Cultural Relativism': Human Rights Quarterly

HUMAN RIGHTSQUARTERLY
Cultural Relativism'
JohnJ. Tilley*
I. INTRODUCTION
We often hearthat "moralityis relativeto culture"or that "rightand wrong

vary with cultural norms." These are rough formulationsof cultural
relativism,2a theorywith multiplecharms,appearingrigorouslyscientificto
some, fashionablypostmodernto others. Not surprisingly,culturalrelativ-
ism is on the upswing in many disciplines,3and is seen by many people as
* John]. Tilleyis an AssociateProfessorof Philosophyat IndianaUniversity-Purdue University

Indianapolis(IUPUI).His researchareasare ethicaltheoryand practicalreason.
1. I am gratefulto RhodaHoward,LouisPojman,PaulWarrenand, especially, Michael
Burkeforhelpfulcomments.I am also gratefulto my studentsin P326, EthicalTheory,for
usefulquestionsand discussions.
2. The terminologyin this essay is not out of the ordinary,but nor is it universal.For
instance, some authors use "ethical relativism"for what this article calls "cultural
relativism,"reservingthe lattertermfor the view thatdifferentculturesaccept different
moral principles. Also, the terms "agent relativism,""transcendentalism," "moral
liberalism,"and "Victorianmorality,"all of which appearin this article,have morethan
one use in moralphilosophy.
3. Especiallythose disciplinesconcernedwith internationalhumanrights.See, e.g., Alison
Dundes Renteln,The UnansweredChallengeof Relativismand the Consequencesfor
HumanRights,7 HUM.RTS. Q. 514 (1985);Alison Dundes Renteln,Relativismand the
Search for Human Rights, 90 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST
56 (1988); ALISoN DUNDESRENTELN,
INTERNATIONAL
HUMAN RIGHTS: UNIVERSALISM (1990); Terry Nardin, The
VERSUS RELATIVISM
Problemof Relativismin InternationalEthics,18 MILLENNIUM149 (1989); MarthaC.
Nussbaum,HumanFunctioningand SocialJustice:In Defense of AristotelianEssential-
ism, 20 POL.THEORY 203, 203-04 (1992) (recountingconversationsthat reveal the
prevalenceof culturalrelativismamongacademics);Sam Garkawe,The Impactof the
Doctrineof CulturalRelativismon the AustralianLegalSystem,2 E LAW-MURDOCH UNIV.
ELEC.J.L., Apr. 1995, available in <http://www.murdoch.edu.au/elaw/issues/v2nl/
garkawe.txt>(visited9 Feb.2000); DonaldJ. Puchala,TheEthicsof Globalism,5 REP.&
PAPERS 2 (1995), available in <http://www.yale.edu/acuns/NEW_publications/
95_Holmes_Lecture.html> (visited 9 Feb. 2000) (recountingconference events that
revealthe prevalenceand influenceof culturalrelativism);ElvinHatch, TheGood Side
of Relativism, 53 J. ANTHROPOLOGICAL
RES.371 (1997). Some valuable correctives to this
trend are Nussbaum,supra, at 205-46; Puchala,supra, at 3-17; Rhoda E. Howard,
CulturalAbsolutismand the Nostalgiafor Community,15 HUM. RTS.Q. 315 (1993);Ray
HumanRightsQuarterly22 (2000) 501-547 @ 2000 by The JohnsHopkinsUniversityPress
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502 HUMAN RIGHTSQUARTERLY Vol. 22
the lastword in ethicaltheory.Inwhat follows I challengethis stateof affairs

by refutingthe chief argumentsfor culturalrelativism.
Indoing this I walk some oft-troddenpaths,4but I also breaknew ones.
For instance, I take unusualpains to adequatelyformulateculturalrelativ-
ism,5and I distinguishit fromthe relativismof present-dayanthropologists,
with which it is often conflated.Also, I addressnot one or two, but eleven
differentargumentsfor culturalrelativism,many of which contributeto its
popularitybut receive scant attentionfromits critics.Toelicit perspicuously
the failings of these arguments,I deploy a host of pertinent but often
neglected distinctions.In the end, culturalrelativismis seen for what it is:
for all its allure and popularity,it is intellectuallydestitute.
II. FORMULATINGCULTURALRELATIVISM
My firstaim is to produce an adequateformulationof culturalrelativism.

This is not so easy. Relativistsstate their view in variousways, and those
statementsare neitherprecise nor equivalent.6Also, there are two ways in
Kiely, ThirdWorldistRelativism:A New Formof Imperialism,25 J. CONTEMP.ASIA159

(1995); Anne F. Bayefsky,CulturalSovereignty,Relativism,and InternationalHuman
Rights:New Excusesfor Old Strategies,9 RATIOJURIS42 (1996).
4. Criticalstudiesof culturalrelativismare numerous.Usefulones includethe "correctives"
in note 3. See also W.T.STACE,THE CONCEPTOF MORALSchs. 1-2, 10 (1937);ElginWilliams,
Anthropologyforthe CommonMan,49 AM.ANTHROPOLOGIST 84 (1947);FrankE.Hartung,
CulturalRelativityand MoralJudgments,21 PHIL.SCI.118 (1954);PaulF. Schmidt,Some
Criticismsof CulturalRelativism,52 J. PHIL.780 (1955);DavidBidney,ThePhilosophical
Presuppositionsof CulturalRelativismand CulturalAbsolutism,in ETHICS ANDTHESOCIAL
SCIENCES B. BRANDT, ETHICAL
51 (Leo Ward ed., 1959); RICHARD ch. 11 (1959); T. L.
THEORY
McClintock,TheArgumentforEthicalRelativismfromthe Diversityof Morals,47 MONIST
528 (1963); PAUL W. TAYLOR, PRINCIPLES
OFETHICSch. 2 (1975); William H. Shaw, Relativism
and Objectivityin Ethics,in MORALITYANDMORAL CONTROVERSIES31 (JohnArthured., 1981);
F. C. WHITE, KNOWLEDGEAND RELATIVISM STOUT, ETHICSAFTERBABELpt. 1
chs. 4-5 (1983); JEFFREY
(1988); LouisP. POJMAN, ETHICS:
DISCOVERINGRIGHT ANDWRONGchs. 2-3 (2d ed. 1995). My
discussionhas benefittedfromthese authorsat manypoints.A relatednote:this article
was finishedin all essentialsin mid-1997;hence, it makes littleuse of itemsthat have
appearedsince then. Amongthose itemsare the following,which I recommendhighly:
ElizabethM. Zechenter,Inthe Nameof Culture:CulturalRelativismand theAbuseof the
Individual,53 J. ANTHROPOLOGICAL RES.319 (1997); MichaelJ. Perry,Are HumanRights
Universal?: The Relativist Challenge and Related Matters, 19 HUM.RTS.Q. 461 (1997);
MICHELEM. MOODY-ADAMS, FIELDWORK PLACES:MORALITY,CULTURE,AND PHILOSOPHY
IN FAMILIAR
(1997);WilliamMaxKnorppJr.,WhatRelativismIsn't,73 PHILOSOPHY277 (1998);JOHNW.
ANDCULTURAL
COOK,MORALITY DIFFERENCES
(1999).
5. One of my aims is to avoid the errors listed in the Appendix.
6. For a prime example, see JAMESF. DOWNS,CULTURES ch. 2 (2d ed. 1975). Downs not
INCRISIS
only fails to pin down the moral theory he intends, but allows it to change from page to
page and to remain entangled with nonmoral ones. For other examples, see RUTH
BENEDICT,PATTERNS OF CULTURE278 (1934); Ruth Benedict, Ideologies in the Light of
ComparativeData, in AN ANTHROPOLOGIST ATWORK383-84 (Margaret Mead ed., 1959);
MELVILLE CULTURAL
J. HERSKOVITS, INCULTURAL
PERSPECTIVES
RELATIVISM: 14, 15, 32-33,
PLURALISM 93,
101 (Frances Herskovits ed., 1973).
2000 CulturalRelativism 503
which a judgmentmightbe relativeto a culture.First,itstruth(orfalsehood)

might be relativeto the culture.That is, the judgmentmight be true in a
relative ratherthan an ordinary,nonrelativeway. Second, the judgment
mightbe true in an ordinaryway but be relativeto a culturethrougha tacit
referenceto the culture. In the first case, the relativityof the judgment
derivesfromthe relativityof moraltruth.Inthe second, the relativityderives
fromthe contentof the judgment.Thetwo cases differsharply,butthis is not
noticed, much less appreciated,in the classic sourcesfor relativism.
Despitethese difficulties,we can formulatea view thatstrikesa balance
among the following:precision,plausibility,significanceas a moraltheory,
and faithfulnessto the aims of leadingculturalrelativists.7
Firstsome terminologicalpoints. Whenever I speak of one or more
people, the people are moralagents as well as humanbeings.8If I say that
such-and-suchis true of Westernculture, the Westernersalluded to are
moral agents. (Manyhuman beings, e.g., infants,do not qualify as such.)
Also, the words "people,""agents,"and their cognates refer not just to
actual human agents, but to realisticallyimaginableones. Here the word
"realistically"indicates that neither the people nor their lives have any
grosslyfar-fetchedfeatures-for instance,featuresthat are contraryto what
we know about the biological natureof humans. The same goes for the
word "cultures."If I say that such-and-suchis confined to a small set of
cultures,I mean thatsuch-and-suchis confinedto a smallset of the cultures
that are actual or realisticallyimaginable.9
7. I have in mindBENEDICT,supranote6; RuthBenedict,Anthropologyand theAbnormal,10

J. GEN.PSYCHOL. 59 (1934); HERSKOVITS, supra note 6; MELVILLE J. HERSKOVITS, MANANDHIS
WORKS (1948); and WILLIAM GRAHAM SUMNER, FOLKWAYS (1906). (Some would add Edward
Westermarck to this list, but he is properly classified as a moral subjectivist, not as a
cultural relativist.) Benedict's work reflects the influence of Oswald Spengler, who
defends cultural relativism in 1 OSWALD SPENGLER, THEDECLINE OFTHEWEST 345-46 (Charles
F. Atkinson trans., 1932) (rev. ed. 1922). A lesser known relativist, well worth consulting,
is CLARENCE E. AYRES, HOLIERTHANTHOU: THE WAY OF THERIGHTEOUS (1929). Additional
endorsements of cultural relativism are easy to find. See, e.g., ALLEN WHEELIS,THEQUEST FOR
IDENTITY 94-96 (1958); EDMUND R. LEACH,A RUNAWAYWORLD?48 (1968); Paul Piccone,
Introduction, 106 TELOS8 (1996). For recent defenses (as opposed to mere endorsements)
of relativism,see RENTELN,supranote 3, ch. 3; CliffordGeertz,AntiAnti-Relativism, 86
AM.ANTHROPOLOGIST 263 (1984). Actually, "defenses" is not quite accurate. Geertz's aim is
not to support relativism, but to point out faults and excesses of anti-relativists. Renteln's
chief aim is to "correct the caricatured picture of relativism" and to uncover the
implications of relativism for human rights issues. RENTELN,supra note 3, ch. 3. So it is not
surprising that neither author adds to the stock of arguments used by Sumner, Benedict,
and Herskovits. A valuable history of cultural relativism is ELVIN HATCH, CULTUREAND
MORALITY: THERELATIVITYOFVALUES INANTHROPOLOGY (1983).
8. The point that they are human beings is not superfluous. Some philosophers use
"people" interchangeably with "rational agents," implying that nonhuman rational
agents would count as people. This article does not use "people" this broadly.
9. The concept of a nonexistent yet realistically imaginable culture (or person), although
fuzzy, is not too fuzzy to be useful. History provides many (though not the only)
examples of such cultures, just as science fiction provides many examples of "cultures"
504 HUMANRIGHTSQUARTERLY Vol. 22
Next, for simplicity,let us interpretculturalrelativismso that it pertains,

not to all moralstatements,but to an importantset of them, distinguishable
in part by their grammaticalform. Let us view it as a thesis about moral
judgments,restrictingthe lattertermto statementsof the form,"Xis (is not)
morallyright(primafacie right,wrong, good, preferableto Y,etc.),"where
X is an action, practice, or institution.Let us furtherrestrictthe term's
meaning by excluding the following: statementsthat are tautologous or
contradictory;statements that expressly reveal whether the object of
evaluationaccordswith the norms(habits,etc.) of a culture;and statements
thatcontain indexicalsor explicit referencesto particularpeople, groups,or
places. Statementsa throughe are moraljudgments;f throughk are not.'"
a. CapitalPunishmentis right.
b. Killinganimals is not good.
c. Lyingis primafacie wrong.
d. Adoptionis morallypreferableto abortion.
e. Payingone's debts is obligatory.
f. Oba's intentionsare noble.
g. Youought to keep your promise.
h. Adri is virtuous.
i. Wrongacts are wrong.
j. The customs of the Hopi are morally superior to those of the
Yanomami.
k. Acts that accord with the normsof the agent'scultureare right.
I emphasizethat only for simplicitydo I interpretculturalrelativismso
that it fails to concern f through k. Most relativistsintend their thesis to
pertainto many such statements.But we can avoid many complications,
and do so without diminishingthe plausibilityof culturalrelativism,if we
leave such statementsaside.
As a furtherpreliminary,let'ssay thata moraljudgmenthas unqualified
that fail to qualify. One reason for extending "cultures"to realisticallyimaginable

