separated officer or
enlisted man who is entitled to any benefit under this Decree has unsettled money and/or property
accountabilities incurred while in the active service, not more than fifty per centum of the pension
gratuity or other payment due such officer or enlisted man or his survivors under this Decree may be
withheld and be applied to settle such accountabilities. cralawred

Under Section 31, Colonel Otamias' retirement benefits are exempt from execution. Retirement
benefits are exempt from execution so as to ensure that the retiree has enough funds to support
himself and his family.

On the other hand, the right to receive support is provided under the Family Code. Article 194 of the
Family Code defines support as follows: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Art. 194. Support comprises everything indispensable for sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical
attendance, education and transportation, in keeping with the financial capacity of the family.

The education of the person entitled to be supported referred to in the preceding paragraph shall
include his schooling or training for some profession, trade or vocation, even beyond the age of
majority. Transportation shall include expenses in going to and from school, or to and from place of
work. cralawred

The provisions of the Family Code also state who are obliged to give support, thus: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Art. 195. Subject to the provisions of the succeeding articles, the following are obliged to support
each other to the whole extent set forth in the preceding article:

(1) The spouses;

(2) Legitimate ascendants and descendants;

(3) Parents and their legitimate children and the legitimate and illegitimate children of the latter;

(4) Parents and their illegitimate children and the legitimate and illegitimate children of the latter;
and

(5) Legitimate brothers and sisters, whether of the full or half- blood.

Art. 196. Brothers and sisters not legitimately related, whether of the full or half-blood, are likewise
bound to support each other to the full extent set forth in Article 194 except only when the need for
support of the brother or sister, being of age, is due to a cause imputable to the claimant's fault or
negligence.

Art. 197. For the support of legitimate ascendants; descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate;
and brothers and sisters, whether legitimately or illegitimately related, only the separate property of
the person obliged to give support shall be answerable provided that in case the obligor has no
separate property, the absolute community or the conjugal partnership, if financially capable, shall
advance the support, which shall be deducted from the share of the spouses obliged upon the
liquidation of the absolute community or of the conjugal partnership[.] cralawred

The provisions of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court that are applicable to this case are in apparent conflict
with each other. Section 4 provides that judgments in actions for support are immediately executory.
On the other hand, Section 13(1) provides that the right to receive pension from government is
exempt from execution, thus: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

RULE 39

EXECUTION, SATISFACTION, AND EFFECT OF JUDGMENTS

....
SEC. 4. Judgments not stayed by appeal. � Judgments in actions for injunction, receivership,
accounting and support, and such other judgments as are now or may hereafter be declared to be
immediately executory, shall be enforceable after their rendition and shall not, be stayed by an
appeal taken therefrom, unless otherwise ordered by the trial court. On appeal therefrom, the
appellate court in its discretion may make an order suspending, modifying, restoring or granting the
injunction, receivership, accounting, or award of support.

The stay of execution shall be upon such terms as to bond or otherwise as may be considered proper
for the security or protection of the rights of the adverse party.

....

SEC. 13. Property exempt from execution. � Except as otherwise expressly provided by law, the
following property, and no other, shall be exempt from execution:

....

(1) The right to receive legal support, or money or property obtained as such support, or

any pension or gratuity from the Government;

....

But no article or species of property mentioned in this section shall be exempt from execution issued
upon a judgment recovered for its price or upon a judgment of foreclosure of a mortgage thereon.
(Emphasis supplied) cralawred

Based on the Family Code, Colonel Otamias is obliged to give support to his family, petitioners in this
case. However, he retired in 2003, and his sole source of income is his pension. Judgments in actions
for support are immediately executory, yet under Section 31 of Presidential Decree No. 1638, his
pension cannot be executed upon.

However, considering that Colonel Otamias has waived a portion of his retirement benefits through
his Deed of Assignment, resolution on the conflict between the civil code provisions on support and
Section 31 of Presidential Decree No. 1638 should be resolved in a more appropriate case.

III

Republic v. Yahon74 is an analogous case because it involved the grant of support to the spouse of a
retired member of the Armed Forces of the Philippines.

In Republic v. Yahon, Daisy R. Yahon filed a Petition for the Issuance of Protection Order under
Republic Act No. 9262.75 She alleged that she did not have any source of income because her
husband made her resign from her job.76 The trial court issued a temporary restraining order, a
portion of which stated: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

To insure that petitioner [Daisy R. Yahon] can receive a fair share of respondent's
retirement and other benefits, the following agencies thru their heads are directed to
WITHHOLD any retirement, pension [,] and other benefits of respondent, S/SGT. CHARLES
A. YAHON, a member of the Armed Forces of the Philippines assigned at 4ID, Camp Evangelista,
Patag, Cagayan de Oro City until further orders from the court: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

1. Commanding General/Officer of the Finance Center of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, Camp
Emilio Aguinaldo, Quezon City;

2. The Management of RSBS, Camp Emilio Aguinaldo, Quezon City;

3. The Regional Manager of PAG-IBIG, Mortola St., Cagayan de Oro City.77 (Emphasis in the original) cralawred

The trial court subsequently granted Daisy's Petition and issued a permanent protection order78 and
held: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Pursuant to the order of the court dated February 6, 2007, respondent, S/Sgt. Charles A. Yahon is
directed to give it to petitioner 50% of whatever retirement benefits and other claims that may be
due or released to him from the government and the said share of petitioner shall be automatically
deducted from respondent's benefits and claims and be given directly to the petitioner, Daisy R.
Yahon.

Let copy of this decision be sent to the Commanding General/Officer of Finance Center of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, Camp Emilio Aguinaldo, Quezon City; the Management of RSBS, Camp
Emilio Aguinaldo, Quezon City and the Regional Manager of PAG-IBIG, Mortola St., Cagayan de Oro
City for their guidance and strict compliance.79 cralawred

In that case, the AFP Finance Center filed before the trial court a Manifestation and Motion stating
that "it was making a limited and special appearance"80 and argued that the trial court did not
acquire jurisdiction over the Armed Forces of the Philippines. Hence, the Armed Forces of the
Philippines is not bound by the trial court's ruling.81 ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

The Armed Forces of the Philippines also cited Pacific Products, where this Court ruled that: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

A rule, which has never been seriously questioned, is that money in the hands of public officers,
although it may be due government employees, is not liable to the creditors of these employees in
the process of garnishment. One reason is, that the State, by virtue of its sovereignty may not be
sued in its own courts except by express authorization by the Legislature, and to subject its officers
to garnishment would be to permit indirectly what is prohibited directly. Another reason is that
moneys sought to be garnished, as long as they remain in the hands of the disbursing officer of the
Government, belong to the latter, although the defendant in garnishment may be entitled to a
specific portion thereof. And still another reason which covers both of the foregoing is that every
consideration of public policy forbids it.82 (Citations omitted) cralawred

This Court in Republic v. Yahon denied the Petition and discussed that because Republic Act No. 9262
is the later enactment, its provisions should prevail,83 thus: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

We hold that Section 8(g) of R.A. No. 9262, being a later enactment, should be construed as laying
down an exception to the general rule above stated that retirement benefits are exempt from
execution. The law itself declares that the court shall order the withholding of a percentage of the
income or salary of the respondent by the employer, which shall be automatically remitted directly to
the woman "[n]otwithstanding other laws to the contrary"84 (Emphasis in the original) cralawred

IV

The 1987 Constitution gives much importance to the family as the basic unit of society, such that
Article XV85 is devoted to it.

The passage of the Family Code further implemented Article XV of the Constitution. This Court has
recognized the importance of granting support to minor children, provided that the filiation of the
child is proven. In this case, the filiation of Jeffren M. Otamias and Jemwel M. Otamias was admitted
by Colonel Otamias in the Deed of Assignment.86 ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Even before the passage of the Family Code, this Court has given primary consideration to the right
of a child to receive support. In Samson v. Yatco,87 a petition for support was dismissed with
prejudice by the trial court on the ground that the minor asking for support was not present in court
during trial. An appeal was filed, but it was dismissed for having been filed out of time. This Court
relaxed the rules of procedure and held that "[i]f the order of dismissal with prejudice of the petition
for support were to stand, the petitioners would be deprived of their right to present and nature
support."88ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

In Gan v. Reyes,89 Augustus Caezar R. Gan (Gan) questioned the trial court's decision requiring him
to give support and claimed that that he was not the father of the minor seeking support. He also
argued that he was not given his day in court. This Court held that Gan's arguments were meant to
delay the execution of the judgment, and that in any case, Gan himself filed a Motion for Leave to
Deposit in Court Support Pendente Lite: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
In all cases involving a child, his interest and welfare are always the paramount concerns. There may
be instances where, in view of the poverty of the child, it would be a travesty of justice to refuse him
support until the decision of the trial court attains finality while time continues to slip away. An
excerpt from the early case of De Leon v. Soriano is relevant, thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

The money and property adjudged for support and education should and must be given presently and
without delay because if it had to wait the final judgment, the children may in the meantime have
suffered because of lack of food or have missed and lost years in school because of lack of funds.
One cannot delay the payment of such funds for support and education for the reason that if paid
long afterwards, however much the accumulated amount, its payment cannot cure the evil and repair
the damage caused. The children with such belated payment for support and education cannot act as
gluttons and eat voraciously and unwisely, afterwards, to make up for the years of hunger and
starvation. Neither may they enrol in several classes and schools and take up numerous subjects all
at once to make up for the years they missed in school, due to non-payment of the funds when
needed.90cralawred

The non-inclusion of the AFP PGMC or the AFP Finance Center in the action for support was proper,
considering that both the AFP PGMC and the AFP Finance Center are not the persons obliged to give
support to Edna, et al. Thus, it was not a real party-in-interest.91 Nor was the AFP PGMC a necessary
party because complete relief could be obtained even without impleading the AFP PGMC.92 ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated May 22, 2009 and
Resolution dated August 11, 2009 in CA-G.R. SP No. 02555-MIN are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The Regional Trial Court Decision dated February 27, 2007 in F.C. Civil Case No. 2006-039
is REINSTATED.
 7.) [ G.R. No. 249011, March 15, 2021 ]

CRISTITA ANABAN, CRISPINA ANABAN, PUREZA ANABAN, CRESENCIA ANABAN-WALANG, AND ROSITA
ANABAN-BARISTO, PETITIONERS, VS. BETTY ANABAN-ALFILER, MERCEDES ANABAN, AND MARCELO
ANABAN, RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

LAZARO-JAVIER, J.:

The Case

This petition for review on certiorari1 seeks to reverse and set aside the Decision2 dated July 24, 2019 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 154216 affirming the nullity of the bigamous marriage between Pedrito Anaban
(Pedrito) and Pepang Guilabo (Pepang) and petitioners Cristita Anaban, Crispina Anaban, Pureza Anaban,
Cresencia Anaban-Walang, and Rosita Anaban-Baristo's status as illegitimate children of Pedrito and must inherit
only as such.

Antecedents

In 1942, Pedrito Anaban (Pedrito) and Virginia Erasmo (Virginia) got married in accordance with the native customs
of the Ibaloi Tribe to which they both belonged. They had three (3) children, i.e., respondents Betty Anaban-Alfiler,
Mercedes Anaban, and Marcelo Anaban.3

In 1947, however, the council of tribe elders took notice of Virginia's insanity and based thereon approved the
couple's divorce and allowed Pedrito to remarry.4

In 1952, Pedrito got married to fellow Ibaloi Pepang still in accordance with their tribe's customs. They begot eight
(8) children – Lardi Anaban, Teodoro Anaban, Monina Anaban and petitioners Cristita Anaban, Crispina Anaban,
Pureza Anaban, Cresencia Anaban-Walang, and Rosita Anaban-Baristo.5

Upon Pedrito's death on September 2, 2004, respondents sued for summary settlement or judicial partition of the
intestate estate of their father Pedrito.6 They named as respondents their half-siblings, petitioners Cristita Anaban,
Crispina Anaban, Pureza Anaban, Cresencia Anaban-Walang, and Rosita Anaban-Baristo.

Respondents averred that during the marriage of their father Pedrito to their mother Virginia, Pedrito acquired from
his father Pedro Anaban a portion of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-14574. But the new
certificate of title issued to Pedrito reflected that he was married to petitioners' mother Pepang. Although in truth, his
marriage with their mother Virginia was not yet legally dissolved. Thus, petitioners are actually the illegitimate
children of their father Pedrito.7

Petitioners, on the other hand, argued that they are the legitimate children of their father Pedrito with their mother
Pepang. Pedrito and respondents' mother Virginia were married in accordance with the Ibaloi Tribe customs and
their marriage was also dissolved in accordance with Ibaloi tribe customs and traditions. Thereafter, Pedrito married
their (petitioners') mother Pepang similarly in accord with the Ibaloi customs. Since the celebration of marriage
pursuant to a tribe's customs was recognized under the Old Civil Code of the Philippines, then its dissolution in
accordance with that tribe's customs must also be recognized. Thus, both the marriage and the subsequent divorce
between Pedrito and Virginia are valid. Consequently, the marriage of their parents must also be deemed valid.8

Ruling of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC)

By Decision9 dated September 28, 2015, the MCTC ruled that, first, the marriage between Pedrito and Virginia was
validly dissolved in accordance with the customs of the Ibaloi tribe; and second, petitioners are the legitimate
children of Pedrito who must succeed in equal proportion with respondents, viz.:
WHEREFORE, from the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered as follows by declaring and ordering that:

1. The entire intestate estate of Pedrito Anaban consists of his exclusive property described as the parcel of
land with an area of 1.8 hectares located at Calot, Sablan, Benguet and registered in the name of Pedrito
Anaban under TCT No. T-14575;

2. Petitioners Betty Anaban-Alfiler, Mercedes Anaban and Marcelo (Billy) Anaban and respondents Teodoro
Anaban, Cristita Anaban, Crispina Anaban, Pureza Anaban, Monina Anaban, Crese[n]cia (Esterlita)
Anaban-Walang and Rosita Anaban-Baristo are the true and lawful heirs of the late Pedrito Anaban and
entitled to inherit the intestate estate left [by] the said deceased;

3. Said true and lawful heirs of the late Pedrito Anaban shall divide the subject parcel of land covered by
TCT No. T-14575 into ten equal shares of 1,800 square meters each;

4. Within 30 days from [the] finality of this Decision, Administratrix Betty Alfiler is ordered to prepare a project
of partition of the intestate estate of the late Pedrito Anaban for [purposes] of distribution and delivery to the
heirs their corresponding shares, the identification of which should be mutually agreed by the heirs. In the
event that identification of the location of the specific shares will not be agreed upon mutually, the same
shall be identified through draw lots; and

5. Administratrix Betty Alfiler is likewise hereby ordered to render her final accounting of her administration
of the intestate estate of the late Pedrito Anaban also within 30 days from finality of this Decision.

SO ORDERED.10

It held that since the tribe elders approved Pedrito and Virginia's divorce. Subsequently, the tribe elders also
approved Pedrito and Pepang's marriage in accordance with the Ibaloi customs. Thus, Pedrito's marriage with
Pepang was as valid as his marriage to Virginia. Petitioners, therefore, are also Pedrito's legitimate children.11

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)

On appeal, RTC-Branch 10, La Trinidad, Benguet, by Decision12 dated October 10, 2017, declared as bigamous
the marriage of Pedrito and Pepang, thus:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the appeal is partially GRANTED.

The Decision of the court a quo declaring that the intestate estate of the decedent consists only of that parcel of
land with an area of 18,574 square meters, registered in the name of the decedent under Transfer Certificate of Title
No. T-14575 is hereby AFFIRMED.

The Court finds the marriage between the decedent, PEDRITO ANABAN and Pepang Guilabo bigamous and VOID.
Respondent-appellees are, therefore, illegitimate. Necessarily, Petitioner-appellants, as legitimate children, shall
equally divide the entire one-half of their father's estate, while Respondent-appellees, as illegitimate children, shall
equally divide the other half thereof. Thus, assuming that no creditor's claim may be deducted upon finality of this
judgment, each of Petitioner-appellants shall be entitled to a share of 3,095.66 square meters. The other one-half
remaining portion shall be apportioned equally between and among Respondent-appellees. Thus, also assuming
that no creditor's claim may be deducted, Respondent-appellees will get a share of 1,326.71 square meters each
from their father's estate. The Decision of the court a quo stating the contrary is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE.

Prior to distribution, the court a quo should ensure that the required publication of the notice of hearing of the
petition and the notice to creditors be complied with and the claims of creditors, if any, are disposed of.

SO ORDERED.13

It held that customs and traditions cannot supplant existing laws unless specifically provided under said laws. Under
the Civil Code, a subsisting marriage may be dissolved only by death of either spouse or when the marriage is
annulled or declared void. True, Article 78 of the old Civil Code recognizes the validity of marriages performed in
accordance with the couple's customs, rites, or practices, but this recognition is limited to the solemnization of
marriage and does not extend to its dissolution. Thus, Pedrito's purported divorce from Virginia cannot be legally
recognized. It follows, therefore, that Pedrito's marriage to Pepang was bigamous, hence, void. In the eyes of the
law, his marriage to Virginia subsisted. Consequently, petitioners are illegitimate children of Pedrito.14

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

By its assailed Decision15 dated July 24, 2019, the Court of Appeals affirmed.

The Court of Appeals ruled that Article 78 of the old Civil Code was unequivocal – it only referred to celebration of
marriage. There was nothing therein implying that the framers also intended to include the validity of divorce
decreed in accordance with non-Christian rites or customs. As the statute is clear, its literal meaning must be
applied without attempt at any further interpretation.16

More, Section 8, Rule VI of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of Republic Act No. 8371 (RA 8371),
otherwise known as the Indigenous People's Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA) also limits the State's recognition of
marriages to those solemnized pursuant to the non-Christian's rites and customs. It does not mention anything
about the State recognition of dissolution of marriages in accordance with non-Christian practices.17

It is true that the State has permitted divorce between Muslim Filipinos after the enactment of the Code of Muslim
Personal Laws; but not divorce in other local tribes.18

The Court of Appeals opined that while it commiserated with the plight of petitioners and the rest of those non-
Christians who contracted subsequent marriages, honestly believing that their previous marriages had already been
dissolved by a divorce decree in accordance with their customs, the court cannot do anything as the matter is for the
exclusive consideration of the legislature and not of the judiciary. 19

The Present Petition

Petitioners now pray that the disposition of the Court of Appeals be reversed and set aside. They maintain that
Pedrito’s marriage with Virginia had already been legally dissolved before he got married to their mother Pepang. As
marriages solemnized in accordance with a tribe's customs and rites are recognized by the State, the subsequent
dissolution of these marriages in accordance with the same customs and rites must also be recognized.20

Admittedly, Article 78 did not expressly state that marriages may be dissolved according to customs, rites, or
practices of non-Christians, but it cannot be denied that the framers of the law intended to recognize all the existing
customs, rites, or practices of non-Christians, for how else would a marriage solemnized in accordance with non-
Christian's customs, rites, or practices be dissolved if not in also accordance with the same customs, rites, or
practices?21

The Court of Appeals also failed to give due attention to the IPRA. Its passage has been the very legal basis of the
recognition of customary laws and practices of the indigenous people (IPs) and indigenous cultural communities
(ICCs). It is a policy of the State to maintain the cultural integrity of the ICCs and IPs.22

This is precisely the reason why the Philippine Statistics Authority (PSA) now applies Administrative Order No. 3
(AO 3), Series of 2004 to govern the procedures and guidelines for the effective civil registration, among others, of
births, marriages, dissolution of marriages, and other civil concerns of the ICCs and IPs. It defines dissolution of
marriage among IPs as the termination of marriage per ruling of the council of elders for causes sanctioned by
established customary laws or practices after exhausting all possible means of reconciliation between the couple.
This was what happened to the marriage of Pedrito and Virginia. The Ibaloi council of elders decreed their
separation and thereafter allowed their father to marry their mother.23

In their Opposition/Motion to Deny Due Course24 dated October 28, 2019, respondents pray that the petition be
denied due course on ground that petitioners failed to furnish their (respondents) counsel with a copy of the petition.
Petitioners only sent a copy of the petition to them, not their counsel in violation of Section 5, Rule 45 of the Revised
Rules of Court and of established jurisprudence stating that service must be made to counsel if the adverse party is
represented by one. They were duly represented by counsel, hence, service of the petition should have been made
on their counsel.

The State, on the other hand, through Assistant Solicitor General Rex Bernardo L. Pascual, Senior State Solicitor
Joel N. Villaseran, and State Solicitor Soleil C. Flores, avers25 that the marriage between Pedrito and Pepang is
void. Customs and traditions cannot be made to apply over and above existing laws unless otherwise allowed by
these laws. The old civil code which was in effect at the time Pedrito and Pepang got married simply stated that
marriages may be performed in accordance with the parties' customs, rites, or practices. It did not state that
marriages may be dissolved according to these customs, rites, and practices. Nothing therein implied that the
lawmakers intended to allow as well securing a divorce in accordance with tribal customs, rites, or practices.26

More, customs must be proven as a fact. Here, petitioners failed to sufficiently prove their specific customs, if any,
governing divorce. They did not present evidence that conclusively establish that Pedrito's purported divorce from
Virginia was in accord with their customs. They similarly failed to present any ruling or decision rendered by the
council of elders supposedly approving the dissolution of Pedrito's marriage with Virginia. Further, they failed to
prove that Pedrito and Virginia complied with the required rituals for completion of the divorce process. In fine, it
cannot be safely assumed that Pedrito's marriage with Virginia was validly terminated.27

Issue

Is Pedrito Anaban's divorce from Virginia Erasmo claimed to have been decreed in accordance with the Ibaloi
customs be recognized under our laws?

Ruling

We answer in the negative.

At the threshold, we emphasize that the action below is for partition of Pedrito's estate. In determining who should
succeed to the estate, the court may pass upon the validity of the subsequent marriage between Pedrito and
Pepang. Thus, in De Castro v. Assidao-De Castro,28 the Court decreed:

However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute
nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child,
settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the
validity of marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question the same so long as it is essential to the
determination of the case. This is without prejudice to any issue that may arise in the case. When such need arises,
a final judgment of declaration of nullity is necessary even if the purpose is other than to remarry. The clause "on the
basis of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void" in Article 40 of the Family Code connotes that such
final judgment need not be obtained only for purpose of remarriage.

Likewise, in Nicdao Cariño v. Yee Cariño, the Court ruled that it is clothed with sufficient authority to pass upon the
validity of two marriages despite the main case being a claim for death benefits. Reiterating Niñal, we held that the
Court may pass upon the validity of a marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question the validity of said
marriage, so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. However, evidence must be adduced,
testimonial or documentary, to prove the existence of grounds rendering such a marriage an absolute nullity.
(Empahsis supplied)

Here, there is no dispute that Pedrito was first married to Virginia, although petitioners assert this marriage was later
on validly dissolved by the divorce decree handed down by the Ibaloi council of elders which consequently allowed
Pedrito to remarry.

The question now comes to fore: can the divorce granted under Ibaloi customs and practices be legally recognized
as to make Pedrito's subsequent marriage to Pepang as valid.

All of the courts below resolved the validity of the so-called divorce between Pedrito and Virginia through the lens of
the old Civil Code. But, in reality, when Pedrito and Virginia got married and even when they later on supposedly
divorced, the old Civil Code was not yet in effect. For it took effect on June 18, 1949, or two (2) years after the
divorce decree was purportedly handed down by the Ibaloi council of elders. The law in effect prior thereto was still
the Spanish Civil Code of 1889, Article 5 of which stated:29

Article 5. Laws are abrogated only by other subsequent laws, and the disuse or any custom or practice to the
contrary shall not prevail against their observance. (Emphasis supplied)

This was the equivalent of Article 11 of the old Civil Code which provides that customs which are contrary to law,
public order or public policy shall not be countenanced.

For purposes of determining whether divorce was contrary to law, public order or public policy at the time Pedrito
and Virginia allegedly obtained their own divorce, we trace back the history of divorce or dissolution of marriage
starting from the Spanish regime.

During the Spanish colonization, Las Siete Partidas was passed which only allowed relative divorce or what is
known now as legal separation. This allowed spouses to be free of all marital obligations while their marriage
subsists in the eyes of the law. In 1917, however, Las Siete Partidas was repealed by Act No. 271030 which took
effect on March 11, 1917. Section 1 of Act No. 2710 reads:

Section 1. A petition for divorce can only be filed for adultery on the part of the wife or concubinage on the part of
the husband, committed in any of the forms described in article four hundred and thirty-seven of the Penal Code.

Divorce, then, can be granted only on two (2) grounds, i.e., adultery and concubinage. This was the prevailing law
when Pedrito and Virginia got married in 1942. In 1943, however, during the Japanese occupation, Act No. 2710
was abolished and Executive Order No. 141 (EO 141) was enacted and took effect on March 25, 1943.

Under EO 141, absolute divorce may be granted on these grounds: (a) adultery and concubinage; (b) attempt on
the life of one spouse by the other; (c) a subsequent marriage by either party before the previous one was
dissolved; (d) loathsome contagious diseases contracted by either spouse; (e) incurable insanity; (f) impotency; (g)
repeated bodily violence by one against the other; (h) intentional or unjustified desertion continuously for at least
one year; (i) unexplained absence from the last conjugal abode continuously for at least three years; and (j) slander
by deed or gross insult by one spouse against the other.

Only a little over a year, however, after the Americans had taken over the Japanese as colonizers again of
the Philippines, EO 141 became ineffective and Act No. 2710, which allowed divorce on ground of
concubinage and adultery, was once again reinstated. This was the prevailing law when Pedrito and Virginia
were granted divorce by the Ibaloi council of elders in 1947.

Thus, in 1947, only two (2) grounds were accepted for divorce, i.e., adultery and concubinage. Neither was
the reason for Pedrito and Virginia's divorce. The Ibaloi council of elders granted the divorce on ground of
Virginia's alleged insanity. The divorce, therefore, is contrary to law, hence, cannot be recognized.

The issue of whether divorce based on customs and practices can be legally recognized during the effectivity of Act
No. 2710 has been resolved by the Court as early as 1933 in People v. Bitdu. The Court held that Mora Bitdu's
divorce from Moro Halid in accordance with the Mohammedan customs cannot be recognized. For divorce cannot
be had except in that court upon which the state has conferred jurisdiction, and then only for those causes
and with those formalities which the state has, by statute, prescribed. The Court explained:

There is little to add to the well considered decision of the trial judge. It seems to us unnecessary to determine
whether or not the divorce in question was granted in accordance with the Mohammedan religious practices, as to
which there seems to exist considerable uncertainty, because in our view of the case a valid divorce can be granted
only by the courts and for the reasons specified in Act No. 2710. It is not claimed that the appellant was divorced
from her first husband in accordance with said Act.

In the case of Francisco vs. Tayao (50 Phil., 42), it was held that in the Philippines the causes for divorce are
prescribed by statute or Act No. 2710 that (of adultery on the part of the) wife or concubinage on the part of the
husband.
In the recent decision of People vs. Bituanan (Moro), (56 Phil., 23), where the defendant and a Moro woman were
married by a datu according to Moro customs and usages and afterwards divorced by the datu according to the
same customs and usages, it was held that the marriage performed according to the rites of the Mohammedan
religion was valid, and assumed, for the purpose of that case, that the defendant and his wife were not legally
divorced.

Section 25 of the Marriage Law (Act No. 3613) provides that marriages between Mohammedans may be performed
in accordance with the rites or practice of their religion, but there is no provision of law which authorizes the granting
of divorces in accordance with the rites or practices of their religion.

A divorce cannot be had except in that court upon which the state has conferred jurisdiction, and then only for those
causes and with those formalities which the state has by statute prescribed (19 C.J., 19).

It is conceded in all jurisdictions that public policy, good morals, and the interests of society require that the marriage
relation should be sounded with every safeguard and its severance allowed only in the manner prescribed and for
the causes specified by law. And the parties can waive nothing essential to the validity of the proceedings (19 C.J.,
20).

With respect to the contention that the appellant acted in good faith in contracting second marriage, believing that
she had been validly divorced from her first husband, it is sufficient to say that everyone is presumed to know the
law, and the fact that one does not know that is act constitutes a violation of the law does not exempt him from the
consequences thereof. x x x (Emphasis supplied)

As the trial court in Bitdu held, the laws governing marriage and its incidents are moral in nature and as such they
are laws relating to public policy. The habits and customs of a people, the dogmas and doctrines of a religion cannot
be superior to or have precedence over laws relating to public policy, because as stated above laws relating to
marriage and its incidents are normal in nature and as such they affect public policy. This holds true even up to this
time.

Since there was no legal and valid ground for the divorce of Pedrito and Virginia, in the eyes of the law, they were
still married and their marriage was not dissolved as to permit Pedrito to remarry. Pedrito's subsequent marriage to
petitioners' mother Pepang, therefore, is void for being bigamous. Verily, the RTC and the Court of Appeals did not
err when they ruled so and declared petitioners as Pedrito's illegitimate children.

Petitioners insists, however, that since the old Civil Code and the IPRA recognize customs in the solemnization of
marriage, the same should be applied in cases of dissolution as marriage. But, as discussed, customs which are
contrary to law, public policy and public order cannot be recognized.

Also, even assuming that the old Civil Code was applicable in the present case, the Court would arrive at the same
conclusion. Article 78 of the old Civil Code provided:

Article 78. Marriages between Mohammedans or pagans who live in the non-Christian provinces may be performed
in accordance with their customs, rites or practices. No marriage license or formal requisites shall be necessary. Nor
shall the persons solemnizing these marriages be obliged to comply with Article 92.

x x x           x x x          x x x

Section 8, Rule 6 of the IRR of IPRA is similarly worded:

Section 8. Recognition of Customary Laws and Practices Governing Civil Relations. Marriage as an inviolable social
institution shall be protected. Marriages performed in accordance with customary laws, rites, traditions and practices
shall be recognized as valid. As proof of marriage, the testimony of authorized community elders or authorities of
traditional sociopolitical structures shall be recognized as evidence of marriage for purposes of registration. x x x

Clearly, both the old Civil Code and the IPRA-IRR provisions limited the State recognition to "marriages performed"
in accordance with customary laws, rites, traditions, and practices. There is no mention of the recognition of
dissolution of marriage in accordance with the IP's customs.
On this score, we emphasize that Muslim customs, rites, and practices are the only non-Christian customary law
recognized by the State through the enactment of Presidential Decree No. 1083 otherwise known as the Code of
Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines. The same in fact bears an entire chapter exclusively dedicated to divorce.
Notably, its applicability clause states:

Article 13. Application.

(1) The provisions of this Title shall apply to marriage and divorce wherein both parties are Muslims, or
wherein only the male party is a Muslim and the marriage is solemnized in accordance with Muslim law or
this Code in any part of the Philippines.

At present, there is no similar law explicitly recognizing the matrimonial customs, rites, and practices of the Ibaloi
Tribe.ℒαwρhi ৷

Even if we are to assume that the constitutional and statutory right to cultural integrity includes recognition of
indigenous divorce or any other form of indigenous dissolution of marriages, the record is bereft of evidence that: (i)
the culture of the Ibaloi recognizes divorce or any other form of dissolution of marriage; (ii) this recognition is a
central aspect of their cultural integrity and not merely peripheral to it; (iii) this recognition has been a central cultural
practice since time immemorial and lasted to this day in its modern forms; and (iv) the contents of and procedures
for this central cultural practice, if any.

The lead government agency for this determination – in the words of the learned counsel of the State, the proof of
customary law as a fact – is the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples. But nothing from their end could
answer how, why, and when the dissolution of marriages is central to the right to cultural integrity and what it means
to say so. It would, therefore, be speculative at this point to link this right to cultural integrity to the dissolution of
marriages between members of the IP communities, sans any supporting evidence.

Lastly, petitioners invoke PSA's AO 3, series of 2004 governing the procedures and guidelines for civil registration of
births, marriages, dissolution of marriages, and other civil concerns of the ICCs and IPs. According to petitioners,
AO 3 defines dissolution of marriage among IPs as the termination of marriage per ruling of the council of elders for
causes sanctioned by established customary law or practice after exhausting all possible means of reconciliation
between the couple.

But, AO 3 only took effect in 2004, fifty-seven (57) years after the divorce was supposedly granted by the Ibaloi
council of elders to Pedrito and Virginia. It cannot be applied retroactively, but only prospectively.

Besides, AO 3 is only a procedural avenue to recognize divorce or any other form of dissolution of marriage where
the substantive law already recognizes such change in a person's civil status. AO 3 cannot confer substantive rights
because the role of the PSA and now the National Statistics Office is to record the civil status of persons but not to
issue laws on how to obtain or confer status.

All told, we hold that the Court of Appeals did not err in pronouncing that the marriage of Pedrito and Virginia was
not legally dissolved. As a consequence, Pedrito's subsequent marriage to Pepang was bigamous, thus, void from
the beginning. The status of petitioners as illegitimate children of Pedrito and their heirship as such insofar as
Pedrito's estate is concerned can no longer be questioned.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is DENIED and the Decision dated July 24, 2019 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 154216 is AFFIRMED.
8.) G.R. No. 154598             August 16, 2004

IN THE MATTER OF APPLICATION FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

RICHARD BRIAN THORNTON for and in behalf of the minor child SEQUEIRA JENNIFER DELLE FRANCISCO
THORNTON, petitioner,
vs.
ADELFA FRANCISCO THORNTON, respondent.

DECISION

CORONA, J.:

This is a petition to review, under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the July 5, 2002 resolution of the Court of Appeals,
1 

Sixteenth Division, in CA G.R. SP No. 70501 dismissing the petition for habeas corpus on the grounds of lack of
jurisdiction and lack of substance. The dispositive portion read:
2 

WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the petition for habeas corpus on the grounds that: a) this Court has
no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the petition; and b) the petition is not sufficient in substance.

Petitioner, an American, and respondent, a Filipino, were married on August 28, 1998 in the Catholic Evangelical
Church at United Nations Avenue, Manila. A year later, respondent gave birth to a baby girl whom they named
Sequeira Jennifer Delle Francisco Thornton.

However, after three years, respondent grew restless and bored as a plain housewife. She wanted to return to her
old job as a "guest relations officer" in a nightclub, with the freedom to go out with her friends. In fact, whenever
petitioner was out of the country, respondent was also often out with her friends, leaving her daughter in the care of
the househelp.

Petitioner admonished respondent about her irresponsibility but she continued her carefree ways. On December 7,
2001, respondent left the family home with her daughter Sequiera without notifying her husband. She told the
servants that she was bringing Sequiera to Purok Marikit, Sta. Clara, Lamitan, Basilan Province.

Petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus in the designated Family Court in Makati City but this was dismissed,
presumably because of the allegation that the child was in Basilan. Petitioner then went to Basilan to ascertain the
whereabouts of respondent and their daughter. However, he did not find them there and the barangay office of Sta.
Clara, Lamitan, Basilan, issued a certification that respondent was no longer residing there.
3 

Petitioner gave up his search when he got hold of respondent’s cellular phone bills showing calls from different
places such as Cavite, Nueva Ecija, Metro Manila and other provinces. Petitioner then filed another petition for
habeas corpus, this time in the Court of Appeals which could issue a writ of habeas corpus enforceable in the entire
country.

However, the petition was denied by the Court of Appeals on the ground that it did not have jurisdiction over the
case. It ruled that since RA 8369 (The Family Courts Act of 1997) gave family courts exclusive original
jurisdiction over petitions for habeas corpus, it impliedly repealed RA 7902 (An Act Expanding the
Jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals) and Batas Pambansa 129 (The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980):

Under Sec. 9 (1), BP 129 (1981) the Intermediate Appellate Court (now Court of Appeals) has jurisdiction to
issue a writ of habeas corpus whether or not in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. This conferment of jurisdiction
 was re-stated in Sec. 1, RA 7902 (1995), an act expanding the jurisdiction of this Court. This jurisdiction
finds its procedural expression in Sec. 1, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court.

In 1997, RA 8369 otherwise known as Family Courts Act was enacted. It provides:

Sec. 5. Jurisdiction of Family Court. – The Family Courts shall have exclusive original jurisdiction to
hear and decide the following cases:

xxx       xxx       xxx

b. Petition for guardianship, custody of children, habeas corpus in relation to the latter.

The vital question is, did RA 8369 impliedly repeal BP 129 and RA 7902 insofar as the jurisdiction of this
Court to issue writ of habeas corpus in custody of minor cases is concerned? The simple answer is, yes, it
did, because there is no other meaning of the word "exclusive" than to constitute the Family Court as the
sole court which can issue said writ. If a court other than the Family Court also possesses the same
competence, then the jurisdiction of the former is not exclusive but concurrent – and such an interpretation is
contrary to the simple and clear wording of RA 8369.

Petitioner argues that unless this Court assumes jurisdiction over a petition for habeas corpus involving
custody of minors, a respondent can easily evade the service of a writ of habeas corpus on him or her by
just moving out of the region over which the Regional Trial Court issuing the writ has territorial jurisdiction.
That may be so but then jurisdiction is conferred by law. In the absence of a law conferring such jurisdiction
in this Court, it cannot exercise it even if it is demanded by expediency or necessity.

Whether RA 8369 is a good or unwise law is not within the authority of this Court – or any court for that
matter – to determine. The enactment of a law on jurisdiction is within the exclusive domain of the
legislature. When there is a perceived defect in the law, the remedy is not to be sought form the courts but
only from the legislature.

The only issue before us therefore is whether the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus in
cases involving custody of minors in the light of the provision in RA 8369 giving family courts exclusive original
jurisdiction over such petitions.

In his comment, the Solicitor General points out that Section 20 of the Rule on Custody of Minors and Writ of
Habeas Corpus in Relation to Custody of Minors (A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC, effective May 15, 2003) has rendered the
issue moot. Section 20 of the rule provides that a petition for habeas corpus may be filed in the Supreme
Court, Court of Appeals, or with any of its members and, if so granted, the writ shall be enforceable anywhere in the
4 

Philippines. 5

The petition is granted.

The Court of Appeals should take cognizance of the case since there is nothing in RA 8369 that revoked its
jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus involving the custody of minors.

The Court of Appeals opines that RA 8369 impliedly repealed RA 7902 and BP 129 since, by giving family courts
exclusive jurisdiction over habeas corpus cases, the lawmakers intended it to be the sole court which can issue writs
of habeas corpus. To the court a quo, the word "exclusive" apparently cannot be construed any other way.

We disagree with the CA’s reasoning because it will result in an iniquitous situation, leaving individuals like petitioner
without legal recourse in obtaining custody of their children. Individuals who do not know the whereabouts of minors
they are looking for would be helpless since they cannot seek redress from family courts whose writs are
enforceable only in their respective territorial jurisdictions. Thus, if a minor is being transferred from one place to
another, which seems to be the case here, the petitioner in a habeas corpus case will be left without legal remedy.
This lack of recourse could not have been the intention of the lawmakers when they passed the Family Courts Act of
1997. As observed by the Solicitor General:
 Under the Family Courts Act of 1997, the avowed policy of the State is to "protect the rights and promote the
welfare of children." The creation of the Family Court is geared towards addressing three major issues
regarding children’s welfare cases, as expressed by the legislators during the deliberations for the law. The
legislative intent behind giving Family Courts exclusive and original jurisdiction over such cases was to avoid
further clogging of regular court dockets, ensure greater sensitivity and specialization in view of the nature of
the case and the parties, as well as to guarantee that the privacy of the children party to the case remains
protected.

The primordial consideration is the welfare and best interests of the child. We rule therefore that RA 8369 did not
divest the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court of their jurisdiction over habeas corpus cases involving the
custody of minors. Again, to quote the Solicitor General:

To allow the Court of Appeals to exercise jurisdiction over the petition for habeas corpus involving a minor
child whose whereabouts are uncertain and transient will not result in one of the situations that the
legislature seeks to avoid. First, the welfare of the child is paramount. Second, the ex parte nature of habeas
corpus proceedings will not result in disruption of the child’s privacy and emotional well-being; whereas to
deprive the appellate court of jurisdiction will result in the evil sought to be avoided by the legislature: the
child’s welfare and well being will be prejudiced.

This is not the first time that this Court construed the word "exclusive" as not foreclosing resort to another
jurisdiction. As correctly cited by the Solicitor General, in Floresca vs. Philex Mining Corporation, the heirs of miners
6 

killed in a work-related accident were allowed to file suit in the regular courts even if, under the Workmen’s
Compensation Act, the Workmen’s Compensation Commissioner had exclusive jurisdiction over such cases.

We agree with the observations of the Solicitor General that:

While Floresca involved a cause of action different from the case at bar. it supports petitioner’s submission
that the word "exclusive" in the Family Courts Act of 1997 may not connote automatic foreclosure of the
jurisdiction of other courts over habeas corpus cases involving minors. In the same manner that the
remedies in the Floresca case were selective, the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals and Family Court in
the case at bar is concurrent. The Family Court can issue writs of habeas corpus enforceable only within its
territorial jurisdiction. On the other hand, in cases where the territorial jurisdiction for the enforcement of the
writ cannot be determined with certainty, the Court of Appeals can issue the same writ enforceable
throughout the Philippines, as provided in Sec. 2, Rule 102 of the Revised Rules of Court, thus:

The Writ of Habeas Corpus may be granted by the Supreme Court, or any member thereof, on any
day and at any time, or by the Court of Appeals or any member thereof in the instances authorized
by law, and if so granted it shall be enforceable anywhere in the Philippines, and may be made
returnable before the court or any member thereof, or before a Court of First Instance, or any judge
thereof for hearing and decision on the merits. It may also be granted by a Court of First Instance, or
a judge thereof, on any day and at any time, and returnable before himself, enforceable only within
his judicial district. (Emphasis supplied)

In ruling that the Commissioner’s "exclusive" jurisdiction did not foreclose resort to the regular courts for damages,
this Court, in the same Floresca case, said that it was merely applying and giving effect to the constitutional
guarantees of social justice in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions and implemented by the Civil Code. It also applied
the well-established rule that what is controlling is the spirit and intent, not the letter, of the law:

"Idolatrous reverence" for the law sacrifices the human being. The spirit of the law insures man’s survival
and ennobles him. In the words of Shakespeare, "the letter of the law killeth; its spirit giveth life."

xxx       xxx       xxx

It is therefore patent that giving effect to the social justice guarantees of the Constitution, as implemented by
the provisions of the New Civil Code, is not an exercise of the power of law-making, but is rendering
obedience to the mandates of the fundamental law and the implementing legislation aforementioned.
Language is rarely so free from ambiguity as to be incapable of being used in more than one sense. Sometimes,
what the legislature actually had in mind is not accurately reflected in the language of a statute, and its literal
interpretation may render it meaningless, lead to absurdity, injustice or contradiction. In the case at bar, a literal
7 

interpretation of the word "exclusive" will result in grave injustice and negate the policy "to protect the rights and
promote the welfare of children" under the Constitution and the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the
8 

Child. This mandate must prevail over legal technicalities and serve as the guiding principle in construing the
provisions of RA 8369.

Moreover, settled is the rule in statutory construction that implied repeals are not favored:

The two laws must be absolutely incompatible, and a clear finding thereof must surface, before the
inference of implied repeal may be drawn. The rule is expressed in the maxim, interpretare et concordare
leqibus est optimus interpretendi, i.e., every statute must be so interpreted and brought into accord with
other laws as to form a uniform system of jurisprudence. The fundament is that the legislature should be
presumed to have known the existing laws on the subject and not have enacted conflicting statutes. Hence,
all doubts must be resolved against any implied repeal, and all efforts should be exerted in order to
harmonize and give effect to all laws on the subject." 9

The provisions of RA 8369 reveal no manifest intent to revoke the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals and Supreme
Court to issue writs of habeas corpus relating to the custody of minors. Further, it cannot be said that the provisions
of RA 8369, RA 7092 and BP 129 are absolutely incompatible since RA 8369 does not prohibit the Court of Appeals
and the Supreme Court from issuing writs of habeas corpus in cases involving the custody of minors. Thus, the
provisions of RA 8369 must be read in harmony with RA 7029 and BP 129 ― that family courts have concurrent
jurisdiction with the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court in petitions for habeas corpus where the custody of minors is at
issue.

In any case, whatever uncertainty there was has been settled with the adoption of A.M. No. 03-03-04-SC Re: Rule
on Custody of Minors and Writ of Habeas Corpus in Relation to Custody of Minors. Section 20 of the rule provides
that:

Section 20. Petition for writ of habeas corpus.- A verified petition for a writ of habeas corpus involving
custody of minors shall be filed with the Family Court. The writ shall be enforceable within its judicial region
to which the Family Court belongs.

xxx       xxx       xxx

The petition may likewise be filed with the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, or with any of its members
and, if so granted, the writ shall be enforceable anywhere in the Philippines. The writ may be made
returnable to a Family Court or to any regular court within the region where the petitioner resides or where
the minor may be found for hearing and decision on the merits. (Emphasis Ours)

From the foregoing, there is no doubt that the Court of Appeals and Supreme Court have concurrent jurisdiction with
family courts in habeas corpus cases where the custody of minors is involved.

One final note. Requiring the serving officer to search for the child all over the country is not an unreasonable
availment of a remedy which the Court of Appeals cited as a ground for dismissing the petition. As explained by the
Solicitor General:10

That the serving officer will have to "search for the child all over the country" does not represent an
insurmountable or unreasonable obstacle, since such a task is no more different from or difficult than the
duty of the peace officer in effecting a warrant of arrest, since the latter is likewise enforceable anywhere
within the Philippines.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The petition for habeas corpus in CA-G.R.-SP-No. 70501 is
hereby REINSTATED and REMANDED to the Court of Appeals, Sixteenth Division.
9.) G.R. No. 136921       April 17, 2001

LORNA GUILLEN PESCA, petitioner

vs.
ZOSIMO A PESCA, respondent.

VITUG, J.:

Submitted for review is the decision of the Court of Appeals, promulgated on 27 May 1998, in C.A. G.R. CV. No.
52374, reversing the decision of the Regional Trial Court ("RTC") of Caloocan City, Branch 130, which has declared
the marriage between petitioner and respondent to be null and void ab initio on the ground of psychological
incapacity on the part of respondent.

Petitioner Lorna G. Pesca and respondent Zosimo A. Pesca first met sometime in 1975 while on board an inter-
island vessel bound for Bacolod City. After a whirlwind courtship, they got married on 03 March 1975. Initially, the
young couple did not live together as petitioner was still a student in college and respondent, a seaman, had to
leave the country on board an ocean-going vessel barely a month after the marriage. Six months later, the young
couple established their residence in Quezon City until they were able to build their own house in Caloocan City
where they finally resided. It was blissful marriage for the couple during the two months of the year that they could
stay together - when respondent was on vacation. The union begot four children, 19-year old Ruhem, 17-year old
Rez, 11-year old Ryan, and 9-year old Richie.

It started in 1988, petitioner said, when she noticed that respondent surprisingly showed signs of "psychological
incapacity" to perform his marital covenant. His "true color" of being an emotionally immature and irresponsible
husband became apparent. He was cruel and violent. He was a habitual drinker, staying with friends daily from 4:00
o'clock in the afternoon until 1:00 o'clock in the morning. When cautioned to stop or, to at least, minimize his
drinking, respondent would beat, slap and kick her. At one time, he chased petitioner with a loaded shotgun and
threatened to kill her in the presence of the children. The children themselves were not spared from physical
violence.

Finally, on 19 November 1992, petitioner and her children left the conjugal abode to live in the house of her sister in
Quezon City as they could no longer bear his violent ways. Two months later, petitioner decided to forgive
respondent, and she returned home to give him a chance to change. But, to her dismay, things did not so turn out
as expected. Indeed, matters became worse.

On the morning of 22 March 1994, about eight o'clock, respondent assaulted petitioner for about half an hour in the
presence of the children. She was battered black and blue. She submitted herself to medical examination at the
Quezon City General Hospital, which diagnosed her injuries as contusions and abrasions. Petitioner filed a
complaint with the barangay authorities, and a case was filed against respondent for slight physical injuries. He was
convicted by the Metropolitan Trial Court of Caloocan City and sentenced to eleven days of imprisonment.

This time, petitioner and her children left the conjugal home for good and stayed with her sister. Eventually, they
decided to rent an apartment. Petitioner sued respondent before the Regional Trial Court for the declaration of
nullity of their marriage invoking psychological incapacity. Petitioner likewise sought the custody of her minor
children and prayed for support pendente lite .

Summons, together with a copy of the complaint, was served on respondent on 25 April 1994 by personal service by
the sheriff. As respondent failed to file an answer or to enter his appearance within the reglementary period, the trial
court ordered the city prosecutor to look into a possible collusion between the parties. Prosecutor Rosa C. Reyes,
on 03 August 1994, submitted her report to the effect that she found no evidence to establish that there was
collusion between the parties. 1âwphi1.nêt

On 11 January 1995, respondent belatedly filed, without leave of court, an answer, and the same, although filed
late, was admitted by the court. In his answer, respondent admitted the fact of his marriage with petitioner and the
birth of their children. He also confirmed the veracity of Annex "A" of the complaint which listed the conjugal
property. Respondent vehemently denied, however, the allegation that he was psychologically incapacitated.
On 15 November 1995, following hearings conducted by it, the trial court rendered its decision declaring the
marriage between petitioner and respondent to be null and void ab initio on the basis of psychological incapacity on
the part of respondent and ordered the liquidation of the conjugal partnership.

Respondent appealed the above decision to the Court of Appeals, contending that the trial court erred, particularly,
in holding that there was legal basis to declare the marriage null and void and in denying his motion to reopen the
case.

The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court and declared the marriage between petitioner and
respondent valid and subsisting. The appellate court said:

"Definitely the appellee has not established the following: That the appellant showed signs of mental
incapacity as would cause him to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenant, as so provided for in
Article 68 of the Family Code; that the incapacity is grave, has preceded the marriage and is incurable; that
his incapacity to meet his marital responsibility is because of a psychological, not physical illness; that the
root cause of the incapacity has been identified medically or clinically, and has been proven by an expert;
and that the incapacity is permanent and incurable in nature.

"The burden of proof to show the nullity of marriage lies in the plaintiff and any doubt should be resolved in
favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity." 1

Petitioner, in her plea to this Court, would have the decision of the Court of Appeals reversed on the thesis that the
doctrine enunciated in Santos vs. Court of Appeals, promulgated on 14 January 1995, as well as the guidelines set
2 

out in Republic vs. Court of Appeals and Molina, promulgated on 13 February 1997, should have no retroactive
3 

application and, on the assumption that the Molina ruling could be applied retroactively, the guidelines therein
outlined should be taken to be merely advisory and not mandatory in nature. In any case, petitioner argues, the
application of the Santos and Molina dicta should warrant only a remand of the case to the trial court for further
proceedings and not its dismissal.

Be that as it may, respondent submits, the appellate court did not err in its assailed decision for there is absolutely
no evidence that has been shown to prove psychological incapacity on his part as the term has been so defined
in Santos.

Indeed, there is no merit in the petition.

The term "psychological incapacity," as a ground for the declaration of nullity of a marriage under Article 36 of the
Family Code, has been explained by the Court, in Santos and reiterated in Molina. The Court, in Santos,
concluded:

"It should be obvious, looking at all the foregoing disquisitions, including, and most importantly, the
deliberations of the Family Code Revision Committee itself, that the use of the phrase 'psychological
incapacity' under Article 36 of the Code has not been meant to comprehend all such possible cases of
psychoses as, likewise mentioned by some ecclesiastical authorities, extremely low intelligence, immaturity,
and like circumstances (cited in Fr. Artemio Balumad's 'Void and Voidable Marriages in the Family Code and
their Parallels in Canon Law,' quoting form the Diagnostic Statistical Manuel of Mental Disorder by the
American Psychiatric Association; Edward Hudson's 'Handbook II for Marriage Nullity Cases'). Article 36 of
the Family. Code cannot be taken and construed independently of, but must stand in conjunction with,
existing precepts in our law on marriage. Thus correlated, 'psychological incapacity' should refer to no less
than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital
covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so
expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love,
respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law
has been to confine the meaning of 'psychological incapacity' to the most serious cases of personality
disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage. This psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated."
The- "doctrine of stare decisis," ordained in Article 8 of the Civil Code, expresses that judicial decisions applying or
interpreting the law shall form part of the legal system of the Philippines. The rule follows the settled legal maxim -
"legis interpretado legis vim obtinet" - that the interpretation placed upon the written law by a competent court has
the force of law. The interpretation or construction placed by the courts establishes the contemporaneous legislative
3 

intent of the law. The latter as so interpreted and construed would thus constitute a part of that law as of the date
the statute is enacted. It is only when a prior ruling of this Court finds itself later overruled, and a different view is
adopted, that the new doctrine may have to be applied prospectively in favor of parties who have relied on the old
doctrine and have acted in good faith in accordance therewith 5 under the familiar rule of "lex prospicit, non respicit."

The phrase "psychological incapacity ," borrowed from Canon law, is an entirely novel provision in our statute
books, and, until the relatively recent enactment of the Family Code, the concept has escaped jurisprudential
attention. It is in Santos when, for the first time, the Court has given life to the term. Molina, that followed, has
additionally provided procedural guidelines to assist the courts and the parties in trying cases for annulment of
marriages grounded on psychological incapacity. Molina has strengthened, not overturned, Santos.

At all events, petitioner has utterly failed, both in her allegations in the complaint and in her evidence, to make out a
case of psychological incapacity on the part of respondent, let alone at the time of solemnization of the contract, so
as to warrant a declaration of nullity of the marriage. Emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, invoked by her,
cannot be equated with psychological incapacity.

The Court reiterates its reminder that marriage is an inviolable social institution and the foundation of the family 6 that
the State cherishes and protects. While the Court commisserates with petitioner in her unhappy marital relationship
with respondent, totally terminating that relationship, however, may not necessarily be the fitting denouement to it. In
these cases, the law has not quite given up, neither should we.

WHEREFORE, the herein petition is DENIED. No costs.

10.) G.R. No. 191002               April 20, 2010

ARTURO M. DE CASTRO, Petitioner,
vs.
JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL (JBC) and PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL - ARROYO, Respondents.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

G.R. No. 191032

JAIME N. SORIANO, Petitioner,
vs.
JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL (JBC), Respondent.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

G.R. No. 191057

PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION (PHILCONSA), Petitioner,

vs.
JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL (JBC), Respondent.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

A.M. No. 10-2-5-SC

IN RE APPLICABILITY OF SECTION 15, ARTICLE VII OF THE CONSTITUTION TO APPOINTMENTS TO THE

JUDICIARY, ESTELITO P. MENDOZA, Petitioner,

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

G.R. No. 191149

JOHN G. PERALTA, Petitioner,
vs.
JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL (JBC). Respondent.
PETER IRVING CORVERA; CHRISTIAN ROBERT S. LIM; ALFONSO V. TAN, JR.; NATIONAL UNION OF
PEOPLE’S LAWYERS; MARLOU B. UBANO; INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES-DAVAO DEL SUR
CHAPTER, represented by its Immediate Past President, ATTY. ISRAELITO P. TORREON, and the latter in
his own personal capacity as a MEMBER of the PHILIPPINE BAR; MITCHELL JOHN L. BOISER; BAGONG
ALYANSANG BAYAN (BAYAN) CHAIRMAN DR. CAROLINA P. ARAULLO; BAYAN SECRETARY GENERAL
RENATO M. REYES, JR.; CONFEDERATION FOR UNITY, RECOGNITION AND ADVANCE-MENT OF
GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES (COURAGE) CHAIRMAN FERDINAND GAITE; KALIPUNAN NG DAMAYANG
MAHIHIRAP (KADAMAY) SECRETARY GENERAL GLORIA ARELLANO; ALYANSA NG NAGKAKAISANG
KABATAAN NG SAMBAYANAN PARA SA KAUNLARAN (ANAKBAYAN) CHAIRMAN KEN LEONARD
RAMOS; TAYO ANG PAG-ASA CONVENOR ALVIN PETERS; LEAGUE OF FILIPINO STUDENTS (LFS)
CHAIRMAN JAMES MARK TERRY LACUANAN RIDON; NATIONAL UNION OF STUDENTS OF THE
PHILIPPINES (NUSP) CHAIRMAN EINSTEIN RECEDES; COLLEGE EDITORS GUILD OF THE PHILIPPINES
(CEGP) CHAIRMAN VIJAE ALQUISOLA; and STUDENT CHRISTIAN MOVEMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES
(SCMP) CHAIRMAN MA. CRISTINA ANGELA GUEVARRA; WALDEN F. BELLO and LORETTA ANN P.
ROSALES; WOMEN TRIAL LAWYERS ORGANIZATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by YOLANDA
QUISUMBING-JAVELLANA; BELLEZA ALOJADO DEMAISIP; TERESITA GANDIONCO-OLEDAN; MA.
VERENA KASILAG-VILLANUEVA; MARILYN STA. ROMANA; LEONILA DE JESUS; and GUINEVERE DE
LEON; AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR.; Intervenors.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 191342

ATTY. AMADOR Z. TOLENTINO, JR., (IBP Governor-Southern Luzon), and ATTY. ROLAND B. INTING
(IBP Governor-Eastern Visayas), Petitioners,
vs.
JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL (JBC), Respondent.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

G.R. No. 191420

PHILIPPINE BAR ASSOCIATION, INC., Petitioner,

vs.
JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL and HER EXCELLENCY GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, Respondents.

RESOLUTION

BERSAMIN, J.:

On March 17, 2010, the Court promulgated its decision, holding:

WHEREFORE, the Court:

1. Dismisses the petitions for certiorari and mandamus in G.R. No. 191002 and G.R. No. 191149, and the
petition for mandamus in G.R. No. 191057 for being premature;

2. Dismisses the petitions for prohibition in G.R. No. 191032 and G.R. No. 191342 for lack of merit; and

3. Grants the petition in A.M. No. 10-2-5-SC and, accordingly, directs the Judicial and Bar Council:

(a) To resume its proceedings for the nomination of candidates to fill the vacancy to be created by
the compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno by May 17, 2010;

(b) To prepare the short list of nominees for the position of Chief Justice;

(c) To submit to the incumbent President the short list of nominees for the position of Chief Justice
on or before May 17, 2010; and

(d) To continue its proceedings for the nomination of candidates to fill other vacancies in the
Judiciary and submit to the President the short list of nominees corresponding thereto in accordance
with this decision.

SO ORDERED.

Motions for Reconsideration

Petitioners Jaime N. Soriano (G.R. No. 191032), Amador Z. Tolentino and Roland B. Inting (G.R. No. 191342), and
Philippine Bar Association (G.R. No. 191420), as well as intervenors Integrated Bar of the Philippines-Davao del Sur
(IBP-Davao del Sur, et al.); Christian Robert S. Lim; Peter Irving Corvera; Bagong Alyansang Bayan and others
(BAYAN, et al.); Alfonso V. Tan, Jr.; the Women Trial Lawyers Organization of the Philippines (WTLOP); Marlou B.
Ubano; Mitchell John L. Boiser; and Walden F. Bello and Loretta Ann P. Rosales (Bello, et al.), filed their respective
motions for reconsideration. Also filing a motion for reconsideration was Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., whose
belated intervention was allowed.

We summarize the arguments and submissions of the various motions for reconsideration, in the aforegiven order:
 Soriano

1. The Court has not squarely ruled upon or addressed the issue of whether or not the power to designate
the Chief Justice belonged to the Supreme Court en banc.

2. The Mendoza petition should have been dismissed, because it sought a mere declaratory judgment and
did not involve a justiciable controversy.

3. All Justices of the Court should participate in the next deliberations. The mere fact that the Chief Justice
sits as ex officio head of the JBC should not prevail over the more compelling state interest for him to
participate as a Member of the Court.

Tolentino and Inting

1. A plain reading of Section 15, Article VII does not lead to an interpretation that exempts judicial
appointments from the express ban on midnight appointments.

2. In excluding the Judiciary from the ban, the Court has made distinctions and has created exemptions
when none exists.

3. The ban on midnight appointments is placed in Article VII, not in Article VIII, because it limits an
executive, not a judicial, power.

4. Resort to the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission is superfluous, and is powerless to vary the
terms of the clear prohibition.

5. The Court has given too much credit to the position taken by Justice Regalado. Thereby, the Court has
raised the Constitution to the level of a venerated text whose intent can only be divined by its framers as to
be outside the realm of understanding by the sovereign people that ratified it.

6. Valenzuela should not be reversed.

7. The petitioners, as taxpayers and lawyers, have the clear legal standing to question the illegal
composition of the JBC.

Philippine Bar Association

1. The Court’s strained interpretation of the Constitution violates the basic principle that the Court should not
formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than what is required by the precise facts of the case.

2. Considering that Section 15, Article VII is clear and straightforward, the only duty of the Court is to apply
it. The provision expressly and clearly provides a general limitation on the appointing power of the President
in prohibiting the appointment of any person to any position in the Government without any qualification and
distinction.

3. The Court gravely erred in unilaterally ignoring the constitutional safeguard against midnight
appointments.

4. The Constitution has installed two constitutional safeguards:- the prohibition against midnight
appointments, and the creation of the JBC. It is not within the authority of the Court to prefer one over the
other, for the Court’s duty is to apply the safeguards as they are, not as the Court likes them to be.

5. The Court has erred in failing to apply the basic principles of statutory construction in interpreting the
Constitution.
6. The Court has erred in relying heavily on the title, chapter or section headings, despite precedents on
statutory construction holding that such headings carried very little weight.

7. The Constitution has provided a general rule on midnight appointments, and the only exception is that on
temporary appointments to executive positions.

8. The Court has erred in directing the JBC to resume the proceedings for the nomination of the candidates
to fill the vacancy to be created by the compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Puno with a view to submitting
the list of nominees for Chief Justice to President Arroyo on or before May 17, 2010. The Constitution grants
the Court only the power of supervision over the JBC; hence, the Court cannot tell the JBC what to do, how
to do it, or when to do it, especially in the absence of a real and justiciable case assailing any specific action
or inaction of the JBC.

9. The Court has engaged in rendering an advisory opinion and has indulged in speculations.

10. The constitutional ban on appointments being already in effect, the Court’s directing the JBC to comply
with the decision constitutes a culpable violation of the Constitution and the commission of an election
offense.

11. The Court cannot reverse on the basis of a secondary authority a doctrine unanimously formulated by
the Court en banc.

12. The practice has been for the most senior Justice to act as Chief Justice whenever the incumbent is
indisposed. Thus, the appointment of the successor Chief Justice is not urgently necessary.

13. The principal purpose for the ban on midnight appointments is to arrest any attempt to prolong the
outgoing President’s powers by means of proxies. The attempt of the incumbent President to appoint the
next Chief Justice is undeniably intended to perpetuate her power beyond her term of office.

IBP-Davao del Sur, et al.

1. Its language being unambiguous, Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution applies to appointments to the
Judiciary. Hence, no cogent reason exists to warrant the reversal of the Valenzuela pronouncement.

2. Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution provides for presidential appointments to the Constitutional
Commissions and the JBC with the consent of the Commission on Appointments. Its phrase "other officers
whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution" is enough proof that the limitation on the
appointing power of the President extends to appointments to the Judiciary. Thus, Section 14, Section 15,
and Section 16 of Article VII apply to all presidential appointments in the Executive and Judicial Branches of
the Government.

3. There is no evidence that the framers of the Constitution abhorred the idea of an Acting Chief Justice in
all cases.

Lim

1. There is no justiciable controversy that warrants the Court’s exercise of judicial review.

2. The election ban under Section 15, Article VII applies to appointments to fill a vacancy in the Court and to
other appointments to the Judiciary.

3. The creation of the JBC does not justify the removal of the safeguard under Section 15 of Article VII
against midnight appointments in the Judiciary.

Corvera
1. The Court’s exclusion of appointments to the Judiciary from the Constitutional ban on midnight
appointments is based on an interpretation beyond the plain and unequivocal language of the Constitution.

2. The intent of the ban on midnight appointments is to cover appointments in both the Executive and
Judicial Departments. The application of the principle of verba legis (ordinary meaning) would have obviated
dwelling on the organization and arrangement of the provisions of the Constitution. If there is any ambiguity
in Section 15, Article VII, the intent behind the provision, which is to prevent political partisanship in all
branches of the Government, should have controlled.

3. A plain reading is preferred to a contorted and strained interpretation based on compartmentalization and
physical arrangement, especially considering that the Constitution must be interpreted as a whole.

4. Resort to the deliberations or to the personal interpretation of the framers of the Constitution should yield
to the plain and unequivocal language of the Constitution.

5. There is no sufficient reason for reversing Valenzuela, a ruling that is reasonable and in accord with the
Constitution.

BAYAN, et al.

1. The Court erred in granting the petition in A.M. No. 10-2-5-SC, because the petition did not present a
justiciable controversy. The issues it raised were not yet ripe for adjudication, considering that the office of
the Chief Justice was not yet vacant and that the JBC itself has yet to decide whether or not to submit a list
of nominees to the President.

2. The collective wisdom of Valenzuela Court is more important and compelling than the opinion of Justice
Regalado.

3. In ruling that Section 15, Article VII is in conflict with Section 4(1), Article VIII, the Court has violated the
principle of ut magis valeat quam pereat (which mandates that the Constitution should be interpreted as a
whole, such that any conflicting provisions are to be harmonized as to fully give effect to all). There is no
conflict between the provisions; they complement each other.

4. The form and structure of the Constitution’s titles, chapters, sections, and draftsmanship carry little weight
in statutory construction. The clear and plain language of Section 15, Article VII precludes interpretation.

Tan, Jr.

1. The factual antecedents do not present an actual case or controversy. The clash of legal rights and
interests in the present case are merely anticipated. Even if it is anticipated with certainty, no actual vacancy
in the position of the Chief Justice has yet occurred.

2. The ruling that Section 15, Article VII does not apply to a vacancy in the Court and the Judiciary runs in
conflict with long standing principles and doctrines of statutory construction. The provision admits only one
exception, temporary appointments in the Executive Department. Thus, the Court should not distinguish,
because the law itself makes no distinction.

3. Valenzuela was erroneously reversed. The framers of the Constitution clearly intended the ban on
midnight appointments to cover the members of the Judiciary. Hence, giving more weight to the opinion of
Justice Regalado to reverse the en banc decision in Valenzuela was unwarranted.

4. Section 15, Article VII is not incompatible with Section 4(1), Article VIII. The 90-day mandate to fill any
vacancy lasts until August 15, 2010, or a month and a half after the end of the ban. The next President has
roughly the same time of 45 days as the incumbent President (i.e., 44 days) within which to scrutinize and
study the qualifications of the next Chief Justice. Thus, the JBC has more than enough opportunity to
examine the nominees without haste and political uncertainty. 1avvphi1
5. When the constitutional ban is in place, the 90-day period under Section 4(1), Article VIII is suspended.

6. There is no basis to direct the JBC to submit the list of nominees on or before May 17, 2010. The directive
to the JBC sanctions a culpable violation of the Constitution and constitutes an election offense.

7. There is no pressing necessity for the appointment of a Chief Justice, because the Court sits en banc,
even when it acts as the sole judge of all contests relative to the election, returns and qualifications of the
President and Vice-President. Fourteen other Members of the Court can validly comprise the Presidential
Electoral Tribunal.

WTLOP

1. The Court exceeded its jurisdiction in ordering the JBC to submit the list of nominees for Chief Justice to
the President on or before May 17, 2010, and to continue its proceedings for the nomination of the
candidates, because it granted a relief not prayed for; imposed on the JBC a deadline not provided by law or
the Constitution; exercised control instead of mere supervision over the JBC; and lacked sufficient votes to
reverse Valenzuela.

2. In interpreting Section 15, Article VII, the Court has ignored the basic principle of statutory construction to
the effect that the literal meaning of the law must be applied when it is clear and unambiguous; and that we
should not distinguish where the law does not distinguish.

3. There is no urgency to appoint the next Chief Justice, considering that the Judiciary Act of 1948 already
provides that the power and duties of the office devolve on the most senior Associate Justice in case of a
vacancy in the office of the Chief Justice.

Ubano

1. The language of Section 15, Article VII, being clear and unequivocal, needs no interpretation

2. The Constitution must be construed in its entirety, not by resort to the organization and arrangement of its
provisions.

3. The opinion of Justice Regalado is irrelevant, because Section 15, Article VII and the pertinent records of
the Constitutional Commission are clear and unambiguous.

4. The Court has erred in ordering the JBC to submit the list of nominees to the President by May 17, 2010
at the latest, because no specific law requires the JBC to submit the list of nominees even before the
vacancy has occurred.

Boiser

1. Under Section 15, Article VII, the only exemption from the ban on midnight appointments is the temporary
appointment to an executive position. The limitation is in keeping with the clear intent of the framers of the
Constitution to place a restriction on the power of the outgoing Chief Executive to make appointments.

2. To exempt the appointment of the next Chief Justice from the ban on midnight appointments makes the
appointee beholden to the outgoing Chief Executive, and compromises the independence of the Chief
Justice by having the outgoing President be continually influential.

3. The Court’s reversal of Valenzuela without stating the sufficient reason violates the principle of stare
decisis.

Bello, et al.
 1. Section 15, Article VII does not distinguish as to the type of appointments an outgoing President is
prohibited from making within the prescribed period. Plain textual reading and the records of the
Constitutional Commission support the view that the ban on midnight appointments extends to judicial
appointments.

2. Supervision of the JBC by the Court involves oversight. The subordinate subject to oversight must first act
not in accord with prescribed rules before the act can be redone to conform to the prescribed rules.

3. The Court erred in granting the petition in A.M. No. 10-2-5-SC, because the petition did not present a
justiciable controversy.

Pimentel

1. Any constitutional interpretative changes must be reasonable, rational, and conformable to the general
intent of the Constitution as a limitation to the powers of Government and as a bastion for the protection of
the rights of the people. Thus, in harmonizing seemingly conflicting provisions of the Constitution, the
interpretation should always be one that protects the citizenry from an ever expanding grant of authority to
its representatives.

2. The decision expands the constitutional powers of the President in a manner totally repugnant to
republican constitutional democracy, and is tantamount to a judicial amendment of the Constitution without
proper authority.

Comments

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) and the JBC separately represent in their respective comments, thus:

OSG

1. The JBC may be compelled to submit to the President a short list of its nominees for the position of Chief
Justice.

2. The incumbent President has the power to appoint the next Chief Justice.

3. Section 15, Article VII does not apply to the Judiciary.

4. The principles of constitutional construction favor the exemption of the Judiciary from the ban on midnight
appointments. 1awph!1

5. The Court has the duty to consider and resolve all issues raised by the parties as well as other related
matters.

JBC

1. The consolidated petitions should have been dismissed for prematurity, because the JBC has not yet
decided at the time the petitions were filed whether the incumbent President has the power to appoint the
new Chief Justice, and because the JBC, having yet to interview the candidates, has not submitted a short
list to the President.

2. The statement in the decision that there is a doubt on whether a JBC short list is necessary for the
President to appoint a Chief Justice should be struck down as bereft of constitutional and legal basis. The
statement undermines the independence of the JBC.

3. The JBC will abide by the final decision of the Court, but in accord with its constitutional mandate and its
implementing rules and regulations.
For his part, petitioner Estelito P. Mendoza (A.M. No. 10-2-5-SC) submits his comment even if the OSG and the
JBC were the only ones the Court has required to do so. He states that the motions for reconsideration were
directed at the administrative matter he initiated and which the Court resolved. His comment asserts:

1. The grounds of the motions for reconsideration were already resolved by the decision and the separate
opinion.

2. The administrative matter he brought invoked the Court’s power of supervision over the JBC as provided
by Section 8(1), Article VIII of the Constitution, as distinguished from the Court’s adjudicatory power under
Section 1, Article VIII. In the former, the requisites for judicial review are not required, which was
why Valenzuela was docketed as an administrative matter. Considering that the JBC itself has yet to take a
position on when to submit the short list to the proper appointing authority, it has effectively solicited the
exercise by the Court of its power of supervision over the JBC.

3. To apply Section 15, Article VII to Section 4(1) and Section 9, Article VIII is to amend the Constitution.

4. The portions of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission quoted in the dissent of Justice Carpio
Morales, as well as in some of the motions for reconsideration do not refer to either Section 15, Article VII or
Section 4(1), Article VIII, but to Section 13, Article VII (on nepotism).

Ruling

We deny the motions for reconsideration for lack of merit, for all the matters being thereby raised and argued, not
being new, have all been resolved by the decision of March 17, 2010.

Nonetheless, the Court opts to dwell on some matters only for the purpose of clarification and emphasis.

First: Most of the movants contend that the principle of stare decisis is controlling, and accordingly insist that the
Court has erred in disobeying or abandoning Valenzuela. 1

The contention has no basis.

Stare decisis derives its name from the Latin maxim stare decisis et non quieta movere, i.e., to adhere to precedent
and not to unsettle things that are settled. It simply means that a principle underlying the decision in one case is
deemed of imperative authority, controlling the decisions of like cases in the same court and in lower courts within
the same jurisdiction, unless and until the decision in question is reversed or overruled by a court of competent
authority. The decisions relied upon as precedents are commonly those of appellate courts, because the decisions
of the trial courts may be appealed to higher courts and for that reason are probably not the best evidence of the
rules of law laid down. 2

Judicial decisions assume the same authority as a statute itself and, until authoritatively abandoned, necessarily
become, to the extent that they are applicable, the criteria that must control the actuations, not only of those called
upon to abide by them, but also of those duty-bound to enforce obedience to them. 3 In a hierarchical judicial system
like ours, the decisions of the higher courts bind the lower courts, but the courts of co-ordinate authority do not bind
each other. The one highest court does not bind itself, being invested with the innate authority to rule according to
its best lights.4

The Court, as the highest court of the land, may be guided but is not controlled by precedent. Thus, the Court,
especially with a new membership, is not obliged to follow blindly a particular decision that it determines, after re-
examination, to call for a rectification.5 The adherence to precedents is strict and rigid in a common-law setting like
the United Kingdom, where judges make law as binding as an Act of Parliament. 6 But ours is not a common-law
system; hence, judicial precedents are not always strictly and rigidly followed. A judicial pronouncement in an earlier
decision may be followed as a precedent in a subsequent case only when its reasoning and justification are
relevant, and the court in the latter case accepts such reasoning and justification to be applicable to the case. The
application of the precedent is for the sake of convenience and stability.
For the intervenors to insist that Valenzuela ought not to be disobeyed, or abandoned, or reversed, and that its
wisdom should guide, if not control, the Court in this case is, therefore, devoid of rationality and foundation. They
seem to conveniently forget that the Constitution itself recognizes the innate authority of the Court en banc to modify
or reverse a doctrine or principle of law laid down in any decision rendered en banc or in division.7

Second: Some intervenors are grossly misleading the public by their insistence that the Constitutional Commission
extended to the Judiciary the ban on presidential appointments during the period stated in Section 15, Article VII.

The deliberations that the dissent of Justice Carpio Morales quoted from the records of the Constitutional
Commission did not concern either Section 15, Article VII or Section 4(1), Article VIII, but only Section 13, Article VII,
a provision on nepotism. The records of the Constitutional Commission show that Commissioner Hilario G. Davide,
Jr. had proposed to include judges and justices related to the President within the fourth civil degree of
consanguinity or affinity among the persons whom the President might not appoint during his or her tenure. In the
end, however, Commissioner Davide, Jr. withdrew the proposal to include the Judiciary in Section 13, Article VII
"(t)o avoid any further complication," 8 such that the final version of the second paragraph of Section 13, Article VII
even completely omits any reference to the Judiciary, to wit:

Section 13. xxx

The spouse and relatives by consanguinity or affinity within the fourth civil degree of the President shall not during
his tenure be appointed as Members of the Constitutional Commissions, or the Office of the Ombudsman, or as
Secretaries, Undersecretaries, chairmen or heads of bureaus or offices, including government-owned or controlled
corporations and their subsidiaries.

Last: The movants take the majority to task for holding that Section 15, Article VII does not apply to appointments in
the Judiciary. They aver that the Court either ignored or refused to apply many principles of statutory construction.

The movants gravely err in their posture, and are themselves apparently contravening their avowed reliance on the
principles of statutory construction.

For one, the movants, disregarding the absence from Section 15, Article VII of the express extension of the ban on
appointments to the Judiciary, insist that the ban applied to the Judiciary under the principle of verba legis. That is
self-contradiction at its worst.

Another instance is the movants’ unhesitating willingness to read into Section 4(1) and Section 9, both of Article VIII,
the express applicability of the ban under Section 15, Article VII during the period provided therein, despite the
silence of said provisions thereon. Yet, construction cannot supply the omission, for doing so would generally
constitute an encroachment upon the field of the Constitutional Commission. Rather, Section 4(1) and Section 9
should be left as they are, given that their meaning is clear and explicit, and no words can be interpolated in
them.9 Interpolation of words is unnecessary, because the law is more than likely to fail to express the legislative
intent with the interpolation. In other words, the addition of new words may alter the thought intended to be
conveyed. And, even where the meaning of the law is clear and sensible, either with or without the omitted word or
words, interpolation is improper, because the primary source of the legislative intent is in the language of the law
itself.10

Thus, the decision of March 17, 2010 has fittingly observed:

Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII to the appointment of
Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so. They could not have ignored the meticulous
ordering of the provisions. They would have easily and surely written the prohibition made explicit in Section 15,
Article VII as being equally applicable to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court in Article VIII itself,
most likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII. That such specification was not done only reveals that the prohibition against
the President or Acting President making appointments within two months before the next presidential elections and
up to the end of the President’s or Acting President’s term does not refer to the Members of the Supreme Court.

We cannot permit the meaning of the Constitution to be stretched to any unintended point in order to suit the
purposes of any quarter.
 Final Word

It has been insinuated as part of the polemics attendant to the controversy we are resolving that because all the
Members of the present Court were appointed by the incumbent President, a majority of them are now granting to
her the authority to appoint the successor of the retiring Chief Justice.

The insinuation is misguided and utterly unfair.

The Members of the Court vote on the sole basis of their conscience and the merits of the issues. Any claim to the
contrary proceeds from malice and condescension. Neither the outgoing President nor the present Members of the
Court had arranged the current situation to happen and to evolve as it has. None of the Members of the Court could
have prevented the Members composing the Court when she assumed the Presidency about a decade ago from
retiring during her prolonged term and tenure, for their retirements were mandatory. Yet, she is now left with an
imperative duty under the Constitution to fill up the vacancies created by such inexorable retirements within 90 days
from their occurrence. Her official duty she must comply with. So must we ours who are tasked by the Constitution
to settle the controversy.

ACCORDINGLY, the motions for reconsideration are denied with finality.

11.) G.R. No. 204039

UNITED COCONUT PLANTERS BANK, Petitioner

vs.
SPOUSES WALTER UY AND LILY UY, Respondents

DECISION

MARTIRES, J.:

This petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse and set aside the 23 May 2012 Decision  and the 18 October
1

2012 Resolution  of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 118534 which affirmed with modification the 24
2

March 2010 Decision  of the Office of the President (OP).

3

THE FACTS

Prime Town Property Group, Inc. (PPGI) and E. Ganzon Inc. were the joint developers of the Kiener Hills Mactan
Condominium Project (Kiener Hills). In 1997, spouses Walter and Lily Uy (respondents) entered into a Contract to
Sell with PPGI for a unit in Kiener Hills. The total contract price amounted to ₱1, 151,718. 7 5 payable according to
the following terms: (a) ₱l00,000.00 as down payment; and (b) the balance paid in 40 monthly installments at
₱26,297.97 from 16 January 1997 to 16 April 2000. 4

On 23 April 1998, PPGI and petitioner United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB) executed the following: Memorandum
of Agreement (MOA),  and Sale of Receivables and Assignment of Rights and Interests.  By virtue of the said
5 6

agreements, PPGI transferred the right to collect the receivables of the buyers, which included respondents, of units
in Kiener Hills. The parties entered into the said agreement as PPGI's partial settlement of its ₱l,814,500,000.00
loan with UCPB. 7

On 17 April 2006, the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board Regional Office (HLURB Regional Office) received
respondents' complaint for sum of money and damages against PPGI and UCPB. They claimed that in spite of their
full payment of the purchase price, PPGI failed to complete the construction of their units in Kiener Hills.
8

The HLURB Regional Office Decision

In its 29 November 2006 decision,  the HLURB Regional Office found that respondents were entitled to a refund in
9

view of PPGI' s failure to complete the construction of their units. Nonetheless, it found that UCPB cannot be
solidarily liable with PPGI because only the accounts receivables were conveyed to UCPB and not the entire
condominium project. The HLURB Regional Office suspended the proceedings as to PPGI on account of its being in
corporate rehabilitation. The dispositive portion reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, decision is hereby rendered suspending the proceedings of the present case.
The complainants are therefore directed to file their claim before the Rehabilitation Receiver.

No judgment as to cost. 10

Unsatisfied, respondents appealed before the HLURB-Board of Commissioners (HLURB Board).

The HLURB Board Decision

In its 17 September 2007 decision,  the HLURB Board reversed and set aside the HL URB Regional Office
11

decision. It agreed that the proceedings against PPGI should be suspended on account of its corporate
rehabilitation. Nevertheless, the HLURB Board found UCPB solidarily liable with PPGI because it stepped into the
latter's shoes insofar as Kiener Hills is concerned pursuant to the MOA between them. It noted that UCPB was
PPGI's successor-in-interest, such that the delay in the completion of the condominium project could be attributable
to it and subject it to liability. The HLURB Board ruled that as PPGI's assignee, UCPB was bound to refund the
payments made, without prejudice to its right of action against PPGI. Thus, it pronounced:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is GRANTED and the decision of the Regional Office is SET
ASIDE and a new one is entered as follows:

1. Respondent UCPB is hereby ordered to refund to the complainant the amount of ₱l,151,718.75 with
interest at the legal rate of 6% per annum reckoned from the date of extrajudicial demand on May 24, 2005
until fully paid without prejudice to whatever claims UCPB may have against PPGI; and

2. Respondent UCPB and PPGI, jointly and severally, are declared liable to the complainant for payment of
exemplary damages in the amount of ₱30,000.00; and attorney's fees in the amount of ₱30,000.00: 12

Aggrieved, UCPB appealed before the OP.

The OP Decision

In its 24 March 2010 decision, the OP affirmed the decision of the HLURB Board. It explained that the agreement
between PPGI and UCPB clearly transferred all rights, titles, interests, and participations over Kiener Hills to the
latter. It concluded that as successor-in-interest, UCPB now had the obligations relating to Kiener Hills, including the
reimbursement of payments to respondents. The OP added that benefit of suspension of actions only attached to
PPGI and not to UCPB. Thus:

WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED. 13

Undeterred, UCPB appealed before the CA.

The CA Ruling

In its assailed 23 May 2012 decision, the CA affirmed with modification the OP decision. While the appellate court
agreed that respondents are entitled to a full refund of the payments they may have made, it ruled that UCPB is not
solidarily liable with PPGI, and as such cannot be held liable for the full satisfaction of respondents' payments. It
limited UCPB's liability to the amount respondents have paid upon the former's assumption as the party entitled to
receive payments or on 23 April 1998 when the MOA and AIR Agreement were made between UCPB and PPGI.

In addition, the appellate court noted the pronouncements of the CA in United Coconut Planters Bank v. O'Halloran
(O'Halloran).   It explained that it involved similar facts and issues where the CA ruled that the assignment of the
14

receivables did not make UCPB the developer of Kiener Hills it being merely the assignee of the receivables under
the contract to sell and, as such, UCPB cannot be deemed as the debtor with respect to the construction,
development, and delivery of the subject condominium units. Thus, the CA ruled:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the instant Petition for Review is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The
promulgated Decision dated 24 March 2010 and Resolution dated 16 February 2011 are hereby AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION, as follows:

1) UCPB is ordered to pay Spouses Uy the amount of ₱552,152.34, with legal interest at 6% per annum from the
filing of the complaint until fully paid without prejudice to whatever claims U CPB may have against Primetown; and

2) Without prejudice to a separate action Spouses Uy may file against Primetown, Primetown is liable to pay
Spouses Uy the amount of ₱599,566.41 with legal interest at 6% per annum from the filing of the complaint until fully
paid.15

UCPB moved for reconsideration but it was denied by the CA in its assailed 18 October 2012 resolution.

Hence, this appeal raising the following:

 ISSUES

[WHETHER] THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRIEVOUSLY ERRED WHEN IT MISCONSTRUED THE
APPLICABILITY TO THE INSTANT CASE OF THE FINAL AND EXECUTORY DECISION IN UNITED COCONUT
PLANTERS BANK V. JOHN P. O'HALLORAN AND JOSEFINA O'HALLORAN (CA-G.R. SP NO. 101699, 23 JULY
1999) UNDER THE PRINCIPLE OF STARE DECISIS; AND

II

[WHETHER] THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN RULING THAT UCPB IS
LIABLE TO THE RESPONDENTS FOR THE AMOUNT THE RESPONDENTS DID NOT PAY THE BANK AND
WHICH UCPB DID NOT RECEIVE. 16

OUR RULING

The petition is meritorious.

Issues that may be raised on appeal

Respondents assailed that the CA erred in applying O'Halloran because the circumstances were different, notably
the issue that estoppel did not arise in the said case. In addition, they argued that 0 'Halloran and the other cases
cited by UCPB are not binding pursuant to the doctrine of stare decisis because they were decided by the CA and
not by this Court. As such, respondents posited that only decisions of the Court, excluding all other courts such as
the CA, form part of the legal system.

On the other hand, UCPB countered that the only issue to be resolved in the present petition is the actual amount of
its liability. It explained that the assailed CA decision had become final and executory after respondents failed to
appeal the same. UCPB pointed out that the issues respondents raised were already ventilated before the appellate
court. It believed that respondents should have filed their own appeal to assail the issues they found questionable.

It must be remembered that when a case is appealed, the appellate court has the power to review the case in its
entirety.  In Heirs of Alcaraz v. Republic of the Phils.,   the Court explained that an appellate court is empowered to
17 18

make its own judgment as it deems to be a just determination of the case, to wit:

In any event, when petitioners interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals, the appealed case was thereby thrown
wide open for review by that court, which is thus necessarily empowered to come out with a judgment as it thinks
would be a just determination of the controversy. Given this power, the appellate court has the authority to either
affirm, reverse or modify the appealed decision of the trial court. To withhold from the appellate court its power to
render an entirely new decision would violate its power of review and would, in effect, render it incapable of
correcting patent errors committed by the lower courts. 19

Thus, when UCPB appealed the present controversy before the Court, it was not merely limited to determine
whether the CA accurately set UCPB's liability against respondents. It is also empowered to determine whether the
appellate court's determination of liability was correct in the first place. This is especially true considering that the
issue of the nature of UCPB's liability is closely intertwined and inseparable from the determination of the amount of
its actual liability.

Stare Decisis applies only to cases decided by the Supreme Court

As above-mentioned, respondents bewail the reliance of the CA on 0 'Halloran arguing that it was not a binding
precedent since it was not issued by this Court. In De Mesa v. Pepsi-Cola Products Phils. Inc.,   the Court explained
20

that the doctrine of stare decisis deems decisions of this Court binding on the lower courts, to wit:

The principle of stare decisis et non quieta movere is entrenched in Article 8 of the Civil Code, to wit:
 xxxx

It enjoins adherence to judicial precedents. It requires our courts to follow a rule already established in a final
decision of the Supreme Court. That decision becomes a judicial precedent to be followed in subsequent cases by
all courts in the land. The doctrine of stare decisis is based on the principle that once a question of law has
been examined and decided, it should be deemed settled and closed to further argument.  (emphasis and 21

underscoring supplied)

In other words, the doctrine of stare decisis becomes operative only when judicial precedents are set by
pronouncements of this Court to the exclusion of lower courts. It is true regardless whether the decisions of the
lower courts are logically or legally sound as only decisions issued by this Court become part of the legal system. At
the most, decisions of lower courts only have a persuasive effect. Thus, respondents are correct in contesting the
application of the doctrine of stare decisis when the CA relied on decisions it had issued.

UCPB only jointly liable to PPGI in reimbursing unitowners of Kiener Hills

With that said, the Court still finds that the CA did not err in ruling that UCPB was only jointly, and not solidarily liable
to PPGI against respondents. In Spouses Choi v. UCPB (Spouses Choi),   the Court had definitely ruled on UCPB 's
22

liability to the purchasers of Kiener Hills, viz:

The primordial issue to be resolved is whether, under the Agreement between Primetown and UCPB, UCPB
assumed the liabilities and obligations of Primetown under its contract to sell with Spouses Choi.

An assignment of credit has been defined as an agreement by virtue of which the owner of a credit, known as the
assignor, by a legal cause - such as sale, dation in payment or exchange or donation - and without need of the
debtor's consent, transfers that credit and its accessory rights to another, known as the assignee, who acquires the
power to enforce it to the same extent as the assignor could have enforced it against the debtor. In every case, the
obligations between assignor and assignee will depend upon the judicial relation which is the basis of the
assignment. An assignment will be construed in accordance with the rules of construction governing contracts
generally, the primary object being always to ascertain and carry out the intention of the parties. This intention is to
be derived from a consideration of the whole instrument, all parts of which should be given effect, and is to be
sought in the words and language employed.

In the present case, the Agreement between Primetown and UCPB provided that Primetown, in consideration of
₱748,000,000.00, "assigned, transferred, conveyed and set over unto [UCPB] all Accounts Receivables accruing
from [Primetown's Kiener] ... together with the assignment of all its rights, titles, interests and participation over the
units covered by or arising from the Contracts to Sell from which the Accounts Receivables have arisen."

The Agreement further stipulated that "x x x this sale/assignment is limited to the Receivables accruing to
[Primetown] from the [b]uyers of the condominium units in x x x [Kiener] and the corresponding Assignment of
Rights and Interests arising from the pertinent Contract to Sell and does not include except for the amount not
exceeding 30,000,000.00, Philippine currency, either singly or cumulatively any and all liabilities which [Primetown]
may have assumed under the individual Contract to Sell." (emphasis omitted)

The Agreement conveys the straightforward intention of Primetown to "sell, assign, transfer, convey and set over" to
UCPB the receivables, rights, titles, interests and participation over the units covered by the contracts to sell.
It explicitly excluded any and all liabilities and obligations, which Primetown assumed under the contracts
to sell. The intention to exclude Primetown's liabilities and obligations is further shown by Primetown's
subsequent letters to the buyers, which stated that "this payment arrangement shall in no way cause any
amendment of the other terms and conditions, nor the cancellation of the Contract to Sell you have
executed with [Primetown]." x x x (emphasis and underlining supplied)

xxxx

The intention to merely assign the receivables and rights of Primetown to UCPB is even bolstered by the CA
decisions in the cases of UCPB v. O'Halloran and UCPB v. Ho.
In UCPB v. O'Halloran, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 101699, respondent O'Halloran's accounts with Primetown
were also assigned by Primetown to UCPB, under the same Agreement as in this case. Since Primetown failed to
deliver the condominium units upon full payment of the purchase price, O'Halloran likewise sued both Primetown
and UCPB for cancellation of the contracts to sell, and the case eventually reached the CA. The CA held UCPB
liable to refund the amount it actually received from O'Halloran. The CA held that there is no legal, statutory or
contractual basis to hold UCPB solidarily liable with Primetown for the full reimbursement of the payments made by
O'Halloran. The CA found that based on the Agreement, UCPB is merely the assignee of the receivables under the
contracts to sell to the extent that the assignment is a manner adopted by which Primetown can pay its loan to the
bank. The CA held that the assignment of receivables did not make UCPB the owner or developer of the unfinished
project to make it solidarily liable with Primetown. The CA decision dated 23 July 2009 in CA-G.R. SP No. 101699
became final and executory upon Entry of Judgment on 17 August 2009 for O'Halloran and 18 August 2009 for
UCPB.

In UCPB v. Ho, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 113446, respondent Ho was similarly situated with O'Halloran and
Spouses Choi. Upon reaching the CA, the CA considered the Agreement between UCPB and Primetown as an
assignment of credit, because: 1) the parties entered into the Agreement without the consent of the debtor; 2)
UCPB's obligation "to deliver to the buyer the title over the condominium unit upon their full payment" signifies that
the title to the condominium unit remained with Primetown; 3) UCPB's prerogative "to rescind the contract to sell and
transfer the title of condominium unit to its name upon failure of the buyer to pay the full purchase price" indicates
that UCPB was merely given the right to transfer title in its name to apply the property as partial payment of
Primetown's obligation; and 4) the Agreement clearly states that the assignment is limited to the receivables and
does not include "any and all liabilities which [Primetown] may have assumed under the individual contract to sell."
Thus, the CA ruled that UCPB was a mere assignee of the right of Primetown to collect on its contract to sell with
Ho. The CA, then, applied the ruling in UCPB v. O'Halloran in finding UCPB jointly liable with Primetown only for the
payments UCPB had actually received from Ho.

On 4 December 2013, this Court issued a Resolution denying Ho's petition for review for failure to show any
reversible error on the part of the CA. On 2 April 2014, this Court likewise denied the motion for reconsideration with
finality. Thus, the 9 May 2013 Decision of the Special Fifteenth Division of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 113446
became final and executory. (emphasis omitted)

Considering that UCPB is a mere assignee of the rights and receivables under the Agreement, UCPB did not
assume the obligations and liabilities of Primetown under its contract to sell with Spouses Choi.

xxxx

Contrary to Spouses Choi's argument that UCPB was estopped, we find that estoppel would not lie since UCPB's
letters to the buyers only assured them of the completion of their units by the developer. UCPB did not represent to
be the new owner of Kiener or that UCPB itself would complete Kiener.  (emphases and underlining supplied)
23

In Liam v. UCPB (Liam),   the Court maintained its position that the transaction between PPGI and UCPB was
24

merely an assignment of credit. Hence, what was transferred to UCPB was only the right to collect PPGI's
receivables from the purchases of Kiener Hills and not the obligation to complete the said condominium project.
Thus:

The terms of the MOA and Deed of Sale/Assignment between PPGI and UCPB unequivocally show that the parties
intended an assignment of PPG l's credit in favor of UCPB.

xxxx

The provisions of the foregoing agreements between PPGI and UCPB are clear, explicit and unambiguous as to
leave no doubt about their objective of executing an assignment of credit instead of subrogation. The MOA and the
Deed of Sale/Assignment clearly state that UCPB became an assignee of PPGI's outstanding receivables of its
condominium buyers. The Court perceives no proviso or any extraneous factor that incites a contrary interpretation.
Even the simultaneous and subsequent acts of the parties accentuate their intention to treat their agreements as
assignment of credit.
 xxxx

The last paragraph of the letter also confirms that UCPB's acquisition of PPGI's receivables did not involve any
changes in the Contract to Sell between PPGI and Liam; neither did it vary the rights and the obligations of the
parties therein. Thus, no novation by subrogation could have taken place.

The CA was therefore correct in ruling that the agreement between PPGI and UCPB was an assignment of credit.
UCPB acquired PPGI's right to demand, collect and receive Liam's outstanding balance; UCPB was not subrogated
into PPGI's place as developer under the Contract to Sen.  (emphases and underlining supplied)
25

It is noteworthy that the circumstances and issues in Choi and Liam fall squarely with the case at bar. First, PPGI
and UCPB were prominent parties in the cited cases. Second, it involved the same documents and agreement
between PPGI and UCPB whereby the right to collect the receivables were assigned to the latter. Third, the
controversy arose from the complaints of disgruntled unit owners to recover the amount they had paid from PPGI or
UCPB after Kiener Hills was not completed.

In addition, the issue on estoppel was addressed in Spouses Choi. There, the Court ruled that the demand letters
UCPB sent to the buyers, including herein respondents, only assured the completion of the condominium project.
Nevertheless, there was no representation on the part of the UCPB that it would continue the construction of Kiener
Hills or that it was the new owner thereof. Guided by the previous pronouncements of this Court, it is settled that
UCPB is only jointly liable with PPGI to the disgruntled purchasers of Kiener Hills, including respondents. Thus,
UCPB is only bound to refund the amount it had unquestionably received from respondents.

Only questions of law may he raised in a petition for review under Rule 45; exceptions

In the present petition, UCPB does not contest the CA's conclusion that it is jointly liable with PPGI to the unit
owners of Kiener Hills.  It, however, assails that the CA erred in computing its actual liability because it was only
1âwphi1

bound to refund the amount it had actually received. Meanwhile, respondents contest that the resolution of the
correct amount of UCPB's liability is a question of fact, which is beyond the ambit of a petition for review under Rule
45.

It is axiomatic that, as a rule, only questions of law may be raised under a petition for review under Rule 45 because
the Court is not a trier of facts and the factual findings of lower courts are final, binding or conclusive on the parties
and to the Court.  As with every rule, however, it admits certain exceptions. Among the recognized exceptions are
26

when the conclusion of the lower court is one grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures or when the
judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts. 27

The Court finds that the exceptions are present to warrant a review of the factual matters.

Jurisprudence has settled UCPB's liability to unit owners to refund the amount it indubitably received from the
purchasers of Kiener Hills. In this case, the CA determined UCPB's actual liability of ₱552,152.34 by subtracting the
amounts already paid to PPGI from the total purchase price of ₱l,151,718.75. 28

Such computation of the appellate court, however, merely assumes that the said balance was actually paid by
respondents and received by UCPB. A closer scrutiny of the records, nonetheless, shows that the said amount is
not supported by the evidence at hand. The only document that identifies the amount respondents had paid to
UCPB is the demand letter it sent to the former. It is noteworthy that the said demand letter was materially
reproduced in respondents' complaint  before the HLURB Regional Office. In the said letter, the amount UCPB
29

received from respondents is only ₱157,757.82.

While respondents alleged that they had paid in full the purchase price of the condominium units, only ₱157,757.82
was sufficiently substantiated to have been actually received by UCPB. Thus, UCPB should only be held liable for
₱157,757.82 because it was the only amount which was unequivocally shown it had received. This is especially true
considering that one who pleads payment has the burden of proving the fact of payment. 30

Thus, it was incumbent upon respondents to prove the actual amount UCPB had unquestionably received.
WHEREFORE, the 23 May 2012 Decision of the Court of Appeals m CA-G.R. SP No. 118534 is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION. Petitioner United Coconut Planters Bank shall pay the amount of ₱157,757.82 to Spouses Walter
and Lily Uy, with legal interest at six percent (6%) per annum, without prejudice to any action which the parties may
have against Prime Town Property Group, Inc.
 12.) G.R. No. 205483, August 23, 2017

MARIO MAGAT, SR., MARIO S. MAGAT, JR. MARIO S. MAGAT, III, MA. MARGARITA M.
ESTAVILLA, MA. MARJORIE S. MAGAT, ALL SUBSTITUTE PARTIES AND HEIRS OF THE
DECEASED PARTY, JULIANA S. MAGAT, Petitioners, v. TANTRADE CORPORATION AND PABLO
S. BORJA, JR., Respondents.

DECISION

LEONEN, J.:

Petitioners in this case substituted as heirs for a deceased party. They crossed islands to file their
appeal before the Court of Appeals. They had to contend with their financial difficulties. Yet, they
were able to meet the periods required under Rule 42 for their motions for extension to file their
petition for review. It was reversible error, if not callousness, on the part of the Court of Appeals to
have summarily dismissed their appeal. Justice and the letter of the law demand that this case be
reinstated and remanded.

This resolves a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
praying that the assailed May 31, 20112 and January 15, 20133 Resolutions of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 05929 be reversed and set aside.

The assailed May 31, 2011 Resolution denied the Urgent Motion for Extension of Time to File Petition
for Review under Rule 424 filed by Mario Magat, Sr., Mario S. Magat, Jr., Mario S. Magat III, Ma.
Margarita M. Estavilla, and Ma. Marjorie S. Magat (petitioners). It likewise ordered that petitioners'
appeal be dismissed.5 The assailed January 15, 2013 Resolution denied petitioners' Motion for
Reconsideration.6

On December 15, 2006,7 respondent Tantrade Corporation (Tantrade) filed a Complaint for Collection
of a Sum of Money with Damages praying that the original defendant, now deceased Juliana S. Magat
(Juliana), be ordered to pay P266,481.50 plus interest, attorney's fees, litigation expenses, and
exemplary damages, for unpaid purchases of construction materials.8

Juliana denied making any such purchases for herself. She claimed that it was her contractor,
respondent Pablo S. Borja, Jr. (Borja), who purchased such supplies from Tantrade, pursuant to their
Owner-Contractor Agreement. Thus, she impleaded respondent Borja as a third-party defendant.9

In its April 8, 2010 Decision,10 the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 2, Tagbilaran City found
Juliana liable to pay Tantrade P305,833.10 plus interest.11 It ruled that purchase orders signed by
Juliana indicated that she bound herself to pay Tantrade for the purchased materials.12 However, it
added that under the Owner-Contractor Agreement, Borja bound himself to furnish all labor,
materials, tools, and equipment for the construction of Juliana's building. Thus, it ordered Borja to
reimburse Juliana the amount which she was ordered to pay Tantrade.13

Juliana appealed before the Regional Trial Court but passed away while her appeal was pending.
Hence, she was substituted by her heirs, now petitioners in this case.14

In its January 27, 2011 Decision,15 the Regional Trial Court, Branch 47, Tagbilaran City affirmed in
toto the Municipal Trial Court in Cities Decision. In its April 18, 2011 Order,16 it denied petitioners'
Motion for Reconsideration. Petitioners' counsel received a copy of the Regional Trial Court April 18,
2011 Order on May 9, 2011.17

On May 23, 2011, one (1) day before the lapse of the 15-day period to file a Petition for Review
under Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, petitioners filed their Urgent Motion for Extension
of Time to File Petition for Review under Rule 42 (First Motion for Extension).18 They asked for an
additional 15 days from May 24, 2011, or until June 8, 2011, to file their appeal.19 They justified their
First Motion for Extension by citing financial constraints. They explained that they were still reeling
from expenses due to the long hospitalization and death of Juliana, and thus, could not immediately
finance their appeal. Petitioners' counsel further stated that petitioners' inability to finance their
appeal had also prevented him from timely preparing the Petition for Review.20

Despite their declared financial difficulties, petitioners managed to pay the docket and other fees and
to make a deposit for costs, as required for a Petition for Review under Rule 42. These were done
alongside the filing of their First Motion for Extension.21

In its assailed May 31, 2011 Resolution,22 the Court of Appeals denied the First Motion for Extension.
It faulted petitioners for "procrastination"23 as they filed a motion for extension a day before the end
of the reglementary period. It further bewailed that "the Court could not be expected to have acted
on such very limited time especially so when the Rollo was received by the office of the ponente only
after its raffle on May 24, 2011."24

On June 6, 2011, or two (2) days before the expiration of the 15-day extension that petitioners
originally prayed for in the First Motion for Extension, petitioners filed their Second Urgent Motion for
Extension of Time (Second Motion for Extension). They had not yet received a copy of the assailed
Court of Appeals May 31, 2011 Resolution by this time. They sought another 15 day extension, or
until June 23, 2011, to file their Petition for Review. Petitioners' counsel explained that petitioners
remained hard�-pressed with their finances.25

On June 22, 2011, a day before the end of the second 15-day extension they prayed for, petitioners
filed with the Court of Appeals their Petition for Review under Rule 42.26

It was only on June 29, 2011 that petitioners received a copy of the assailed Court of Appeals May
31, 2011 Resolution.27 On July 11, 2011, they filed a Motion for Reconsideration.28 They explained
that the "[d]istance between Tagbilaran City and Cebu City, the length of time to prepare the main
petition and the certified copies of pleadings and other court records, and the lack of money to
finance the filing of a Petition for Review"29 hindered them from immediately filing their appeal.

Not impressed with petitioners' reasons, the Court of Appeals issued its assailed January 15,
201330 Resolution, denying petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration.

Hence, this Petition was filed.

For resolution is the issue of whether or not the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in
denying the extensions sought by petitioners and in dismissing their appeal.

Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure governs appeals taken to the Court of Appeals from
decisions of Regional Trial Courts rendered in the exercise of their appellate jurisdiction. Its Section 1
specifies the period for filing petitions for review:

Section 1. How appeal taken; time for filing. - A party desiring to appeal from a decision of the
Regional Trial Court rendered in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction may file a verified petition
for review with the Court of Appeals, paying at the same time to the clerk of said court the
corresponding docket� and other lawful fees, depositing the amount of P500.00 for costs, and
furnishing the Regional Trial Court and the adverse party with a copy of the petition. The petition
shall be filed and served within fifteen (15) days from notice of the decision sought to be reviewed or
of the denial of petitioner's motion for new trial or reconsideration filed in due time after
judgment.  Upon proper motion and the payment of the full amount of the docket and other
lawful fees and the deposit for costs before the expiration of the reglementary period, the
Court of Appeals may grant an additional period of fifteen (15) days only within which to
file the petition for review. No further extension shall be granted except for the most
compelling reason and in no case to exceed fifteen (15) days. (Emphasis supplied)
It is evident from the last two (2) sentences of Section 1 that motions for extension to file Rule 42
petitions are permissible.

Rule 44 takes a particularly liberal stance with regard to the period for filing petitions. It explicitly
enables extensions, while other modes of appeal do not. In contrast with Rule 42, Rule 40, or the
rules on appeals to the Regional Trial Courts from the Municipal Trial Courts, and Rule 41, or the
rules on appeals to the Court of Appeals of decisions of the Regional Trial Courts rendered in the
exercise of their original jurisdiction, make no similar reference to any extension to file such appeals.
They even proscribe motions for extension to file motions for new trial or reconsideration.31

Rule 42 enables not just one (1) but two (2) extensions of 15 days each. An initial extension may be
given, provided that it is sought through a proper motion, docket and lawful fees are paid, and a
deposit for costs is made before the expiration of the reglementary period. After this initial extension,
Rule 42 permits a second extension of another 15 days. This second extension shall, however, only
be "for the most compelling reason."

The grants of both first and second extensions are addressed to the sound discretion of the Court of
Appeals. Mere compliance with the requirements of timely filing a proper motion, tendering payment
and making a deposit, and averring compelling reasons does not guarantee the Court of Appeals'
solicitude. The general rule remains to be the filing of a verified petition "within fifteen (15) days
from notice of the decision sought to be reviewed or of the denial of petitioner's motion for new trial
or reconsideration." Extensions are proper only under exceptional circumstances. Rule 42's
indulgence is not a license for interruptions born by caprice or indolence:

As a rule, periods prescribed to do certain acts must be followed with fealty as they are designed
primarily to speed up the final disposition of the case. Such reglementary periods are indispensable
interdictions against needless delays and for an orderly discharge of judicial business. Deviations
from the rules cannot be tolerated. More importantly, its observance cannot be left to the whims and
caprices of the parties. What is worrisome is that parties who fail to file their pleading within the
periods provided for by the Rules of Court, through their counsel's inexcusable neglect. resort to
beseeching the Court to bend the rules in the guise of a plea for a liberal interpretation thereof, thus,
sacrificing efficiency and order. As we emphasized in Sublay v. NLRC, we cannot respond with
alacrity to every claim of injustice and bend the rules to placate vociferous protestors crying and
claiming to be victims of a wrong.32

The need to comply with reglementary periods to file appeals is an adjunct of the basic principle that
the right to appeal is merely vested by statute. Thus, anyone who appeals must diligently comply
with the governing rules. The non admission of belatedly filed appeals amounts to decision on the
merits:

There are certain procedural rules that must remain inviolable, like those setting the periods for
perfecting an appeal or filing a petition for review, for it is doctrinally entrenched that the right to
appeal is a statutory right and one who seeks to avail of that right must comply with the statute or
rules . . . [T]he perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period permitted by law is not
only mandatory but also jurisdictional and the failure to perfect the appeal renders the judgment of
the court final and executory. Just as a losing party has the right to file an appeal within the
prescribed period, the winning party also has the correlative right to enjoy the finality of the
resolution of his/her case.

These periods are carefully guarded and lawyers are well-advised to keep track of their applications.
After all, a denial of a petition for being time-barred is a decision on the merits.33 (Citations omitted)

By the very nature of pleading exceptions as justifications for liberality, it devolves upon the party
seeking an extension to file an appeal to establish the merits of his or her plea:
[E]xceptional circumstances or compelling reasons may have existed in the past when we either
suspended the operation of the Rules or exempted a particular case from their application. But, these
instances were the exceptions rather than the rule, and we invariably took this course of action only
upon a meritorious plea for the liberal construction of the Rules of Court based on attendant
exceptional circumstances. These uncommon exceptions allowed us to maintain the stability of our
rulings, while allowing for the unusual cases when the dictates of justice demand a correspondingly
different treatment.

Under this unique nature of the exceptions, a party asking for the suspension of the Rules of Court
comes to us with the heavy burden of proving that he deserves to be accorded exceptional
treatment. Every plea for a liberal construction of the Rules must at least be accompanied by an
explanation of why the party-litigant failed to comply with the rules and by a justification for the
requested liberal construction.34

This Court finds petitioners here to have effectively pleaded grounds that warrant the extensions
prayed for. More basic, however, this Court finds it to be a serious error for the Court of Appeals to
decry petitioners' supposed "procrastination" when, to begin with, petitioners acted well within the
periods sanctioned by Rule 42. Petitioners did not ask the Court of Appeals to sanction an aberrant
situation beyond Rule 42, Section 1's contemplation. Thus, this case is not even about suspending,
relaxing, or extraordinarily applying Rule 42, Section 1.

The Court of Appeals made much of how petitioners filed their First Motion for Extension a day before
the end of the reglementary period. It ruled how "[it] could not be expected to have acted on such
very limited time especially so when the Rollo was received by the office of the ponente only after its
raffle on May 24, 2011."35

This Court is baffled by the Court of Appeals' bemoaning.

Rule 42 allows 15 days to file petitions for review. Within the same period, appellants are expressly
permitted by the penultimate sentence of Rule 42, Section 1 to file motions for extension. It is true
that in seeking an extension, rather than immediately filing a petition, appellants wager on the Court
of Appeals' favorable action. Still, it remains that they have 15 days to seek an extension. They
should not be faulted for maximizing the period that Rule 42 allows. In doing so, they are not
"procrastinating" but are merely exercising a legitimate option. If the Court of Appeals takes issue
with the filing of motions for extension a day before the end of the proper period, it should advocate
a revision of Rule 42 instead of faulting parties which act within the bounds of this rule.

Petitioners can neither be faulted for the receipt by the ponente's office of the Rollo on May 24, 2011.
Party-litigants have no control over the internal processes of courts, including the time it takes for
justices to receive the records. They simply have nothing to do with that. Party�-litigants need not,
could not, and should not intrude into a court's internal dynamics. They only need to comply with
what the rules require. They have done their part once they timely file their submissions.

To legitimately seek an initial extension, petitioners had to file a proper motion and to ensure that
docket and lawful fees were paid and deposit for costs was made before the expiration of the
reglementary period. Save for the Court of Appeals' assertion of procrastination, there is no
intimation that petitioners failed in any of these requirements. No other technical defect has been
attributed to petitioners' First Motion for Extension. They also timely paid the docket and other fees,
and deposited for costs. They did these alongside the filing of their First Motion for Extension before
the lapse of 15 days following their receipt of a copy of the Regional Trial Court April 18, 2011 Order
on May 9, 2011.36

Petitioners did not abuse court processes when they sought a second extension. Their Second Motion
for Extension was filed two (2) days before the end of the first 15-day extension. It was filed, not
only within, but in advance of the lapse of the period for seeking the second extension sanctioned by
the final sentence of Rule 42, Section 1. It is true that by the time the Second Motion for Extension
was filed on June 6, 2011, the Court of Appeals had already denied petitioners' First Motion for
Extension in its assailed May 31, 2011 Resolution. Petitioners, however, would not be notified of that
denial until June 29, 2011. The most that petitioners can be charged with is optimism that, barring
timely notification to the contrary, their First Motion for Extension was granted. They may have been
guileless, but they were not malicious.

Petitioners did not exhaust the additional 15 days they sought and filed their Petition for Review a
day ahead of what would have been their deadline. When they did this on June 22, 2011, they had
yet to learn that the Court of Appeals had declined their initial plea for an extension. Their lack of
knowledge belies intent to disrespect the Court of Appeals or to run afoul of the Rules of Court.
Moreover, their filing of subsequent submissions in advance of their deadlines demonstrates sincerity
in preventing undue delay.

Ultimately, this Court considers it to be in the better interest of justice had the Court of Appeals been
more perceptive of petitioners' plight and granted them the extension sought, in order that they
could have fully litigated their cause.

Their pleaded justifications were hardly frivolous. Petitioners stepped into the shoes of a defendant
who passed away. Certainly, substituting for a deceased party is not forced upon heirs37 and
petitioners' inclusion in litigation was due to their free volition. Still, petitioners' predicament of
grappling with the potentially stained name of a deceased wife and mother, who could no longer
defend herself against allegations of unpaid debts, and whose estate faced possible diminution or
dissipation likely made it pressing for them to pursue her case. Doing so, however, meant
shouldering costs that were not initially theirs to bear. By the unfortunate fortuity of Juliana's
passing, petitioners found themselves defending a case that was not their own and bearing all the
costs-financial or otherwise-that it entailed.

By the time they had been compelled to litigate, Juliana's case w already in its advanced stages. By
then, pursuing an appeal literally entailed crossing the sea to another island. The Court of Appeals
should have considered that the required docket fees and deposit for costs under Rule 42 were not all
that petitioners had to shoulder. There, too, was the need for proper legal representation in the
advanced stages of litigation and having to bear the adversity of having twice lost in lower courts.

Petitioners were simultaneously afflicted with the tragedy of death and constrained by their means.
These were compelling reasons warranting a solicitous stance towards them. Justice is better served
by extending consideration to them and enabling an exhaustive resolution of the parties' claims. This
is especially so as petitioners' utmost good faith was demonstrated; they having seen to it that, even
as they were imploring the Court of Appeals' understanding, each of the technical requirements of
Rule 42 was satisfied.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals' assailed May 31,2011 and January
15, 2013 Resolutions in CA-G.R. SP No. 05929 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Petition for
Review under Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure filed by petitioners before the Court of
Appeals is REINSTATED and the Court of Appeals is directed to resolve its merits with dispatch.
13.) G.R. No. 208614

SIMEON TRINIDAD PIEDAD (deceased) survived and assumed by his heirs, namely: ELISEO PIEDAD
(deceased) , JOEL PIEDAD, PUBLIO PIEDAD, JR., GLORIA PIEDAD, LOT PIEDAD, ABEL PIEDAD, ALI
*

PIEDAD, and LEE PIEDAD, Petitioners

vs.
CANDELARIA LINEHAN BOBILLES and MARIANO BOBILLES, Respondents

DECISION

LEONEN, J.:

Courts should take to heart the principle of equity if the strict application of the statute of limitations or laches would
result in manifest wrong or injustice.

This resolves the Petition for Review  filed by Eliseo Piedad, Joel Piedad, Publio Piedad, Jr., Gloria Piedad, Lot
1

Piedad, Abel Piedad, Ali Piedad, and Lee Piedad (the Heirs of Piedad) assailing the Resolutions dated December
10, 2012  and July 10, 2013  of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 07176.
2 3

The facts as established by the pleadings of the parties are as follows:

Sometime in 1974, Simeon Piedad (Piedad) filed a case for annulment of an absolute deed of sale against
Candelaria Linehan Bobilles (Candelaria) and Mariano Bobilles (Mariano). The case was docketed as Civil Case No.
435-T and raffled to Branch 9, Regional Trial Court, Cebu City, presided over by Judge Benigno Gaviola (Judge
Gaviola). 4

On March 19, 1992, the trial court ruled in Piedad's favor and declared the deed of sale as null and void for being a
forgery.  The fallo of this Decision read:
5

WHEREFORE, premises considered and by preponderance of evidence, the Court hereby renders a Decision in
favor of herein plaintiff Simeon Piedad and against defendants Candelaria Linehan-Bobilles and Mariano Bobilles,
by declaring the deed of sale in question (Exhibit "A" or "5") to be NULL and VOID for being a mere forgery, and
ordering herein defendants, their heirs and/or assigns to vacate the house and surrender their possession of said
house and all other real properties which are supposed to have been covered by the voided deed of sale (Exhibit
"A" or "5") to the administrator of the estate of spouses Nemesio Piedad and Fortunata Nillas. Furthermore, herein
defendants are hereby ordered to pay plaintiff or his heirs the following: (1) ₱3,000.00 Moral Damages; (2)
₱2,000.00 Exemplary Damages; and (3) ₱800.00 attorney's fees, plus costs.

SO ORDERED. 6

Candelaria and Mariano appealed the trial court Decision, but on September 15, 1998, the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 38652 dismissed the appeal and affirmed the trial court ruling. 7

The Court of Appeals Decision became final and executory on November 1, 1998.  On October 22, 2001, Judge
8

Gaviola issued an order for the issuance of a writ of demolition.  The dispositive portion of this Order read:
9

WHEREFORE, let a writ of demolition issue against Candelaria Linehan Bobilles and Mariano Bobilles. The sheriff
implementing the writ is ordered to allow the defendants 10 days to remove their improvements in the premises and
for them to vacate. Should defendant still fail to do so within the period aforestated, the sheriff may proceed with the
demolition of the improvements without any further order from this Court.

SO ORDERED. 10

On November 26, 2001, Judge Gaviola denied Candelaria's Motion for Reconsideration. 11
On December 4, 2001, Judge Gaviola issued a Writ of Demolition against Candelaria and Mariano and referred it to
Sheriff Antonio A. Bellones (Sheriff Bellones) for its implementation.
12

That same day,  in the same case, Candelaria filed a Petition for the Probate of the Last Will and Testament of
13

Simeon Piedad. Judge Gaviola ordered that the petition be heard independently and that it be raffled to another
branch.14

Candelaria's Petition for the Probate of the Last Will and Testament of Simeon Piedad was eventually docketed as
S.P. Proc. No. 457-T and raffled to Branch 59, Regional Trial Court, Toledo City, presided over by Judge Gaudioso
D. Villarin (Villarin).
15

On May 16, 2002, Candelaria also filed a verified petition for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or
preliminary injunction against Sheriff Bellones to restrain him from enforcing the writ of demolition. This was
docketed as S.P. Proc. No. 463-T. 16

Judge Cesar 0. Estrera (Judge Estrera), Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Toledo City and Presiding
Judge of Branch 29, ordered the raffle of the petition against Sheriff Bellones. A few days later, after summarily
hearing the case, Judge Estrera issued a restraining order against Sheriff Bellones. 17

Upon Candelaria's motion, Judge Estrera consolidated S.P. Proc. No. 457-T with S.P. Proc. No. 463-T before
Branch 59, Regional Trial Court, Toledo City. 18

On May 27, 2002, again upon Candelaria's motion, Judge Villarin of Branch 59 extended the temporary restraining
order against Sheriff Bell ones for 17 days.19

The following motions were eventually filed before Judge Villarin, but he never resolved them: (1) a motion to
dismiss, as amended; (2) a motion requesting the issuance of an order lifting the injunction order; and (3) a joint
motion to resolve the motions. 20

On February 28, 2007, the Heirs of Piedad filed an administrative complaint against Judges Estrera and Villarin. The
administrative complaint charged them with Issuing an Unlawful Order Against a Co-Equal Court and Unreasonable
Delay in Resolving Motions. 21

On December 16, 2009, this Court found both Judges Estrera and Villarin administratively liable for gross ignorance
of the law, and Judge Villarin liable for undue delay in rendering an order.  The fallo of this Court's Decision read:
22

WHEREFORE, the Court finds Judge Cesar O. Estrera and Judge Gaudioso D. Villarin of the RTC in Toledo City,
Cebu, Branches 29 and 59, respectively, GUILTY of GROSS IGNORANCE OF THE LAW and imposes upon them a
FINE in the amount of twenty[-]one thousand pesos (PhP 21,000) each, with the stern warning that a repetition of
similar or analogous infractions in the future shall be dealt with more severely. Also, the Court finds Judge Gaudioso
D. Villarin GUILTY of UNDUE DELAY IN RENDERING AN ORDER and imposes upon him a FINE in the additional
amount of eleven thousand pesos (PhP 11,000)[.]

SO ORDERED. 23

Civil Case No. 435-T before Branch 9, Regional Trial Court, Cebu City was eventually transferred to Branch 29,
Regional Trial Court, Toledo City. 24

On July 12, 2010, the Heirs of Piedad filed their Motion Praying that an Order Be Issued to Sheriff Antonio Bellones
to Resume the Unfinished Writ of Execution and/or Writ of Demolition before Regional Trial Court, Branch 29,
Toledo City.25

In his Order  dated May 15, 2012, Presiding Judge Ruben F. Altubar (Judge Altubar) of Branch 29, Regional Trial
26

Court, Toledo City denied the motion.

Judge Altubar opined that since more than 12 years had passed since the Court of Appeals September 15, 1998
Decision became final and executory, the execution should have been pursued through a petition for revival
judgment, not a mere motion. 27

On August 16, 2012, Judge Altubar denied the Motion for Reconsideration of the Heirs of Piedad. 28

The Heirs of Piedad appealed the denial of their motions with a petition under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court. On
December 10, 2012, the Court of Appeals  dismissed the appeal for being the wrong remedy:
29

First, assailed in the instant petition are Orders denying petitioners' motion to enforce a writ of execution and writ of
demolition in Civil Case No. 435-T.

Second, the Orders assailed in this petition were not rendered in the exercise of the RTC's appellate jurisdiction. In
fact, Civil Case No[.] 435- T is an original action for annulment of a Deed of Absolute Sale.

Under the Rules, appeals to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its
appellate jurisdiction shall be by petition for review under Rule 42.

The appropriate course of action for the petitioner was to file a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 alleging grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction committed by the presiding judge who issued the
assailed Orders dated May 15, 2012 and August 16, 2012. 30

On July 10, 2013, the Court of Appeals  denied the Heirs of Piedad's Motion for Reconsideration.
31

On September 27, 2013, petitioners Heirs of Piedad filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari  before this Court,
32

where they adopted the findings of fact in the administrative case against Judges Estrera and Villarin. 33

Petitioners assert that the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion when it denied their motion for the
resumption of the writ of demolition and their motion for reconsideration. 34

Petitioners chide Judge Altubar for being equally ignorant of the law as Judges Estrera and Villarin. They also point
out that Court of Appeals Justice Gabriel T. Ingles, who penned the dismissal of their appeal, presided over S.P.
Proc No. 463-T when he was still the acting Regional Trial Court Judge of Branch 59, Toledo City  and even issued
35

an Order  dated July 9, 2008.

36

Petitioners pray for the resumption of the writ of demolition issued by Branch 9, Regional Trial Court, Cebu City. 37

In its October 21, 2013 Resolution,  this Court granted petitioners' motion for extension and directed respondents to
38

comment on the Petition.

On January 15, 2014, respondents filed their Comment  to the Petition where they claim that it cannot be
39

determined if the Petition falls under Rule 45 or Rule 65.  Nonetheless, whether viewed as a petition under Rule 65
40

or an appeal under Rule 45, respondents assert that the Petition was still devoid of merit. 41

Respondents opine that petitioners' motion for the implementation of the writ of demolition was already barred by
prescription since it was filed 12 years after the Court of Appeals September 15, 1998 Decision, which upheld the
validity of the writ of demolition, became final and executory. 42

Respondents further claim that the ruling in the administrative case against Judges Estrera and Villarin cannot bind
them since they were not parties to the case and the issue resolved was the administrative liability of these judges.
They emphasize that this Court did not rule on the validity of Judges Estrera's and Villarin's issuances and orders in
S.P. Proc No. 463-T and S.P. Proc. No. 457-T. 43

Respondents also question the personality of petitioners to institute the case on Piedad's behalf. 44
Finally, respondents put petitioners to task for their disrespectful tone towards the judges and justice invol_ved in
this case.45

On February 12, 2014, petitioners filed a Motion for Substitution of Heirs,  alleging that petitioner Eliseo Piedad died
46

on January 8, 2014 and would be substituted by his surviving spouse and their children. 47

In its July 14, 2014 Resolution,  this Court required petitioners to file a reply to the Comment.
48

In their Reply,  petitioners assert that their Petition was filed under Rule 65 because it alleges grave abuse of
49

discretion  on the part of the Court of Appeals.

50

Petitioners apologized for the confusion created by their former counsel in filing the appeal before the Court of
Appeals. They claimed that their former counsel, now deceased, was almost 100 years old when he filed the appeal
before the Court of Appeals and Petition before this Court. However, petitioners insist that considering the merit of
their case, the Court of Appeals should not have dismissed their appeal on mere technicalities. 51

Petitioners ask this Court for liberality for the procedural lapses committed by their former counsel. 52

The issues submitted for this Court's resolution are:

First, whether or not petitioners have duly established their personality to file the petition as heirs of Simeon Piedad;
and

Second, whether or not the. motion to revive judgment was timely filed.

Rule 3, Section 2 of the Rules of Civil Procedure provides who may be a party in interest in a civil action:

Section 2. Parties in interest - A real party in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the
judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Unless otherwise authorized by law or these Rules,
every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest.

Rule 3, Section 16  then provides for the process of substitution of parties when the original party to a pending
53

action dies and death does not extinguish the claim.

Petitioners claim to be Piedad's children; thus, they assert that they are the real parties in interest to the action
begun by their father. On the other hand, respondents claim that petitioners did not properly substitute Piedad upon
his death; hence, they failed to substantiate their personality to move for the revival of judgment. 54

Respondents fail to convince. Petitioners have been repeatedly recognized as Piedad's rightful heirs not only by the
Court of Appeals but also by this Court.

In Heirs of Simeon Piedad v. Exec. Judge Estrera,  petitioners filed an administrative case in their capacity as
55

Piedad's heirs and this Court acknowledged their standing to sue in this capacity. The same is also true in the
assailed Court of Appeals September 15, 1998 Decision where petitioners filed their appeal as Piedad's heirs and
their personality to represent their father was never questioned or assailed.

This Court upheld petitioners' personality to sue in Heirs of Simeon Piedad and sees no reason to deny them the
same recognition in the case at bar when the current case is merely an offshoot of their father's original complaint
for nullity of deed of sale.

Furthermore, this Court takes judicial notice of how respondents, through their counsels,  deliberately and
56

maliciously delayed the execution of a final and executory judgment by filing patently dilatory actions. These actions
include the Petition for the Probate of the Last Will and Testament of Simeon Piedad,  filed in the same case as
57

Piedad's complaint for annulment of absolute deed of sale. The Petition for Probate of the Last Will and Testament
of Simeon Piedad was filed in response to the Writ of Demolition issued on December 4, 2001, pursuant to the final
and executory Court of Appeals September 15, 1998 Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 38652. 58

Respondents, through their counsels, further delayed the execution of the judgment by filing a petition against
Sheriff Bellones of Branch 9, Regional Trial Court, Cebu City to restrain him from enforcing the writ of demolition. 59

The extent of the insidious machinations employed by respondents and their counsels were highlighted when they
assailed petitioners' motion for execution for purportedly being filed beyond the prescriptive period of 10 years,
when they themselves were part of the reason for the delay in execution.

Counsels for respondents are "reminded that as officers of the law, they are mandated by Rule 12.04 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility to "not unduly delay a case, impede the execution of a judgment or misuse court
processes." While counsels for respondents are expected to serve their clients to the utmost of their ability, their
duty to their clients does not include disrespecting the law by scheming to impede the execution of a final and
executory judgment. As members of the Bar, counsels for respondents are enjoined to represent their clients "with
zeal within the bounds of the law."60

Thus, counsels for respondents are given a stern warning to desist from committing similar acts which undermine
the law and its processes. Any similar infractions in the future from counsels for respondents will be dealt with more
severely.

II

Rule 39, Section 6 of the Rules of Civil Procedure provides the two (2) ways of executing a final and executory
judgment:

Section 6. Execution by motion or by independent action. - A final and executory judgment or order may be
executed on motion within five (5) years from the date of its entry. After the lapse of such time, and before it is
barred by the statute of limitations, a judgment may be enforced by action. The revived judgment may also be
enforced by motion within five (5) years from the date of its entry and thereafter by action before it is barred by the
statute of limitations.

Rule 39, Section 6 of the Rules of Court must be read in conjunction with Articles 1144(3) and 1152 of the Civil
Code, which provide:

Article 1144. The following actions must be brought within ten years from the time the right of action accrues:

....

(3) Upon a judgment.

....

Article 1152. The period for prescription of actions to demand the fulfillment of obligation declared by a judgment
commences from the time the judgment became final.

Thus, the prevailing party may move for the execution of a final and executory judgment as a matter of right within
five (5) years from the entry of judgment. If no motion is filed within this period, the judgment is converted to a mere
right of action and can only be enforced by instituting a complaint for the revival of judgment in a regular court within
10 years fromfinality of judgment.61

In the case at bar, the Court of Appeal's ruling on the nullity of the deed of absolute sale executed between Piedad
and respondents became final and executory on November 1, 1998. Judge Gaviola, upon motion, then issued an
order for the issuance of a writ of demolition on October 22, 2001. 62
However, the writ of demolition was never served on respondents due to their dilatory tactics and the gross
ignorance of the law and undue delay caused by Judges Estrera and Villarin. The case only began to gain traction
on July 12, 2010,  when petitioners filed their motion for the revival of judgment. But by this time, almost 12 years
63

had passed since the Court of Appeals September 15, 1998 Decision became final and executory. This led Branch
29, Regional Trial Court, Toledo City, where the case was transferred from Branch 9, Regional Trial Court, Cebu
City, to deny the motion in its Order dated May 15, 2012 for being the wrong remedy. The Regional Trial Court
stated:

In the instant case, reckoned from November 1, 1998, the date when the Decision of the Court of Appeals became
final and executory, 12 years and 1 day had already elapsed when the instant motion was filed on November 2,
2010. There may be instances that execution may still pursue despite the lapse of ten -years· from finality of
judgment but it should be a result of a well-justified action for revival of judgment, not a mere motion, as can be
found in the cited Supreme Court Decision. 64

The Regional Trial Court likewise referred to Bausa v. Heirs of Dino  to support its denial of petitioners' motion,
65

claiming that the case at bar is very similar  with Bausa. However, a careful reading of Bausa shows that while it
66

contains similarities with the case at bar, the factual circumstances and ruling in Baus a tend to support petitioners'
motion for revival, not its denial.

In Bausa, the Decision declaring petitioners as the rightful owners of the disputed property became final and
executory on January 28, 1987. On May 8, 1987, petitioners filed a motion for execution which was granted by the
trial court but was not served on the respondent. 67

Petitioners in Bausa subsequently applied for the issuance of an alias writ of execution, which was likewise granted.
The sheriff then executed a Delivery of Possession, but respondents refused to sign the Delivery of Possession and
refused to vacate the premises. This prompted petitioners to apply for a writ of demolition, which was again granted
but could not be implemented due to respondents' continued resistance. Finally, petitioners filed an action to
revive  the judgment of the trial court, which respondents asserted was not timely filed.
68

Bausa stated that the law set time limitations in the enforcement of judgments "to prevent obligors from sleeping on
their rights."  Bausa then held that considering petitioners' diligent efforts in the enforcement of what was already
69

rightfully theirs and respondents' machinations that prevented petitioners from possessing their property, it cannot
be said that petitioners slept on their rights:

Despite diligent efforts and the final and executory nature of the Decision, petitioners have yet to regain possession
of what is legally their own. These circumstances clearly demonstrate that the failure to execute the judgment was
due to respondents' refusal to follow the several writs ordering them to vacate the premises. It would be unfair for
the Court to allow respondents to profit from their defiance of valid court orders. 70

Bausa likewise emphasized that if manifest wrong or injustice would result with the strict adherence to the statute of
limitations or doctrine of laches, it would be better for courts to rule under the principle of equity:

It is a better rule that courts, under the principle of equity, will not be guided or bound strictly by the statute of
limitations or the doctrine of laches when to do so, manifest wrong or injustice would result. It would be more in
keeping with justice and equity to allow the revival of the judgment rendered by Branch 52 of the Regional Trial
Court of Sorsogon in Civil Case No. 639. To rule otherwise would result in an absurd situation where the rightful
owner of a property would be ousted by a usurper on mere technicalities. Indeed, it would be an idle ceremony to
insist on the filing of another action that would only unduly prolong respondents' unlawful retention of the premises
which they had, through all devious means, unjustly withheld from petitioners all these years. 71

Just like in Bausa, it also cannot be said that petitioners slept on their rights. Petitioners filed a motion for execution
well within the five (5)-year period prescribed by Rule 39, Section 6 of the Rules of Court. However, their efforts
were thwarted by respondents' machinations and Judges Estrera's and Villarin's illegal acts of issuing restraining
orders against a coequal court. Nonetheless, petitioners continued to persevere and filed several motions  before
72

Judge Villarin, which the judge proceeded to ignore. This Court recognized the illegality of the acts committed by
Judges Estrera and Villarin when this Court held them administratively liable for gross ignorance of the law and
undue delay in rendering an order, imposing upon them a fine and a stem warning that a repetition of a similar act
will be dealt with more severely. 73
In dismissing the motion for revival, the Regional Trial Court adopted a strict interpretation of Rule 39, Section 6 of
the Rules of Court because the proper remedy was supposedly an action for revival of judgment, not just a mere
motion.  The Court of Appeals, in turn, also dismissed the petition for being the wrong remedy.
74 75

The lower courts are mistaken.

In David v. Ejercito,  for reasons of equity, this Court treated the motion for execution, alias writ of execution, and
76

motion for demolition as substantial compliance with the requirement to file an action to revive judgment if no motion
for execution is filed within five (5) years from the date of its entry of judgment.  David pointed out that petitioner's
77

deliberate efforts at delaying the execution of a final and executory judgment should not be condoned:

It would be an idle ceremony to insist on the filing of a separate action that would only unduly prolong petitioner's
unlawful retention of the premises which he has through all devious means unjustly withheld from respondents all
these years. 78

This Court, in a long line of cases,  has allowed for the execution of a final and executory judgment even if
79

prescription has already set in, if the delay was caused by the judgment obligor for his or her benefit or advantage.
The reason behind this exception was explained in Camacho v. Court of Appeals: 80

The purpose of the law in prescribing time limitations for enforcing judgments or actions is to prevent obligors from
sleeping on their rights.  Far from sleeping on their rights, respondents persistently pursued their rights of action. It
1âwphi1

is revolting to the conscience to allow petitioner to further avert the satisfaction of her obligation because of sheer
literal adherence to technicality. After all, the Rules of Court mandates that a liberal construction of the Rules be
adopted in order to promote their object and to assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy and inexpensive
determination of every action and proceeding. This rule of construction is especially useful in the present case
where adherence to the letter of the law would result in absurdity and manifest injustice. 81

This Court has also interrupted  the tolling of the prescriptive period or deducted  from the prescriptive period when
82 83

the peculiar circumstances of the case or the dictates of equity called for it. This Court held in Lancita v. Magbanua: 84

In computing the time limited for suing out of an execution, although there is authority to the contrary, the general
rule is that there should not be included the time when execution is stayed, either by agreement of the parties for a
definite time, by injunction, by the taking of an appeal or writ of error so as to operate as a supersedeas, by the
death of a party, or otherwise. Any interruption or delay occasioned by the debtor will extend the time within which
the writ may be issued without scire facias. 85

It is not disputed that the deed of absolute sale between Piedad and respondents was declared null and void for
being a forgery, and that the Court of Appeals September 15, 1998 Decision became final and executory as early as
November 1, 1998. However, due to respondents' schemes and maneuvers, they managed for many years to
prevent Piedad and his heirs from enjoying what had already been decreed to be rightfully theirs, leading to an
empty victory and petitioners' continued struggle for their rights.

Considering that the Regional Trial Court May 15, 2012 Order dismissing petitioners' motion for revival was utterly
devoid of legal or factual basis, it is clear that it was attended by grave abuse of discretion for being issued
capriciously and with a gross misapprehension of the facts. 86

To reiterate, jurisprudence is consistent that when the delay in filing a motion or action for execution could not be
attributed to the prevailing party, a liberal interpretation of the rules of procedure should be resorted to where a
literal and strict adherence will most likely result in miscarriage of justice.
87

WHEREFORE, this Court resolves to GRANT the Petition. The assailed Resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated
December 10, 2012 and July 10, 2013 in CA-G.R. SP No. 07176 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Writ of
Demolition issued on December 4, 2001 by Branch 9, Regional Trial Court, Cebu City is ORDERED SERVED on
Candelaria Linehan Bobilles and/or Mariano Bobilles or any of their heirs, successors, or assigns to resume the
execution process against them.
 14.) [ G.R. No. 227363. March 12, 2019 ]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. SALVADOR TULAGAN,
ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
This is an appeal from the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated August 17, 2015 in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 06679, which affirmed
the Joint Decision[2] dated February 10, 2014 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Carlos City in Criminal Case Nos. SCC-6210 and
SCC-6211, finding accused-appellant Salvador Tulagan (Tulagan) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of sexual assault and
statutory rape as defined and penalized under Article 266-A, paragraphs 2 and 1(d) of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), respectively, in
relation to Article 266-B.
In Criminal Case No. SCC-6210, Tulagan was charged as follows:

That sometime in the month of September 2011, at x x x, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
by means of force, intimidation and with abuse of superior strength forcibly laid complainant AAA,[3] a 9-year-old minor in a cemented
pavement, and did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously inserted his finger into the vagina of the said AAA, against her will
and consent.

Contrary to Article 266-A, par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to R.A. 7610.

In Criminal Case No. SCC-6211, Tulagan was charged as follows:

That on or about October 8, 2011 at x x x, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, by means of
force, intimidation and with abuse of superior strength, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse
with complainant AAA, a 9-year-old minor against her will and consent to the damage and prejudice of said AAA, against her will and
consent.

Contrary to Article 266-A, par. 1(d) of the Revised Penal Code in relation to R.A. 7610.

Upon arraignment, Tulagan pleaded not guilty to the crimes charged.

During the trial, BBB, aunt of the victim AAA, testified that around 10:30 a.m. of October 17, 2011, she noticed a man looking at AAA
outside their house. When AAA asked her permission to go to the bathroom located outside their house, the man suddenly went near
AAA. Out of suspicion, BBB walked to approach AAA. As BBB came close to AAA, the man left suddenly. After AAA returned from the
bathroom, BBB asked what the man was doing to her. AAA did not reply. She then told AAA to get inside the house. She asked AAA to
move her panties down, and examined her genitalia. She noticed that her genitalia was swollen. AAA then confessed to her about the
wrong done to her by appellant whom AAA referred to as Badong or Salvador Tulagan. AAA cried hard and embraced BBB tightly. AAA
asked BBB for her help and even told her that she wanted Badong to be put in jail.

AAA, nine (9) years old, testified that sometime in September 2011 while she was peeling corn with her cousin who lived adjacent to
her grandmother's house, Tulagan approached her, spread her legs, and inserted his finger into her private part. She said that it was
painful, but Tulagan just pretended as if he was just looking for something and went home.

AAA, likewise, testified that at around 11:00 a.m. of October 8, 2011, while she was playing with her cousin in front of Tulagan's house,
he brought her to his house and told her to keep quiet. He told her to lie down on the floor, and removed her short pants and panties.
He also undressed himself, kissed AAA's cheeks, and inserted his penis into her vagina. She claimed that it was painful and that she
cried because Tulagan held her hands and pinned them with his. She did not tell anyone about the incident, until her aunt examined her
private part.

Upon genital examination by Dr. Brenda Tumacder on AAA, she found a healed laceration at 6 o'clock position in AAA's hymen, and a
dilated or enlarged vaginal opening. She said that it is not normal for a 9-year-old child to have a dilated vaginal opening and laceration
in the hymen.

For the defense, Tulagan claimed that he did not know AAA well, but admitted that he lived barely five (5) meters away from AAA's
grandmother's house where she lived. He added that the whole month of September 2011, from 8:00 a.m. to 1:00 p.m., he was
gathering dried banana leaves to sell then take a rest after 1:00 p.m. at their terrace, while his mother cut the banana leaves he
gathered at the back of their kitchen. He said that he never went to AAA's house and that he had not seen AAA during the entire month
of September 2011. Tulagan, likewise, claimed that before the alleged incidents occurred, his mother had a misunderstanding with
AAA's grandmother, who later on started spreading rumors that he raped her granddaughter.
After trial, the RTC found that the prosecution successfully discharged the burden of proof in two offenses of rape against AAA. It held
that all the elements of sexual assault and statutory rape was duly established. The trial court relied on the credible and positive
declaration of the victim as against the alibi and denial of Tulagan. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds the accused GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt [of] the crime of rape defined and
penalized under Article 266-A, paragraph 1 (d), in relation to R.A. 7610 in Criminal Case No. SCC-6211 and is hereby sentenced to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the victim in the amount of fifty thousand (Php50,000.00) pesos; moral
damages in the amount of fifty thousand (Php 50,000.00) pesos, and to pay the cost of the suit. Likewise, this Court finds the accused
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt in Criminal Case No. SCC-6210 for the crime of rape defined and penalized under Article 266-A,
paragraph 2 and he is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of six (6) years of prision correccional, as minimum, to
twelve (12) years of prision mayor, as maximum, and to indemnify the victim in the amount of thirty thousand (Php30,000.00) pesos;
and moral damages in the amount of twenty thousand (Php20,000.00) pesos, and to pay the cost of suit.
SO ORDERED.[4]
Upon appeal, the CA affirmed with modification Tulagan's conviction of sexual assault and statutory rape. The dispositive portion of the
Decision reads:

ACCORDINGLY, the Decision dated February 10, 2014 is AFFIRMED, subject to the following MODIFICATIONS:
1. In Criminal Case No. SCC-6210 (Rape by Sexual Assault), appellant is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of 12 years
of reclusion temporal, as minimum, to 15 years of reclusion temporal, as maximum. The award of moral damages is increased to
P30,000.00; and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages, are likewise granted.
2. In Criminal Case No. SCC-6211 (Statutory Rape), the awards of civil indemnity and moral damages are increased to P100,000.00
each. Exemplary damages in the amount of P100,000.00, too, are granted.

3. All damages awarded are subject to legal interest at the rate of 6% [per annum] from the date of finality of this judgment until fully
paid.
SO ORDERED.[5]
Aggrieved, Tulagan invoked the same arguments he raised before the CA in assailing his conviction. He alleged that the appellate court
erred in giving weight and credence to the inconsistent testimony of AAA, and in sustaining his conviction despite the prosecution's
failure to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. To support his appeal, he argued that the testimony of AAA was fraught with
inconsistencies and lapses which affected her credibility.

Our Ruling
The instant appeal has no merit. However, a modification of the nomenclature of the crime, the penalty imposed, and the damages
awarded in Criminal Case No. SCC-6210 for sexual assault, and a reduction of the damages awarded in Criminal Case No. SCC-6211
for statutory rape, are in order.

Factual findings of the trial court carry great weight and respect due to the unique opportunity afforded them to observe the witnesses
when placed on the stand. Consequently, appellate courts will not overturn the factual findings of the trial court in the absence of facts
or circumstances of weight and substance that would affect the result of the case.[6] Said rule finds an even more stringent application
where the said findings are sustained by the CA, as in the instant case:

Time and again, we have held that when it comes to the issue of credibility of the victim or the prosecution witnesses, the findings of the
trial courts carry great weight and respect and, generally, the appellate courts will not overturn the said findings unless the trial court
overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight and substance which will alter the assailed decision or
affect the result of the case. This is so because trial courts are in the best position to ascertain and measure the sincerity and
spontaneity of witnesses through their actual observation of the witnesses' manner of testifying, their demeanor and behavior in court.
Trial judges enjoy the advantage of observing the witness' deportment and manner of testifying, her "furtive glance, blush of conscious
shame, hesitation, flippant or sneering tone, calmness, sigh, or the scant or full realization of an oath" - all of which are useful aids for
an accurate determination of a witness' honesty and sincerity. Trial judges, therefore, can better determine if such witnesses are telling
the truth, being in the ideal position to weigh conflicting testimonies. Again, unless certain facts of substance and value were overlooked
which, if considered, might affect the result of the case, its assessment must be respected, for it had the opportunity to observe the
conduct and demeanor of the witnesses while testifying and detect if they were lying. The rule finds an even more stringent application
where the said findings are sustained by the Court of Appeals.[7]

Here, in Criminal Case No. SCC-6210 for sexual assault, both the RTC and the CA found AAA's testimony to be credible,
straightforward and unwavering when she testified that Tulagan forcibly inserted his finger in her vagina. In Criminal Case No. SCC-
6211 for statutory rape, both the RTC and the CA also found that the elements thereof were present, to wit: (1) accused had carnal
knowledge of the victim, and (2) said act was accomplished when the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age. Indubitably, the
courts  a quo found that the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt Tulagan's guilt for the crime of rape. We find no
reason to deviate from said findings and conclusions of the courts a quo.

Jurisprudence tells us that a witness' testimony containing inconsistencies or discrepancies does not, by such fact alone, diminish the
credibility of such testimony. In fact, the variance in minor details has the net effect of bolstering instead of diminishing the witness'
credibility because they discount the possibility of a rehearsed testimony. Instead, what remains paramount is the witness' consistency
in relating the principal elements of the crime and the positive and categorical identification of the accused as the perpetrator of the
same.[8]
As correctly held by the CA, the fact that some of the details testified to by AAA did not appear in her Sinumpaang Salaysay does not
mean that the sexual assault did not happen. AAA was still able to narrate all the details of the sexual assault she suffered in Tulagan's
hands. AAA's account of her ordeal being straightforward and candid and corroborated by the medical findings of the examining
physician, as well as her positive identification of Tulagan as the perpetrator of the crime, are, thus, sufficient to support a conviction of
rape.

As for Tulagan's imputation of ill motive on the part of AAA's grandmother, absent any concrete supporting evidence, said allegation will
not convince us that the trial court's assessment of the credibility of the victim and her supporting witness was tainted with arbitrariness
or blindness to a fact of consequence. We reiterate the principle that no young girl, such as AAA, would concoct a sordid tale, on her
own or through the influence of her grandmother as per Tulagan's intimation, undergo an invasive medical examination then subject
herself to the stigma and embarrassment of a public trial, if her motive was other than a fervent desire to seek justice. In People v.
Garcia,[9] we held:

Testimonies of child-victims are normally given full weight and credit, since when a girl, particularly if she is a minor, says that she has
been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape has in fact been committed. When the offended party is of tender
age and immature, courts are inclined to give credit to her account of what transpired, considering not only her relative vulnerability but
also the shame to which she would be exposed if the matter to which she testified is not true. Youth and immaturity are generally
badges of truth and sincerity. A young girl's revelation that she had been raped, coupled with her voluntary submission to medical
examination and willingness to undergo public trial where she could be compelled to give out the details of an assault on her dignity,
cannot be so easily dismissed as mere concoction.[10]

We also reject Tulagan's defense of denial. Being a negative defense, the defense of denial, if not substantiated by clear and
convincing evidence, as in the instant case, deserves no weight in law and cannot be given greater evidentiary value than the testimony
of credible witnesses, like AAA, who testified on affirmative matters. Since AAA testified in a categorical and consistent manner without
any ill motive, her positive identification of Tulagan as the sexual offender must prevail over his defenses of denial and alibi.

Here, the courts a quo did not give credence to Tulagan's alibi considering that his house was only 50 meters away from AAA's house,
thus, he failed to establish that it was physically impossible for him to be at the locus criminis when the rape incidents took place.
"Physical impossibility" refers to distance and the facility of access between the crime scene and the location of the accused when the
crime was committed. There must be a demonstration that they were so far away and could not have been physically present at the
crime scene and its immediate vicinity when the crime was committed. In this regard, Tulagan failed to prove that there was physical
impossibility for him to be at the crime scene when the rape was committed.[11] Thus, his alibi must fail.

Further, although the rape incidents in the instant case were not immediately reported to the police, such delay does not affect the
truthfulness of the charge in the absence of other circumstances that show the same to be mere concoction or impelled by some ill
motive.[12]

For the guidance of the Bench and the Bar, We take this opportunity to reconcile the provisions on Acts of Lasciviousness, Rape and
Sexual Assault under the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8353 vis-a-vis Sexual Intercourse and
Lascivious Conduct under Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610, to fortify the earlier decisions of the Court and doctrines laid down on similar
issues, and to clarify the nomenclature and the imposable penalties of said crimes, and damages in line with existing jurisprudence.[13]

Prior to the effectivity of R.A. No. 8353 or The Anti-Rape Law of 1997 on October 22, 1997, acts constituting sexual assault under
paragraph 2,[14] Article 266-A of the RPC, were punished as acts of lasciviousness under Article No. 336[15] of the RPC or Act No. 3815
which took effect on December 8, 1930. For an accused to be convicted of acts of lasciviousness, the confluence of the following
essential elements must be proven: (1) that the offender commits any act of lasciviousness or lewdness; and (2) that it is done under
any of the following circumstances: (a) by using force or intimidation; (b) when the offended woman is deprived of reason or otherwise
unconscious; or (c) when the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age.[16] In Amployo v. People,[17] We expounded on the broad
definition of the term "lewd":

The term lewd is commonly defined as something indecent or obscene; it is characterized by or intended to excite crude sexual desire.
That an accused is entertaining a lewd or unchaste design is necessarily a mental process the existence of which can be inferred by
overt acts carrying out such intention, i.e., by conduct that can only be interpreted as lewd or lascivious. The presence or absence of
lewd designs is inferred from the nature of the acts themselves and the environmental circumstances. What is or what is not lewd
conduct, by its very nature, cannot be pigeonholed into a precise definition. As early as US. v. Gomez, we had already lamented
that

It would be somewhat difficult to lay down any rule specifically establishing just what conduct makes one amenable to the provisions of
article 439 of the Penal Code. What constitutes lewd or lascivious conduct must be determined from the circumstances of each case. It
may be quite easy to determine in a particular case that certain acts are lewd and lascivious, and it may be extremely difficult in another
case to say just where the line of demarcation lies between such conduct and the amorous advances of an ardent lover.[18]

When R.A. No. 7610 or The Special Protection of Children Against Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act took effect on June 17,
1992 and its Implementing Rules and Regulation was promulgated in October 1993, the term "lascivious conduct" was given a specific
definition. The Rules and Regulations on the Reporting and Investigation of Child Abuse Cases states that "lascivious conduct means
the intentional touching, either directly or through clothing, of the genitalia, anus, groin, breast, inner thigh, or buttocks, or the
introduction of any object into the genitalia, anus or mouth, of any person, whether of the same or opposite sex, with an intent to abuse,
humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person, bestiality, masturbation, lascivious exhibition of the
genitals or pubic area of a person."

Upon the effectivity of R.A. No. 8353, specific forms of acts of lasciviousness were no longer punished under Article 336 of the RPC,
but were transferred as a separate crime of "sexual assault" under paragraph 2, Article 266-A of the RPC. Committed by "inserting
penis into another person's mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or object, into the genital or anal orifice of another person" against
the victim's will, "sexual assault" has also been called "gender-free rape" or "object rape." However, the term "rape by sexual assault" is
a misnomer, as it goes against the traditional concept of rape, which is carnal knowledge of a woman without her consent or against her
will. In contrast to sexual assault which is a broader term that includes acts that gratify sexual desire (such as cunnilingus, felatio,
sodomy or even rape), the classic rape is particular and its commission involves only the reproductive organs of a woman and a man.
Compared to sexual assault, rape is severely penalized because it may lead to unwanted procreation; or to paraphrase the words of
the legislators, it will put an outsider into the woman who would bear a child, or to the family, if she is married.[19] The dichotomy
between rape and sexual assault can be gathered from the deliberation of the House of Representatives on the Bill entitled "An Act To
Amend Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Sexual Assault":

INTERPELLATION OF MR. [ERASMO B.] DAMASING:

xxxx

Pointing out his other concerns on the measure, specifically regarding the proposed amendment to the Revised Penal Code making
rape gender-free, Mr. Damasing asked how carnal knowledge could be committed in case the sexual act involved persons of the same
sex or involves unconventional sexual acts.