cultures,not just to actualones, is that it enables us to avoid Error6 in the Appendix.
Anyoneout to detail some of the centralfeaturesof realisticallyimaginableculturesor
personswould profitfromNussbaum,supranote 3, at 214-23.
10. Three comments: First,in this article "right,""wrong,"etc., mean "morallyright,"
"morallywrong,"etc. Second, some remarkspertinentto statementsi and j are in the
Appendix,and much is saidaboutk in SectionIV.Third,"Xis primafacie wrong"means
the same as "otherthingsbeing equal, X is wrong."
validity,or that it'sjust plain valid, if and only if it has these features:first,it
is true;and second, neitheritstruthnor its content is relativizedto a specific
personor group. If "stealingis wrong"is just plain valid, then it'strue that
stealing is wrong, and we need not qualify this by adding, "thatis, true
relative to culture C (group D, person E)."Also, the judgmentmakes no
covert referenceto a particulargroupor person. Forexample, it is neither
equivalentto, nor elliptical for, "stealingis wrong when done by those of
cultureC."11
We also can speakof judgmentsthatare validforX, where X is a person
or group. A moral judgmentis valid for X just in case one of two things
obtains:eitherthe judgmentis just plain valid, or else it has these features:
it is true, and although its truthor its content is tied to a specific set of
people, X is within that set and thus unable to evade the judgment.12If
"lying is wrong" is valid for Europeans,no Europeancan sidestep it by
saying,"butthatjudgmentis shorthandfor 'lying is wrongwhen Africansdo
it,'"or "butonly relativeto Asiansis it truethat lying is wrong."In short,the
judgment pertainsto thefts by Europeans,and is true for Europeans.No
Europeancan brushit aside.
A judgmentis universallyvalidjust in case it is valid for everyone. It is
locally valid just in case it is valid for some, but not all, cultures. It is
culturallyrelativejust in case it has featuresthat ensure that it's at best
locally valid, never universallyso.
We now can formulateculturalrelativism,followed by its chief rival:
* CulturalRelativism:Althoughfor every culture some moral judg-
mentsare valid, no moraljudgmentis universallyvalid. Everymoral
judgmentis culturallyrelative.13
* Universalism:Some moraljudgmentsare universallyvalid.
11. This is not the only way for "stealingis wrong"to makea covertreference(as I use that
term)to C. Itwould do so if "wrong"were a relationalterm(like "tall")and C were the
relevantreferenceclass.
12. Two remarks:first,I am assumingthata moraljudgmentis validfor groupX only if it is
validforeach memberof X. Second,as my wordingindicates,I am deliberatelyignoring
the possibilitythatsome moraljudgmentsare relativeto groupX, but not to group Y,in
theirtruth,and to Y,but not to X, in theircontent.Thisview lacks proponents,not to
mentionplausibility.
13. Given the meaningof "culturallyrelative,"some brandsof relativismface a curious
problem.Theyassertthatsome moraljudgmentsarevalidfor no one. Butif "Xis wrong"
is validforno one, it seems to followthat"Xis notwrong"is validforeveryone,in which
case culturalrelativismis false. Havingmentionedthis problem,Iwill put it aside,except
to say thatthe relativistswho face it are not alone. A variationof it plagueserrortheories
of moraljudgment.(Forsuch a theory,see J.L. MACKIE, ETHICS:INVENTING RIGHTAND WRONG
(1977).) Ifwe agreewith errortheoriststhatall moraljudgments,including"stealingis
wrong,"arefalse,we seem to implythat"stealingis notwrong"is true,in which case not
all moral judgments are false. For more on this problem and the prospects for
overcomingit, see JonathanHarrison,Mackie's Moral Scepticism,57 PHIL.173 (1982).
Although most of this article concerns culturalrelativism,some of it

concerns agent relativismand appraiserrelativism,which are statedbelow.
Thoroughness requires that we address these views, because cultural
relativists,includingSumner,Benedict,and Herskovits,often say thingsthat
suggestthem.14But I hesitateto attributeeitherview to those authors.This
is because both views are grossly implausible.I show this in the fourth
section of this article;in the fifthI proceedto my maintopic: argumentsfor
culturalrelativism.
* Agent Relativism:Moral judgmentsthat positively assess an ac-
tion-for instance, "that was morally good," and "it would be
morallyrightfor Claireto assist Alph"-are true if and only if the
action accords with the cultural norms (i.e., socially approved
habits)of the agent who performsthe action. By the same token,
moraljudgmentsthatnegativelyassess an action are true if and only
if the action conflictswith the culturalnormsof the relevantagent.
* AppraiserRelativism:If a person makes a positive moraljudgment
about an action or an action-type-for instance, by asserting"that
was morallyright"or "cannibalismis morallyOK"-her judgmentis
true if and only if the action accordswith the normsof her culture.
If she makes a negative moral judgment about the action, her
judgmentis true if and only if the action conflictswith the normsof
her culture.
IIl. CLARIFYINGREMARKS
The views to be discussed require eight further comments. First, my

formulationof culturalrelativismcontainsthe word "valid,"the explication
of which contains the word "true."Perhaps some will frown at this,
maintainingthat truthis a dated and stiflingconcept. But such frownsare
hardto take seriously.Toassertthattruthis a datedconcept is to putforward
as truethe statement,"truthis a datedconcept."Thosewho thinkotherwise
are loading the word "true"with more meaning than it actually has. To
asserta propositionis to advance it as true;so unlesswe are preparedto quit
makingassertions,we should not frownon the notion of truth.Perhapswe
should frownon certaintheoriesof truth,but that is anotherpoint.
14. SUMNER,supranote 7, supranote 6, at 101; Benedict,supra

?? 31, 65, 439; HERSKOVITS,
note 7, at 73. The terms"agentrelativism"and "appraiserrelativism,"by the way, are
borrowedfrom David Lyons,EthicalRelativismand the Problemof Incoherence,86
ETHICS107 (1976). (Lyonsuses the terms "agent's-grouprelativism"and "appraiser's-
grouprelativism.")
Second, throughoutmost of this article I speak as if universalismwere

the only alternativeto culturalrelativism.This is partlyfor simplicityand
partly because the debate over cultural relativism is mainly between
culturalrelativistsand universalists.It is not because culturalrelativismand
universalismare the only possibilities.One way to oppose culturalrelativ-
ism without being a universalistis to defend moral nihilism,the view that
every moralstatementis eitherfalse or meaninglessand hence valid for no
one.15
Third,culturalrelativismis not advancedby its proponentsas a relative
truth.Theirview is not thatculturalrelativismis true relativeto a particular
group, but that culturalrelativismis true, period.16We should readcultural
relativismwith this in mind, and thus distinguishit from more global forms
of relativismthat do not exempt the judgment,"everymoral judgmentis
culturallyrelative,"from being true in only a relativeway. However,we
cannot ignore these other forms of relativism. Unfortunately,cultural
relativistssometimesuse one of them when arguingtheircase. They invoke
totalrelativism,the view thatevery statementis trueor false relativeto one
of a myriad of incommensurable,but equally rational, frameworksof
belief."7I say "unfortunately"because the resultingargumentfails dismally.
We will encounterit in a latersection.
Fourth,we must sharplydistinguishthe theses in the previoussection
fromthe relativismof present-dayanthropologists.Earlyin this centurysuch
a distinctionwould have been unnecessary,but now things are different.
When anthropologistsspeak of "culturalrelativism"they seldom have in
mind an ethical view.18 They usuallymean one of the following:19
15. A pristineexample of moral nihilism is the emotive theory defended by A.J. AYER,
ch.
ANDLOGIC
LANGUAGE,TRUTH 6 (2d ed. 1946).
16. This is not only the standardway of interpretingcultural relativism,but the only
charitableway. It also is borneout by the unqualifiedway in which culturalrelativists
statetheirthesis.See, e.g., SUMNER,
supranote 7, ?? 31, 42, 65, 439, 572; HERSKOVITS,
supra
note 6, at 101; Benedict,supranote 7, at 73. Also relevantare RENTELN,supranote 3, at
68-69; Schmidt,supranote 4, at 781-82.
17. Forexample,Sumner,Benedict,and Herskovitsseem to do this at times. (I say "seem"
becausethey are not entirelyclear aboutthe thesisthey intend.)See SUMNER,supranote
7, ? 232; BENEDICT,supranote 6, at 2; HERSKOVITS,supranote 6, at 15.
18. Andwhen they do havesuch a view in mind,we usuallyfindthem rejectingit. See, e.g.,
HATCH, supra note 7, chs. 5, 7; H. RUSSELLBERNARD, RESEARCHMETHODSIN CULTURAL
ANTHROPOLOGY117 (1988); HenryH. Bagish,Confessionsof a FormerCulturalRelativist,
90/91, at 30 (Elvio Angeloni ed., 1990); STANLEY
in ANTHROPOLOGY TAMBIAH,
JEYARAJA MAGIC,
(1990); Janine Hitchens, Critical
128-29
SCIENCE,RELIGION,AND THE SCOPE OF RATIONALITY
Implicationsof FranzBoas' Theoryand Methodology,19 DIALECTICAL 237,
ANTHROPOLOGY
248-49 (1994); CONRADPHILLIP OF HUMANDIVERSITY
THEEXPLORATION
ANTHROPOLOGY:
KOTTAK,
45-46 (6th ed. 1994); James P. Spradley& David W. McCurdy,Cultureand the
ContemporaryWorld, in CONFORMITY AND CONFLICT8 (JamesP. Spradley& David W.
write
McCurdyeds., 9th ed. 1997). A second point:when contemporaryanthropologists
theysometimeschoose wordsthatsuggestone of the theories
about"culturalrelativism,"
* MethodologicalContextualism:Everycustom,belief, or action must

be studiedin the contextof the culturein which it occurs. Thatis, it
must be studied in lightof the historyand traditions,problemsand
opportunities,and total body of customsof the society in which it is
found. Otherwise,we will gain little insightinto other cultures.
* Methodological Neutralism:To understandother cultures, social
scientists must suppress their moral convictions when studying
those cultures.Althoughthey cannot entirelyfree themselvesfrom
such convictions,they should tryto put the convictionsaside in the
interestof accurateresearch.
These views entail none of the forms of relativismdefined earlier.20For
example,they do not entailculturalrelativism,forthey implynothingabout
moralvalidity.The general lesson here is that althoughculturalrelativism
has adherentsin many academic disciplines, it is not the gospel in any of
those disciplines, including anthropology.The view that relativismis an
axiom of anthropologyis eitherfalse or fiftyyearsout of date.21
Fifth,if the differencebetween appraiserrelativismand agent relativism
is not clear,or if it is not clear just how sharpthatdifferenceis, an example
will help. Suppose the normsof Ravi'sculturedifferfrom those of Ruth's.
Suppose also that Ruthis doing somethingthat accords with the normsof
her culture but not with those of Ravi's. Ravi states that Ruth'sdeed is
wrong. Accordingto appraiserrelativism,Ravi'sstatementis true because
in Section II. But when their words are read in context, the view in question almost
alwaysturnsout to be one of those below. Thispointmay pertainto a few of the authors
in note 19.
19. Thesepositionsare not new in anthropology(Benedictand Herskovitsheld both),nor is
the habitof callingthem "culturalrelativism." What is new-i.e., differentfromthe first
half of the century-is the habit of restrictingthat term to these positions, thereby
excludingthe moraltheoriesin SectionII.Forthe firstof the two positions,see RICHLEY H.
CRAPO, CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY 17, 38-39 (3d ed. 1993); MICHAEL C. HOWARD, CONTEMPORARY
CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY 5-6, 14 (4th ed. 1993); SERENA
NANDA,CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY 17, 19
(5thed. 1994);F.AllanHanson,Racismand Relativism,10 TIKKUN 63, 66 (1995). Forthe
second position,see HATCH,supranote 7, at 11; Bagish,supranote 18, at 33-34; MARVIN
HARRIS, CULTURAL 10-11
ANTHROPOLOGY (3d ed. 1991); David H.P. Maybury-Lewis, A
SpecialSortof Pleading:Anthropologyat the Serviceof EthnicGroups,in TALKINGABOUT
PEOPLE:READINGSIN CONTEMPORARY 16,
CULTURALANTHROPOLOGY 17 (William A. Haviland &
RobertJ. Gordoneds., 2d ed. 1996).
20. Thisis emphasizedby some of the social scientistswho acceptthese views. Examplesare
HATCH, supranote 7, at 11; Hanson,supranote 19; HOWARD, supranote 19; Maybury-
Lewis,supranote 19.
21. Thisdated view is common among philosophers;unfortunately,it often blindsthem to
some worthwhile literature.I have in mind the many useful criticismsof cultural
relativismthathave been writtenby anthropologists. Threeexamples:HATCH, supranote
7, chs. 4-5; Bidney, supra note 4; David Bidney, The Concept of Value in Modern
Anthropology,in ANTHROPOLOGYTODAY 682 (A. L. Kroebered., 1953).
the deed he is evaluating conflicts with the norms of his culture. But
accordingto agent relativism,Ravi'sstatementis false because the evalu-
ated deed accords with the normsof the agent'sculture, the agent being
Ruth.
Sixth,agent relativismand appraiserrelativismdifferin manyways from
culturalrelativism.Forone thing, each concerns a class of statementsthat
differsfrom (but overlaps with) the class we have dubbed "moraljudg-
ments." (For instance, unlike cultural relativism, agent relativism and
appraiser relativismeach extend to the statement, "that act is right.")
Further,each is more specific than culturalrelativismabout severalthings,
including the aspect of culture to which moralityis connected and the
natureof the connection. Eachassertsa connection between moralityand
normsand maintainsthat the connection is as tightas possible.
The differencejust mentioned has importantconsequences. Suppose
that Clairebuys some veal, her deed agreeingboth with the normsof her
culture and with those of Chen's. Later,Claire and Chen conclude that
Claire's deed was wrong. (Perhaps they have become animal rights
activists.)Agent relativismand appraiserrelativismeach imply that Claire
and Chen have drawnfalse conclusions. Butculturalrelativism,as we have
defined it, has no such implication.Culturalrelativismdoes not exclude the
possibilitythat even though buyingveal accordswith the normsof Claire's
culture, "buyingveal is wrong" is valid for her culture, whereas "buying
veal is right"is invalid.
A key point here is thatculturalrelativismdoes not assertan agreement
between valid moraljudgmentsand norms.Perhaps"eatingveal is wrong"
is valid for a culture,even thougheatingveal accordswith the normsof the
culture.Anotherkey point is thatculturalrelativismimpliesno testfor moral
validity.Thatis, it does not tell us how to check moraljudgmentsforvalidity
or how to identifythe culturesfor which the judgmentsare valid.22Most
relativistswill flesh out their thesis to say that the scope of any moral
judgment'svaliditymatchesthe scope of variousnorms,meaningthat the
judgmentis valid only forculturesthatsharethose norms.And mostwill say
that it's the agreementof the judgment with the norms that makes the
judgment valid. But this is beside the point. The point is that cultural
relativismsimpliciteris simply a metaethicalthesis that limitsthe scope of
each moral judgment'svalidity.It is not a normativethesis that helps us
identifyvalid moraljudgmentsor their correspondingcultures.23(As some
22. supranote 7.
See, e.g., Ayres,supranote 7; WHEELIS,
23. A metaethicaltheory aims to illuminateone or more featuresof moral languageor
thought, perhapseven to provide a comprehensiveaccount of such language and
thought. A normativeethical theory furnishesmoral guidance by, say, providinga
methodfor identifyingvalid moraljudgments.Insayingthatculturalrelativismis strictly
mightput it, culturalrelativismis merelya schemafor normativetheoriesof