Mr. [Sergio A. F.] Apostol replied that the Bill is divided into two classifications: rape and sexual assault. The Committee, he explained,
defines rape as carnal knowledge by a person with the opposite sex, while sexual assault is defined as gender-free, meaning it is
immaterial whether the person committing the sexual act is a man or a woman or of the same sex as the victim.

Subsequently, Mr. Damasing adverted to Section 1 which seeks to amend Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by RA
No. 7659, which is amended in the Bill as follows: "Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a person of the opposite sex
under the following circumstances." He then inquired whether it is the Committee's intent to make rape gender-free, either by a man
against a woman, by a woman against a man, by man against a man, or by a woman against a woman. He then pointed out that the
Committee's proposed amendment is vague as presented in the Bill, unlike the Senate version which specifically defines in what
instances the crime of rape can be committed by a man or by the opposite sex.

Mr. Apostol replied that under the Bill "carnal knowledge" presupposes that the offender is of the opposite sex as the victim. If they are
of the same sex, as what Mr. Damasing has specifically illustrated, such act cannot be considered rape - it is sexual assault.

Mr. Damasing, at this point, explained that the Committee's definition of carnal knowledge should be specific since the phrase "be a
person of the opposite sex" connotes that carnal knowledge can be committed by a person, who can be either a man or a woman and
hence not necessarily of the opposite sex but may be of the same sex.

Mr. Apostol pointed out that the measure explicitly used the phrase “carnal knowledge of a person of the opposite sex" to define that
the abuser and the victim are of the opposite sex; a man cannot commit rape against another man or a woman against another woman.
He pointed out that the Senate version uses the phrase carnal knowledge with a woman".

While he acknowledged Mr. Apostol's points, Mr. Damasing reiterated that the specific provisions need to be clarified further to avoid
confusion, since, earlier in the interpellation Mr. Apostol admitted that being gender-free, rape can be committed under four situations
or by persons of the same sex. Whereupon, Mr. Damasing read the specific provisions of the Senate version of the measure.

In his rejoinder, Mr. Apostol reiterated his previous contention that the Bill has provided for specific and distinct definitions regarding
rape and sexual assault to differentiate that rape cannot be totally gender-free as it must be committed by a person against someone of
the opposite sex.

With regard to Mr. Damasing's query on criminal sexual acts involving persons of the same sex, Mr. Apostol replied that Section 2,
Article 266(b) of the measure on sexual assault applies to this particular provision.

Mr. Damasing, at this point, inquired on the particular page where Section 2 is located.

SUSPENSION OF SESSION

xxxx
INTERPELLATION OF MR. DAMASING
(Continuation)

Upon resumption of session, Mr. Apostol further expounded on Sections 1 and 2 of the bill and differentiated rape from sexual assault.
Mr. Apostol pointed out that the main difference between the aforementioned sections is that carnal knowledge or rape, under Section
1, is always with the opposite sex. Under Section 2, on sexual assault, he explained that such assault may be on the genitalia, the
mouth, or the anus; it can be done by a man against a woman, a man against a man, a woman against a woman or a woman against a
man.[20]

Concededly, R.A. No. 8353 defined specific acts constituting acts of lasciviousness as a. distinct crime of "sexual assault," and
increased the penalty thereof from prision correccional to prision mayor. But it was never the intention of the legislature to redefine the
traditional concept of rape. The Congress merely upgraded the same from a "crime against chastity" (a private crime) to a "crime
against persons" (a public crime) as a matter of policy and public interest in order to allow prosecution of such cases even without the
complaint of the offended party, and to prevent extinguishment of criminal liability in such cases through express pardon by the
offended party. Thus, other forms of acts of lasciviousness or lascivious conduct committed against a child, such as touching of other
delicate parts other than the private organ or kissing a young girl with malice, are still punished as acts of lasciviousness under Article
336 of the RPC in relation to R.A. No. 7610 or lascivious conduct under Section 5 of R.A. No. 7610.

Records of committee and plenary deliberations of the House of Representative and of the deliberations of the Senate, as well as the
records of bicameral conference committee meetings, further reveal no legislative intent for R.A. No. 8353 to supersede Section 5(b) of
R.A. No. 7610. The only contentious provisions during the bicameral conference committee meetings to reconcile the bills of the Senate
and House of Representatives which led to the enactment of R.A. No. 8353, deal with the nature of and distinction between rape by
carnal knowledge and rape by sexual assault; the threshold age to be considered in statutory rape [whether Twelve (12) or Fourteen
(14)], the provisions on marital rape and effect of pardon, and the presumptions of vitiation or lack of consent in rape cases. While R.A.
No. 8353 contains a generic repealing and amendatory clause, the records of the deliberation of the legislature are silent with respect
to sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct against children under R.A. No. 7610, particularly those who are 12 years old or below 18,
or above 18 but are unable to fully take care or protect themselves from abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation or discrimination because
of a physical or mental disability or condition.

In instances where the lascivious conduct committed against a child victim is covered by the definition under R.A. No. 7610, and the act
is likewise covered by sexual assault under paragraph 2,[21] Article 266-A of the RPC, the offender should be held liable for violation of
Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610. The ruling in Dimakuta v. People[22] is instructive:

Article 226-A, paragraph 2 of the RPC, punishes inserting of the penis into another person's mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or
object, into the genital or anal orifice of another person if the victim did not consent either it was done through force, threat or
intimidation; or when the victim is deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious; or by means of fraudulent machination or grave
abuse of authority as sexual assault as a form of rape. However, in instances where the lascivious conduct is covered by the definition
under R.A. No 7610, where the penalty is reclusion temporal medium, and the act is likewise covered by sexual assault under Article
266-A, paragraph 2 of the RPC, which is punishable by prision mayor , the offender should be liable for violation of Section 5(b), Article
III of R.A. No. 7610, where the law provides for the higher penalty of reclusion temporal medium, if the offended party is a child victim.
But if the victim is at least eighteen (18) years of age, the offender should be liable under Art. 266-A, par. 2 of the RPC and not R.A. No.
7610, unless the victim is at least eighteen (18) years and she is unable to fully take care of herself or protect herself from abuse,
neglect, cruelty, exploitation or discrimination because of a physical or mental disability or condition, in which case, the offender may
still be held liable for sexual abuse under R.A. No. 7610.[23]

There could be no other conclusion, a child is presumed by law to be incapable of giving rational consent to any lascivious act, taking
into account the constitutionally enshrined State policy to promote the physical, moral, spiritual, intellectual and social well-being of the
youth, as well as, in harmony with the foremost consideration of the child's best interests in all actions concerning him or her. This is
equally consistent with the declared policy of the State to provide special protection to children from all forms of abuse, neglect, cruelty,
exploitation and discrimination, and other conditions prejudicial to their development; provide sanctions for their commission and carry
out a program for prevention and deterrence of and crisis intervention in situations of child abuse, exploitation, and discrimination.
Besides, if it was the intention of the framers of the law to make child offenders liable only of Article 266-A of the RPC, which provides
for a lower penalty than R.A. No. 7610, the law could have expressly made such statements.[24]

Meanwhile, if acts of lasciviousness or lascivious conduct are committed with a child who is 12 years old or less than 18 years old, the
ruling in Dimakuta[25] is also on point:

Under Section 5, Article III of R.A. No. 7610, a child is deemed subjected to other sexual abuse when he or she indulges in lascivious
conduct under the coercion or influence of any adult. This statutory provision must be distinguished from Acts of Lasciviousness under
Articles 336 and 339 of the RPC. As defined in Article 336 of the RPC, Acts of Lasciviousness has the following elements:

(1) That the offender commits any act of lasciviousness or lewdness;

(2) That it is done under any of the following circumstances:

a. By using force or intimidation; or
b. When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; or
c. When the offended party is under 12 years of age; and
(3) That the offended party is another person of either sex.

Article 339 of the RPC likewise punishes acts of lasciviousness committed with the  consent  of the offended party if done by the same
persons and under the same circumstances mentioned in Articles 337 and 338 of the RPC, to wit:
1. if committed against a virgin over twelve years and under eighteen years of age by any person in public authority, priest, home-
servant, domestic, guardian, teacher, or any person who, in any capacity, shall be entrusted with the education or custody of the
woman; or
2. if committed by means of deceit against a woman who is single or a widow of good reputation, over twelve but under eighteen
years of age.
Therefore, if the victim of the lascivious acts or conduct is over 12 years of age and under eighteen (18) years of age, the accused shall
be liable for:

1. Other acts of lasciviousness under Art. 339 of the RPC, where the victim is a virgin and consents to the lascivious acts through
abuse of confidence or when the victim is single or a widow of good reputation and consents to the lascivious acts through deceit, or;
2. Acts of lasciviousness under Art. 336 if the act of lasciviousness is not covered by lascivious conduct as defined in R.A. No. 7610. In
case the acts of lasciviousness [are] covered by lascivious conduct under R.A. No. 7610 and it is done through coercion or influence,
which establishes absence or lack of consent, then Art. 336 of the RPC is no longer applicable
3. Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610, where there was no consent on the part of the victim to the lascivious conduct, which was
done through the employment of coercion or influence. The offender may likewise be liable for sexual abuse under R.A. No. 7610 if the
victim is at least eighteen (18) years and she is unable to fully take care of herself or protect herself from abuse, neglect, cruelty,
exploitation or discrimination because of a physical or mental disability or condition.[26]
In People v. Caoili,[27] We prescribed the following guidelines in designating or charging the proper offense in case lascivious conduct is
committed under Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610, and in determining the imposable penalty:
1. The age of the victim is taken into consideration in designating or charging the offense, and in determining the imposable penalty.

2. If the victim is under twelve (12) years of age, the nomenclature of the crime should be "Acts of Lasciviousness under
Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610." Pursuant to the second proviso in Section
5(b) of R.A. No. 7610, the imposable penalty is reclusion temporal in its medium period.
3. If the victim is exactly twelve (12) years of age, or more than twelve (12) but below eighteen (18) years of age, or is eighteen (18)
years old or older but is unable to fully take care of herself/himself or protect herself/himself from abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation or
discrimination because of a physical or mental disability or condition, the crime should be designated as "Lascivious Conduct under
Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610," and the imposable penalty is reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua.[28]
Based on the Caoili[29] guidelines, it is only when the victim of the lascivious conduct is 18 years old and above that such crime would be
designated as "Acts of Lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC" with the imposable penalty of prision correccional.
Considering the development of the crime of sexual assault from a mere "crime against chastity" in the form of acts of lasciviousness to
a "crime against persons" akin to rape, as well as the rulings in Dimakuta and Caoili. We hold that if the acts constituting sexual assault
are committed against a victim under 12 years of age or is demented, the nomenclature of the offense should now be "Sexual Assault
under paragraph 2, Article 266-A of the RPC in relation to Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610" and no longer "Acts of Lasciviousness under
Article 336 of the RPC in relation to Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610," because sexual assault as a form of acts of lasciviousness is no
longer covered by Article 336 but by Article 266-A(2) of the RPC, as amended by R.A. No. 8353. Nevertheless, the imposable penalty is
still reclusion temporal in its medium period, and not prision mayor.

Whereas if the victim is 12 years old and under 18 years old, or 18 years old and above under special circumstances, the nomenclature
of the crime should be "Lascivious Conduct under Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610" with the imposable penalty of reclusion temporal in its
medium period to reclusion perpetua,[30] but it should not make any reference to the provisions of the RPC. It is only when the victim of
the sexual assault is 18 years old and above, and not demented, that the crime should be called as "Sexual Assault under paragraph 2,
Article 266-A of the RPC" with the imposable penalty of prision mayor.

Sexual intercourse with a victim who is under 12 years old or is demented is statutory rape

Under Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610, the proper penalty when sexual intercourse is committed with a victim who is under 12 years of
age or is demented is reclusion perpetua, pursuant to paragraph 1(d),[31]Article 266-A in relation to Article 266-B of the RPC, as
amended by R.A. No. 8353,[32] which in turn amended Article 335[33] of the RPC. Thus:

Section 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. - Children, whether male or female, who for money, profit, or any other
consideration or due to the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group, indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct,
are deemed to be children exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse.

The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon the following:
xxxx

(b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a child exploited in prostitution or subject to other sexual
abuse; Provided, That when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age, the perpetrators shall be prosecuted under Article 335,
paragraph 3, for rape [sic] and Article 336 of Act No. 3815, as amended, the Revised Penal Code, for rape or lascivious conduct, as the
case may be: Provided, That the penalty for lascivious conduct when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age shall be reclusion
temporal in its medium period; x x x.[34]

In Quimvel v. People,[35] it was opined[36] that the two provisos under Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610 will apply only if the victim is under
12 years of age, but not to those 12 years old and below 18, for the following reason:

"while the first clause of Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. 7610 is silent with respect to the age of the victim, Section 3, Article I thereof
defines "children" as those below eighteen (18) years of age or those over but are unable to fully take care of themselves or protect
themselves from abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation or discrimination because of a physical or mental disability. Notably,
two provisos succeeding the first clause of Section 5(b) explicitly state a qualification that when the victim of lascivious conduct is under
12 years of age, the perpetrator shall be (1) prosecuted under Article 336 of the RPC, and (2) the penalty shall be reclusion temporal in
its medium period. It is a basic rule in statutory construction that the office of the proviso qualifies or modifies only the phrase
immediately preceding it or restrains of limits the generality of the clause that it immediately follows. A proviso is to be
construed with reference to the immediately preceding part of the provisions, to which it is attached, and not to the statute
itself or the other sections thereof.[37] Accordingly, this case falls under the qualifying provisos of Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. 7610
because the allegations in the information make out a case for acts of lasciviousness, as defined under Article 336 of the RPC, and the
victim is under 12 years of age x x x."[38]

In view of the foregoing rule in statutory construction, it was proposed[39] in  Quimvel that the penalty for acts of lasciviousness
committed against a child should depend on his/her age: if the victim is under 12 years of age, the penalty is reclusion temporal in its
medium period, and if the victim is 12 years old and below 18, or 18 or older under special circumstances under Section 3(a)[40] of R.A.
No. 7610, the penalty is reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua.

Applying by analogy the foregoing discussion in Quimvel to the act of sexual intercourse with a child exploited in prostitution or subject
to other sexual abuse, We rule that when the offended party is under 12 years of age or is demented, only the first proviso of Section
5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610 will apply, to wit: "when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age, the perpetrators shall be
prosecuted under Article 335, paragraph 3, for rape x x x." The penalty for statutory rape under Article 335 is reclusion perpetua, which
is. still the same as in the current rape law, i.e., paragraph 1(d), Article 266-A in relation to Article 266-B of the RPC, as amended by
R.A. No. 8353, except in cases where the victim is below 7 years of age where the imposable penalty is death.[41]

Note that the second proviso of Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610 will not apply because it clearly has nothing to do with sexual intercourse,
and it only deals with "lascivious conduct when the victim is under 12 years of age." While the terms "lascivious conduct" and "sexual
intercourse" are included in the definition of "sexual abuse" under Section 2(g)[42] of the Rules and Regulations on the Reporting and
Investigation of Child Abuse Cases, note that the definition of "lascivious conduct"[43] does not include sexual intercourse. Be it stressed
that the purpose of indicating the phrase "under twelve (12) years of age" is to provide for statutory lascivious conduct or statutory rape,
whereby evidence of force, threat or intimidation is immaterial because the offended party, who is under 12 years old or is demented, is
presumed incapable of giving rational consent.

Malto ruling clarified

An important distinction between violation of Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610 and rape under the RPC was explained in Malto v.
People[44] We ruled in Malto[45] that one may be held liable for violation of Sec. 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610 despite a finding that the
person did not commit rape, because rape is a felony under the RPC, while sexual abuse against a child is punished by a special law.
Said crimes are separate and distinct, and they have different elements. Unlike in rape, however, consent is immaterial in cases
involving violation of Sec. 5, Art. III of R.A. No. 7610. The mere fact of having sexual intercourse or committing lascivious conduct with a
child who is exploited in prostitution or subjected to sexual abuse constitutes the offense.

In Malto,[46] where the accused professor indulged several times in sexual intercourse with the 17-year-old private complainant, We also
stressed that since a child cannot give consent to a contract under our civil laws because she can easily be a victim of fraud as she is
not capable of full understanding or knowing the nature or import of her actions, the harm which results from a child's bad decision in a
sexual encounter may be infinitely more damaging to her than a bad business deal. Thus, the law should protect her from the harmful
consequences of her attempts at adult sexual behavior. For this reason, a child should not be deemed to have validly consented to
adult sexual activity and to surrender herself in the act of ultimate physical intimacy under a law which seeks to afford her special
protection against abuse, exploitation and discrimination. In sum, a child is presumed by law to be incapable of giving rational consent
to any lascivious conduct or sexual intercourse.

We take exception, however, to the sweeping conclusions in Malto (1) that "a child is presumed by law to be incapable of giving rational
consent to any lascivious conduct or sexual intercourse" and (2) that "consent of the child is immaterial in criminal cases involving
violation of Section 5, Article III of RA 7610" because they would virtually eradicate the concepts of statutory rape and statutory acts of
lasciviousness, and trample upon the express provision of the said law.

Recall that in statutory rape, the only subject of inquiry is whether the woman is below 12 years old or is demented and whether carnal
knowledge took place; whereas force, intimidation and physical evidence of injury are not relevant considerations. With respect to acts
of lasciviousness, R.A. No. 8353 modified Article 336 of the RPC by retaining the circumstance that the offended party is under 12
years old in order for acts of lasciviousness to be considered as statutory and by adding the circumstance that the offended party is
demented, thereby rendering the evidence of force or intimidation immaterial.[47] This is because the law presumes that the victim who is
under 12 years old or is demented does not and cannot have a will of her own on account of her tender years or dementia; thus, a
child's or a demented person's consent is immaterial because of her presumed incapacity to discern good from evil.[48]
However, considering the definition under Section 3(a) of R.A. No. 7610 of the term "children" which refers to persons below eighteen
(18) years of age or those over but are unable to fully take care of themselves or protect themselves from abuse, neglect, cruelty,
exploitation or discrimination because of a physical or mental disability or condition, We find that the opinion in Malto, that a child is
presumed by law to be incapable of giving rational consent, unduly extends the concept of statutory rape or acts of lasciviousness to
those victims who are within the range of 12 to 17 years old, and even those 18 years old and above under special circumstances who
are still considered as "children" under Section 3(a) of R.A. No. 7610. While Malto is correct that consent is immaterial in cases under
R.A. No. 7610 where the offended party is below 12 years of age, We clarify that consent of the child is material and may even be a
defense in criminal cases involving violation of Section 5, Article III of R.A. No. 7610 when the offended party is 12 years old or below
18, or above 18 under special circumstances. Such consent may be implied from the failure to prove that the said victim engaged in
sexual intercourse either "due to money, profit or any other consideration or due to the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or
group."

It bears emphasis that violation of the first clause of Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610 on sexual intercourse with a child exploited
in prostitution or subject to other sexual abuse, is separate and distinct from statutory rape under paragraph 1(d), Article 266-A of the
RPC. Aside from being dissimilar in the sense that the former is an offense under special law, while the latter is a felony under the RPC,
they also have different elements.[49] Nevertheless, sexual intercourse with a victim who is under 12 years of age or is demented is
always statutory rape, as Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610 expressly states that the perpetrator will be prosecuted under Article 335,
paragraph 3 of the RPC [now paragraph 1(d), Article 266-A of the RPC as amended by R.A. No. 8353].

Even if the girl who is below twelve (12) years old or is demented consents to the sexual intercourse, it is always a crime of statutory
rape under the RPC, and the offender should no longer be held liable under R.A. No. 7610. For example, a nine (9)-year-old girl was
sold by a pimp to a customer, the crime committed by the latter if he commits sexual intercourse with the girl is still statutory rape,
because even if the girl consented or is demented, the law presumes that she is incapable of giving a rational consent. The same
reason holds true with respect to acts of lasciviousness or lascivious conduct when the offended party is less than 12 years old or is
demented. Even if such party consents to the lascivious conduct, the crime is always statutory acts of lasciviousness. The offender will
be prosecuted under Article 336[50] of the RPC, but the penalty is provided for under Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610. Therefore, there is
no conflict between rape and acts of lasciviousness under the RPC, and sexual intercourse and lascivious conduct under R.A. No.
7610.

Meanwhile, if sexual intercourse is committed with a child under 12 years of age, who is deemed to be "exploited in prostitution and
other sexual abuse," then those who engage in or promote, facilitate or induce child prostitution under Section 5(a)[51] of R.A. No. 7610
shall be liable as principal by force or inducement under Article 17[52] of the RPC in the crime of statutory rape under Article 266-A(1) of
the RPC; whereas those who derive profit or advantage therefrom under Section 5(c)[53] of R.A. No. 7610 shall be liable as principal by
indispensable cooperation under Article 17 of the RPC. Bearing in mind the policy of R.A. No. 7610 of providing for stronger deterrence
and special protection against child abuse and exploitation, the following shall be the nomenclature of the said statutory crimes and the
imposable penalties for principals by force or inducement or by indispensable cooperation:
1. Acts of Lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC, in relation to Section 5(a) or (c), as the case may be, of R.A. No.
7610, with the imposable penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua;

2. Rape under Article 266-A(1) of the RPC, in relation to Article 17 of the RPC and Section 5(a) or (c), as the case may be, of
R.A. No. 7610 with the imposable penalty of reclusion perpetua, pursuant to Article 266-B of the RPC, except when the
victim is below 7 years old, in which case the crime is considered as Qualified Rape, for which the death penalty shall be
imposed; and

3. Sexual Assault under Article 266-A(2) of the RPC, in relation to Section 5(a) or (c), as the case may be, of R.A. No. 7610
with the imposable penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua.

If the victim who is 12 years old or less than 18 and is deemed to be a child "exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse" because
she agreed to indulge in sexual intercourse "for money, profit or any other consideration or due to coercion or influence of any adult,
syndicate or group," then the crime could not be rape under the RPC, because this no longer falls under the concept of statutory rape,
and there was consent. That is why the offender will now be penalized under Section 5(b), R.A. No. 7610, and not under Article
335[54] of the RPC [now Article 266-A]. But if the said victim does not give her consent to sexual intercourse in the sense that the sexual
intercourse was committed through force, threat or intimidation, the crime is rape under paragraph 1, Article 266-A of the RPC.
However, if the same victim gave her consent to the sexual intercourse, and no money, profit, consideration, coercion or influence is
involved, then there is no crime committed, except in those cases where "force, threat or intimidation" as an element of rape is
substituted by "moral ascendancy or moral authority,"[55] like in the cases of incestuous rape, and unless it is punished under the RPC
as qualified seduction under Article 337[56] or simple seduction under Article 338.[57]

Rulings in Tubillo, Abay and Pangilinan clarified

At this point, it is not amiss to state that the rulings in People v. Tubillo,[58] People v. Abay[59] and People v. Pangilinan[60] should be
clarified, because there is no need to examine whether the focus of the prosecution's evidence is "coercion and influence" or "force and
intimidation" for the purpose of determining which between R.A. No. 7610 or the RPC should the accused be prosecuted under in
cases of acts of lasciviousness or rape where the offended party is 12 years of age or below 18.

To recap, We explained in Abay[61] that under Section 5 (b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610 in relation to R.A. No. 8353, if the victim of
sexual abuse is below 12 years of age, the offender should not be prosecuted for sexual abuse but for statutory rape under paragraph
1(d), Article 266-A of the RPC, and penalized with reclusion perpetua. On the other hand, if the victim is 12 years or older, the offender
should be charged with either sexual abuse under Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610 or rape under Article 266-A (except paragraph 1 [d]) of
the RPC. However, the offender cannot be accused of both crimes for the same act because his right against double jeopardy might be
prejudiced. Besides, rape cannot be complexed with a violation of Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610, because under Section 48 of the RPC
(on complex crimes), a felony under the RPC (such as rape) cannot be complexed with an offense penalized by a special law.

Considering that the victim in Abay was more than 12 years old when the crime was committed against her, and the Information against
appellant stated that the child was 13 years old at the time of the incident, We held that appellant may be prosecuted either for violation
of Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610 or rape under Article 266-A (except paragraph 1[d]) of the RPC. We observed that while the
Information may have alleged the elements of both crimes, the prosecution's evidence only established that appellant sexually violated
the person of the child through force and intimidation by threatening her with a bladed instrument and forcing her to submit to his bestial
designs. Hence, appellant was found guilty of rape under paragraph 1(a), Article 266-A of the RPC.

In Pangilinan, where We were faced with the same dilemma because all the elements of paragraph 1, Article 266-A of the RPC and
Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610 were present, it was ruled that the accused can be charged with either rape or child abuse and be
convicted therefor. However, We observed that rape was established, since the prosecution's evidence proved that the accused had
carnal knowledge of the victim through force and intimidation by threatening her with a samurai. Citing the discussion in Abay, We ruled
as follows:

As in the present case, appellant can indeed be charged with either Rape or Child Abuse and be convicted therefor. The prosecution's
evidence established that appellant had carnal knowledge of AAA through force and intimidation by threatening her with a samurai.
Thus, rape was established. Considering that in the resolution of the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, he resolved the filing of rape
under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code for which appellant was convicted by both the RTC and the CA, therefore, we merely
affirm the conviction.[62]

In the recent case of Tubillo where We noted that the Information would show that the case involves both the elements of paragraph 1,
Article 266-A of the RPC and Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610, We likewise examined the evidence of the prosecution, whether it focused
on the specific force or intimidation employed by the offender or on the broader concept of coercion or influence to have carnal
knowledge with the victim. In ruling that appellant should be convicted of rape under paragraph 1(a), Article 266-A of the RPC instead
of violation of Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610, We explained:

Here, the evidence of the prosecution unequivocally focused on the force or intimidation employed by Tubillo against HGE under Article
266- A(1)(a) of the RPC. The prosecution presented the testimony of HGE who narrated that Tubillo unlawfully entered the house
where she was sleeping by breaking the padlock. Once inside, he forced himself upon her, pointed a knife at her neck, and inserted his
penis in her vagina. She could not resist the sexual attack against her because Tubillo poked a bladed weapon at her neck. Verily,
Tubillo employed brash force or intimidation to carry out his dastardly deeds.[63]

With this decision, We now clarify the principles laid down in Abay, Pangilinan and Tubillo to the effect that there is a need to examine
the evidence of the prosecution to determine whether the person accused of rape should be prosecuted under the RPC or R.A. No.
7610 when the offended party is 12 years old or below 18.

First, if sexual intercourse is committed with an offended party who is a child less than 12 years old or is demented, whether or not
exploited in prostitution, it is always a crime of statutory rape; more so when the child is below 7 years old, in which case the crime is
always qualified rape.

Second, when the offended party is 12 years old or below 18 and the charge against the accused is carnal knowledge through "force,
threat or intimidation," then he will be prosecuted for rape under Article 266-A(1)(a) of the RPC. In contrast, in case of sexual
intercourse with a child who is 12 years old or below 18 and who is deemed "exploited in prostitution or other sexual abuse," the crime
could not be rape under the RPC, because this no longer falls under the concept of statutory rape, and the victim indulged in sexual
intercourse either "for money, profit or any other consideration or due to coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group," which
deemed the child as one "exploited in prostitution or other sexual abuse."

To avoid further confusion, We dissect the phrase "children exploited in prostitution" as an element of violation of Section 5(b) of R.A.
No. 7610. As can be gathered from the text of Section 5 of R.A. No. 7610 and having in mind that the term "lascivious conduct"[64] has a
clear definition which does not include "sexual intercourse," the phrase "children exploited in prostitution" contemplates four (4)
scenarios: (a) a child, whether male or female, who for money, profit or any other consideration, indulges in lascivious conduct; (b) a
female child, who for money, profit or any other consideration, indulges in sexual intercourse; (c) a child, whether male or female, who
due to the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group, indulges in lascivious conduct; and (d) a female, due to the coercion
or influence of any adult, syndicate or group, indulge in sexual intercourse.

The term "other sexual abuse," on the other hand, is construed in relation to the definitions of "child abuse" under Section 3, Article I of
R.A. No. 7610 and "sexual abuse" under Section 2(g) of the Rules and Regulations on the Reporting and Investigation of Child Abuse
Cases.[65] In the former provision, "child abuse" refers to the maltreatment, whether habitual or not, of the child which includes sexual
abuse, among other matters. In the latter provision, "sexual abuse" includes the employment, use, persuasion, inducement, enticement
or coercion of a child to engage in, or assist another person to engage in, sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct or the molestation,
prostitution, or incest with children.

In Quimvel, it was held that the term "coercion or influence" is broad enough to cover or even synonymous with the term "force or
intimidation." Nonetheless, it should be emphasized that "coercion or influence" is used in Section 5[66] of R.A. No. 7610 to qualify or
refer to the means through which "any adult, syndicate or group" compels a child to indulge in sexual intercourse. On the other hand,
the use of "money, profit or any other consideration" is the other mode by which a child indulges in sexual intercourse, without the
participation of "any adult, syndicate or group." In other words, "coercion or influence" of a child to indulge in sexual intercourse is
clearly exerted NOT by the offender whose liability is based on Section 5(b)[67] of R.A. No. 7610 for committing sexual act with a child
exploited in prostitution or other sexual abuse. Rather, the "coercion or influence" is exerted upon the child by "any adult, syndicate, or
group" whose liability is found under Section 5(a)[68] for engaging in, promoting, facilitating or inducing child prostitution, whereby the
sexual intercourse is the necessary consequence of the prostitution.

For a clearer view, a comparison of the elements of rape under the RPC and sexual intercourse with a child under Section 5(b) of R.A.
No. 7610 where the offended party is between 12 years old and below 18, is in order.

Rape under Article 266-A(1)(a,b,c) under the Section 5(1) of R.A. No. 7610
RPC
1. Offender is a man; 1. Offender is a man;

2. Carnal knowledge of a woman; 2. Indulges in sexual intercourse with a female child

exploited in prostitution or other sexual abuse, who
is 12 years old or below 18 or above 18 under
special circumstances;
3. Through force, threat or intimidation; when the 3. Coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or
offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise group is employed against the child to become a
unconscious; and by means of fraudulent prostitute
machination or grave abuse of authority
As can be gleaned above, "force, threat or intimidation" is the element of rape under the RPC, while "due to coercion or influence of any
adult, syndicate or group" is the operative phrase for a child to be deemed "exploited in prostitution or other sexual abuse," which is the
element of sexual abuse under Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610. The "coercion or influence" is not the reason why the child submitted
herself to sexual intercourse, but it was utilized in order for the child to become a prostitute. Considering that the child has become a
prostitute, the sexual intercourse becomes voluntary and consensual because that is the logical consequence of prostitution as defined
under Article 202 of the RPC, as amended by R.A. No. 10158 where the definition of "prostitute" was retained by the new law:[69]

Article 202. Prostitutes; Penalty. - For the purposes of this article, women who, for money or profit, habitually indulge in sexual
intercourse or lascivious conduct, are deemed to be prostitutes.

Any person found guilty of any of the offenses covered by this article shall be punished by arresto menor or a fine not exceeding 200
pesos, and in case of recidivism, by arresto mayor in its medium period to prision correccional in its minimum period or a fine ranging
from 200 to 2,000 pesos, or both, in the discretion of the court.

Therefore, there could be no instance that an Information may charge the same accused with the crime of rape where "force, threat or
intimidation" is the element of the crime under the RPC, and at the same time violation of Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610 where the
victim indulged in sexual intercourse because she is exploited in prostitution either "for money, profit or any other consideration or due
to coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group" — the phrase which qualifies a child to be deemed "exploited in prostitution or
other sexual abuse" as an element of violation of Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610.

Third, if the charge against the accused where the victim is 12 years old or below 18 is sexual assault under paragraph 2, Article 266-A
of the RPC, then it may happen that the elements thereof are the same as that of lascivious conduct under Section 5(b) of R.A. No.
7610, because the term "lascivious conduct" includes introduction of any object into the genitalia, anus or mouth of any person.[70] In
this regard, We held in Dimakuta that in instances where a "lascivious conduct" committed against a child is covered by R.A. No. 7610
and the act is likewise covered by sexual assault under paragraph 2, Article 266-A of the RPC [punishable by prision mayor], the
offender should be held liable for violation of Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610 [punishable by reclusion temporal  medium], consistent with
the declared policy of the State to provide special protection to children from all forms of abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation and
discrimination, and other conditions prejudicial to their development. But when the offended party is below 12 years of age or is
demented, the accused should be prosecuted and penalized under paragraph 2, Article 266-A of the RPC in relation to Section 5(b) of
R.A. No. 7610, because the crime of sexual assault is considered statutory, whereby the evidence of force or intimidation is immaterial.

Assuming that the elements of both violations of Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610 and of Article 266-A, paragraph 1(a) of the RPC are
mistakenly alleged in the same Information – e.g., carnal knowledge or sexual intercourse was due to "force or intimidation" with the
added phrase of "due to coercion or influence," one of the elements of Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610; or in many instances wrongfully
designate the crime in the Information as violation of "Article 266-A, paragraph 1(a) in relation to Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610,"
although this may be a ground for quashal of the Information under Section 3(f)[71] of Rule 117 of the Rules of Court and proven during
the trial in a case where the victim who is 12 years old or under 18 did not consent to the sexual intercourse, the accused should still be
prosecuted pursuant to the RPC, as amended by R.A. No. 8353, which is the more recent and special penal legislation that is not only
consistent, but also strengthens the policies of R.A. No. 7610. Indeed, while R.A. No. 7610 is a special law specifically enacted to
provide special protection to children from all forms of abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation and discrimination and other conditions
prejudicial to their development, We hold that it is contrary to the legislative intent of the same law if the lesser penalty (reclusion
temporal medium to reclusion perpetua) under Section 5(b) thereof would be imposed against the perpetrator of sexual intercourse
with a child 12 years of age or below 18.

Article 266-A, paragraph 1(a) in relation to Article 266-B of the RPC, as amended by R.A. No. 8353, is not only the more recent law, but
also deals more particularly with all rape cases, hence, its short title "The Anti-Rape Law of 1997." R.A. No. 8353 upholds the policies
and principles of R.A. No. 7610, and provides a "stronger deterrence and special protection against child abuse," as it imposes a more
severe penalty of reclusion perpetua under Article 266-B of the RPC, or even the death penalty if the victim is (1) under 18 years of age
and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or
common-law spouse of the parent of the victim; or (2) when the victim is a child below 7 years old.

It is basic in statutory construction that in case of irreconcilable conflict between two laws, the later enactment must prevail, being the
more recent expression of legislative will.[72] Indeed, statutes must be so construed and harmonized with other statutes as to form a
uniform system of jurisprudence, and if several laws cannot be harmonized, the earlier statute must yield to the later enactment,
because the later law is the latest expression of the legislative will.[73] Hence, Article 266-B of the RPC must prevail over Section 5(b) of
R.A. No. 7610.

In sum, the following are the applicable laws and penalty for the crimes of acts of lasciviousness or lascivious conduct and rape by
carnal knowledge or sexual assault, depending on the age of the victim, in view of the provisions of paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 266-A
and Article 336 of the RPC, as amended by R.A. No. 8353, and Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610:

Designation of the Crime & Imposable Penalty

Age of Victim: Under 12 years old or 12 years old or below 18, or 18 years old and above
demented 18 under special
Crime Committed: circumstances[74]
Acts of Lasciviousness Acts of Lasciviousness Lascivious conduct[75] under Not applicable
committed against children under Article 336 of the Section 5(b) of R.A. No.
exploited in prostitution or RPC in relation to Section 7610: reclusion temporal in
other sexual abuse 5(b) of R.A. No. its medium period
7610: reclusion to reclusion perpetua
temporal in its medium
period
Sexual Assault committed Sexual Assault under Lascivious Conduct under Not applicable
against children exploited in Article 266-A(2) of the Section 5(b) of R.A. No.
prostitution or other sexual RPC in relation to Section 7610: reclusion temporal in
abuse 5(b) of R.A. No. its medium period
7610: reclusion to reclusion perpetua
temporal in its medium
period
Sexual Intercourse Rape under Article 266- Sexual Abuse[77] under Not applicable
committed against children A(1) of the RPC: reclusion Section 5(b) of R.A. No.
exploited in prostitution or perpetua, except when the 7610: reclusion temporal in
other sexual abuse victim is below 7 years old its medium period
in which case death to reclusion perpetua
penalty shall be imposed[76]
Rape by carnal knowledge Rape under Article 266- Rape under Article 266-A(1) Rape under Article 266-
A(1) in relation to Art. in relation to Art. 266-B of A(1) of the
266-B of the the RPC: reclusion perpetua RPC: reclusion
RPC: reclusion perpetua, perpetua
except when the victim is
below 7 years old in which
case death penalty shall be
imposed
Rape by Sexual Assault Sexual Assault under Lascivious Conduct under Sexual Assault under
Article 266-A(2) of the Section 5(b) of R.A. No. Article 266-A(2) of the
 RPC in relation to Section 7610: reclusion temporal in RPC: prision mayor
5(b) of R.A. No. its medium period
7610: reclusion to reclusion perpetua
temporal in its medium
period
For the crime of acts of lasciviousness or lascivious conduct, the nomenclature of the crime and the imposable penalty are based on
the guidelines laid down in Caoili. For the crimes of rape by carnal knowledge and sexual assault under the RPC, as well as sexual
intercourse committed against children under R.A. No. 7610, the designation of the crime and the imposable penalty are based on the
discussions in Dimakuta,[78] Quimvel[79] and Caoili, in line with the policy of R.A. No. 7610 to provide stronger deterrence and special
protection to children from all forms of abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation, discrimination, and other conditions prejudicial to their
development. It is not amiss to stress that the failure to designate the offense by statute, or to mention the specific provision penalizing
the act, or an erroneous specification of the law violated, does not vitiate the information if the facts alleged clearly recite the facts
constituting the crime charged, for what controls is not the title of the information or the designation of the offense, but the actual facts
recited in the information.[80] Nevertheless, the designation in the information of the specific statute violated is imperative to avoid
surprise on the accused and to afford him the opportunity to prepare his defense accordingly.[81]

Justice Caguioa asks us to abandon our rulings in Dimakuta, Quimvel and Caoili, and to consider anew the viewpoint in his Separate
Dissenting Opinion in Quimvel  that the provisions of R.A. No. 7610 should be understood in its proper context, i.e., that it only applies in
the specific and limited instances where the victim is a child "subjected to prostitution or other sexual abuse." He asserts that if the
intention of R.A. No. 7610 is to penalize all sexual abuses against children under its provisions to the exclusion of the RPC, it would
have expressly stated so and would have done away with the qualification that the child be "exploited in prostitution or subjected to
other sexual abuse." He points out that Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610 is a provision of specific and limited application, and must be
applied as worded — a separate and distinct offense from the "common" or ordinary acts of lasciviousness under Article 336 of the
RPC. In support of his argument that the main thrust of R.A. No. 7610 is the protection of street children from exploitation, Justice
Caguioa cites parts of the sponsorship speech of Senators Santanina T. Rasul, Juan Ponce Enrile and Jose D. Lina, Jr.

We find no compelling reason to abandon our ruling in Dimakuta, Quimvel and Caoili.

In his Separate Concurring Opinion in Quimvel, the ponente aptly explained that if and when there is an absurdity in the interpretation of
the provisions of the law, the proper recourse is to refer to the objectives or the declaration of state policy and principles under Section
2 of R.A. No. 7610, as well as Section 3(2), Article XV of the 1987 Constitution:

[R.A. No. 7610] Sec. 2. Declaration of State Policy and Principles. - It is hereby declared to be the policy of the State to provide
special protection to children from all forms of abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation and discrimination, and other conditions
prejudicial to their development; provide sanctions for their commission and carry out a program for prevention and deterrence of
and crisis intervention in situations of child abuse, exploitation and discrimination. The State shall intervene on behalf of the child when
the parent, guardian, teacher or person having care or custody of the child fails or is unable to protect the child against abuse,
exploitation and discrimination or when such acts against the child are committed by the said parent, guardian, teacher or person
having care and custody of the same.

It shall be the policy of the State to protect and rehabilitate children gravely threatened or endangered by circumstances which affect or
will affect their survival and normal development and over which they have no control.

The best interests of children shall be the paramount consideration in all actions concerning them, whether undertaken by public or
private social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities, and legislative bodies, consistent with the principle of First
Call for Children as enunciated in the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child. Every effort shall be exerted to promote the
welfare of children and enhance their opportunities for a useful and happy life. [Emphasis added]

[Article XV 1987 Constitution] Section 3. The State shall defend:

xxxx

(2) The right of children to assistance, including proper care and nutrition, and special protection from all forms of neglect, abuse,
cruelty, exploitation, and other conditions prejudicial to their development.[82]

Clearly, the objective of the law, more so the Constitution, is to provide a special type of protection for children from all types of abuse.
Hence, it can be rightly inferred that the title used in Article III, Section 5, "Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse" does not mean
that it is only applicable to children used as prostitutes as the main offense and the other sexual abuses as additional offenses, the
absence of the former rendering inapplicable the imposition of the penalty provided under R.A. No. 7610 on the other sexual abuses
committed by the offenders on the children concerned.
Justice Caguioa asserts that Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610 is clear - it only punishes those who commit the act of sexual
intercourse or lascivious conduct with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse. There is no ambiguity to speak
of that which requires statutory construction to ascertain the legislature's intent in enacting the law.

We would have agreed with Justice Caguioa if not for Section 5 itself which provides who are considered as "children exploited in
prostitution and other sexual abuse." Section 5 states that "[c]hildren, whether male or female, who for money, profit, or any other
consideration or due to the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group, indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct,
are deemed to be children exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse." Contrary to the view of Justice Caguioa, Section 5(b),
Article III of R.A. No. 7610 is not as clear as it appears to be; thus, We painstakingly sifted through the records of the Congressional
deliberations to discover the legislative intent behind such provision.

Justice Caguioa then asks: (1) if the legislature intended for Section 5(b), R.A. No. 7610 to cover any and all types of sexual abuse
committed against children, then why would it bother adding language to the effect that the provision applies to "children exploited in
prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse?" and (2) why would it also put Section 5 under Article III of the law, which is entitled
"Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse?"

We go back to the record of the Senate deliberation to explain the history behind the phrase "child exploited in prostitution or subject to
other sexual abuse."

Section 5 originally covers Child Prostitution only, and this can still be gleaned from Section 6 on Attempt To Commit Child Prostitution,
despite the fact that both Sections fall under Article III on Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. Thus:

Section 6. Attempt To Commit Child Prostitution. - There is an attempt to commit child prostitution under Section 5, paragraph
(a) hereof when any person who, not being a relative of a child, is found alone with the said child inside the room or cubicle of a house,
an inn, hotel, motel, pension house, apartelle or other similar establishments, vessel, vehicle or any other hidden or secluded area
under circumstances which would lead a reasonable person to believe that the child is about to be exploited in prostitution and other
sexual abuse.

There is also an attempt to commit child prostitution, under paragraph (b) of Section 5 hereof when any person is receiving services
from a child in a sauna parlor or bath, massage clinic, health club and other similar establishments. A penalty lower by two (2) degrees
than that prescribed for the consummated felony under Section 5 hereof shall be imposed upon the principals of the attempt to commit
the crime of child prostitution under this Act, or, in the proper case, under the Revised Penal Code.

Even Senator Lina, in his explanation of his vote, stated that Senate Bill 1209 also imposes the penalty of reclusion temporal in its
medium period to reclusion perpetua for those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a child exploited in
prostitution.[83] Senator Lina mentioned nothing about the phrases "subject to other sexual abuse" or "Other Sexual Abuse" under
Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610.

However, to cover a situation where the minor may have been coerced or intimidated into lascivious conduct, not necessarily for money
or profit, Senator Eduardo Angara proposed the insertion of the phrase "WHO FOR MONEY, PROFIT, OR ANY OTHER
CONSIDERATION OR DUE TO THE COERCION OR INFLUENCE OF ANY ADULT, SYNDICATE OR GROUP, INDULGE" in sexual
intercourse or lascivious conduct, under Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610.[84]

Further amendment of then Article III of R.A. No. 7610 on Child Prostitution was also proposed by then President Pro Tempore Sotero
Laurel, to which Senator Angara agreed, in order to cover the "expanded scope" of "child abuse." Thus, Article III was amended and
entitled "Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse."[85] This is the proper context where the element that a child be "exploited in
prostitution and other sexual abuse" or EPSOSA, came to be, and should be viewed.

We hold that it is under President Pro Tempore Laurel's amendment on "expanded scope'' of "child abuse" under Section 5(b) and the
definition of "child abuse" under Section 3,[86] Article I of R.A. No. 7610 that should be relied upon in construing the element of "exploited
under prostitution and other sexual abuse." In understanding the element of "exploited under prostitution and other sexual abuse", We
take into account two provisions of R.A. No. 7610, namely: (1) Section 5, Article III, which states that "[c]hildren, whether male or
female, who for money, profit, or any other consideration or due to the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group, indulge in
sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct, are deemed to be exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse"; and (2) Section 3, Article I,
which states that "child abuse" refers to the maltreatment, whether habitual or not, of the child, which includes, sexual abuse.

To clarify, once and for all, the meaning of the element of "exploited in prostitution" under Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610,
[87]
 We rule that it contemplates 4 scenarios, namely: (a) a child, whether male or female, who for money, profit or any other
consideration, indulges in lascivious conduct; (b) a child, whether male or female, who due to the coercion or influence of any adult,
syndicate or group, indulges in lascivious conduct; (c) a female child, who for money, profit or any other consideration, indulges in
sexual intercourse; and (d) a female, due to the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group, indulges in sexual intercourse.

Note, however, that the element of "exploited in prostitution" does not cover a male child, who for money, profit or any other
consideration, or due to coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate, or group, indulges in sexual intercourse. This is because at the
time R.A. No. 7610 was enacted in 1992, the prevailing law on rape was Article 335 of the RPC where rape can only be committed by
having carnal knowledge of a woman under specified circumstances. Even under R.A. No. 8353 which took effect in 1997, the concept
of rape remains the same — it is committed by a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under specified circumstances. As
can be gathered from the Senate deliberation on Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610, it is only when the victim or the child who was
abused is a male that the offender would be prosecuted thereunder because the crime of rape does not cover child abuse of males.[88]

The term "other sexual abuse," on the other hand, should be construed in relation to the definitions of "child abuse" under Section 3,
[89]
 Article I of R.A. No. 7610 and "sexual abuse" under Section 2(g)[90] of the Rules and Regulations on the Reporting and Investigation
of Child Abuse Cases.[91] In the former provision, "child abuse" refers to the maltreatment, whether habitual or not, of the child which
includes sexual abuse, among other matters. In the latter provision, "sexual abuse" includes the employment, use, persuasion,
inducement, enticement or coercion of a child to engage in, or assist another person to engage in, sexual intercourse or lascivious
conduct or the molestation, prostitution, or incest with children. Thus, the term "other sexual abuse" is broad enough to include all other
acts of sexual abuse other than prostitution. Accordingly, a single act of lascivious conduct is punished under Section 5(b), Article III,
when the victim is 12 years old and below 18, or 18 or older under special circumstances. In contrast, when the victim is under 12 years
old, the proviso of Section 5(b) states that the perpetrator should be prosecuted under Article 336 of the RPC for acts of lasciviousness,
whereby the lascivious conduct itself is the sole element of the said crime. This is because in statutory acts of lasciviousness, as in
statutory rape, the minor is presumed incapable of giving consent; hence, the other circumstances pertaining to rape — force, threat,
intimidation, etc. — are immaterial.

Justice Caguioa also posits that the Senate deliberation on R.A. No. 7610 is replete with similar disquisitions that all show the intent to
make the law applicable to cases involving child exploitation through prostitution, sexual abuse, child trafficking, pornography and other
types of abuses. He stresses that the passage of the laws was the Senate's act of heeding the call of the Court to afford protection to a
special class of children, and not to cover any and all crimes against children that are already covered by other penal laws, such as the
RPC and Presidential Decree No. 603, otherwise known as the Child and Youth Welfare Code. He concludes that it is erroneous for us
to rule that R.A. No. 7610 applies in each and every case where the victim although he or she was not proved, much less, alleged to be
a child "exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse." He invites us to go back to the ruling in Abello that "since R.A. No.
7610 is a special law referring to a particular class in society, the prosecution must show that the victim truly belongs to this particular
class to warrant the application of the statute's provisions. Any doubt in this regard we must resolve in favor of the accused."

Justice Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe also disagrees that R.A. No. 7610 would be generally applicable to all cases of sexual abuse
involving minors, except those who are under 12 years of age. Justice Perlas-Bernabe concurs with Justice Caguioa that Section 5(b),
Article III of R.A. No. 7610 only applies in instances where the child-victim is "exploited in prostitution or subject to other sexual abuse"
(EPSOSA). She asserts that her limited view, as opposed to the ponencia's expansive view, is not only supported by several textual
indicators both in law and the deliberations, but also squares with practical logic and reason. She also contends that R.A. No. 7610 was
enacted to protect those who, like the child-victim in People v. Ritter, willingly engaged in sexual acts, not out of desire to satisfy their
own sexual gratification, but because of their "vulnerable pre-disposition as exploited children. She submits that, as opposed to the
RPC where sexual crimes are largely predicated on the lack of consent, Section 5(b) fills in the gaps of the RPC by introducing the
EPSOSA element which effectively dispenses with the need to prove the lack of consent at the time the act of sexual abuse is
committed. Thus, when it comes to a prosecution under Section 5(b), consent at the time the sexual act is consummated is, unlike in
the RPC, not anymore a defense.

We are unconvinced that R.A. No. 7610 only protects a special class of children, i.e., those who are "exploited in prostitution or
subjected to other sexual abuse," and does not cover all crimes against them that are already punished by existing laws. It is hard to
understand why the legislature would enact a penal law on child abuse that would create an unreasonable classification between those
who are considered as "exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse" or EPSOSA and those who are not. After all, the policy is to
provide stronger deterrence and special protection to children from all forms of abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation, discrimination and
other conditions prejudicial to their development.

In the extended explanation of his vote on Senate Bill No. 1209,[92] Senator Lina emphasized that the bill complements the efforts the
Senate has initiated towards the implementation of a national comprehensive program for the survival and development of Filipino
children, in keeping with the Constitutional mandate that "[t]he State shall defend the right of children to assistance, including proper
care and nutrition; and special protection from all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation, and other conditions prejudicial to their
development."[93] Senator Lina also stressed that the bill supplies the inadequacies of the existing laws treating crimes committed
against children, namely, the RPC and the Child and Youth Welfare Code, in the light of the present situation, i.e., current empirical
data on child abuse indicate that a stronger deterrence is imperative.[94]

In the same vein, Senator Rasul expressed in her Sponsorship Speech the same view that R.A. No. 7610 intends to protect all children
against all forms of abuse and exploitation, thus:

There are still a lot of abuses and injustices done to our children who suffer not only from strangers, but sadly, also in the hands of their
parents and relatives. We know for a fact that the present law on the matter, the Child and Welfare Code (PD No. 603) has very little to
offer to abuse children. We are aware of the numerous cases not reported in media.

In the Filipino Family structure, a child is powerless; he or she is not supposed to be heard and seen. Usually, it is the father or the
mother who has a say in family matters, and children, owing to their limited capability, are not consulted in most families. Many children
may be suffering from emotional, physical and social abuses in their homes, but they cannot come out in the open; besides, there is a
very thin line separating discipline from abuse. This becomes wider when the abuse becomes grave and severe.
Perhaps, more lamentable than the continuing child abuses and exploitation is the seeming unimportance or the lack of interest in the
way we have dealt with the said problem in the country. No less than the Supreme Court, in the recent case of People v. Ritter, held
that we lack criminal laws which will adequately protect street children from exploitation of pedophiles. But as we know, we, at the
Senate have not been remiss in our bounden duty to sponsor bills which will ensure the protection of street children from the tentacles
of sexual exploitation. Mr. President, now is the time to convert these bills into reality.

In our long quest for solutions to problems regarding children, which problems are deeply rooted in poverty, I have felt this
grave need to sponsor a bill, together with Senators Lina and Mercado, which would ensure the children's protection from all
forms of abuse and exploitation, to provide stiffer sanction for their commission and carry out programs for prevention and
deterrence to aid crisis intervention in situations of child abuse and exploitation.

Senate Bill No. 1209 translates into reality the provision of our 1987 Constitution on "THE FAMILY," and I quote:

Sec. 3. The State shall defend:

xxxx

(2) The right of children to assistance, including proper care and nutrition, and special protection from all forms of neglect, abuse,
cruelty, exploitation, and other conditions prejudicial to their development.

This is a specific provision peculiar to the Philippines. No other Constitution in the whole world contains this mandate. Keeping true to
this mandate, Mr. President, and the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child which has been drafted in the largest global summit, of
which we have acceded, we should waste no time in passing this significant bill into law. This is a commitment; thus, we should not
thrive on mere promises. We, the legislature of this country, must have that political will to transform this promise into a vibrant reality.

Children's normal growth and development, considering their young minds and fragile bodies, must not be stunted. We legislators must
pave the way for the sustained progress of our children. Let not a child's opportunity for physical, spiritual, moral, social and intellectual
well-being be stunted by the creeping cruelty and insanity that sometimes plague the minds of the adults in the society who, ironically,
are the persons most expected to be the guardians of their interest and welfare.[95]
Justice Caguioa further submits that Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610 cannot be read in isolation in the way that Dimakuta,
Quimvel and Caoili do, but must be read in the whole context of R.A. No. 7610 which revolves around (1) child prostitution, (2) other
sexual abuse in relation to prostitution and (3) the specific acts punished under R.A. No. 7610, namely, child trafficking under Article IV,
obscene publications and indecent shows under Article V, and sanctions for establishments where these prohibited acts are promoted,
facilitated or conducted under Article VII. He adds that even an analysis of the structure of R.A. No. 7610 demonstrates its intended
application to the said cases of child exploitation involving children "exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse." Citing
the exchange between Senators Pimentel and Lina during the second reading of Senate Bill No. 1209 with respect to the provision on
attempt to commit child prostitution, Justice Caguioa likewise posits that a person can only be convicted of violation of Article 336 in
relation to Section 5(b), upon allegation and proof of the unique circumstances of the children "exploited in prostitution or subjected to
other sexual abuse."

We disagree that the whole context in which Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610 must be read revolves only around child prostitution, other
sexual abuse in relation to prostitution, and the specific acts punished under R.A. No. 7610. In fact, the provisos of Section 5(b) itself
explicitly state that it must also be read in light of the provisions of the RPC, thus: "Provided, That when the victim is under twelve (12)
years of age, the perpetrators shall be prosecuted under Article 335, paragraph 3, for rape and Article 336 of Act No. 3815, as
amended, the Revised Penal Code, for rape or lascivious conduct, as the case may be; Provided, That the penalty for lascivious
conduct when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age shall be reclusion temporal in its medium period. "

When the first proviso of Section 5(b) states that "when the victim is under 12 years of age shall be prosecuted under the RPC," it only
means that the elements of rape under then Article 335, paragraph 3 of the RPC [now Article 266-A, paragraph 1(d)], and of acts of
lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC, have to be considered, alongside the element of the child being "exploited in prostitution
and or other sexual abuse," in determining whether the perpetrator can be held liable under R.A. No. 7610. The second proviso of
Section 5(b), on the other hand, merely increased the penalty for lascivious conduct when the victim is under 12 years of age,
from prision correccional to reclusion temporal in its medium period, in recognition of the principle of statutory acts of lasciviousness,
where the consent of the minor is immaterial.

Significantly, what impels Us to reject Justice Caguioa's view that acts of lasciviousness committed against children may be punished
under either Article 336 of the RPC [with prision correccional] or Acts of Lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC, in relation to
Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610 [with reclusion temporal medium]/Lascivious Conduct under Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610 [with reclusion
temporal medium to reclusion perpetua], is the provision under Section 10 of R.A. No. 7610.

As pointed out by the ponente in Quimvel, where the victim of acts of lasciviousness is under 7 years old, Quimvel cannot be merely
penalized with prision correccional for acts of lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC when the victim is a child because it is
contrary to the letter and intent of R.A. No. 7610 to provide for stronger deterrence and special protection against child abuse,
exploitation and discrimination. The legislative intent is expressed under Section 10, Article VI of R.A. No. 7610 which, among others,
increased by one degree the penalty for certain crimes when the victim is a child under 12 years of age, to wit:

Section 10. Other Acts of Neglect, Abuse, Cruelty or Exploitation and Other Conditions Prejudicial to the Child's Development. —

xxxx

For purposes of this Act, the penalty for the commission of acts punishable under Articles 248, 249, 262, paragraph 2, and 263,
paragraph 1 of Act No. 3815, as amended, for the crimes of murder, homicide, other intentional mutilation, and serious physical injuries,
respectively, shall be reclusion perpetua when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age. The penalty for the commission of acts
punishable under Article 337, 339, 340 and 341 of Act No. 3815, as amended, the Revised Penal Code, for the crimes of
qualified seduction, acts of lasciviousness with consent of the offended party, corruption of minors, and white slave trade,
respectively, shall be one (1) degree higher than that imposed by law when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age.[96]

The ponente explained that to impose upon Quimvel an indeterminate sentence computed from the penalty of prision
correccional under Article 336 of the RPC would defeat the purpose of R.A. No. 7610 to provide for stronger deterrence and special
protection against child abuse, exploitation and discrimination. First, the imposition of such penalty would erase the substantial
distinction between acts of lasciviousness under Article 336 and acts of lasciviousness with consent of the offended party under Article
339,[97] which used to be punishable by arresto mayor, and now by prision correccional pursuant to Section 10, Article VI of R.A. No.
7610. Second, it would inordinately put on equal footing the acts of lasciviousness committed against a child and the same crime
committed against an adult, because the imposable penalty for both would still be prision correccional, save for the aggravating
circumstance of minority that may be considered against the perpetrator. Third, it would make acts of lasciviousness against a child a
probationable offense, pursuant to the Probation Law of 1976,[98] as amended by R.A. No. 10707.[99] Indeed, while the foregoing
implications are favorable to the accused, they are contrary to the State policy and principles under R.A. No. 7610 and the Constitution
on the special protection to children.

Justice Caguioa also faults that a logical leap was committed when the ponencia posited that the Section 10, Article VI, R.A. No. 7610
amendment of the penalties under Articles 337, 339, 340 and 341 of the RPC, also affected Article 336 on acts of lasciviousness. He
argues that given the clear import of Section 10 to the effect that the legislature expressly named the provisions it sought to amend
through R.A. No. 7610, amendment by implication cannot be insisted on.

We disagree. Articles 337 (Qualified Seduction), 339 (Acts of Lasciviousness with the Consent of the Offended Party), 340 (Corruption
of Minor) and 341 (White Slave Trade) of the RPC, as well as Article 336 (Acts of Lasciviousness) of the RPC, fall under Title Eleven of
the RPC on Crimes against Chastity. All these crimes can be committed against children. Given the policy of R.A. No. 7610 to provide
stronger deterrence and special protection against child abuse, We see no reason why the penalty for acts of lasciviousness committed
against children should remain to be prision correccional when Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610 penalizes those who commit
lascivious conduct with a child exploited in prostitution or subject to other sexual abuse with a penalty of reclusion temporal in its
medium period when the victim is under 12 years of age.

Contrary to the view of Justice Caguioa, there is, likewise, no such thing as a recurrent practice of relating the crime committed to R.A.
No. 7610 in order to increase the penalty, which violates the accused's constitutionally protected right to due process of law. In the
interpretation of penal statutes, the rule is to subject it to careful scrutiny and to construe it with such strictness as to safeguard the
rights of the accused,[100] and at the same time preserve the obvious intention of the legislature.[101] A strict construction of penal statutes
should also not be permitted to defeat the intent, policy and purpose of the legislature, or the object of the law sought to be attained.
[102]
 When confronted with apparently conflicting statutes, the courts should endeavor to harmonize and reconcile them, instead of
declaring the outright invalidity of one against the other, because they are equally the handiwork of the same legislature.[103] In this case,
We are trying to harmonize the applicability of the provisions of R.A. No. 7610 vis-a-vis those of the RPC, as amended by R.A. No.
8353, in order to carry out the legislative intent to provide stronger deterrence and special protection against all forms of child abuse,
exploitation and discrimination.

Pertinent parts of the deliberation in Senate Bill No. 1209 underscoring the legislative intent to increase the penalties as a deterrent
against all forms of child abuse, including those covered by the RPC and the Child and Youth Welfare Code, as well as to give special
protection to all children, read:

Senator Lina. x x x
For the information and guidance of our Colleagues, the phrase "child abuse" here is more descriptive than a definition that specifies
the particulars of the acts of child abuse. As can be gleaned from the bill, Mr. President, there is a reference in Section 10 to the "Other
Acts of Neglect, Abuse, Cruelty or Exploitation and Other Conditions Prejudicial to the Child's Development."

We refer, for example, to the Revised Penal Code. There are already acts described and punished under the Revised Penal Code and
the Child and Youth Welfare Code. These are all enumerated already, Mr. President. There are particular acts that are already being
punished.
But we are providing stronger deterrence against child abuse and exploitation by increasing the penalties when the victim is a child.
That is number one. We define a child as "one who is 15 years and below." [Later amended to those below 18, including those above
18 under special circumstances]
The President Pro Tempore. Would the Sponsor then say that this bill repeals, by implication or as a consequence, the law he
just cited for the protection of the child as contained in that Code just mentioned, since this provides for stronger deterrence
against child abuse and we have now a Code for the protection of the child?
Senator Lina. We specified in the bill, Mr. President, increase in penalties. That is one. But, of course, that is not everything
included in the bill. There are other aspects like making it easier to prosecute these cases of pedophilia in our country. That is
another aspect of this bill.
The other aspects of the bill include the increase in the penalties on acts committed against children; and by definition,
children are those below 15 years of age.
So, it is an amendment to the Child and Youth Welfare Code, Mr. President. This is not an amendment by implication. We
made direct reference to the Articles in the Revised Penal Code and in the Articles in the Child and Youth Welfare Code that
are amended because of the increase in the penalties.
The President Pro Tempore. Would Senator Lina think then that, probably, it would be more advisable to specify the amendments and
amend the particular provision of the existing law rather than put up a separate bill like this?
Senator Lina. We did, Mr. President. In Section 10, we made reference to...
The President Pro Tempore. The Chair is not proposing any particular amendment. This is just an inquiry for the purpose of making
some suggestions at this stage where we are now in the period of amendments.
Senator Lina. We deemed it proper to have a separate Act, Mr. President, that will include all measures to provide stronger deterrence
against child abuse and exploitation. There are other aspects that are included here other than increasing the penalties that are
already provided for in the Revised Penal Code and in the Child and Youth Welfare Code when the victims are children.
Aside from the penalties, there are other measures that are provided for in this Act. Therefore, to be more systematic about it,
instead of filing several bills, we thought of having a separate Act that will address the problems of children below 15 years of
age. This is to emphasize the fact that this is a special sector in our society that needs to be given special protection. So this
bill is now being presented for consideration by the Chamber.[104]
The aforequoted parts of the deliberation in Senate Bill No. 1209 likewise negate the contention of Justice Perlas-Bernabe that "to
suppose that R.A. No. 7610 would generally cover acts already punished under the Revised Penal Code (RPC) would defy the
operational logic behind the introduction of this special law." They also address the contention of Justice Caguioa that the passage of
the same law was the Senate's act of heeding the call of the Court to afford protection to a special class of children, and not to cover
any and all crimes against children that are already covered by other penal laws, like the RPC and P.D. No. 603.

As pointed out by Senator Lina, the other aspect of S.B. No. 1209, is to increase penalties on acts committed against children; thus,
direct reference was made to the Articles in the RPC and in the Articles in the Child and Youth Welfare Code that are amended
because of the increase in the penalties. The said legislative intent is consistent with the policy to provide stronger deterrence and
special protection of children against child abuse, and is now embodied under Section 10, Article VI of R.A. No. 7610, viz.:
For purposes of this Act, the penalty for the commission of acts punishable under Articles 248, 249, 262, paragraph 2, and 263,
paragraph 1 of Act No. 3815, as amended, the Revised Penal Code, for the crimes of murder, homicide, other intentional mutilation,
and serious physical injuries, respectively, shall be reclusion perpetua when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age. The penalty
for the commission of acts punishable under Article 337, 339, 340 and 341 of Act No. 3815, as amended, the Revised Penal Code, for
the crimes of qualified seduction, acts of lasciviousness with the consent of the offended party, corruption of minors, and white slave
trade, respectively, shall be one (1) degree higher than that imposed by law when the victim is under twelve (12) years age.
Justice Perlas-Bernabe and Justice Caguioa are both correct that R.A. No. 7610 was enacted to fill the gaps in the law, as observed by
the Court in People v. Ritter. However, they may have overlooked that fact that the Congressional deliberations and the express
provisions of R.A. No. 7610 all point to the intention and policy to systematically address the problems of children below 15 years of age
[later increased to below 18], which Senator Lina emphasized as a special sector in our society that needs to be given special
protection.[105]
Justice Perlas-Bernabe also noted that a general view on the application of R.A. No. 7610 would also lead to an unnerving
incongruence between the law's policy objective and certain penalties imposed thereunder. She pointed out that under Article 335 of
the RPC, prior to its amendment by R.A. No. 8353, the crime of rape committed against a minor who is not under 12 and below 18, is
punished with the penalty of reclusion perpetua, while under Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610, the crime of sexual abuse against
a child EPSOSA is punished only with a lower penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua. She concluded
that it would not make sense for the Congress to pass a supposedly stronger law against child abuse if the same carries a lower
penalty for the same act of rape under the old RPC provision.
Justice Perlas-Bernabe's observation on incongruent penalties was similarly noted by the ponente in his Separate Concurring Opinion
in Quimvel, albeit with respect to the penalties for acts of lasciviousness committed against a child, but he added that the proper
remedy therefor is a corrective legislation:
Curiously, despite the clear intent of R.A. 7610 to provide for stronger deterrence and special protection against child abuse, the
penalty [reclusion temporal medium] when the victim is under 12 years old is lower compared to the penalty [reclusion
temporal medium to reclusion perpetua] when the victim is 12 years old and below 18. The same holds true if the crime of acts of
lasciviousness is attended by an aggravating circumstance or committed by persons under Section 31,[106] Article XII of R.A. 7610, in
which case, the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua. In contrast, when no mitigating or aggravating circumstance attended the
crime of acts of lasciviousness, the penalty therefor when committed against a child under 12 years old is aptly higher than the penalty
when the child is 12 years old and below 18. This is because, applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum term in the case
of the younger victims shall be taken from reclusion temporal minimum, whereas as the minimum term in the case of the older victims
shall be taken from prision mayor medium to reclusion temporal minimum. It is a basic rule in statutory construction that what courts
may correct to reflect the real and apparent intention of the legislature are only those which are clearly clerical errors or obvious
mistakes, omissions, and misprints, but not those due to oversight, as shown by a review of extraneous circumstances, where the law
is clear, and to correct it would be to change the meaning of the law. To my mind, a corrective legislation is the proper remedy to
address the noted incongruent penalties for acts of lasciviousness committed against a child.[107]
To support his theory that the provisions of R.A. No. 7610 are intended only for those under the unique circumstances of the children
being "exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse," Justice Caguioa quoted pertinent portions of the Senate deliberation
on the provision on attempt to commit child prostitution," which concededly do not affect Article 336 of the RPC on acts of
lasciviousness. Senator Lina provided with a background, not of the provision of Section 5(b), but of Section 6 of R.A. No. 7610 on
attempt to commit child prostitution, thus:

Senator Lina. xxx Mr. President, Article 336 of Act No. 3815 will remain unaffected by this amendment we are introducing here. As a
backgrounder, the difficulty in the prosecution of so-called "pedophiles" can be traced to this problem of having to catch the malefactor
committing the sexual act on the victim. And those in the law enforcement agencies and in the prosecution service of the Government
have found it difficult to prosecute. Because if an old person, especially foreigner, is seen with a child with whom he has no relation—
blood or otherwise — and they are just seen in a room and there is no way to enter the room and to see them in flagrante delicto, then
it will be very difficult for the prosecution to charge or to hale to court these pedophiles.
So we are introducing into this bill, Mr. President, an act that is already considered an attempt to commit child prostitution. This, in no
way, affects the Revised Penal Code provisions on acts of lasciviousness or qualified seduction.[108]
Justice Caguioa's reliance on the foregoing statements of Senator Lina is misplaced. While Senator Lina was referring to the specific
provision on attempt to commit child prostitution under Section 6, Article III of R.A. No. 7610, Senator Aquilino Pimentel Jr.'s questions
were directed more on the general effect of Senate Bill No. 1209 on the existing provisions of the RPC on child sexual abuse, which
elicited from Senator Lina the intent to provide higher penalties for such crimes, to wit:

Senator Pimentel. I understand the Gentleman's opinion on that particular point. But my question really is much broader. I am sorry
that it would seem as if I am trying to be very meticulous about this.
Senator Lina. It is all right.
Senator Pimentel. But the point is, there are existing laws that cover the sexual abuse of children already, particularly female
children. What I am trying to say is, what effect will the distinguished Gentleman's bill have on these existing laws,
particularly provisions of the Revised Penal Code. That is why I tried to cite the case of rape—having sexual intercourse with
a child below 12 years of age, seduction instances, qualified abduction, or acts of lasciviousness, involving minors; meaning
to say, female below 18 years of age. There are already existing laws on this particular point.
Senator Lina. Mr. President, there will also be a difference in penalties when the person or the victim is 12 years old or less. That is
another effect. So, there is a difference.
For example, in qualified seduction, the penalty present for all persons between age of 13 to 17 is prision correccional; for acts of
lasciviousness under the proposal, similar acts will be prision mayor if the child is 12 years or less.
Under qualified seduction, the present penalty is prision correccional, minimum and medium. Under the proposal, it will be prision
correccional maximum to prision mayor minimum, and so on and so forth.
Even in facts of lasciviousness, with consent of the offended party, there is still a higher penalty. In corruption of minors, there will be a
higher penalty. When murder is committed, and the victim is under 12 years or less, there will be a higher penalty from reclusion
temporal to reclusion perpetua. The penalty when the culprit is below 12 years or less will be reclusion perpetua. The intention is really
to provide a strong deterrence sand special protection against child abuse and exploitation.
Senator Pimentel. So, the net effect of this amendment, therefore, is to amend the provisions of the Revised Penal Code,
insofar as they relate to the victims who are females below the age of 12.
Senator Lina. That will be the net effect, Mr. President.
Senator Pimentel. We probably just have to tighten up our provisions to make that very explicit. Mr. President.
Senator Lina. Yes. During the period of individual amendments, Mr. President, that can be well taken care of.[109]
Quoting the sponsorship speech of Senator Rasul and citing the case of People v. Ritter,[110] Justice Caguioa asserts that the enactment
of R.A. No. 7610 was a response of the legislature to the observation of the Court that there was a gap in the law because of the lack of
criminal laws which adequately protect street children from exploitation of pedophiles.
Justice Caguioa is partly correct. Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610 is separate and distinct from common and ordinary acts of
lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC. However, when the victim of such acts of lasciviousness is a child, as defined by law, We
hold that the penalty is that provided for under Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610 - i.e., reclusion temporal medium in case the victim is
under 12 years old, and reclusion temporal medium to reclusion perpetua when the victim is between 12 years old or under 18 years
old or above 18 under special circumstances - and not merely prision correccional under Article 336 of the RPC. Our view is consistent
with the legislative intent to provide stronger deterrence against all forms of child abuse, and the evil sought to be avoided by the
enactment of R.A. No. 7610, which was exhaustively discussed during the committee deliberations of the House of Representatives:
HON. [PABLO] P. GARCIA: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. This problem is also bogging me for quite some time because there has been
so much cry against this evil in our society. But, then until now, neither the courts nor those in the medical world have come up with the
exact definition of pedophilia. I have two standard dictionaries—Webster and another one an English dictionary, Random Dictionary
and the term "pedophilia" is not there. Although, we have read so much literature, articles about pedophilia and it is commonly
understood as we might say a special predilection for children. "Pedo" coming from the Greek word "pedo." But whether this would
apply to children of either sex, say male or female is not also very clear. It is a sexual desire for its very unusual out of the ordinary
desire or predilection for children. Now, in our country, this has gain[ed] notoriety because of activities of foreigners in Pagsanjan and
even in Cebu. But most of the victims I have yet to hear of another victim than male. Of course, satisfaction of sexual desire on female,
young female, we have instances of adults who are especially attracted to the young female children, say below the ages of 12 or 15 if
you can still classify these young female children. So our first problem is whether pedophilia would apply only to male victims or should
it also apply to female victims?
I am trying to make this distinction because we have already a law in our jurisdiction. I refer to the Revised Penal Code where sexual
intercourse with a child below 12 automatically becomes statutory rape whether with or without consent. In other words, force or
intimidation is not a necessary element. If a person commits sexual intercourse with a child below 12, then he automatically has
committed statutory rape and the penalty is stiff. Now, we have really to also think deeply about our accepted definition of sexual
intercourse. Sexual intercourse is committed against… or is committed by a man and a woman. There is no sexual intercourse between
persons of the same sex. The sexual intercourse, as defined in the standard dictionaries and also as has been defined by our courts is
always committed between a man and a woman. And so if we pass here a law, which would define pedophilia and include any sexual
contact between persons of different or the same sexes, in other words, homosexual or heterosexual, then, we will have to be
overhauling our existing laws and jurisprudence on sexual offenses.

For example, we have in our Revised Penal Code, qualified seduction, under Article 337 of the Revised Penal Code, which provides
that the seduction of a virgin over 12 and under 18 committed by any person in public authority: priest, house servant, domestic
guardian, teacher, or person who in any capacity shall be entrusted with the education or custody of the woman seduced, shall be
punished by etc. etc. Now, if we make a general definition of pedophilia then shall that offender, who, under our present law, is guilty of
pedophilia? I understand that the consensus is to consider a woman or a boy below 15 as a child and therefore a potential victim of
pedophilia. And so, what will happen to our laws and jurisprudence on seduction? The Chairman earlier mentioned that possible we
might just amend our existing provisions on crimes against chastity, so as to make it stiffer, if the victim or the offended party is a minor
below a certain age, then there is also seduction of a woman who is single or a widow of good reputation, over 12 but under 18.
Seduction, as understood in law, is committed against a woman, in other words, a man having sexual intercourse with a woman. That is
how the term is understood in our jurisprudence. So I believe Mr. Chairman, that we should rather act with caution and circumspection
on this matter. Let us hear everybody because we are about to enact a law which would have very drastic and transcendental effects
on our existing laws. In the first place, we are not yet very clear on what is pedophilia. We have already existing laws, which would
punish these offenses.