a particulartype.) This does not make the thesis trivial. For one thing, if
culturalrelativismis true many normativetheories stand refuted,for they
presupposeuniversalism.
Seventh, universalism,like culturalrelativism,is strictlymetaethical.It
does not tell us how to identify universallyvalid moral judgments.At
variouspoints I speak of this or that "version"of universalism,by which I
mean the combinationof universalismeither with a belief that this or that
moraljudgmentis universallyvalid, or with a proposalabout how to check
moraljudgmentsforvalidity.24 Butuniversalismsimpliciterdiffersfromall of
these "versions."Fromthe bare fact that a person is a universalistwe can
infer nothingabout the content of his moral beliefs-for example, that he
opposes multiculturalism or affirmativeaction. We can infermerelythat he
thinksthat some moraljudgmentsare universallyvalid. Perhapshe has no
detailed list in mind.
Thispoint is especially relevantin latersections (e.g., VI,partK).Butit's
worthnotingearly,forthis reason:some universalistshave highlyconserva-
tive agendas; they want to persuade us not only of universalism,but of
specific moral judgmentsthat discourage liberal causes. This leads some
people to confuse universalismwith conservatism.To prevent misunder-
standing,let me note that I am not writingas a conservative,particularlyif
"conservative"implies antipathyto culturalpluralism.
Eighth,culturalrelativismis often defined as the view that "different
cultures are subject to different moral standards"or that "the moral
standardsof one culturedo not apply to others."Butthe terms"subjectto,"
"standards,"and "applyto" are left undefined, makingthe definitions in
which they figureunclear.The terminologyin Section II helps removethe
unclarity,turningthe previously murkyexpressions into handy ways of
statingthe relativist'skey points. Letus say that culture C is "subjectto" a
moral standardthat requires (permits, forbids) X, or that the standard
"applies to" C, just in case the moral judgment "X is obligatory (right,
wrong)"is valid for C. Culturalrelativismcan now be expressedas the view
that althoughall culturesare subjectto moralstandards,there is no moral
standardthat applies to all cultures.
metaethical,I am deviatingfromthe views of Sumner,Benedict,and Herskovits,who

intend their theory to be normativeas well as metaethical.But I am doing so in a
charitableway, a way that cuts down on the numberof objectionsto which they are
open. Insofaras Sumner,Benedict, and Herskovitsdefend a normativetheory, that
theory is a brandof agent relativismor appraiserrelativism,and hence open to the
objectionsin Section IV.See generallythe passagescited in notes 14 and 27.
24. countsas a full-blownnormativetheory,
Not everythingI call a "versionof universalism"
thoughmanysuch theoriesare indeedversionsof universalism.
IV. AGENT RELATIVISM

AND APPRAISERRELATIVISM
This section addresses agent relativismand appraiserrelativism.25 These

views have absurd implications,largely because they assert a skin tight
connection between moralityand culturalnorms.
Imaginea culture in which the norms requirethe first-bornof each
familyto be burnedalive at the age of two. Thisnormdid not evolve willy-
nilly;it grew up, and remainscurrent,owing to the belief thatthe frequency
of plaguescan be diminishedonly by burningthe first-bornof each family.
This custom causes great suffering,but those who practice it see it as a
necessaryevil. Now supposethata memberof thisculturedevotes herselfto
the study of disease and discovers that burningfirst-bornchildren does
nothingto reduce the frequencyof plagues.Accordingto agent relativism,
this person should dismiss her discovery as irrelevantto the moralityof
burningfirst-bornchildren. The rightnessof a deed is determinedby the
normsof the agent'sculture;it has nothingto do with the originor rationale
of those norms. Perhapsthe norms derive from errorsabout the conse-
quences of what the normsprescribe,but accordingto agent relativismthis
makesno differenceto the rightnessor wrongnessof violatingthose norms.
This implicationof agent relativismis absurd.Ifa moralevaluationof a
practicestems, however indirectly,fromerrorsabout the consequences of
the practice,the correctionof those errorsis surely relevantto subsequent
thinkingabout the moralityof the practice.
A second implicationof agent relativismis that we can resolveethical
disputesby takinga poll or in some otherway uncoveringthe local norms.
Thisis ludicrous.Ifwe findtwo Alaskansarguingaboutwhetherit would be
rightfor them to go herringfishing,it'suseless to tell them thatsuch fishing
agreeswith the normsof theirculture.Theyalreadyknow that;theirdispute
concerns somethingelse.
A thirdissue is that agent relativismcauses problemsfor the notion of
moral reform. Imagine a culture in which the norms prescribe racial
discrimination,and a memberof thatculturetriesto reformit by peacefully
resistingthe oppressivenormsand inspiringothersto do likewise. If agent
relativismis true,this personis not a reformerbuta wrongdoer,for his deeds
conflict with the normsof his culture.The general problemis easy to see.
The quintessentialmoralreformeris one who furthersthe cause of morality
25. Much of the material in this section is taken, with slight modifications, from two of my
previouspapers:JohnJ. Tilley, CulturalRelativism,Universalism,and the Burdenof
Proof,27 MILLENNIUM275 (1998); John J. Tilley, The Problemfor NormativeCultural
272 (1998) [hereinafterTilley, The Problem]. The same goes for
Relativism, 11 RATIOJURIS
some other portions of this essay. For instance, much of Section VII, part F, appears in
Tilley, The Problem, supra, at 281-82.
by challenging practices that are deeply entrenched in his culture. But

accordingto agent relativism,to challenge such practicesis not to further
the cause of morality;it is to do justthe opposite.Thus,paradoxically,to be
a moral reformeris to fail to be a moral reformer.
Appraiserrelativism is no more plausible than agent relativism. It
implies,falsely,thatCelia does not necessarilycontradictherselfif she says
to Yoko, "When you say that abortion is morally right, what you say is
perfectlytrue. Nevertheless,abortionis not morallyright."26 PerhapsCelia's
culture differsfrom Yoko's,and abortionagrees with the normsof Yoko's
culturebut not with those of Celia's. If so, to accept appraiserrelativismis
to implythatCelia'scommentto Yokois not only logicallyflawlessbut true.
The trouble,of course, is thatCelia'scomment is not logicallyflawless;it is
plainlycontradictory.
A second implausibleconsequence of appraiserrelativismis that to
morallycriticize the normsof one's own culture is always ridiculous.For
what is it to morallycriticize those norms if not to judge that many of the
deeds that accord with them are wrong? But according to appraiser
relativism,to judge those deeds as wrong is to judge falsely,given that the
normswith which they accord are the normsof one's own culture.
Let'sconsider a third problem for appraiserrelativism.Suppose the
normsof Ali'sculturepermitpolygyny,butthe normsof Juan'scultureforbid
it. Now suppose thatAli and Juaneach assert,at the same time and place,
and in the same situation,"polygyny,whenever and whereverit occurs, is
morallyright."Ifappraiserrelativismis true,Ali has uttereda truthand Juan
has uttereda falsehood, which means they have made differentassertions
about polygyny.This is puzzling, to say the least.
Appraiserrelativistshave a reply,but it'snot effective.Theirreplyis that
"morallyright"means "inaccordwith the normsof my culture."27 The latter
phrasecontains the indexicalexpression"my culture";so there is nothing
puzzling about the claim that when Juanand Ali say "polygynyis morally
right"they are assertingdifferentthings. Eachspeakeris tacitly referringto
his own culture.
The troublewith this reply is that it's patentlyfalse. If "morallyright"
were a stand-infor "in accord with the normsof my culture,"anyone who
morallydenounced a practiceaftergrantingthat it agreeswith the normsof
her culturewould contradictherself. If Jill said, "Racismaccords with the
normsof my culture,but it'snot morallyright,"she would be guiltynot only
of a falsehood but of a contradiction.Clearly,though, Jill has utteredno
26. See JONATHAN HARRISON, OUR KNOWLEDGE OF RIGHTANDWRONG230 (1971). See also id. at
120-21.
27. For variants of this view, see SUMNER,supra note 7, ? 439; Benedict, supra note 7, at 73.
contradiction.Thus,"morallyright"is not a stand-infor "inaccordwith the

normsof my culture."
V. ARGUMENTSFOR CULTURALRELATIVISM
Culturalrelativism("relativism"for short) is not as clearly flawed as the

previous two views. It implies that morality is somehow a function of
culture,but unlikeagent relativismand appraiserrelativism,it says nothing
about the exact natureof the function or the aspects of culture to which
moralityis tied. So its proponentscan argue,withoutobvious absurdity,that
they can flesh out theirview to avoid problemsof the kindjust discussed.28
Even so, their thesis requiressupport,and as shown in the next few
sections, it receives no supportfrom the relativists'arguments.29Some of
these argumentsare tempting,otherswarrantthe commentfamouslymade
by F.H. Bradleyabout an opponent'sthinking:"I am ashamed to have to
examine such reasoning,but it is necessaryto do so, since it is common
enough."30 All of the argumentsfail. Theirappeal stems from confusions,
and once the confusions are cleared up-that is, once we make some
distinctions-the argumentscollapse. Whatfollows are unadornedversions
of the arguments.Furtherrefinements,as well as the distinctions that
underminethe arguments,come later.
A. The Triviality Argument
Accordingto the firstargument,universalismis temptingonly if we focus on

judgmentsthatare so lackingin definitecontentthateven if they were valid
28. Fora hintas to how they mightproceed,see the second sentence in note 11. Frankly,I
believe thata close scrutinyof culturalrelativismwould uncoverproblemsof the kind
discussedin SectionIV.I will not pursuethis because I wantto focus on the arguments
for culturalrelativism.
29. Mostof these argumentsfall intothreecategories.Thosein the firstcategoryaimto show
that relativismis confirmedby the studyof diversecultures.Those in the second aim to
revealdesirableaspectsof relativismor undesirableaspectsof universalism.Thosein the
thirdaim to illustrateby examplethatwhat is wrong in one cultureis not wrong in the
next, or thatwidely differentcustomscan be equally right.Presumably,we are to infer
from the examples that relativismis true, no doubt because it so easily explains the
illustratedpoint. Argumentsof all three types appearin the classic texts of relativism,
though often in only embryonic form. For example, what I later dub the "nomad
argument"and the "ethnocentrismargument"are suggested,respectively,by SUMNER,
supranote 7, ? 333; and HERSKOVITS,supranote 6, at 50. The "toleranceargument"is
supranote 7, at 76, 78.
suggestedin BENEDICT,supranote 6, at 37, 278; and in HERSKOVITS,
For the "researchargument,"see HERSKOVITS, supra note 6, at 14-15, 39, 51, 101;
HERSKOVITS,supranote 7, at 78.
30. F.H. BRADLEY,ETHICAL 115 n.2 (2d ed. 1927).
STUDIEs
for everyone, nothing importantwould follow. When offeringexamples of