As a matter of fact, for the information of this Committee, in Cebu, I think that it is the first conviction for an offense which would in our
understanding amounts to pedophilia. A fourteen-year old boy was the victim of certain sexual acts committed by a German national.
The fiscal came up with an information for acts of lasciviousness under the Revised Penal Code and that German national was
convicted for the offense charged. Now, the boy was kept in his rented house and subjected to sexual practices very unusual,
tantamount to perversion but under present laws, these offenses such as... well, it's too, we might say, too obscene to describe, cannot
be categorized under our existing laws except acts of lasciviousness because there is no sexual intercourse. Sexual intercourse in our
jurisdiction is as I have stated earlier, committed by a man and a woman. And it is a sexual contact of the organ of the man with the
organ of the woman. But in the case of this German national, if there was any sexual contact it was between persons of the same sex.
So, he was convicted. He's a detention prisoner and there is also deportation proceeding against him. In fact, he has applied for
voluntary deportation, but he is to serve a penalty of prision correccional to prision mayor. So, that is the situation I would say in which
we find ourselves. I am loath to immediately act on this agitation for a definition of a crime of pedophilia. There is no I think this
Committee should study further the laws in other countries. Whether there is a distinct crime known as pedophilia and whether this can
be committed against a person of the same sex or of another sex, or whether this crime is separate and distinct from the other crimes
against honor or against chastity in their respective jurisdictions. This is a social evil but it has to be addressed with the tools we have at
hand. If we have to forge another tool or instrument to find to fight this evil, then I think we should make sure that we are not doing
violence for destroying the other existing tools we have at hand. And maybe there is a need to sharpen the tools we have at hand,
rather than to make a new tool to fight this evil. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.[111]
Moreover, contrary to the claim of Justice Caguioa, We note that the Information charging Tulagan with rape by sexual assault in
Criminal Case No. SCC-6210 not only distinctly stated that the same is "Contrary to Article 266-A, par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code in
relation to R.A. 7610," but it also sufficiently alleged all the elements of violation of Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610, in this wise:

Elements of Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610 Information in Criminal Case No. SCC-6210
1. The accused commits the act of sexual intercourse 1. That sometime in the month of September 2011 x x
or lascivious conduct. x, the abovenamed accused [Tulagan] x x x did then
and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
inserted his finger into the vagina of said AAA,
against her will and consent.
2. The said act is performed with a child exploited in 2. [T]he above-name accused, by means of force,
prostitution or other sexual abuse. Section 5 of R.A. intimidation and with abuse of superior
No. 7610 deems as "children exploited in prostitution strength forcibly laid complainant AAA, x x x in a
and other sexual abuse" those children, whether male cemented pavement, and x x x inserted his finger into
or female, (1) who for money, profit or any other the vagina of said AAA, against her will and consent.
consideration or (2) due to the coercion or
influence of any adult, syndicate or group, indulge in
sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct.
3. The child, whether male or female, is below 18 3. AAA is a 9-year-old minor.
years of age.
In Quimvel, We ruled that the Information in Olivarez v. Court of Appeals[112] is conspicuously couched in a similar fashion as the
Information in the case against Quimvel. We explained that the absence of the phrase "exploited in prostitution or subject to other
sexual abuse" or even a specific mention of "coercion" or "influence" was never a bar for us to uphold the finding of guilt against an
accused for violation of R.A. No. 7610. Just as We held that it was enough for the Information in Olivarez to have alleged that the
offense was committed by means of ''force and intimidation," We must also rule that the Information in the case at bench does not
suffer from the alleged infirmity.
We likewise held in Quimvel that the offense charged can also be elucidated by consulting the designation of the offense as appearing
in the Information. The designation of the offense is a critical element required under Sec. 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court for it assists
in apprising the accused of the offense being charged. Its inclusion in the Information is imperative to avoid surprise on the accused
and to afford him of opportunity to prepare his defense accordingly. Its import is underscored in this case where the preamble states
that the crime charged is "Acts of Lasciviousness in relation to Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610."
We held that for purposes of determining the proper charge, the term "coercion or influence" as appearing in the law is broad enough to
cover "force and intimidation" as used in the Information; in fact, as these terms are almost used synonymously, it is then "of no
moment that the terminologies employed by R.A. No. 7610 and by the Information are different."[113] We also ruled that a child is
considered one "exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse" when the child indulges in sexual intercourse or lascivious
conduct "under the coercion or influence of any adult."[114] Thus, We rule that the above-quoted Information in Criminal Case No. SCC-
6210 sufficiently informs Tulagan of the nature and cause of accusation against him, namely: rape by sexual assault under paragraph
2, Article 266-A of the RPC in relation to R.A. No. 7610.
We also take this opportunity to address the position of Justice Caguioa and Justice Perlas-Bernabe, which is based on dissenting
opinions[115] in Olivarez and Quimvel. Citing the Senate deliberations, the dissenting opinions explained that the phrase "or any other
consideration or due to coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group," under Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610, was added to
merely cover situations where a child is abused or misused for sexual purposes without any monetary gain or profit. The dissenting
opinions added that this was significant because profit or monetary gain is essential in prostitution; thus, the lawmakers intended that in
case all other elements of prostitution are present, but the monetary gain or profit is missing, the sexually abused and misused child
would still be afforded the same protection of the law as if he or she were in the same situation as a child exploited in prostitution. [116]
We partly disagree with the foregoing view. The amendment introduced by Senator Eduardo Angara not only covers cases wherein the
child is misused for sexual purposes not because of money or profit, and coercion or intimidation, but likewise expanded the scope of
Section 5 of R.A. No. 7610 to cover not just child prostitution but also "other sexual abuse" in the broader context of child abuse," thus:
Senator Angara. I refer to line 9, "who for money or profit." I would like to amend this, Mr. President, to cover a situation where the
minor may have been coerced or intimidated into this lascivious conduct, not necessarily for money or profit, so that we can cover those
situations and not leave a loophole in this section.
This proposal I have is something like this: WHO FOR MONEY, PROFIT, OR ANY OTHER CONSIDERATION OR DUE TO THE
COERCION OR INFLUENCE OF ANY ADULT, SYNDICATE OR GROUP INDULGE, etcetera.

The President Pro Tempore. I see. That would mean also changing the subtitle of Section 4. Will it no longer be child prostitution?
Senator Angara. No, no. Not necessarily, Mr. President, because we are still talking of the child who is being misused for sexual
purposes either for money or for consideration. What I am trying to cover is the other consideration. Because, here, it is limited only to
the child being abused or misused for sexual purposes, only for money or profit.
I am contending, Mr. President, that there may be situations where the child may not have been used for profit or ...

The President Pro Tempore. So, it is no longer prostitution. Because the essence of prostitution is profit.
Senator Angara. Well, the Gentleman is right. Maybe the heading ought to be expanded. But, still, the President will agree that that is
a form or manner of child abuse.
The President Pro Tempore. What does the Sponsor say? Will the Gentleman kindly restate the amendment?
ANGARA AMENDMENT

Senator Angara. The new section will read something like this, Mr. President: MINORS, WHETHER MALE OR FEMALE, WHO FOR
MONEY, PROFIT OR ANY OTHER CONSIDERATION OR DUE TO THE COERCION OR INFLUENCE OF ANY ADULT, SYNDICATE
OR GROUP INDULGE IN SEXUAL INTERCOURSE, et cetera.
Senator Lina. It is accepted, Mr. President.
The President Pro Tempore. Is there any objection? [Silence] Hearing none, the amendment is approved.
How about the title, "Child Prostitution," shall we change that too?
Senator Angara. Yes, Mr. President, to cover the expanded scope.
The President Pro Tempore. Is that not what we would call probably "child abuse"?
Senator Angara. Yes, Mr. President.
The President Pro Tempore. Is that not defined on line 2, page 6?
Senator Angara. Yes, Mr. President. Child prostitution and other sexual abuse.
The President Pro Tempore. Subject to rewording. Is there any objection? [Silence] Hearing none, the amendment is approved. Any
other amendments?[117]
Indeed, the Angara amendment explains not just the rationale of the body of Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610 to cover a loophole or
situation where the minor may have been coerced or intimidated to indulge in lascivious conduct. The amendment of President Pro
Tempore Laurel, however, also affects the title of Article III, Section 5 of R.A. No. 7610, i.e., "Child Prostitution and Other Sexual
Abuse." It is settled that if a chapter and section heading has been inserted merely for convenience or reference, and not as integral
part of the statute, it should not be allowed to control interpretation.[118] To our mind, however, the amendment highlights the intention to
expand the scope of Section 5 to incorporate the broader concept of "child abuse," which includes acts of lasciviousness under Article
336 of the RPC committed against "children," as defined under Section 3 of R.A. No. 7610. Records of the Senate deliberation show
that "child prostitution" was originally defined as "minors, whether male or female, who, for money or profit, indulge in sexual
intercourse or lascivious conduct are deemed children exploited in prostitution."[119] With the late addition of the phrase "or subject to
other sexual abuse," which connotes "child abuse," and in line with the policy of R.A. No. 7610 to provide stronger deterrence and
special protection of children against child abuse, We take it to mean that Section 5(b) also intends to cover those crimes of child
sexual abuse already punished under the RPC, and not just those children exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse,
who are coerced or intimidated to indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct. This is the reason why We disagree with the view
of Justice Perlas-Bernabe that the first proviso under Section 5(b) — which provides that "when the victim is under twelve (12) years of
age, the perpetrators shall be prosecuted under x x x the Revised Penal Code, for rape or lascivious conduct, as the case may be" — is
a textual indicator that R.A. No. 7610 has a specific application only to children who are pre-disposed to "consent" to a sexual act
because they are "exploited in prostitution or subject to other sexual abuse," thereby negating the ponente's theory of general
applicability.
In People v. Larin,[120] We held that a child is deemed exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse, when the child
indulges in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct (a) for money, profit, or any other consideration; or (b) under the coercion or
influence of any adult, syndicate or group. Under R.A. No. 7610, children are "persons below eighteen years of age or those unable to
fully take care of themselves or protect themselves from abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation or discrimination because of their age or
mental disability or condition." Noting that the law covers not only a situation in which a child is abused for profit, but also one in which a
child, through coercion or intimidation, engages in any lascivious conduct, We ruled that Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610 penalizes not
only child prostitution, the essence of which is profit, but also other forms of sexual abuse of children. We stressed that this is clear from
the deliberations of the Senate, and that the law does not confine its protective mantle only to children under twelve (12) years of age.
In Amployo v. People,[121] citing Larin, We observed that Section 5 of R.A. No. 7610 does not merely cover a situation of a child being
abused for profit, but also one in which a child engages in any lascivious conduct through coercion or intimidation. As case law has it,
intimidation need not necessarily be irresistible. It is sufficient that some compulsion equivalent to intimidation annuls or subdues the
free exercise of the will of the offended party. This is especially true in the case of young, innocent and immature girls who could not be
expected to act with equanimity of disposition and with nerves of steel. Young girls cannot be expected to act like adults under the
same circumstances or to have the courage and intelligence to disregard the threat.
In Olivarez vs. Court of Appeals,[122] We held that a child is deemed subjected to other sexual abuse when the child indulges in
lascivious conduct under the coercion or influence of any adult. We found that the 16-year old victim in that case was sexually abused
because she was coerced or intimidated by petitioner to indulge in a lascivious conduct. We stated that it is inconsequential that the
sexual abuse occurred only once because, as expressly provided in Section 3(b) of R.A. 7610, the abuse may be habitual or not. We
also observed that Article III of R.A. 7610 is captioned as "Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse" because Congress really
intended to cover a situation where the minor may have been coerced or intimidated into lascivious conduct, not necessarily for money
or profit, hence, the law covers not only child prostitution but also other forms of sexual abuse.
In Garingarao v. People,[123] We ruled that a child is deemed subject to other sexual abuse when the child is the victim of lascivious
conduct under the coercion or influence of any adult. In lascivious conduct under the coercion or influence of any adult, there must be
some form of compulsion equivalent to intimidation which subdues the free exercise of the offended party's free will. We further ruled
that it is inconsequential that sexual abuse under R.A. No. 7610 occurred only once. Section 3(b) of R.A. No. 7610 provides that the
abuse may be habitual or not. Hence, the fact that the offense occurred only once is enough to hold an accused liable for acts of
lasciviousness under R.A. No. 7610.
In Quimvel,[124] We stressed that Section 5(a) of R.A. No. 7610 punishes acts pertaining to or connected with child prostitution wherein
the child is abused primarily for profit. On the other hand, paragraph (b) punishes sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct committed
on a child subjected to other sexual abuse. It covers not only a situation where a child is abused for profit but also one in which a child,
through coercion, intimidation or influence, engages in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct. Hence, the law punishes not only child
prostitution but also other forms of sexual abuse against children. This is even made clearer by the deliberations of the Senate, as cited
in the landmark ruling of People v. Larin. We also added that the very definition of "child abuse" under Section 3(b) of R.A. No. 7610
does not require that the victim suffer a separate and distinct act of sexual abuse aside from the act complained of, for it refers to the
maltreatment whether habitual or not, of the child. Thus, a violation of Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610 occurs even though the accused
committed sexual abuse against the child victim only once, even without a prior sexual offense.
In Caoili,[125] We reiterated that R.A. No. 7610 finds application when the victims of abuse, exploitation or discrimination are children or
those "persons below 18 years of age or those over but are unable to fully take care of themselves or protect themselves from abuse,
neglect, cruelty, exploitation or discrimination because of a physical or mental disability or condition." It has been settled that Section
5(b) of R.A. No. 7610 does not require a prior or contemporaneous abuse that is different from what is complained of, or that a third
person should act in concert with the accused. Section 5 of R.A. No. 7610 does not merely cover a situation of a child being abused for
profit, but also one in which a child is coerced to engage in lascivious conduct.
Meanwhile, Justice Marvic Mario Victor F. Leonen partly agrees with the ponencia that insertion of a finger into a minor's vagina
deserves a higher penalty than prision mayor under Article 266-A, paragraph 2 in relation to Article 266-B of the RPC. However, he
asserts that non consensual insertion of a finger in another's genitals is rape by carnal knowledge under Article 266-A, paragraph 1 of
the RPC. He also reiterates his view in People v. Quimvel that Article 336 of the RPC has already been rendered ineffective with the
passage of R.A. No. 8353.
We stand by our ruling in Caoili that the act of inserting a finger in another's genitals cannot be considered rape by carnal knowledge,
thus:
The language of paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 266-A of the RPC, as amended by R.A. No. 8353. provides the elements that
substantially differentiate the two forms of rape, i.e., rape by sexual intercourse and rape by sexual assault. It is through legislative
process that the dichotomy between these two modes of rape was created. To broaden the scope of rape by sexual assault, by
eliminating its legal distinction from rape through sexual intercourse, calls for judicial legislation which We cannot traverse without
violating the principle of separation of powers. The Court remains steadfast in confining its powers within the constitutional sphere of
applying the law as enacted by the Legislature.

In fine, given the material distinctions between the two modes of rape introduced in R.A. No. 8353, the variance doctrine cannot be
applied to convict an accused of rape by sexual assault if the crime charged is rape through sexual intercourse, since the former
offense cannot be considered subsumed in the latter.[126]
We also maintain the majority ruling in  Quimvel that Sec. 4 of R.A. No. 8353 did not expressly repeal Article 336 of the RPC for if it
were the intent of Congress, it would have expressly done so. Apropos is the following disquisition in Quimvel:
x x x  Rather, the phrase in Sec. 4 states: "deemed amended, modified, or repealed accordingly" qualifies "Article 335 of Act No. 3815,
as amended, and all laws, acts, presidential decrees, executive orders, administrative orders, rules and regulations inconsistent with or
contrary to the provisions of [RA 8353]."
As can be read, repeal is not the only fate that may befall statutory provisions that are inconsistent with RA 8353. It may be that mere
amendment or modification would suffice to reconcile the inconsistencies resulting from the latter law's enactment. In this case, Art. 335
of the RPC, which previously penalized rape through carnal knowledge, has been replaced by Art. 266-A. Thus, the reference by Art.
336 of the RPC to any of the circumstances mentioned on the erstwhile preceding article on how the crime is perpetrated should now
refer to the circumstances covered by Art. 266-A as introduced by the Anti-Rape Law.

We are inclined to abide by the Court's long-standing policy to disfavor repeals by implication for laws are presumed to be passed with
deliberation and full knowledge of all laws existing on the subject. The failure to particularly mention the law allegedly repealed
indicates that the intent was not to repeal the said law, unless an irreconcilable inconsistency and repugnancy exists in the terms of the
new and old laws. Here, RA 8353 made no specific mention of any RPC provision other than Art. 335 as having been amended,
modified, or repealed. And as demonstrated, the Anti Rape Law, on the one hand, and Art. 336 of the RPC, on the other, are not
irreconcilable. The only construction that can be given to the phrase "preceding article" is that Art. 336 of the RPC now refers to Art.
266-A in the place of the repealed Art. 335. It is, therefore, erroneous to claim that Acts of Lasciviousness can no longer be prosecuted
under the RPC.
It is likewise incorrect to claim that Art. 336 had been rendered inoperative by the Anti-Rape Law and argue in the same breath the
applicability of Sec. 5(b) of RA 7610. x x x

xxxx

If Art. 336 then ceased to be a penal provision in view of its alleged incompleteness, then so too would Sec. 5(b) of RA 7610 be
ineffective since it defines and punishes the prohibited act by way of reference to the RPC provision.

The decriminalization of Acts of Lasciviousness under the RPC, as per Justice Leonen's theory, would not sufficiently be supplanted by
RA 7610 and RA 9262, otherwise known as the Anti-Violence Against Women and their Children Law (Anti-VAWC Law). Under RA
7610, only minors can be considered victims of the enumerated forms of abuses therein. Meanwhile, the Anti-VAWC law limits the
victims of sexual abuses covered by the RA to a wife, former wife, or any women with whom the offender has had a dating or sexual
relationship, or against her child. Clearly, these laws do not provide ample protection against sexual offenders who do not discriminate
in selecting their victims. One does not have to be a child before he or she can be victimized by acts of lasciviousness. Nor does one
have to be a woman with an existing or prior relationship with the offender to fall prey. Anyone can be a victim of another's lewd design.
And if the Court will subscribe to Justice Leonen's position, it will render a large portion of our demographics (i.e., adult females who
had no prior relationship to the offender, and adult males) vulnerable to sexual abuses. [127]
To be sure, deliberation of Senate Bill No. 950 which became R.A. No. 8353 reveals the legislative intent not to repeal acts of
lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC as a crime against chastity, but only to reclassify rape as a crime against persons, thus:

Senator Enrile: x x x As I indicated last week, I will support this bill but I would like to clarify some points just to set the matters into the
Record.
Mr. President, the first thing I would like to find out is the status of this bill — whether this is going to be a statutory crime or a part of the
crimes defined in the Revised Penal Code.

There is a big difference between these two concepts, Mr. President, because all of us who have studied law know in our course in
Criminal Law two of crimes: Crimes which we call  malum prohibitum  which are statutory crimes and mala in se or crimes that would
require intent. That is why we always recite the principle that actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea. Because in every crime defined in
the Revised Penal Code, we required what they call a mens rea, meaning intent to commit a crime in almost all cases: attempted,
frustrated and consummated.
Now, am I now to understand, Madam Sponsor, that this type of crime will be taken out of the Revised Penal Code and shall be
covered by a special law making it a statutory crime rather than a crime that is committed with the accompaniment of intent.

Senator Shahani: Mr. President, we will recall that this was the topic of prolonged interpellations not only by Senator Enrile, but also by
Senator Sotto. In consultation with Senator Roco - we were not able to get in touch with Senator Santiago — we felt that the purpose of
this bill would be better served if we limited the bill to amending Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, at the same time expanding the
definition of rape, reclassifying the same as a crime against persons, providing evidentiary requirements and procedures for the
effective prosecution of offenders, and institutionalizing measures for the protection and rehabilitation of rape victims and for other
purposes. In other words, it stays within the Revised Penal Code, and rape is associated with criminal intent.
Having said this, it means that there will be a new chapter. They are proposing a new chapter to be known as Chapter III on rape, under
Title 8 of the Revised Penal Code. There it remains as a crime against persons and no longer as a crime against chastity, but the
criminal intent is retained.

Senator Enrile. So, the distinction between rape as a crime, although now converted from a crime against chastity to a crime
against persons, and seduction and act of lasciviousness would be maintained. Am I correct in this, Mr. President?
Senator Shahani. That is correct, Mr. President.[128]
In light of the foregoing disquisition, We hold that Tulagan was aptly prosecuted for sexual assault under paragraph 2, Article 266-A of
the RPC in Criminal Case. No. SCC-6210 because it was alleged and proven that AAA was nine (9) years old at the time he inserted
his finger into her vagina. Instead of applying the penalty under Article 266-B of the RPC, which is prision mayor, the proper penalty
should be that provided in Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610, which is reclusion temporal in its medium period. This is because
AAA was below twelve (12) years of age at the time of the commission of the offense, and that the act of inserting his finger in AAA's
private part undeniably amounted to "lascivious conduct."[129] Hence, the proper nomenclature of the offense should be Sexual Assault
under paragraph 2, Article 266-A of the RPC, in relation to Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum term of the indeterminate penalty shall be that which could be properly
imposed under the law, which is fifteen (15) years, six (6) months and twenty (20) days of reclusion temporal. On the other hand, the
minimum term shall be within the range of the penalty next lower in degree, which is reclusion temporal in its minimum period, or twelve
(12) years and one (1) day to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months. Hence, Tulagan should be meted the indeterminate sentence of
twelve (12) years, ten (10) months and twenty-one (21) days of reclusion temporal, as minimum, to fifteen (15) years, six (6) months
and twenty (20) days of reclusion temporal, as maximum.
In Criminal Case No. SCC-6211 for statutory rape, We affirm that Tulagan should suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua in accordance
with paragraph 1(d), Article 266-A in relation to Article 266-B of the RPC, as amended by R.A. No. 8353.
Damages
For the sake of consistency and uniformity, We deem it proper to address the award of damages in cases of Sexual Assault under
paragraph 2, Article 266-A of the RPC in relation to Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610, and Acts of Lasciviousness under Article 336 of the
RPC in relation to Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610. Considering that the imposable penalties for the said two crimes are within the range
of reclusion temporal, the award of civil indemnity and moral damages should now be fixed in the amount of P50,000.00 each. The said
amount is based on People v. Jugueta[130] which awards civil indemnity and moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00 each in cases
of homicide where the imposable penalty is reclusion temporal. In case exemplary damages are awarded due to the presence of any
aggravating circumstance, to set a public example, or to deter elders who abuse and corrupt the youth, then an equal amount of
P50,000.00 should likewise be awarded.
The said award of civil indemnity, moral damages and exemplary damages should be distinguished from those awarded in cases of: (1)
Acts of Lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC where the imposable penalty is prision correccional, the amount of civil indemnity
and moral damages should now be fixed at P20,000.00 while exemplary damages, if warranted, should also be P20,000.00; (2) Sexual
Assault under paragraph 2, Article 266-A of the RPC where the imposable penalty is prision mayor, the award of civil indemnity and
moral damages should be fixed at P30,000.00 each, while the award of exemplary damages, if warranted, should also be P30,000.00
pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence;[131] and (3) Lascivious conduct under Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610, when the penalty of reclusion
perpetua is imposed, and the award of civil indemnity, moral damages and exemplary damages is P75,000.00 each.
The justification for the award of civil indemnity, moral damages and exemplary damages was discussed in People v. Combate,[132] as
follows:
First, civil indemnity ex delicto is the indemnity authorized in our criminal law for the offended party, in the amount authorized by the
prevailing judicial policy and apart from other proven actual damages, which itself is equivalent to actual or compensatory damages in
civil law. This award stems from Article 100 of the RPC which states, "Every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable."
Civil liability ex delicto may come in the form of restitution, reparation, and indemnification. Restitution is defined as the compensation
for loss; it is full or partial compensation paid by a criminal to a victim ordered as part of a criminal sentence or as a condition for
probation. Likewise, reparation and indemnification are similarly defined as the compensation for an injury, wrong, loss, or damage
sustained. Clearly, all of these correspond to actual or compensatory damages defined under the Civil Code.
xxxx

The second type of damages the Court awards are moral damages, which are also compensatory in nature. Del Mundo v. Court of
Appeals expounded on the nature and purpose of moral damages, viz.:
Moral damages, upon the other hand, may be awarded to compensate one for manifold injuries such as physical suffering, mental
anguish, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings and social humiliation. These damages must be understood to be in
the concept of grants, not punitive or corrective in nature, calculated to compensate the claimant for the injury suffered. Although
incapable of exactness and no proof of pecuniary loss is necessary in order that moral damages may be awarded, the amount of
indemnity being left to the discretion of the court, it is imperative, nevertheless, that (1) injury must have been suffered by the claimant,
and (2) such injury must have sprung from any of the cases expressed in Article 2219 and Article 2220 of the Civil Code x x x.
Similarly, in American jurisprudence, moral damages are treated as "compensatory damages awarded for mental pain and suffering or
mental anguish resulting from a wrong." They may also be considered and allowed "for resulting pain and suffering, and for humiliation,
indignity, and vexation suffered by the plaintiff as result of his or her assailant's conduct, as well as the factors of provocation, the
reasonableness of the force used, the attendant humiliating circumstances, the sex of the victim, [and] mental distress."
The rationale for awarding moral damages has been explained in Lambert v. Heirs of Rey Castillon: "[T]he award of moral damages is
aimed at a restoration, within the limits possible, of the spiritual status quo ante; and therefore, it must be proportionate to the suffering
inflicted."
Corollarily, moral damages under Article 2220 of the Civil Code also does not fix the amount of damages that can be awarded. It is
discretionary upon the court, depending on the mental anguish or the suffering of the private offended party. The amount of moral
damages can, in relation to civil indemnity, be adjusted so long as it does not exceed the award of civil indemnity.
xxxx

Being corrective in nature, exemplary damages, therefore, can be awarded, not only due to the presence of an aggravating
circumstance, but also where the circumstances of the case show the highly reprehensible or outrageous conduct of the offender. In
much the same way as Article 2230 prescribes an instance when exemplary damages may be awarded, Article 2229, the main
provision, lays down the very basis of the award. Thus, in People v. Matrimonio, the Court imposed exemplary damages to deter other
fathers with perverse tendencies or aberrant sexual behavior from sexually abusing their own daughters. Also, in People v. Cristobal,
the Court awarded exemplary damages on account of the moral corruption, perversity and wickedness of the accused in sexually
assaulting a pregnant married woman. In People of the Philippines v. Cristino Cañada, People of the Philippines v. Pepito Neverio and
People of the Philippines v. Lorenzo Layco, Sr., the Court awarded exemplary damages to set a public example, to serve as deterrent
to elders who abuse and corrupt the youth, and to protect the latter from sexual abuse.[133]
In summary, the award of civil indemnity, moral damages and exemplary damages in Acts of Lasciviousness under Article 336 of the
RPC, Acts of Lasciviousness in relation to Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610, Lascivious Conduct under Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610,
Sexual Assault under paragraph 2, Article 266-A of the RPC, and Sexual Assault in relation to Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610, are as
follows:

Crime Civil Indemnity Moral Damages Exemplary Damages[134]

Acts of Lasciviousness P20,000.00 P20,000.00 P20,000.00
under Article 336 of the
RPC [Victim is of legal
age]
Acts of lasciviousness in P50,000.00 P50,000.00 P50,000.00
relation to Section 5(b) of
R.A. No. 7610 [Victim is
a child under 12 years old
or is demented]
Sexual Abuse or P75,000.00 (If penalty P75,000.00 (If penalty P75,000.00 (If penalty
Lascivious Conduct under imposed is reclusion imposed is reclusion imposed is reclusion
Section 5(b) of R.A. No. perpetua) perpetua) perpetua)
7610 [Victim is a child 12 P50,000.00 (If penalty P50,000.00 (If penalty P50,000.00 (If penalty
years old and below 18, or imposed is within the imposed is within the imposed is within the
above 18 under special range of reclusion range of reclusion range of reclusion
circumstances] temporal medium) temporal medium) temporal medium)
Sexual Assault under P30,000.00 P30,000.00 P30,000.00
Article 266-A(2) of the
RPC [Victim is of legal
age]
Sexual Assault under P50,000.00 P50,000.00 P50,000.00
Article 266-A(2) of the
RPC in relation to Section
5(b) of R.A. No. 7610
[Victim is a child under
12 years old or is
demented]
It is settled that an award of civil indemnity ex delicto is mandatory upon a finding of the fact of rape, and moral damages may be
automatically awarded in rape cases without need of proof of mental and physical suffering. The award of exemplary damages is also
called for to set a public example and to protect the young from sexual abuse. As to the civil liability in Criminal Case No. SCC-6210 for
sexual assault under paragraph 2, Article 266-A of the RPC, in relation to Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610, Tulagan should, therefore, pay
AAA the amounts of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P50,000.00 as exemplary damages.
Anent the award of damages in Criminal Case No. SCC-6211 for statutory rape, We modify the same in line with the ruling in People v.
Jugueta,[135] where We held that "when the circumstances surrounding the crime call for the imposition of reclusion perpetua only, there
being no ordinary aggravating circumstance, the proper amounts should be P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral
damages, and P75,000.00 as exemplary damages." Also in consonance with prevailing jurisprudence, the amount of damages
awarded shall earn interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the finality of this judgment until said amounts are fully paid.
Over and above the foregoing, We observe that despite the clear intent of R.A. No. 7610 to provide for stronger deterrence and special
protection against child abuse, the penalty for violation of Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610 [reclusion temporal medium] when the victim is
under 12 years old is lower compared to the penalty [reclusion temporal medium to reclusion perpetua] when the victim is 12 years old
and below 18. The same holds true if the crime of acts of lasciviousness is attended by an aggravating circumstance or committed by
persons under Section 31,[136] Article XII of R.A. No. 7610, in which case, the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua. In contrast, when
no mitigating or aggravating circumstance attended the crime of acts of lasciviousness, the penalty therefor when committed against a
child under 12 years old is aptly higher than the penalty when the child is 12 years old and below 18. This is because, applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum term in the case of the younger victims shall be taken from reclusion temporal minimum,
[137]
 whereas as the minimum term in the case of the older victims shall be taken from prision mayor medium to reclusion
temporal minimum.[138] It is a basic rule in statutory construction that what courts may correct to reflect the real and apparent intention of
the legislature are only those which are clearly clerical errors or obvious mistakes, omissions, and misprints,[139] but not those due to
oversight, as shown by a review of extraneous circumstances, where the law is clear, and to correct it would be to change the meaning
of the law.[140] Thus, a corrective legislation is the proper remedy to address the noted incongruent penalties for acts of lasciviousness
committed against a child.
We further note that R.A. No. 8353 did not expressly repeal Article 336 of the RPC, as amended. Section 4 of R.A. No. 8353 only states
that Article 336 of the RPC, as amended, and all laws, rules and regulations inconsistent with or contrary to the provisions thereof are
deemed amended, modified or repealed, accordingly. There is nothing inconsistent between the provisions of Article 336 of the RPC,
as amended, and R.A. No. 8353, except in sexual assault as a form of rape. To recall, R.A. No. 8353 only modified Article 336 of the
RPC, as follows: (1) by carrying over to acts of lasciviousness the additional circumstances[141] applicable to rape, viz.: threat and
fraudulent machinations or grave abuse of authority; (2) by retaining the circumstance that the offended party is under 12 years old, and
including dementia as another one, in order for acts of lasciviousness to be considered as statutory, wherein evidence of force or
intimidation is immaterial because the offended party who is under 12 years old or demented, is presumed incapable of giving rational
consent; and (3) by removing from the scope of acts of lasciviousness and placing under the crime of rape by sexual assault the
specific lewd act of inserting the offender's penis into another person's mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or object into the genital
or anal orifice of another person. Hence, Article 336 of the RPC, as amended, is still a good law despite the enactment of R.A. No. 8353
for there is no irreconcilable inconsistency between their provisions. When the lascivious act is not covered by R.A. No. 8353, then
Article 336 of the RPC is applicable, except when the lascivious conduct is covered by R.A. No. 7610.
We are also not unmindful of the fact that the accused who commits acts of lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC, in relation to
Section 5 (b) of R.A. No. 7610, suffers the more severe penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period, than the one who commits
Rape Through Sexual Assault, which is merely punishable by prision mayor.
In People v. Chingh,[142] We noted that the said fact is undeniably unfair to the child victim, and it was not the intention of the framers of
R.A. No. 8353 to have disallowed the applicability of R.A. No. 7610 to sexual abuses committed to children. We held that despite the
passage of R.A. No. 8353, R.A. No. 7610 is still a good law, which must be applied when the victims are children or those "persons
below eighteen (18) years of age or those over but are unable to fully take care of themselves or protect themselves from abuse,
neglect, cruelty, exploitation or discrimination because of a physical or mental disability or condition."[143]
In Dimakuta, We added that where the lascivious conduct is covered by the definition under R.A. No. 7610, where the penalty
is reclusion temporal medium and the said act is, likewise, covered by sexual assault under Art. 266-A, paragraph 2 of the RPC, which
is punishable by prision mayor, the offender should be liable for violation of Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610, where the law
provides the higher penalty of reclusion temporal medium, if the offended party is a child. But if the victim is at least eighteen (18) years
of age, the offender should be liable under Art. 266-A, par. 2 of the RPC and not R.A. No. 7610, unless the victim is at least 18 years
old and she is unable to fully take care of herself or protect herself from abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation or discrimination because
of a physical or mental disability or condition, in which case, the offender may still be held liable of sexual abuse under R.A. No. 7610.
The reason for the foregoing is that with respect to lascivious conduct, R.A. No. 7610 affords special protection and stronger deterrence
against child abuse, as compared to R.A. No. 83.53 which specifically amended the RPC provisions on rape.
Finally, despite the enactment of R.A. No. 8353 more than 20 years ago in 1997, We had been consistent in our rulings in Larin,
Olivarez, and Garingarao, Quimvel and Caoili, all of which uphold the intent of R.A. No. 7610 to provide special protection of children
and stronger deterrence against child abuse. Judicial stability compels to stand by, but not to abandon, our sound rulings: [1] that
Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610 penalizes not only child prostitution, the essence of which is profit, but also other forms of
sexual abuse wherein a child engages in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct through coercion or influence; and [2] that it is
inconsequential that the sexual abuse occurred only once. Our rulings also find textual anchor on Section 5, Article III of R.A. No. 7610,
which explicitly states that a child is deemed "exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse," when the child indulges in
sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct for money, profit or any other consideration, or under the coercion or influence of any adult,
syndicate or group, as well as on Section 3(b), Article I thereof, which clearly provides that the term "child abuse" refers to the
maltreatment, whether habitual or not, of the child which includes sexual abuse.
If the lawmakers disagreed with our interpretation, they could have easily amended the law, just like what they did when they enacted
R.A. No. 10591[144] [Amendment on the provision of use of firearm in the commission of a crime], R.A. No. 10951[145] [Amendments to
certain penalty and fines under the Revised Penal Code] and R.A. No. 10707[146] [Amendments to the Probation Law] after We
rendered People v. Ladjaalam,[147] Corpuz v. People,[148] Colinares v. People and Dimakuta v. People, respectively, and their silence
could only be construed as acquiescence to our rulings.
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the appeal is DENIED. The Joint Decision dated February 10, 2014 of the Regional Trial
Court in Criminal Case Nos. SCC-6210 and SCC-6211, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals Decision dated August 17, 2015 in CA-
G.R. CR-HC No. 06679, is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. We find accused-appellant Salvador Tulagan:
1. Guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Sexual Assault under paragraph 2, Article 266-A of the Revised
Penal Code, in relation to Section 5(b) of Republic Act No. 7610, in Criminal Case No. SCC-6210, and is
sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of twelve (12) years, ten (10) months and twenty-one (21)
days of reclusion temporal, as minimum, to fifteen (15) years, six (6) months and twenty (20) days
of reclusion temporal, as maximum. Appellant is ORDERED to PAY AAA the amounts of P50,000.00 as
civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P50,000.00 as exemplary damages.

2. Guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Statutory Rape under Article 266-A(1)(d) and penalized in Article
266-B of the Revised Penal Code, in Criminal Case No. SCC-6211, and is sentenced to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua with modification as to the award of damages. Appellant is ORDERED to PAY AAA
the amounts of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages, and P75,000.00 as exemplary
damages.
Legal interest of six percent (6%) per annum is imposed on all damages awarded from the date of finality of this Decision until fully paid.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Department of Justice, the Office of the Solicitor General, the Office of the Court
Administrator, and the Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals, for their guidance and information, as well as the House of
Representatives and the Senate of the Philippines, as reference for possible statutory amendments on the maximum penalty for
lascivious conduct under Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610 when the victim is under 12 years of age [reclusion
temporal medium], and when the victim is 12 years old and below 18, or 18 or older under special circumstances [reclusion
temporal medium to reclusion perpetua] under Section 3(a) of R.A. No. 7610.
15.) G.R. No. L-5691 December 27, 1910

S. D. MARTINEZ and his wife, CARMEN ONG DE MARTINEZ, plaintiffs-appellees,

vs.
WILLIAM VAN BUSKIRK, defendant-appellant.

Lionel D. Hargis for appellant.

Sanz and Oppisso for appellee.

MORELAND, J.:

The facts found by the trial court are undisputed by either party in this case. They are —

That on the 11th day of September, 1908, the plaintiff, Carmen Ong de Martinez, was riding in a carromata
on Calle Real, district of Ermita, city of Manila, P.I., along the left-hand side of the street as she was going,
when a delivery wagon belonging to the defendant used for the purpose of transportation of fodder by the
defendant, and to which was attached a pair of horses, came along the street in the opposite direction to
that the in which said plaintiff was proceeding, and that thereupon the driver of the said plaintiff's carromata,
observing that the delivery wagon of the defendant was coming at great speed, crowded close to the
sidewalk on the left-hand side of the street and stopped, in order to give defendant's delivery wagon an
opportunity to pass by, but that instead of passing by the defendant's wagon and horses ran into the
carromata occupied by said plaintiff with her child and overturned it, severely wounding said plaintiff by
making a serious cut upon her head, and also injuring the carromata itself and the harness upon the horse
which was drawing it.

x x x           x x x          x x x

These facts are not dispute, but the defendant presented evidence to the effect that the cochero, who was
driving his delivery wagon at the time the accident occurred, was a good servant and was considered a safe
and reliable cochero; that the delivery wagon had sent to deliver some forage at Paco Livery Stable on Calle
Herran, and that for the purpose of delivery thereof the cochero driving the team as defendant's employee
tied the driving lines of the horses to the front end of the delivery wagon and then went back inside of the
wagon for the purpose of unloading the forage to be delivered; that while unloading the forage and in the act
of carrying some of it out, another vehicle drove by, the driver of which cracked a whip and made some
other noises, which frightened the horses attached to the delivery wagon and they ran away, and the driver
was thrown from the inside of the wagon out through the rear upon the ground and was unable to stop the
horses; that the horses then ran up and on which street they came into collision with the carromata in which
the plaintiff, Carmen Ong de Martinez, was riding.

The defendant himself was not with the vehicle on the day in question.

Upon these facts the court below found the defendant guilty of negligence and gave judgment against him for
P442.50, with interest thereon at the rate of 6 per cent per annum from the 17th day of October, 1908, and for the
costs of the action. The case is before us on an appeal from that judgment.

There is no general law of negligence in the Philippine Islands except that embodied in the Civil Code. The
provisions of that code pertinent to this case are —

Art. 1902. A person who by an act or omission causes damage to another when there is fault or negligence
shall be obliged to repair the damage so done.

Art. 1903. The obligation imposed by preceding article is demandable, not only for personal acts and
omissions, but also for those of the persons for whom they should be responsible.
 The father, and on his death or incapacity the mother, is liable for the damages caused by the minors who
live with them.

Guardians are liable for the damages caused by minors or incapacitated persons who are under their
authority and live with them.

Owners of directors of an establishment or enterprise are equally liable for the damages caused by the
employees in the service of the branches in which the latter may be employed or on account of their duties.

The State is liable in this sense when it acts through a special agent, but not when the damages should
have been caused by the official to whom properly it pertained to do the act performed, in which case the
provisions of the preceding article shall be applicable.

Finally, masters or directors of arts and trades are liable for the damages caused by their pupils or
apprentices while they are under their custody.

The liability referred to in this article shall cease when the persons mentioned therein prove that they
employed all the diligence of a good father of a family to avoid the damage.

Passing the question whether or not an employer who has furnished a gentle and tractable team and a trusty and
capable driver is, under the last paragraph of the above provisions, liable for the negligence of such driver in
handling the team, we are of the opinion that the judgment must be reversed upon the ground that the evidence
does not disclose that the cochero was negligent.

While the law relating to negligence in this jurisdiction may possibly be some what different from that in Anglo-Saxon
countries, a question we do not now discuss, the rules under which the fact of negligence is determined are,
nevertheless, generally the same. That is to say, while the law designating the person responsible for a negligent
act may not be the same here as in many jurisdictions, the law determining what is a negligent act is the same here,
generally speaking, as elsewhere. (Supreme court of Spain, 4 December, 1903; 16 May, 1893; 27 June, 1894; 9
April, 1896; 14 March, 1901; 2 March, 1904; 7 February, 1905; 16 June, 1905; 23 June, 1905; 13 April, 1903; 7
March, 1902; 12 June, 1900; 2 March, 1907; 18 March, 1898; 3 June, 1901.)

It appears from the undisputed evidence that the horses which caused the damage were gentle and tractable; that
the cochero was experienced and capable; that he had driven one of the horses several years and the other five or
six months; that he had been in the habit, during all that time, of leaving them in the condition in which they were left
on the day of the accident; that they had never run away up to that time and there had been, therefore, no accident
due to such practice; that to leave the horses and assist in unloading the merchandise in the manner
described on the day of the accident was the custom of all cochero who delivered merchandise of the
character of that which was being delivered by the cochero of the defendant on the day in question, which custom
was sanctioned by their employers.

In our judgment, the cochero of the defendant was not negligent in leaving the horses in the manner
described by the evidence in this case, either under Spanish or American jurisprudence. (Lynch vs. Nurdin, 1 Q.
B., 422; Rumsey vs. Nelson, 58 Vt., 590; Drake vs. Mount, 33 N. J. L., 442; Hoboken Land and Improvement
Co. vs. Lally, 48 N. J. L., 604; Wasmer vs. D. L. & W. R. R. Co., 80 N. Y., 212.)  lawphi1 .net

In the case of Hayman vs. Hewitt (Peake N. P. Cas., pt. 2, p. 170), Lord Kenyon said:

He was performing his duty while removing the goods into the house, and, if every person who suffered a
cart to remain in the street while he took goods out of it was obliged to employ another to look after the
horses, it would be impossible for the business of the metropolis to go on.

In the case of Griggs vs. Fleckenstein (14 Minn., 81), the court said:

The degree of care required of the plaintiff, or those in charged of his horse, at the time of the injury, is that
which would be exercised by a person of ordinary care and prudence under like circumstances. It can not be
said that the fact of leaving the horse unhitched is in itself negligence. Whether it is negligence to leave a
 horse unhitched must be depend upon the disposition of the horse; whether he was under the observation
and control of some person all the time, and many other circumstances; and is a question to be determined
by the jury from the facts of each case.

In the case of Belles vs. Kellner (67 N. J. L., 255), it was held that it was error on the part of the trial court to refuse
to charge that "it is not negligence for the driver of a quite, gentle horse to leave him unhitched and otherwise
unattended on the side of a public highways while the driver is upon the sidewalk loading goods on the wagon." The
said court closed its opinion with these words:

There was evidence which could have fully justified the jury in finding that the horse was quite and gentle,
and that the driver was upon the sidewalk loading goods on the wagon, at time of the alleged injury, and that
the horse had been used for years in that way without accident. The refusal of the trial court to charge as
requested left the jury free to find was verdict against the defendant, although the jury was convinced that
these facts were proven. lawphil.net

In the case of Southworth vs. Ry. Co. (105 Mass., 342), it was held:

That evidence that a servant, whom traders employed to deliver goods, upon stopping with his horse and
wagon to deliver a parcel at a house from fifty to a hundred rods from a railroad crossing, left the horse
unfastened for four or five minutes while he was in the house, knowing that it was not afraid of cars, and
having used it for three or four months without ever hitching it or knowing it to start, is not conclusive, as a
matter of law, of a want of due care on his part.

The duty, a violation of which is claimed to be negligence in the respect in question, is to exercise reasonable care
and prudence. Where reasonable care is employed in doing an act not itself illegal or inherently likely to produce
damage to others, there will be no liability, although damage in fact ensues. (Milwaukee Ry. Co. vs. Arms, 91 U. S.,
489; Parrott vs. Wells, 15 Wall., 524; Brown vs. Kendall, 6 Cushing, 292; Jackson Architectural Iron
Works vs. Hurlbut, 158 N. Y., 34 Westerfield vs. Levis, 43 La. An., 63; Niosi vs. Empire Steam Laundry, 117 Cal.,
257.)

The act of defendant's driver in leaving the horses in the manner proved was not unreasonable or imprudent. Acts
the performance of which has not proved destructive or injurious and which have, therefore, been acquiesced in by
society for so long a time that they have ripened into custom, can not be held to be themselves unreasonable or
imprudent. Indeed the very reason why they have been permitted by society is that they beneficial rather than
prejudicial.  Accidents sometimes happen and injuries result from the most ordinary acts of life. But such are not
itc-alf

their natural or customary results. To hold that, because such an act once resulted in accident or injury, the actor is
necessarily negligent, is to go far. The fact that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is sometimes successfully invoked in
such a case, does not in any sense militate against the reasoning presented. That maxim at most only creates
a prima facie case, and that only in the absence of proof of the circumstances under which the act complained of
was performed. It is something invoked in favor of the plaintiff before defendant's case showing the conditions and
circumstances under which the injury occurred, the creative reason for the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur disappears.
This is demonstrated by the case of Inland and Seaboard Costing Co. vs. Tolson (139 U.S., 551), where the court
said (p. 554):

. . . The whole effect of the instruction in question, as applied to the case before the jury, was that if the
steamboat, on a calm day and in smooth water, was thrown with such force against a wharf properly built, as
to tear up some of the planks of the flooring, this would be prima facie evidence of negligence on the part of
the defendant's agent in making the landing, unless upon the whole evidence in the case this prima
facie evidence was rebutted. As such damage to a wharf is not ordinarily done by a steamboat under control
of her officers and carefully managed by them, evidence that such damage was done in this case was prima
facie, and, if unexplained, sufficient evidence of negligence on their part, and the jury might properly be so
instructed.

There was presented in this case, and by the plaintiffs themselves, not only the fact of the runway and the accident
resulting therefrom, but also the conditions under which the runaway occurred. Those conditions showing of
themselves that the defendant's cochero was not negligent in the management of the horse, the prima facie case in
plaintiffs' favor, if any, was destroyed as soon as made.
It is a matter of common knowledge as well as proof that it is the universal practice of merchants to deliver
merchandise of the kind of that being delivered at the time of the injury, in the manner in which that was then being
delivered; and that it is the universal practice to leave the horses in the manner in which they were left at the time of
the accident. This is the custom in all cities. It has not been productive of accidents or injuries. The public, finding
itself unprejudiced by such practice, has acquiesced for years without objection. Ought the public now, through the
courts, without prior objection or notice, to be permitted to reverse the practice of decades and thereby make
culpable and guilty one who had every reason and assurance to believe that he was acting under the sanction of the
strongest of all civil forces, the custom of a people? We think not.

The judgement is reversed, without special finding as to costs. So ordered.

 16.) [ G.R. No. 249011, March 15, 2021 ]

CRISTITA ANABAN, CRISPINA ANABAN, PUREZA ANABAN, CRESENCIA ANABAN-WALANG, AND ROSITA
ANABAN-BARISTO, PETITIONERS, VS. BETTY ANABAN-ALFILER, MERCEDES ANABAN, AND MARCELO
ANABAN, RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

LAZARO-JAVIER, J.:

The Case

This petition for review on certiorari1 seeks to reverse and set aside the Decision2 dated July 24, 2019 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 154216 affirming the nullity of the bigamous marriage between Pedrito Anaban
(Pedrito) and Pepang Guilabo (Pepang) and petitioners Cristita Anaban, Crispina Anaban, Pureza Anaban,
Cresencia Anaban-Walang, and Rosita Anaban-Baristo's status as illegitimate children of Pedrito and must inherit
only as such.

Antecedents

In 1942, Pedrito Anaban (Pedrito) and Virginia Erasmo (Virginia) got married in accordance with the native customs
of the Ibaloi Tribe to which they both belonged. They had three (3) children, i.e., respondents Betty Anaban-Alfiler,
Mercedes Anaban, and Marcelo Anaban.3

In 1947, however, the council of tribe elders took notice of Virginia's insanity and based thereon approved the
couple's divorce and allowed Pedrito to remarry.4

In 1952, Pedrito got married to fellow Ibaloi Pepang still in accordance with their tribe's customs. They begot eight
(8) children – Lardi Anaban, Teodoro Anaban, Monina Anaban and respondents Cristita Anaban, Crispina Anaban,
Pureza Anaban, Cresencia Anaban-Walang, and Rosita Anaban-Baristo.5

Upon Pedrito's death on September 2, 2004, respondents sued for summary settlement or judicial partition of the
intestate estate of their father Pedrito.6 They named as respondents their half-siblings, petitioners Cristita Anaban,
Crispina Anaban, Pureza Anaban, Cresencia Anaban-Walang, and Rosita Anaban-Baristo.

Respondents averred that during the marriage of their father Pedrito to their mother Virginia, Pedrito acquired from
his father Pedro Anaban a portion of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-14574. But the new
certificate of title issued to Pedrito reflected that he was married to petitioners' mother Pepang. Although in truth, his
marriage with their mother Virginia was not yet legally dissolved. Thus, petitioners are actually the illegitimate
children of their father Pedrito.7

Petitioners, on the other hand, argued that they are the legitimate children of their father Pedrito with their mother
Pepang. Pedrito and respondents' mother Virginia were married in accordance with the Ibaloi Tribe customs and
their marriage was also dissolved in accordance with Ibaloi tribe customs and traditions. Thereafter, Pedrito married
their (petitioners') mother Pepang similarly in accord with the Ibaloi customs. Since the celebration of marriage
pursuant to a tribe's customs was recognized under the Old Civil Code of the Philippines, then its dissolution in
accordance with that tribe's customs must also be recognized. Thus, both the marriage and the subsequent divorce
between Pedrito and Virginia are valid. Consequently, the marriage of their parents must also be deemed valid.8

Ruling of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC)

By Decision9 dated September 28, 2015, the MCTC ruled that, first, the marriage between Pedrito and Virginia was
validly dissolved in accordance with the customs of the Ibaloi tribe; and second, petitioners are the legitimate
children of Pedrito who must succeed in equal proportion with respondents, viz.:
WHEREFORE, from the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered as follows by declaring and ordering that:

1. The entire intestate estate of Pedrito Anaban consists of his exclusive property described as the parcel of
land with an area of 1.8 hectares located at Calot, Sablan, Benguet and registered in the name of Pedrito
Anaban under TCT No. T-14575;

2. Petitioners Betty Anaban-Alfiler, Mercedes Anaban and Marcelo (Billy) Anaban and respondents Teodoro
Anaban, Cristita Anaban, Crispina Anaban, Pureza Anaban, Monina Anaban, Crese[n]cia (Esterlita)
Anaban-Walang and Rosita Anaban-Baristo are the true and lawful heirs of the late Pedrito Anaban and
entitled to inherit the intestate estate left [by] the said deceased;

3. Said true and lawful heirs of the late Pedrito Anaban shall divide the subject parcel of land covered by
TCT No. T-14575 into ten equal shares of 1,800 square meters each;

4. Within 30 days from [the] finality of this Decision, Administratrix Betty Alfiler is ordered to prepare a project
of partition of the intestate estate of the late Pedrito Anaban for [purposes] of distribution and delivery to the
heirs their corresponding shares, the identification of which should be mutually agreed by the heirs. In the
event that identification of the location of the specific shares will not be agreed upon mutually, the same
shall be identified through draw lots; and

5. Administratrix Betty Alfiler is likewise hereby ordered to render her final accounting of her administration
of the intestate estate of the late Pedrito Anaban also within 30 days from finality of this Decision.

SO ORDERED.10

It held that since the tribe elders approved Pedrito and Virginia's divorce. Subsequently, the tribe elders also
approved Pedrito and Pepang's marriage in accordance with the Ibaloi customs. Thus, Pedrito's marriage with
Pepang was as valid as his marriage to Virginia. Petitioners, therefore, are also Pedrito's legitimate children.11

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)

On appeal, RTC-Branch 10, La Trinidad, Benguet, by Decision12 dated October 10, 2017, declared as bigamous
the marriage of Pedrito and Pepang, thus:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the appeal is partially GRANTED.

The Decision of the court a quo declaring that the intestate estate of the decedent consists only of that parcel of
land with an area of 18,574 square meters, registered in the name of the decedent under Transfer Certificate of Title
No. T-14575 is hereby AFFIRMED.

The Court finds the marriage between the decedent, PEDRITO ANABAN and Pepang Guilabo bigamous and VOID.
Respondent-appellees are, therefore, illegitimate. Necessarily, Petitioner-appellants, as legitimate children, shall
equally divide the entire one-half of their father's estate, while Respondent-appellees, as illegitimate children, shall
equally divide the other half thereof. Thus, assuming that no creditor's claim may be deducted upon finality of this
judgment, each of Petitioner-appellants shall be entitled to a share of 3,095.66 square meters. The other one-half
remaining portion shall be apportioned equally between and among Respondent-appellees. Thus, also assuming
that no creditor's claim may be deducted, Respondent-appellees will get a share of 1,326.71 square meters each
from their father's estate. The Decision of the court a quo stating the contrary is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE.

Prior to distribution, the court a quo should ensure that the required publication of the notice of hearing of the
petition and the notice to creditors be complied with and the claims of creditors, if any, are disposed of.

SO ORDERED.13

It held that customs and traditions cannot supplant existing laws unless specifically provided under said laws. Under
the Civil Code, a subsisting marriage may be dissolved only by death of either spouse or when the marriage is
annulled or declared void. True, Article 78 of the old Civil Code recognizes the validity of marriages performed in
accordance with the couple's customs, rites, or practices, but this recognition is limited to the solemnization of
marriage and does not extend to its dissolution. Thus, Pedrito's purported divorce from Virginia cannot be legally
recognized. It follows, therefore, that Pedrito's marriage to Pepang was bigamous, hence, void. In the eyes of the
law, his marriage to Virginia subsisted. Consequently, petitioners are illegitimate children of Pedrito.14

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

By its assailed Decision15 dated July 24, 2019, the Court of Appeals affirmed.

The Court of Appeals ruled that Article 78 of the old Civil Code was unequivocal – it only referred to celebration of
marriage. There was nothing therein implying that the framers also intended to include the validity of divorce
decreed in accordance with non-Christian rites or customs. As the statute is clear, its literal meaning must be
applied without attempt at any further interpretation.16

More, Section 8, Rule VI of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of Republic Act No. 8371 (RA 8371),
otherwise known as the Indigenous People's Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA) also limits the State's recognition of
marriages to those solemnized pursuant to the non-Christian's rites and customs. It does not mention anything
about the State recognition of dissolution of marriages in accordance with non-Christian practices.17

It is true that the State has permitted divorce between Muslim Filipinos after the enactment of the Code of Muslim
Personal Laws; but not divorce in other local tribes.18

The Court of Appeals opined that while it commiserated with the plight of petitioners and the rest of those non-
Christians who contracted subsequent marriages, honestly believing that their previous marriages had already been
dissolved by a divorce decree in accordance with their customs, the court cannot do anything as the matter is for the
exclusive consideration of the legislature and not of the judiciary. 19

The Present Petition

Petitioners now pray that the disposition of the Court of Appeals be reversed and set aside. They maintain that
Pedrito’s marriage with Virginia had already been legally dissolved before he got married to their mother Pepang. As
marriages solemnized in accordance with a tribe's customs and rites are recognized by the State, the subsequent
dissolution of these marriages in accordance with the same customs and rites must also be recognized.20

Admittedly, Article 78 did not expressly state that marriages may be dissolved according to customs, rites, or
practices of non-Christians, but it cannot be denied that the framers of the law intended to recognize all the existing
customs, rites, or practices of non-Christians, for how else would a marriage solemnized in accordance with non-
Christian's customs, rites, or practices be dissolved if not in also accordance with the same customs, rites, or
practices?21

The Court of Appeals also failed to give due attention to the IPRA. Its passage has been the very legal basis of the
recognition of customary laws and practices of the indigenous people (IPs) and indigenous cultural communities
(ICCs). It is a policy of the State to maintain the cultural integrity of the ICCs and IPs.22

This is precisely the reason why the Philippine Statistics Authority (PSA) now applies Administrative Order No. 3
(AO 3), Series of 2004 to govern the procedures and guidelines for the effective civil registration, among others, of
births, marriages, dissolution of marriages, and other civil concerns of the ICCs and IPs. It defines dissolution of
marriage among IPs as the termination of marriage per ruling of the council of elders for causes sanctioned by
established customary laws or practices after exhausting all possible means of reconciliation between the couple.
This was what happened to the marriage of Pedrito and Virginia. The Ibaloi council of elders decreed their
separation and thereafter allowed their father to marry their mother.23

In their Opposition/Motion to Deny Due Course24 dated October 28, 2019, respondents pray that the petition be
denied due course on ground that petitioners failed to furnish their (respondents) counsel with a copy of the petition.
Petitioners only sent a copy of the petition to them, not their counsel in violation of Section 5, Rule 45 of the Revised
Rules of Court and of established jurisprudence stating that service must be made to counsel if the adverse party is
represented by one. They were duly represented by counsel, hence, service of the petition should have been made
on their counsel.

The State, on the other hand, through Assistant Solicitor General Rex Bernardo L. Pascual, Senior State Solicitor
Joel N. Villaseran, and State Solicitor Soleil C. Flores, avers25 that the marriage between Pedrito and Pepang is
void. Customs and traditions cannot be made to apply over and above existing laws unless otherwise allowed by
these laws. The old civil code which was in effect at the time Pedrito and Pepang got married simply stated that
marriages may be performed in accordance with the parties' customs, rites, or practices. It did not state that
marriages may be dissolved according to these customs, rites, and practices. Nothing therein implied that the
lawmakers intended to allow as well securing a divorce in accordance with tribal customs, rites, or practices.26

More, customs must be proven as a fact. Here, petitioners failed to sufficiently prove their specific customs, if any,
governing divorce. They did not present evidence that conclusively establish that Pedrito's purported divorce from
Virginia was in accord with their customs. They similarly failed to present any ruling or decision rendered by the
council of elders supposedly approving the dissolution of Pedrito's marriage with Virginia. Further, they failed to
prove that Pedrito and Virginia complied with the required rituals for completion of the divorce process. In fine, it
cannot be safely assumed that Pedrito's marriage with Virginia was validly terminated.27

Issue

Is Pedrito Anaban's divorce from Virginia Erasmo claimed to have been decreed in accordance with the Ibaloi
customs be recognized under our laws?

Ruling

We answer in the negative.

At the threshold, we emphasize that the action below is for partition of Pedrito's estate. In determining who should
succeed to the estate, the court may pass upon the validity of the subsequent marriage between Pedrito and
Pepang. Thus, in De Castro v. Assidao-De Castro,28 the Court decreed:

However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute
nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child,
settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the
validity of marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question the same so long as it is essential to the
determination of the case. This is without prejudice to any issue that may arise in the case. When such need arises,
a final judgment of declaration of nullity is necessary even if the purpose is other than to remarry. The clause "on the
basis of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void" in Article 40 of the Family Code connotes that such
final judgment need not be obtained only for purpose of remarriage.

Likewise, in Nicdao Cariño v. Yee Cariño, the Court ruled that it is clothed with sufficient authority to pass upon the
validity of two marriages despite the main case being a claim for death benefits. Reiterating Niñal, we held that the
Court may pass upon the validity of a marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question the validity of said
marriage, so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. However, evidence must be adduced,
testimonial or documentary, to prove the existence of grounds rendering such a marriage an absolute nullity.
(Empahsis supplied)

Here, there is no dispute that Pedrito was first married to Virginia, although petitioners assert this marriage was later
on validly dissolved by the divorce decree handed down by the Ibaloi council of elders which consequently allowed
Pedrito to remarry.

The question now comes to fore: can the divorce granted under Ibaloi customs and practices be legally recognized
as to make Pedrito's subsequent marriage to Pepang as valid.

All of the courts below resolved the validity of the so-called divorce between Pedrito and Virginia through the lens of
the old Civil Code. But, in reality, when Pedrito and Virginia got married and even when they later on supposedly
divorced, the old Civil Code was not yet in effect. For it took effect on June 18, 1949, or two (2) years after the
divorce decree was purportedly handed down by the Ibaloi council of elders. The law in effect prior thereto was still
the Spanish Civil Code of 1889, Article 5 of which stated:29

Article 5. Laws are abrogated only by other subsequent laws, and the disuse or any custom or practice to the
contrary shall not prevail against their observance. (Emphasis supplied)

This was the equivalent of Article 11 of the old Civil Code which provides that customs which are contrary to law,
public order or public policy shall not be countenanced.

For purposes of determining whether divorce was contrary to law, public order or public policy at the time Pedrito
and Virginia allegedly obtained their own divorce, we trace back the history of divorce or dissolution of marriage
starting from the Spanish regime.

During the Spanish colonization, Las Siete Partidas was passed which only allowed relative divorce or what is
known now as legal separation. This allowed spouses to be free of all marital obligations while their marriage
subsists in the eyes of the law. In 1917, however, Las Siete Partidas was repealed by Act No. 271030 which took
effect on March 11, 1917. Section 1 of Act No. 2710 reads:

Section 1. A petition for divorce can only be filed for adultery on the part of the wife or concubinage on the part of
the husband, committed in any of the forms described in article four hundred and thirty-seven of the Penal Code.

Divorce, then, can be granted only on two (2) grounds, i.e., adultery and concubinage. This was the prevailing law
when Pedrito and Virginia got married in 1942. In 1943, however, during the Japanese occupation, Act No. 2710
was abolished and Executive Order No. 141 (EO 141) was enacted and took effect on March 25, 1943.

Under EO 141, absolute divorce may be granted on these grounds: (a) adultery and concubinage; (b) attempt on
the life of one spouse by the other; (c) a subsequent marriage by either party before the previous one was
dissolved; (d) loathsome contagious diseases contracted by either spouse; (e) incurable insanity; (f) impotency; (g)
repeated bodily violence by one against the other; (h) intentional or unjustified desertion continuously for at least
one year; (i) unexplained absence from the last conjugal abode continuously for at least three years; and (j) slander
by deed or gross insult by one spouse against the other.

Only a little over a year, however, after the Americans had taken over the Japanese as colonizers again of the
Philippines, EO 141 became ineffective and Act No. 2710, which allowed divorce on ground of concubinage and
adultery, was once again reinstated. This was the prevailing law when Pedrito and Virginia were granted divorce by
the Ibaloi council of elders in 1947.

Thus, in 1947, only two (2) grounds were accepted for divorce, i.e., adultery and concubinage. Neither was the
reason for Pedrito and Virginia's divorce. The Ibaloi council of elders granted the divorce on ground of Virginia's
alleged insanity. The divorce, therefore, is contrary to law, hence, cannot be recognized.

The issue of whether divorce based on customs and practices can be legally recognized during the effectivity of Act
No. 2710 has been resolved by the Court as early as 1933 in People v. Bitdu.31 The Court held that Mora Bitdu's
divorce from Moro Halid in accordance with the Mohammedan customs cannot be recognized. For divorce cannot
be had except in that court upon which the state has conferred jurisdiction, and then only for those causes and with
those formalities which the state has, by statute, prescribed. The Court explained:

There is little to add to the well considered decision of the trial judge. It seems to us unnecessary to determine
whether or not the divorce in question was granted in accordance with the Mohammedan religious practices, as to
which there seems to exist considerable uncertainty, because in our view of the case a valid divorce can be granted
only by the courts and for the reasons specified in Act No. 2710. It is not claimed that the appellant was divorced
from her first husband in accordance with said Act.

In the case of Francisco vs. Tayao (50 Phil., 42), it was held that in the Philippines the causes for divorce are
prescribed by statute or Act No. 2710 that (of adultery on the part of the) wife or concubinage on the part of the
husband.
In the recent decision of People vs. Bituanan (Moro), (56 Phil., 23), where the defendant and a Moro woman were
married by a datu according to Moro customs and usages and afterwards divorced by the datu according to the
same customs and usages, it was held that the marriage performed according to the rites of the Mohammedan
religion was valid, and assumed, for the purpose of that case, that the defendant and his wife were not legally
divorced.

Section 25 of the Marriage Law (Act No. 3613) provides that marriages between Mohammedans may be performed
in accordance with the rites or practice of their religion, but there is no provision of law which authorizes the granting
of divorces in accordance with the rites or practices of their religion.

A divorce cannot be had except in that court upon which the state has conferred jurisdiction, and then only for those
causes and with those formalities which the state has by statute prescribed (19 C.J., 19).

It is conceded in all jurisdictions that public policy, good morals, and the interests of society require that the marriage
relation should be sounded with every safeguard and its severance allowed only in the manner prescribed and for
the causes specified by law. And the parties can waive nothing essential to the validity of the proceedings (19 C.J.,
20).

With respect to the contention that the appellant acted in good faith in contracting second marriage, believing that
she had been validly divorced from her first husband, it is sufficient to say that everyone is presumed to know the
law, and the fact that one does not know that is act constitutes a violation of the law does not exempt him from the
consequences thereof. x x x (Emphasis supplied)

As the trial court in Bitdu held, the laws governing marriage and its incidents are moral in nature and as such they
are laws relating to public policy. The habits and customs of a people, the dogmas and doctrines of a religion cannot
be superior to or have precedence over laws relating to public policy, because as stated above laws relating to
marriage and its incidents are normal in nature and as such they affect public policy. This holds true even up to this
time.

Since there was no legal and valid ground for the divorce of Pedrito and Virginia, in the eyes of the law, they were
still married and their marriage was not dissolved as to permit Pedrito to remarry. Pedrito's subsequent marriage to
petitioners' mother Pepang, therefore, is void for being bigamous. Verily, the RTC and the Court of Appeals did not
err when they ruled so and declared petitioners as Pedrito's illegitimate children.

Petitioners insists, however, that since the old Civil Code and the IPRA recognize customs in the solemnization of
marriage, the same should be applied in cases of dissolution as marriage. But, as discussed, customs which are
contrary to law, public policy and public order cannot be recognized.

Also, even assuming that the old Civil Code was applicable in the present case, the Court would arrive at the same
conclusion. Article 78 of the old Civil Code provided:

Article 78. Marriages between Mohammedans or pagans who live in the non-Christian provinces may be performed
in accordance with their customs, rites or practices. No marriage license or formal requisites shall be necessary. Nor
shall the persons solemnizing these marriages be obliged to comply with Article 92.

x x x           x x x          x x x

Section 8, Rule 6 of the IRR of IPRA is similarly worded:

Section 8. Recognition of Customary Laws and Practices Governing Civil Relations. Marriage as an inviolable social
institution shall be protected. Marriages performed in accordance with customary laws, rites, traditions and practices
shall be recognized as valid. As proof of marriage, the testimony of authorized community elders or authorities of
traditional sociopolitical structures shall be recognized as evidence of marriage for purposes of registration. x x x

Clearly, both the old Civil Code and the IPRA-IRR provisions limited the State recognition to "marriages performed"
in accordance with customary laws, rites, traditions, and practices. There is no mention of the recognition of
dissolution of marriage in accordance with the IP's customs.
On this score, we emphasize that Muslim customs, rites, and practices are the only non-Christian customary law
recognized by the State through the enactment of Presidential Decree No. 1083 otherwise known as the Code of
Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines.32 The same in fact bears an entire chapter exclusively dedicated to
divorce. Notably, its applicability clause states:

Article 13. Application.

(1) The provisions of this Title shall apply to marriage and divorce wherein both parties are Muslims, or
wherein only the male party is a Muslim and the marriage is solemnized in accordance with Muslim law or
this Code in any part of the Philippines.

At present, there is no similar law explicitly recognizing the matrimonial customs, rites, and practices of the Ibaloi
Tribe.ℒαwρhi ৷

Even if we are to assume that the constitutional and statutory right to cultural integrity includes recognition of
indigenous divorce or any other form of indigenous dissolution of marriages, the record is bereft of evidence that: (i)
the culture of the Ibaloi recognizes divorce or any other form of dissolution of marriage; (ii) this recognition is a
central aspect of their cultural integrity and not merely peripheral to it; (iii) this recognition has been a central cultural
practice since time immemorial and lasted to this day in its modern forms; and (iv) the contents of and procedures
for this central cultural practice, if any.

The lead government agency for this determination – in the words of the learned counsel of the State, the proof of
customary law as a fact – is the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples. But nothing from their end could
answer how, why, and when the dissolution of marriages is central to the right to cultural integrity and what it means
to say so. It would, therefore, be speculative at this point to link this right to cultural integrity to the dissolution of
marriages between members of the IP communities, sans any supporting evidence.

Lastly, petitioners invoke PSA's AO 3, series of 2004 governing the procedures and guidelines for civil registration of
births, marriages, dissolution of marriages, and other civil concerns of the ICCs and IPs. According to petitioners,
AO 3 defines dissolution of marriage among IPs as the termination of marriage per ruling of the council of elders for
causes sanctioned by established customary law or practice after exhausting all possible means of reconciliation
between the couple.

But, AO 3 only took effect in 2004, fifty-seven (57) years after the divorce was supposedly granted by the Ibaloi
council of elders to Pedrito and Virginia. It cannot be applied retroactively, but only prospectively.

Besides, AO 3 is only a procedural avenue to recognize divorce or any other form of dissolution of marriage where
the substantive law already recognizes such change in a person's civil status. AO 3 cannot confer substantive rights
because the role of the PSA and now the National Statistics Office is to record the civil status of persons but not to
issue laws on how to obtain or confer status.

All told, we hold that the Court of Appeals did not err in pronouncing that the marriage of Pedrito and Virginia was
not legally dissolved. As a consequence, Pedrito's subsequent marriage to Pepang was bigamous, thus, void from
the beginning. The status of petitioners as illegitimate children of Pedrito and their heirship as such insofar as
Pedrito's estate is concerned can no longer be questioned.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is DENIED and the Decision dated July 24, 2019 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 154216 is AFFIRMED.
17.) G.R. No. 162155               August 28, 2007

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE and ARTURO V. PARCERO in his official capacity as Revenue
District Officer of Revenue District No. 049 (Makati), Petitioners,
vs.
PRIMETOWN PROPERTY GROUP, INC., Respondent.

DECISION

CORONA, J.:

This petition for review on certiorari 1 seeks to set aside the August 1, 2003 decision 2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. SP No. 64782 and its February 9, 2004 resolution denying reconsideration. 3

On March 11, 1999, Gilbert Yap, vice chair of respondent Primetown Property Group, Inc., applied for the refund or
credit of income tax respondent paid in 1997. In Yap's letter to petitioner revenue district officer Arturo V. Parcero of
Revenue District No. 049 (Makati) of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR), 4 he explained that the increase in the
cost of labor and materials and difficulty in obtaining financing for projects and collecting receivables caused the real
estate industry to slowdown. 5 As a consequence, while business was good during the first quarter of 1997,
respondent suffered losses amounting to ₱71,879,228 that year. 6

According to Yap, because respondent suffered losses, it was not liable for income taxes. 7 Nevertheless,
respondent paid its quarterly corporate income tax and remitted creditable withholding tax from real estate sales to
the BIR in the total amount of ₱26,318,398.32.8 Therefore, respondent was entitled to tax refund or tax credit. 9

On May 13, 1999, revenue officer Elizabeth Y. Santos required respondent to submit additional documents to
support its claim.10 Respondent complied but its claim was not acted upon. Thus, on April 14, 2000, it filed a petition
for review11 in the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA).

On December 15, 2000, the CTA dismissed the petition as it was filed beyond the two-year prescriptive period for
filing a judicial claim for tax refund or tax credit.12 It invoked Section 229 of the National Internal Revenue Code
(NIRC):

Sec. 229. Recovery of Taxes Erroneously or Illegally Collected. -- No suit or proceeding shall be maintained in any
court for the recovery of any national internal revenue tax hereafter alleged to have been erroneously or illegally
assessed or collected, or of any penalty claimed to have been collected without authority, or of any sum alleged to
have been excessively or in any manner wrongfully collected, until a claim for refund or credit has been duly filed
with the Commissioner; but such suit or proceeding may be maintained, whether or not such tax, penalty, or sum
has been paid under protest or duress.

In any case, no such suit or proceeding shall be filed after the expiration of two (2) years from the date of
payment of the tax or penalty regardless of any supervening cause that may arise after payment: Provided,
however, That the Commissioner may, even without a claim therefor, refund or credit any tax, where on the face of
the return upon which payment was made, such payment appears clearly to have been erroneously paid. (emphasis
supplied)

The CTA found that respondent filed its final adjusted return on April 14, 1998. Thus, its right to claim a refund or
credit commenced on that date.13

The tax court applied Article 13 of the Civil Code which states:

Art. 13. When the law speaks of years, months, days or nights, it shall be understood that years are of three
hundred sixty-five days each; months, of thirty days; days, of twenty-four hours, and nights from sunset to sunrise.

If the months are designated by their name, they shall be computed by the number of days which they respectively
have.
In computing a period, the first day shall be excluded, and the last included. (emphasis supplied)

Thus, according to the CTA, the two-year prescriptive period under Section 229 of the NIRC for the filing of judicial
claims was equivalent to 730 days. Because the year 2000 was a leap year, respondent's petition, which was filed
731 days14 after respondent filed its final adjusted return, was filed beyond the reglementary period.15

Respondent moved for reconsideration but it was denied. 16 Hence, it filed an appeal in the CA.17

On August 1, 2003, the CA reversed and set aside the decision of the CTA.18 It ruled that Article 13 of the Civil Code
did not distinguish between a regular year and a leap year. According to the CA:

The rule that a year has 365 days applies, notwithstanding the fact that a particular year is a leap year.19

In other words, even if the year 2000 was a leap year, the periods covered by April 15, 1998 to April 14, 1999 and
April 15, 1999 to April 14, 2000 should still be counted as 365 days each or a total of 730 days. A statute which is
clear and explicit shall be neither interpreted nor construed. 20

Petitioners moved for reconsideration but it was denied. 21 Thus, this appeal.

Petitioners contend that tax refunds, being in the nature of an exemption, should be strictly construed against
claimants.22 Section 229 of the NIRC should be strictly applied against respondent inasmuch as it has been
consistently held that the prescriptive period (for the filing of tax refunds and tax credits) begins to run on the day
claimants file their final adjusted returns.23 Hence, the claim should have been filed on or before April 13, 2000 or
within 730 days, reckoned from the time respondent filed its final adjusted return.

The conclusion of the CA that respondent filed its petition for review in the CTA within the two-year prescriptive
period provided in Section 229 of the NIRC is correct. Its basis, however, is not.

The rule is that the two-year prescriptive period is reckoned from the filing of the final adjusted return. 24 But how
should the two-year prescriptive period be computed?

As already quoted, Article 13 of the Civil Code provides that when the law speaks of a year, it is understood to be
equivalent to 365 days. In National Marketing Corporation v. Tecson,25 we ruled that a year is equivalent to 365 days
regardless of whether it is a regular year or a leap year.26

However, in 1987, EO27 292 or the Administrative Code of 1987 was enacted. Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I
thereof provides:

Sec. 31. Legal Periods. — "Year" shall be understood to be twelve calendar months; "month" of thirty days,
unless it refers to a specific calendar month in which case it shall be computed according to the number of days the
specific month contains; "day", to a day of twenty-four hours and; "night" from sunrise to sunset. (emphasis
supplied)

A calendar month is "a month designated in the calendar without regard to the number of days it may contain." 28 It is
the "period of time running from the beginning of a certain numbered day up to, but not including, the corresponding
numbered day of the next month, and if there is not a sufficient number of days in the next month, then up to and
including the last day of that month." 29 To illustrate, one calendar month from December 31, 2007 will be from
January 1, 2008 to January 31, 2008; one calendar month from January 31, 2008 will be from February 1, 2008 until
February 29, 2008.30

A law may be repealed expressly (by a categorical declaration that the law is revoked and abrogated by another) or
impliedly (when the provisions of a more recent law cannot be reasonably reconciled with the previous
one).31 Section 27, Book VII (Final Provisions) of the Administrative Code of 1987 states:

Sec. 27. Repealing clause. — All laws, decrees, orders, rules and regulation, or portions thereof, inconsistent with
this Code are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.
A repealing clause like Sec. 27 above is not an express repealing clause because it fails to identify or designate the
laws to be abolished.32 Thus, the provision above only impliedly repealed all laws inconsistent with the
Administrative Code of 1987. 1avvphi1

Implied repeals, however, are not favored. An implied repeal must have been clearly and unmistakably intended by
the legislature. The test is whether the subsequent law encompasses entirely the subject matter of the former law
and they cannot be logically or reasonably reconciled. 33

Both Article 13 of the Civil Code and Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987 deal with
the same subject matter — the computation of legal periods. Under the Civil Code, a year is equivalent to 365 days
whether it be a regular year or a leap year. Under the Administrative Code of 1987, however, a year is composed of
12 calendar months. Needless to state, under the Administrative Code of 1987, the number of days is irrelevant.