universallyvalid moraljudgments,universalistswisely avoid the judgment,
"kindnessis right,period."Theyoffer"kindnessis primafacie right,"which
indeed has the look of a universallyvalid truth.However,the judgmenttells
us merelythat being an act of kindnessis a right-makingfeatureof any act.
How do we know when thatfeatureis outweighedby wrong-makingones,
resultingin an act of kindnessthat is ultimatelywrong ratherthan right?The
judgmentdoes not provide an answer; it leaves each cultureto solve the
problem its own way. Nor does the judgmentclarify "kindness;"hence,
different cultures will interpretthe term differently.Thus, even if the
judgmentis universallyvalid, nothingimportantfollows.
B. The PolygynyArgument
The next argumentbegins with facts aboutdifferentcultures.Some cultures

practice polygyny,others monogamy,and still others polyandry.In some
cultures modesty of dress is the norm; in others it is not. Also, although
peyote is outlawed in many cultures, it has a traditionalplace in others.
Such examples are numerous.What they share is a referenceto customs
that, no matterhow odd they appearto some, are seen as naturalby those
who practicethem. Can anyone say that only some of these customs are
right,that all of the others are wrong?Can anyone reasonablythink that
from this vast arrayof accepted customs, only a few warrantthe label
"moral,"the others being immoralor evil? Surely not; hence we should
grantthat rightand wrong varywith culture.
C. The Human Sacrifice Argument
The thirdargumentresemblesthe second, but concerns a more "appalling"

*custom.The custom is thatof beheadingpeople, often dozens at a time, as
a formof religioussacrifice.3'In our culturethis deed would be wrong, but
just imaginean isolatedculturethat has practicedit for ages and sees it as
mandated from heaven.32The people of this culture have never had
occasion to questionthe practice;also, they see it as theironly way to avoid
divine punishment.
31. Othercustomscould have been chosen here, for example,the Dinka'sritualburialof

spear-masters or the Inuit'scustomof female infanticide.
32. Theterm"ourculture"(andany termakinto it), both here and elsewherein this article,
to referto mostany culturethe
need not referto the author'sculture.Itcan be interpreted
readerchooses, thoughin a few cases this mayrequireminoradjustmentsin the relevant
passageor argument.
Now imagine someone from our culture arrivingon their shores and
morallycondemningthem fortheirdeeds. Surelythis is ridiculous.Itwould
not be ridiculous,however, if aimed at perpetratorsof such deeds in our
own culture.Clearly,good and evil are culturallyvariable.
D. The Nomad Argument
The fourthargumentconcerns a homicidal custom that derives, not from

religiousbeliefs,butfromlivingconditions.Considera nomadicculturethat
mercifullykillsthose who aretoo old and feeble to walk long distances.The
nomadscannot carrythese people along with the group,yet migrationfrom
one food source to another is requiredfor the group'ssurvival.The only
alternativeto killingthe old and weak is to abandonthem to a slow death
by starvationand exposure. For this reason, the custom is to kill these
people in a painless way. Those who receive this treatmentsee it as
kindness;they would feel wronged if treateddifferently.
Can anyone plausiblysay that the custom described here is immoral?
Surelynot, yet the customdescribed,thatof killingthe old and weak, would
be wrong if practicedby us. Obviously,rightand wrong varywith culture.
E. The ResearchArgument
We now come to the most common argumentfor relativism.To state it

simply,researchshows thatthe moralityof one culturediffersradicallyfrom
thatof the next. The word "radically"is crucial.The point is that moralities
differ fundamentally,not merely in what they prescribeabout this or that
practice. This has been documented at length through the work of
anthropologistsand shows that what is rightfor one culture is wrong for
others.
F. The True-for-Them
Argument
The sixth argumentresemblesthe fifth,but is worthconsideringseparately.
Accordingto the true-for-them argument,a studyof diverseculturesreveals
that whatever is true for one culture is false for others. For example,
althoughfor us it is truethatthe earthis spherical,for the ancient Egyptians
it was true that the earth is flat. This does not stop us from criticizingthe
Egyptians'views, but such criticismmerely reflectsour own standpoint;it
does not show that for the Egyptiansthe earthwas not flat. What goes for
geological statements clearly goes for moral ones, so no moral judgment is
universally valid.
G. The FallibilismArgument
The next argumentfocuses not on the notion of truth, but on that of

certainty.It begins with the plausiblepremise,often called fallibilism,that
all knowledgeis tentative,provisional.Thereare no beliefsof which we can
be absolutelycertain,no incorrigibletruthson which our belief systemcan
be founded. Therefore,when justifyingour beliefs we must ultimatelyrely
on the customs and traditionsof our respectivecultures. This applies to
moral beliefs no less than to any others and resultsin a brandof cultural
relativism.Thus, to reject culturalrelativismis implausible;to do so is to
accept the outdated,discreditedview that absolutecertaintyis attainable.
H. The EmpiricalOutlook Argument
Accordingto the eighth argument,to rejectrelativismin favorof universal-

ism is to opt for the view that moralstandardsare absolute. Butwho in this
scientificage can accept such a view! How can it be truethatmonogamyis
not only morally right, but absolutely so? And if moral standardsare
absolute ratherthan relative,exactly what are they and from whence do
they come?Arethey mysteriousentitiesthatexist outsideof time and space?
Do we graspthemthroughmysticalinsight?Clearly,anyone with a modern,
empiricaloutlook will rejectsuch hypothesesand accept relativism.
I. The EthnocentrismArgument
We can introducethe next argumentby asking,who's to judge?Universal-

ists say that some moraljudgmentsare valid for everyone, but when asked
to statethem they always list the rulesof theirculture.They label as "right"
the habitsof theirown people and condemnas "wrong"the habitsof others.
In short, universalistsare implicitlyethnocentric;they have an attitudeof
culturalsuperiority.Butsuch an attitudeis unjustified;the reasonableoption
is to accept relativism.
J. The Naivete Argument
A further reason to accept relativism is that to accept its opposite,

universalism,is to reveala childish naivet. about the source and influence
of morality. Our morality derives, not from the apprehension of moral truths,
but from enculturation. And no matter what its source, it has only a limited
effect on behavior. Most human affairs are guided, not by moral principles,
2000 CulturalRelativism 51 7
but by politics, and normally reflect the interests of those in power. This is
especially true of what appear to be disputes about moral precepts. As one
author puts it, commenting on the principle of free speech:
People cling to [these] pieties because they do not wish to face . . . Y the
alternative.Thatalternativeis politics,the realization... Ythatdecisionsabout
what is and is not protectedin the realmof expressionwill restnot on principle
or firmdoctrine,buton the abilityof some persons,to interpret-recharacterize
or rewrite-principleand doctrinein ways that lead to the protectionof speech
they want heardand the regulationof speech they want silenced. . . . In short,
the name of the game has always been politics... ..
K. The Tolerance Argument
The final argument is this: Relativism, unlike other moral theories, has the
following attractive feature: to accept it is to be tolerant of other cultures.
Relativism implies that we cannot impose our morality on other cultures,
which in turn implies that we must refrainfrom doing so. And to refrainfrom
doing so is to be tolerant. Thus, if we accept relativism we are logically
committed to a policy of tolerance.
VI. NEGLECTEDDISTINCTIONS
This section presents the distinctions relativists neglect, the distinctions that
undermine the above arguments. The next section continues the discussion
and application of the distinctions and considers replies from the relativist.
A. Indefinite judgments versus Empty judgments
First, we must distinguish indefinite judgments, meaning those whose

content is indefinite, from empty ones. A moral judgment is empty just in
case it is both practically and philosophically unimportant, in which case
we can grant it to be universally valid without granting anything interesting.
The judgement, "kindness is prima facie right"is indefinite, but it is far from
empty. It is indefinite because it does not settle the question whether this or
that act is one of kindness, or whether, assuming an act to be one of
33. StanleyFish, There'sNo Such Thingas FreeSpeech and It'sa Good Thing,Too, in ARE
You POLITICALLY CULTURALSTANDARDS43, 51 (Francis J. Beckwith
CORRECT?:DEBATINGAMERICA'S
& Michael E. Bauman eds., 1993).
kindness,the act is morallyright.(This is not to say that these questions

cannot be settled;merelythatthe judgmentitselfdoes not settle them.) But
it is far from empty, for two reasons. Firstly,if it is universallyvalid
something importantfollows, namely, that relativismis false, not only in
letterbut in spirit.Forif "kindnessis primafacie right"is valid for everyone,
there is nothingabout moralconcepts thatpreventsthe judgmentsin which
they figurefrom being universallyvalid. So perhapsmany such judgments
are universallyvalid, including many that are highly definite. Those who
aim to identify such judgments can continue their work, ignoring any
naysayingfrom relativists.
Secondly, the view that kindness is prima facie right does not lack
practicalimportance.Some deeds clearlyare acts of kindness;othersclearly
are not. Perhapsa gray area exists between acts of the firstsort and acts of
the second, but this is irrelevant.A concept with fuzzy boundariesis not a
concept withoutboundaries.Also, many kind deeds have no featuresthat
could plausibly count as wrong-makingfeatures. Thus, their evaluation
requires no weighing of right-makingqualities against wrong-making
ones.34In sum, a judgmentcan be highly indefinitewithoutbeing vacuous
in a practicalsense.
B. Morality versus Victorian Morality
We must also distinguish morality, meaning morality as it is usually

conceived, from"Victorianmorality."The latterconsistsof a hodgepodgeof
taboos regardingsuch things as sexual behavior,styles of dress, marital
customs, and the use of intoxicants.It includes such precepts as these:
"premaritalsex is wrong;""wearingshortskirtsis immoral;"and "smoking
hashish is evil." Clearly, the subjects addressed by Victorian morality
constitute, at best, only a small portion of those addressed by morality.
Moralitycentrallyaddresses,not the length of hemlines and the like, but
actions by which we harm,killor endangerpeople, violatetheirautonomy,
or treatthem unfairly.Itaddressesrapeand torture,slaveryand genocide, to
name just a few things. The upshot is that any thesis that purportsto be
about morality-meaning moralityin general,not a limitedor marginalpart
of it-must addressdeeds of the sort just listed, not merelysuch things as
sexual behavior. Otherwise it rests on a contrived understandingof
"morality."35
34. Evenwhen this requirementexists, it seldom createsgreatdifficulties.But I will let this

pass.
35. "Butwho's to say what 'morality'means! Maybefor me it means nothingmore than
Victorianmorality!"Whateverthe attractionsof this response,relativistswould be wise
2000 Cultural Relativism 519
C. Liberalismversus Relativism
Third, we must distinguishrelativismfrom moral liberalism,a common

versionof universalism.36 Moralliberalshold thatsome moralrequirements
are universal,especially the requirementto respectone anotherand show
due regardfor the welfare,freedom,and culturalintegrityof all people. In
this way liberalsdifferfromrelativists.Theyalso differfrommoralconserva-
tives, for they do not condemn premaritalsex, homosexuality,the use of
marijuana,and many other things conservativesdenounce. Such things,
liberalscontend,are in themselvesneitherwrongnorobligatory;hence they
are morallypermissible.And because they are morallypermissible,each
personor culturehas considerableautonomywhen it comes to adoptingor
rejectingthem. Some liberalsexpressthis idea misleadingly,by saying that
"moralityis relative."Havingdone so, they call themselves"relativists" and
then feel hesitantto reject any view labeled "relativism."Predictably,we
often find them avowingtwo incompatibleviews, relativismand liberalism.
Just as liberals often stray into relativism,relativistsoften stray into
liberalism,despite the contradictioninvolved.37It is inconsistentto say, on
the one hand,that no moralrequirementis universaland, on the other,that
everyone is morallyrequiredto respectothercultures.No matterhow often
we find relativismand liberalismconjoined, we should not be duped into
seeing them as compatible.They are as contraryas any two views can be.
D. MoralJudgmentsversus Judgmentsof Blame
The fourthdistinctionis between moraljudgments,as earlierdefined, and

judgments of blame. I use "blame"broadly, to mean "blame, rebuke,
reproach,or reproval."To the extent that judgmentsof blame evaluate
something,they evaluatean agent,or an agent in relationto his actions. But
moral judgments evaluate actions themselves. Hence there is a great
differencebetween judgmentsof blame and moraljudgments.One conse-
quence is thatto cite facts aboutjudgmentsof blame-for instance,the fact
thatsuch judgmentsare inappropriatein manycontexts-is neitherto show,
to avoid it. Ifrelativismsays nothingaboutthe moralityof rape,torture,and racism,if it

impliesnothingaboutwhether"slaveryis wrong"and "genocideis evil"are universally
valid, it contributesnothingto moraltheory.
36. Notes2, 24, and 51 are relevanthere. Forexamplesof moralliberalism,see STACE,supra
note 4, chs. 3, 7-8; HATCH,supra note 7, ch. 7. Neither authormakes the mistake
mentionedlaterin this paragraph.
37. See, e.g., BENEDICT,supra note 6, at 37, 278; HERSKOVITS, supra note 6, at 33, 93-94;
HERSKOVITS, supranote 7, at 76. Fora pertinentand helpfuldiscussionof Benedict'swork,
see Williams,supranote 4.
nor to come close to showing, that no moraljudgmentis universallyvalid.

Forexample, even if we could prove that judgmentsof blame are always
we would not threatenthe claimthat"genocideis not
false or inappropriate,
good" is universallyvalid.38Whetherthat judgementis universallyvalid is
not settled by determining whether those who commit genocide are
blameworthy.39
E. Situationismversus Relativism
Next, we must distinguish relativismfrom the commonplace view that

whethera deed is rightor wrong "dependson the situation"or is "relative
to circumstances."This view is compatiblewith universalism.Supposewe
rejectrelativismbecause we see the followingas universallyvalid:"causing
needless sufferingis wrong." Now suppose we are asked, "Is it wrong to
detonate TNT?"Naturally,we will say that it depends on the situation.
However, in deciding what the situation demands we will consult the
principle we hold as universallyvalid: that causing needless sufferingis
wrong. It would be wrong to detonate TNT in a busy caf6, causing much
needless suffering.It would not be wrong to do so in a rock quarryas a
means of splittingrocks.
Similarremarksapply to other actions. Some acts, if performedby us,
would cause needless sufferingowing to the circumstancesin which we
live. Inotherculturesthey mightcause no sufferingowing to circumstances
that differmarkedlyfromours.40Therefore,it is plausibleto say that in our
culture, but not in the others, the acts are wrong. This is compatiblewith
saying that "causingneedless sufferingis wrong"is universallyvalid.
38. STOUT, supranote 4, at 86-87.

39. Likewise, whether "genocide is not good" is universallyvalid is not settled by
determiningwhether"you should not commitgenocide"is true no matterwho "you"
designates.Forthis reason,GilbertHarman'sthesis in GilbertHarman,MoralRelativism
Defended, 84 PHIL. REV. 3 (1975), is irrelevantto the present topic (and not very
contentious-see STOUT, supranote 4, at 90). Harmanarguesthat "innerjudgments,"
meaningjudgmentsthatevaluatean agent in relationto an action(e.g., "youshouldnot
do X"),arerelativeto reasonswithtwo features:Theyareendorsedby the personmaking
the judgment;and they are capable of motivatingthe evaluated agent. Harman's
argumentdoes not tie innerjudgmentsspecificallyto culture,nordoes it addressmoral
judgmentsas they are defined in this paper. In short, it does not supportcultural
relativism.Forcriticismof Harman'sthesis,see B.C.Postow,MoralRelativismAvoided,
95 (1979); David Copp, Harmanon Internalism,Relativism,and Logical
60 PERSONALIST
Form,92 ETHICS227 (1982); John Tilley, Innerjudgmentsand Moral Relativism,18
PHILOSOPHIA171 (1988);ROBERTL. ARRINGTON,RATIONALISM, 202 (1989).
AND RELATIVISM
REALISM,
40. Itgoes withoutsayingthatwhat we are dubbing"circumstances" are sometimestied to
culture.Forinstance,what counts as a joke in one society mightcount as an insult in
another,owing to culturaldifferencesbetween the societies. Clearly,this truismabout
circumstanceslends no supportto relativism.Itis light-yearsapartfromthe view thatno
moraljudgmentis universallyvalid.
In sum, we must not confuse relativismwith situationism,41the view

that determinationsof rightand wrong must be sensitiveto circumstances.
(Likewise,we mustnot confuse universalismwith the denialof situationism.)
Situationismis an importanttruth,but it is neither a moral theory nor a
contributionto moraltheory.Nor is it anythingnew. It has been acknowl-
edged for ages, and has been accommodated by moral outlooks of all
kinds.42
F. Validity versus Acceptance
Next, we must distinguishvalid moral judgmentsfrom accepted ones. A

moraljudgmentis accepted by a culturejust in case most membersof the
cultureregardthe judgmentas valid, at least for theirown culture.The fact
that a judgment is regardedas valid does not ensure that it is valid; so
acceptance does not ensure validity.Likewise,the fact that a judgmentis
valid does not ensure that people regardit as such; so validity does not
ensure acceptance.
We easily overlook these points owing to our dual use of the word
"morality."We often speakof "themoralityof the Dinka"or "themoralityof
the Inuit,"meaning the set of moral preceptsthe people accept. We are
41. The usual term is "situational relativism." "Situationism" is useful because "relativism"
does not appear in it; so we risk no confusion with cultural relativism.
42. Many people find this surprising. They have the vague idea that situationism is a
discovery of the last hundred years or so. Some of them even believe that relativists
deserve credit for the discovery. Lest these errors gain any more currency, the case
against them will be documented with especial thoroughness. See PLATO,Republic, in THE
COLLECTED DIALOGUES OF PLATObk. 1, 331c, at 580 (EdithHamilton& HuntingtonCairns
eds., 1963);ARISTOTLE,EthicaNicomachea,in THEBASICWORKSOFARISTOTLE bk. 2, 1104al-
9, 1109b14-27, at 953, 964 (Richard McKeon ed., 1941); CICERO, The Offices, in CICERO'S
OFfiCES14--15 ,27, 120, 124-25 (Thomas Cockman trans., J.M. Dent & Sons 1949); 1 ST.
THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA I, q.19, a.6, ad.1 (Fathers of the English Dominican
q.18, aa.3-4
Province trans., Benziger Bros. 1947-48); id. at I-II, q.7, aa.2-3; id. at I-11I,
& 10-11; id. at I-II, q.73, a.7; id. at I-II, q.94, a.4; JOHN LOCKE,Essays on the Law of
Nature, in LOCKE:POLITICALESSAYS essay 7, at 120 (Mark Goldie ed., 1997); William
Wollaston, The Religion of Nature Delineated, in 1 BRITISH MORALISTS ?? 287-88, at 248-
49 (D. D. Raphael ed., 1969) (1724); EDWARD BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TOMORAL PHILOSOPHY
27-28 (Thoemmes Press 1994) (1745); DAVID FORDYCE, THEELEMENTS OFMORAL PHILOSOPHY
47-48, 107 (Thoemmes Press 1990) (1754); ADAMFERGUSON,INSTITUTES OFMORALPHILOSOPHY
163-64 (Garland 1978) (1773); RICHARD PRICE, A REVIEW OFTHEPRINCIPAL QUESTIONS INMORALS
164-65, 175-76 (D. Daiches Raphael ed., 1948) (1787); ADAM SMITH,THETHEORYOFMORAL
SENTIMENTS174, 331-32, 339-40 (D.D. Raphael & A.L. Macfie eds., 1976) (1759); JEREMY
BENTHAM,AN INTRODUCTION TO THEPRINCIPLESOF MORALSAND LEGISLATION ch. 7, ? 21, at 194-95
(Wilfrid Harrison ed., 1948) (1823); 2 DUGALDSTEWART, THE PHILOSOPHY OF THEACTIVE AND
MORALPOWERS OFMAN 326 (1828); GEORGE ELIOT, THEMILLON THEFLOSS bk. 7, ch. 2, at 628
(A.S. Byatt ed., 1979) (1860); 2 ADOLFWUTTKE, CHRISTIAN ETHICS133-39 (John P. Lacroix
trans., 1873); PAUL JANET,THE THEORYOF MORALS 163-64 (Mary Chapman trans., 1883);
WALTER H. HILL, ETHICS
62-64 (2d ed. 1878); J.H. MUIRHEAD, THEELEMENTS OFETHICS 197, 213
(1892).
neithersaying nor denying that the preceptsare valid. On other occasions

we say "moralityforbidscruelty"and "moralityrequiresthatwe respectour
neighbors,"meaningthat a set of valid moralprinciplesforbidscrueltyand
disrespect.Given this dual use of "morality,"
it is easy to conflateaccepted
moraljudgmentswith valid ones. It is easy to thinkthat because the Inuit's
moralitydiffersfrom the Dinka's,the precepts that are valid for the first
cultureare not valid for the other.Butsuch thinkingis muddled.When we
say that the Inuit'smoralitydiffersfromthe Dinka'swe mean that the two
cultures accept differentmoral precepts. This implies nothing about the
validityof those precepts.Perhapsneitherset of preceptsis valid; perhaps
both are.
G. Truthversus Justification
The next distinctionis between truthand justification.43 SupposeJohngives

Rutha coin, and she slips it into her pocket. Momentslater,when she is
lookingthe otherway,Johnskillfullypicksherpocketand removesthe coin.
Is it now true that the coin is in Ruth'spocket?Clearly not. But is Ruth
justifiedin believingthatthe coin is in her pocket?Of course she is. She put
it there herself, and she has no evidence that it has been removed. The
example shows that a belief can be justifiedwithoutbeing true.
Some people hesitate to grant the distinction between truth and
justificationbecause they reason in one of the following five ways:
(1) To think that "true"differsin meaning from "justified"is to grant,
implausibly,the existence of a strangeentity called "truth."
(2) To think that truthdiffersfrom justificationis to think there is an
extralinguisticrealityto which truestatementscorrespond.In short,
it is to grant the embarrassinglyold-fashioned correspondence
theoryof truth.
(3) To thinkthat Ruth'sbeliefs can be justifiedwithoutbeing true is to
thinkthat Ruthcan be mistaken.But who am I to say that Ruthis
mistaken!What makesme so infalliblethat I can pass judgmenton
Ruth'sbeliefs!
(4) To think that truth differsfrom justificationis to think there is a
"cosmic" perspective, a "God's-eye"point of view, from which
truthscan be distinguishedfromfalsehoods.Butno such perspective
exists.
43. For useful discussions, see STOUT,supra note 4, pt. 1; Max Hocutt, Some Truthsabout
Truth,22 BEHAV.& PHIL.1-5 (1994).
(5) If I grantthat my beliefs can be justifiedwithout being true, I must

grantthat my beliefscan be justifiedwithoutbeing true.So even the
things I am fully justifiedin believing,for instance,thatthe earth is
spherical,mightbe false. Butto grantthat they mightbe false is to
cease believingthem (if only momentarily),and I find that I cannot
sincerelydo this. Thus,I am logicallybarredfromgrantingthatthey
mightbe false; hence, I am barredfromthinkingthat beliefs can be
justifiedwithout being true.
All five arguments are unsound. To grant that truth differs from
justificationis neither to grant that truth is a thing, nor to accept the
(anythingbut embarrassing)correspondencetheory of truth.44Nor is it to
think that we are infallibleor that we can achieve a cosmic perspective
(whateverthat is). Nor, finally, is it to cease believing what we justifiably
believe. Tosee all of this, note that (A)through(F)are logicallycompatible:
(A) Some justifiedbeliefs, including Ruth'sbelief about the coin, are
not true.
(B) Thereis no such thingas truth.To say that truthexists is merelyto
say thatsome statementsare true.Theword "merely"is appropriate
because the assertion"'fireis hot' is true"is equivalentto "fireis
hot."The firstassertioncarriesno more metaphysicalbaggagethan
the second one does.
(C) Truthis not a species of correspondence.
(D) Thereis no cosmic perspectivefromwhich truthscan be siftedfrom
falsehoods.
(E) The earth is spherical.
(F) AlthoughIjustifiablybelieve (E),there is alwaysa chance, however
slim, that (E)is false. The same goes for my other justifiedbeliefs
(including(A)through(D)). In fact, it is safe to say that some of my
justifiedbeliefs are false, though I don't know exactly which ones.
The point that we must distinguishtruthfromjustificationamountsto
this:we have good reasonto accept (A).Because(A) is compatiblewith (B)
and (C),to grantit is not to accept a bizarremetaphysicor a correspondence
theoryof truth.And because (A) is consistentwith (D) through(F),to grant
it is neither to cease believing that the earth is spherical, nor to claim
infallibilityor the advantageof a cosmic standpoint.
44. An accessibledefenseof the correspondencetheory-or a correspondencetheory-is in