There obviously exists a manifest incompatibility in the manner of computing legal periods under the Civil Code and
the Administrative Code of 1987. For this reason, we hold that Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I of the Administrative
Code of 1987, being the more recent law, governs the computation of legal periods. Lex posteriori derogat priori.

Applying Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987 to this case, the two-year prescriptive
period (reckoned from the time respondent filed its final adjusted return 34 on April 14, 1998) consisted of 24 calendar
months, computed as follows:

Year 1 1st calendar April 15, 1998 to May 14, 1998

month

  2nd calendar May 15, 1998 to June 14, 1998

month

  3rd calendar June 15, 1998 to July 14, 1998

month

  4th calendar July 15, 1998 to August 14, 1998

month

  5th calendar August 15, 1998 to September 14,

month 1998

  6th calendar September 15, to October 14, 1998

month 1998

  7th calendar October 15, 1998 to November 14,

month 1998

  8th calendar November 15, to December 14,

month 1998 1998

  9th calendar December 15, to January 14, 1999

month 1998

  10th calendar January 15, 1999 to February 14, 1999

month

  11th calendar February 15, 1999 to March 14, 1999

month

  12th calendar March 15, 1999 to April 14, 1999

month

Year 2 13th calendar April 15, 1999 to May 14, 1999

month
   14th calendar May 15, 1999 to June 14, 1999
month

  15th calendar June 15, 1999 to July 14, 1999

month

  16th calendar July 15, 1999 to August 14, 1999

month

  17th calendar August 15, 1999 to September 14,

month 1999

  18th calendar September 15, to October 14, 1999

month 1999

  19th calendar October 15, 1999 to November 14,

month 1999

  20th calendar November 15, to December 14,

month 1999 1999

  21st calendar December 15, to January 14, 2000

month 1999

  22nd calendar January 15, 2000 to February 14, 2000

month

  23rd calendar February 15, 2000 to March 14, 2000

month

  24th calendar March 15, 2000 to April 14, 2000

month

We therefore hold that respondent's petition (filed on April 14, 2000) was filed on the last day of the 24th calendar
month from the day respondent filed its final adjusted return. Hence, it was filed within the reglementary period.

Accordingly, the petition is hereby DENIED. The case is REMANDED to the Court of Tax Appeals which is ordered
to expeditiously proceed to hear C.T.A. Case No. 6113 entitled Primetown Property Group, Inc. v. Commissioner of
Internal Revenue and Arturo V. Parcero.
18.) G.R. No. 184823               October 6, 2010

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Petitioner,

vs.
AICHI FORGING COMPANY OF ASIA, INC., Respondent.

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

A taxpayer is entitled to a refund either by authority of a statute expressly granting such right, privilege, or incentive
in his favor, or under the principle of solutio indebiti requiring the return of taxes erroneously or illegally collected. In
both cases, a taxpayer must prove not only his entitlement to a refund but also his compliance with the procedural
due process as non-observance of the prescriptive periods within which to file the administrative and the judicial
claims would result in the denial of his claim.

This Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeks to set aside the July 30, 2008
Decision1 and the October 6, 2008 Resolution2 of the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) En Banc.

Factual Antecedents

Respondent Aichi Forging Company of Asia, Inc., a corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the
Republic of the Philippines, is engaged in the manufacturing, producing, and processing of steel and its by-
products.3 It is registered with the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) as a Value-Added Tax (VAT) entity 4 and its
products, "close impression die steel forgings" and "tool and dies," are registered with the Board of Investments
(BOI) as a pioneer status.5

On September 30, 2004, respondent filed a claim for refund/credit of input VAT for the period July 1, 2002 to
September 30, 2002 in the total amount of ₱3,891,123.82 with the petitioner Commissioner of Internal Revenue
(CIR), through the Department of Finance (DOF) One-Stop Shop Inter-Agency Tax Credit and Duty Drawback
Center.6

Proceedings before the Second Division of the CTA

On even date, respondent filed a Petition for Review 7 with the CTA for the refund/credit of the same input VAT. The
case was docketed as CTA Case No. 7065 and was raffled to the Second Division of the CTA.

In the Petition for Review, respondent alleged that for the period July 1, 2002 to September 30, 2002, it generated
and recorded zero-rated sales in the amount of ₱131,791,399.00, 8 which was paid pursuant to Section 106(A) (2)
(a) (1), (2) and (3) of the National Internal Revenue Code of 1997 (NIRC); 9 that for the said period, it incurred and
paid input VAT amounting to ₱3,912,088.14 from purchases and importation attributable to its zero-rated
sales;10 and that in its application for refund/credit filed with the DOF One-Stop Shop Inter-Agency Tax Credit and
Duty Drawback Center, it only claimed the amount of ₱3,891,123.82. 11

In response, petitioner filed his Answer12 raising the following special and affirmative defenses, to wit:

4. Petitioner’s alleged claim for refund is subject to administrative investigation by the Bureau;

5. Petitioner must prove that it paid VAT input taxes for the period in question;

6. Petitioner must prove that its sales are export sales contemplated under Sections 106(A) (2) (a), and
108(B) (1) of the Tax Code of 1997;

7. Petitioner must prove that the claim was filed within the two (2) year period prescribed in Section 229 of
the Tax Code;
 8. In an action for refund, the burden of proof is on the taxpayer to establish its right to refund, and failure to
sustain the burden is fatal to the claim for refund; and

9. Claims for refund are construed strictly against the claimant for the same partake of the nature of
exemption from taxation.13

Trial ensued, after which, on January 4, 2008, the Second Division of the CTA rendered a Decision partially granting
respondent’s claim for refund/credit. Pertinent portions of the Decision read:

For a VAT registered entity whose sales are zero-rated, to validly claim a refund, Section 112 (A) of the NIRC of
1997, as amended, provides:

SEC. 112. Refunds or Tax Credits of Input Tax. –

(A) Zero-rated or Effectively Zero-rated Sales. – Any VAT-registered person, whose sales are zero-rated or
effectively zero-rated may, within two (2) years after the close of the taxable quarter when the sales were made,
apply for the issuance of a tax credit certificate or refund of creditable input tax due or paid attributable to such
sales, except transitional input tax, to the extent that such input tax has not been applied against output tax: x x x

Pursuant to the above provision, petitioner must comply with the following requisites: (1) the taxpayer is engaged in
sales which are zero-rated or effectively zero-rated; (2) the taxpayer is VAT-registered; (3) the claim must be filed
within two years after the close of the taxable quarter when such sales were made; and (4) the creditable input tax
due or paid must be attributable to such sales, except the transitional input tax, to the extent that such input tax has
not been applied against the output tax.

The Court finds that the first three requirements have been complied [with] by petitioner.

With regard to the first requisite, the evidence presented by petitioner, such as the Sales Invoices (Exhibits "II" to "II-
262," "JJ" to "JJ-431," "KK" to "KK-394" and "LL") shows that it is engaged in sales which are zero-rated.

The second requisite has likewise been complied with. The Certificate of Registration with OCN 1RC0000148499
(Exhibit "C") with the BIR proves that petitioner is a registered VAT taxpayer.

In compliance with the third requisite, petitioner filed its administrative claim for refund on September 30, 2004
(Exhibit "N") and the present Petition for Review on September 30, 2004, both within the two (2) year prescriptive
period from the close of the taxable quarter when the sales were made, which is from September 30, 2002.

As regards, the fourth requirement, the Court finds that there are some documents and claims of petitioner that are
baseless and have not been satisfactorily substantiated.

xxxx

In sum, petitioner has sufficiently proved that it is entitled to a refund or issuance of a tax credit certificate
representing unutilized excess input VAT payments for the period July 1, 2002 to September 30, 2002, which are
attributable to its zero-rated sales for the same period, but in the reduced amount of ₱3,239,119.25, computed as
follows:

Amount of Claimed Input VAT ₱ 3,891,123.82

Less:  
Exceptions as found by the ICPA 41,020.37

Net Creditable Input VAT ₱ 3,850,103.45

Less:  
Output VAT Due 610,984.20
Excess Creditable Input VAT ₱ 3,239,119.25
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present Petition for Review is PARTIALLY GRANTED. Accordingly,
respondent is hereby ORDERED TO REFUND OR ISSUE A TAX CREDIT CERTIFICATE in favor of petitioner [in]
the reduced amount of THREE MILLION TWO HUNDRED THIRTY NINE THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED NINETEEN
AND 25/100 PESOS (₱3,239,119.25), representing the unutilized input VAT incurred for the months of July to
September 2002.

SO ORDERED.14

Dissatisfied with the above-quoted Decision, petitioner filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration, 15 insisting that the
administrative and the judicial claims were filed beyond the two-year period to claim a tax refund/credit provided for
under Sections 112(A) and 229 of the NIRC. He reasoned that since the year 2004 was a leap year, the filing of the
claim for tax refund/credit on September 30, 2004 was beyond the two-year period, which expired on September 29,
2004.16 He cited as basis Article 13 of the Civil Code, 17 which provides that when the law speaks of a year, it is
equivalent to 365 days. In addition, petitioner argued that the simultaneous filing of the administrative and the
judicial claims contravenes Sections 112 and 229 of the NIRC. 18 According to the petitioner, a prior filing of an
administrative claim is a "condition precedent"19 before a judicial claim can be filed. He explained that the rationale of
such requirement rests not only on the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies but also on the fact that the
CTA is an appellate body which exercises the power of judicial review over administrative actions of the BIR. 20

The Second Division of the CTA, however, denied petitioner’s Motion for Partial Reconsideration for lack of merit.
Petitioner thus elevated the matter to the CTA En Banc via a Petition for Review.21

Ruling of the CTA En Banc

On July 30, 2008, the CTA En Banc affirmed the Second Division’s Decision allowing the partial tax refund/credit in
favor of respondent. However, as to the reckoning point for counting the two-year period, the CTA En Banc ruled:

Petitioner argues that the administrative and judicial claims were filed beyond the period allowed by law and hence,
the honorable Court has no jurisdiction over the same. In addition, petitioner further contends that respondent's filing
of the administrative and judicial [claims] effectively eliminates the authority of the honorable Court to exercise
jurisdiction over the judicial claim.

We are not persuaded.

Section 114 of the 1997 NIRC, and We quote, to wit:

SEC. 114. Return and Payment of Value-added Tax. –

(A) In General. – Every person liable to pay the value-added tax imposed under this Title shall file a quarterly return
of the amount of his gross sales or receipts within twenty-five (25) days following the close of each taxable quarter
prescribed for each taxpayer: Provided, however, That VAT-registered persons shall pay the value-added tax on a
monthly basis.

[x x x x ]

Based on the above-stated provision, a taxpayer has twenty five (25) days from the close of each taxable quarter
within which to file a quarterly return of the amount of his gross sales or receipts. In the case at bar, the taxable
quarter involved was for the period of July 1, 2002 to September 30, 2002. Applying Section 114 of the 1997 NIRC,
respondent has until October 25, 2002 within which to file its quarterly return for its gross sales or receipts [with]
which it complied when it filed its VAT Quarterly Return on October 20, 2002.

In relation to this, the reckoning of the two-year period provided under Section 229 of the 1997 NIRC should start
from the payment of tax subject claim for refund. As stated above, respondent filed its VAT Return for the taxable
third quarter of 2002 on October 20, 2002. Thus, respondent's administrative and judicial claims for refund filed on
September 30, 2004 were filed on time because AICHI has until October 20, 2004 within which to file its claim for
refund.
In addition, We do not agree with the petitioner's contention that the 1997 NIRC requires the previous filing of an
administrative claim for refund prior to the judicial claim. This should not be the case as the law does not prohibit the
simultaneous filing of the administrative and judicial claims for refund. What is controlling is that both claims for
refund must be filed within the two-year prescriptive period.

In sum, the Court En Banc finds no cogent justification to disturb the findings and conclusion spelled out in the
assailed January 4, 2008 Decision and March 13, 2008 Resolution of the CTA Second Division. What the instant
petition seeks is for the Court En Banc to view and appreciate the evidence in their own perspective of things, which
unfortunately had already been considered and passed upon.

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition for Review is hereby DENIED DUE COURSE and DISMISSED for lack of merit.
Accordingly, the January 4, 2008 Decision and March 13, 2008 Resolution of the CTA Second Division in CTA Case
No. 7065 entitled, "AICHI Forging Company of Asia, Inc. petitioner vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
respondent" are hereby AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED.22

Petitioner sought reconsideration but the CTA En Banc denied23 his Motion for Reconsideration.

Issue

Hence, the present recourse where petitioner interposes the issue of whether respondent’s judicial and
administrative claims for tax refund/credit were filed within the two-year prescriptive period provided in Sections
112(A) and 229 of

the NIRC.24

Petitioner’s Arguments

Petitioner maintains that respondent’s administrative and judicial claims for tax refund/credit were filed in violation of
Sections 112(A) and 229 of the NIRC.25 He posits that pursuant to Article 13 of the Civil Code, 26 since the year 2004
was a leap year, the filing of the claim for tax refund/credit on September 30, 2004 was beyond the two-year period,
which expired on September 29, 2004.27

Petitioner further argues that the CTA En Banc erred in applying Section 114(A) of the NIRC in determining the start
of the two-year period as the said provision pertains to the compliance requirements in the payment of VAT. 28 He
asserts that it is Section 112, paragraph (A), of the same Code that should apply because it specifically provides for
the period within which a claim for tax refund/ credit should be made. 29

Petitioner likewise puts in issue the fact that the administrative claim with the BIR and the judicial claim with the CTA
were filed on the same day.30 He opines that the simultaneous filing of the administrative and the judicial claims
contravenes Section 229 of the NIRC, which requires the prior filing of an administrative claim. 31 He insists that such
procedural requirement is based on the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies and the fact that the CTA
is an appellate body exercising judicial review over administrative actions of the CIR. 32

Respondent’s Arguments

For its part, respondent claims that it is entitled to a refund/credit of its unutilized input VAT for the period July 1,
2002 to September 30, 2002 as a matter of right because it has substantially complied with all the requirements
provided by law.33 Respondent likewise defends the CTA En Banc in applying Section 114(A) of the NIRC in
computing the prescriptive period for the claim for tax refund/credit. Respondent believes that Section 112(A) of the
NIRC must be read together with Section 114(A) of the same Code. 34

As to the alleged simultaneous filing of its administrative and judicial claims, respondent contends that it first filed an
administrative claim with the One-Stop Shop Inter-Agency Tax Credit and Duty Drawback Center of the DOF before
it filed a judicial claim with the CTA.35 To prove this, respondent points out that its Claimant Information Sheet No.
4970236 and BIR Form No. 1914 for the third quarter of 2002, 37 which were filed with the DOF, were attached as
Annexes "M" and "N," respectively, to the Petition for Review filed with the CTA. 38 Respondent further contends that
the non-observance of the 120-day period given to the CIR to act on the claim for tax refund/credit in Section 112(D)
is not fatal because what is important is that both claims are filed within the two-year prescriptive period. 39 In support
thereof, respondent cites Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Victorias Milling Co., Inc. 40 where it was ruled that
"[i]f, however, the [CIR] takes time in deciding the claim, and the period of two years is about to end, the suit or
proceeding must be started in the [CTA] before the end of the two-year period without awaiting the decision of the
[CIR]."41 Lastly, respondent argues that even if the period had already lapsed, it may be suspended for reasons of
equity considering that it is not a jurisdictional requirement. 42

Our Ruling

The petition has merit.

Unutilized input VAT must be claimed within two years after the close of the taxable quarter when the sales were
made

In computing the two-year prescriptive period for claiming a refund/credit of unutilized input VAT, the Second
Division of the CTA applied Section 112(A) of the NIRC, which states:

SEC. 112. Refunds or Tax Credits of Input Tax. –

(A) Zero-rated or Effectively Zero-rated Sales – Any VAT-registered person, whose sales are zero-rated or
effectively zero-rated may, within two (2) years after the close of the taxable quarter when the sales were made,
apply for the issuance of a tax credit certificate or refund of creditable input tax due or paid attributable to such
sales, except transitional input tax, to the extent that such input tax has not been applied against output tax:
Provided, however, That in the case of zero-rated sales under Section 106(A)(2)(a)(1), (2) and (B) and Section 108
(B)(1) and (2), the acceptable foreign currency exchange proceeds thereof had been duly accounted for in
accordance with the rules and regulations of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP): Provided, further, That where
the taxpayer is engaged in zero-rated or effectively zero-rated sale and also in taxable or exempt sale of goods or
properties or services, and the amount of creditable input tax due or paid cannot be directly and entirely attributed to
any one of the transactions, it shall be allocated proportionately on the basis of the volume of sales. (Emphasis
supplied.)

The CTA En Banc, on the other hand, took into consideration Sections 114 and 229 of the NIRC, which read:

SEC. 114. Return and Payment of Value-Added Tax. –

(A) In General. – Every person liable to pay the value-added tax imposed under this Title shall file a quarterly return
of the amount of his gross sales or receipts within twenty-five (25) days following the close of each taxable quarter
prescribed for each taxpayer: Provided, however, That VAT-registered persons shall pay the value-added tax on a
monthly basis.

Any person, whose registration has been cancelled in accordance with Section 236, shall file a return and pay the
tax due thereon within twenty-five (25) days from the date of cancellation of registration: Provided, That only one
consolidated return shall be filed by the taxpayer for his principal place of business or head office and all branches.

xxxx

SEC. 229. Recovery of tax erroneously or illegally collected. –

No suit or proceeding shall be maintained in any court for the recovery of any national internal revenue tax hereafter
alleged to have been erroneously or illegally assessed or collected, or of any penalty claimed to have been collected
without authority, or of any sum alleged to have been excessively or in any manner wrongfully collected, until a
claim for refund or credit has been duly filed with the Commissioner; but such suit or proceeding may be maintained,
whether or not such tax, penalty or sum has been paid under protest or duress.
In any case, no such suit or proceeding shall be filed after the expiration of two (2) years from the date of payment
of the tax or penalty regardless of any supervening cause that may arise after payment: Provided, however, That the
Commissioner may, even without written claim therefor, refund or credit any tax, where on the face of the return
upon which payment was made, such payment appears clearly to have been erroneously paid. (Emphasis
supplied.)

Hence, the CTA En Banc ruled that the reckoning of the two-year period for filing a claim for refund/credit of
unutilized input VAT should start from the date of payment of tax and not from the close of the taxable quarter when
the sales were made.43

The pivotal question of when to reckon the running of the two-year prescriptive period, however, has already been
resolved in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Mirant Pagbilao Corporation, 44 where we ruled that Section 112(A)
of the NIRC is the applicable provision in determining the start of the two-year period for claiming a refund/credit of
unutilized input VAT, and that Sections 204(C) and 229 of the NIRC are inapplicable as "both provisions apply only
to instances of erroneous payment or illegal collection of internal revenue taxes." 45 We explained that:

The above proviso [Section 112 (A) of the NIRC] clearly provides in no uncertain terms that unutilized input VAT
payments not otherwise used for any internal revenue tax due the taxpayer must be claimed within two
years reckoned from the close of the taxable quarter when the relevant sales were made pertaining to the
input VAT regardless of whether said tax was paid or not. As the CA aptly puts it, albeit it erroneously applied
the aforequoted Sec. 112 (A), "[P]rescriptive period commences from the close of the taxable quarter when the
sales were made and not from the time the input VAT was paid nor from the time the official receipt was issued."
Thus, when a zero-rated VAT taxpayer pays its input VAT a year after the pertinent transaction, said taxpayer only
has a year to file a claim for refund or tax credit of the unutilized creditable input VAT. The reckoning frame would
always be the end of the quarter when the pertinent sales or transaction was made, regardless when the input VAT
was paid. Be that as it may, and given that the last creditable input VAT due for the period covering the progress
billing of September 6, 1996 is the third quarter of 1996 ending on September 30, 1996, any claim for unutilized
creditable input VAT refund or tax credit for said quarter prescribed two years after September 30, 1996 or, to be
precise, on September 30, 1998. Consequently, MPC’s claim for refund or tax credit filed on December 10, 1999
had already prescribed.

Reckoning for prescriptive period under

Secs. 204(C) and 229 of the NIRC inapplicable

To be sure, MPC cannot avail itself of the provisions of either Sec. 204(C) or 229 of the NIRC which, for the purpose
of refund, prescribes a different starting point for the two-year prescriptive limit for the filing of a claim therefor. Secs.
204(C) and 229 respectively provide:

Sec. 204. Authority of the Commissioner to Compromise, Abate and Refund or Credit Taxes. – The Commissioner
may –

xxxx

(c) Credit or refund taxes erroneously or illegally received or penalties imposed without authority, refund the value of
internal revenue stamps when they are returned in good condition by the purchaser, and, in his discretion, redeem
or change unused stamps that have been rendered unfit for use and refund their value upon proof of destruction. No
credit or refund of taxes or penalties shall be allowed unless the taxpayer files in writing with the Commissioner a
claim for credit or refund within two (2) years after the payment of the tax or penalty: Provided, however, That a
return filed showing an overpayment shall be considered as a written claim for credit or refund.

xxxx

Sec. 229. Recovery of Tax Erroneously or Illegally Collected. – No suit or proceeding shall be maintained in any
court for the recovery of any national internal revenue tax hereafter alleged to have been erroneously or illegally
assessed or collected, or of any penalty claimed to have been collected without authority, of any sum alleged to
have been excessively or in any manner wrongfully collected without authority, or of any sum alleged to have been
excessively or in any manner wrongfully collected, until a claim for refund or credit has been duly filed with the
Commissioner; but such suit or proceeding may be maintained, whether or not such tax, penalty, or sum has been
paid under protest or duress.

In any case, no such suit or proceeding shall be filed after the expiration of two (2) years from the date of payment
of the tax or penalty regardless of any supervening cause that may arise after payment: Provided, however, That the
Commissioner may, even without a written claim therefor, refund or credit any tax, where on the face of the return
upon which payment was made, such payment appears clearly to have been erroneously paid.

Notably, the above provisions also set a two-year prescriptive period, reckoned from date of payment of the tax or
penalty, for the filing of a claim of refund or tax credit. Notably too, both provisions apply only to instances of
erroneous payment or illegal collection of internal revenue taxes.

MPC’s creditable input VAT not erroneously paid

For perspective, under Sec. 105 of the NIRC, creditable input VAT is an indirect tax which can be shifted or passed
on to the buyer, transferee, or lessee of the goods, properties, or services of the taxpayer. The fact that the
subsequent sale or transaction involves a wholly-tax exempt client, resulting in a zero-rated or effectively zero-rated
transaction, does not, standing alone, deprive the taxpayer of its right to a refund for any unutilized creditable input
VAT, albeit the erroneous, illegal, or wrongful payment angle does not enter the equation.

xxxx

Considering the foregoing discussion, it is clear that Sec. 112 (A) of the NIRC, providing a two-year prescriptive
period reckoned from the close of the taxable quarter when the relevant sales or transactions were made
pertaining to the creditable input VAT, applies to the instant case, and not to the other actions which refer
to erroneous payment of taxes.46 (Emphasis supplied.)

In view of the foregoing, we find that the CTA En Banc erroneously applied Sections 114(A) and 229 of the NIRC in
computing the two-year prescriptive period for claiming refund/credit of unutilized input VAT. To be clear, Section
112 of the NIRC is the pertinent provision for the refund/credit of input VAT. Thus, the two-year period should be
reckoned from the close of the taxable quarter when the sales were made.

The administrative claim was timely filed

Bearing this in mind, we shall now proceed to determine whether the administrative claim was timely filed.

Relying on Article 13 of the Civil Code,47 which provides that a year is equivalent to 365 days, and taking into
account the fact that the year 2004 was a leap year, petitioner submits that the two-year period to file a claim for tax
refund/ credit for the period July 1, 2002 to September 30, 2002 expired on September 29, 2004. 48

We do not agree.

In Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Primetown Property Group, Inc.,49 we said that as between the Civil Code,
which provides that a year is equivalent to 365 days, and the Administrative Code of 1987, which states that a year
is composed of 12 calendar months, it is the latter that must prevail following the legal maxim, Lex posteriori derogat
priori.50 Thus:

Both Article 13 of the Civil Code and Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987 deal with
the same subject matter – the computation of legal periods. Under the Civil Code, a year is equivalent to 365 days
whether it be a regular year or a leap year. Under the Administrative Code of 1987, however, a year is composed of
12 calendar months. Needless to state, under the Administrative Code of 1987, the number of days is irrelevant.

There obviously exists a manifest incompatibility in the manner of computing legal periods under the Civil Code and
the Administrative Code of 1987. For this reason, we hold that Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I of the Administrative
Code of 1987, being the more recent law, governs the computation of legal periods. Lex posteriori derogat priori.
Applying Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987 to this case, the two-year prescriptive
period (reckoned from the time respondent filed its final adjusted return on April 14, 1998) consisted of 24 calendar
months, computed as follows:

Year 1 1st calendar month April 15, 1998 to May 14, 1998

2nd calendar month May 15, 1998 to June 14, 1998

3rd calendar month June 15, 1998 to July 14, 1998

4th calendar month July 15, 1998 to August 14, 1998

5th calendar month August 15, 1998 to September 14, 1998

6th calendar month September 15, 1998 to October 14, 1998

7th calendar month October 15, 1998 to November 14, 1998

8th calendar month November 15, 1998 to December 14, 1998

9th calendar month December 15, 1998 to January 14, 1999

10th calendar month January 15, 1999 to February 14, 1999

11th calendar month February 15, 1999 to March 14, 1999

12th calendar month March 15, 1999 to April 14, 1999

Year 2 13th calendar month April 15, 1999 to May 14, 1999

14th calendar month May 15, 1999 to June 14, 1999

15th calendar month June 15, 1999 to July 14, 1999

16th calendar month July 15, 1999 to August 14, 1999

17th calendar month August 15, 1999 to September 14, 1999

18th calendar month September 15, 1999 to October 14, 1999

19th calendar month October 15, 1999 to November 14, 1999

20th calendar month November 15, 1999 to December 14, 1999

21st calendar month December 15, 1999 to January 14, 2000

22nd calendar month January 15, 2000 to February 14, 2000

23rd calendar month February 15, 2000 to March 14, 2000

24th calendar month March 15, 2000 to April 14, 2000

We therefore hold that respondent's petition (filed on April 14, 2000) was filed on the last day of the 24th calendar
month from the day respondent filed its final adjusted return. Hence, it was filed within the reglementary period. 51

Applying this to the present case, the two-year period to file a claim for tax refund/credit for the period July 1, 2002
to September 30, 2002 expired on September 30, 2004. Hence, respondent’s administrative claim was timely filed.

The filing of the judicial claim was premature

However, notwithstanding the timely filing of the administrative claim, we

are constrained to deny respondent’s claim for tax refund/credit for having been filed in violation of Section 112(D)
of the NIRC, which provides that:

SEC. 112. Refunds or Tax Credits of Input Tax. –

xxxx

(D) Period within which Refund or Tax Credit of Input Taxes shall be Made. – In proper cases, the Commissioner
shall grant a refund or issue the tax credit certificate for creditable input taxes within one hundred twenty (120) days
from the date of submission of complete documents in support of the application filed in accordance with
Subsections (A) and (B) hereof.

In case of full or partial denial of the claim for tax refund or tax credit, or the failure on the part of the Commissioner
to act on the application within the period prescribed above, the taxpayer affected may, within thirty (30) days from
the receipt of the decision denying the claim or after the expiration of the one hundred twenty day-period, appeal the
decision or the unacted claim with the Court of Tax Appeals. (Emphasis supplied.)

Section 112(D) of the NIRC clearly provides that the CIR has "120 days, from the date of the submission of the
complete documents in support of the application [for tax refund/credit]," within which to grant or deny the claim. In
case of full or partial denial by the CIR, the taxpayer’s recourse is to file an appeal before the CTA within 30 days
from receipt of the decision of the CIR. However, if after the 120-day period the CIR fails to act on the application for
tax refund/credit, the remedy of the taxpayer is to appeal the inaction of the CIR to CTA within 30 days.

In this case, the administrative and the judicial claims were simultaneously filed on September 30, 2004. Obviously,
respondent did not wait for the decision of the CIR or the lapse of the 120-day period. For this reason, we find the
filing of the judicial claim with the CTA premature.

Respondent’s assertion that the non-observance of the 120-day period is not fatal to the filing of a judicial claim as
long as both the administrative and the judicial claims are filed within the two-year prescriptive period 52 has no legal
basis.

There is nothing in Section 112 of the NIRC to support respondent’s view. Subsection (A) of the said provision
states that "any VAT-registered person, whose sales are zero-rated or effectively zero-rated may, within two years
after the close of the taxable quarter when the sales were made, apply for the issuance of a tax credit certificate or
refund of creditable input tax due or paid attributable to such sales." The phrase "within two (2) years x x x apply for
the issuance of a tax credit certificate or refund" refers to applications for refund/credit filed with the CIR and not to
appeals made to the CTA. This is apparent in the first paragraph of subsection (D) of the same provision, which
states that the CIR has "120 days from the submission of complete documents in support of the application filed in
accordance with Subsections (A) and (B)" within which to decide on the claim.

In fact, applying the two-year period to judicial claims would render nugatory Section 112(D) of the NIRC, which
already provides for a specific period within which a taxpayer should appeal the decision or inaction of the CIR. The
second paragraph of Section 112(D) of the NIRC envisions two scenarios: (1) when a decision is issued by the CIR
before the lapse of the 120-day period; and (2) when no decision is made after the 120-day period. In both
instances, the taxpayer has 30 days within which to file an appeal with the CTA. As we see it then, the 120-day
period is crucial in filing an appeal with the CTA.

With regard to Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Victorias Milling, Co., Inc.53 relied upon by respondent, we find
the same inapplicable as the tax provision involved in that case is Section 306, now Section 229 of the NIRC. And
as already discussed, Section 229 does not apply to refunds/credits of input VAT, such as the instant case.

In fine, the premature filing of respondent’s claim for refund/credit of input VAT before the CTA warrants a dismissal
inasmuch as no jurisdiction was acquired by the CTA.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed July 30, 2008 Decision and the October 6, 2008
Resolution of the Court of Tax Appeals are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Court of Tax Appeals Second
Division is DIRECTED to dismiss CTA Case No. 7065 for having been prematurely filed.
19.) G.R. No. 198485

MARUBENI PHILIPPINES CORPORATION, Petitioner

vs.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent

DECISION

CAGUIOA, J.:

Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari   under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by petitioner
1

Marubeni Philippines Corporation (Marubeni), assailing the Decision   dated March 23, 2011 and Resolution   dated
2 3

August 31, 2011 of the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) En Banc in CTA EB Case No. 557. The CTA En Banc affirmed
with modification the CTA Second Division's Decision   dated June 2, 2009 in C.T.A. Case No. 6469. The CTA
4

Second Division dismissed Marubeni's claim for refund and/or issuance of a tax credit certificate (TCC) for having
been filed beyond the two-year prescriptive period. The CTA En Banc, on the other hand, dismissed Marubeni's
claim for refund and/or issuance of a TCC because it was premature.

Facts

Marubeni is a domestic corporation duly registered with the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) as a Value-Added Tax
(VAT) taxpayer.   On April 25, 2000, Marubeni filed its Quarterly VAT Return for the 1st quarter of Calendar Year
5

(CY) 2000 with the BIR. 6

On March 27, 2002, Marubeni filed with the BIR a written claim for a refund and/or the issuance of a TCC, which it
later amended on April 25, 2002, reducing its claim to ₱3,887,419.31.   On the same date, Marubeni filed a petition
7

for review before the CTA claiming a refund and/or issuance ofa TCC in the amount of ₱3,887,419.31.  8

During the proceedings in the CTA, Marubeni presented its witnesses and offered its evidence while respondent
Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR) submitted the case for decision based on the pleadings.   After submitting
9

its Memorandum, Marubeni moved to be allowed to present additional evidence, which the CTA Second Division
granted. 10

On December 8, 2008, Marubeni filed its Memorandum and on January 15, 2009, the case was deemed submitted
for decision. 11

In a Decision dated June 2, 2009, the CTA Second Division dismissed Marubeni's judicial claim, the dispositive
portion of which states:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED DUE COURSE, and accordingly, DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.  12

The CTA Second Division ruled that following Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Mirant Pagbilao
Corporation,   Marubeni timely filed its administrative claim for refund and/or the issuance of a TCC on March 27,
13

2002, which was within the two-year period from the close of the 1st quarter of CY 2000,   but that Marubeni's
14

judicial claim for refund and/or issuance of TCC that was filed on April 25, 2002 (or the same day Marubeni
amended its administrative claim for a refund and/or the issuance of a TCC to ₱3,887,419.31) was late because this
should have been filed also within the two-year period from the close of the 1st quarter of CY 2000.   Marubeni
15

moved for reconsideration, but this was denied by the CT A Second Division in its Resolution   dated October 20,
16

2009.

Marubeni then elevated the matter to the CT A En Banc, raising the following arguments: (1) the two-year
prescriptive period for the filing of the administrative and judicial claims for refund and/or issuance of TCC is
reckoned from the date of the filing of the Quarterly VAT Return and payment of the output tax as held by the Court
in Atlas Consolidated Mining and Development Corporation v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue;   (2) Mirant could
17
not validly overturn the ruling in Atlas; and (3) assuming that Mirani validly overturned the ruling in Atlas, the ruling
should be applied prospectively and should not be made to apply to pending judicial claims for refund of excess
input V AT.  18

On March 23, 2011, the CTA En Banc rendered a Decision affirming with modification the Decision and Resolution
of the CTA Second Division, the dispositive portion of which states:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. Accordingly, the Decision of the former Second
Division of this Court in CTA Case No. 6469 dated June 2, 2009 and its Resolution dated October 20, 2009 are
hereby AFFIRMED, with the modification that the dismissal of the Petition for Review is on the ground for having
been prematurely filed. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.  19

The CTA En Banc agreed with the CTA Second Division that Marubeni timely filed its administrative claim for
refund.   But as to Marubeni' s judicial claim for refund, the CTA En Banc ruled that following Section 112 (D) of the
20

National Internal Revenue Code (1997 Tax Code) and the Court's ruling in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v.
Aichi Forging Company of Asia, Inc. ,  the filing of the petition for review with the CTA was premature. According to
21

the CTA En Banc, Marubeni should have filed its petition for review with the CTA 30 days from receipt of the
decision of the CIR denying the claim or after the expiration of the 120-day period from the filing of the
administrative claim with the CIR.  22

Marubeni moved for reconsideration but the CTA En Banc denied this in a Resolution dated August 31, 2011.

Hence, this petition.

Issues

Marubeni raised the following issues:

a. Whether Aichi is applicable to its claim for refund;

b. Whether Aichi should only be applied prospectively; and,

c. Whether the CIR waived the defense of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies.  23

The Court's Ruling

The petition lacks merit.

Prescriptive period for filing of judicial

claim for refund.

The first and second issues are discussed together.

Marubeni claims that the Court's ruling in Atlas should be the one applicable to it instead of Aichi.   In Atlas, the
24

Court held that the two-year period for the filing of claims for refund and/or issuance of TCC for input VAT must be
counted from the date of filing of the quarterly VAT return. On the other hand, in Aichi, the Court ruled that the
compliance with the 120+30 day periods in Section 112 (C) of the 1997 Tax Code were mandatory and
jurisdictional.

Marubeni thus argues that the prospective application of Aichi means that Aichi will only be applied to claims for
refund that were filed with the CTA after the promulgation of Aichi (which was promulgated by the Court on October
6, 2010).   And since Marubeni filed its petition with the CTA on April 25, 2002, the Court's ruling in Atlas, and
25

not Aichi, should be applied to it.

This claim is wrong.

The issue of the retroactive application of Aichi and the applicability of Atlas was also raised in Mindanao II
Geothermal Partnership v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue.   The facts and issue here and in Mindanao II are
26

identical, except only for the covered taxable period - Marubeni's claim involved the pt quarter of CY 2000, while the
claim in Mindanao II involved different quarters of CY 2003. Thus, the ruling of the Court in Mindanao II squarely
applies here.

The Court ruled in Mindanao II that a taxpayer cannot claim that Atlas, which was promulgated on June 8, 2007, is
controlling on the timeliness of a judicial claim that was filed prior to June 8, 2007. According to the Court, it is the
1997 Tax Code, which took effect on January 1, 1998, that applies to the taxpayer, thus:

When Mindanao II and Mindanao I filed their respective administrative and judicial claims in 2005,
neither Atlas nor Mirant has been promulgated. Atlas was promulgated on 8 June 2007, while Mirant was
promulgated on 12 September 2008. It is therefore misleading to state that Atlas was the controlling doctrine at the
time of filing of the claims. The 1997 Tax Code, which took effect on 1 January 1998, was the applicable law at the
time of filing of the claims in issue. x x x   (Emphasis in the original)
27

In this regard, the Court had already clarified in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. San Roque Power
Corp.,   that Atlas did not interpret, expressly or impliedly, the 120+30 day periods, thus:
28

San Roque cannot also claim [to] being misled, misguided or confused by the Atlas doctrine because San Roque
filed its petition for review with the CTA more than four years before Atlas was promulgated. The Atlas doctrine did
not exist at the time San Roque failed to comply with the 120-day period. Thus, San Roque cannot invoke
the Atlas doctrine as an excuse for its failure to wait for the 120-day period to lapse. In any event, the Atlas doctrine
merely stated that the two-year prescriptive period should be counted from the date of payment of the output VAT,
not from the close of the taxable quarter when the sales involving the input VAT were made. The Atlas doctrine
does not interpret, expressly or impliedly, the 120+30 day periods.   (Emphasis in original.)
29

Similarly, it was misleading for Marubeni to invoke Atlas given that Atlas could not have been applicable as it was
promulgated years after Marubeni had filed its administrative and judicial claims in 2002; accordingly, it cannot
escape the applicability of the 1997 Tax Code.

Section 112 of the 1997 Tax Code   a provides for the rules on claiming refunds of and/or the issuance of a TCC for
29

unutilized input VAT, the pertinent portions of which read as follows:

SEC. 112. Refunds or Tax Credits of Input Tax. –

(A) Zero-rated or Effectively Zero-rated Sales. - Any VATregistered person, whose sales are zero-rated or
effectively zero-rated may, within two (2) years after the close of the taxable quarter when the sales were made,
apply for the issuance of a tax credit certificate or refund of creditable input tax due or paid attributable to such
sales, except transitional input tax, to the extent that such input tax has not been applied against output tax: x x x

xxxx

(C) Period within which Refund or Tax Credit of Input Taxes shall be Made. - In proper cases, the Commissioner
shall grant a refund or issue the tax credit certificate for creditable input taxes within one hundred twenty (120) days
from the date of submission of complete documents in support of the application filed in accordance with Subsection
(A) hereof.

In case of full or partial denial of the claim for tax refund or tax credit, or the failure on the part of the Commissioner
to act on the application within the period prescribed above, the taxpayer affected may, within thirty (30) days from
the receipt of the decision denying the claim or after the expiration of the one hundred twenty day-period, appeal the
decision or the unacted claim with the Court of Tax Appeals. (Emphasis supplied)
According to the Court in Mindanao II, it is the above-quoted Section 112 (C) of the 1997 Tax Code that applies to
the judicial claim for refund, and, citing San Roque,  compliance with the 120+30 day periods is mandatory and
30

jurisdictional. Thus:

In determining whether the claims for the second, third and fourth quarters of 2003 have been properly appealed,
we still see no need to refer to either Atlas or Mirant, or even to Section 229 of the 1997 Tax Code. The second
paragraph of Section 112 (C) of the 1997 Tax Code is clear: "In case of full or partial denial of the claim for tax
refund or tax credit, or the failure on the part of the Commissioner to act on the application within the period
prescribed above, the taxpayer affected may, within thirty (30) days from the receipt of the decision denying the
claim or after the expiration of the one hundred twenty day-period, appeal the decision or the unacted claim with the
Court of Tax Appeals."

The mandatory and jurisdictional nature of the 120+30 day periods was explained in San Roque:

At the time San Roque filed its petition for review with the CTA, the 120+30 day mandatory periods were already in
the law. Section 112(C) expressly grants the Commissioner 120 days within which to decide the taxpayer's claim.
The law is clear, plain, and unequivocal: "x x x the Commissioner shall grant a refund or issue the tax credit
certificate for creditable input taxes within one hundred twenty (120) days from the date of submission of complete
documents." Following the verba legis doctrine, this law must be applied exactly as worded since it is clear, plain,
and unequivocal. The taxpayer cannot simply file a petition with the CT A without waiting for the Commissioner's
decision within the 120-day mandatory and jurisdictional period. The CT A will have no jurisdiction because there
will be no "decision" or "deemed a denial" decision of the Commissioner for the CT A to review. In San Roque's
case, it filed its petition with the CTA a mere 13 days after it filed its administrative claim with the Commissioner.
Indisputably, San Roque knowingly violated the mandatory 120-day period, and it cannot blame anyone but itself.

Section 112(C) also expressly grants the taxpayer a 30-day period to appeal to the CTA the decision or inaction of
the Commissioner, thus:

x x x the taxpayer affected may, within thirty (30) days from the receipt of the decision denying the claim or
after the expiration of the one hundred twenty dayperiod, appeal the decision or the unacted claim with the
Court of Tax Appeals. (Emphasis supplied)

This law is clear, plain, and unequivocal. Following the well-settled verba legis doctrine, this law should be applied
exactly as worded since it is clear, plain, and unequivocal. As this law states, the taxpayer may, if he wishes, appeal
the decision of the Commissioner to the CTA within 30 days from receipt of the Commissioner's decision, or if the
Commissioner does not act on the taxpayer's claim within the 120-day period, the taxpayer may appeal to the CTA
within 30 days from the expiration of the 120-day period.

xxxx

Section 112(A) and (C) must be interpreted according to its clear, plain, and unequivocal language. The taxpayer
can file his administrative claim for refund or credit at anytime within the two-year prescriptive period. If he files his
claim on the last day of the two-year prescriptive period, his claim is still filed on time. The Commissioner will have
120 days from such filing to decide the claim. If the Commissioner decides the claim on the 120th day, or does not
decide it on that day, the taxpayer still has 30 days to file his judicial claim with the CTA. This is not only the plain
meaning but also the only logical interpretation of Section l 12(A) and (C). (Emphases in the original; citations
omitted) 31

Marubeni therefore failed to comply with the mandatory and jurisdictional requirement of Section 112 (C) when it
filed its petition for review with the CTA on April 25, 2002, or just 29 days after filing its administrative claim before
the BIR on March 27, 2002.

Since Marubeni filed its judicial claim for refund on April 25, 2002, it could not benefit from BIR Ruling No. DA-489-
03 that was subsequently issued on December 10, 2003. As the Court ruled in San Roque:

To repeat, a claim for tax refund or credit, like a claim for tax exemption, is construed strictly against the taxpayer.
One of the conditions for a judicial claim of refund or credit under the VAT System is compliance with the 120+30
day mandatory and jurisdictional periods. Thus, strict compliance with the 120+30 day periods is necessary for such
a claim to prosper, whether before, during, or after the effectivity of the Atlas doctrine, except for the period from the
issuance of BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03 on 10 December 2003 to 6 October 2010 when the Aichi doctrine was
adopted, which again reinstated the 120+30 day periods as mandatory and jurisdictional.   (Emphasis and
32

underscoring supplied.)

In fine, Marubeni's judicial claim for refund was, as correctly found by the CTA En Banc, premature and the CTA
was devoid of any jurisdiction over the petition for review because of Marubeni's failure to strictly comply with the
120+30 day periods required by Section 112 (C) of the 1997 Tax Code. To recall, Marubeni filed its administrative
claim on March 27, 2002. The CIR had 120 days from that date within which to rule on that administrative claim. But
within 29 days from March 27, 2002, or on April 25, 2002, Marubeni already filed its petition for review with the CTA.

Waiver of objection to non-exhaustion of administrative remedies.

Marubeni also argues that even assuming that the 120+ 30 day periods are applicable, failure to comply with said
periods violates only the rule on non-exhaustion of administrative remedies which can be waived when not objected
to.   Stated otherwise, Marubeni posits that the CIR's failure to raise the issue of prematurity in its Answer to
33

Marubeni' s petition before the CTA should be deemed a waiver of that objection.   Again, this has no basis.
34

In Applied Food Ingredients Company, Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,   the Court, citing San
35

Roque, ruled that the failure to observe the 120 days prior to filing of a judicial claim for refund is not a mere non-
exhaustion of administrative remedies but is jurisdictional in nature, thus:

Considering further that the 30-day period to appeal to the CT A is dependent on the 120-day period, both periods
are hereby rendered jurisdictional.  Failure to observe 120 days prior to the filing of a judicial claim is not a mere
1âwphi1

non-exhaustion of administrative remedies, but is likewise considered jurisdictional. The period of 120 days is a
prerequisite for the commencement of the 30-day period to appeal to the CTA. In both instances, whether the CIR
renders a decision (which must be made within 120 days) or there was inaction, the period of 120 days is material.  36

Accordingly, the CIR's failure to raise the issue of compliance with the 120+30 day periods in its Answer to
Marubeni's petition for review cannot be deemed a waiver of such objection. As the Court ruled in Applied Food, the
periods are jurisdictional, and "x x x the issue of jurisdiction over the subject matter may, at any time, be raised by
the parties or considered by the Court motu proprio."  Marubeni cannot therefore escape compliance with the
37

120+39 day periods. Its failure to observe the periods is fatal to its judicial claim for refund.  38

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition for review is hereby DENIED. The Decision dated March
23, 2011 and the Resolution dated August 31, 2011 of the CTA En Banc in CTA EB Case No. 557 are
hereby AFFIRMED.
 20.) [ G.R. No. 209306. September 27, 2017 ]
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, PETITIONER, VS. HEDCOR SIBULAN, INC.,
RESPONDENT.

RESOLUTION
CAGUIOA, J:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari[1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, filed by petitioner Commissioner of Internal
Revenue (CIR), are the Amended Decision[2] dated May 30, 2013 and Resolution[3] dated September 17, 2013 of the Court of Tax
Appeals (CTA) En Banc in CTA EB No. 890. The CTA En Banc reversed and set aside its earlier Decision[4] dated December 6, 2012,
which affirmed the CTA Third Division's (CTA Division) dismissal of respondent Hedcor Sibulan, Inc.'s (HSI) judicial claim on the ground
of prematurity, in CTA Case No. 8051; and remanded the case to the CTA Division for the determination of HSI's entitlement to a
refund of its alleged unutilized input value-added tax (VAT) for the first quarter of calendar year 2008, if any.

The Facts

HSI is a domestic corporation duly organized and existing under Philippine laws and is principally engaged in the business of power
generation through hydropower and subsequent sale of generated power to the Davao Light and Power Company, Inc.[5]

On April 21, 2008, HSI filed with the BIR its Original Quarterly VAT Returns for the first quarter of 2008.[6]

On May 20, 2008, HSI filed with the BIR its Amended Quarterly VAT Returns for the first quarter of 2008, which showed that it incurred
unutilized input VAT from its domestic purchases of goods and services in the total amount of P9,379,866.27, attributable to its zero-
rated sales of generated power.[7] Further, HSI allegedly did not have any local sales subject to VAT at 12%, which means that HSI did
not have any output VAT liability against which its unutilized input VAT could be applied or credited.[8]

On March 29, 2010, HSI filed its administrative claim for refund of unutilized input VAT for the first quarter of taxable year 2008 in the
amount of P9,379,866.27.[9]

On March 30, 2010, or one day after filing its administrative claim, HSI filed its judicial claim for refund with the CTA, docketed as CTA
Case No. 8051.[10]

In its Answer, the CIR argued, inter alia, that the HSFs judicial claim was prematurely filed and there was likewise no proof of
compliance with the prescribed requirements for VAT refund pursuant to Revenue Memorandum Order (RMO) No. 53-98.[11]

Meanwhile, on October 6, 2010, while HSFs claim for refund or issuance of tax credit certificate (TCC) was pending before the CTA
Division, this Court promulgated Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Aichi Forging Company of Asia, Inc.[12] (Aichi) where the Court
held that compliance with the 120-day period granted to the CIR, within which to act on an administrative claim for refund or credit of
unutilized input VAT, as provided under Section 112(C) of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC) of 1997, as amended, is
mandatory and jurisdictional in filing an appeal with the CTA.

Following Aichi, the CTA Division, in its Decision[13] dated January 5, 2012, dismissed HSI's judicial claim for having been prematurely
filed.[14]

HSI filed a motion for reconsideration which the CTA Division denied for lack of merit, in its Resolution[15] dated March 28, 2012.

Aggrieved, HSI elevated the matter to the CTA En Banc arguing that (1) its Petition for Review was not prematurely filed with the CTA
Division; (2) the periods under Section 112(C) of the NIRC of 1997, as amended, are not mandatory in nature; and (3) the Court's ruling
in Aichi should not be given a retroactive effect.[16]

On December 6, 2012, the CTA En Banc rendered a Decision[17] affirming the CTA Division's Decision and Resolution. The CTA En
Banc emphasized that following the principle of stare decisis et non quieta movere, the principles laid down in Aichi needed to be
applied for the purpose of maintaining consistency in jurisprudence.[18]

On January 2, 2013, HSI filed a Motion for Reconsideration.[19]

On February 12, 2013, during the pendency of said motion with the CTA En Banc, the Court decided the consolidated cases
of Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. San Roque Power Corporation, Taganito Mining Corporation v. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, and Philex Mining Corporation v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue[20] (San Roque), where BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03 was
recognized as an exception to the mandatory and jurisdictional nature of the 120-day waiting period under Section 112(C) of the NIRC
of 1997, as amended.

In view of this Court's pronouncements in San Roque, the CTA En Banc, on May 30, 2013, rendered the assailed Amended Decision
reversing and setting aside its December 6, 2012 Decision[21] and remanding the case to the CTA Division for a complete determination
of HSI's full compliance with the other legal requirements relative to its claim for refund or tax credit of its alleged unutilized input VAT
for the first quarter of calendar year 2008.
The CIR filed a motion for reconsideration, which the CTA En Banc denied in the assailed Resolution[22] dated September 17, 2013.

Hence, this petition, raising the following issues:

Whether HSI timely filed its judicial claim for refund/credit on March 30, 2010, a day after filing its administrative claim.

Whether HSI is entitled to its claim for refund/credit representing the alleged unutilized input VAT for the first quarter of calendar year
2008 amounting to P9,379,866.27.[23]

The Court's Ruling

The petition lacks merit.

Under Section 112(C) of the NIRC of 1997, as amended, the CIR is given a period of 120 days within which to grant or deny a claim for
refund. Upon receipt of the CIR's decision or ruling denying the said claim, or upon the expiration of the 120-day period without action
from the CIR, the taxpayer has thirty (30) days within which to file a petition for review with the CTA.

As earlier stated, the Court in Aichi clarified that the 120+30-day periods are mandatory and jurisdictional, the non-observance of which
is fatal to the filing of a judicial claim with the CTA. Subsequently, however, the Court, in San Roque, recognized an exception to the
mandatory and jurisdictional nature of the 120+30-day periods. The Court held that BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03, issued prior to the
promulgation of Aichi, which explicitly declared that the "taxpayer-claimant need not wait for the lapse of the 120-day period before it
could seek judicial relief with the CTA by way of petition for review,"[24] furnishes a valid basis to hold the CIR in estoppel because the
CIR had misled taxpayers into prematurely filing their judicial claims with the CTA:

There is no dispute that the 120-day period is mandatory and jurisdictional, and that the CTA does not acquire jurisdiction over a
judicial claim that is filed before the expiration of the 120-day period. There are, however, two exceptions to this rule. The first exception
is if the Commissioner, through a specific ruling, misleads a particular taxpayer to prematurely file a judicial claim with the CTA. Such
specific ruling is applicable only to such particular taxpayer. The second exception is where the Commissioner, through a general
interpretative rule issued under Section 4 of the Tax Code, misleads all taxpayers into filing prematurely judicial claims with
the CTA. In these cases, the Commissioner cannot be allowed to later on question the CTA's assumption of jurisdiction over
such claim since equitable estoppel has set in as expressly authorized under Section 246 of the Tax Code.

xxxx

BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03 is a general interpretative rule because it was a response to a query made, not by a particular taxpayer, but
by a government agency tasked with processing tax refunds and credits, that is, the One Stop Shop Inter-Agency Tax Credit and
Drawback Center of the Department of Finance. This government agency is also the addressee, or the entity responded to, in BIR
Ruling No. DA-489-03. Thus, while this government agency mentions in its query to the Commissioner the administrative claim of Lazi
Bay Resources Development, Inc., the agency was in fact asking the Commissioner what to do in cases like the tax claim of Lazi Bay
Resources Development, Inc., where the taxpayer did not wait for the lapse of the 120-day period.

Clearly, BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03 is a general interpretative rule. Thus, all taxpayers can rely on BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03
from the time of its issuance on 10 December 2003 up to its reversal by this Court in Aichi on 6 October 2010, where this
Court held that the 120+30 day periods are mandatory and jurisdictional. [25] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
In Taganito Mining Corporation v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,[26] the Court reconciled the pronouncements in Aichi and San
Roque in this wise:
Reconciling the pronouncements in the Aichi and San Roque cases, the rule must therefore be that during the period December 10,
2003 (when BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03 was issued) to October 6, 2010 (when the Aichi case was promulgated), taxpayers-
claimants need not observe the 120-day period before it could file a judicial claim for refund of excess input VAT before the
CTA. Before and after the aforementioned period (i.e., December 10, 2003 to October 6, 2010), the observance of the 120-day
period is mandatory and jurisdictional to the filing of such claim. [27] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Here, records show that HSI filed its judicial claim for refund on March 30, 2010, or after the issuance of BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03, but
before the date when Aichi was promulgated. Thus, even though HSI's claim was filed without waiting for the expiration of the 120-day
mandatory period, the CTA may still take cognizance of the case because the claim was filed within the excepted period stated in San
Roque. BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03 effectively shielded the filing of HSI's judicial claim from the vice of prematurity.[28] The CTA En
Banc was therefore correct in setting aside its earlier Decision dismissing HSI's claim on the ground of prematurity; and remanding the
case to the CTA Division for a complete determination of HSI's entitlement to the claimed VAT refund, if any.

The CIR, however, impugns the validity of BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03 asserting that (1) it was merely issued by a Deputy
Commissioner, and not the CIR, who is exclusively authorized by law to interpret tax matters; and (2) it was already repealed and
superseded on November 1, 2005 by Revenue Regulations No. 16-2005 (RR 16-2005), which echoed the mandatory and jurisdictional
nature of the 120-day period under Section 112(C) of the NIRC.

The Court is not persuaded.

In the Court En Banc's Resolution in San Roque dated October 8, 2013,[29] the Court upheld the authority of a Deputy Commissioner to
issue interpretative rules. The Court said that the NIRC does not prohibit the delegation of the CIR's power under Section 4 thereof. The
CIR may delegate the powers vested in him under the pertinent provisions of the NIRC to any or such subordinate officials with the rank
equivalent to a division chief or higher, subject to such limitations and restrictions as may be imposed under rules and regulations to be
promulgated by the Secretary of Finance, upon recommendation of the CIR.[30]

Moreover, in Procter and Gamble Asia Pte, Ltd. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,[31] the Court, reiterating its ruling
in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Deutsche Knowledge Services, Pte. Ltd.,[32] hold that all taxpayers may rely upon BIR Ruling
No. DA-489-03, as a general interpretative rule, from the time of its issuance on December 10, 2003 until its effective reversal by the
Court in Aichi.[33] The Court further ruled that while RR 16-2005 may have re-established the necessity of the 120-day period, taxpayers
cannot be faulted for still relying on BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03 even after the issuance of RR 16-2005 because the issue on the
mandatory compliance of the 120-day period was only brought before the Court and resolved with finality in Aichi.[34]

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition for review is hereby DENIED. The Amended Decision dated May 30, 2013 and
the Resolution dated September 17, 2013 of the CTA En Banc in CTA EB No. 890 are hereby AFFIRMED.
21.) G.R. No. 193707               December 10, 2014

NORMA A. DEL SOCORRO, for and in behalf of her minor child RODERIGO NORJO VAN WILSEM, Petitioner,
vs.
ERNST JOHAN BRINKMAN VAN WILSEM, Respondent.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to reverse and set
aside the Orders  dated February 19, 2010 and September 1, 2010, respectively, of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu
1

City (RTC-Cebu), which dismissed the criminal case entitled People of the Philippines v. Ernst Johan Brinkman Van
Wilsem, docketed as Criminal Case No. CBU-85503, for violation of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9262, otherwise known
as the Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004.

The following facts are culled from the records:

Petitioner Norma A. Del Socorro and respondent Ernst Johan Brinkman Van Wilsem contracted marriage in Holland
on September 25, 1990.  On January 19, 1994, they were blessed with a son named Roderigo Norjo Van Wilsem,
2

who at the time of the filing of the instant petition was sixteen (16) years of age.
3

Unfortunately, their marriage bond ended on July 19, 1995 by virtue of a Divorce Decree issued by the appropriate
Court of Holland.  At that time, their son was only eighteen (18) months old.  Thereafter, petitioner and her son came
4 5

home to the Philippines.6

According to petitioner, respondent made a promise to provide monthly support to their son in the amount of Two
Hundred Fifty (250) Guildene (which is equivalent to Php17,500.00 more or less).  However, since the arrival of
7

petitioner and her son in the Philippines, respondent never gave support to the son, Roderigo. 8

Not long thereafter, respondent came to the Philippines and remarried in Pinamungahan, Cebu, and since then,
have been residing thereat.  Respondent and his new wife established a business known as Paree Catering, located
9

at Barangay Tajao, Municipality of Pinamungahan, Cebu City.  To date, all the parties, including their son, Roderigo,
10

are presently living in Cebu City. 11

On August 28, 2009, petitioner, through her counsel, sent a letter demanding for support from respondent. However,
respondent refused to receive the letter. 12

Because of the foregoing circumstances, petitioner filed a complaint affidavit with the Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu
City against respondent for violation of Section 5, paragraph E(2) of R.A. No. 9262 for the latter’s unjust refusal to
support his minor child with petitioner.  Respondent submitted his counter-affidavit thereto, to which petitioner also
13

submitted her reply-affidavit.  Thereafter, the Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu City issued a Resolution recommending
14

the filing of an information for the crime charged against herein respondent.

The information, which was filed with the RTC-Cebu and raffled to Branch 20 thereof, states that:

That sometime in the year 1995 and up to the present, more or less, in the Municipality of Minglanilla, Province of
Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and deliberately deprive, refuse and still continue to deprive his son RODERIGO NORJO VAN
WILSEM, a fourteen (14) year old minor, of financial support legally due him, resulting in economic abuse to the
victim. CONTRARY TO LAW. 15

Upon motion and after notice and hearing, the RTC-Cebu issued a Hold Departure Order against
respondent.  Consequently, respondent was arrested and, subsequently, posted bail.  Petitioner also filed a
16 17

Motion/Application of Permanent Protection Order to which respondent filed his Opposition.  Pending the resolution
18

thereof, respondent was arraigned.  Subsequently, without the RTC-Cebu having resolved the application of the
19
protection order, respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of: (1) lack of jurisdiction over the offense
charged; and (2) prescription of the crime charged. 20

On February 19, 2010, the RTC-Cebu issued the herein assailed Order,  dismissing the instant criminal case
21

against respondent on the ground that the facts charged in the information do not constitute an offense with respect
to the respondent who is an alien, the dispositive part of which states:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds that the facts charged in the information do not constitute an offense with respect to
the accused, he being an alien, and accordingly, orders this case DISMISSED.

The bail bond posted by accused Ernst Johan Brinkman Van Wilsem for his provisional liberty is hereby cancelled
(sic) and ordered released.

SO ORDERED.

Cebu City, Philippines, February 19, 2010. 22

Thereafter, petitioner filed her Motion for Reconsideration thereto reiterating respondent’s obligation to support their
child under Article 195  of the Family Code, thus, failure to do so makes him liable under R.A. No. 9262 which
23

"equally applies to all persons in the Philippines who are obliged to support their minor children regardless of the
obligor’s nationality."
24

On September 1, 2010, the lower court issued an Order  denying petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration and
25

reiterating its previous ruling. Thus:

x x x The arguments therein presented are basically a rehash of those advanced earlier in the memorandum of the
prosecution. Thus, the court hereby reiterates its ruling that since the accused is a foreign national he is not subject
to our national law (The Family Code) in regard to a parent’s duty and obligation to givesupport to his child.
Consequently, he cannot be charged of violating R.A. 9262 for his alleged failure to support his child. Unless it is
conclusively established that R.A. 9262 applies to a foreigner who fails to give support tohis child, notwithstanding
that he is not bound by our domestic law which mandates a parent to give such support, it is the considered opinion
of the court that no prima faciecase exists against the accused herein, hence, the case should be dismissed.

WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

Cebu City, Philippines, September 1, 2010. 26

Hence, the present Petition for Review on Certiorari raising the following issues:

1. Whether or not a foreign national has an obligation to support his minor child under Philippine law; and

2. Whether or not a foreign national can be held criminally liable under R.A. No. 9262 for his unjustified
failure to support his minor child.
27

At the outset, let it be emphasized that We are taking cognizance of the instant petition despite the fact that the
same was directly lodged with the Supreme Court, consistent with the ruling in Republic v. Sunvar Realty
Development Corporation,  which lays down the instances when a ruling of the trial court may be brought on appeal
28

directly to the Supreme Court without violating the doctrine of hierarchy of courts, to wit:

x x x Nevertheless, the Rules do not prohibit any of the parties from filing a Rule 45 Petition with this Court, in case
only questions of law are raised or involved. This latter situation was one that petitioners found themselves in when
they filed the instant Petition to raise only questions of law. In Republic v. Malabanan, the Court clarified the three
modes of appeal from decisions of the RTC, to wit: (1) by ordinary appeal or appeal by writ of error under Rule 41,
whereby judgment was rendered in a civil or criminal action by the RTC in the exercise of its original jurisdiction; (2)
by a petition for review under Rule 42, whereby judgment was rendered by the RTC in the exercise of its appellate
jurisdiction; and (3) by a petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court under Rule 45. "The first mode of
appeal is taken to the [Court of Appeals] on questions of fact or mixed questions of fact and law. The second mode
of appeal is brought to the CA on questions of fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact and law. The third mode of
appealis elevated to the Supreme Court only on questions of law." (Emphasis supplied)

There is a question of law when the issue does not call for an examination of the probative value of the evidence
presented or of the truth or falsehood of the facts being admitted, and the doubt concerns the correct application of
law and jurisprudence on the matter. The resolution of the issue must rest solely on what the law provides on the
given set of circumstances. 29

Indeed, the issues submitted to us for resolution involve questions of law – the response thereto concerns the
correct application of law and jurisprudence on a given set of facts, i.e.,whether or not a foreign national has an
obligation to support his minor child under Philippine law; and whether or not he can be held criminally liable under
R.A. No. 9262 for his unjustified failure to do so.

It cannot be negated, moreover, that the instant petition highlights a novel question of law concerning the liability of
a foreign national who allegedly commits acts and omissions punishable under special criminal laws, specifically in
relation to family rights and duties. The inimitability of the factual milieu of the present case, therefore, deserves a
definitive ruling by this Court, which will eventually serve as a guidepost for future cases. Furthermore, dismissing
the instant petition and remanding the same to the CA would only waste the time, effort and resources of the courts.
Thus, in the present case, considerations of efficiency and economy in the administration of justice should prevail
over the observance of the hierarchy of courts.

Now, on the matter of the substantive issues, We find the petition meritorious. Nonetheless, we do not fully agree
with petitioner’s contentions.

To determine whether or not a person is criminally liable under R.A. No. 9262, it is imperative that the legal
obligation to support exists.

Petitioner invokes Article 195  of the Family Code, which provides the parent’s obligation to support his child.
30

Petitioner contends that notwithstanding the existence of a divorce decree issued in relation to Article 26 of the
Family Code,  respondent is not excused from complying with his obligation to support his minor child with
31

petitioner.

On the other hand, respondent contends that there is no sufficient and clear basis presented by petitioner that she,
as well as her minor son, are entitled to financial support.  Respondent also added that by reason of the Divorce
32

Decree, he is not obligated topetitioner for any financial support.

33

On this point, we agree with respondent that petitioner cannot rely on Article 195  of the New Civil Code in
34

demanding support from respondent, who is a foreign citizen, since Article 15  of the New Civil Code stresses the
35

principle of nationality. In other words, insofar as Philippine laws are concerned, specifically the provisions of the
Family Code on support, the same only applies to Filipino citizens. By analogy, the same principle applies to
foreigners such that they are governed by their national law with respect to family rights and duties. 36

The obligation to give support to a child is a matter that falls under family rights and duties. Since the respondent is
a citizen of Holland or the Netherlands, we agree with the RTC-Cebu that he is subject to the laws of his country, not
to Philippinelaw, as to whether he is obliged to give support to his child, as well as the consequences of his failure to
do so.37

In the case of Vivo v. Cloribel,  the Court held that –

38

Furthermore, being still aliens, they are not in position to invoke the provisions of the Civil Code of the Philippines,
for that Code cleaves to the principle that family rights and duties are governed by their personal law, i.e.,the laws of
the nation to which they belong even when staying in a foreign country (cf. Civil Code, Article 15). 39
It cannot be gainsaid, therefore, that the respondent is not obliged to support petitioner’s son under Article195 of the
Family Code as a consequence of the Divorce Covenant obtained in Holland. This does not, however, mean that
respondent is not obliged to support petitioner’s son altogether.

In international law, the party who wants to have a foreign law applied to a dispute or case has the burden of
proving the foreign law.  In the present case, respondent hastily concludes that being a national of the Netherlands,
40

he is governed by such laws on the matter of provision of and capacity to support.  While respondent pleaded the
41

laws of the Netherlands in advancing his position that he is not obliged to support his son, he never proved the
same.

It is incumbent upon respondent to plead and prove that the national law of the Netherlands does not impose upon
the parents the obligation to support their child (either before, during or after the issuance of a divorce decree),
because Llorente v. Court of Appeals,  has already enunciated that:
42

True, foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized to takejudicial notice
of them. Like any other fact, they must be alleged and proved. 43

In view of respondent’s failure to prove the national law of the Netherlands in his favor, the doctrine of processual
presumption shall govern. Under this doctrine, if the foreign law involved is not properly pleaded and proved, our
courts will presume that the foreign law is the same as our local or domestic or internal law.  Thus, since the law of
44

the Netherlands as regards the obligation to support has not been properly pleaded and proved in the instant case,
it is presumed to be the same with Philippine law, which enforces the obligation of parents to support their children
and penalizing the non-compliance therewith.

Moreover, while in Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera,  the Court held that a divorce obtained in a foreign land as well as its
45

legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines in view of the nationality principle on the matter of status of
persons, the Divorce Covenant presented by respondent does not completely show that he is notliable to give
support to his son after the divorce decree was issued. Emphasis is placed on petitioner’s allegation that under the
second page of the aforesaid covenant, respondent’s obligation to support his child is specifically stated,  which was
46

not disputed by respondent.

We likewise agree with petitioner that notwithstanding that the national law of respondent states that parents have
no obligation to support their children or that such obligation is not punishable by law, said law would still not find
applicability,in light of the ruling in Bank of America, NT and SA v. American Realty Corporation,  to wit:
47

In the instant case, assuming arguendo that the English Law on the matter were properly pleaded and proved in
accordance with Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court and the jurisprudence laid down in Yao Kee, et al. vs.
Sy-Gonzales, said foreign law would still not find applicability.

Thus, when the foreign law, judgment or contract is contrary to a sound and established public policy of the forum,
the said foreign law, judgment or order shall not be applied.

Additionally, prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their object public
order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by
determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.

The public policy sought to be protected in the instant case is the principle imbedded in our jurisdiction proscribing
the splitting up of a single cause of action.

Section 4, Rule 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is pertinent

If two or more suits are instituted on the basis of the same cause of action, the filing of one or a judgment upon the
merits in any one is available as a ground for the dismissal of the others. Moreover, foreign law should not be
applied when its application would work undeniable injustice to the citizens or residents of the forum. To give justice
is the most important function of law; hence, a law, or judgment or contract that is obviously unjust negates the
fundamental principles of Conflict of Laws. 48

Applying the foregoing, even if the laws of the Netherlands neither enforce a parent’s obligation to support his child
nor penalize the noncompliance therewith, such obligation is still duly enforceable in the Philippines because it
would be of great injustice to the child to be denied of financial support when the latter is entitled thereto.

We emphasize, however, that as to petitioner herself, respondent is no longer liable to support his former wife, in
consonance with the ruling in San Luis v. San Luis,  to wit:
49

As to the effect of the divorce on the Filipino wife, the Court ruled that she should no longerbe considered marriedto
the alien spouse. Further, she should not be required to perform her marital duties and obligations. It held:

To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner has to be considered still married to private
respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil Code cannot be just.
Petitioner should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to private
respondent. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She
should not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served. (Emphasis added) 50

Based on the foregoing legal precepts, we find that respondent may be made liable under Section 5(e) and (i) of
R.A. No. 9262 for unjustly refusing or failing to give support topetitioner’s son, to wit:

SECTION 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children.- The crime of violence against women and their
children is committed through any of the following acts:

xxxx

(e) Attempting to compel or compelling the woman or her child to engage in conduct which the woman or her child
has the right to desist from or desist from conduct which the woman or her child has the right to engage in, or
attempting to restrict or restricting the woman's or her child's freedom of movement or conduct by force or threat of
force, physical or other harm or threat of physical or other harm, or intimidation directed against the woman or child.
This shall include, butnot limited to, the following acts committed with the purpose or effect of controlling or
restricting the woman's or her child's movement or conduct:

xxxx

(2) Depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her children of financial support legally due her or her family, or
deliberately providing the woman's children insufficient financial support; x x x x

(i) Causing mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation to the woman or her child, including, but not
limited to, repeated verbal and emotional abuse, and denial of financial support or custody of minor childrenof
access to the woman's child/children. 51

Under the aforesaid special law, the deprivation or denial of financial support to the child is considered anact of
violence against women and children.

In addition, considering that respondent is currently living in the Philippines, we find strength in petitioner’s claim that
the Territoriality Principle in criminal law, in relation to Article 14 of the New Civil Code, applies to the instant case,
which provides that: "[p]enal laws and those of public security and safety shall be obligatory upon all who live and
sojourn in Philippine territory, subject to the principle of public international law and to treaty stipulations." On this
score, it is indisputable that the alleged continuing acts of respondent in refusing to support his child with petitioner
is committed here in the Philippines as all of the parties herein are residents of the Province of Cebu City. As such,
our courts have territorial jurisdiction over the offense charged against respondent. It is likewise irrefutable that
jurisdiction over the respondent was acquired upon his arrest.
Finally, we do not agree with respondent’s argument that granting, but not admitting, that there is a legal basis for
charging violation of R.A. No. 9262 in the instant case, the criminal liability has been extinguished on the ground of
prescription of crime  under Section 24 of R.A. No. 9262, which provides that:
52

SECTION 24. Prescriptive Period. – Acts falling under Sections 5(a) to 5(f) shall prescribe in twenty (20) years. Acts
falling under Sections 5(g) to 5(I) shall prescribe in ten (10) years.

The act of denying support to a child under Section 5(e)(2) and (i) of R.A. No. 9262 is a continuing offense,  which
53

started in 1995 but is still ongoing at present. Accordingly, the crime charged in the instant case has clearly not
prescribed.

Given, however, that the issue on whether respondent has provided support to petitioner’s child calls for an
examination of the probative value of the evidence presented, and the truth and falsehood of facts being admitted,
we hereby remand the determination of this issue to the RTC-Cebu which has jurisdiction over the case.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Orders dated February 19, 2010 and September 1, 2010,
respectively, of the Regional Trial Court of the City of Cebu are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is
REMANDED to the same court to conduct further proceedings based on the merits of the case.
22.) G.R. No. L-19671           November 29, 1965

PASTOR B. TENCHAVEZ, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
VICENTA F. ESCAÑO, ET AL., defendants-appellees.

I. V. Binamira & F. B. Barria for plaintiff-appellant.

Jalandoni & Jarnir for defendants-appellees.

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

Direct appeal, on factual and legal questions, from the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, in its Civil
Case No. R-4177, denying the claim of the plaintiff-appellant, Pastor B. Tenchavez, for legal separation and one
million pesos in damages against his wife and parents-in-law, the defendants-appellees, Vicente, Mamerto and
Mena,1 all surnamed "Escaño," respectively.2

The facts, supported by the evidence of record, are the following:

Missing her late afternoon classes on 24 February 1948 in the University of San Carlos, Cebu City, where she was
then enrolled as a second year student of commerce, Vicenta Escaño, 27 years of age (scion of a well-to-do and
socially prominent Filipino family of Spanish ancestry and a "sheltered colegiala"), exchanged marriage vows with
Pastor Tenchavez, 32 years of age, an engineer, ex-army officer and of undistinguished stock, without the
knowledge of her parents, before a Catholic chaplain, Lt. Moises Lavares, in the house of one Juan Alburo in the
said city. The marriage was the culmination of a previous love affair and was duly registered with the local civil
register.

Vicenta's letters to Pastor, and his to her, before the marriage, indicate that the couple were deeply in love.
Together with a friend, Pacita Noel, their matchmaker and go-between, they had planned out their marital future
whereby Pacita would be the governess of their first-born; they started saving money in a piggy bank. A few weeks
before their secret marriage, their engagement was broken; Vicenta returned the engagement ring and accepted
another suitor, Joseling Lao. Her love for Pastor beckoned; she pleaded for his return, and they reconciled. This
time they planned to get married and then elope. To facilitate the elopement, Vicenta had brought some of her
clothes to the room of Pacita Noel in St. Mary's Hall, which was their usual trysting place.

Although planned for the midnight following their marriage, the elopement did not, however, materialize because
when Vicente went back to her classes after the marriage, her mother, who got wind of the intended nuptials, was
already waiting for her at the college. Vicenta was taken home where she admitted that she had already married
Pastor. Mamerto and Mena Escaño were surprised, because Pastor never asked for the hand of Vicente, and were
disgusted because of the great scandal that the clandestine marriage would provoke (t.s.n., vol. III, pp. 1105-06).
The following morning, the Escaño spouses sought priestly advice. Father Reynes suggested a recelebration to
validate what he believed to be an invalid marriage, from the standpoint of the Church, due to the lack of authority
from the Archbishop or the parish priest for the officiating chaplain to celebrate the marriage. The recelebration did
not take place, because on 26 February 1948 Mamerto Escaño was handed by a maid, whose name he claims he
does not remember, a letter purportedly coming from San Carlos college students and disclosing an amorous
relationship between Pastor Tenchavez and Pacita Noel; Vicenta translated the letter to her father, and thereafter
would not agree to a new marriage. Vicenta and Pastor met that day in the house of Mrs. Pilar Mendezona.
Thereafter, Vicenta continued living with her parents while Pastor returned to his job in Manila. Her letter of 22
March 1948 (Exh. "M"), while still solicitous of her husband's welfare, was not as endearing as her previous letters
when their love was aflame.

Vicenta was bred in Catholic ways but is of a changeable disposition, and Pastor knew it. She fondly accepted her
being called a "jellyfish." She was not prevented by her parents from communicating with Pastor (Exh. "1-Escaño"),
but her letters became less frequent as the days passed. As of June, 1948 the newlyweds were already estranged
(Exh. "2-Escaño"). Vicenta had gone to Jimenez, Misamis Occidental, to escape from the scandal that her marriage
stirred in Cebu society. There, a lawyer filed for her a petition, drafted by then Senator Emmanuel Pelaez, to annul
her marriage. She did not sign the petition (Exh. "B-5"). The case was dismissed without prejudice because of her
non-appearance at the hearing (Exh. "B-4").