JOHN R. SEARLE,THE CONSTRUCTION 9 (1995).Also helpfulis Hocutt,supra
ch.
OF SOCIALREALITY
note 43.
524 HUMANRIGHTS
QUARTERLY Vol.22
The distinction between justificationand truth is often blurredby a

common way of speaking.Ratherthan saying, "Ruthis justifiedin thinking
thatthe coin is in her pocket,"many people say, "It'strue for Ruththatthe
coin is in her pocket." The second statementcontains the word "true;"
hence it leads some people to conflatejustificationwith truth.
This is just one of the confusionsspawned by the expression,(G) "It's
true for R that p," which is a common substitutefor each of the following,
more precise, statements:
* R is justifiedin believing that p.
* R believes that p.
* One of R'ssincerebeliefs,a belief Rexpects othersto respect,is that
p. (Forexample, "It'struefor me thatabortionis right,"is a common
substitutefor "One of my sincere beliefs, a belief I expect you to
respect, is that abortionis right.")
* It'strue that p-for-R.(Forexample, "It'strue for me that Chili is too
hot," means "It'strue that Chili is too hot for me" [which in turn
means "Chiliis too hot to suit me"].)
Thethoughtbehind(G)is almostalwaysa variantof one of the fourjust
listed.45Thus,we should distrustany argumentin which (G) is a premise,
especially if it concludes with any claim aboutthe truthof p-for instance,
the claim thatp is relativetruth.Not one of the four itemsfor which (G) is
a surrogateimplies that p is true in any way. For example, althoughthe
statement"it'struethatChili is too hot for me" impliesthe truthof "Chiliis
too hot to suit me," it implies nothingabout the truthof "Chiliis too hot,
period."
H. Fallibilismversus Relativism
Next, we must distinguishrelativismfrom fallibilism.(Likewise,we must

distinguishuniversalismfromthe denial of fallibilism.)Fallibilism,the view
that all knowledge is provisional,that complete certaintyis unattainable,
implies that we cannot be absolutelycertain of the validityof any moral
precept. This does not support relativism,for it does not imply that the
validityof which we cannot be absolutelycertainis confinedto just one or
a few cultures.To put this anotherway, universalismis aboutthe scope of a
moralprinciple'svalidity;it is not about the certaintythat attends(or does
45. I mighthave overlookedthe fourthone had I not heardDennisStampementionit. The

example-about the chili-is his.
not attend)moralprinciples.So to show thatcertaintyis impossibleis not to

refuteuniversalism.The debate between relativistsand universalistsarises
withinthe fallibilistcamp, not merelybeyond its borders.46
Anotherdifferencebetween fallibilismand relativismis that fallibilism
per se is not the least bit "cultural."Fallibilismimpliesthata specific theory
of epistemic justification,namely foundationalism,is false.47This is not to
implythatthe correctview of justification,whateverit is, ties justificationto
cultures. Certainlyit is not to imply that justificationis so thoroughlya
function of cultural norms, habits, and so on that whatever is justifiably
believed in one culturecannot convergewith what is justifiablybelieved in
others.Ifsuch convergenceis impossible,this will have to be establishedon
groundsentirelydifferentfromfallibilism.
I. Universalismversus Absolutism
The next distinction is between universalismand moral absolutism.To

clarifythe latterwe mustfirstdistinguishmoralrulesfrom moralprinciples
(both of which must be distinguishedfrom particularmoral judgments).
Althoughthe boundarybetween rules and principlesis fuzzy, and often
there is room for debate about whetherwe have a rule or a principle,we
can contrastthe two as follows.48Moral principlesare more general and
more basic than moral rules-more general in that they apply to a wider
46. Indeed,fallibilistswho rejectrelativismare numerous.Two examplesare STOUT,

supra
note 4, pt. 1; and DAVIDO. BRINK,MORALREALISM OF ETHICS
ANDTHEFOUNDATIONS (1989). A
second point:Thefootnotedsentencesuggeststhatjustas fallibilistscan be universalists,
nonfallibilistscan be culturalrelativists.This is indeed the case. Nonfallibilism,in its
classic form(knownas foundationalism), assertsthat some beliefs are incorrigibleand
that others are justified insofar as they are, or can be, reliably derived from the
incorrigibleones. Thisthesiscomportswith the view thatevery moraltruthtacitlyrefers
to, and in that sense is "relativeto," a specific culture.In short,a moralbelief can be
foundedon incorrigibletruthsand at the same time be indexedto, or tacitlyabout, a
particularculture.(Sumnerand Herskovitscan be interpretedalong these lines, though
it would takesome workto show this.)Thus,the debateover fallibilismcannotsettlethe
debate over relativism,and vice versa.We mustkeep these issuesdistinct.
47. Foundationalismis defined in note 46. Alternativesto it include coherentismand
minimal (or fallibilist)foundationalism.Each of these views incorporatesfallibilism;
neitherentails culturalrelativismor anythingclose to it. Both views are discussed in
ROBERTAUDI, THE STRUCTURE (1993). Coherentismis also discussed in BRINK,
OF JUSTIFICATION
supranote 46, ch. 5.
48. For a more detailed discussion, see MARCUSGEORGE ch. 5
IN ETHICS
SINGER,GENERALIZATION
(1971). Also relevant are STACE,supra note 4, ch. 4; NICHOLASRESCHER, THE
OBJECTIVITY:
OBLIGATIONSOF IMPERSONAL 136-44
REASON (1997). My treatmentof rules, principles,and
particularmoraljudgmentsis fairlytraditionaland perhapsoversimplified.Fora more
complicatedpicture,see ARRINGTON,supranote 39, ch. 1. The complicationsundermine
none of the main resultsof this section.
class of actions; more basic in that they are used to justify moral rules,
whereasthe converse is not true. "Armedrobberyis wrong"is a moralrule;
"causingneedless unhappinessis wrong"is a moralprinciple.The second
statementappliesto an immensevarietyof actionsand is commonlyused to
justify the first (by working in combinationwith the premise that armed
robberyusuallycauses needless unhappiness).The firstjudgmentconcerns
a much narrowerclass of actions and is not used to justifythe second.
Now to clarifymoralabsolutism.Accordingto thatview, manyordinary
moral rulesare not only universallyvalid but indefeasible:they cannot be
overriddenby other moralconsiderations,even in extremecircumstances.
Thewords "ordinary" and "rules"are important.The absolutist'spoint is not
that moralprinciplesare indefeasible,but that we can find many indefea-
sible truthseven among moral rules. Also, we can find plenty of them
among ordinarymoral rules-the rules we learned from our parentsand
schoolteachers.Such rules include "stealingis wrong,""honestyis right,"
"law-breakingis unethical,"and "payingone's debts is obligatory."Accord-
ing to absolutists,manysuch rulesare indefeasibleas they stand;there is no
need either to alter the act-descriptions-for instance, by replacing"steal-
ing"with "stealingmerelyfor the sake of stealing"--orto insert"normally"
or "primafacie" before the words "wrong,""right,"and so on.49
Universalism does not imply absolutism. Most universalistsreject
absolutism, maintainingthat ordinarymoral rules, when valid, are also
defeasible.50A plausibleway to flesh out this idea is to say that such rules
are ellipticalfor statementsthatconcern what is usuallyrightor wrong.On
this view, "payingone's debts is obligatory"is shortfor "payingone's debts
is usually obligatory"or "payingone's debts is obligatoryin the situations
you and I (the audience and speaker)normallyface." The latterprecepts,
even if universallyvalid, do not imply that people should pay their debts
come what may.
49. in frontof "moral

My definitionof absolutism,specificallymy insertionof "ordinary"
rules,"reflectsthe influenceof MarcusGeorgeSinger,TheIdealof a RationalMorality,
60 PROC.& ADDRESSES AM.PHIL.ASSN.15, 28 (1986).
50. Five examples: POJMAN,supra note 4, at 47; RESCHER,supra note 48, at 164; SINGER, supra
note 48, at 123-33; FRIEDRICHPAULSEN,A SYSTEM OF ETHICS233-35, 360-63 (FrankThilly
trans., 1899); KWASI
WIREDU,CULTURAL UNIVERSALS ANAFRICAN
ANDPARTICULARS: 65-66
PERSPECTIVE
(1996). See also STACE,supra note 4, at 193-94; TAYLOR,supra note 4, at 26-29; SMITH,
supra note 42, at 174. An objection may come to mind here: namely, that when
the way
relativistsidentifyuniversalismwith absolutism,they are not using"absolutism"
I do. Thisobjectionis addressedin SectionVII,partH.
1. Universalismversus Transcendentalism
A furtherdistinctionis between universalismand moraltranscendentalism.

The latter is the view that rightnessand wrongness have no relation to
human needs or happiness.In its most extremeform, it impliesthat moral
factsare unrelatednot only to the needs and happinessof people, but to the
world people inhabit.Tobe a universalistis not necessarily,or even usually,
to be a transcendentalist.Utilitarians,for instance, see the following as
universallyvalid: "Actsthat produce at least as much happiness as the
situationpermitsare right;acts that fail to do so are wrong."51Clearly,this
of
"principle utility" does not divorce moral rightnessfrom human happi-
ness, much less fromthe world people inhabit.
K. Universalismversus Ethnocentrism
Next, we mustdistinguishuniversalismfromethnocentrism.The ethnocen-

tric person uncriticallyaccepts the prevailingviews of his cultureand sees
cultureswith contraryviews as ignorantor backward.The universalist,on
the other hand, thinks merely that some moral standardsapply to all
cultures.Clearly,he is not bound to the idea thatthese universalstandards,
whateverthey are, dovetailwith the accepted views of his culture.Perhaps
he is skepticalof those views. Evenif he is not, perhapshe knowsthatmoral
beliefsare hardto justifyand that intelligent,well-meaningpeople can hold
differentmoral opinions. Knowingthis, he is likely to respect the moral
views of others,to see them as anythingbut ignorantor backward.
L. Universalismversus Naivete
The nextdistinctionis between universalismand moralnaivet6.Bythe latter

I mean either an underestimationof the degree to which moralbeliefs are
influencedby enculturation,or an overestimationof the degree to which
moralconcerns underliehumanconduct. Universalismneitherentails nor
fosterssuch naivete;it implies nothingaboutthe source of moralbeliefs or
about what motivatespeople to act. It says that some moraljudgmentsare
universallyvalid, but "universallyvalid" means nothing akin to "highly
influential"or "acceptedindependentlyof enculturation."
51. Thisarticleuses utilitarianism and liberalism,bothof which areforms

(actutilitarianism)
of universalism,to illustratevariouspoints.Thisis because bothviews are plausibleand
familiar.Whetherthey are trueis an independentissue, an issue on which the general
pointsof this essay do not hinge. Foran illustrationof this claim, see infranote 66 and
accompanyingtext.
M. Moral Projection,MoralCoercion, and MoralVictimization
Finally,we must distinguishthree meaningsof the statement,"Wecannot

impose our moralityon other cultures":
(1) We cannot project our moralityonto other cultures,meaningthis:
we cannot reliablyconclude, merelyfromthe fact that"Xis right"is
valid for our culture,that "Xis right"is valid for other cultures.
(2) We should not morallycoerce othercultures.Thatis, we should not
force the people of other culturesto comply with a moraldemand
simplybecause it is a demandto which the people of ourcultureare
subject.
(3) We should not morallyvictimizeother cultures.
What is it to morallyvictimizeothers?It is to harminnocentpeople as
a resultof our moralviews. Considerthe CrimeanTatarsof the seventeenth
century.Theythoughtthat it was morallypermissibleto captureand enslave
Russians,so they made annual raids on these people and sold them as
slaves. The Russianswere not merelyvictimsof the Tatars,butvictimsof the
Tatars'morality.
Relativismis specificallyaboutthe scope of moralvalidity;so although
it rulesout projectingour moralityonto others, it does not ruleout morally
victimizingor morallycoercing them. Consideragain the Tatars:suppose
they accept relativismand conclude that because of culturaldifferences
between themselves and Russians,the judgment, "Conductingraids to
enslave people is right,"althoughvalid forTatars,is not likelyto be validfor
Russians.This is merely to granta point about the limits of a judgment's
validity;it does not compel the Tatars,either logicallyor morally,to refrain
fromtheir raids.It is consistentfor the Tatarsto accept relativismand grant
that they cannot projecttheir moralityonto Russians,while insistingthat
they can, and should, raidand enslave Russians.
N. Summary
In sum, when examining arguments for cultural relativism we must

distinguish:
1. indefinitejudgmentsfromempty ones;
2. moralityfromVictorianmorality;
3. relativism from moral liberalism;
4. moral judgments from judgments of blame;
5. relativismfromsituationism;
6. validityfrom acceptance;
7. truthfromjustification;
8. relativismfromfallibilism;
9. universalismfromabsolutism;
10. universalismfromtranscendentalism;
11. universalismfromethnocentrism;
12. universalismfrom moral naivete;and
13. moralprojectionfrom moralcoercion and moralvictimization.
These distinctionsare not nit-picking,nor are they pertinentsolely to
the topic of relativism.They are essential to any edifying discussion of
ethics. Butas the next section reveals,culturalrelativistsneglect them.
VII. THE FAILUREOF THE RELATIVIST'S

ARGUMENTS
Let'scontinue our discussion by returningto the relativist'sarguments.By

the end of this section it will be abundantlyclear that all eleven arguments
fail, largelybecause they ignorethe distinctionsin the precedingsection.
A. The Failure of the Triviality Argument
The trivialityargumentfails because it confuses indefinitejudgmentswith

emptyones. "Kindnessis primafacie right"is indeed indefinite,but it is far
fromempty.The argumentharborsa second erroras well, for we can easily
make universalismtemptingwithoutfocusingon indefinitejudgments.The
following are far from indefinite, but they surely make universalism
tempting:"torturing childrenfor the fun of hearingthem scream is wrong;"
"annihilatinga culturebecause its customsseem odd is not good;""starting
a nuclearwar merelyto demonstratemilitarymightis immoral."It'shardto
believe that these judgmentslack universalvalidity.No wonder relativists
steer clear of them when arguingtheir case.
Perhapsrelativistswill complainthat the effectivenessof the examples
stems fromact-descriptionsthat referto motives.This calls for two replies.
First, there is nothing underhanded about such descriptions. They are a
common way of producing highly definite moral judgments. Second,
relativists should be wary about granting "effectiveness" to the examples. If
they mean that the examples are indeed universallyvalid, they have
abandonedtheirthesis, for they have admittedthat some moraljudgments
are valid for everyone.Thisadmissioncontradictsrelativismno matterwhat
act-descriptionsappear in the judgments. Also, it implies that there is
nothingabout moral predicatesthat preventsthe judgmentsin which they
occur from being valid for all cultures. So it's likely that many such
judgments are universallyvalid, including many that say nothing about
motives.
Some relativists(though not the diehard ones) are likely to make a
second complaint. They will exclaim: "But we don't deny that such
judgmentsare universallyvalid!The whole pointof ourthesis is thatcruelty
and oppression are universally wrong, that respect and tolerance are
universally right!" But if this is indeed their "whole point," they have
nothingto contributeto moraltheory. If relativismis not an alternativeto
universalism,if it is merely a set of commonplace remarksthat most any
brandof universalismcan accommodate,it lacks the philosophicalimpor-
tance its defendersclaim for it.52Tothe extentthat it has that importance,it
conflicts with universalism,which means that it does deny, implicitlyat
least, that the example judgmentsare universallyvalid.
B. The Failureof the PolygynyArgument
The polygyny argument also fails. To see this, imagine a person who
believes (implausibly)that polygynyand polyandryare universallywrong.
Does the argumentdo anythingto refutethis belief?Of course not. Itmerely
assumes that the readerwill lack that belief and agree that polygynyand
polyandryare rightin some cultures.
Buteven if we grantthat polygyny,polyandry,and so forthare rightin
some cultures, the polygyny argumentis unpersuasiveif we distinguish
moralityfromVictorianmorality.Thatis, the argumentis persuasiveonly if
we think of moralityas a set of preceptsabout maritalcustoms, habitsof
dress, and the like. Once we recall that moralityconcerns such things as
slaveryand genocide, the argumentloses appeal. Anyone who doubts this
need only returnto the argumentand replace "peyote"with "slavery,"and
substitute"racism,""imperialism,"and "genocide"for "monogamy,""po-
lygyny,"and "polyandry." The revisedargumentis not temptingin the least.
If the polygyny argumentis so easily made unpersuasive,no doubt a
logical flaw lurkssomewhere behind the rhetoricalone. It is not hard to
52. See HERSKOVITS, supra note 6, at 14; BENEDICT,supra note 6, at 278.
find. Upon reading the argument and granting its premise about the
rightnessof polygyny, monogamy,and so on, we are expected to reject
universalismin favorof relativism.The troubleis this:we can grantthatthe
listed customs are right for their respective cultures but then plausibly
accept one of many versions of universalism,an example of which is
liberalism.Accordingto moral liberals,polygyny qua polygyny is neither
wrong nor obligatory;the same goes for monogamyand polyandry.So of
course it can be right, meaning morally permissible,for one culture to
practicepolygyny,anotherpolyandry,and so on. Tomakethe pointanother
way, the polygyny argumentfails unless the rightnessof the customs it
mentions can be explained only by granting relativism. However, the
rightnessof the customs is easily explained on the assumptionof moral
liberalism.Thatassumptionalso explainswhy the polygynyargumentloses
appeal when we replace "peyote" with "slavery,""monogamy"with
"racism,"and so forth.Accordingto liberalism,slavery and racismare at
sharpodds with the moral requirementto treatpeople with respect.
C. The Failureof the HumanSacrificeArgument
The humansacrificeargumentignoresthe differencebetween judgmentsof

blame and moraljudgments.Itfocuses on our reluctanceto condemn, i.e.,
blame, the people in the imaginaryculture.We have good reasonsfor this
reluctance,but they are not tied to any kind of moral relativism.To state
them briefly,a person is blameworthyfor a deed only if the deed was done
intentionallyor negligently,and eitherwith a beliefthatthe deed was wrong
or with informationand abilitiesthat should have led to such a belief. The
deed of those in the isolated culturedoes not meet these conditions. So,
naturally,we are reluctantto assign blame.
Butthis is a small point;the key point is thatjudgmentsof blame differ
so much from moral judgments that any argumentthat trades on the
inappropriateness of blame fails to supportrelativism.To repeatan earlier
example, even if we could prove thatjudgmentsof blame are always false
or out of place, this would not threaten the claim that "genocide is not
good" is universallyvalid.
D. The Failureof the Nomad Argument
The nomadargumentis slightlybetterthan the previoustwo arguments,for

it concerns neither Victorian morality nor judgments of blame. Instead, it
trades on the plausibility of this statement: (1) Killing the old and weak is
right for the nomads but wrong for us.
Butwhy is (1) so plausible?53 The answeris found in situationism.More

exactly,the followingjudgmentis universallyvalid, and it permitskillingthe
old and weak in the nomads' situation, but not in ours: (2) An act that
preventsintensesuffering,and producesno avoidable ill results,is morally
right.
In short,the plausibilityof (1) derives, not from relativism,but from a
universallyvalid truthappliedto differentcircumstances.Or at least this is
true:the nomadargumentdoes nothingto threatenthe hypothesisthat(2) is
universallyvalid, for the plausibilityof (1) is easily explained on that very
hypothesis:that (2) is universallyvalid. So the nomad argumentfails. Like
the other argumentsfor relativism, it is tempting only if we ignore a
distinction,in this case the distinctionbetween relativismand situationism.
E. The Failureof the ResearchArgument
The researchargumentfails for two reasons.First,the premisethatdifferent

cultures accept radically different moralities is questionable. There is
evidence that at the level of general principles,the moral views of the
Second, even if differentcultures
world's cultures overlap significantly.54
accepteddifferentmoralprinciples,nothingwould follow aboutthe validity
of those principles.Acceptance is one thing, validity is another;hence, a
judgmentcan be universallyvalid withoutbeing universallyaccepted.
Itwill not do to retort,"Butwho's to say there'sany moralvalidity!"or
"Butwho's to say which judgmentsarevalid!"Suchquestionsare besidethe
point.55The point is that acceptance and validity are differentproperties.
The claim that no moral principleis universallyaccepted does not imply
that no moralprincipleis universallyvalid. This is a purelylogical point;it
does not presupposea view aboutwhich moralprinciplesarevalid, or even
that any such principlesare valid.
Nor will it do to say that we have misunderstoodthe premise of the
researchargument.We have interpretedthat premiseto be about accepted
53. Somewill contendthat(1) is not plausible,thatmercykillingis alwayswrong.We need

not disputetheirpoint.If it is true,the nomadargumentfailsowing to a false premise.If
it is not true,the nomadargumentfails for reasonsstatedbelow.
54. Fordiscussions,summaries,and pieces of this evidence, see the followingauthorsand
the many others they cite: BRANDT, supra note 4, at 285-88; W.H. Davis, Cultural
Relativityin Ethics,9 S. HUMAN.REV.51 (1975);FrancesV. Harbour,BasicMoralValues:
A SharedCore,9 ETHICS& INT'LAFF. 155 (1995). Also relevantare WIREDU, supranote 50,
ch. 6; and 1 WILLIAMEDWARDHARTPOLELECKY,HISTORYOF EUROPEANMORALSFROMAUGUSTUSTO
CHARLEMAGNE 91--110 (GeorgeBraziller1955) (1869).
55. Also, relativistshave no businessaskingthe firstquestion,for their thesis assertsthat
some moraljudgmentsare valid.
moralprinciples,not aboutvalid ones. This is necessaryif the premiseis to

count as an empirical thesis. To read it as the claim that valid moral
principles vary with culture makes it something that anthropological
research can neither confirm nor refute, which makes the argumentin
which it figuresonly nominallya "research"argument.Worseyet, it makes
the argumentquestion-begging.
Perhapsrelativistswill replythatwe can change the researchargument
so that it avoidsthe above problems.First,we can change its premiseso that
it concerns rules ratherthan principles.Second, we can say that although
relativism is not entailed by the new premise, it provides the best
explanationof the diversityto which the premiserefers.
The problemwith this replyis thatwe can easily explainthe diversityof
accepted rules without embracing relativism.The conditions in which
people live and interactdifferfrom one society to the next. Therefore,we
should expect any universally valid principle-for instance, "causing
pointlesssufferingis wrong"-to spawn many differentrules.56
Infact,even if differentsocieties accepted differentmoralprinciples,we
would have no reason to accept relativism.Moralquestions are compli-
cated, both conceptuallyand empirically.They involve intricatearguments
and hairsplittingdistinctions and are entangled with difficult empirical
issues. Also, they triggerbiases and emotions that affect our thinking.So
even if some moralprinciplesare universallyvalid,we shouldexpect to find
different people accepting differentones." We also should expect the
differencesto correlate,at least roughly,with differencesin culture.Biases,
nonmoralbeliefs, and emotional responses, all of which influence moral
thinking,are culturallyinfluenced.
I can thinkof a plausibleobjection to this point, but it fails to support
relativism.It runs as follows: to say that differentculturesaccept entirely
differentmoralprinciplesis to implythat some culturesaccept none of the
moral principles we do. Those principles include "deliberatelycausing
pointless misery is wrong" and "helping a critically injuredneighbor is
primafacie right."Some culturesdo not accept these principles,butthey do
accept principlesthat qualifyas moralprinciples-this is what we imply if
we say thatdifferentculturesaccept entirelydifferentmoralprinciples.The
trouble is this: if someone who means what we mean by "deliberately
56. We should expect this for other reasonsas well. Forpertinentand useful remarks,see
STACE,supra note 4, ch. 10; LECKY,
supra note 54; MORRIS ON THE DIVERSITY
GINSBERG, OF
MORALS 101-10 (1956); RonaldD. Milo, Moral Deadlock,61 PHIL.453 (1986); Judith
ANDPOLITICAL
OFMORAL
JarvisThomson, The No Reason Thesis, in FOUNDATIONS PHILOSOPHY
1,
15-18 (EllenFrankelPaulet al. eds., 1990).
57. Assuming, that is, that it is possible for different people to accept different ones. See the
next paragraphin the text.
causing pointlessmisery"and "helpinga criticallyinjuredneighbor"rejects

the two principlesjuststated,we have reasonto thinkthathe does not mean
what we mean by "wrong"and "right."(Forwhat is it to understandthose
termsif not to think,among otherthings,thatdeliberatelycausingpointless
misery is wrong?)But if he does not mean what we mean by those terms,
how did we determinethat he accepts principlesthatare moralprinciples?
We normallyidentifya person'smoralprinciplesby identifyingthose of his
principlesthat contain the predicates"right"and "wrong,"where the latter
are used much the way we use them. (Or else we look for principlesthat
contain equivalents of those predicates, identifyingthem according to
similaritiesin usage.) If he uses them in a radicallydifferentway, we do not
count the principlesin which they occur as moralones, unlesswe are using
"moral"in a bizarresense.
If this reply is forceful it works against the researchargument,for it
strengthensand extends the earlier point that moral tenets do not vary
radicallyaroundthe world. Itstrengthensthat point by castingdoubton the
case againstit. Whatsome researcherssee as radicaldifferencesin accepted
moralitiesare most likely only verbaldifferences,not moralones.58It also
extends the earlier point to cover rules as well as principles, because
"helpinga criticallyinjuredneighboris primafacie right"is a moral rule,
despite anythingsaid in the previousparagraph.
F. The Failureof the True-for-Them