On 24 June 1950, without informing her husband, she applied for a passport, indicating in her application that she
was single, that her purpose was to study, and she was domiciled in Cebu City, and that she intended to return after
two years. The application was approved, and she left for the United States. On 22 August 1950, she filed a verified
complaint for divorce against the herein plaintiff in the Second Judicial District Court of the State of Nevada in and
for the County of Washoe, on the ground of "extreme cruelty, entirely mental in character." On 21 October 1950, a
decree of divorce, "final and absolute", was issued in open court by the said tribunal.

In 1951 Mamerto and Mena Escaño filed a petition with the Archbishop of Cebu to annul their daughter's marriage
to Pastor (Exh. "D"). On 10 September 1954, Vicenta sought papal dispensation of her marriage (Exh. "D"-2).

On 13 September 1954, Vicenta married an American, Russell Leo Moran, in Nevada. She now lives with him in
California, and, by him, has begotten children. She acquired American citizenship on 8 August 1958.

But on 30 July 1955, Tenchavez had initiated the proceedings at bar by a complaint in the Court of First Instance of
Cebu, and amended on 31 May 1956, against Vicenta F. Escaño, her parents, Mamerto and Mena Escaño, whom
he charged with having dissuaded and discouraged Vicenta from joining her husband, and alienating her affections,
and against the Roman Catholic Church, for having, through its Diocesan Tribunal, decreed the annulment of the
marriage, and asked for legal separation and one million pesos in damages. Vicenta claimed a valid divorce from
plaintiff and an equally valid marriage to her present husband, Russell Leo Moran; while her parents denied that
they had in any way influenced their daughter's acts, and counterclaimed for moral damages.

The appealed judgment did not decree a legal separation, but freed the plaintiff from supporting his wife and to
acquire property to the exclusion of his wife. It allowed the counterclaim of Mamerto Escaño and Mena Escaño for
moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees against the plaintiff-appellant, to the extent of P45,000.00, and
plaintiff resorted directly to this Court.

The appellant ascribes, as errors of the trial court, the following:

1. In not declaring legal separation; in not holding defendant Vicenta F. Escaño liable for damages and in
dismissing the complaint;.

2. In not holding the defendant parents Mamerto Escano and the heirs of Doña Mena Escaño liable for
damages;.

3 In holding the plaintiff liable for and requiring him to pay the damages to the defendant parents on their
counterclaims; and.

4. In dismissing the complaint and in denying the relief sought by the plaintiff.

That on 24 February 1948 the plaintiff-appellant, Pastor Tenchavez, and the defendant-appellee, Vicenta Escaño,
were validly married to each other, from the standpoint of our civil law, is clearly established by the record before us.
Both parties were then above the age of majority, and otherwise qualified; and both consented to the marriage,
which was performed by a Catholic priest (army chaplain Lavares) in the presence of competent witnesses. It is
nowhere shown that said priest was not duly authorized under civil law to solemnize marriages.

The chaplain's alleged lack of ecclesiastical authorization from the parish priest and the Ordinary, as required by
Canon law, is irrelevant in our civil law, not only because of the separation of Church and State but also because
Act 3613 of the Philippine Legislature (which was the marriage law in force at the time) expressly provided that —

SEC. 1. Essential requisites. Essential requisites for marriage are the legal capacity of the contracting
parties and consent. (Emphasis supplied)
The actual authority of the solemnizing officer was thus only a formal requirement, and, therefore, not essential to
give the marriage civil effects,3 and this is emphasized by section 27 of said marriage act, which provided the
following:

SEC. 27. Failure to comply with formal requirements. No marriage shall be declared invalid because of the
absence of one or several of the formal requirements of this Act if, when it was performed, the spouses or
one of them believed in good faith that the person who solemnized the marriage was actually empowered to
do so, and that the marriage was perfectly legal.

The good faith of all the parties to the marriage (and hence the validity of their marriage) will be presumed until the
contrary is positively proved (Lao vs. Dee Tim, 45 Phil. 739, 745; Francisco vs. Jason, 60 Phil. 442, 448). It is well to
note here that in the case at bar, doubts as to the authority of the solemnizing priest arose only after the marriage,
when Vicenta's parents consulted Father Reynes and the archbishop of Cebu. Moreover, the very act of Vicenta in
abandoning her original action for annulment and subsequently suing for divorce implies an admission that her
marriage to plaintiff was valid and binding.

Defendant Vicenta Escaño argues that when she contracted the marriage she was under the undue influence of
Pacita Noel, whom she charges to have been in conspiracy with appellant Tenchavez. Even granting, for
argument's sake, the truth of that contention, and assuming that Vicenta's consent was vitiated by fraud and undue
influence, such vices did not render her marriage ab initio void, but merely voidable, and the marriage remained
valid until annulled by a competent civil court. This was never done, and admittedly, Vicenta's suit for annulment in
the Court of First Instance of Misamis was dismissed for non-prosecution.

It is equally clear from the record that the valid marriage between Pastor Tenchavez and Vicenta Escaño remained
subsisting and undissolved under Philippine law, notwithstanding the decree of absolute divorce that the wife sought
and obtained on 21 October 1950 from the Second Judicial District Court of Washoe County, State of Nevada, on
grounds of "extreme cruelty, entirely mental in character." At the time the divorce decree was issued, Vicenta
Escaño, like her husband, was still a Filipino citizen. 4 She was then subject to Philippine law, and Article 15 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines (Rep. Act No. 386), already in force at the time, expressly provided:

Laws relating to family rights and duties or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding
upon the citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.

The Civil Code of the Philippines, now in force, does not admit absolute divorce, quo ad vinculo matrimonii; and in
fact does not even use that term, to further emphasize its restrictive policy on the matter, in contrast to the preceding
legislation that admitted absolute divorce on grounds of adultery of the wife or concubinage of the husband (Act
2710). Instead of divorce, the present Civil Code only provides for legal separation (Title IV, Book 1, Arts. 97 to
108), and, even in that case, it expressly prescribes that "the marriage bonds shall not be severed" (Art. 106,
subpar. 1).

For the Philippine courts to recognize and give recognition or effect to a foreign decree of absolute divorce betiveen
Filipino citizens could be a patent violation of the declared public policy of the state, specially in view of the third
paragraph of Article 17 of the Civil Code that prescribes the following:

Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their object public
order, policy and good customs, shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by
determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.

Even more, the grant of effectivity in this jurisdiction to such foreign divorce decrees would, in effect, give rise to an
irritating and scandalous discrimination in favor of wealthy citizens, to the detriment of those members of our polity
whose means do not permit them to sojourn abroad and obtain absolute divorces outside the Philippines.

From this point of view, it is irrelevant that appellant Pastor Tenchavez should have appeared in the Nevada divorce
court. Primarily because the policy of our law cannot be nullified by acts of private parties (Civil Code,Art. 17, jam
quot.); and additionally, because the mere appearance of a non-resident consort cannot confer jurisdiction where
the court originally had none (Area vs. Javier, 95 Phil. 579).
From the preceding facts and considerations, there flows as a necessary consequence that in this jurisdiction
Vicenta Escaño's divorce and second marriage are not entitled to recognition as valid; for her previous union to
plaintiff Tenchavez must be declared to be existent and undissolved. It follows, likewise, that her refusal to perform
her wifely duties, and her denial of consortium and her desertion of her husband constitute in law a wrong caused
through her fault, for which the husband is entitled to the corresponding indemnity (Civil Code, Art. 2176). Neither an
unsubstantiated charge of deceit nor an anonymous letter charging immorality against the husband constitute,
contrary to her claim, adequate excuse. Wherefore, her marriage and cohabitation with Russell Leo Moran is
technically "intercourse with a person not her husband" from the standpoint of Philippine Law, and entitles plaintiff-
appellant Tenchavez to a decree of "legal separation under our law, on the basis of adultery" (Revised Penal Code,
Art. 333).

The foregoing conclusions as to the untoward effect of a marriage after an invalid divorce are in accord with the
previous doctrines and rulings of this court on the subject, particularly those that were rendered under our laws prior
to the approval of the absolute divorce act (Act 2710 of the Philippine Legislature). As a matter of legal history, our
statutes did not recognize divorces a vinculo before 1917, when Act 2710 became effective; and the present Civil
Code of the Philippines, in disregarding absolute divorces, in effect merely reverted to the policies on the subject
prevailing before Act 2710. The rulings, therefore, under the Civil Code of 1889, prior to the Act above-mentioned,
are now, fully applicable. Of these, the decision in Ramirez vs. Gmur, 42 Phil. 855, is of particular interest. Said this
Court in that case:

As the divorce granted by the French Court must be ignored, it results that the marriage of Dr. Mory and
Leona Castro, celebrated in London in 1905, could not legalize their relations; and the circumstance that
they afterwards passed for husband and wife in Switzerland until her death is wholly without legal
significance. The claims of the very children to participate in the estate of Samuel Bishop must therefore be
rejected. The right to inherit is limited to legitimate, legitimated and acknowledged natural children. The
children of adulterous relations are wholly excluded. The word "descendants" as used in Article 941 of the
Civil Code cannot be interpreted to include illegitimates born of adulterous relations. (Emphasis supplied)

Except for the fact that the successional rights of the children, begotten from Vicenta's marriage to Leo Moran after
the invalid divorce, are not involved in the case at bar, the Gmur case is authority for the proposition that such union
is adulterous in this jurisdiction, and, therefore, justifies an action for legal separation on the part of the innocent
consort of the first marriage, that stands undissolved in Philippine law. In not so declaring, the trial court committed
error.

True it is that our ruling gives rise to anomalous situations where the status of a person (whether divorced or not)
would depend on the territory where the question arises. Anomalies of this kind are not new in the Philippines, and
the answer to them was given in Barretto vs. Gonzales, 58 Phil. 667:

The hardship of the existing divorce laws in the Philippine Islands are well known to the members of the
Legislature. It is the duty of the Courts to enforce the laws of divorce as written by Legislature if they are
constitutional. Courts have no right to say that such laws are too strict or too liberal. (p. 72)

The appellant's first assignment of error is, therefore, sustained.

However, the plaintiff-appellant's charge that his wife's parents, Dr. Mamerto Escaño and his wife, the late Doña
Mena Escaño, alienated the affections of their daughter and influenced her conduct toward her husband are not
supported by credible evidence. The testimony of Pastor Tenchavez about the Escaño's animosity toward him
strikes us to be merely conjecture and exaggeration, and are belied by Pastor's own letters written before this suit
was begun (Exh. "2-Escaño" and "Vicenta," Rec. on App., pp. 270-274). In these letters he expressly apologized to
the defendants for "misjudging them" and for the "great unhappiness" caused by his "impulsive blunders" and "sinful
pride," "effrontery and audacity" [sic]. Plaintiff was admitted to the Escaño house to visit and court Vicenta, and the
record shows nothing to prove that he would not have been accepted to marry Vicente had he openly asked for her
hand, as good manners and breeding demanded. Even after learning of the clandestine marriage, and despite their
shock at such unexpected event, the parents of Vicenta proposed and arranged that the marriage be recelebrated in
strict conformity with the canons of their religion upon advice that the previous one was canonically defective. If no
recelebration of the marriage ceremony was had it was not due to defendants Mamerto Escaño and his wife, but to
the refusal of Vicenta to proceed with it. That the spouses Escaño did not seek to compel or induce their daughter to
assent to the recelebration but respected her decision, or that they abided by her resolve, does not constitute in law
an alienation of affections. Neither does the fact that Vicenta's parents sent her money while she was in the United
States; for it was natural that they should not wish their daughter to live in penury even if they did not concur in her
decision to divorce Tenchavez (27 Am. Jur. 130-132).

There is no evidence that the parents of Vicenta, out of improper motives, aided and abetted her original suit for
annulment, or her subsequent divorce; she appears to have acted independently, and being of age, she was entitled
to judge what was best for her and ask that her decisions be respected. Her parents, in so doing, certainly cannot
be charged with alienation of affections in the absence of malice or unworthy motives, which have not been shown,
good faith being always presumed until the contrary is proved.

SEC. 529. Liability of Parents, Guardians or Kin. — The law distinguishes between the right of a parent to
interest himself in the marital affairs of his child and the absence of rights in a stranger to intermeddle in
such affairs. However, such distinction between the liability of parents and that of strangers is only in regard
to what will justify interference. A parent isliable for alienation of affections resulting from his own malicious
conduct, as where he wrongfully entices his son or daughter to leave his or her spouse, but he is not liable
unless he acts maliciously, without justification and from unworthy motives. He is not liable where he acts
and advises his child in good faith with respect to his child's marital relations in the interest of his child as he
sees it, the marriage of his child not terminating his right and liberty to interest himself in, and be extremely
solicitous for, his child's welfare and happiness, even where his conduct and advice suggest or result in the
separation of the spouses or the obtaining of a divorce or annulment, or where he acts under mistake or
misinformation, or where his advice or interference are indiscreet or unfortunate, although it has been held
that the parent is liable for consequences resulting from recklessness. He may in good faith take his child
into his home and afford him or her protection and support, so long as he has not maliciously enticed his
child away, or does not maliciously entice or cause him or her to stay away, from his or her spouse. This rule
has more frequently been applied in the case of advice given to a married daughter, but it is equally
applicable in the case of advice given to a son.

Plaintiff Tenchavez, in falsely charging Vicenta's aged parents with racial or social discrimination and with having
exerted efforts and pressured her to seek annulment and divorce, unquestionably caused them unrest and anxiety,
entitling them to recover damages. While this suit may not have been impelled by actual malice, the charges were
certainly reckless in the face of the proven facts and circumstances. Court actions are not established for parties to
give vent to their prejudices or spleen.

In the assessment of the moral damages recoverable by appellant Pastor Tenchavez from defendant Vicente
Escaño, it is proper to take into account, against his patently unreasonable claim for a million pesos in damages,
that (a) the marriage was celebrated in secret, and its failure was not characterized by publicity or undue humiliation
on appellant's part; (b) that the parties never lived together; and (c) that there is evidence that appellant had
originally agreed to the annulment of the marriage, although such a promise was legally invalid, being against public
policy (cf. Art. 88, Civ. Code). While appellant is unable to remarry under our law, this fact is a consequence of the
indissoluble character of the union that appellant entered into voluntarily and with open eyes rather than of her
divorce and her second marriage. All told, we are of the opinion that appellant should recover P25,000 only by way
of moral damages and attorney's fees.

With regard to the P45,000 damages awarded to the defendants, Dr. Mamerto Escaño and Mena Escaño, by the
court below, we opine that the same are excessive. While the filing of this unfounded suit must have wounded said
defendants' feelings and caused them anxiety, the same could in no way have seriously injured their reputation, or
otherwise prejudiced them, lawsuits having become a common occurrence in present society. What is important,
and has been correctly established in the decision of the court below, is that said defendants were not guilty of any
improper conduct in the whole deplorable affair. This Court, therefore, reduces the damages awarded to P5,000
only.

Summing up, the Court rules:

(1) That a foreign divorce between Filipino citizens, sought and decreed after the effectivity of the present Civil Code
(Rep. Act 386), is not entitled to recognition as valid in this jurisdiction; and neither is the marriage contracted with
another party by the divorced consort, subsequently to the foreign decree of divorce, entitled to validity in the
country;
(2) That the remarriage of divorced wife and her co-habitation with a person other than the lawful husband entitle
the latter to a decree of legal separation conformably to Philippine law;

(3) That the desertion and securing of an invalid divorce decree by one consort entitles the other to recover
damages;

(4) That an action for alienation of affections against the parents of one consort does not lie in the absence of proof
of malice or unworthy motives on their part.

WHEREFORE, the decision under appeal is hereby modified as follows;

(1) Adjudging plaintiff-appellant Pastor Tenchavez entitled to a decree of legal separation from defendant Vicenta F.
Escaño;

(2) Sentencing defendant-appellee Vicenta Escaño to pay plaintiff-appellant Tenchavez the amount of P25,000 for
damages and attorneys' fees;

(3) Sentencing appellant Pastor Tenchavez to pay the appellee, Mamerto Escaño and the estate of his wife, the
deceased Mena Escaño, P5,000 by way of damages and attorneys' fees.
23.) G.R. Nos. 95122-23             May 31, 1991

BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS (COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION AND DEPORTATION), BOARD OF SPECIAL

INQUIRY, COMMISSIONER ANDREA D. DOMINGO, ASSOCIATE COMMISSIONER JORGE V. SARMIENTO,
ACTING ASSOCIATE COMMISSIONER REGINO R. SANTIAGO, MEMBERS OF THE BOARD OF SPECIAL
INQUIRY, ESTANISLAO CANTA, LEO MAGAHOM and BENJAMIN KALAW, petitioners,
vs.
HON. JOSELITO DELA ROSA, Presiding Judge, RTC Manila, Branch 29, WILLIAM T.
GATCHALIAN, respondents.

BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS (COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION AND DEPORTATION), BOARD OF SPECIAL

INQUIRY, COMMISSIONER ANDREA D. DOMINGO, ASSOCIATE COMMISSIONER JORGE V. SARMIENTO,
ACTING ASSOCIATE COMMISSIONER REGINO R. SANTIAGO, MEMBERS OF THE BOARD OF SPECIAL
INQUIRY, ESTANISLAO CANTA, LEO MAGAHOM and BENJAMIN KALAW, petitioners,
vs.
HON. TERESITA DIZON CAPULONG, Presiding Judge, RTC Branch 172, Valenzuela, Metro Manila, DEE HUA
T. GATCHALIAN, SHERWING T. GATCHALIAN, KENNETH T. GATCHALIAN, REXLON T. GATCHALIAN, and
WESLIE T. GATCHALIAN, respondents.

G.R. Nos. 95612-13             May 31, 1991

WILLIAM T. GATCHALIAN, petitioner,
vs.
BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS (COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION AND DEPORTATION), et al., respondents.

The Solicitor General for petitioners.

edesma, Saludo & Associates for respondent William Gatchalian.
Cervo and Tanay Law Office for respondent T.D. Capulong, D.H.T. Gatchalian, et al.

BIDIN, J.:

This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by the Solicitor General seeking 1) to set aside the
Resolution/Temporary Restraining Order dated September 7, 1990, issued by respondent Judge de la Rosa in Civil
Case No. 90-54214 which denied petitioners' motion to dismiss and restrained petitioners from commencing or
continuing with any of the proceedings which would lead to the deportation of respondent William Gatchalian,
docketed as D.C. No. 90-523, as well as the Order of respondent Judge Capulong dated September 6, 1990 in Civil
Case No. 3431-V-90 which likewise enjoined petitioners from proceeding with the deportation charges against
respondent Gatchalian, and 2) to prohibit respondent judges from further acting in the aforesaid civil cases.

On October 23, 1990, respondent Gatchalian filed his Comment with Counter-Petition, docketed as G.R. Nos.
96512-13, alleging lack of jurisdiction on the part of respondent Board of Commissioners, et al., over his person with
prayer that he be declared a Filipino citizen, or in the alternative, to remand the case to the trial court for further
proceedings.

On December 13, 1990, petitioners filed their comment to respondent Gatchalian's counter-petition. The Court
considers the comment filed by respondent Gatchalian as answer to the petition and petitioners' comment as
answer to the counter-petition and gives due course to the petitions.

There is no dispute as to the following facts:

On July 12, 1960, Santiago Gatchalian, grandfather of William Gatchalian, was recognized by the Bureau of
Immigration as a native born Filipino citizen following the citizenship of his natural mother, Marciana Gatchalian
(Annex "1", counter-petition). Before the Citizenship Evaluation Board, Santiago Gatchalian testified that he has five
(5) children with his wife Chu Gim Tee, namely: Jose Gatchalian, Gloria Gatchalian, Francisco Gatchalian, Elena
Gatchalian and Benjamin Gatchalian (Annex "2", counter-petition).

On June 27, 1961, William Gatchalian, then a twelve-year old minor, arrived in Manila from Hongkong together with
Gloria, Francisco, and Johnson, all surnamed Gatchalian. They had with them Certificates of Registration and
Identity issued by the Philippine Consulate in Hongkong based on a cablegram bearing the signature of the then
Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Felixberto Serrano, and sought admission as Filipino citizens. Gloria and Francisco are
the daughter and son, respectively, of Santiago Gatchalian; while William and Johnson are the sons of Francisco.

After investigation, the Board of Special Inquiry No. 1 rendered a decision dated July 6, 1961, admitting William
Gatchalian and his companions as Filipino citizens (Annex "C", petition). As a consequence thereof, William
Gatchalian was issued Identification Certificate No. 16135 by the immigration authorities on August 16, 1961 (Annex
"D", petition).

On January 24, 1962, the then Secretary of Justice issued Memorandum No. 9 setting aside all decisions purporting
to have been rendered by the Board of Commissioners on appeal or on review motu proprio of decisions of the
Board of Special Inquiry. The same memorandum directed the Board of Commissioners to review all cases where
entry was allowed on the ground that the entrant was a Philippine citizen. Among those cases was that of William
and others.

On July 6, 1962, the new Board of Commissioners, after a review motu proprio of the proceedings had in the Board
of Special Inquiry, reversed the decision of the latter and ordered the exclusion of, among others, respondent
Gatchalian (Annex "E", petition). A warrant of exclusion also dated July 6, 1962 was issued alleging that "the
decision of the Board of Commissioners dated July 6, 1962 . . . has now become final and executory (Annex "F",
petition).

The actual date of rendition of said decision by the Board of Commissioners (whether on July 6, 1962 or July 20,
1962) became the subject of controversy in the 1967 case of Arocha vs. Vivo (21 SCRA 532) wherein this Court
sustained the validity of the decision of the new Board of Commissioners having been promulgated on July 6, 1962,
or within the reglementary period for review.

Sometime in 1973, respondent Gatchalian, as well as the others covered by the July 6, 1962 warrant of exclusion,
filed a motion for re-hearing with the Board of Special Inquiry where the deportion case against them was assigned.

On March 14, 1973, the Board of Special Inquiry recommended to the then Acting Commissioner Victor Nituda the
reversal of the July 6, 1962 decision of the then Board of Commissioners and the recall of the warrants of arrest
issued therein (Annex "5", counter-petition).

On March 15, 1973, Acting Commissioner Nituda issued an order reaffirming the July 6, 1961 decision of the Board
of Special Inquiry thereby admitting respondent Gatchalian as a Filipino citizen and recalled the warrant of arrest
issued against him (Annex "6", counter-petition).

On June 7, 1990, the acting director of the National Bureau of Investigation wrote the Secretary of Justice
recommending that respondent Gatchalian along with the other applicants covered by the warrant of exclusion
dated July 6, 1962 be charged with violation of Sec. 37 (a), pars. 1 and 2, in relation to Secs. 45 (c), and (d) and (e)
of Commonwealth Act No. 613, as amended, also known as the Immigration Act of 1940 (Annex "G", petition).

On August 1, 1990, the Secretary of Justice indorsed the recommendation of the NBI to the Commissioner of
Immigration for investigation and immediate action (Annex "20", counter-petition).

On August 15, 1990, petitioner Commissioner Domingo of the Commission of Immigration and Deportation * issued
a mission order commanding the arrest of respondent William Gatchalian (Annex "18", counter-petition). The latter
appeared before Commissioner Domingo on August 20, 1990 and was released on the same day upon posting
P200,000.00 cash bond.
On August 29, 1990, William Gatchalian filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with injunction before the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Br. 29, presided by respondent Judge dela Rosa, docketed as Civil Case No. 90-
54214.

On September 4, 1990, petitioners filed a motion to dismiss Civil Case No. 90-54214 alleging that respondent judge
has no jurisdiction over the Board of Commissioners and/or the Board of Special Inquiry. Nonetheless, respondent
judge dela Rosa issued the assailed order dated September 7, 1990, denying the motion to dismiss.

Meanwhile, on September 6, 1990, respondent Gatchalian's wife and minor children filed before the Regional Trial
Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, Br. 172, presided by respondent judge Capulong Civil Case No. 3431-V-90 for
injunction with writ of preliminary injunction. The complaint alleged, among others, that petitioners acted without or in
excess of jurisdiction in the institution of deportation proceedings against William. On the same day, respondent
Capulong issued the questioned temporary restraining order restraining petitioners from continuing with the
deportation proceedings against William Gatchalian.

The petition is anchored on the following propositions: 1) respondent judges have no jurisdiction over petitioners
(Board of Commissioners, et al.,) and the subject matter of the case, appellate jurisdiction being vested by BP 129
with the Court of Appeals; 2) assuming respondent judges have jurisdiction, they acted with grave abuse of
discretion in preempting petitioners in the exercise of the authority and jurisdiction to hear and determine the
deportation case against respondent Gatchalian, and in the process determine also his citizenship; 3) respondent
judge dela Rosa gravely abused his discretion in ruling that the issues raised in the deportation proceedings are
beyond the competence and jurisdiction of petitioners, thereby disregarding the cases of Arocha vs. Vivo and Vivo
vs. Arca (supra), which put finality to the July 6, 1962 decision of the Board of Commissioners that respondent
Gatchalian is a Chinese citizen; and 4) respondent judge Capulong should have dismissed Civil Case No. 3431-V-
90 for forum-shopping.

In his counter-petition, William Gatchalian alleges among others that: 1) assuming that the evidence on record is not
sufficient to declare him a Filipino citizen, petitioners have no jurisdiction to proceed with the deportation case until
the courts shall have finally resolved the question of his citizenship; 2) petitioners can no longer judiciously and fairly
resolve the question of respondent's citizenship in the deportation case because of their bias, pre-judgment and
prejudice against him; and 3) the ground for which he is sought to be deported has already prescribed.

For purposes of uniformity, the parties herein will be referred to in the order the petitions were filed.

Petitioners argue that under Sec. 9 (3) of BP 129, it is the Court of Appeals which has exclusive appellate
jurisdiction over all final judgments or orders of quasi-judicial agencies, boards or commissions, such as the Board
of Commissioners and the Board of Special Inquiry.

Respondent, on the other hand, contends that petitioners are not quasi-judicial agencies and are not in equal rank
with Regional Trial Courts.

Under Sec. 21 (1) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, the Regional Trial Courts have concurrent jurisdiction with this
Court and the Court of Appeals to issue "writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas
corpus and injunction which may be enforced in any part of their respective regions, . . ." Thus, the RTCs are vested
with the power to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the government.

It is true that under Sec. 9 (3) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, the Court of Appeals is vested with —

(3) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions, resolutions, order, or awards of
Regional Trial Courts and quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, board or commission, except those
falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution, the
provisions of this Act, and of sub-paragraph (1) of the third paragraph of and sub-paragraph (4) of the fourth
paragraph of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948.

It does not provide, however, that said exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals extends to all quasi-
judicial agencies. The quasi-judicial bodies whose decisions are exclusively appealable to the Court of Appeals are
those which under the law, Republic Act No. 5434, or their enabling acts, are specifically appealable to the Court of
Appeals (Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force vs. Court of Appeals, 171 SCRA 348 [1989]; Lupangco vs.
Court of Appeals, 160 SCRA 848 [1988]). Thus, under Republic Act No. 5434, it is specifically provided that the
decisions of the Land Registration Commission (LRC), the Social Security Commission (SSC), Civil Aeronautics
Board (CAB), the Patent Office and the Agricultural Invention Board are appealable to the Court of Appeals.

In the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force (supra), this Court clarified the matter when We ruled:

Under our Resolution dated January 11, 1983:

. . . The appeals to the Intermediate Appellate Court (now Court of Appeals) from quasi-judicial
bodies shall continue to be governed by the provisions of Republic Act No. 5434 insofar as the same
is not inconsistent with the provisions of B.P. Blg. 129.

The pertinent provisions of Republic Act No. 5434 are as follows:

Sec. 1. Appeals from specified agencies.— Any provision of existing law or Rules of Court to the
contrary notwithstanding, parties aggrieved by a final ruling, award, order, or decision, or judgment
of the Court of Agrarian Relations; the Secretary of Labor under Section 7 of Republic Act Numbered
Six hundred and two, also known as the "Minimum Wage Law"; the Department of Labor under
Section 23 of Republic Act Numbered Eight hundred seventy-five, also known as the "Industrial
Peace Act"; the Land Registration Commission; the Social Security Commission; the Civil
Aeronautics Board; the Patent Office and the Agricultural Inventions Board, may appeal therefrom to
the Court of Appeals, within the period and in the manner herein provided, whether the appeal
involves questions of fact, mixed questions of fact and law, or questions of law, or all three kinds of
questions. From final judgments or decisions of the Court of Appeals, the aggrieved party may
appeal by certiorari to the Supreme Court as provided under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

Because of subsequent amendments, including the abolition of various special courts, jurisdiction over
quasi-judicial bodies has to be, consequently, determined by the corresponding amendatory statutes. Under
the Labor Code, decisions and awards of the National Labor Relations Commission are final and executory,
but, nevertheless, reviewable by this Court through a petition for certiorari and not by way of appeal.

Under the Property Registration Decree, decision of the Commission of Land Registration, en consulta, are
appealable to the Court of Appeals.

The decisions of the Securities and Exchange Commission are likewise appealable to the Appellate Court,
and so are decisions of the Social Security Commission.

As a rule, where legislation provides for an appeal from decisions of certain administrative bodies to the
Court of Appeals, it means that such bodies are co-equal with the Regional Trial Courts, in terms of rank
and stature, and logically, beyond the control of the latter. (Emphasis supplied)

There are quasi-judicial agencies, as the National Labor Relations Commissions, whose decisions are directly
appealable to this Court. It is only when a specific law, as Republic Act No. 5434, provides appeal from certain
bodies or commissions to the Court of Appeals as the Land Registration Commission (LRC), Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) and others, that the said commissions or boards may be considered co-equal with the
RTCs in terms of rank, stature and are logically beyond the control of the latter.

However, the Bureau of Immigration (or CID) is not among those quasi-judicial agencies specified by law whose
decisions, orders, and resolutions are directly appealable to the Court of Appeals. In fact, its decisions are subject to
judicial review in accordance with Sec. 25, Chapter 4, Book VII of the 1987 Administrative Code, which provides as
follows:

Sec. 25. Judicial Review.—(1) Agency decisions shall be subject to judicial review in accordance with this
chapter and applicable laws.
 x x x           x x x          x x x

(6) The review proceeding shall be filed in the court specified in the statute or, in the absence thereof, in any
court of competent jurisdiction in accordance with the provisions on venue of the Rules of Court.

Said provision of the Administrative Code, which is subsequent to B.P. Blg. 129 and which thus modifies the latter,
provides that the decision of an agency like the Bureau of Immigration should be subject to review by the court
specified by the statute or in the absence thereof, it is subject to review by any court of competent jurisdiction in
accordance with the provisions on venue of the Rules of Court.

B.P. Blg. 129 did not intend to raise all quasi-judicial bodies to the same level or rank of the RTC except those
specifically provided for under the law as aforestated. As the Bureau of Immigration is not of equal rank as the RTC,
its decisions may be appealable to, and may be reviewed through a special civil action for certiorari by, the RTC
(Sec. 21, (1) BP 129).

True, it is beyond cavil that the Bureau of Immigration has the exclusive authority and jurisdiction to try and hear
cases against an alleged alien, and in the process, determine also their citizenship (Lao Gi vs. Court of Appeals,
180 SCRA 756 [1989]). And a mere claim of citizenship cannot operate to divest the Board of Commissioners of its
jurisdiction in deportation proceedings (Miranda vs. Deportation Board, 94 Phil. 531 [1954]).

However, the rule enunciated in the above-cases admits of an exception, at least insofar as deportation proceedings
are concerned. Thus, what if the claim to citizenship of the alleged deportee is satisfactory? Should the deportation
proceedings be allowed to continue or should the question of citizenship be ventilated in a judicial proceeding?
In Chua Hiong vs. Deportation Board (96 Phil. 665 [1955]), this Court answered the question in the affirmative, and
We quote:

When the evidence submitted by a respondent is conclusive of his citizenship, the right to immediate review
should also be recognized and the courts should promptly enjoin the deportation proceedings. A citizen is
entitled to live in peace, without molestation from any official or authority, and if he is disturbed by a
deportation proceeding, he has the unquestionable right to resort to the courts for his protection, either by a
writ of habeas corpus or of prohibition, on the legal ground that the Board lacks jurisdiction. If he is a citizen
and evidence thereof is satisfactory, there is no sense nor justice in allowing the deportation proceedings to
continue, granting him the remedy only after the Board has finished its investigation of his undesirability.

. . . And if the right (to peace) is precious and valuable at all, it must also be protected on time, to prevent
undue harassment at the hands of ill-meaning or misinformed administrative officials. Of what use is this
much boasted right to peace and liberty if it can be availed of only after the Deportation Board has unjustly
trampled upon it, besmirching the citizen's name before the bar of public opinion? (Emphasis supplied)

The doctrine of primary jurisdiction of petitioners Board of Commissioners over deportation proceedings is,
therefore, not without exception (Calacday vs. Vivo, 33 SCRA 413 [1970]; Vivo vs. Montesa, 24 SCRA 155 [1967]).
Judicial intervention, however, should be granted only in cases where the "claim of citizenship is so substantial that
there are reasonable grounds to believe that the claim is correct. In other words, the remedy should be allowed only
on sound discretion of a competent court in a proper proceeding (Chua Hiong vs. Deportation Board, supra; Co. vs.
Deportation Board, 78 SCRA 107 [1977]). It appearing from the records that respondent's claim of citizenship is
substantial, as We shall show later, judicial intervention should be allowed.

In the case at bar, the competent court which could properly take cognizance of the proceedings instituted by
respondent Gatchalian would nonetheless be the Regional Trial Court and not the Court of Appeals in view of Sec.
21 (1), BP 129, which confers upon the former jurisdiction over actions for prohibition concurrently with the Court of
Appeals and the Supreme Court and in line with the pronouncements of this Court in Chua Hiong and Co cases.

Ordinarily, the case would then be remanded to the Regional Trial Court. But not in the case at bar.  Considering
1âwphi1

the voluminous pleadings submitted by the parties and the evidence presented, We deem it proper to decide the
controversy right at this instance. And this course of action is not without precedent for "it is a cherished rule of
procedure for this Court to always strive to settle the entire controversy in a single proceeding leaving no root or
branch to bear the seeds of future litigation. No useful purpose will be served if this case is remanded to the trial
court only to have its decision raised again to the Court of Appeals and from there to this Court" (Marquez vs.
Marquez, 73 Phil. 74; Keramic Industries, Inc. vs. Guerrero, 61 SCRA 265 [1974]) Alger Electric, Inc. vs. Court of
Appeals (135 SCRA 37 [1985]), citing Gayos vs. Gayos (67 SCRA 146 [1975]).

In Lianga Bay Logging Co., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals (157 SCRA 357 [1988]), We also stated:

Remand of the case to the lower court for further reception of evidence is not necessary where the court is
in a position to resolve the dispute based on the records before it. On many occasions, the Court, in the
public interest and the expeditious administration of justice, has resolved actions on the merits instead of
remanding them to the trial court for further proceedings, such as where the ends of justice would not be
subserved by the remand of the case or when public interest demands an early disposition of the case or
where the trial court had already received all the evidence of the parties (Quisumbing vs. CA, 112 SCRA
703; Francisco, et al., vs. The City of Davao, et al., supra; Republic vs. Security Credit & Acceptance Corp.,
et al., 19 SCRA 58; Samal vs. CA, supra; Republic vs. Central Surety & Insurance Co., 25 SCRA 641).

Likewise in Tejones vs. Gironella (159 SCRA 100 [1988]), We said:

Sound practice seeks to accommodate the theory which avoids waste of time, effort and expense, both to
the parties and the government, not to speak of delay in the disposal of the case (cf. Fernandez vs. Garcia,
92 Phil. 592, 297). A marked characterstic of our judicial set-up is that where the dictates of justice so
demand . . . the Supreme Court should act, and act with finality (Li Siu Liat vs. Republic, 21 SCRA 1039,
1046, citing Samal vs. CA, 99 Phil. 230 and US vs. Gimenez, 34 Phil. 74.) (Beautifont, Inc. vs. Court of
appeals, et al., Jan. 29, 1988; See also Labo vs. Commission on Elections, 176 SCRA 1 [1989]).

Respondent Gatchalian has adduced evidence not only before the Regional Trial Court but also before Us in the
form of public documents attached to his pleadings. On the other hand, Special Prosecutor Renato Mabolo in his
Manifestation (dated September 6, 1990; Rollo, p. 298, counter-petition) before the Bureau of Immigration already
stated that there is no longer a need to adduce evidence in support of the deportation charges against respondent.
In addition, petitioners invoke that this Court's decision in Arocha vs. Vivo and Vivo vs. Arca (supra), has already
settled respondent's alienage. Hence, the need for a judicial determination of respondent's citizenship specially so
where the latter is not seeking admission, but is already in the Philippines (for the past thirty [30] years) and is being
expelled (Chua Hiong vs. Deportation Board, supra).

According to petitioners, respondent's alienage has been conclusively settled by this Court in
the Arocha and Vivo cases, We disagree. It must be noted that in said cases, the sole issue resolved therein was
the actual date of rendition of the July 6, 1962 decision of the then board of Commissioners, i.e., whether the
decision was rendered on July 6, 1962 or on July 20, 1962 it appearing that the figure (date) "20" was erased and
over it was superimposed the figure "6" thereby making the decision fall within the one-year reglementary period
from July 6, 1961 within which the decision may be reviewed. This Court did not squarely pass upon any question of
citizenship, much less that of respondent's who was not a party in the aforesaid cases. The said cases originated
from a petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed on July 21, 1965 by Macario Arocha in behalf of Pedro Gatchalian.
Well settled is the rule that a person not party to a case cannot be bound by a decision rendered therein.

Neither can it be argued that the Board of Commissioners' decision (dated July 6, 1962) finding respondent's claim
to Philippine citizenship not satisfactorily proved, constitute res judicata. For one thing, said decision did not make
any categorical statement that respondent Gatchalian is a Chinese. Secondly, the doctrine of res judicata does not
apply to questions of citizenship (Labo vs. Commission on Elections (supra); citing Soria vs. Commissioner of
Immigration, 37 SCRA 213; Lee vs. Commissioner of Immigration, 42 SCRA 561 [1971]; Sia Reyes vs. Deportation
Board, 122 SCRA 478 [1983]).

In Moy Ya Lim vs. Commissioner of Immigration (41 SCRA 292 [1971]) and in Lee vs. Commissioner of Immigration
(supra), this Court declared that:

(e)verytime the citizenship of a person is material or indispensable in a judicial or administrative case,

whatever the corresponding court or administrative authority decides therein as to such citizenship is
generally not considered as res adjudicata, hence it has to be threshed out again and again as the occasion
may demand.
An exception to the above rule was laid by this Court in Burca vs. Republic (51 SCRA 248 [1973]), viz:

We declare it to be a sound rule that where the citizenship of a party in a case is definitely resolved by a
court or by an administrative agency, as a material issue in the controversy, after a full-blown hearing with
the active participation of the Solicitor General or his authorized representative, and this finding or the
citizenship of the party is affirmed by this Court, the decision on the matter shall constitute conclusive proof
of such party's citizenship in any other case or proceeding. But it is made clear that in no instance will a
decision on the question of citizenship in such cases be considered conclusive or binding in any other case
or proceeding, unless obtained in accordance with the procedure herein stated.

Thus, in order that the doctrine of res judicata may be applied in cases of citizenship, the following must be present:
1) a person's citizenship must be raised as a material issue in a controversy where said person is a party; 2) the
Solicitor General or his authorized representative took active part in the resolution thereof, and 3) the finding or
citizenship is affirmed by this Court.

Gauged by the foregoing, We find the pre-conditions set forth in Burca inexistent in the Arocha and Vivo cases
relied upon by petitioners. Indeed, respondent William Gatchalian was not even a party in said cases.

Coming now to the contention of petitioners that the arrest of respondent follows as a matter of consequence based
on the warrant of exclusion issued on July 6, 1962, coupled with the Arocha and Vivo cases (Rollo, pp. 33), the
Court finds the same devoid of merit.

Sec. 37 (a) of Commonwealth Act No. 613, as amended, otherwise known as the Immigration Act of 1940, reads:

Sec. 37. (a) The following aliens shall be arrested upon the warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration or
of any other officer designated by him for the purpose and deported upon the warrant of the Commissioner
of Immigration after a determination by the Board of Commissioner of the existence of the ground for
deportation as charged against the alien. (Emphasis supplied)

From a perusal of the above provision, it is clear that in matters of implementing the Immigration Act insofar as
deportation of aliens are concerned, the Commissioner of Immigration may issue warrants of arrest only after a
determination by the Board of Commissioners of the existence of the ground for deportation as charged against the
alien. In other words, a warrant of arrest issued by the Commissioner of Immigration, to be valid, must be for the
sole purpose of executing a final order of deportation. A warrant of arrest issued by the Commissioner of
Immigration for purposes of investigation only, as in the case at bar, is null and void for being unconstitutional (Ang
Ngo Chiong vs. Galang, 67 SCRA 338 [1975] citing Po Siok Pin vs. Vivo, 62 SCRA 363 [1975]; Vivo vs. Montesa,
24 SCRA 155; Morano vs. Vivo, 20 SCRA 562; Qua Chee Gan vs. Deportation Board, 9 SCRA 27 [1963]; Ng Hua
To vs. Galang, 10 SCRA 411; see also Santos vs. Commissioner of Immigration, 74 SCRA 96 [1976]).

As We held in Qua Chee Gan vs. Deportation Board (supra), "(t)he constitution does not distinguish warrants
between a criminal case and administrative proceedings. And if one suspected of having committed a crime is
entitled to a determination of the probable cause against him, by a judge, why should one suspected of a violation of
an administrative nature deserve less guarantee?" It is not indispensable that the alleged alien be arrested for
purposes of investigation. If the purpose of the issuance of the warrant of arrest is to determine the existence of
probable cause, surely, it cannot pass the test of constitutionality for only judges can issue the same (Sec. 2, Art. III,
Constitution).

A reading of the mission order/warrant of arrest (dated August 15, 1990; Rollo, p. 183, counter-petition) issued by
the Commissioner of Immigration, clearly indicates that the same was issued only for purposes of investigation of
the suspects, William Gatchalian included. Paragraphs 1 and 3 of the mission order directs the Intelligence
Agents/Officers to:

x x x           x x x          x x x

1. Make a warrantless arrest under the Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 113, Sec. 5, for violation of the
Immigration Act, Sec. 37, para. a; Secs. 45 and 46 Administrative Code;
 x x x           x x x          x x x

3. Deliver the suspect to the Intelligence Division and immediately conduct custodial interrogation, after
warning the suspect that he has a right to remain silent and a right to counsel; . . .

Hence, petitioners' argument that the arrest of respondent was based, ostensibly, on the July 6, 1962 warrant of
exclusion has obviously no leg to stand on. The mission order/warrant of arrest made no mention that the same was
issued pursuant to a final order of deportation or warrant of exclusion.

But there is one more thing that militates against petitioners' cause. As records indicate, which petitioners
conveniently omitted to state either in their petition or comment to the counter-petition of respondent, respondent
Gatchalian, along with others previously covered by the 1962 warrant of exclusion, filed a motion for re-hearing
before the Board of Special Inquiry (BSI) sometime in 1973.

On March 14, 1973, the Board of Special Inquiry, after giving due course to the motion for re-hearing, submitted a
memorandum to the then Acting Commissioner Victor Nituda (Annex "5", counter-petition) recommending 1 the
reconsideration of the July 6, 1962 decision of the then Board of Commissioners which reversed the July 6, 1961
decision of the then Board of Special Inquiry No. 1 and 2 the lifting of the warrants of arrest issued against
applicants. The memorandum inferred that the "very basis of the Board of Commissioners in reversing the decision
of the Board of Special Inquiry was due to a forged cablegram by the then Secretary of Foreign Affairs, . . ., which
was dispatched to the Philippine Consulate in Hong Kong authorizing the registration of applicants as P.I. citizens."
The Board of Special Inquiry concluded that "(i)f at all, the cablegram only led to the issuance of their Certificate(s)
of Identity which took the place of a passport for their authorized travel to the Philippines. It being so, even if the
applicants could have entered illegally, the mere fact that they are citizens of the Philippines entitles them to remain
in the country."

On March 15, 1973, then Acting Commissioner Nituda issued an Order (Annex "6", counter-petition) which affirmed
the Board of Special Inquiry No. 1 decision dated July 6, 1961 admitting respondent Gatchalian and others as
Filipino citizens; recalled the July 6, 1962 warrant of arrest and revalidated their Identification Certificates.

The above order admitting respondent as a Filipino citizen is the last official act of the government on the basis of
which respondent William Gatchalian continually exercised the rights of a Filipino citizen to the present.
Consequently, the presumption of citizenship lies in favor of respondent William Gatchalian.

There should be no question that Santiago Gatchalian, grandfather of William Gatchalian, is a Filipino citizen. As a
matter of fact, in the very order of the BOC of July 6, 1962, which reversed the July 6, 1961 BSI order, it is an
accepted fact that Santiago Gatchalian is a Filipino. The opening paragraph of said order states:

The claim to Filipino citizenship of abovenamed applicants is based on the citizenship of one Santiago
Gatchalian whose Philippine citizenship was recognized by the Bureau of Immigration in an Order dated July
12, 1960. (Annex "37", Comment with Counter-Petition).

Nonetheless, in said order it was found that the applicants therein have not satisfactorily proven that they are the
children and/or grandchildren of Santiago Gatchalian. The status of Santiago Gatchalian as a Filipino was reiterated
in Arocha and Arca (supra) where advertence is made to the "applicants being the descendants of one Santiago
Gatchalian, a Filipino." (at p. 539).

In the sworn statement of Santiago Gatchalian before the Philippine Consul in Hongkong in 1961 (Annex "1" to the
Comment of petitioners to Counter-Petition), he reiterated his status as a Philippine citizen being the illegitimate
child of Pablo Pacheco and Marciana Gatchalian, the latter being a Filipino; that he was born in Manila on July 25,
1905; and that he was issued Philippine Passport No. 28160 (PA-No. A91196) on November 18, 1960 by the
Department of Foreign Affairs in Manila. In his affidavit of January 23, 1961 (Annex "5", counter-petition), Santiago
reiterated his claim of Philippine citizenship as a consequence of his petition for cancellation of his alien registry
which was granted on February 18, 1960 in C.E.B. No. 3660-L; and that on July 20, 1960, he was recognized by the
Bureau of Immigration as a Filipino and was issued Certificate No. 1-2123.
The dissenting opinions of my esteemed brethrens, Messrs. Justices F.P. Feliciano and H.G. Davide, Jr., proposing
to re-open the question of citizenship of Santiago Gatchalian at this stage of the case, where it is not even put in
issue, is quite much to late. As stated above, the records of the Bureau of Immigration show that as of July 20,
1960, Santiago Gatchalian had been declared to be a Filipino citizen. It is a final decision that forecloses a re-
opening of the same 30 years later. Petitioners do not even question Santiago Gatchalian's Philippine citizenship. It
is the citizenship of respondent William Gatchalian that is in issue and addressed for determination of the Court in
this case.

Furthermore, petitioners' position is not enhanced by the fact that respondent's arrest came twenty-eight (28) years
after the alleged cause of deportation arose. Section 37 (b) of the Immigration Act states that deportation "shall not
be effected . . . unless the arrest in the deportation proceedings is made within five (5) years after the cause of
deportation arises." In Lam Shee vs. Bengzon (93 Phil. 1065 [1953]), We laid down the consequences of such
inaction, thus:

There is however an important circumstance which places this case beyond the reach of the resultant
consequence of the fraudulent act committed by the mother of the minor when she admitted that she gained
entrance into the Philippines by making use of the name of a Chinese resident merchant other than that of
her lawful husband, and that is, that the mother can no longer be the subject of deportation proceedings for
the simple reason that more than 5 years had elapsed from the date of her admission. Note that the above
irregularity was divulged by the mother herself, who in a gesture of sincerity, made an spontaneous
admission before the immigration officials in the investigation conducted in connection with the landing of the
minor on September 24, 1947, and not through any effort on the part of the immigration authorities. And
considering this frank admission, plus the fact that the mother was found to be married to another Chinese
resident merchant, now deceased, who owned a restaurant in the Philippines valued at P15,000 and which
gives a net profit of P500 a month, the immigration officials then must have considered the irregularity not
serious enough when, inspire of that finding, they decided to land said minor "as a properly documented
preference quota immigrant" (Exhibit D). We cannot therefore but wonder why two years later the
immigration officials would reverse their attitude and would take steps to institute deportation proceedings
against the minor.

Under the circumstances obtaining in this case, we believe that much as the attitude of the mother would be
condemned for having made use of an improper means to gain entrance into the Philippines and acquire
permanent residence there, it is now too late, not to say unchristian, to deport the minor after having allowed
the mother to remain even illegally to the extent of validating her residence by inaction, thus allowing the
period of prescription to set in and to elapse in her favor. To permit his deportation at this late hour would be
to condemn him to live separately from his mother through no fault of his thereby leaving him to a life of
insecurity resulting from lack of support and protection of his family. This inaction or oversight on the part of
immigration officials has created an anomalous situation which, for reasons of equity, should be resolved in
favor of the minor herein involved. (Emphasis supplied)

In the case at bar, petitioners' alleged cause of action and deportation against herein respondent arose in 1962.
However, the warrant of arrest of respondent was issued by Commissioner Domingo only on August 15, 1990 — 28
long years after. It is clear that petitioners' cause of action has already prescribed and by their inaction could not
now be validly enforced by petitioners against respondent William Gatchalian. Furthermore, the warrant of exclusion
dated July 6, 1962 was already recalled and the Identification certificate of respondent, among others, was
revalidated on March 15, 1973 by the then Acting Commissioner Nituda.

It is also proposed in the dissenting opinions of Messrs. Justices Feliciano and Davide, Jr., that the BOC decision
dated July 6, 1962 and the warrant of exclusion which was found to be valid in Arocha should be applicable to
respondent William Gatchalian even if the latter was not a party to said case. They also opined that under Sec. 37
(b) of the Immigration Act, the five (5) years limitation is applicable only where the deportation is sought to be
effected under clauses of Sec. 37 (b) other than clauses 2, 7, 8, 11 and 12 and that no period of limitation is
applicable in deportations under clauses 2, 7, 8, 11 and 12.

The Court disagrees. Under Sec. 39 of the Immigration Act, it is reiterated that such deportation proceedings should
be instituted within five (5) years. Section 45 of the same Act provides penal sanctions for violations of the offenses
therein enumerated with a fine of "not more than P1,000.00 and imprisonment for not more than two (2) years and
deportation if he is an alien." Thus:
 Penal Provisions

Sec. 45. Any individual who—

(a) When applying for an immigration document personates another individual, or falsely appears in the
name of deceased individual, or evades the immigration laws by appearing under an assumed name;
fictitious name; or

(b) Issues or otherwise disposes of an immigration document, to any person not authorized by law to receive
such document; or

(c) Obtains, accepts or uses any immigration document, knowing it to be false; or

(d) Being an alien, enters the Philippines without inspection and admission by the immigration officials, or
obtains entry into the Philippines by wilful, false, or misleading representation or wilful concealment of a
material fact; or

(e) Being an alien shall for any fraudulent purpose represent himself to be a Philippine citizen in order to
evade any requirement of the immigration laws; or

(f) In any immigration matter shall knowingly make under oath any false statement or representations; or

(g) Being an alien, shall depart from the Philippines without first securing an immigration clearance
certificates required by section twenty-two of this Act; or

(h) Attempts or conspires with another to commit any of the foregoing acts, shall be guilty of an offense, and
upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not more than one thousand pesos, and imprisoned for not more than
two years, and deported if he is an alien. (Emphasis supplied)

Such offenses punishable by correctional penalty prescribe in 10 years (Art. 90, Revised Penal Code); correctional
penalties also prescribe in 10 years (Art. 92, Revised Penal Code).

It must be noted, however, that under Sec. 1, Act No. 3326 [1926], as amended, (Prescription for Violations
Penalized by Special Acts and Municipal Ordinances) "violations penalized by special acts shall, unless otherwise
provided in such acts, prescribe in accordance with the following rules: . . .c) after eight years for those punished by
imprisonment for two years or more, but less than six years; . . ."

Consequently, no prosecution and consequent deportation for violation of the offenses enumerated in the
Immigration Act can be initiated beyond the eight-year prescriptive period, the Immigration Act being a special
legislation.

The Court, therefore, holds that the period of effecting deportation of an alien after entry or a warrant of exclusion
based on a final order of the BSI or BOC are not imprescriptible. The law itself provides for a period of prescription.
Prescription of the crime is forfeiture or loss of the rights of the State to prosecute the offender after the lapse of a
certain time, while prescription of the penalty is the loss or forfeiture by the government of the right to execute the
final sentence after the lapse of a certain time (Padilla, Criminal Law, Vol. 1, 1974, at p. 855).

"Although a deportation proceeding does not partake of the nature of a criminal action, however, considering that it
is a harsh and extraordinary administrative proceeding affecting the freedom and liberty of a person, the
constitutional right of such person to due process should not be denied. Thus, the provisions of the Rules of Court of
the Philippines particularly on criminal procedure are applicable to deportation proceedings." (Lao Gi vs. Court of
Appeals, supra). Under Sec. 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, a final judgment may not be executed after the lapse
of five (5) years from the date of its entry or from the date it becomes final and executory. Thereafter, it may be
enforced only by a separate action subject to the statute of limitations. Under Art. 1144 (3) of the Civil Code, an
action based on judgment must be brought within 10 years from the time the right of action accrues.

In relation to Sec. 37 (b) of the Immigration Act, the rule, therefore, is:
1. Deportation or exclusion proceedings should be initiated within five (5) years after the cause of deportation or
exclusion arises when effected under any other clauses other than clauses 2, 7, 8, 11 and 12 and of paragraph (a)
of Sec. 37 of the Immigration Act; and

2. When deportation or exclusion is effected under clauses 2, 7, 8, 11 and 12 of paragraph (a) of Sec. 37, the
prescriptive period of the deportation or exclusion proceedings is eight (8) years.

In the case at bar, it took petitioners 28 years since the BOC decision was rendered on July 6, 1962 before they
commenced deportation or exclusion proceedings against respondent William Gatchalian in 1990. Undoubtedly,
petitioners' cause of action has already prescribed. Neither may an action to revive and/or enforce the decision
dated July 6, 1962 be instituted after ten (10) years (Art. 1144 [3], Civil Code).

Since his admission as a Filipino citizen in 1961, respondent William Gatchalian has continuously resided in the
Philippines. He married Ting Dee Hua on July 1, 1973 (Annex "8", counter-petition) with whom he has four (4) minor
children. The marriage contract shows that said respondent is a Filipino (Annex "8"). He holds passports and earlier
passports as a Filipino (Annexes "9", "10" & "11", counter-petition). He is a registered voter of Valenzuela, Metro
Manila where he has long resided and exercised his right of suffrage (Annex 12, counter-petition). He engaged in
business in the Philippines since 1973 and is the director/officer of the International Polymer Corp. and Ropeman
International Corp. as a Filipino (Annexes, "13" & "14", counter-petition). He is a taxpayer. Respondent claims that
the companies he runs and in which he has a controlling investment provides livelihood to 4,000 employees and
approximately 25,000 dependents. He continuously enjoyed the status of Filipino citizenship and discharged his
responsibility as such until petitioners initiated the deportation proceedings against him.

"The power to deport an alien is an act of the State. It is an act by or under the authority of the sovereign power. It is
a police measure against undesirable aliens whose presence in the country is found to be injurious to the public
good and domestic tranquility of the people" (Lao Gi vs. Court of Appeals, supra). How could one who has helped
the economy of the country by providing employment to some 4,000 people be considered undesirable and be
summarily deported when the government, in its concerted drive to attract foreign investors, grants Special Resident
Visa to any alien who invest at least US$50,000.00 in the country? Even assuming arguendo that respondent is an
alien, his deportation under the circumstances is unjust and unfair, if not downright illegal. The action taken by
petitioners in the case at bar is diametrically opposed to settled government policy.

Petitioners, on the other hand, claim that respondent is an alien. In support of their position, petitioners point out that
Santiago Gatchalian's marriage with Chu Gim Tee in China as well as the marriage of Francisco (father of William)
Gatchalian to Ong Chiu Kiok, likewise in China, were not supported by any evidence other than their own self-
serving testimony nor was there any showing what the laws of China were. It is the postulate advanced by
petitioners that for the said marriages to be valid in this country, it should have been shown that they were valid by
the laws of China wherein the same were contracted. There being none, petitioners conclude that the aforesaid
marriages cannot be considered valid. Hence, Santiago's children, including Francisco, followed the citizenship of
their mother, having been born outside of a valid marriage. Similarly, the validity of the Francisco's marriage not
having been demonstrated, William and Johnson followed the citizenship of their mother, a Chinese national.

After a careful consideration of petitioner's argument, We find that it cannot be sustained.

In Miciano vs. Brimo (50 Phil. 867 [1924]; Lim and Lim vs. Collector of Customs, 36 Phil. 472; Yam Ka Lim vs.
Collector of Customs, 30 Phil. 46 [1915]), this Court held that in the absence of evidence to the contrary, foreign
laws on a particular subject are presumed to be the same as those of the Philippines. In the case at bar, there being
no proof of Chinese law relating to marriage, there arises the presumption that it is the same as that of Philippine
law.

The lack of proof of Chinese law on the matter cannot be blamed on Santiago Gatchalian much more on respondent
William Gatchalian who was then a twelve-year old minor. The fact is, as records indicate, Santiago was not
pressed by the Citizenship Investigation Board to prove the laws of China relating to marriage, having been content
with the testimony of Santiago that the Marriage Certificate was lost or destroyed during the Japanese occupation of
China. Neither was Francisco Gatchalian's testimony subjected to the same scrutiny by the Board of Special Inquiry.
Nevertheless, the testimonies of Santiago Gatchalian and Francisco Gatchalian before the Philippine consular and
immigration authorities regarding their marriages, birth and relationship to each other are not self-serving but are
admissible in evidence as statements or declarations regarding family reputation or tradition in matters of pedigree
(Sec. 34, Rule 130). Furtheremore, this salutary rule of evidence finds support in substantive law. Thus, Art. 267 of
the Civil Code provides:

Art. 267. In the absence of a record of birth, authentic document, final judgment or possession of status,
legitimate filiation may be proved by any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. (See
also Art. 172 of the Family Code)

Consequently, the testimonies/affidavits of Santiago Gatchalian and Francisco Gatchalian aforementioned are not
self-serving but are competent proof of filiation (Art. 172 [2], Family Code).

Philippine law, following the lex loci celebrationis, adheres to the rule that a marriage formally valid where
celebrated is valid everywhere. Referring to marriages contracted abroad, Art. 71 of the Civil Code (now Art. 26 of
the Family Code) provides that "(a)ll marriages performed outside of the Philippines in accordance with the laws in
force in the country where they were performed, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country . . ." And
any doubt as to the validity of the matrimonial unity and the extent as to how far the validity of such marriage may be
extended to the consequences of the coverture is answered by Art. 220 of the Civil Code in this manner: "In case of
doubt, all presumptions favor the solidarity of the family. Thus, every intendment of law or facts leans toward the
validity of marriage, the indissolubility of the marriage bonds, the legitimacy of children, the community of property
during marriage, the authority of parents over their children, and the validity of defense for any member of the family
in case of unlawful aggression." (Emphasis supplied). Bearing in mind the "processual presumption" enunciated
in Miciano and other cases, he who asserts that the marriage is not valid under our law bears the burden of proof to
present the foreign law.

Having declared the assailed marriages as valid, respondent William Gatchalian follows the citizenship of his father
Francisco, a Filipino, as a legitimate child of the latter. Francisco, in turn is likewise a Filipino being the legitimate
child of Santiago Gatchalian who (the latter) is admittedly a Filipino citizen whose Philippine citizenship was
recognized by the Bureau of Immigration in an order dated July 12, 1960.

Finally, respondent William Gatchalian belongs to the class of Filipino citizens contemplated under Sec. 1, Article IV
of the Constitution, which provides:

Sec. 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:

(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this Constitution. . . .

This forecloses any further question about the Philippine citizenship of respondent William Gatchalian.

The Court is not unaware of Woong Woo Yiu vs. Vivo (13 SCRA 552 [1965]) relied upon by petitioners. The ruling
arrived thereat, however, cannot apply in the case at bar for the simple reason that the parties therein testified to
have been married in China by a village leader, which undoubtedly is not among those authorized to solemnize
marriage as provided in Art. 56 of the Civil Code (now Art. 7, Family Code).

Premises considered, the Court deems it unnecessary to resolve the other issues raised by the parties.

WHEREFORE, G.R. Nos. 95122-23 is DISMISSED for lack of merit; G.R. Nos. 95612-13 is hereby GRANTED and
respondent William Gatchalian is declared a Filipino citizen. Petitioners are hereby permanently enjoined from
continuing with the deportation proceedings docketed as DC No. 90-523 for lack of jurisdiction over respondent
Gatchalian, he being a Filipino citizen; Civil Cases No. 90-54214 and 3431-V-90 pending before respondent judges
are likewise DISMISSED. Without pronouncement as to costs
24.) G.R. No. 133743             February 6, 2007

EDGAR SAN LUIS, Petitioner,

vs.
FELICIDAD SAN LUIS, Respondent.

x ---------------------------------------------------- x

G.R. No. 134029             February 6, 2007

RODOLFO SAN LUIS, Petitioner,

vs.
FELICIDAD SAGALONGOS alias FELICIDAD SAN LUIS, Respondent.

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

Before us are consolidated petitions for review assailing the February 4, 1998 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 52647, which reversed and set aside the September 12, 1995 2 and January 31, 1996 3 Resolutions
of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 134 in SP. Proc. No. M-3708; and its May 15, 1998
Resolution 4 denying petitioners’ motion for reconsideration.

The instant case involves the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo T. San Luis (Felicisimo), who was the former
governor of the Province of Laguna. During his lifetime, Felicisimo contracted three marriages. His first marriage
was with Virginia Sulit on March 17, 1942 out of which were born six children, namely: Rodolfo, Mila, Edgar, Linda,
Emilita and Manuel. On August 11, 1963, Virginia predeceased Felicisimo.

Five years later, on May 1, 1968, Felicisimo married Merry Lee Corwin, with whom he had a son, Tobias. However,
on October 15, 1971, Merry Lee, an American citizen, filed a Complaint for Divorce 5 before the Family Court of the
First Circuit, State of Hawaii, United States of America (U.S.A.), which issued a Decree Granting Absolute Divorce
and Awarding Child Custody on December 14, 1973. 6

On June 20, 1974, Felicisimo married respondent Felicidad San Luis, then surnamed Sagalongos, before Rev. Fr.
William Meyer, Minister of the United Presbyterian at Wilshire Boulevard, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A. 7 He had
no children with respondent but lived with her for 18 years from the time of their marriage up to his death on
December 18, 1992.

Thereafter, respondent sought the dissolution of their conjugal partnership assets and the settlement of Felicisimo’s
estate. On December 17, 1993, she filed a petition for letters of administration 8 before the Regional Trial Court of
Makati City, docketed as SP. Proc. No. M-3708 which was raffled to Branch 146 thereof.

Respondent alleged that she is the widow of Felicisimo; that, at the time of his death, the decedent was residing at
100 San Juanico Street, New Alabang Village, Alabang, Metro Manila; that the decedent’s surviving heirs are
respondent as legal spouse, his six children by his first marriage, and son by his second marriage; that the decedent
left real properties, both conjugal and exclusive, valued at ₱30,304,178.00 more or less; that the decedent does not
have any unpaid debts. Respondent prayed that the conjugal partnership assets be liquidated and that letters of
administration be issued to her.

On February 4, 1994, petitioner Rodolfo San Luis, one of the children of Felicisimo by his first marriage, filed a
motion to dismiss 9 on the grounds of improper venue and failure to state a cause of action. Rodolfo claimed that the
petition for letters of administration should have been filed in the Province of Laguna because this was Felicisimo’s
place of residence prior to his death. He further claimed that respondent has no legal personality to file the petition
because she was only a mistress of Felicisimo since the latter, at the time of his death, was still legally married to
Merry Lee.
On February 15, 1994, Linda invoked the same grounds and joined her brother Rodolfo in seeking the dismissal 10 of
the petition. On February 28, 1994, the trial court issued an Order 11 denying the two motions to dismiss.

Unaware of the denial of the motions to dismiss, respondent filed on March 5, 1994 her opposition 12 thereto. She
submitted documentary evidence showing that while Felicisimo exercised the powers of his public office in Laguna,
he regularly went home to their house in New Alabang Village, Alabang, Metro Manila which they bought sometime
in 1982. Further, she presented the decree of absolute divorce issued by the Family Court of the First Circuit, State
of Hawaii to prove that the marriage of Felicisimo to Merry Lee had already been dissolved. Thus, she claimed that
Felicisimo had the legal capacity to marry her by virtue of paragraph 2, 13 Article 26 of the Family Code and the
doctrine laid down in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. 14

Thereafter, Linda, Rodolfo and herein petitioner Edgar San Luis, separately filed motions for reconsideration from
the Order denying their motions to dismiss. 15 They asserted that paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code cannot
be given retroactive effect to validate respondent’s bigamous marriage with Felicisimo because this would impair
vested rights in derogation of Article 256 16 of the Family Code.

On April 21, 1994, Mila, another daughter of Felicisimo from his first marriage, filed a motion to disqualify Acting
Presiding Judge Anthony E. Santos from hearing the case.

On October 24, 1994, the trial court issued an Order 17 denying the motions for reconsideration. It ruled that
respondent, as widow of the decedent, possessed the legal standing to file the petition and that venue was properly
laid. Meanwhile, the motion for disqualification was deemed moot and academic 18 because then Acting Presiding
Judge Santos was substituted by Judge Salvador S. Tensuan pending the resolution of said motion.

Mila filed a motion for inhibition 19 against Judge Tensuan on November 16, 1994. On even date, Edgar also filed a
motion for reconsideration 20 from the Order denying their motion for reconsideration arguing that it does not state
the facts and law on which it was based.

On November 25, 1994, Judge Tensuan issued an Order 21 granting the motion for inhibition. The case was re-
raffled to Branch 134 presided by Judge Paul T. Arcangel.

On April 24, 1995, 22 the trial court required the parties to submit their respective position papers on the twin issues
of venue and legal capacity of respondent to file the petition. On May 5, 1995, Edgar manifested 23 that he is
adopting the arguments and evidence set forth in his previous motion for reconsideration as his position paper.
Respondent and Rodolfo filed their position papers on June 14, 24 and June 20, 25 1995, respectively.

On September 12, 1995, the trial court dismissed the petition for letters of administration. It held that, at the time of
his death, Felicisimo was the duly elected governor and a resident of the Province of Laguna. Hence, the petition
should have been filed in Sta. Cruz, Laguna and not in Makati City. It also ruled that respondent was without legal
capacity to file the petition for letters of administration because her marriage with Felicisimo was bigamous, thus,
void ab initio. It found that the decree of absolute divorce dissolving Felicisimo’s marriage to Merry Lee was not valid
in the Philippines and did not bind Felicisimo who was a Filipino citizen. It also ruled that paragraph 2, Article 26 of
the Family Code cannot be retroactively applied because it would impair the vested rights of Felicisimo’s legitimate
children.

Respondent moved for reconsideration 26 and for the disqualification 27 of Judge Arcangel but said motions were
denied. 28

Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed and set aside the orders of the trial court in its
assailed Decision dated February 4, 1998, the dispositive portion of which states:

WHEREFORE, the Orders dated September 12, 1995 and January 31, 1996 are hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE; the Orders dated February 28 and October 24, 1994 are REINSTATED; and the records of the case is
REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings. 29

The appellante court ruled that under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the term "place of residence" of the
decedent, for purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate, refers to the personal, actual or physical
habitation, or actual residence or place of abode of a person as distinguished from legal residence or domicile. It
noted that although Felicisimo discharged his functions as governor in Laguna, he actually resided in Alabang,
Muntinlupa. Thus, the petition for letters of administration was properly filed in Makati City.

The Court of Appeals also held that Felicisimo had legal capacity to marry respondent by virtue of paragraph 2,
Article 26 of the Family Code and the rulings in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. 30 and Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera. 31 It found that
the marriage between Felicisimo and Merry Lee was validly dissolved by virtue of the decree of absolute divorce
issued by the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii. As a result, under paragraph 2, Article 26, Felicisimo
was capacitated to contract a subsequent marriage with respondent. Thus –

With the well-known rule – express mandate of paragraph 2, Article 26, of the Family Code of the Philippines, the
doctrines in Van Dorn, Pilapil, and the reason and philosophy behind the enactment of E.O. No. 227, — there is no
justiciable reason to sustain the individual view — sweeping statement — of Judge Arc[h]angel, that "Article 26, par.
2 of the Family Code, contravenes the basic policy of our state against divorce in any form whatsoever." Indeed,
courts cannot deny what the law grants. All that the courts should do is to give force and effect to the express
mandate of the law. The foreign divorce having been obtained by the Foreigner on December 14, 1992, 32 the
Filipino divorcee, "shall x x x have capacity to remarry under Philippine laws". For this reason, the marriage between
the deceased and petitioner should not be denominated as "a bigamous marriage.

Therefore, under Article 130 of the Family Code, the petitioner as the surviving spouse can institute the judicial
proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased. x x x 33

Edgar, Linda, and Rodolfo filed separate motions for reconsideration 34 which were denied by the Court of Appeals.

On July 2, 1998, Edgar appealed to this Court via the instant petition for review on certiorari. 35 Rodolfo later filed a
manifestation and motion to adopt the said petition which was granted. 36

In the instant consolidated petitions, Edgar and Rodolfo insist that the venue of the subject petition for letters of
administration was improperly laid because at the time of his death, Felicisimo was a resident of Sta. Cruz, Laguna.
They contend that pursuant to our rulings in Nuval v. Guray 37 and Romualdez v. RTC, Br. 7, Tacloban
City, 38 "residence" is synonymous with "domicile" which denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when
absent, one intends to return. They claim that a person can only have one domicile at any given time. Since
Felicisimo never changed his domicile, the petition for letters of administration should have been filed in Sta. Cruz,
Laguna.

Petitioners also contend that respondent’s marriage to Felicisimo was void and bigamous because it was performed
during the subsistence of the latter’s marriage to Merry Lee. They argue that paragraph 2, Article 26 cannot be
retroactively applied because it would impair vested rights and ratify the void bigamous marriage. As such,
respondent cannot be considered the surviving wife of Felicisimo; hence, she has no legal capacity to file the
petition for letters of administration.

The issues for resolution: (1) whether venue was properly laid, and (2) whether respondent has legal capacity to file
the subject petition for letters of administration.

The petition lacks merit.

Under Section 1, 39 Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of administration of the estate of Felicisimo
should be filed in the Regional Trial Court of the province "in which he resides at the time of his death." In the case
of Garcia Fule v. Court of Appeals, 40 we laid down the doctrinal rule for determining the residence – as
contradistinguished from domicile – of the decedent for purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate:

[T]he term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as distinguished from "legal residence or domicile."
This term "resides," like the terms "residing" and "residence," is elastic and should be interpreted in the light of the
object or purpose of the statute or rule in which it is employed. In the application of venue statutes and rules –
Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of such nature – residence rather than domicile is the significant
factor. Even where the statute uses the word "domicile" still it is construed as meaning residence and not domicile in
the technical sense. Some cases make a distinction between the terms "residence" and "domicile" but as generally
used in statutes fixing venue, the terms are synonymous, and convey the same meaning as the term "inhabitant." In
other words, "resides" should be viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or
physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and
actual stay thereat. In this popular sense, the term means merely residence, that is, personal residence, not legal
residence or domicile. Residence simply requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile
requires bodily presence in that place and also an intention to make it one’s domicile. No particular length of time of
residence is required though; however, the residence must be more than temporary. 41 (Emphasis supplied)

It is incorrect for petitioners to argue that "residence," for purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of the estate
of Felicisimo, is synonymous with "domicile." The rulings in Nuval and Romualdez are inapplicable to the instant
case because they involve election cases. Needless to say, there is a distinction between "residence" for purposes
of election laws and "residence" for purposes of fixing the venue of actions. In election cases, "residence" and
"domicile" are treated as synonymous terms, that is, the fixed permanent residence to which when absent, one has
the intention of returning. 42 However, for purposes of fixing venue under the Rules of Court, the "residence" of a
person is his personal, actual or physical habitation, or actual residence or place of abode, which may not
necessarily be his legal residence or domicile provided he resides therein with continuity and consistency. 43 Hence,
it is possible that a person may have his residence in one place and domicile in another.

In the instant case, while petitioners established that Felicisimo was domiciled in Sta. Cruz, Laguna, respondent
proved that he also maintained a residence in Alabang, Muntinlupa from 1982 up to the time of his death.
Respondent submitted in evidence the Deed of Absolute Sale 44 dated January 5, 1983 showing that the deceased
purchased the aforesaid property. She also presented billing statements 45 from the Philippine Heart Center and
Chinese General Hospital for the period August to December 1992 indicating the address of Felicisimo at "100 San
Juanico, Ayala Alabang, Muntinlupa." Respondent also presented proof of membership of the deceased in the Ayala
Alabang Village Association 46 and Ayala Country Club, Inc., 47 letter-envelopes 48 from 1988 to 1990 sent by the
deceased’s children to him at his Alabang address, and the deceased’s calling cards 49 stating that his home/city
address is at "100 San Juanico, Ayala Alabang Village, Muntinlupa" while his office/provincial address is in
"Provincial Capitol, Sta. Cruz, Laguna."

From the foregoing, we find that Felicisimo was a resident of Alabang, Muntinlupa for purposes of fixing the venue of
the settlement of his estate. Consequently, the subject petition for letters of administration was validly filed in the
Regional Trial Court 50 which has territorial jurisdiction over Alabang, Muntinlupa. The subject petition was filed on
December 17, 1993. At that time, Muntinlupa was still a municipality and the branches of the Regional Trial Court of
the National Capital Judicial Region which had territorial jurisdiction over Muntinlupa were then seated in Makati City
as per Supreme Court Administrative Order No. 3. 51 Thus, the subject petition was validly filed before the Regional
Trial Court of Makati City.

Anent the issue of respondent Felicidad’s legal personality to file the petition for letters of administration, we must
first resolve the issue of whether a Filipino who is divorced by his alien spouse abroad may validly remarry under the
Civil Code, considering that Felicidad’s marriage to Felicisimo was solemnized on June 20, 1974, or before the
Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988. In resolving this issue, we need not retroactively apply the provisions of
the Family Code, particularly Art. 26, par. (2) considering that there is sufficient jurisprudential basis allowing us to
rule in the affirmative.

The case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. 52 involved a marriage between a foreigner and his Filipino wife, which marriage
was subsequently dissolved through a divorce obtained abroad by the latter. Claiming that the divorce was not valid
under Philippine law, the alien spouse alleged that his interest in the properties from their conjugal partnership
should be protected. The Court, however, recognized the validity of the divorce and held that the alien spouse had
no interest in the properties acquired by the Filipino wife after the divorce. Thus:

In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from the standards of American
law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage. As stated by the Federal Supreme Court of the United States in
Atherton vs. Atherton, 45 L. Ed. 794, 799:

"The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the bond of matrimony by a competent jurisdiction are to
change the existing status or domestic relation of husband and wife, and to free them both from the bond. The
marriage tie, when thus severed as to one party, ceases to bind either. A husband without a wife, or a wife without a
husband, is unknown to the law. When the law provides, in the nature of a penalty, that the guilty party shall not
marry again, that party, as well as the other, is still absolutely freed from the bond of the former marriage."

Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He would have no
standing to sue in the case below as petitioner’s husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is
bound by the Decision of his own country’s Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision
he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own representation before said Court from asserting his right over the
alleged conjugal property. 53

As to the effect of the divorce on the Filipino wife, the Court ruled that she should no longer be considered married
to the alien spouse. Further, she should not be required to perform her marital duties and obligations. It held:

To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner has to be considered still
married to private respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil
Code cannot be just. Petitioner should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render
support to private respondent. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal
property. She should not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be
served. 54 (Emphasis added)

This principle was thereafter applied in Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera 55 where the Court recognized the validity of a divorce
obtained abroad. In the said case, it was held that the alien spouse is not a proper party in filing the adultery suit
against his Filipino wife. The Court stated that "the severance of the marital bond had the effect of dissociating the
former spouses from each other, hence the actuations of one would not affect or cast obloquy on the other." 56

Likewise, in Quita v. Court of Appeals, 57 the Court stated that where a Filipino is divorced by his naturalized foreign
spouse, the ruling in Van Dorn applies. 58 Although decided on December 22, 1998, the divorce in the said case was
obtained in 1954 when the Civil Code provisions were still in effect.

The significance of the Van Dorn case to the development of limited recognition of divorce in the Philippines cannot
be denied. The ruling has long been interpreted as severing marital ties between parties in a mixed marriage and
capacitating the Filipino spouse to remarry as a necessary consequence of upholding the validity of a divorce
obtained abroad by the alien spouse. In his treatise, Dr. Arturo M. Tolentino cited Van Dorn stating that "if the
foreigner obtains a valid foreign divorce, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine
law." 59 In Garcia v. Recio, 60 the Court likewise cited the aforementioned case in relation to Article 26. 61

In the recent case of Republic v. Orbecido III, 62 the historical background and legislative intent behind paragraph 2,
Article 26 of the Family Code were discussed, to wit:

Brief Historical Background

On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino signed into law Executive Order No. 209, otherwise known as the
"Family Code," which took effect on August 3, 1988. Article 26 thereof states:

All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were
solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35, 37,
and 38.

On July 17, 1987, shortly after the signing of the original Family Code, Executive Order No. 227 was likewise signed
into law, amending Articles 26, 36, and 39 of the Family Code. A second paragraph was added to Article 26. As so
amended, it now provides:

ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the country where
they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under
Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to
remarry under Philippine law. (Emphasis supplied)

xxxx
Legislative Intent

Records of the proceedings of the Family Code deliberations showed that the intent of Paragraph 2 of Article 26,
according to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of the Civil Code Revision Committee, is to avoid the absurd
situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer
married to the Filipino spouse.

Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the 1985 case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. The Van
Dorn case involved a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The Court held therein that a
divorce decree validly obtained by the alien spouse is valid in the Philippines, and consequently, the
Filipino spouse is capacitated to remarry under Philippine law. 63 (Emphasis added)

As such, the Van Dorn case is sufficient basis in resolving a situation where a divorce is validly obtained abroad by
the alien spouse. With the enactment of the Family Code and paragraph 2, Article 26 thereof, our lawmakers
codified the law already established through judicial precedent. 1awphi1.net

Indeed, when the object of a marriage is defeated by rendering its continuance intolerable to one of the parties and
productive of no possible good to the community, relief in some way should be obtainable. 64 Marriage, being a
mutual and shared commitment between two parties, cannot possibly be productive of any good to the society
where one is considered released from the marital bond while the other remains bound to it. Such is the state of
affairs where the alien spouse obtains a valid divorce abroad against the Filipino spouse, as in this case.

Petitioners cite Articles 15 65 and 17 66 of the Civil Code in stating that the divorce is void under Philippine law insofar
as Filipinos are concerned. However, in light of this Court’s rulings in the cases discussed above, the Filipino
spouse should not be discriminated against in his own country if the ends of justice are to be served. 67 In Alonzo v.
Intermediate Appellate Court, 68 the Court stated:

But as has also been aptly observed, we test a law by its results; and likewise, we may add, by its purposes. It is a
cardinal rule that, in seeking the meaning of the law, the first concern of the judge should be to discover in its
provisions the intent of the lawmaker. Unquestionably, the law should never be interpreted in such a way as to
cause injustice as this is never within the legislative intent. An indispensable part of that intent, in fact, for we
presume the good motives of the legislature, is to render justice.

Thus, we interpret and apply the law not independently of but in consonance with justice. Law and justice are
inseparable, and we must keep them so. To be sure, there are some laws that, while generally valid, may seem
arbitrary when applied in a particular case because of its peculiar circumstances. In such a situation, we are not
bound, because only of our nature and functions, to apply them just the same, in slavish obedience to their
language. What we do instead is find a balance between the word and the will, that justice may be done even as the
law is obeyed.

As judges, we are not automatons. We do not and must not unfeelingly apply the law as it is worded, yielding like
robots to the literal command without regard to its cause and consequence. "Courts are apt to err by sticking too
closely to the words of a law," so we are warned, by Justice Holmes again, "where these words import a policy that
goes beyond them."

xxxx

More than twenty centuries ago, Justinian defined justice "as the constant and perpetual wish to render every one
his due." That wish continues to motivate this Court when it assesses the facts and the law in every case brought to
it for decision. Justice is always an essential ingredient of its decisions. Thus when the facts warrants, we interpret
the law in a way that will render justice, presuming that it was the intention of the lawmaker, to begin with, that the
law be dispensed with justice. 69
Applying the above doctrine in the instant case, the divorce decree allegedly obtained by Merry Lee which
absolutely allowed Felicisimo to remarry, would have vested Felicidad with the legal personality to file the present
petition as Felicisimo’s surviving spouse. However, the records show that there is insufficient evidence to prove the
validity of the divorce obtained by Merry Lee as well as the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo under the laws of
the U.S.A. In Garcia v. Recio, 70 the Court laid down the specific guidelines for pleading and proving foreign law and
divorce judgments. It held that presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient and that proof of its
authenticity and due execution must be presented. Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or document
may be proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy
thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such
copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine
foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his
office. 71

With regard to respondent’s marriage to Felicisimo allegedly solemnized in California, U.S.A., she submitted
photocopies of the Marriage Certificate and the annotated text 72 of the Family Law Act of California which
purportedly show that their marriage was done in accordance with the said law. As stated in Garcia, however, the
Court cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws as they must be alleged and proved. 73

Therefore, this case should be remanded to the trial court for further reception of evidence on the divorce decree
obtained by Merry Lee and the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo.

Even assuming that Felicisimo was not capacitated to marry respondent in 1974, nevertheless, we find that the
latter has the legal personality to file the subject petition for letters of administration, as she may be considered the
co-owner of Felicisimo as regards the properties that were acquired through their joint efforts during their
cohabitation.

Section 6, 74 Rule 78 of the Rules of Court states that letters of administration may be granted to the surviving
spouse of the decedent. However, Section 2, Rule 79 thereof also provides in part:

SEC. 2. Contents of petition for letters of administration. – A petition for letters of administration must be filed by an
interested person and must show, as far as known to the petitioner: x x x.

An "interested person" has been defined as one who would be benefited by the estate, such as an heir, or one who
has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor. The interest must be material and direct, and not merely indirect
or contingent. 75

In the instant case, respondent would qualify as an interested person who has a direct interest in the estate of
Felicisimo by virtue of their cohabitation, the existence of which was not denied by petitioners. If she proves the
validity of the divorce and Felicisimo’s capacity to remarry, but fails to prove that her marriage with him was validly
performed under the laws of the U.S.A., then she may be considered as a co-owner under Article 144 76 of the Civil
Code. This provision governs the property relations between parties who live together as husband and wife without
the benefit of marriage, or their marriage is void from the beginning. It provides that the property acquired by either
or both of them through their work or industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on co-
ownership. In a co-ownership, it is not necessary that the property be acquired through their joint labor, efforts and
industry. Any property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint
efforts. Hence, the portions belonging to the co-owners shall be presumed equal, unless the contrary is proven. 77

Meanwhile, if respondent fails to prove the validity of both the divorce and the marriage, the applicable provision
would be Article 148 of the Family Code which has filled the hiatus in Article 144 of the Civil Code by expressly
regulating the property relations of couples living together as husband and wife but are incapacitated to
marry. 78 In Saguid v. Court of Appeals, 79 we held that even if the cohabitation or the acquisition of property occurred
before the Family Code took effect, Article 148 governs. 80 The Court described the property regime under this
provision as follows:

The regime of limited co-ownership of property governing the union of parties who are not legally capacitated to
marry each other, but who nonetheless live together as husband and wife, applies to properties acquired during said
cohabitation in proportion to their respective contributions. Co-ownership will only be up to the extent of the proven
actual contribution of money, property or industry. Absent proof of the extent thereof, their contributions and
corresponding shares shall be presumed to be equal.

xxxx

In the cases of Agapay v. Palang, and Tumlos v. Fernandez, which involved the issue of co-ownership of properties
acquired by the parties to a bigamous marriage and an adulterous relationship, respectively, we ruled that proof of
actual contribution in the acquisition of the property is essential. x x x

As in other civil cases, the burden of proof rests upon the party who, as determined by the pleadings or the nature of
the case, asserts an affirmative issue. Contentions must be proved by competent evidence and reliance must be
had on the strength of the party’s own evidence and not upon the weakness of the opponent’s defense. x x x 81

In view of the foregoing, we find that respondent’s legal capacity to file the subject petition for letters of
administration may arise from her status as the surviving wife of Felicisimo or as his co-owner under Article 144 of
the Civil Code or Article 148 of the Family Code.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals reinstating and affirming the February
28, 1994 Order of the Regional Trial Court which denied petitioners’ motion to dismiss and its October 24, 1994
Order which dismissed petitioners’ motion for reconsideration is AFFIRMED. Let this case be REMANDED to the
trial court for further proceedings.
25.) G.R. No. L-23678             June 6, 1967

TESTATE ESTATE OF AMOS G. BELLIS, deceased.

PEOPLE'S BANK and TRUST COMPANY, executor.
MARIA CRISTINA BELLIS and MIRIAM PALMA BELLIS, oppositors-appellants,
vs.
EDWARD A. BELLIS, ET AL., heirs-appellees.

Vicente R. Macasaet and Jose D. Villena for oppositors appellants.

Paredes, Poblador, Cruz and Nazareno for heirs-appellees E. A. Bellis, et al.
Quijano and Arroyo for heirs-appellees W. S. Bellis, et al.
J. R. Balonkita for appellee People's Bank & Trust Company.
Ozaeta, Gibbs and Ozaeta for appellee A. B. Allsman.

BENGZON, J.P., J.:

This is a direct appeal to Us, upon a question purely of law, from an order of the Court of First Instance of Manila
dated April 30, 1964, approving the project of partition filed by the executor in Civil Case No. 37089 therein.1äwphï1.ñët

The facts of the case are as follows:

Amos G. Bellis, born in Texas, was "a citizen of the State of Texas and of the United States." By his first wife, Mary
E. Mallen, whom he divorced, he had five legitimate children: Edward A. Bellis, George Bellis (who pre-deceased
him in infancy), Henry A. Bellis, Alexander Bellis and Anna Bellis Allsman; by his second wife, Violet Kennedy, who
survived him, he had three legitimate children: Edwin G. Bellis, Walter S. Bellis and Dorothy Bellis; and finally, he
had three illegitimate children: Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis.

On August 5, 1952, Amos G. Bellis executed a will in the Philippines, in which he directed that after all taxes,
obligations, and expenses of administration are paid for, his distributable estate should be divided, in trust, in the
following order and manner: (a) $240,000.00 to his first wife, Mary E. Mallen; (b) P120,000.00 to his three
illegitimate children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis, Miriam Palma Bellis, or P40,000.00 each and (c) after the
foregoing two items have been satisfied, the remainder shall go to his seven surviving children by his first and
second wives, namely: Edward A. Bellis, Henry A. Bellis, Alexander Bellis and Anna Bellis Allsman, Edwin G. Bellis,
Walter S. Bellis, and Dorothy E. Bellis, in equal shares.1äwphï1.ñët

Subsequently, or on July 8, 1958, Amos G. Bellis died a resident of San Antonio, Texas, U.S.A. His will was
admitted to probate in the Court of First Instance of Manila on September 15, 1958.

The People's Bank and Trust Company, as executor of the will, paid all the bequests therein including the amount of
$240,000.00 in the form of shares of stock to Mary E. Mallen and to the three (3) illegitimate children, Amos Bellis,
Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis, various amounts totalling P40,000.00 each in satisfaction of their
respective legacies, or a total of P120,000.00, which it released from time to time according as the lower court
approved and allowed the various motions or petitions filed by the latter three requesting partial advances on
account of their respective legacies.

On January 8, 1964, preparatory to closing its administration, the executor submitted and filed its "Executor's Final
Account, Report of Administration and Project of Partition" wherein it reported, inter alia, the satisfaction of the
legacy of Mary E. Mallen by the delivery to her of shares of stock amounting to $240,000.00, and the legacies of
Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis in the amount of P40,000.00 each or a total of
P120,000.00. In the project of partition, the executor — pursuant to the "Twelfth" clause of the testator's Last Will
and Testament — divided the residuary estate into seven equal portions for the benefit of the testator's seven
legitimate children by his first and second marriages.

On January 17, 1964, Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis filed their respective oppositions to the project of
partition on the ground that they were deprived of their legitimes as illegitimate children and, therefore, compulsory
heirs of the deceased.
Amos Bellis, Jr. interposed no opposition despite notice to him, proof of service of which is evidenced by the registry
receipt submitted on April 27, 1964 by the executor. 1

After the parties filed their respective memoranda and other pertinent pleadings, the lower court, on April 30, 1964,
issued an order overruling the oppositions and approving the executor's final account, report and administration and
project of partition. Relying upon Art. 16 of the Civil Code, it applied the national law of the decedent, which in this
case is Texas law, which did not provide for legitimes.

Their respective motions for reconsideration having been denied by the lower court on June 11, 1964, oppositors-
appellants appealed to this Court to raise the issue of which law must apply — Texas law or Philippine law.

In this regard, the parties do not submit the case on, nor even discuss, the doctrine of renvoi, applied by this Court
in Aznar v. Christensen Garcia, L-16749, January 31, 1963. Said doctrine is usually pertinent where the decedent is
a national of one country, and a domicile of another. In the present case, it is not disputed that the decedent was
both a national of Texas and a domicile thereof at the time of his death. 2 So that even assuming Texas has a conflict
of law rule providing that the domiciliary system (law of the domicile) should govern, the same would not result in a
reference back (renvoi) to Philippine law, but would still refer to Texas law. Nonetheless, if Texas has a conflicts rule
adopting the situs theory (lex rei sitae) calling for the application of the law of the place where the properties are
situated, renvoi would arise, since the properties here involved are found in the Philippines. In the absence,
however, of proof as to the conflict of law rule of Texas, it should not be presumed different from ours. 3 Appellants'
position is therefore not rested on the doctrine of renvoi. As stated, they never invoked nor even mentioned it in their
arguments. Rather, they argue that their case falls under the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of
Article 17 in relation to Article 16 of the Civil Code.

Article 16, par. 2, and Art. 1039 of the Civil Code, render applicable the national law of the decedent, in intestate or
testamentary successions, with regard to four items: (a) the order of succession; (b) the amount of successional
rights; (e) the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will; and (d) the capacity to succeed. They provide that —

ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is situated.

However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of succession and to the
amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by
the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may he the nature of the
property and regardless of the country wherein said property may be found.

ART. 1039. Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation of the decedent.

Appellants would however counter that Art. 17, paragraph three, of the Civil Code, stating that —

Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their object public
order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated,
or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.

prevails as the exception to Art. 16, par. 2 of the Civil Code afore-quoted. This is not correct. Precisely,
Congress deleted the phrase, "notwithstanding the provisions of this and the next preceding article" when they
incorporated Art. 11 of the old Civil Code as Art. 17 of the new Civil Code, while reproducing without substantial
change the second paragraph of Art. 10 of the old Civil Code as Art. 16 in the new. It must have been their purpose
to make the second paragraph of Art. 16 a specific provision in itself which must be applied in testate and intestate
succession. As further indication of this legislative intent, Congress added a new provision, under Art. 1039, which
decrees that capacity to succeed is to be governed by the national law of the decedent.

It is therefore evident that whatever public policy or good customs may be involved in our System of legitimes,
Congress has not intended to extend the same to the succession of foreign nationals. For it has specifically chosen
to leave, inter alia, the amount of successional rights, to the decedent's national law. Specific provisions must
prevail over general ones.
Appellants would also point out that the decedent executed two wills — one to govern his Texas estate and the
other his Philippine estate — arguing from this that he intended Philippine law to govern his Philippine estate.
Assuming that such was the decedent's intention in executing a separate Philippine will, it would not alter the law,
for as this Court ruled in Miciano v. Brimo, 50 Phil. 867, 870, a provision in a foreigner's will to the effect that his
properties shall be distributed in accordance with Philippine law and not with his national law, is illegal and void, for
his national law cannot be ignored in regard to those matters that Article 10 — now Article 16 — of the Civil Code
states said national law should govern.

The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a citizen of the State of Texas, U.S.A., and that under the
laws of Texas, there are no forced heirs or legitimes. Accordingly, since the intrinsic validity of the provision of the
will and the amount of successional rights are to be determined under Texas law, the Philippine law on legitimes
cannot be applied to the testacy of Amos G. Bellis.

Wherefore, the order of the probate court is hereby affirmed in toto, with costs against appellants. So ordered.
26.) G.R. No. L-23145      November 29, 1968

TESTATE ESTATE OF IDONAH SLADE PERKINS, deceased. RENATO D. TAYAG, ancillary administrator-

appellee,
vs.
BENGUET CONSOLIDATED, INC., oppositor-appellant.

Cirilo F. Asperillo, Jr., for ancillary administrator-appellee.

Ross, Salcedo, Del Rosario, Bito and Misa for oppositor-appellant.

FERNANDO, J.:

Confronted by an obstinate and adamant refusal of the domiciliary administrator, the County Trust Company of New
York, United States of America, of the estate of the deceased Idonah Slade Perkins, who died in New York City on
March 27, 1960, to surrender to the ancillary administrator in the Philippines the stock certificates owned by her in a
Philippine corporation, Benguet Consolidated, Inc., to satisfy the legitimate claims of local creditors, the lower court,
then presided by the Honorable Arsenio Santos, now retired, issued on May 18, 1964, an order of this tenor: "After
considering the motion of the ancillary administrator, dated February 11, 1964, as well as the opposition filed by the
Benguet Consolidated, Inc., the Court hereby (1) considers as lost for all purposes in connection with the
administration and liquidation of the Philippine estate of Idonah Slade Perkins the stock certificates covering the
33,002 shares of stock standing in her name in the books of the Benguet Consolidated, Inc., (2) orders said
certificates cancelled, and (3) directs said corporation to issue new certificates in lieu thereof, the same to be
delivered by said corporation to either the incumbent ancillary administrator or to the Probate Division of this Court." 1

From such an order, an appeal was taken to this Court not by the domiciliary administrator, the County Trust
Company of New York, but by the Philippine corporation, the Benguet Consolidated, Inc. The appeal cannot
possibly prosper. The challenged order represents a response and expresses a policy, to paraphrase Frankfurter,
arising out of a specific problem, addressed to the attainment of specific ends by the use of specific remedies, with
full and ample support from legal doctrines of weight and significance.

The facts will explain why. As set forth in the brief of appellant Benguet Consolidated, Inc., Idonah Slade Perkins,
who died on March 27, 1960 in New York City, left among others, two stock certificates covering 33,002 shares of
appellant, the certificates being in the possession of the County Trust Company of New York, which as noted, is the
domiciliary administrator of the estate of the deceased. 2 Then came this portion of the appellant's brief: "On August
12, 1960, Prospero Sanidad instituted ancillary administration proceedings in the Court of First Instance of Manila;
Lazaro A. Marquez was appointed ancillary administrator, and on January 22, 1963, he was substituted by the
appellee Renato D. Tayag. A dispute arose between the domiciary administrator in New York and the ancillary
administrator in the Philippines as to which of them was entitled to the possession of the stock certificates in
question. On January 27, 1964, the Court of First Instance of Manila ordered the domiciliary administrator, County
Trust Company, to "produce and deposit" them with the ancillary administrator or with the Clerk of Court. The
domiciliary administrator did not comply with the order, and on February 11, 1964, the ancillary administrator
petitioned the court to "issue an order declaring the certificate or certificates of stocks covering the 33,002 shares
issued in the name of Idonah Slade Perkins by Benguet Consolidated, Inc., be declared [or] considered as lost." 3

It is to be noted further that appellant Benguet Consolidated, Inc. admits that "it is immaterial" as far as it is
concerned as to "who is entitled to the possession of the stock certificates in question; appellant opposed the
petition of the ancillary administrator because the said stock certificates are in existence, they are today in the
possession of the domiciliary administrator, the County Trust Company, in New York, U.S.A...." 4

It is its view, therefore, that under the circumstances, the stock certificates cannot be declared or considered as lost.
Moreover, it would allege that there was a failure to observe certain requirements of its by-laws before new stock
certificates could be issued. Hence, its appeal.

As was made clear at the outset of this opinion, the appeal lacks merit. The challenged order constitutes an
emphatic affirmation of judicial authority sought to be emasculated by the wilful conduct of the domiciliary
administrator in refusing to accord obedience to a court decree. How, then, can this order be stigmatized as illegal?
As is true of many problems confronting the judiciary, such a response was called for by the realities of the situation.
What cannot be ignored is that conduct bordering on wilful defiance, if it had not actually reached it, cannot without
undue loss of judicial prestige, be condoned or tolerated. For the law is not so lacking in flexibility and
resourcefulness as to preclude such a solution, the more so as deeper reflection would make clear its being
buttressed by indisputable principles and supported by the strongest policy considerations.

It can truly be said then that the result arrived at upheld and vindicated the honor of the judiciary no less than that of
the country. Through this challenged order, there is thus dispelled the atmosphere of contingent frustration brought
about by the persistence of the domiciliary administrator to hold on to the stock certificates after it had, as admitted,
voluntarily submitted itself to the jurisdiction of the lower court by entering its appearance through counsel on June
27, 1963, and filing a petition for relief from a previous order of March 15, 1963.

Thus did the lower court, in the order now on appeal, impart vitality and effectiveness to what was decreed. For
without it, what it had been decided would be set at naught and nullified. Unless such a blatant disregard by the
domiciliary administrator, with residence abroad, of what was previously ordained by a court order could be thus
remedied, it would have entailed, insofar as this matter was concerned, not a partial but a well-nigh complete
paralysis of judicial authority.

1. Appellant Benguet Consolidated, Inc. did not dispute the power of the appellee ancillary administrator to gain
control and possession of all assets of the decedent within the jurisdiction of the Philippines. Nor could it. Such a
power is inherent in his duty to settle her estate and satisfy the claims of local creditors. 5 As Justice Tuason
speaking for this Court made clear, it is a "general rule universally recognized" that administration, whether principal
or ancillary, certainly "extends to the assets of a decedent found within the state or country where it was granted,"
the corollary being "that an administrator appointed in one state or country has no power over property in another
state or country."6

It is to be noted that the scope of the power of the ancillary administrator was, in an earlier case, set forth by Justice
Malcolm. Thus: "It is often necessary to have more than one administration of an estate. When a person dies
intestate owning property in the country of his domicile as well as in a foreign country, administration is had in both
countries. That which is granted in the jurisdiction of decedent's last domicile is termed the principal administration,
while any other administration is termed the ancillary administration. The reason for the latter is because a grant of
administration does not ex proprio vigore have any effect beyond the limits of the country in which it is granted.
Hence, an administrator appointed in a foreign state has no authority in the [Philippines]. The ancillary
administration is proper, whenever a person dies, leaving in a country other than that of his last domicile, property to
be administered in the nature of assets of the deceased liable for his individual debts or to be distributed among his
heirs."7

It would follow then that the authority of the probate court to require that ancillary administrator's right to "the stock
certificates covering the 33,002 shares ... standing in her name in the books of [appellant] Benguet Consolidated,
Inc...." be respected is equally beyond question. For appellant is a Philippine corporation owing full allegiance and
subject to the unrestricted jurisdiction of local courts. Its shares of stock cannot therefore be considered in any wise
as immune from lawful court orders.

Our holding in Wells Fargo Bank and Union v. Collector of Internal Revenue 8 finds application. "In the instant case,
the actual situs of the shares of stock is in the Philippines, the corporation being domiciled [here]." To the force of
the above undeniable proposition, not even appellant is insensible. It does not dispute it. Nor could it successfully do
so even if it were so minded.

2. In the face of such incontrovertible doctrines that argue in a rather conclusive fashion for the legality of the
challenged order, how does appellant, Benguet Consolidated, Inc. propose to carry the extremely heavy burden of
persuasion of precisely demonstrating the contrary? It would assign as the basic error allegedly committed by the
lower court its "considering as lost the stock certificates covering 33,002 shares of Benguet belonging to the
deceased Idonah Slade Perkins, ..."9 More specifically, appellant would stress that the "lower court could not
"consider as lost" the stock certificates in question when, as a matter of fact, his Honor the trial Judge knew, and
does know, and it is admitted by the appellee, that the said stock certificates are in existence and are today in the
possession of the domiciliary administrator in New York." 10
There may be an element of fiction in the above view of the lower court. That certainly does not suffice to call for the
reversal of the appealed order. Since there is a refusal, persistently adhered to by the domiciliary administrator in
New York, to deliver the shares of stocks of appellant corporation owned by the decedent to the ancillary
administrator in the Philippines, there was nothing unreasonable or arbitrary in considering them as lost and
requiring the appellant to issue new certificates in lieu thereof. Thereby, the task incumbent under the law on the
ancillary administrator could be discharged and his responsibility fulfilled.

Any other view would result in the compliance to a valid judicial order being made to depend on the uncontrolled
discretion of the party or entity, in this case domiciled abroad, which thus far has shown the utmost persistence in
refusing to yield obedience. Certainly, appellant would not be heard to contend in all seriousness that a judicial
decree could be treated as a mere scrap of paper, the court issuing it being powerless to remedy its flagrant
disregard.

It may be admitted of course that such alleged loss as found by the lower court did not correspond exactly with the
facts. To be more blunt, the quality of truth may be lacking in such a conclusion arrived at. It is to be remembered
however, again to borrow from Frankfurter, "that fictions which the law may rely upon in the pursuit of legitimate
ends have played an important part in its development." 11

Speaking of the common law in its earlier period, Cardozo could state fictions "were devices to advance the ends of
justice, [even if] clumsy and at times offensive."12 Some of them have persisted even to the present, that eminent
jurist, noting "the quasi contract, the adopted child, the constructive trust, all of flourishing vitality, to attest the
empire of "as if" today."13 He likewise noted "a class of fictions of another order, the fiction which is a working tool of
thought, but which at times hides itself from view till reflection and analysis have brought it to the light." 14

What cannot be disputed, therefore, is the at times indispensable role that fictions as such played in the law. There
should be then on the part of the appellant a further refinement in the catholicity of its condemnation of such judicial
technique. If ever an occasion did call for the employment of a legal fiction to put an end to the anomalous situation
of a valid judicial order being disregarded with apparent impunity, this is it. What is thus most obvious is that this
particular alleged error does not carry persuasion.

3. Appellant Benguet Consolidated, Inc. would seek to bolster the above contention by its invoking one of the
provisions of its by-laws which would set forth the procedure to be followed in case of a lost, stolen or destroyed
stock certificate; it would stress that in the event of a contest or the pendency of an action regarding ownership of
such certificate or certificates of stock allegedly lost, stolen or destroyed, the issuance of a new certificate or
certificates would await the "final decision by [a] court regarding the ownership [thereof]." 15

Such reliance is misplaced. In the first place, there is no such occasion to apply such by-law. It is admitted that the
foreign domiciliary administrator did not appeal from the order now in question. Moreover, there is likewise the
express admission of appellant that as far as it is concerned, "it is immaterial ... who is entitled to the possession of
the stock certificates ..." Even if such were not the case, it would be a legal absurdity to impart to such a provision
conclusiveness and finality. Assuming that a contrariety exists between the above by-law and the command of a
court decree, the latter is to be followed.

It is understandable, as Cardozo pointed out, that the Constitution overrides a statute, to which, however, the
judiciary must yield deference, when appropriately invoked and deemed applicable. It would be most highly
unorthodox, however, if a corporate by-law would be accorded such a high estate in the jural order that a court must
not only take note of it but yield to its alleged controlling force.

The fear of appellant of a contingent liability with which it could be saddled unless the appealed order be set aside
for its inconsistency with one of its by-laws does not impress us. Its obedience to a lawful court order certainly
constitutes a valid defense, assuming that such apprehension of a possible court action against it could possibly
materialize. Thus far, nothing in the circumstances as they have developed gives substance to such a fear.
Gossamer possibilities of a future prejudice to appellant do not suffice to nullify the lawful exercise of judicial
authority.

4. What is more the view adopted by appellant Benguet Consolidated, Inc. is fraught with implications at war with
the basic postulates of corporate theory.
We start with the undeniable premise that, "a corporation is an artificial being created by operation of law...." 16 It
owes its life to the state, its birth being purely dependent on its will. As Berle so aptly stated: "Classically, a
corporation was conceived as an artificial person, owing its existence through creation by a sovereign power." 17 As a
matter of fact, the statutory language employed owes much to Chief Justice Marshall, who in the Dartmouth College
decision defined a corporation precisely as "an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing only in
contemplation of law."18

The well-known authority Fletcher could summarize the matter thus: "A corporation is not in fact and in reality a
person, but the law treats it as though it were a person by process of fiction, or by regarding it as an artificial person
distinct and separate from its individual stockholders.... It owes its existence to law. It is an artificial person created
by law for certain specific purposes, the extent of whose existence, powers and liberties is fixed by its
charter."19 Dean Pound's terse summary, a juristic person, resulting from an association of human beings granted
legal personality by the state, puts the matter neatly. 20

There is thus a rejection of Gierke's genossenchaft theory, the basic theme of which to quote from Friedmann, "is
the reality of the group as a social and legal entity, independent of state recognition and concession." 21 A corporation
as known to Philippine jurisprudence is a creature without any existence until it has received the imprimatur of the
state according to law. It is logically inconceivable therefore that it will have rights and privileges of a higher priority
than that of its creator. More than that, it cannot legitimately refuse to yield obedience to acts of its state organs,
certainly not excluding the judiciary, whenever called upon to do so.

As a matter of fact, a corporation once it comes into being, following American law still of persuasive authority in our
jurisdiction, comes more often within the ken of the judiciary than the other two coordinate branches. It institutes the
appropriate court action to enforce its right. Correlatively, it is not immune from judicial control in those instances,
where a duty under the law as ascertained in an appropriate legal proceeding is cast upon it.

To assert that it can choose which court order to follow and which to disregard is to confer upon it not autonomy
which may be conceded but license which cannot be tolerated. It is to argue that it may, when so minded, overrule
the state, the source of its very existence; it is to contend that what any of its governmental organs may lawfully
require could be ignored at will. So extravagant a claim cannot possibly merit approval.

5. One last point. In Viloria v. Administrator of Veterans Affairs, 22 it was shown that in a guardianship proceedings
then pending in a lower court, the United States Veterans Administration filed a motion for the refund of a certain
sum of money paid to the minor under guardianship, alleging that the lower court had previously granted its petition
to consider the deceased father as not entitled to guerilla benefits according to a determination arrived at by its main
office in the United States. The motion was denied. In seeking a reconsideration of such order, the Administrator
relied on an American federal statute making his decisions "final and conclusive on all questions of law or fact"
precluding any other American official to examine the matter anew, "except a judge or judges of the United States
court."23 Reconsideration was denied, and the Administrator appealed.

In an opinion by Justice J.B.L. Reyes, we sustained the lower court. Thus: "We are of the opinion that the appeal
should be rejected. The provisions of the U.S. Code, invoked by the appellant, make the decisions of the U.S.
Veterans' Administrator final and conclusive when made on claims property submitted to him for resolution; but they
are not applicable to the present case, where the Administrator is not acting as a judge but as a litigant. There is a
great difference between actions against the Administrator (which must be filed strictly in accordance with the
conditions that are imposed by the Veterans' Act, including the exclusive review by United States courts), and those
actions where the Veterans' Administrator seeks a remedy from our courts and submits to their jurisdiction by filing
actions therein. Our attention has not been called to any law or treaty that would make the findings of the Veterans'
Administrator, in actions where he is a party, conclusive on our courts. That, in effect, would deprive our tribunals of
judicial discretion and render them mere subordinate instrumentalities of the Veterans' Administrator."

It is bad enough as the Viloria decision made patent for our judiciary to accept as final and conclusive,
determinations made by foreign governmental agencies. It is infinitely worse if through the absence of any coercive
power by our courts over juridical persons within our jurisdiction, the force and effectivity of their orders could be
made to depend on the whim or caprice of alien entities. It is difficult to imagine of a situation more offensive to the
dignity of the bench or the honor of the country.
Yet that would be the effect, even if unintended, of the proposition to which appellant Benguet Consolidated seems
to be firmly committed as shown by its failure to accept the validity of the order complained of; it seeks its reversal.
Certainly we must at all pains see to it that it does not succeed. The deplorable consequences attendant on
appellant prevailing attest to the necessity of negative response from us. That is what appellant will get.

That is all then that this case presents. It is obvious why the appeal cannot succeed. It is always easy to conjure
extreme and even oppressive possibilities. That is not decisive. It does not settle the issue. What carries weight and
conviction is the result arrived at, the just solution obtained, grounded in the soundest of legal doctrines and
distinguished by its correspondence with what a sense of realism requires. For through the appealed order, the
imperative requirement of justice according to law is satisfied and national dignity and honor maintained.

WHEREFORE, the appealed order of the Honorable Arsenio Santos, the Judge of the Court of First Instance, dated
May 18, 1964, is affirmed. With costs against oppositor-appelant Benguet Consolidated, Inc.
27.) G.R. No. 149177               November 23, 2007

KAZUHIRO HASEGAWA and NIPPON ENGINEERING CONSULTANTS CO., LTD., Petitioners,

vs.
MINORU KITAMURA, Respondent.

DECISION

NACHURA, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the April 18, 2001
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 60827, and the July 25, 2001 Resolution 2 denying the
motion for reconsideration thereof.

On March 30, 1999, petitioner Nippon Engineering Consultants Co., Ltd. (Nippon), a Japanese consultancy firm
providing technical and management support in the infrastructure projects of foreign governments, 3 entered into an
Independent Contractor Agreement (ICA) with respondent Minoru Kitamura, a Japanese national permanently
residing in the Philippines.4 The agreement provides that respondent was to extend professional services to Nippon
for a year starting on April 1, 1999. 5 Nippon then assigned respondent to work as the project manager of the
Southern Tagalog Access Road (STAR) Project in the Philippines, following the company's consultancy contract
with the Philippine Government.6

When the STAR Project was near completion, the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) engaged the
consultancy services of Nippon, on January 28, 2000, this time for the detailed engineering and construction
supervision of the Bongabon-Baler Road Improvement (BBRI) Project. 7 Respondent was named as the project
manager in the contract's Appendix 3.1.8

On February 28, 2000, petitioner Kazuhiro Hasegawa, Nippon's general manager for its International Division,
informed respondent that the company had no more intention of automatically renewing his ICA. His services would
be engaged by the company only up to the substantial completion of the STAR Project on March 31, 2000, just in
time for the ICA's expiry.9

Threatened with impending unemployment, respondent, through his lawyer, requested a negotiation conference and
demanded that he be assigned to the BBRI project. Nippon insisted that respondent’s contract was for a fixed term
that had already expired, and refused to negotiate for the renewal of the ICA. 10

As he was not able to generate a positive response from the petitioners, respondent consequently initiated on June
1, 2000 Civil Case No. 00-0264 for specific performance and damages with the Regional Trial Court of Lipa City. 11

For their part, petitioners, contending that the ICA had been perfected in Japan and executed by and between
Japanese nationals, moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. They asserted that the claim for
improper pre-termination of respondent's ICA could only be heard and ventilated in the proper courts of Japan
following the principles of lex loci celebrationis and lex contractus.12

In the meantime, on June 20, 2000, the DPWH approved Nippon's request for the replacement of Kitamura by a
certain Y. Kotake as project manager of the BBRI Project. 13

On June 29, 2000, the RTC, invoking our ruling in Insular Government v. Frank14 that matters connected with the
performance of contracts are regulated by the law prevailing at the place of performance, 15 denied the motion to
dismiss.16 The trial court subsequently denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration, 17 prompting them to file with the
appellate court, on August 14, 2000, their first Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 [docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
60205].18 On August 23, 2000, the CA resolved to dismiss the petition on procedural grounds—for lack of statement
of material dates and for insufficient verification and certification against forum shopping. 19 An Entry of Judgment
was later issued by the appellate court on September 20, 2000. 20
Aggrieved by this development, petitioners filed with the CA, on September 19, 2000, still within the reglementary
period, a second Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 already stating therein the material dates and attaching
thereto the proper verification and certification. This second petition, which substantially raised the same issues as
those in the first, was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 60827.21

Ruling on the merits of the second petition, the appellate court rendered the assailed April 18, 2001
Decision22 finding no grave abuse of discretion in the trial court's denial of the motion to dismiss. The CA ruled,
among others, that the principle of lex loci celebrationis was not applicable to the case, because nowhere in the
pleadings was the validity of the written agreement put in issue. The CA thus declared that the trial court was correct
in applying instead the principle of lex loci solutionis.23

Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was subsequently denied by the CA in the assailed July 25, 2001
Resolution.24

Remaining steadfast in their stance despite the series of denials, petitioners instituted the instant Petition for Review
on Certiorari25 imputing the following errors to the appellate court:

A. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE TRIAL COURT
VALIDLY EXERCISED JURISDICTION OVER THE INSTANT CONTROVERSY, DESPITE THE FACT
THAT THE CONTRACT SUBJECT MATTER OF THE PROCEEDINGS A QUO WAS ENTERED INTO BY
AND BETWEEN TWO JAPANESE NATIONALS, WRITTEN WHOLLY IN THE JAPANESE LANGUAGE
AND EXECUTED IN TOKYO, JAPAN.

B. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN OVERLOOKING THE NEED TO

REVIEW OUR ADHERENCE TO THE PRINCIPLE OF LEX LOCI SOLUTIONIS IN THE LIGHT OF
RECENT DEVELOPMENT[S] IN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAWS.26

The pivotal question that this Court is called upon to resolve is whether the subject matter jurisdiction of Philippine
courts in civil cases for specific performance and damages involving contracts executed outside the country by
foreign nationals may be assailed on the principles of lex loci celebrationis, lex contractus, the "state of the most
significant relationship rule," or forum non conveniens.

However, before ruling on this issue, we must first dispose of the procedural matters raised by the respondent.

Kitamura contends that the finality of the appellate court's decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 60205 has already barred the
filing of the second petition docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 60827 (fundamentally raising the same issues as those in
the first one) and the instant petition for review thereof.

We do not agree. When the CA dismissed CA-G.R. SP No. 60205 on account of the petition's defective certification
of non-forum shopping, it was a dismissal without prejudice. 27 The same holds true in the CA's dismissal of the said
case due to defects in the formal requirement of verification 28 and in the other requirement in Rule 46 of the Rules of
Court on the statement of the material dates. 29 The dismissal being without prejudice, petitioners can re-file the
petition, or file a second petition attaching thereto the appropriate verification and certification—as they, in fact did—
and stating therein the material dates, within the prescribed period 30 in Section 4, Rule 65 of the said Rules.31

The dismissal of a case without prejudice signifies the absence of a decision on the merits and leaves the parties
free to litigate the matter in a subsequent action as though the dismissed action had not been commenced. In other
words, the termination of a case not on the merits does not bar another action involving the same parties, on the
same subject matter and theory. 32

Necessarily, because the said dismissal is without prejudice and has no res judicata effect, and even if petitioners
still indicated in the verification and certification of the second certiorari petition that the first had already been
dismissed on procedural grounds, 33 petitioners are no longer required by the Rules to indicate in their certification of
non-forum shopping in the instant petition for review of the second certiorari petition, the status of the aforesaid first
petition before the CA. In any case, an omission in the certificate of non-forum shopping about any event that will
not constitute res judicata and litis pendentia, as in the present case, is not a fatal defect. It will not warrant the
dismissal and nullification of the entire proceedings, considering that the evils sought to be prevented by the said
certificate are no longer present. 34

The Court also finds no merit in respondent's contention that petitioner Hasegawa is only authorized to verify and
certify, on behalf of Nippon, the certiorari petition filed with the CA and not the instant petition. True, the
Authorization35 dated September 4, 2000, which is attached to the second certiorari petition and which is also
attached to the instant petition for review, is limited in scope—its wordings indicate that Hasegawa is given the
authority to sign for and act on behalf of the company only in the petition filed with the appellate court, and that
authority cannot extend to the instant petition for review. 36 In a plethora of cases, however, this Court has liberally
applied the Rules or even suspended its application whenever a satisfactory explanation and a subsequent
fulfillment of the requirements have been made. 37 Given that petitioners herein sufficiently explained their misgivings
on this point and appended to their Reply38 an updated Authorization39 for Hasegawa to act on behalf of the company
in the instant petition, the Court finds the same as sufficient compliance with the Rules.

However, the Court cannot extend the same liberal treatment to the defect in the verification and certification. As
respondent pointed out, and to which we agree, Hasegawa is truly not authorized to act on behalf of Nippon in this
case. The aforesaid September 4, 2000 Authorization and even the subsequent August 17, 2001 Authorization were
issued only by Nippon's president and chief executive officer, not by the company's board of directors. In not a few
cases, we have ruled that corporate powers are exercised by the board of directors; thus, no person, not even its
officers, can bind the corporation, in the absence of authority from the board. 40 Considering that Hasegawa verified
and certified the petition only on his behalf and not on behalf of the other petitioner, the petition has to be denied
pursuant to Loquias v. Office of the Ombudsman.41 Substantial compliance will not suffice in a matter that demands
strict observance of the Rules.42 While technical rules of procedure are designed not to frustrate the ends of justice,
nonetheless, they are intended to effect the proper and orderly disposition of cases and effectively prevent the
clogging of court dockets.43

Further, the Court has observed that petitioners incorrectly filed a Rule 65 petition to question the trial court's denial
of their motion to dismiss. It is a well-established rule that an order denying a motion to dismiss is interlocutory, and
cannot be the subject of the extraordinary petition for certiorari or mandamus. The appropriate recourse is to file an
answer and to interpose as defenses the objections raised in the motion, to proceed to trial, and, in case of an
adverse decision, to elevate the entire case by appeal in due course. 44 While there are recognized exceptions to this
rule,45 petitioners' case does not fall among them.

This brings us to the discussion of the substantive issue of the case.

Asserting that the RTC of Lipa City is an inconvenient forum, petitioners question its jurisdiction to hear and resolve
the civil case for specific performance and damages filed by the respondent. The ICA subject of the litigation was
entered into and perfected in Tokyo, Japan, by Japanese nationals, and written wholly in the Japanese language.
Thus, petitioners posit that local courts have no substantial relationship to the parties 46 following the [state of the]
most significant relationship rule in Private International Law. 47

The Court notes that petitioners adopted an additional but different theory when they elevated the case to the
appellate court. In the Motion to Dismiss48 filed with the trial court, petitioners never contended that the RTC is an
inconvenient forum. They merely argued that the applicable law which will determine the validity or invalidity of
respondent's claim is that of Japan, following the principles of lex loci celebrationis and lex contractus.49 While not
abandoning this stance in their petition before the appellate court, petitioners on certiorari significantly invoked the
defense of forum non conveniens.50 On petition for review before this Court, petitioners dropped their other
arguments, maintained the forum non conveniens defense, and introduced their new argument that the applicable
principle is the [state of the] most significant relationship rule. 51

Be that as it may, this Court is not inclined to deny this petition merely on the basis of the change in theory, as
explained in Philippine Ports Authority v. City of Iloilo.52 We only pointed out petitioners' inconstancy in their
arguments to emphasize their incorrect assertion of conflict of laws principles.

To elucidate, in the judicial resolution of conflicts problems, three consecutive phases are involved: jurisdiction,
choice of law, and recognition and enforcement of judgments. Corresponding to these phases are the following
questions: (1) Where can or should litigation be initiated? (2) Which law will the court apply? and (3) Where can the
resulting judgment be enforced?53
Analytically, jurisdiction and choice of law are two distinct concepts. 54 Jurisdiction considers whether it is fair to
cause a defendant to travel to this state; choice of law asks the further question whether the application of a
substantive law which will determine the merits of the case is fair to both parties. The power to exercise jurisdiction
does not automatically give a state constitutional authority to apply forum law. While jurisdiction and the choice of
the lex fori will often coincide, the "minimum contacts" for one do not always provide the necessary "significant
contacts" for the other.55 The question of whether the law of a state can be applied to a transaction is different from
the question of whether the courts of that state have jurisdiction to enter a judgment. 56

In this case, only the first phase is at issue—jurisdiction.  Jurisdiction, however, has various aspects. For a court to
1âwphi1

validly exercise its power to adjudicate a controversy, it must have jurisdiction over the plaintiff or the petitioner, over
the defendant or the respondent, over the subject matter, over the issues of the case and, in cases involving
property, over the res or the thing which is the subject of the litigation.57 In assailing the trial court's jurisdiction
herein, petitioners are actually referring to subject matter jurisdiction.

Jurisdiction over the subject matter in a judicial proceeding is conferred by the sovereign authority which establishes
and organizes the court. It is given only by law and in the manner prescribed by law. 58 It is further determined by the
allegations of the complaint irrespective of whether the plaintiff is entitled to all or some of the claims asserted
therein.59 To succeed in its motion for the dismissal of an action for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
claim,60 the movant must show that the court or tribunal cannot act on the matter submitted to it because no law
grants it the power to adjudicate the claims.61

In the instant case, petitioners, in their motion to dismiss, do not claim that the trial court is not properly vested by
law with jurisdiction to hear the subject controversy for, indeed, Civil Case No. 00-0264 for specific performance and
damages is one not capable of pecuniary estimation and is properly cognizable by the RTC of Lipa City. 62 What they
rather raise as grounds to question subject matter jurisdiction are the principles of lex loci celebrationis and lex
contractus, and the "state of the most significant relationship rule."

The Court finds the invocation of these grounds unsound.

Lex loci celebrationis relates to the "law of the place of the ceremony"63 or the law of the place where a contract is
made.64 The doctrine of lex contractus or lex loci contractus means the "law of the place where a contract is
executed or to be performed."65 It controls the nature, construction, and validity of the contract 66 and it may pertain to
the law voluntarily agreed upon by the parties or the law intended by them either expressly or implicitly. 67 Under the
"state of the most significant relationship rule," to ascertain what state law to apply to a dispute, the court should
determine which state has the most substantial connection to the occurrence and the parties. In a case involving a
contract, the court should consider where the contract was made, was negotiated, was to be performed, and the
domicile, place of business, or place of incorporation of the parties. 68 This rule takes into account several contacts
and evaluates them according to their relative importance with respect to the particular issue to be resolved. 69

Since these three principles in conflict of laws make reference to the law applicable to a dispute, they are rules
proper for the second phase, the choice of law. 70 They determine which state's law is to be applied in resolving the
substantive issues of a conflicts problem.71 Necessarily, as the only issue in this case is that of jurisdiction, choice-
of-law rules are not only inapplicable but also not yet called for.

Further, petitioners' premature invocation of choice-of-law rules is exposed by the fact that they have not yet pointed
out any conflict between the laws of Japan and ours. Before determining which law should apply, first there should
exist a conflict of laws situation requiring the application of the conflict of laws rules. 72 Also, when the law of a foreign
country is invoked to provide the proper rules for the solution of a case, the existence of such law must be pleaded
and proved.73

It should be noted that when a conflicts case, one involving a foreign element, is brought before a court or
administrative agency, there are three alternatives open to the latter in disposing of it: (1) dismiss the case, either
because of lack of jurisdiction or refusal to assume jurisdiction over the case; (2) assume jurisdiction over the case
and apply the internal law of the forum; or (3) assume jurisdiction over the case and take into account or apply the
law of some other State or States.74 The court’s power to hear cases and controversies is derived from the
Constitution and the laws. While it may choose to recognize laws of foreign nations, the court is not limited by
foreign sovereign law short of treaties or other formal agreements, even in matters regarding rights provided by
foreign sovereigns.75
Neither can the other ground raised, forum non conveniens,76 be used to deprive the trial court of its jurisdiction
herein. First, it is not a proper basis for a motion to dismiss because Section 1, Rule 16 of the Rules of Court does
not include it as a ground.77 Second, whether a suit should be entertained or dismissed on the basis of the said
doctrine depends largely upon the facts of the particular case and is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial
court.78 In this case, the RTC decided to assume jurisdiction. Third, the propriety of dismissing a case based on this
principle requires a factual determination; hence, this conflicts principle is more properly considered a matter of
defense.79

Accordingly, since the RTC is vested by law with the power to entertain and hear the civil case filed by respondent
and the grounds raised by petitioners to assail that jurisdiction are inappropriate, the trial and appellate courts
correctly denied the petitioners’ motion to dismiss.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED.

28.) G.R. No. 162894             February 26, 2008

RAYTHEON INTERNATIONAL, INC., petitioner,

vs.
STOCKTON W. ROUZIE, JR., respondent.

DECISION

TINGA, J.:

Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure which
seeks the reversal of the Decision1 and Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 67001 and the
dismissal of the civil case filed by respondent against petitioner with the trial court.

As culled from the records of the case, the following antecedents appear:

Sometime in 1990, Brand Marine Services, Inc. (BMSI), a corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of
the State of Connecticut, United States of America, and respondent Stockton W. Rouzie, Jr., an American citizen,
entered into a contract whereby BMSI hired respondent as its representative to negotiate the sale of services in
several government projects in the Philippines for an agreed remuneration of 10% of the gross receipts. On 11
March 1992, respondent secured a service contract with the Republic of the Philippines on behalf of BMSI for the
dredging of rivers affected by the Mt. Pinatubo eruption and mudflows. 3

On 16 July 1994, respondent filed before the Arbitration Branch of the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC) a suit against BMSI and Rust International, Inc. (RUST), Rodney C. Gilbert and Walter G. Browning for
alleged nonpayment of commissions, illegal termination and breach of employment contract. 4 On 28 September
1995, Labor Arbiter Pablo C. Espiritu, Jr. rendered judgment ordering BMSI and RUST to pay respondent’s money
claims.5 Upon appeal by BMSI, the NLRC reversed the decision of the Labor Arbiter and dismissed respondent’s
complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.6 Respondent elevated the case to this Court but was dismissed in a
Resolution dated 26 November 1997. The Resolution became final and executory on 09 November 1998.

On 8 January 1999, respondent, then a resident of La Union, instituted an action for damages before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Bauang, La Union. The Complaint, 7 docketed as Civil Case No. 1192-BG, named as defendants
herein petitioner Raytheon International, Inc. as well as BMSI and RUST, the two corporations impleaded in the
earlier labor case. The complaint essentially reiterated the allegations in the labor case that BMSI verbally employed
respondent to negotiate the sale of services in government projects and that respondent was not paid the
commissions due him from the Pinatubo dredging project which he secured on behalf of BMSI. The complaint also
averred that BMSI and RUST as well as petitioner itself had combined and functioned as one company.

In its Answer,8 petitioner alleged that contrary to respondent’s claim, it was a foreign corporation duly licensed to do
business in the Philippines and denied entering into any arrangement with respondent or paying the latter any sum
of money. Petitioner also denied combining with BMSI and RUST for the purpose of assuming the alleged obligation
of the said companies.9 Petitioner also referred to the NLRC decision which disclosed that per the written agreement
between respondent and BMSI and RUST, denominated as "Special Sales Representative Agreement," the rights
and obligations of the parties shall be governed by the laws of the State of Connecticut. 10 Petitioner sought the
dismissal of the complaint on grounds of failure to state a cause of action and forum non conveniens and prayed for
damages by way of compulsory counterclaim.11

On 18 May 1999, petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion for Preliminary Hearing Based on Affirmative Defenses and for
Summary Judgment12 seeking the dismissal of the complaint on grounds of forum non conveniens and failure to
state a cause of action. Respondent opposed the same. Pending the resolution of the omnibus motion, the
deposition of Walter Browning was taken before the Philippine Consulate General in Chicago. 13

In an Order14 dated 13 September 2000, the RTC denied petitioner’s omnibus motion. The trial court held that the
factual allegations in the complaint, assuming the same to be admitted, were sufficient for the trial court to render a
valid judgment thereon. It also ruled that the principle of forum non conveniens was inapplicable because the trial
court could enforce judgment on petitioner, it being a foreign corporation licensed to do business in the Philippines. 15

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration 16 of the order, which motion was opposed by respondent. 17 In an Order
dated 31 July 2001,18 the trial court denied petitioner’s motion. Thus, it filed a Rule 65 Petition 19 with the Court of
Appeals praying for the issuance of a writ of certiorari and a writ of injunction to set aside the twin orders of the trial
court dated 13 September 2000 and 31 July 2001 and to enjoin the trial court from conducting further proceedings. 20

On 28 August 2003, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed Decision 21 denying the petition for certiorari for lack
of merit. It also denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration in the assailed Resolution issued on 10 March 2004. 22

The appellate court held that although the trial court should not have confined itself to the allegations in the
complaint and should have also considered evidence aliunde in resolving petitioner’s omnibus motion, it found the
evidence presented by petitioner, that is, the deposition of Walter Browning, insufficient for purposes of determining
whether the complaint failed to state a cause of action. The appellate court also stated that it could not rule one way
or the other on the issue of whether the corporations, including petitioner, named as defendants in the case had
indeed merged together based solely on the evidence presented by respondent. Thus, it held that the issue should
be threshed out during trial.23 Moreover, the appellate court deferred to the discretion of the trial court when the latter
decided not to desist from assuming jurisdiction on the ground of the inapplicability of the principle of forum non
conveniens.

Hence, this petition raising the following issues:

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN REFUSING TO DISMISS THE COMPLAINT
FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST RAYTHEON INTERNATIONAL, INC.

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN REFUSING TO DISMISS THE COMPLAINT
ON THE GROUND OF FORUM NON CONVENIENS.24

Incidentally, respondent failed to file a comment despite repeated notices. The Ceferino Padua Law Office, counsel
on record for respondent, manifested that the lawyer handling the case, Atty. Rogelio Karagdag, had severed
relations with the law firm even before the filing of the instant petition and that it could no longer find the
whereabouts of Atty. Karagdag or of respondent despite diligent efforts. In a Resolution 25 dated 20 November 2006,
the Court resolved to dispense with the filing of a comment.

The instant petition lacks merit.

Petitioner mainly asserts that the written contract between respondent and BMSI included a valid choice of law
clause, that is, that the contract shall be governed by the laws of the State of Connecticut. It also mentions the
presence of foreign elements in the dispute – namely, the parties and witnesses involved are American corporations
and citizens and the evidence to be presented is located outside the Philippines – that renders our local courts
inconvenient forums. Petitioner theorizes that the foreign elements of the dispute necessitate the immediate
application of the doctrine of forum non conveniens.

Recently in Hasegawa v. Kitamura,26 the Court outlined three consecutive phases involved in judicial resolution of
conflicts-of-laws problems, namely: jurisdiction, choice of law, and recognition and enforcement of judgments. Thus,
in the instances27 where the Court held that the local judicial machinery was adequate to resolve controversies with
a foreign element, the following requisites had to be proved: (1) that the Philippine Court is one to which the parties
may conveniently resort; (2) that the Philippine Court is in a position to make an intelligent decision as to the law and
the facts; and (3) that the Philippine Court has or is likely to have the power to enforce its decision. 28

On the matter of jurisdiction over a conflicts-of-laws problem where the case is filed in a Philippine court and where
the court has jurisdiction over the subject matter, the parties and the res, it may or can proceed to try the case even
if the rules of conflict-of-laws or the convenience of the parties point to a foreign forum. This is an exercise of
sovereign prerogative of the country where the case is filed. 29
Jurisdiction over the nature and subject matter of an action is conferred by the Constitution and the law 30 and by the
material allegations in the complaint, irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover all or some of
the claims or reliefs sought therein. 31 Civil Case No. 1192-BG is an action for damages arising from an alleged
breach of contract. Undoubtedly, the nature of the action and the amount of damages prayed are within the
jurisdiction of the RTC.

As regards jurisdiction over the parties, the trial court acquired jurisdiction over herein respondent (as party plaintiff)
upon the filing of the complaint. On the other hand, jurisdiction over the person of petitioner (as party defendant)
was acquired by its voluntary appearance in court.32

That the subject contract included a stipulation that the same shall be governed by the laws of the State of
Connecticut does not suggest that the Philippine courts, or any other foreign tribunal for that matter, are
precluded from hearing the civil action. Jurisdiction and choice of law are two distinct concepts.
Jurisdiction considers whether it is fair to cause a defendant to travel to this state; choice of law asks the
further question whether the application of a substantive law which will determine the merits of the case is
fair to both parties.33 The choice of law stipulation will become relevant only when the substantive issues of
the instant case develop, that is, after hearing on the merits proceeds before the trial court.

Under the doctrine of forum non conveniens, a court, in conflicts-of-laws cases, may refuse impositions on
its jurisdiction where it is not the most "convenient" or available forum and the parties are not precluded
from seeking remedies elsewhere.34 Petitioner’s averments of the foreign elements in the instant case are not
sufficient to oust the trial court of its jurisdiction over Civil Case No. No. 1192-BG and the parties involved.

Moreover, the propriety of dismissing a case based on the principle of forum non conveniens requires a factual
determination; hence, it is more properly considered as a matter of defense. While it is within the discretion of the
trial court to abstain from assuming jurisdiction on this ground, it should do so only after vital facts are established,
to determine whether special circumstances require the court’s desistance. 35

Finding no grave abuse of discretion on the trial court, the Court of Appeals respected its conclusion that it can
assume jurisdiction over the dispute notwithstanding its foreign elements. In the same manner, the Court defers to
the sound discretion of the lower courts because their findings are binding on this Court.

Petitioner also contends that the complaint in Civil Case No. 1192-BG failed to state a cause of action against
petitioner. Failure to state a cause of action refers to the insufficiency of allegation in the pleading. 36 As a general
rule, the elementary test for failure to state a cause of action is whether the complaint alleges facts which if true
would justify the relief demanded.37

The complaint alleged that petitioner had combined with BMSI and RUST to function as one company. Petitioner
contends that the deposition of Walter Browning rebutted this allegation. On this score, the resolution of the Court of
Appeals is instructive, thus:

x x x Our examination of the deposition of Mr. Walter Browning as well as other documents produced in the
hearing shows that these evidence aliunde are not quite sufficient for us to mete a ruling that the complaint
fails to state a cause of action.

Annexes "A" to "E" by themselves are not substantial, convincing and conclusive proofs that Raytheon
Engineers and Constructors, Inc. (REC) assumed the warranty obligations of defendant Rust International in
the Makar Port Project in General Santos City, after Rust International ceased to exist after being absorbed
by REC. Other documents already submitted in evidence are likewise meager to preponderantly conclude
that Raytheon International, Inc., Rust International[,] Inc. and Brand Marine Service, Inc. have combined
into one company, so much so that Raytheon International, Inc., the surviving company (if at all) may be
held liable for the obligation of BMSI to respondent Rouzie for unpaid commissions. Neither these
documents clearly speak otherwise. 38

As correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals, the question of whether petitioner, BMSI and RUST merged
together requires the presentation of further evidence, which only a full-blown trial on the merits can afford.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is DENIED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 67001 are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
 29.) [ G.R. No. 249011, March 15, 2021 ]

CRISTITA ANABAN, CRISPINA ANABAN, PUREZA ANABAN, CRESENCIA ANABAN-WALANG, AND ROSITA
ANABAN-BARISTO, PETITIONERS, VS. BETTY ANABAN-ALFILER, MERCEDES ANABAN, AND MARCELO
ANABAN, RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

LAZARO-JAVIER, J.:

The Case

This petition for review on certiorari1 seeks to reverse and set aside the Decision2 dated July 24, 2019 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 154216 affirming the nullity of the bigamous marriage between Pedrito Anaban
(Pedrito) and Pepang Guilabo (Pepang) and petitioners Cristita Anaban, Crispina Anaban, Pureza Anaban,
Cresencia Anaban-Walang, and Rosita Anaban-Baristo's status as illegitimate children of Pedrito and must inherit
only as such.

Antecedents

In 1942, Pedrito Anaban (Pedrito) and Virginia Erasmo (Virginia) got married in accordance with the native customs
of the Ibaloi Tribe to which they both belonged. They had three (3) children, i.e., respondents Betty Anaban-Alfiler,
Mercedes Anaban, and Marcelo Anaban.3

In 1947, however, the council of tribe elders took notice of Virginia's insanity and based thereon approved the
couple's divorce and allowed Pedrito to remarry.4

In 1952, Pedrito got married to fellow Ibaloi Pepang still in accordance with their tribe's customs. They begot eight
(8) children – Lardi Anaban, Teodoro Anaban, Monina Anaban and respondents Cristita Anaban, Crispina Anaban,
Pureza Anaban, Cresencia Anaban-Walang, and Rosita Anaban-Baristo.5

Upon Pedrito's death on September 2, 2004, respondents sued for summary settlement or judicial partition of the
intestate estate of their father Pedrito.6 They named as respondents their half-siblings, petitioners Cristita Anaban,
Crispina Anaban, Pureza Anaban, Cresencia Anaban-Walang, and Rosita Anaban-Baristo.

Respondents averred that during the marriage of their father Pedrito to their mother Virginia, Pedrito acquired from
his father Pedro Anaban a portion of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-14574. But the new
certificate of title issued to Pedrito reflected that he was married to petitioners' mother Pepang. Although in truth, his
marriage with their mother Virginia was not yet legally dissolved. Thus, petitioners are actually the illegitimate
children of their father Pedrito.7

Petitioners, on the other hand, argued that they are the legitimate children of their father Pedrito with their mother
Pepang. Pedrito and respondents' mother Virginia were married in accordance with the Ibaloi Tribe customs and
their marriage was also dissolved in accordance with Ibaloi tribe customs and traditions. Thereafter, Pedrito married
their (petitioners') mother Pepang similarly in accord with the Ibaloi customs. Since the celebration of marriage
pursuant to a tribe's customs was recognized under the Old Civil Code of the Philippines, then its dissolution in
accordance with that tribe's customs must also be recognized. Thus, both the marriage and the subsequent divorce
between Pedrito and Virginia are valid. Consequently, the marriage of their parents must also be deemed valid.8

Ruling of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC)

By Decision9 dated September 28, 2015, the MCTC ruled that, first, the marriage between Pedrito and Virginia was
validly dissolved in accordance with the customs of the Ibaloi tribe; and second, petitioners are the legitimate
children of Pedrito who must succeed in equal proportion with respondents, viz.:
WHEREFORE, from the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered as follows by declaring and ordering that:

1. The entire intestate estate of Pedrito Anaban consists of his exclusive property described as the parcel of
land with an area of 1.8 hectares located at Calot, Sablan, Benguet and registered in the name of Pedrito
Anaban under TCT No. T-14575;

2. Petitioners Betty Anaban-Alfiler, Mercedes Anaban and Marcelo (Billy) Anaban and respondents Teodoro
Anaban, Cristita Anaban, Crispina Anaban, Pureza Anaban, Monina Anaban, Crese[n]cia (Esterlita)
Anaban-Walang and Rosita Anaban-Baristo are the true and lawful heirs of the late Pedrito Anaban and
entitled to inherit the intestate estate left [by] the said deceased;

3. Said true and lawful heirs of the late Pedrito Anaban shall divide the subject parcel of land covered by
TCT No. T-14575 into ten equal shares of 1,800 square meters each;

4. Within 30 days from [the] finality of this Decision, Administratrix Betty Alfiler is ordered to prepare a project
of partition of the intestate estate of the late Pedrito Anaban for [purposes] of distribution and delivery to the
heirs their corresponding shares, the identification of which should be mutually agreed by the heirs. In the
event that identification of the location of the specific shares will not be agreed upon mutually, the same
shall be identified through draw lots; and

5. Administratrix Betty Alfiler is likewise hereby ordered to render her final accounting of her administration
of the intestate estate of the late Pedrito Anaban also within 30 days from finality of this Decision.

SO ORDERED.10

It held that since the tribe elders approved Pedrito and Virginia's divorce. Subsequently, the tribe elders also
approved Pedrito and Pepang's marriage in accordance with the Ibaloi customs. Thus, Pedrito's marriage with
Pepang was as valid as his marriage to Virginia. Petitioners, therefore, are also Pedrito's legitimate children.11

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)

On appeal, RTC-Branch 10, La Trinidad, Benguet, by Decision12 dated October 10, 2017, declared as bigamous
the marriage of Pedrito and Pepang, thus:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the appeal is partially GRANTED.

The Decision of the court a quo declaring that the intestate estate of the decedent consists only of that parcel of
land with an area of 18,574 square meters, registered in the name of the decedent under Transfer Certificate of Title
No. T-14575 is hereby AFFIRMED.

The Court finds the marriage between the decedent, PEDRITO ANABAN and Pepang Guilabo bigamous and VOID.
Respondent-appellees are, therefore, illegitimate. Necessarily, Petitioner-appellants, as legitimate children, shall
equally divide the entire one-half of their father's estate, while Respondent-appellees, as illegitimate children, shall
equally divide the other half thereof. Thus, assuming that no creditor's claim may be deducted upon finality of this
judgment, each of Petitioner-appellants shall be entitled to a share of 3,095.66 square meters. The other one-half
remaining portion shall be apportioned equally between and among Respondent-appellees. Thus, also assuming
that no creditor's claim may be deducted, Respondent-appellees will get a share of 1,326.71 square meters each
from their father's estate. The Decision of the court a quo stating the contrary is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE.

Prior to distribution, the court a quo should ensure that the required publication of the notice of hearing of the
petition and the notice to creditors be complied with and the claims of creditors, if any, are disposed of.

SO ORDERED.13

It held that customs and traditions cannot supplant existing laws unless specifically provided under said laws. Under
the Civil Code, a subsisting marriage may be dissolved only by death of either spouse or when the marriage is
annulled or declared void. True, Article 78 of the old Civil Code recognizes the validity of marriages performed in
accordance with the couple's customs, rites, or practices, but this recognition is limited to the solemnization of
marriage and does not extend to its dissolution. Thus, Pedrito's purported divorce from Virginia cannot be legally
recognized. It follows, therefore, that Pedrito's marriage to Pepang was bigamous, hence, void. In the eyes of the
law, his marriage to Virginia subsisted. Consequently, petitioners are illegitimate children of Pedrito.14

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

By its assailed Decision15 dated July 24, 2019, the Court of Appeals affirmed.

The Court of Appeals ruled that Article 78 of the old Civil Code was unequivocal – it only referred to celebration of
marriage. There was nothing therein implying that the framers also intended to include the validity of divorce
decreed in accordance with non-Christian rites or customs. As the statute is clear, its literal meaning must be
applied without attempt at any further interpretation.16

More, Section 8, Rule VI of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of Republic Act No. 8371 (RA 8371),
otherwise known as the Indigenous People's Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA) also limits the State's recognition of
marriages to those solemnized pursuant to the non-Christian's rites and customs. It does not mention anything
about the State recognition of dissolution of marriages in accordance with non-Christian practices.17

It is true that the State has permitted divorce between Muslim Filipinos after the enactment of the Code of Muslim
Personal Laws; but not divorce in other local tribes.18

The Court of Appeals opined that while it commiserated with the plight of petitioners and the rest of those non-
Christians who contracted subsequent marriages, honestly believing that their previous marriages had already been
dissolved by a divorce decree in accordance with their customs, the court cannot do anything as the matter is for the
exclusive consideration of the legislature and not of the judiciary. 19

The Present Petition

Petitioners now pray that the disposition of the Court of Appeals be reversed and set aside. They maintain that
Pedrito’s marriage with Virginia had already been legally dissolved before he got married to their mother Pepang. As
marriages solemnized in accordance with a tribe's customs and rites are recognized by the State, the subsequent
dissolution of these marriages in accordance with the same customs and rites must also be recognized.20

Admittedly, Article 78 did not expressly state that marriages may be dissolved according to customs, rites, or
practices of non-Christians, but it cannot be denied that the framers of the law intended to recognize all the existing
customs, rites, or practices of non-Christians, for how else would a marriage solemnized in accordance with non-
Christian's customs, rites, or practices be dissolved if not in also accordance with the same customs, rites, or
practices?21

The Court of Appeals also failed to give due attention to the IPRA. Its passage has been the very legal basis of the
recognition of customary laws and practices of the indigenous people (IPs) and indigenous cultural communities
(ICCs). It is a policy of the State to maintain the cultural integrity of the ICCs and IPs.22

This is precisely the reason why the Philippine Statistics Authority (PSA) now applies Administrative Order No. 3
(AO 3), Series of 2004 to govern the procedures and guidelines for the effective civil registration, among others, of
births, marriages, dissolution of marriages, and other civil concerns of the ICCs and IPs. It defines dissolution of
marriage among IPs as the termination of marriage per ruling of the council of elders for causes sanctioned by
established customary laws or practices after exhausting all possible means of reconciliation between the couple.
This was what happened to the marriage of Pedrito and Virginia. The Ibaloi council of elders decreed their
separation and thereafter allowed their father to marry their mother.23

In their Opposition/Motion to Deny Due Course24 dated October 28, 2019, respondents pray that the petition be
denied due course on ground that petitioners failed to furnish their (respondents) counsel with a copy of the petition.
Petitioners only sent a copy of the petition to them, not their counsel in violation of Section 5, Rule 45 of the Revised
Rules of Court and of established jurisprudence stating that service must be made to counsel if the adverse party is
represented by one. They were duly represented by counsel, hence, service of the petition should have been made
on their counsel.

The State, on the other hand, through Assistant Solicitor General Rex Bernardo L. Pascual, Senior State Solicitor
Joel N. Villaseran, and State Solicitor Soleil C. Flores, avers25 that the marriage between Pedrito and Pepang is
void. Customs and traditions cannot be made to apply over and above existing laws unless otherwise allowed by
these laws. The old civil code which was in effect at the time Pedrito and Pepang got married simply stated that
marriages may be performed in accordance with the parties' customs, rites, or practices. It did not state that
marriages may be dissolved according to these customs, rites, and practices. Nothing therein implied that the
lawmakers intended to allow as well securing a divorce in accordance with tribal customs, rites, or practices.26

More, customs must be proven as a fact. Here, petitioners failed to sufficiently prove their specific customs, if any,
governing divorce. They did not present evidence that conclusively establish that Pedrito's purported divorce from
Virginia was in accord with their customs. They similarly failed to present any ruling or decision rendered by the
council of elders supposedly approving the dissolution of Pedrito's marriage with Virginia. Further, they failed to
prove that Pedrito and Virginia complied with the required rituals for completion of the divorce process. In fine, it
cannot be safely assumed that Pedrito's marriage with Virginia was validly terminated.27

Issue

Is Pedrito Anaban's divorce from Virginia Erasmo claimed to have been decreed in accordance with the Ibaloi
customs be recognized under our laws?

Ruling

We answer in the negative.

At the threshold, we emphasize that the action below is for partition of Pedrito's estate. In determining who should
succeed to the estate, the court may pass upon the validity of the subsequent marriage between Pedrito and
Pepang. Thus, in De Castro v. Assidao-De Castro,28 the Court decreed:

However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute
nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child,
settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the
validity of marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question the same so long as it is essential to the
determination of the case. This is without prejudice to any issue that may arise in the case. When such need arises,
a final judgment of declaration of nullity is necessary even if the purpose is other than to remarry. The clause "on the
basis of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void" in Article 40 of the Family Code connotes that such
final judgment need not be obtained only for purpose of remarriage.

Likewise, in Nicdao Cariño v. Yee Cariño, the Court ruled that it is clothed with sufficient authority to pass upon the
validity of two marriages despite the main case being a claim for death benefits. Reiterating Niñal, we held that the
Court may pass upon the validity of a marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question the validity of said
marriage, so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. However, evidence must be adduced,
testimonial or documentary, to prove the existence of grounds rendering such a marriage an absolute nullity.
(Empahsis supplied)

Here, there is no dispute that Pedrito was first married to Virginia, although petitioners assert this marriage was later
on validly dissolved by the divorce decree handed down by the Ibaloi council of elders which consequently allowed
Pedrito to remarry.

The question now comes to fore: can the divorce granted under Ibaloi customs and practices be legally recognized
as to make Pedrito's subsequent marriage to Pepang as valid.

All of the courts below resolved the validity of the so-called divorce between Pedrito and Virginia through the lens of
the old Civil Code. But, in reality, when Pedrito and Virginia got married and even when they later on supposedly
divorced, the old Civil Code was not yet in effect. For it took effect on June 18, 1949, or two (2) years after the
divorce decree was purportedly handed down by the Ibaloi council of elders. The law in effect prior thereto was still
the Spanish Civil Code of 1889, Article 5 of which stated:29

Article 5. Laws are abrogated only by other subsequent laws, and the disuse or any custom or practice to the
contrary shall not prevail against their observance. (Emphasis supplied)

This was the equivalent of Article 11 of the old Civil Code which provides that customs which are contrary to law,
public order or public policy shall not be countenanced.

For purposes of determining whether divorce was contrary to law, public order or public policy at the time Pedrito
and Virginia allegedly obtained their own divorce, we trace back the history of divorce or dissolution of marriage
starting from the Spanish regime.

During the Spanish colonization, Las Siete Partidas was passed which only allowed relative divorce or what is
known now as legal separation. This allowed spouses to be free of all marital obligations while their marriage
subsists in the eyes of the law. In 1917, however, Las Siete Partidas was repealed by Act No. 271030 which took
effect on March 11, 1917. Section 1 of Act No. 2710 reads:

Section 1. A petition for divorce can only be filed for adultery on the part of the wife or concubinage on the part of
the husband, committed in any of the forms described in article four hundred and thirty-seven of the Penal Code.

Divorce, then, can be granted only on two (2) grounds, i.e., adultery and concubinage. This was the prevailing law
when Pedrito and Virginia got married in 1942. In 1943, however, during the Japanese occupation, Act No. 2710
was abolished and Executive Order No. 141 (EO 141) was enacted and took effect on March 25, 1943.

Under EO 141, absolute divorce may be granted on these grounds: (a) adultery and concubinage; (b) attempt on
the life of one spouse by the other; (c) a subsequent marriage by either party before the previous one was
dissolved; (d) loathsome contagious diseases contracted by either spouse; (e) incurable insanity; (f) impotency; (g)
repeated bodily violence by one against the other; (h) intentional or unjustified desertion continuously for at least
one year; (i) unexplained absence from the last conjugal abode continuously for at least three years; and (j) slander
by deed or gross insult by one spouse against the other.

Only a little over a year, however, after the Americans had taken over the Japanese as colonizers again of the
Philippines, EO 141 became ineffective and Act No. 2710, which allowed divorce on ground of concubinage and
adultery, was once again reinstated. This was the prevailing law when Pedrito and Virginia were granted divorce by
the Ibaloi council of elders in 1947.

Thus, in 1947, only two (2) grounds were accepted for divorce, i.e., adultery and concubinage. Neither was the
reason for Pedrito and Virginia's divorce. The Ibaloi council of elders granted the divorce on ground of Virginia's
alleged insanity. The divorce, therefore, is contrary to law, hence, cannot be recognized.

The issue of whether divorce based on customs and practices can be legally recognized during the effectivity of Act
No. 2710 has been resolved by the Court as early as 1933 in People v. Bitdu.31 The Court held that Mora Bitdu's
divorce from Moro Halid in accordance with the Mohammedan customs cannot be recognized. For divorce cannot
be had except in that court upon which the state has conferred jurisdiction, and then only for those causes and with
those formalities which the state has, by statute, prescribed. The Court explained:

There is little to add to the well considered decision of the trial judge. It seems to us unnecessary to determine
whether or not the divorce in question was granted in accordance with the Mohammedan religious practices, as to
which there seems to exist considerable uncertainty, because in our view of the case a valid divorce can be granted
only by the courts and for the reasons specified in Act No. 2710. It is not claimed that the appellant was divorced
from her first husband in accordance with said Act.

In the case of Francisco vs. Tayao (50 Phil., 42), it was held that in the Philippines the causes for divorce are
prescribed by statute or Act No. 2710 that (of adultery on the part of the) wife or concubinage on the part of the
husband.
In the recent decision of People vs. Bituanan (Moro), (56 Phil., 23), where the defendant and a Moro woman were
married by a datu according to Moro customs and usages and afterwards divorced by the datu according to the
same customs and usages, it was held that the marriage performed according to the rites of the Mohammedan
religion was valid, and assumed, for the purpose of that case, that the defendant and his wife were not legally
divorced.

Section 25 of the Marriage Law (Act No. 3613) provides that marriages between Mohammedans may be performed
in accordance with the rites or practice of their religion, but there is no provision of law which authorizes the granting
of divorces in accordance with the rites or practices of their religion.

A divorce cannot be had except in that court upon which the state has conferred jurisdiction, and then only for those
causes and with those formalities which the state has by statute prescribed (19 C.J., 19).

It is conceded in all jurisdictions that public policy, good morals, and the interests of society require that the marriage
relation should be sounded with every safeguard and its severance allowed only in the manner prescribed and for
the causes specified by law. And the parties can waive nothing essential to the validity of the proceedings (19 C.J.,
20).

With respect to the contention that the appellant acted in good faith in contracting second marriage, believing that
she had been validly divorced from her first husband, it is sufficient to say that everyone is presumed to know the
law, and the fact that one does not know that is act constitutes a violation of the law does not exempt him from the
consequences thereof. x x x (Emphasis supplied)

As the trial court in Bitdu held, the laws governing marriage and its incidents are moral in nature and as such they
are laws relating to public policy. The habits and customs of a people, the dogmas and doctrines of a religion cannot
be superior to or have precedence over laws relating to public policy, because as stated above laws relating to
marriage and its incidents are normal in nature and as such they affect public policy. This holds true even up to this
time.

Since there was no legal and valid ground for the divorce of Pedrito and Virginia, in the eyes of the law, they were
still married and their marriage was not dissolved as to permit Pedrito to remarry. Pedrito's subsequent marriage to
petitioners' mother Pepang, therefore, is void for being bigamous. Verily, the RTC and the Court of Appeals did not
err when they ruled so and declared petitioners as Pedrito's illegitimate children.

Petitioners insists, however, that since the old Civil Code and the IPRA recognize customs in the solemnization of
marriage, the same should be applied in cases of dissolution as marriage. But, as discussed, customs which are
contrary to law, public policy and public order cannot be recognized.

Also, even assuming that the old Civil Code was applicable in the present case, the Court would arrive at the same
conclusion. Article 78 of the old Civil Code provided:

Article 78. Marriages between Mohammedans or pagans who live in the non-Christian provinces may be performed
in accordance with their customs, rites or practices. No marriage license or formal requisites shall be necessary. Nor
shall the persons solemnizing these marriages be obliged to comply with Article 92.

x x x           x x x          x x x

Section 8, Rule 6 of the IRR of IPRA is similarly worded:

Section 8. Recognition of Customary Laws and Practices Governing Civil Relations. Marriage as an inviolable social
institution shall be protected. Marriages performed in accordance with customary laws, rites, traditions and practices
shall be recognized as valid. As proof of marriage, the testimony of authorized community elders or authorities of
traditional sociopolitical structures shall be recognized as evidence of marriage for purposes of registration. x x x

Clearly, both the old Civil Code and the IPRA-IRR provisions limited the State recognition to "marriages performed"
in accordance with customary laws, rites, traditions, and practices. There is no mention of the recognition of
dissolution of marriage in accordance with the IP's customs.
On this score, we emphasize that Muslim customs, rites, and practices are the only non-Christian customary law
recognized by the State through the enactment of Presidential Decree No. 1083 otherwise known as the Code of
Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines.32 The same in fact bears an entire chapter exclusively dedicated to
divorce. Notably, its applicability clause states:

Article 13. Application.

(1) The provisions of this Title shall apply to marriage and divorce wherein both parties are Muslims, or
wherein only the male party is a Muslim and the marriage is solemnized in accordance with Muslim law or
this Code in any part of the Philippines.

At present, there is no similar law explicitly recognizing the matrimonial customs, rites, and practices of the Ibaloi
Tribe.ℒαwρhi ৷

Even if we are to assume that the constitutional and statutory right to cultural integrity includes recognition of
indigenous divorce or any other form of indigenous dissolution of marriages, the record is bereft of evidence that: (i)
the culture of the Ibaloi recognizes divorce or any other form of dissolution of marriage; (ii) this recognition is a
central aspect of their cultural integrity and not merely peripheral to it; (iii) this recognition has been a central cultural
practice since time immemorial and lasted to this day in its modern forms; and (iv) the contents of and procedures
for this central cultural practice, if any.

The lead government agency for this determination – in the words of the learned counsel of the State, the proof of
customary law as a fact – is the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples. But nothing from their end could
answer how, why, and when the dissolution of marriages is central to the right to cultural integrity and what it means
to say so. It would, therefore, be speculative at this point to link this right to cultural integrity to the dissolution of
marriages between members of the IP communities, sans any supporting evidence.

Lastly, petitioners invoke PSA's AO 3, series of 2004 governing the procedures and guidelines for civil registration of
births, marriages, dissolution of marriages, and other civil concerns of the ICCs and IPs. According to petitioners,
AO 3 defines dissolution of marriage among IPs as the termination of marriage per ruling of the council of elders for
causes sanctioned by established customary law or practice after exhausting all possible means of reconciliation
between the couple.

But, AO 3 only took effect in 2004, fifty-seven (57) years after the divorce was supposedly granted by the Ibaloi
council of elders to Pedrito and Virginia. It cannot be applied retroactively, but only prospectively.

Besides, AO 3 is only a procedural avenue to recognize divorce or any other form of dissolution of marriage where
the substantive law already recognizes such change in a person's civil status. AO 3 cannot confer substantive rights
because the role of the PSA and now the National Statistics Office is to record the civil status of persons but not to
issue laws on how to obtain or confer status.

All told, we hold that the Court of Appeals did not err in pronouncing that the marriage of Pedrito and Virginia was
not legally dissolved. As a consequence, Pedrito's subsequent marriage to Pepang was bigamous, thus, void from
the beginning. The status of petitioners as illegitimate children of Pedrito and their heirship as such insofar as
Pedrito's estate is concerned can no longer be questioned.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is DENIED and the Decision dated July 24, 2019 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 154216 is AFFIRMED.
30.) G.R. No. L-20089      December 26, 1964

BEATRIZ P. WASSMER, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
FRANCISCO X. VELEZ, defendant-appellant.

Jalandoni & Jamir for defendant-appellant.

Samson S. Alcantara for plaintiff-appellee.

BENGZON, J.P., J.:

The facts that culminated in this case started with dreams and hopes, followed by appropriate planning and serious
endeavors, but terminated in frustration and, what is worse, complete public humiliation.

Francisco X. Velez and Beatriz P. Wassmer, following their mutual promise of love, decided to get married and set
September 4, 1954 as the big day. On September 2, 1954 Velez left this note for his bride-to-be:

Dear Bet —

Will have to postpone wedding — My mother opposes it. Am leaving on the Convair today.

Please do not ask too many people about the reason why — That would only create a scandal.

Paquing

But the next day, September 3, he sent her the following telegram:

NOTHING CHANGED REST ASSURED RETURNING VERY SOON APOLOGIZE MAMA PAPA
LOVE .

PAKING

Thereafter Velez did not appear nor was he heard from again.

Sued by Beatriz for damages, Velez filed no answer and was declared in default. Plaintiff adduced evidence before
the clerk of court as commissioner, and on April 29, 1955, judgment was rendered ordering defendant to pay plaintiff
P2,000.00 as actual damages; P25,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages; P2,500.00 as attorney's fees; and the
costs.

On June 21, 1955 defendant filed a "petition for relief from orders, judgment and proceedings and motion for new
trial and reconsideration." Plaintiff moved to strike it cut. But the court, on August 2, 1955, ordered the parties and
their attorneys to appear before it on August 23, 1955 "to explore at this stage of the proceedings the possibility of
arriving at an amicable settlement." It added that should any of them fail to appear "the petition for relief and the
opposition thereto will be deemed submitted for resolution."

On August 23, 1955 defendant failed to appear before court. Instead, on the following day his counsel filed a motion
to defer for two weeks the resolution on defendants petition for relief. The counsel stated that he would confer with
defendant in Cagayan de Oro City — the latter's residence — on the possibility of an amicable element. The court
granted two weeks counted from August 25, 1955.

Plaintiff manifested on June 15, 1956 that the two weeks given by the court had expired on September 8, 1955 but
that defendant and his counsel had failed to appear.
Another chance for amicable settlement was given by the court in its order of July 6, 1956 calling the parties and
their attorneys to appear on July 13, 1956. This time. however, defendant's counsel informed the court that chances
of settling the case amicably were nil.

On July 20, 1956 the court issued an order denying defendant's aforesaid petition. Defendant has appealed to this
Court. In his petition of June 21, 1955 in the court a quo defendant alleged excusable negligence as ground to set
aside the judgment by default. Specifically, it was stated that defendant filed no answer in the belief that an
amicable settlement was being negotiated.

A petition for relief from judgment on grounds of fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence, must be duly
supported by an affidavit of merits stating facts constituting a valid defense. (Sec. 3, Rule 38, Rules of Court.)
Defendant's affidavit of merits attached to his petition of June 21, 1955 stated: "That he has a good and valid
defense against plaintiff's cause of action, his failure to marry the plaintiff as scheduled having been due to
fortuitous event and/or circumstances beyond his control." An affidavit of merits like this stating mere conclusions or
opinions instead of facts is not valid. (Cortes vs. Co Bun Kim, L-3926, Oct. 10, 1951; Vaswani vs. P. Tarrachand
Bros., L-15800, December 29, 1960.)

Defendant, however, would contend that the affidavit of merits was in fact unnecessary, or a mere surplusage,
because the judgment sought to be set aside was null and void, it having been based on evidence adduced before
the clerk of court. In Province of Pangasinan vs. Palisoc, L-16519, October 30, 1962, this Court pointed out that the
procedure of designating the clerk of court as commissioner to receive evidence is sanctioned by Rule 34 (now Rule
33) of the Rules of Court. Now as to defendant's consent to said procedure, the same did not have to be obtained
for he was declared in default and thus had no standing in court (Velez vs. Ramas, 40 Phil. 787; Alano vs. Court of
First Instance, L-14557, October 30, 1959).

In support of his "motion for new trial and reconsideration," defendant asserts that the judgment is contrary to law.
The reason given is that "there is no provision of the Civil Code authorizing" an action for breach of promise to
marry. Indeed, our ruling in Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals (L-14628, Sept. 30, 1960), as reiterated in Estopa vs.
Biansay (L-14733, Sept. 30, 1960), is that "mere breach of a promise to marry" is not an actionable wrong. We
pointed out that Congress deliberately eliminated from the draft of the new Civil Code the provisions that would have
it so.

It must not be overlooked, however, that the extent to which acts not contrary to law may be perpetrated with
impunity, is not limitless for Article 21 of said Code provides that "any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to
another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the
damage."

The record reveals that on August 23, 1954 plaintiff and defendant applied for a license to contract marriage, which
was subsequently issued (Exhs. A, A-1). Their wedding was set for September 4, 1954. Invitations were printed and
distributed to relatives, friends and acquaintances (Tsn., 5; Exh. C). The bride-to-be's trousseau, party drsrses and
other apparel for the important occasion were purchased (Tsn., 7-8). Dresses for the maid of honor and the flower
girl were prepared. A matrimonial bed, with accessories, was bought. Bridal showers were given and gifts received
(Tsn., 6; Exh. E). And then, with but two days before the wedding, defendant, who was then 28 years old,: simply
left a note for plaintiff stating: "Will have to postpone wedding — My mother opposes it ... " He enplaned to his home
city in Mindanao, and the next day, the day before the wedding, he wired plaintiff: "Nothing changed rest assured
returning soon." But he never returned and was never heard from again.

Surely this is not a case of mere breach of promise to marry. As stated, mere breach of promise to marry is not an
actionable wrong. But to formally set a wedding and go through all the above-described preparation and publicity,
only to walk out of it when the matrimony is about to be solemnized, is quite different. This is palpably and
unjustifiably contrary to good customs for which defendant must be held answerable in damages in accordance with
Article 21 aforesaid.

Defendant urges in his afore-stated petition that the damages awarded were excessive. No question is raised as to
the award of actual damages. What defendant would really assert hereunder is that the award of moral and
exemplary damages, in the amount of P25,000.00, should be totally eliminated.
Per express provision of Article 2219 (10) of the New Civil Code, moral damages are recoverable in the cases
mentioned in Article 21 of said Code. As to exemplary damages, defendant contends that the same could not be
adjudged against him because under Article 2232 of the New Civil Code the condition precedent is that "the
defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner." The argument is devoid of
merit as under the above-narrated circumstances of this case defendant clearly acted in a "wanton ... , reckless
[and] oppressive manner." This Court's opinion, however, is that considering the particular circumstances of this
case, P15,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages is deemed to be a reasonable award.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, with the above-indicated modification, the lower court's judgment is hereby affirmed,
with costs.
31.) G.R. No. L-18630      December 17, 1966

APOLONIO TANJANCO, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ARACELI SANTOS, respondents.

P. Carreon and G. O. Veneracion, Jr. for petitioner.

Antonio V. Bonoan for respondents.

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

Appeal from a decision of the Court of Appeals (in its Case No. 27210-R) revoking an order of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal (in Civil Case No. Q-4797) dismissing appellant's action for support and damages.

The essential allegations of the complaint are to the effect that, from December, 1957, the defendant (appellee
herein), Apolonio Tanjanco, courted the plaintiff, Araceli Santos, both being of adult age; that "defendant expressed
and professed his undying love and affection for plaintiff who also in due time reciprocated the tender feelings"; that
in consideration of defendant's promise of marriage plaintiff consented and acceded to defendant's pleas for carnal
knowledge; that regularly until December 1959, through his protestations of love and promises of marriage,
defendant succeeded in having carnal access to plaintiff, as a result of which the latter conceived a child; that due to
her pregnant condition, to avoid embarrassment and social humiliation, plaintiff had to resign her job as secretary in
IBM Philippines, Inc., where she was receiving P230.00 a month; that thereby plaintiff became unable to support
herself and her baby; that due to defendant's refusal to marry plaintiff, as promised, the latter suffered mental
anguish, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, and social humiliation. The prayer was for a
decree compelling the defendant to recognize the unborn child that plaintiff was bearing; to pay her not less than
P430.00 a month for her support and that of her baby, plus P100,000.00 in moral and exemplary damages, plus
P10,000.00 attorney's fees.

Upon defendant's motion to dismiss, the court of first instance dismissed the complaint for failure to state a cause of
action.

Plaintiff Santos duly appealed to the Court of Appeals, and the latter ultimately decided the case, holding with the
lower court that no cause of action was shown to compel recognition of a child as yet unborn, nor for its support, but
decreed that the complaint did state a cause of action for damages, premised on Article 21 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, prescribing as follows:

ART. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals,
good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.

The Court of Appeals, therefore, entered judgment setting aside the dismissal and directing the court of origin to
proceed with the case.

Defendant, in turn, appealed to this Court, pleading that actions for breach of a promise to marry are not permissible
in this jurisdiction, and invoking the rulings of this Court in Estopa vs. Piansay, L-14733, September 30,
1960; Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals, L-14628, January 29, 1962; and De Jesus vs. SyQuia, 58 Phil. 886.

We find this appeal meritorious.

In holding that the complaint stated a cause of action for damages, under Article 21 above mentioned, the Court of
Appeals relied upon and quoted from the memorandum submitted by the Code Commission to the Legislature in
1949 to support the original draft of the Civil Code. Referring to Article 23 of the draft (now Article 21 of the Code),
the Commission stated:

But the Code Commission has gone farther than the sphere of wrongs defined or determined by positive
law. Fully sensible that there are countless gaps in the statutes, which leave so many victims of moral
 wrongs helpless, even though they have actually suffered material and moral injury, the Commission has
deemed it necessary, in the interest of justice, to incorporate in the proposed Civil Code the following rule:

"ART. 23. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage."

An example will illustrate the purview of the foregoing norm: "A" seduces the nineteen-year old daughter of
"X". A promise of marriage either has not been made, or can not be proved. The girl becomes pregnant.
Under the present laws, there is no crime, as the girl is above eighteen years of age. Neither can any civil
action for breach of promise of marriage be filed. Therefore, though the grievous moral wrong has been
committed, and though the girl and her family have suffered incalculable moral damage, she and her parents
cannot bring any action for damages. But under the proposed article, she and her parents would have such
a right of action.

The Court of Appeals seems to have overlooked that the example set forth in the Code Commission's memorandum
refers to a tort upon a minor who has been seduced. The essential feature is seduction, that in law is more than
mere sexual intercourse, or a breach of a promise of marriage; it connotes essentially the idea of deceit, enticement,
superior power or abuse of confidence on the part of the seducer to which the woman has yielded (U.S. vs.
Buenaventura, 27 Phil. 121; U.S. vs. Arlante, 9 Phil. 595).

It has been ruled in the Buenaventura case (supra) that —

To constitute seduction there must in all cases be some sufficient promise or inducement and the woman
must yield because of the promise or other inducement. If she consents merely from carnal lust and the
intercourse is from mutual desire, there is no seduction (43 Cent. Dig. tit. Seduction, par. 56). She must be
induced to depart from the path of virtue by the use of some species of arts, persuasions and wiles, which
are calculated to have and do have that effect, and which result in her ultimately submitting her person to the
sexual embraces of her seducer (27 Phil. 123).

And in American Jurisprudence we find:

On the other hand, in an action by the woman, the enticement, persuasion or deception is the essence of
the injury; and a mere proof of intercourse is insufficient to warrant a recover.

Accordingly it is not seduction where the willingness arises out of sexual desire or curiosity of the female,
and the defendant merely affords her the needed opportunity for the commission of the act. It has been
emphasized that to allow a recovery in all such cases would tend to the demoralization of the female sex,
and would be a reward for unchastity by which a class of adventuresses would be swift to profit." (47 Am.
Jur. 662)

Bearing these principles in mind, let us examine the complaint. The material allegations there are as follows:

I. That the plaintiff is of legal age, single, and residing at 56 South E. Diliman, Quezon City, while defendant
is also of legal age, single and residing at 525 Padre Faura, Manila, where he may be served with
summons;

II. That the plaintiff and the defendant became acquainted with each other sometime in December, 1957 and
soon thereafter, the defendant started visiting and courting the plaintiff;

III. That the defendant's visits were regular and frequent and in due time the defendant expressed and
professed his undying love and affection for the plaintiff who also in due time reciprocated the tender
feelings;

IV. That in the course of their engagement, the plaintiff and the defendant as are wont of young people in
love had frequent outings and dates, became very close and intimate to each other and sometime in July,
1958, in consideration of the defendant's promises of marriage, the plaintiff consented and acceded to the
former's earnest and repeated pleas to have carnal knowledge with him;
 V. That subsequent thereto and regularly until about July, 1959 except for a short period in December, 1958
when the defendant was out of the country, the defendant through his protestations of love and promises of
marriage succeeded in having carnal knowledge with the plaintiff;

VI. That as a result of their intimate relationship, the plaintiff started conceiving which was confirmed by a
doctor sometime in July, 1959;

VII. That upon being certain of her pregnant condition, the plaintiff informed the defendant and pleaded with
him to make good his promises of marriage, but instead of honoring his promises and righting his wrong, the
defendant stopped and refrained from seeing the plaintiff since about July, 1959 has not visited the plaintiff
and to all intents and purposes has broken their engagement and his promises.

Over and above the partisan allegations, the facts stand out that for one whole year, from 1958 to 1959, the plaintiff-
appellee, a woman of adult age, maintained intimate sexual relations with appellant, with repeated acts of
intercourse. Such conduct is incompatible with the idea of seduction. Plainly there is here voluntariness and mutual
passion; for had the appellant been deceived, had she surrendered exclusively because of the deceit, artful
persuasions and wiles of the defendant, she would not have again yielded to his embraces, much less for one year,
without exacting early fulfillment of the alleged promises of marriage, and would have cut chart all sexual relations
upon finding that defendant did not intend to fulfill his promises. Hence, we conclude that no case is made under
Article 21 of the Civil Code, and no other cause of action being alleged, no error was committed by the Court of First
Instance in dismissing the complaint.

Of course, the dismissal must be understood as without prejudice to whatever actions may correspond to the child
of the plaintiff against the defendant-appellant, if any. On that point, this Court makes no pronouncement, since the
child's own rights are not here involved.

FOR THE FOREGOING REASONS, the decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and that of the Court of First
Instance is affirmed. No costs
32.) G.R. No. 97336 February 19, 1993

GASHEM SHOOKAT BAKSH, petitioner,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and MARILOU T. GONZALES, respondents.

Public Attorney's Office for petitioner.

Corleto R. Castro for private respondent.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

This is an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to review and set aside the Decision  of
1

the respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 24256 which affirmed in toto the 16 October 1939 Decision of
Branch 38 (Lingayen) of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pangasinan in Civil Case No. 16503. Presented is the
issue of whether or not damages may be recovered for a breach of promise to marry on the basis of Article 21 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines.

The antecedents of this case are not complicated:

On 27 October 1987, private respondent, without the assistance of counsel, filed with the aforesaid trial court a
complaint  for damages against the petitioner for the alleged violation of their agreement to get married. She alleges
2

in said complaint that: she is twenty-two (22) years old, single, Filipino and a pretty lass of good moral character and
reputation duly respected in her community; petitioner, on the other hand, is an Iranian citizen residing at the
Lozano Apartments, Guilig, Dagupan City, and is an exchange student taking a medical course at the Lyceum
Northwestern Colleges in Dagupan City; before 20 August 1987, the latter courted and proposed to marry her; she
accepted his love on the condition that they would get married; they therefore agreed to get married after the end of
the school semester, which was in October of that year; petitioner then visited the private respondent's parents in
Bañaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan to secure their approval to the marriage; sometime in 20 August 1987, the petitioner
forced her to live with him in the Lozano Apartments; she was a virgin before she began living with him; a week
before the filing of the complaint, petitioner's attitude towards her started to change; he maltreated and threatened to
kill her; as a result of such maltreatment, she sustained injuries; during a confrontation with a representative of the
barangay captain of Guilig a day before the filing of the complaint, petitioner repudiated their marriage agreement
and asked her not to live with him anymore and; the petitioner is already married to someone living in Bacolod City.
Private respondent then prayed for judgment ordering the petitioner to pay her damages in the amount of not less
than P45,000.00, reimbursement for actual expenses amounting to P600.00, attorney's fees and costs, and granting
her such other relief and remedies as may be just and equitable. The complaint was docketed as Civil Case No.
16503.

In his Answer with Counterclaim,  petitioner admitted only the personal circumstances of the parties as averred in
3

the complaint and denied the rest of the allegations either for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a
belief as to the truth thereof or because the true facts are those alleged as his Special and Affirmative Defenses. He
thus claimed that he never proposed marriage to or agreed to be married with the private respondent; he neither
sought the consent and approval of her parents nor forced her to live in his apartment; he did not maltreat her, but
only told her to stop coming to his place because he discovered that she had deceived him by stealing his money
and passport; and finally, no confrontation took place with a representative of the barangay captain. Insisting, in his
Counterclaim, that the complaint is baseless and unfounded and that as a result thereof, he was unnecessarily
dragged into court and compelled to incur expenses, and has suffered mental anxiety and a besmirched reputation,
he prayed for an award of P5,000.00 for miscellaneous expenses and P25,000.00 as moral damages.

After conducting a pre-trial on 25 January 1988, the trial court issued a Pre-Trial Order  embodying the stipulated
4

facts which the parties had agreed upon, to wit:

 1. That the plaintiff is single and resident (sic) of Bañaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan, while the defendant
is single, Iranian citizen and resident (sic) of Lozano Apartment, Guilig, Dagupan City since
September 1, 1987 up to the present;

2. That the defendant is presently studying at Lyceum Northwestern, Dagupan City, College of
Medicine, second year medicine proper;

3. That the plaintiff is (sic) an employee at Mabuhay Luncheonette , Fernandez Avenue, Dagupan
City since July, 1986 up to the present and a (sic) high school graduate;

4. That the parties happened to know each other when the manager of the Mabuhay Luncheonette,
Johhny Rabino introduced the defendant to the plaintiff on August 3, 1986.

After trial on the merits, the lower court, applying Article 21 of the Civil Code, rendered on 16 October 1989 a
decision  favoring the private respondent. The petitioner was thus ordered to pay the latter damages and attorney's
5

fees; the dispositive portion of the decision reads:

IN THE LIGHT of the foregoing consideration, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff
and against the defendant.

1. Condemning (sic) the defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of twenty thousand (P20,000.00)
pesos as moral damages.

2. Condemning further the defendant to play the plaintiff the sum of three thousand (P3,000.00)
pesos as atty's fees and two thousand (P2,000.00) pesos at (sic) litigation expenses and to pay the
costs.

3. All other claims are denied. 6

The decision is anchored on the trial court's findings and conclusions that (a) petitioner and private respondent were
lovers, (b) private respondent is not a woman of loose morals or questionable virtue who readily submits to sexual
advances, (c) petitioner, through machinations, deceit and false pretenses, promised to marry private respondent, d)
because of his persuasive promise to marry her, she allowed herself to be deflowered by him, (e) by reason of that
deceitful promise, private respondent and her parents — in accordance with Filipino customs and traditions — made
some preparations for the wedding that was to be held at the end of October 1987 by looking for pigs and chickens,
inviting friends and relatives and contracting sponsors, (f) petitioner did not fulfill his promise to marry her and (g)
such acts of the petitioner, who is a foreigner and who has abused Philippine hospitality, have offended our sense of
morality, good customs, culture and traditions. The trial court gave full credit to the private respondent's testimony
because, inter alia, she would not have had the temerity and courage to come to court and expose her honor and
reputation to public scrutiny and ridicule if her claim was false.
7

The above findings and conclusions were culled from the detailed summary of the evidence for the private
respondent in the foregoing decision, digested by the respondent Court as follows:

According to plaintiff, who claimed that she was a virgin at the time and that she never had a
boyfriend before, defendant started courting her just a few days after they first met. He later
proposed marriage to her several times and she accepted his love as well as his proposal of
marriage on August 20, 1987, on which same day he went with her to her hometown of Bañaga,
Bugallon, Pangasinan, as he wanted to meet her parents and inform them of their relationship and
their intention to get married. The photographs Exhs. "A" to "E" (and their submarkings) of defendant
with members of plaintiff's family or with plaintiff, were taken that day. Also on that occasion,
defendant told plaintiffs parents and brothers and sisters that he intended to marry her during the
semestral break in October, 1987, and because plaintiff's parents thought he was good and trusted
him, they agreed to his proposal for him to marry their daughter, and they likewise allowed him to
stay in their house and sleep with plaintiff during the few days that they were in Bugallon. When
plaintiff and defendant later returned to Dagupan City, they continued to live together in defendant's
apartment. However, in the early days of October, 1987, defendant would tie plaintiff's hands and
 feet while he went to school, and he even gave her medicine at 4 o'clock in the morning that made
her sleep the whole day and night until the following day. As a result of this live-in relationship,
plaintiff became pregnant, but defendant gave her some medicine to abort the fetus. Still plaintiff
continued to live with defendant and kept reminding him of his promise to marry her until he told her
that he could not do so because he was already married to a girl in Bacolod City. That was the time
plaintiff left defendant, went home to her parents, and thereafter consulted a lawyer who
accompanied her to the barangay captain in Dagupan City. Plaintiff, her lawyer, her godmother, and
a barangay tanod sent by the barangay captain went to talk to defendant to still convince him to
marry plaintiff, but defendant insisted that he could not do so because he was already married to a
girl in Bacolod City, although the truth, as stipulated by the parties at the pre-trial, is that defendant is
still single.

Plaintiff's father, a tricycle driver, also claimed that after defendant had informed them of his desire to
marry Marilou, he already looked for sponsors for the wedding, started preparing for the reception by
looking for pigs and chickens, and even already invited many relatives and friends to the forthcoming
wedding.  8

Petitioner appealed the trial court's decision to the respondent Court of Appeals which docketed the case as CA-
G.R. CV No. 24256. In his Brief,  he contended that the trial court erred (a) in not dismissing the case for lack of
9

factual and legal basis and (b) in ordering him to pay moral damages, attorney's fees, litigation expenses and costs.

On 18 February 1991, respondent Court promulgated the challenged decision   affirming in toto the trial court's
10

ruling of 16 October 1989. In sustaining the trial court's findings of fact, respondent Court made the following
analysis:

First of all, plaintiff, then only 21 years old when she met defendant who was already 29 years old at
the time, does not appear to be a girl of loose morals. It is uncontradicted that she was a virgin prior
to her unfortunate experience with defendant and never had boyfriend. She is, as described by the
lower court, a barrio lass "not used and accustomed to trend of modern urban life", and certainly
would (sic) not have allowed
"herself to be deflowered by the defendant if there was no persuasive promise made by the
defendant to marry her." In fact, we agree with the lower court that plaintiff and defendant must have
been sweethearts or so the plaintiff must have thought because of the deception of defendant, for
otherwise, she would not have allowed herself to be photographed with defendant in public in so
(sic) loving and tender poses as those depicted in the pictures Exhs. "D" and "E". We cannot believe,
therefore, defendant's pretense that plaintiff was a nobody to him except a waitress at the restaurant
where he usually ate. Defendant in fact admitted that he went to plaintiff's hometown of Bañaga,
Bugallon, Pangasinan, at least thrice; at (sic) the town fiesta on February 27, 1987 (p. 54, tsn May
18, 1988), at (sic) a beach party together with the manager and employees of the Mabuhay
Luncheonette on March 3, 1987 (p. 50, tsn id.), and on April 1, 1987 when he allegedly talked to
plaintiff's mother who told him to marry her daughter (pp. 55-56, tsn id.). Would defendant have left
Dagupan City where he was involved in the serious study of medicine to go to plaintiff's hometown in
Bañaga, Bugallon, unless there was (sic) some kind of special relationship between them? And this
special relationship must indeed have led to defendant's insincere proposal of marriage to plaintiff,
communicated not only to her but also to her parents, and (sic) Marites Rabino, the owner of the
restaurant where plaintiff was working and where defendant first proposed marriage to her, also
knew of this love affair and defendant's proposal of marriage to plaintiff, which she declared was the
reason why plaintiff resigned from her job at the restaurant after she had accepted defendant's
proposal (pp. 6-7, tsn March 7, 1988).

Upon the other hand, appellant does not appear to be a man of good moral character and must think
so low and have so little respect and regard for Filipino women that he openly admitted that when he
studied in Bacolod City for several years where he finished his B.S. Biology before he came to
Dagupan City to study medicine, he had a common-law wife in Bacolod City. In other words, he also
lived with another woman in Bacolod City but did not marry that woman, just like what he did to
plaintiff. It is not surprising, then, that he felt so little compunction or remorse in pretending to love
and promising to marry plaintiff, a young, innocent, trustful country girl, in order to satisfy his lust on
her. 11
 and then concluded:

In sum, we are strongly convinced and so hold that it was defendant-appellant's fraudulent and
deceptive protestations of love for and promise to marry plaintiff that made her surrender her virtue
and womanhood to him and to live with him on the honest and sincere belief that he would keep said
promise, and it was likewise these (sic) fraud and deception on appellant's part that made plaintiff's
parents agree to their daughter's living-in with him preparatory to their supposed marriage. And as
these acts of appellant are palpably and undoubtedly against morals, good customs, and public
policy, and are even gravely and deeply derogatory and insulting to our women, coming as they do
from a foreigner who has been enjoying the hospitality of our people and taking advantage of the
opportunity to study in one of our institutions of learning, defendant-appellant should indeed be
made, under Art. 21 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, to compensate for the moral damages and
injury that he had caused plaintiff, as the lower court ordered him to do in its decision in this case.  12

Unfazed by his second defeat, petitioner filed the instant petition on 26 March 1991; he raises therein the single
issue of whether or not Article 21 of the Civil Code applies to the case at bar.  13

It is petitioner's thesis that said Article 21 is not applicable because he had not committed any moral wrong or injury
or violated any good custom or public policy; he has not professed love or proposed marriage to the private
respondent; and he has never maltreated her. He criticizes the trial court for liberally invoking Filipino customs,
traditions and culture, and ignoring the fact that since he is a foreigner, he is not conversant with such Filipino
customs, traditions and culture. As an Iranian Moslem, he is not familiar with Catholic and Christian ways. He
stresses that even if he had made a promise to marry, the subsequent failure to fulfill the same is excusable or
tolerable because of his Moslem upbringing; he then alludes to the Muslim Code which purportedly allows a Muslim
to take four (4) wives and concludes that on the basis thereof, the trial court erred in ruling that he does not posses
good moral character. Moreover, his controversial "common law life" is now his legal wife as their marriage had
been solemnized in civil ceremonies in the Iranian Embassy. As to his unlawful cohabitation with the private
respondent, petitioner claims that even if responsibility could be pinned on him for the live-in relationship, the private
respondent should also be faulted for consenting to an illicit arrangement. Finally, petitioner asseverates that even if
it was to be assumed arguendo that he had professed his love to the private respondent and had also promised to
marry her, such acts would not be actionable in view of the special circumstances of the case. The mere breach of
promise is not actionable.  14

On 26 August 1991, after the private respondent had filed her Comment to the petition and the petitioner had filed
his Reply thereto, this Court gave due course to the petition and required the parties to submit their respective
Memoranda, which they subsequently complied with.

As may be gleaned from the foregoing summation of the petitioner's arguments in support of his thesis, it is clear
that questions of fact, which boil down to the issue of the credibility of witnesses, are also raised. It is the rule in this
jurisdiction that appellate courts will not disturb the trial court's findings as to the credibility of witnesses, the latter
court having heard the witnesses and having had the opportunity to observe closely their deportment and manner of
testifying, unless the trial court had plainly overlooked facts of substance or value which, if considered, might affect
the result of the case. 15

Petitioner has miserably failed to convince Us that both the appellate and trial courts had overlooked any fact of
substance or values which could alter the result of the case.

Equally settled is the rule that only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court. It is not the function of this Court to analyze or weigh all over again the evidence introduced by
the parties before the lower court. There are, however, recognized exceptions to this rule. Thus, in Medina
vs. Asistio, Jr.,   this Court took the time, again, to enumerate these exceptions:
16

xxx xxx xxx

(1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures
(Joaquin v. Navarro, 93 Phil. 257 [1953]); (2) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken,
absurb or impossible (Luna v. Linatok, 74 Phil. 15 [1942]); (3) Where there is a grave abuse of
discretion (Buyco v. People, 95 Phil. 453 [1955]); (4) When the judgment is based on a
 misapprehension of facts (Cruz v. Sosing,
L-4875, Nov. 27, 1953); (5) When the findings of fact are conflicting (Casica v. Villaseca, L-9590 Ap.
30, 1957; unrep.) (6) When the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of
the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellate and appellee (Evangelista v.
Alto Surety and Insurance Co., 103 Phil. 401 [1958]);
(7) The findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court (Garcia v. Court of
Appeals, 33 SCRA 622 [1970]; Sacay v. Sandiganbayan, 142 SCRA 593 [1986]); (8) When the
findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based (Ibid.,);
(9) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners main and reply briefs are not
disputed by the respondents (Ibid.,); and (10) The finding of fact of the Court of Appeals is premised
on the supposed absence of evidence and is contradicted by the evidence on record (Salazar v.
Gutierrez, 33 SCRA 242 [1970]).

Petitioner has not endeavored to joint out to Us the existence of any of the above quoted exceptions in this case.
Consequently, the factual findings of the trial and appellate courts must be respected.

And now to the legal issue.

The existing rule is that a breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable wrong.   Congress deliberately
17

eliminated from the draft of the New Civil Code the provisions that would have made it so. The reason therefor is set
forth in the report of the Senate Committees on the Proposed Civil Code, from which We quote:

The elimination of this chapter is proposed. That breach of promise to marry is not actionable has
been definitely decided in the case of De Jesus vs. Syquia.   The history of breach of promise suits
18

in the United States and in England has shown that no other action lends itself more readily to abuse
by designing women and unscrupulous men. It is this experience which has led to the abolition of
rights of action in the so-called Heart Balm suits in many of the American states. . . .  19

This notwithstanding, the said Code contains a provision, Article 21, which is designed to expand the concept of
torts or quasi-delict in this jurisdiction by granting adequate legal remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs
which is impossible for human foresight to specifically enumerate and punish in the statute books.  20

As the Code Commission itself stated in its Report:

But the Code Commission had gone farther than the sphere of wrongs defined or determined by
positive law. Fully sensible that there are countless gaps in the statutes, which leave so many
victims of moral wrongs helpless, even though they have actually suffered material and moral injury,
the Commission has deemed it necessary, in the interest of justice, to incorporate in the proposed
Civil Code the following rule:

Art. 23. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is
contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the
damage.

An example will illustrate the purview of the foregoing norm: "A" seduces the nineteen-year old
daughter of "X". A promise of marriage either has not been made, or can not be proved. The girl
becomes pregnant. Under the present laws, there is no crime, as the girl is above nineteen years of
age. Neither can any civil action for breach of promise of marriage be filed. Therefore, though the
grievous moral wrong has been committed, and though the girl and family have suffered incalculable
moral damage, she and her parents cannot bring action for damages. But under the proposed
article, she and her parents would have such a right of action.

Thus at one stroke, the legislator, if the forgoing rule is approved, would vouchsafe adequate legal
remedy for that untold number of moral wrongs which it is impossible for human foresight to provide
for specifically in the statutes. 
21

Article 2176 of the Civil Code, which defines a quasi-delict thus:

 Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to
pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation
between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.

is limited to negligent acts or omissions and excludes the notion of willfulness or intent. Quasi-delict, known
in Spanish legal treatises as culpa aquiliana, is a civil law concept while torts is an Anglo-American or
common law concept. Torts is much broader than culpa aquiliana because it includes not only negligence,
but international criminal acts as well such as assault and battery, false imprisonment and deceit. In the
general scheme of the Philippine legal system envisioned by the Commission responsible for drafting the
New Civil Code, intentional and malicious acts, with certain exceptions, are to be governed by the Revised
Penal Code while negligent acts or omissions are to be covered by Article 2176 of the Civil Code.   In22

between these opposite spectrums are injurious acts which, in the absence of Article 21, would have been
beyond redress. Thus, Article 21 fills that vacuum. It is even postulated that together with Articles 19 and 20
of the Civil Code, Article 21 has greatly broadened the scope of the law on civil wrongs; it has become much
more supple and adaptable than the Anglo-American law on torts.  23

In the light of the above laudable purpose of Article 21, We are of the opinion, and so hold, that where a man's
promise to marry is in fact the proximate cause of the acceptance of his love by a woman and his representation to
fulfill that promise thereafter becomes the proximate cause of the giving of herself unto him in a sexual congress,
proof that he had, in reality, no intention of marrying her and that the promise was only a subtle scheme or
deceptive device to entice or inveigle her to accept him and to obtain her consent to the sexual act, could justify the
award of damages pursuant to Article 21 not because of such promise to marry but because of the fraud and deceit
behind it and the willful injury to her honor and reputation which followed thereafter. It is essential, however, that
such injury should have been committed in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy.

In the instant case, respondent Court found that it was the petitioner's "fraudulent and deceptive protestations of
love for and promise to marry plaintiff that made her surrender her virtue and womanhood to him and to live with him
on the honest and sincere belief that he would keep said promise, and it was likewise these fraud and deception on
appellant's part that made plaintiff's parents agree to their daughter's living-in with him preparatory to their supposed
marriage."   In short, the private respondent surrendered her virginity, the cherished possession of every single
24

Filipina, not because of lust but because of moral seduction — the kind illustrated by the Code Commission in its
example earlier adverted to. The petitioner could not be held liable for criminal seduction punished under either
Article 337 or Article 338 of the Revised Penal Code because the private respondent was above eighteen (18) years
of age at the time of the seduction.

Prior decisions of this Court clearly suggest that Article 21 may be applied in a breach of promise to marry where the
woman is a victim of moral seduction. Thus, in Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals,  this Court denied recovery of
25

damages to the woman because:

. . . we find ourselves unable to say that petitioner is morally guilty of seduction, not only because he
is approximately ten (10) years younger than the complainant — who was around thirty-six (36)
years of age, and as highly enlightened as a former high school teacher and a life insurance agent
are supposed to be — when she became intimate with petitioner, then a mere apprentice pilot, but,
also, because the court of first instance found that, complainant "surrendered herself" to petitioner
because, "overwhelmed by her love" for him, she "wanted to bind" him by having a fruit of their
engagement even before they had the benefit of clergy.

In Tanjanco vs. Court of Appeals,   while this Court likewise hinted at possible recovery if there had been moral
26

seduction, recovery was eventually denied because We were not convinced that such seduction existed. The
following enlightening disquisition and conclusion were made in the said case:

The Court of Appeals seem to have overlooked that the example set forth in the Code Commission's
memorandum refers to a tort upon a minor who had been seduced. The essential feature is
seduction, that in law is more than mere sexual intercourse, or a breach of a promise of marriage; it
connotes essentially the idea of deceit, enticement, superior power or abuse of confidence on the
part of the seducer to which the woman has yielded (U.S. vs. Buenaventura, 27 Phil. 121; U.S. vs.
Arlante, 9 Phil. 595).
 It has been ruled in the Buenaventura case (supra) that —

To constitute seduction there must in all cases be some sufficient promise or

inducement and the woman must yield because of the promise or other inducement.
If she consents merely from carnal lust and the intercourse is from mutual desire,
there is no seduction (43 Cent. Dig. tit. Seduction, par. 56) She must be induced to
depart from the path of virtue by the use of some species of arts, persuasions and
wiles, which are calculated to have and do have that effect, and which result in her
person to ultimately submitting her person to the sexual embraces of her seducer (27
Phil. 123).

And in American Jurisprudence we find:

On the other hand, in an action by the woman, the enticement, persuasion or

deception is the essence of the injury; and a mere proof of intercourse is insufficient
to warrant a recovery.

Accordingly it is not seduction where the willingness arises out of sexual desire of
curiosity of the female, and the defendant merely affords her the needed opportunity
for the commission of the act. It has been emphasized that to allow a recovery in all
such cases would tend to the demoralization of the female sex, and would be a
reward for unchastity by which a class of adventuresses would be swift to profit. (47
Am. Jur. 662)

xxx xxx xxx

Over and above the partisan allegations, the fact stand out that for one whole year, from 1958 to
1959, the plaintiff-appellee, a woman of adult age, maintain intimate sexual relations with appellant,
with repeated acts of intercourse. Such conduct is incompatible with the idea of seduction. Plainly
there is here voluntariness and mutual passion; for had the appellant been deceived, had she
surrendered exclusively because of the deceit, artful persuasions and wiles of the defendant, she
would not have again yielded to his embraces, much less for one year, without exacting early
fulfillment of the alleged promises of marriage, and would have cut short all sexual relations upon
finding that defendant did not intend to fulfill his defendant did not intend to fulfill his promise. Hence,
we conclude that no case is made under article 21 of the Civil Code, and no other cause of action
being alleged, no error was committed by the Court of First Instance in dismissing the complaint.  27

In his annotations on the Civil Code,   Associate Justice Edgardo L. Paras, who recently retired from this Court,
28

opined that in a breach of promise to marry where there had been carnal knowledge, moral damages may be
recovered:

. . . if there be criminal or moral seduction, but not if the intercourse was due to mutual lust.
(Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals,
L-14628, Sept. 30, 1960; Estopa vs. Piansay, Jr., L-14733, Sept. 30, 1960; Batarra vs. Marcos, 7
Phil. 56 (sic); Beatriz Galang vs. Court of Appeals, et al., L-17248, Jan. 29, 1962). (In other words, if
the CAUSE be the promise to marry, and the EFFECT be the carnal knowledge, there is a chance
that there was criminal or moral seduction, hence recovery of moral damages will prosper. If it be the
other way around, there can be no recovery of moral damages, because here mutual lust has
intervened). . . .

together with "ACTUAL damages, should there be any, such as the expenses for the wedding presentations
(See Domalagon v. Bolifer, 33 Phil. 471).

Senator Arturo M. Tolentino   is also of the same persuasion:

29

It is submitted that the rule in Batarra vs. Marcos,   still subsists, notwithstanding the incorporation
30

of the present article  in the Code. The example given by the Code Commission is correct, if there
31
 was seduction, not necessarily in the legal sense, but in the vulgar sense of deception. But when the
sexual act is accomplished without any deceit or qualifying circumstance of abuse of authority or
influence, but the woman, already of age, has knowingly given herself to a man, it cannot be said
that there is an injury which can be the basis for indemnity.

But so long as there is fraud, which is characterized by willfulness (sic), the action lies. The court,
however, must weigh the degree of fraud, if it is sufficient to deceive the woman under the
circumstances, because an act which would deceive a girl sixteen years of age may not constitute
deceit as to an experienced woman thirty years of age. But so long as there is a wrongful act and a
resulting injury, there should be civil liability, even if the act is not punishable under the criminal law
and there should have been an acquittal or dismissal of the criminal case for that reason.

We are unable to agree with the petitioner's alternative proposition to the effect that granting, for argument's sake,
that he did promise to marry the private respondent, the latter is nevertheless also at fault. According to him, both
parties are in pari delicto; hence, pursuant to Article 1412(1) of the Civil Code and the doctrine laid down in Batarra
vs. Marcos,   the private respondent cannot recover damages from the petitioner. The latter even goes as far as
32

stating that if the private respondent had "sustained any injury or damage in their relationship, it is primarily because
of her own doing,   for:
33

. . . She is also interested in the petitioner as the latter will become a doctor sooner or later. Take
notice that she is a plain high school graduate and a mere employee . . . (Annex "C") or a waitress
(TSN, p. 51, January 25, 1988) in a luncheonette and without doubt, is in need of a man who can
give her economic security. Her family is in dire need of financial assistance. (TSN, pp. 51-53, May
18, 1988). And this predicament prompted her to accept a proposition that may have been offered by
the petitioner.  34

These statements reveal the true character and motive of the petitioner. It is clear that he harbors a condescending,
if not sarcastic, regard for the private respondent on account of the latter's ignoble birth, inferior educational
background, poverty and, as perceived by him, dishonorable employment. Obviously then, from the very beginning,
he was not at all moved by good faith and an honest motive. Marrying with a woman so circumstances could not
have even remotely occurred to him. Thus, his profession of love and promise to marry were empty words directly
intended to fool, dupe, entice, beguile and deceive the poor woman into believing that indeed, he loved her and
would want her to be his life's partner. His was nothing but pure lust which he wanted satisfied by a Filipina who
honestly believed that by accepting his proffer of love and proposal of marriage, she would be able to enjoy a life of
ease and security. Petitioner clearly violated the Filipino's concept of morality and brazenly defied the traditional
respect Filipinos have for their women. It can even be said that the petitioner committed such deplorable acts in
blatant disregard of Article 19 of the Civil Code which directs every person to act with justice, give everyone his due
and observe honesty and good faith in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his obligations.

No foreigner must be allowed to make a mockery of our laws, customs and traditions.

The pari delicto rule does not apply in this case for while indeed, the private respondent may not have been
impelled by the purest of intentions, she eventually submitted to the petitioner in sexual congress not out of lust, but
because of moral seduction. In fact, it is apparent that she had qualms of conscience about the entire episode for as
soon as she found out that the petitioner was not going to marry her after all, she left him. She is not, therefore,
in pari delicto with the petitioner. Pari delicto means "in equal fault; in a similar offense or crime; equal in guilt or in
legal fault."   At most, it could be conceded that she is merely in delicto.
35

Equity often interferes for the relief of the less guilty of the parties, where his transgression has been
brought about by the imposition of undue influence of the party on whom the burden of the original
wrong principally rests, or where his consent to the transaction was itself procured by
fraud. 36

In Mangayao vs. Lasud,   We declared:

37

Appellants likewise stress that both parties being at fault, there should be no action by one against
the other (Art. 1412, New Civil Code). This rule, however, has been interpreted as applicable only
 where the fault on both sides is, more or less, equivalent. It does not apply where one party is
literate or intelligent and the other one is not. (c.f. Bough vs. Cantiveros, 40 Phil. 209).

We should stress, however, that while We find for the private respondent, let it not be said that this Court condones
the deplorable behavior of her parents in letting her and the petitioner stay together in the same room in their house
after giving approval to their marriage. It is the solemn duty of parents to protect the honor of their daughters and
infuse upon them the higher values of morality and dignity.

WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the challenged decision, the instant petition is hereby DENIED, with
costs against the petitioner.
33.) A.M. No. P-11-2922               April 4, 2011
(formerly A.M. OCA IPI No. 03-1778-P)

MARY JANE ABANAG, Complainant,

vs.
NICOLAS B. MABUTE, Court Stenographer I, Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC), Paranas,
Samar, Respondent.

D E CI S I O N

BRION, J.:

We resolve the administrative case against Nicolas B. Mabute (respondent), Court Stenographer I in the Municipal
Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Paranas, Samar, filed by Mary Jane Abanag (complainant) for Disgraceful and
Immoral Conduct.

In her verified letter-complaint dated September 19, 2003, the complainant, a 23-year old unmarried woman, alleged
that respondent courted her and professed his undying love for her. Relying on respondent’s promise that he would
marry her, she agreed to live with him. She became pregnant, but after several months into her pregnancy,
respondent brought her to a "manghihilot" and tried to force her to take drugs to abort her baby. When she did not
agree, the respondent turned cold and eventually abandoned her. She became depressed resulting in the loss of
her baby. She also stopped schooling because of the humiliation that she suffered.

In his comment on the complaint submitted to the Office of the Court Administrator, the respondent vehemently
denied the complainant’s allegations and claimed that the charges against him were baseless, false and fabricated,
and were intended to harass him and destroy his reputation. He further averred that Norma Tordesillas, the
complainant’s co-employee, was using the complaint to harass him. Tordesillas resented him because he had
chastised her for her arrogant behavior and undesirable work attitude. He believes that the complainant’s letter-
complaint, which was written in the vernacular, was prepared by Tordesillas who is from Manila and fluent in
Tagalog; the respondent would have used the "waray" or English language if she had written the letter-complaint.

The complainant filed a Reply, insisting that she herself wrote the letter-complaint. She belied the respondent’s
claim that she was being used by Tordesillas who wanted to get even with him.

In a Resolution dated July 29, 2005, the Court referred the letter-complaint to then Acting Executive Judge
Carmelita T. Cuares of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Catbalogan City, Samar for investigation, report and
recommendation.

The respondent sought Judge Cuares’ inhibition from the case, alleging that the Judge was partial and had bias in
favor of the complainant; the complainant herself had bragged that she personally knew Judge Cuares. The Court
designated Judge Esteban V. dela Peña, who succeeded Judge Cuares as Acting Executive Judge, to continue with
the investigation of the case.1 Eventually, Judge Agerico A. Avila took over the investigation when he was
designated the Executive Judge of the RTC of Catbalogan City, Samar.

In his Report/Recommendation dated June 7, 2010, 2 Executive Judge Avila reported on the developments in the
hearing of the case. The complainant testified that she met the respondent while she was a member of the Singles
for Christ. They became acquainted and they started dating. The relationship blossomed until they lived together in
a rented room near the respondent’s office.

The respondent, for his part, confirmed that he met the complainant when he joined the Singles for Christ. He
described their liaison as a dating relationship. He admitted that the complainant would join him at his rented room
three to four times a week; when the complainant became pregnant, he asked her to stay and live with him. He
vehemently denied having brought the complainant to a local "manghihilot" and that he had tried to force her to
abort her baby. He surmised that the complainant’s miscarriage could be related to her epileptic attacks during her
pregnancy. The respondent further testified that the complainant’s mother did not approve of him, but the
complainant defied her mother and lived with him. He proposed marriage to the complainant, but her mother did not
like him as a son-in-law and ordered the complainant to return home. The complainant obeyed her mother. They
have separated ways since then, but he pledged his undying love for the complainant.

The Investigating Judge recommends the dismissal of the complaint against the respondent, reporting that:

Normally the personal affair of a court employee who is a bachelor and has maintained an amorous relation with a
woman equally unmarried has nothing to do with his public employment. The sexual liaison is between two
consenting adults and the consequent pregnancy is but a natural effect of the physical intimacy. Mary Jane was not
forced to live with Nicolas nor was she impelled by some devious means or machination. The fact was, she freely
acceded to cohabit with him. The situation may-not-be-so-ideal but it does not give cause for administrative
sanction. There appears no law which penalizes or prescribes the sexual activity of two unmarried persons. So, the
accusation of Mary Jane that Nicolas initiated the abortion was calculated to bring the act within the ambit of an
immoral, disgraceful and gross misconduct. Except however as to the self-serving assertion that Mary Jane was
brought to a local midwife and forced to take the abortifacient, there was no other evidence to support that it was in
fact so. All pointed to a harmonious relation that turned sour. In no small way Mary Jane was also responsible of
what befell upon her.3

The Court defined immoral conduct as conduct that is willful, flagrant or shameless, and that shows a moral
indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable members of the community. 4 To justify suspension or
disbarment, the act complained of must not only be immoral, but grossly immoral. 5 A grossly immoral act is one that
is so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or an act so unprincipled or disgraceful as to be reprehensible
to a high degree.6

Based on the allegations of the complaint, the respondent’s comment, and the findings of the Investigating Judge,
we find that the acts complained of cannot be considered as disgraceful or grossly immoral conduct.

We find it evident that the sexual relations between the complainant and the respondent were consensual.  They lawphi1

met at the Singles for Christ, started dating and subsequently became sweethearts. The respondent frequently
visited the complainant at her boarding house and also at her parents’ residence. The complainant voluntarily
yielded to the respondent and they eventually lived together as husband and wife in a rented room near the
respondent’s office. They continued their relationship even after the complainant had suffered a miscarriage.

Mere sexual relations between two unmmaried and consenting adults are not enough to warrant administrative
sanction for illicit behavior.7 The Court has repeatedly held that voluntary intimacy between a man and a woman
who are not married, where both are not under any impediment to marry and where no deceit exists, is neither a
criminal nor an unprincipled act that would warrant disbarment or disciplinary action. 8 1avvphi1

While the Court has the power to regulate official conduct and, to a certain extent, private conduct, it is not within our
authority to decide on matters touching on employees’ personal lives, especially those that will affect their and their
family’s future. We cannot intrude into the question of whether they should or should not marry. 9 However, we take
this occasion to remind judiciary employees to be more circumspect in their adherence to their obligations under the
Code of Professional Responsibility. The conduct of court personnel must be free from any taint of impropriety or
scandal, not only with respect to their official duties but also in their behavior outside the Court as private individuals.
This is the best way to preserve and protect the integrity and the good name of our courts. 10

WHEREFORE, the Court resolves to DISMISS the present administrative complaint against Nicolas B. Mabute,
Stenographer 1 of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Paranas, Samar, for lack of merit. No costs.
 34.) G.R. No. 209359, October 17, 2018

METROHEIGHTS SUBDIVISION HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC., Petitioner, v. CMS

CONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, TOMASITO T. CRUZ, TITA F. CRUZ,
SIMONETTE F. CRUZ, ANGEL T. CRUZ, ERNESTO T. CRUZ AND METROPOLITAN
WATERWORKS AND SEWERAGE SYSTEM (MWSS), Respondents.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari  under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to
reverse and set aside the Decision1 and the Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA), dated October
10, 2012 and September 30, 2013, respectively, in CA-G.R. CV No. 89085.

On June 29, 1992, petitioner Metroheights Subdivision Homeowners Association, Inc. filed with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC)3 of Quezon City a complaint4 for damages with prayer for a temporary
restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction and writ of preliminary mandatory injunction
against respondents CMS Construction and Development Corporation (CMS Construction), Tomasito
Cruz, Tita Cruz, Simonette Cruz, Angel Cruz, Ernesto Cruz (the Cruzes), and Metropolitan
Waterworks and Sewerage System (MWSS).

Petitioner alleged, among others, that it sought the assistance of respondent MWSS to address the
insufficient supply of water in its subdivision to which the latter advised the improvement and
upgrading of its private internal water distribution lines, foremost of which was the transfer or
change in the location of its tapping source and the change in size of its water service line from the
old line tapped at Sanville Subdivision to a new tapping source on Visayas Avenue, Quezon City; that
on November 16, 1990, petitioner entered into a contract with respondent MWSS for the new water
service connection, and respondent MWSS awarded the project to a contractor which implemented
the same, the cost of which was solely shouldered by contribution from petitioner's members
amounting to P190,000.00, inclusive of labor, materials, and respondent MWSS' fees and charges;
and that since then, there was already sufficient and strong water pressure twenty-four (24) hours a
day in the petitioner's subdivision.

However, sometime in April 1992, respondent CMS Construction made diggings and excavations, and
started to lay water pipes along Fisheries Street and Morning Star Drive in Sanville Subdivision,
Quezon City, petitioner's neighboring subdivision; that in the process, respondent CMS Construction,
with the knowledge and consent of respondent MWSS but without petitioner's knowledge and
consent, unilaterally cut-off and disconnected the latter's new and separate water service connection
on Visayas Avenue; that on May 28, 1992, petitioner's members were waterless, which lasted for
three (3) days, and that petitioner's polyvinyl chloride (PVC) pipes and radius elbow, valued at
around P30,000.00, were stolen by respondent CMS Construction's workers; that when petitioner's
officers discovered the illegal cutting of the water connection on May 30, 1992, they immediately
complained to the respondents and demanded for the restoration of their water line; that respondent
CMS Construction only made a temporary reconnection with the use of a 2-inch rubber hose to the
new water line it constructed at Sanville Subdivision; and that despite petitioner's verbal and written
demands, respondents have failed to restore petitioner's water line connection in its original state
and to return the missing PVC pipes and radius elbow.

In its Answer with Counterclaim, respondent MWSS averred, among others, that on August 16, 1991,
it entered into a contract with respondent CMS Construction for the mainlaying and rehabilitation of
the existing water main and appurtenances, and the installation/replacement of water service
connection at Sanville Subdivision, Quezon City; that in connection with the said undertaking, it
necessitated the creek crossing of a 150 mm cast iron pipe to be placed alongside the bridge situated
along Morning Star Drive in Quezon City; that alongside the said bridge, there existed two pipes with
casings, one of which was owned by petitioner; that it designed the placing of the 150 mm cast iron
pipe alongside the above-stated bridge and the design included the interconnection of the two
existing pipes; that the aforementioned interconnection features the use of split tap tees, one of
which was for the 100 mm pipe allegedly owned by petitioner; and that the infrastructure project
aimed to improve the water pressure of eight (8) subdivisions in Tandang Sora which included
Metroheights Subdivision.

On the other hand, respondents CMS Construction and the Cruzes claimed that they were awarded
by respondent MWSS a contract for the latter's Manila Water Supply Rehabilitation Project II,
covering the Tandang Sora area, to provide an improved and equitable water distribution to eight (8)
subdivisions located therein; that its proposed working drawings had been reviewed and approved by
respondent MWSS; that it is not true that it started laying water pipes along the Morning Star Drive
water pipeline by unilaterally cutting off and disconnecting petitioner's existing water pipeline
measuring 100-mm (4-inches) in diameter along the said creek as the same was replaced with a PVC
water pipe measuring 150-mm in diameter; that the alleged cutting off, disconnection and
replacement of petitioner's pipeline bigger in diameter took only three to four hours, and the
resumption of the water flow after replacement could not have rendered the homeowners waterless
for three (3) days; and that the officers and engineers of petitioner were previously consulted on the
rehabilitation project.

On March 30, 1999, the RTC rendered a Decision,5 the dispositive portion of which provides:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff. Defendants
are hereby ordered to jointly and severally pay plaintiff the sum of:

1. P190,000.00 as and by way of actual damages;

2. P100,000.00 as and by way of nominal damages;
3. P100,000.00 as and by way of exemplary damages;
4. P50,000.00 as and by way of attorney's fees; and
5. The costs of this [s]uit.

SO ORDERED[.]6

The RTC found, among others, that respondents did not have the authority to simply cut, disconnect
and transfer petitioner's water supply with impunity, without notice to or without getting its consent;
and that respondents acted in concert and in bad faith, which made them jointly and severally liable
for damages.

Respondent MWSS filed its notice of appeal while respondents CMS Construction and the Cruzes filed
a motion for new trial which the RTC granted.

On May 18, 2006, the RTC issued a Decision7 which affirmed its earlier Decision dated March 30,
1999.

The RTC found that respondents' claim of damnum absque injuria was not tenable. Under the
principle of damnum absque injuria, the legitimate exercise of a person's right, even if it causes loss
to another, does not automatically result in an actionable injury and the law does not prescribe a
remedy for the loss. However, this principle admits of exception as when there is an abuse of a
person's right. The exercise of one's right should be done in a manner that will not cause injustice to
another. Since water is a basic necessity, the lack thereof not only caused inconvenience but posed
health concerns as well. Notice to petitioner of the interruption of the water supply should have been
made prior to the implementation of the project.

Respondents' motion for reconsideration was denied.

Respondents filed their appeal with the CA. On October 10, 2012, the CA issued its assailed decision,
the decretal portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision dated May 18, 2006, as well as the Decision
dated March 30, 1999 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
complaint below is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.8

The CA found that the respondents' rehabilitation project was not undertaken without any notice at
all; that respondents' actions were merely consequential to the exercise of their rights and
obligations to manage and maintain the water supply system, an exercise which includes water
rehabilitation and improvement within the area, pursuant to a prior agreement for the water supply
system; and that the alleged abuse of right was not sufficiently established.

Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied by the CA in a Resolution dated September 30,
2013.

Hence, this petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioner, raising the following issues:

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT THERE WAS PRIOR NOTICE
UPON THE PETITIONER OF THE REHABILITATION PROJECT BEFORE IT WAS UNDERTAKEN BY THE
RESPONDENTS;

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS CANNOT BE HELD LIABLE UNDER ARTICLE 19 OF THE
CIVIL CODE;

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE ABUSE OF RIGHT OF THE
RESPONDENTS WAS NOT SUFFICIENTLY ESTABLISHED;

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT AND
ABSOLVING RESPONDENTS OF ANY CIVIL LIABILITY IN FAVOR OF THE PETITIONER.9

The issue for resolution is whether the respondents should be held liable for damages for the cutting
off, disconnection and transfer of petitioner's existing separate water service connection on Visayas
Avenue without the latter's knowledge and consent which also resulted in petitioner's subdivision
being waterless.

To begin with, to address the perennial problem of insufficient supply of water in Metroheights
Subdivision, petitioner had filed its application for transfer location of tapping/change size of the
water service connection on Visayas Avenue with respondent MWSS, which the latter approved and
implemented; thus, petitioner had uninterrupted water supply. On August 16, 1991, respondent
MWSS entered into a contract with respondent CMS Construction for the mainlaying and
rehabilitation of existing water main and appurtenances, and the installation/replacement of water
service connection at Sanville Subdivision, Quezon City. In the process, petitioner's existing water
service connection on Visayas Avenue was cut-off, disconnected and transferred by respondents, and
petitioner's homeowners experienced loss of water supply for three (3) days.

The RTC found respondents liable for damages on the basis of abuse of right under Article 19 of the
New Civil Code, giving credence to petitioner's claim that there was no notice to it prior to the
implementation of respondents' project. The CA reversed the RTC and found that there was no abuse
of right committed by the respondents, as the project was not undertaken without notice to
petitioner.

We reverse the CA.

Article 19 of the New Civil Code deals with the principle of abuse of rights, thus:
Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with
justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.

"The principle of abuse of rights x x x departs from the classical theory that 'he who uses a right
injures no one.' The modern tendency is to depart from the classical and traditional theory, and to
grant indemnity for damages in cases where there is an abuse of rights, even when the act is not
illicit."10

"Article 19 [of the New Civil Code] was intended to expand the concept of torts by granting adequate
legal remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to
provide[,] specifically in statutory law. If mere fault or negligence in one's acts can make him liable
for damages for injury caused thereby, with more reason should abuse or bad faith make him liable.
The absence of good faith is essential to abuse of right. Good faith is an honest intention to abstain
from taking any unconscientious advantage of another, even through the forms or technicalities of
the law, together with an absence of all information or belief of fact which would render the
transaction unconscientious. In business relations, it means good faith as understood by men of
affairs."11

"While Article 19 [of the New Civil Code] may have been intended as a mere declaration of principle,
the 'cardinal law on human conduct' expressed in said article has given rise to certain rules, e.g. that
where a person exercises his rights but does so arbitrarily or unjustly or performs his duties in a
manner that is not in keeping with honesty and good faith, he opens himself to liability. The elements
of an abuse of rights under Article 19 are: (1) there is a legal right or duty; (2) which is exercised in
bad faith; (3) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another."12

Here, it was admitted by Engr. Victor Cariaga,13 an MWSS consultant, and Mr. Tomasito
Cruz,14 respondent CMS Construction's President, that petitioner has its own pipeline or source of
water coming from Visayas Avenue. Respondents also admitted that because of the rehabilitation
project they were undertaking, petitioner's water pipeline, measuring 100 mm in diameter along the
side of the creek, was replaced with a PVC plastic pipe 150 mm in diameter; and that petitioner's
water line had to be transferred, and in the process of transferring, petitioner's existing water line
had to be cut off. Considering that respondents would disconnect and change petitioner's existing
water line tapped from Visayas Avenue to another tapping source, good faith and prudence dictate
that petitioner should be informed or notified of such actions, as respondents admitted that prior
notice to affected areas is a standard operating procedure. More so, petitioner's members had spent
their own money to pay for their existing water connection on Visayas Avenue to address the
perennial problem of the lack of water supply in their area.

The CA found that the rehabilitation project was not undertaken without notice to petitioner, which
was contrary to the RTC's finding that there was no notice given to petitioner. The matter of whether
there was notice to petitioner is factual. It is elementary that a question of fact is not appropriate for
a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The parties may raise only
questions of law because the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts. However, we may review the
findings of fact by the CA when they are contrary to those of the trial court, as in this case.15

In finding that there was notice given by the respondents to petitioner, the CA relied on the
testimonies of Tomasito Cruz, President of respondent CMS Construction, that prior to the actual
implementation of the project, permissions from the Office of the City Engineer and the affected
homeowners' associations were sought; and that of Engr. Victor Cariaga, consultant of respondent
MWSS, saying that it is an operating procedure to give letters to the homeowners, as well as to the
barangays affected, notifying them of the objective of the project and requesting for meetings.

Notably, however, the CA failed to consider that Tomasito Cruz testified during his cross-examination
that there was no notice to petitioner coming from their company, to wit:
Q: Now, do I get from you that CMS or any of its officers including you did not personally give a written
notice to the plaintiff prior to the implementation of this water rehab project?
� �
A: Our company...that is not our responsibility. Because the one who owns the project is MWSS and they
are the ones who asked for permission.
�
ATTY. REYES, JR.: Okay.
� �
Q: In other words, you agree with me that there is no such notice coming from your party CMS? There is
no such notice?
� �
A: From our company, none, sir.
� �
Q: Now, is it your assumption that there was such a notice given by MWSS?
� �
A: From what I know there was a notice. In fact, there was even a meeting, sir.
� �
Q: Did you happen to see a copy of this written notice from the MWSS?
� �
A: No, sir.
� �
Q: Since 1992, when the contract was awarded and then later implemented up to this present time, did
you ever have an occasion to go to MWSS and ask for a copy of that alleged written notice to the
plaintiff?
� �
A: I did not ask for that, sir. Because from what I know, because there was a meeting, there was already
an agreement.
� �
Q: In short, Mr. witness at present you cannot produce any documentary proof of that allege[d] notice
coming from MWSS?
� �
A: None, sir.16
The alleged meetings, claimed by Tomasito Cruz to have taken place to show that petitioner had
already been notified of the rehabilitation project, were not substantiated at all. Even Engr. Cariaga's
assertion that it is an operating procedure to give letters to the homeowners, as well as the
barangays affected, regarding the objective of the project and calling for meetings was not also
established by any documentary evidence. It is, therefore, established that there was no notice, not
even a generalized notice, given by respondents to petitioner regarding the rehabilitation project.

In Manila Gas Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 17 we held:

What is peculiar in the stand of Defendant is that while it would insist on the giving of notices and
warnings, it did not have any competent and sufficient evidence to prove the same. Demands in open
were made by Plaintiff counsel whether Defendant could show any written evidence showing that
notices and warnings were sent to Plaintiff. Not a single piece of evidence was produced. Normally, if
a notice is refused, then the original and its copies would still be in the hands of the public utility
concerned. In the instant case, it has to be repeated, not a single copy, original or duplicate,
triplicate, etc. of any notice to pay or warning of disconnection was produced in court. The court
cannot believe that Defendant, as what the testimonies of its witnesses would like to impress upon
this Court, conducts its business that way. Defendant is a big business concern and it cannot be said
that it treats its business as a joke. Its personnel should realize this, for only with such an awareness
can they respond faithfully to their responsibilities as members of a big business enterprise imbued
with public interest over which the Philippine Government is concerned.18

In fact, it was only after petitioner's officer investigated the reason behind the loss of water supply in
their subdivision that it was learned that their existing line was cut-off and transferred by
respondents. Also, it was only when petitioner's officer went to the office of respondent CMS
Construction and complained about the loss of water supply in their subdivision that petitioner's
homeowners' water line was temporarily reconnected with a 2-inch rubber hose. The testimony of
respondent CMS Construction's President revealed this matter on cross-examination, to wit:

COURT: So, you are saying Mr. witness that you visited [the] site on the very day when the officers of the
association came to your office and complained that they have no water?
� �
A: Yes, Your HONOR.
�
ATTY. REYES, JR.: Okay.
� �
Q: And you claimed that you went to the site on the same day, you saw that there was already a
connection of the water supply line of the plaintiff to the new line that you installed and you
claimed that there was water on the line but it cannot reach plaintiff?
� �
A: Yes, sir.
�
ATTY. REYES, JR.: Okay.
� �
Q: Was the connection between the water line system of plaintiff to the new line that you installed at
that time when you visited through a temporary rubber hose?
� �
A: The reason why we put the rubber hose just like in electricity it is like a "jumper". Because of
their complaint that they had no water. That was the idea of the project engineer of MWSS, sir.
� �
xxxx
� �
Q: Therefore, it is correct to say that without the temporary connection made through a rubber hose
there would be no water for the plaintiff since the time of disconnection?
� �
A: Well, sir, it did not help.
� �
xxxx
� �
Q: So, in short, you are claiming that whether or not the connection was made there was no water, is
that what you are claiming?
� �
A: There was water, but it was weak flow.19

Clearly, had petitioner's officer not complained about the water service interruption in their
subdivision and the rubber hose connection was not made to temporarily fix petitioner's concern,
petitioner's homeowners would have continuously suffered loss of water service.

Notably, respondents admitted in their respective Comments that the inconvenience of the temporary
stoppage of water supply in petitioner's area was highly inevitable in the process of changing
petitioner's water pipe size crossing the bridge up to Visayas Avenue where the tapping source is
connected. Notwithstanding, respondents proceeded with the cutting off and disconnection of
petitioner's water connection without the latter's consent and notification thereby causing prejudice
or injury to the petitioner's members because of the unexpected water loss for three (3) days.
Respondents' actions were done in total disregard of the standards set by Article 19 of the New Civil
Code which entitles petitioner to damages.

In MWSS v. Act Theater, Inc.,20 we held that petitioner's act of cutting off respondents' water service
connection without prior notice was arbitrary, injurious and prejudicial to the latter, justifying the
award of damages under Article 19 of the New Civil Code, thus:

When a right is exercised in a manner which discards these norms (set under Art. 19) resulting in
damage to another, a legal wrong is committed for which actor can be held accountable. In this case,
the petitioner failed to act with justice and give the respondent what is due to it when the petitioner
unceremoniously cut off the respondent's water service connection. As correctly found by the
appellate court:
While it is true that MWSS had sent a notice of investigation to plaintiff-appellee prior to the
disconnection of the latter's water services, this was done only a few hours before the actual
disconnection. Upon receipt of the notice and in order to ascertain the matter, Act sent its assistant
manager Teodulo Gumalid, Jr. to the MWSS office but he was treated badly on the flimsy excuse that
he had no authority to represent Act. Act's water services were cut at midnight of the day following
the apprehension of the employees. Clearly, the plaintiff-appellee was denied due process when it
was deprived of the water services. As a consequence thereof, Act had to contract another source to
provide water for a number of days. Plaintiff-appellee was also compelled to deposit with MWSS the
sum of P200,000.00 for the restoration of their water services.21

We do not agree with the CA's finding that respondents' actions were merely consequential to the
exercise of their rights and obligations to manage and maintain the water supply system. "Having the
right should not be confused with the manner by which such right is to be exercised."22 Article 19 of
the New Civil Code sets the standard in the exercise of one's rights and in the performance of one's
duties, i.e., he must act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
"The exercise of a right ends when the right disappears, and it disappears when it is abused,
especially to the prejudice of others. The mask of a right without the spirit of justice which gives it
life is repugnant to the modem concept of social law."23 Here it was established, as shown by the
above discussions, that respondents indeed abused their right.

We find that respondents MWSS and CMS Construction should be held liable for damages to
petitioner but not the Cruzes who are the directors and stockholders of respondent CMS
Construction. Section 31 of the Corporation Code is the governing law on personal liability of officers
for the debts of the corporation, to wit:

Sec. 31. Liability of directors, trustees or officers. � Directors or trustees who willfully and
knowingly vote for or assent to patently unlawful acts of the corporation or who are guilty of gross
negligence or bad faith in directing the affairs of the corporation or acquire any personal or pecuniary
interest in conflict with their duty as such directors or trustees shall be liable jointly and severally for
all damages resulting therefrom suffered by the corporation, its stockholders or members and other
persons.

We find that petitioner failed to show that the Cruzes committed any of those above-quoted acts to
make them personally liable.

Petitioner is entitled to the award of actual damages. Petitioner alleged that it had spent P190,000.00
for the transfer location of tapping/change size of the water service connection, which was
unilaterally cut off, disconnected and transferred by respondents. However, only the amount of
P161,541.85 was duly proved by the checks, which petitioner had paid to their contractor, thus, such
amount should be awarded. "Actual or compensatory damages cannot be presumed, but must be
duly proved, and proved with a reasonable degree of certainty."24

Petitioner is also entitled to the award of exemplary damages in the amount of P100,000.00.
Exemplary damages may be imposed by way of example or correction for the public good. We also
award the amount of P50,000.00 as attorney's fees as petitioner was compelled to litigate to protect
its interest by reason of the unjustified act of respondents.

We find no basis to award nominal damages since there is an award of actual damages. "Nominal
damages cannot co-exist with actual or compensatory damages."25

Finally, in line with prevailing jurisprudence, legal interest at the rate of 6% per annum is imposed on
the monetary awards computed from the finality of this Decision until full payment.26

WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED. The Decision dated October 10,
2012 and the Resolution dated September 30, 2013 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 89085
are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decisions, dated March 30, 1999 and May 18, 2006, of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 77, of Quezon City are hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.

Thus, as modified, the Decision dated March 30, 1999 of the Regional Trial Court is as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff Metroheights
Subdivision Homeowners Association, Inc. Defendants Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage
System and CMS Construction and Development Corporation are hereby ordered to jointly and
severally pay plaintiff the sum of:

(a) P161,541.85 as and by way of actual damages;

(b) P100,000.00 as and by way of exemplary damages;
(c) P50,000.00 as and by way of attorney's fees; and
(d) The costs of this suit.

All damages awarded shall earn interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the date of
finality of this Decision until fully paid.