Argument
The true-for-themargumentconfuses justificationwith truth.The source of
the confusion is the premisethat althoughit is true for us that the earth is
spherical, it was true for the ancient Egyptiansthat the earth is flat. This
premise is unobjectionableonly if it serves as a stand-infor one of the
following:
* We think the earth is spherical,but the ancient Egyptiansthought
the earthto be flat.
* Althoughwe are justifiedin believingthe earthto be spherical,the
ancient Egyptianswere justifiedin believingthe earthto be flat.
But if the premise is a stand-infor one of these sentences, it neither
illustratesnor supportsany view about the variabilityof truth.It indeed
58. For more on this point, which to my knowledge no relativist has adequately addressed,
see STOUT,supra note 4, at 19-21; RESCHER,supra note 48, ch. 9; Martin E. Lean, Aren't
Moraljudgments "Factual"?, ? 4 (1970); David Cooper, MoralRelativism,
51 PERSONALIST
3 MIDWESTSTUD.IN PHIL. 97 (1978); J.L.A. Garcia, Relativism and Moral Divergence, 19
264,
METAPHIL. 275-80 (1988).
supportsthe claim that "whateveris truefor one cultureis false for others,"
but only if that claim means something like this: whatever is believed by
one cultureis doubted by others.
A likely replyis thatthe true-for-themargumentcannot be dismissedso
easily. Itsclaim that whateveris true for one culture is false for others is a
crude statementof a view that, when properlyformulated,clearlyrulesout
universalism.The view in question is this:
* TotalRelativism:Everytruthis a local truth,meaningthatit'struefor,
or within, one of a myriad of incommensurable,but equally
rational,frameworksof belief. So no true assertion,moral or non-
moral, has any rationalpurchaseon those who do not share the
frameworkto which the assertionis relative.59
Fromthis view it follows that no moraljudgmentis universallyvalid;thus,
universalismstands refuted.
The problems with this brand of argumentare well-known.60 Total
relativismrefutes nothing, because it applies to all assertions, including
itselfand any conclusionsdrawnfrom it. Thus, it impliesthatthe following
views cannotcommandthe assentof anyoneoutsidethe relevantframeworks:
(1) total relativismis true;
(2) if total relativismis true, no moraljudgmentis universallyvalid;and
(3) no moraljudgmentis universallyvalid.
So total relativismdoes not threatenuniversalism.61
Note, by the way, that statement(3) is not redundant.Iftotal relativism
is true, then relativeto some frameworks,(3) is false even if (1) and (2) are
59. Some people assume that total relativismhas been establishedby the individualor
combinedworkof various"postmodern" thinkers--e.g.,StanleyFish,JacquesDerrida,
and Richard Rorty. This assumption is made by JUNG MIN CHOI& JOHN W. MURPHY, THE
ANDPHILOSOPHY
POLITICS OFPOLITICAL
CORRECTNESS(1992). These authors accept total relativism
but neverstate it clearly.Fora briefbutsoundcriticismof theirendorsementand use of
thatthesis,a criticismthatappliesto manyotherpostmodernists, see FrancisJ.Beckwith,
A Critiqueof Political Correctness,in PHILOSOPHY:THE QUEST FOR TRUTH 582 (Louis P.
Pojmaned., 3d ed. 1996). Threeotherbriefbutforcefulworkson thistopic are:Richard
D. Mohr, The Perils of Postmodernism, 2 HARV. GAY & LESBIANREV.9 (1995); Thomas
Nagel, TheSleep of Reason,NEWREPUBLIC,12 Oct. 1998, at 32; MargaritaRosaLevin,A
Defenseof Objectivity,inTHETHEORY
OFKNOWLEDGE: CLASSICAL& CONTEMPORARY 631
READINGS
(Louis P. Pojman ed., 2d ed. 1999).
60. See PLATO, Theaetetus, in THE COLLECTED DIALOGUESOF PLATO,supra note 42, 170a-171c, at
875-77. For recent discussions, see HARVEY RELATIVISM
SIEGEL, REFUTED
(1987); JAMES F. HARRIS,
AGAINST RELATIVISM(1992); John Preston, On Some Objectionsto Relativism, 5 RATIO JURIS 57
(1992); HaroldZellner,Is RelativismSelf-Defeating?,20 J. PHIL.RES.
287 (1995).
61. Norwill it do to exempttotal relativismfromwhat it says aboutotherjudgments.Ifone
judgmentis exemptfromit, perhapsmanyare, includingmany moralones.
true. Relativeto those frameworks,it is false that if p entails q, and p is true,

then q is true. We must be careful here, of course. Given total relativism,
nothingsaid in this paragraph-includingthe claim that it says something-
is true for all frameworks.Or is it? Obviously, it all depends on our
framework-unless, of course, our frameworkis one thatmakes it false that
it all dependson ourframework.Butwatch out. Iftotal relativismis true,the
precedingcaveat is not true for all frameworks.Nor,for that matter,is the
one just stated.Or is it? It all depends. ...
No doubt these remarksare perplexing.The problem is not with the
remarksbut with total relativism.To reflecton thatthesis is to lose our grip
on it, which means that it's not fully intelligible.
Butlet'sreturnto my firstclaim abouttotal relativism.Thatclaim, again,
is that if total relativismis true, statements(1) through(3) cannot command
the assent of anyone outside the relevantframeworks;so total relativism
fails to threatenuniversalism.Supposethe relativistcontendsthat my claim
standsrefutedbecause every assertion,includingmine, is at best a relative
truth.Then insofaras his contentionhas force, it refutesitself,in which case
it has no force.
Suppose,on the other hand,that he claims thatour belief-frameworkis
no differentfromhis and that relativeto thatframework,(3) is true.We can
point out that we have seen no evidence for this claim. More important,
accordingto his thesis any such evidence would be genuine evidence for
only one framework.And for all we know, that framework-call it F-
differsfromours and from most others, includingthe one relativeto which
we are mistakenin thinkingthat F differsfrom ours, and the framework
relative to which we are similarly mistaken about the frameworkjust
mentioned-the one relativeto which we are mistakenin thinkingthat F
differsfromours.
Suppose, finally,that the total relativistclaims that althoughuniversal-
ism is an option for those outside the frameworkto which (3) is relative,
those who share that frameworkcannot be faultedfor rejectinguniversal-
ism. We can reply that, given total relativism,his claim is relativeto a
specific framework.And for all we know,that frameworkdiffersboth from
ours and from the one to which (3) is relative. Perhaps for the latter
frameworks,it's false that those who share the frameworkto which (3) is
relativecannot be faultedfor rejectinguniversalism.It is worthaddingthat
any evidence to the contraryis relativeto a particularframework,which
very likelydiffersnot only fromours and the one to which (3) is relative,but
from the frameworkrelativeto which we are mistakenin saying what we
just said-namely, that for our frameworkand the one to which (3) is
relative,it'sfalse thatthose who sharethe frameworkto which (3) is relative
cannot be faulted for rejecting universalism.
Once again our discussion has become perplexing. Even so it confirms
something, namely, the earlier point that total relativismcannot disprove

anything,includinguniversalism.To use total relativismfor that purposeis
neitherto refutenor to supportanything;it is merely to become mired in
(literally)endless complications.Frustratedwith this, some total relativists
will respondas follows:"Weare not in the businessof refutingor supporting
things!We dismisssuch activityas futile,and merelyinviteyou to sharethe
mood, the style, the perspectiveexpressedby our thesis."The problemwith
this responseis that it'suseless to those we are addressing,namely,cultural
relativistswho wish to use total relativismin supportof theirposition.Also,
we have no reasonto accept, or even to entertain,the invitationextended
here.Those rebuffedby this statementshouldthinktwice aboutdisputingit.
Togive reasonsto accept an invitationis to enterthe businessof supporting
things.
G. The Failureof the FallibilismArgument
The fallibilismargumentpresupposes,falsely,thatfallibilismentails relativ-

ism. This is enough to renderit unsound. However,lest it retainan air of
credibility,let us note not only thatfallibilismfails to supportrelativismbut
thatfallibilismis no more congenialto relativismthan it is to universalism.
Anythingfallibilismimplies about human beliefs-for instance, about the
confidence we place in them-applies to all human beliefs, includingthe
relativist's.Forinstance,its implicationthatcertaintyis unattainableapplies
to the following beliefs no less than to any others:"I am a memberof a
culture;""thereis more than one culture in the world;""differentcultures
have differentcustoms;"and "culturalrelativismis plausible."Itfollows that
if a lackof certaintynecessitateda lackof confidence,fallibilismwould rule
out confidence both in relativism and in the assumptions on which
relativismrests.Also, if a lack of certaintymeantthatepistemicjustification
is culturallyrelative,culturalrelativismcould not be justifiablyheld by all
cultures.
These remarksdo much to forestall an objection to my claim that
fallibilismand relativismdiffer.The objection is that fallibilismis similarin
spirit,even if not in letter,to relativism.Althoughfallibilismputs no limits
on the scope of any precept's validity, it puts substantiallimits on the
confidence we can place in our moral beliefs. That such limits exist is
somethingrelativistshave long insistedupon; thus, to grantfallibilismis to
make a largeconcession to culturalrelativism.
This objection is mistaken in two ways. First,cultural relativistssee
nothing wrong with moral confidence, provided the beliefs in which it
inheres are valid. Ruth Benedict would see nothing out of line about
a Zufii's confident belief that for the Zurii premarital sex is morally
permissible.62 She would indeed see somethingout of line about a Zufii's

confident belief that "premaritalsex is morally permissible"is valid for
everyone. But this is because Benedict deems the latter belief false, not
because she sees moralconfidence as inappropriatein all cases.63
Second (andat the priceof some repetition),fallibilism,as it pertainsto
moral beliefs, implies merely that such beliefs are "tentative"or "provi-
sional"in the special sense fallibilistsgive those terms.It impliesthat moral
beliefs are corrigible,or in principlerevisable,and as such are in the same
boat with the following beliefs (all of which, accordingto fallibilism,are in
principlerevisable):"1=1;""Iexist;""othersbesides myselfexist;""mybirth
preceded my reading of Folkways;" "there is more than one culture in the
world;" "relativistsand universalistsuse language when defending their
views."
Does anyone, includingany relativist,lack confidence in these beliefs?
Of course not. Nor is there any need to, even if we rejectfoundationalism.
Foundationalismis neitherthe only plausible account of justification,nor
the only one at home with the commonsenseview thatsome beliefswarrant
considerableconfidence.64So the rejectionof foundationalismdoes not put
"substantiallimits"on the confidence we can place in our beliefs. If it be
said that special difficultiesattendconfidence in moralbeliefs, my reply is
thatthis needs to be shown; it does not follow fromfallibilism.Ifit is shown,
it will apply to all moral beliefs, includingthe ones relativistsare eager to
vindicate-namely, those that aspire to merely "local,"or culturallyspe-
cific, validity.Hence it will advance the relativist'scause not a whit.
H. The Failureof the EmpiricalOutlook Argument
The empiricaloutlook argumentconfounds universalismwith absolutism;

We can see itsweaknessby askingif it refutes
also with transcendentalism.65
62. BENEDICT,supranote 6, at 126. I am not saying(nordenying)thatBenedictthinkscertainty

is attainable.Confidenceand certaintyare two differentthings.See infranote 64.
63. Benedictdoes some confidentmoralizingin BENEDICT,supranote 6, at 32, 37, 247-50.
64. Two such accountsare mentionedin note 46. Theclaimthatconfidenceis at home with
nonfoundationalism will seem paradoxicalif we conflateconfidencewith philosophical
certainty.Thegreatestconfidencewe can have in a belief is the confidenceproduced,or
ratherconstitutedby, the absenceof sinceredoubt.The absence of such doubtrequires
no certaintyof the kind foundationalismdeems possible. An excellent source on this
subjectis 1 CHARLES
S. THE ESSENTIAL
PEIRCE, PEIRCE: PHILOSOPHICAL
SELECTED (Nathan
WRITINGS
Houser& ChristianKloeseleds., 1992) (see especiallyessay 7: The Fixationof Belier).
Includedin this volume is Peirce's1868 article,QuestionsConcerningCertainFaculties
ClaimedforMan.This is a classic critiqueof foundationalism.
65. Forthe kindof confusionthat gives riseto the empiricaloutlookargument,see CHOI &
MURPHY, supra note 59, at 41-42.
utilitarianism,a common version of universalism.Clearlyit doesn't.66 The

principle of utility does not tie rightnessto anything transcendent-for
instance, to mysteriousfacts that we grasp through mystical insight. Nor
does it make any moralrulesexceptionless. Utilitarianshold that all moral
rules are defeasible;the only exceptionless moraltruthis the principleof
utility.
A possible reply is that we have distortedwhat relativistsmean by
"absolutism." We musttakethis replyseriouslybecause "moralabsolutism"
sometimes refers, not to the view that most ordinary moral rules are
exceptionless, but to one of the following positions: (a) valid moral
principles have their source in an external authority;(b) a truly "moral"
person ignores the consequences of her deeds, or at least their conse-
quences to herself;and (c) some moraltruthsare not only universallyvalid
but derivedfrom self-evidentpremises.
This replyfails to rescue the empiricaloutlook argument.Few versions
of universalismimply (a), (b), or (c). Forinstance, utilitarianismimplies (a)
only if we use "externalauthority"in a contrived way. And as already
pointedout, universalismdoes not implya foundationalistview of the kind
in (c). Universalismis fully at home with nonfoundational(e.g., coherentist)
methodsof justification.
Perhapssome relativistswill say that we have again distortedtheir
argument.Whatthey mean by "absolutism"is simplyany view accordingto
which some (nonempty)moraltruths,be they rules,principles,or whatever,
are exceptionless.This replywill not do. One problemwith it is that many
brandsof relativismwould make some moral truthsexceptionless. To say
that a moraljudgmentis valid for only some culturesis not to say that the
judgmentis defeasible. Perhapsit is indefeasiblewhereverit is valid.
Another problem with the reply is that it deprives the charge of
absolutismof any powerto discreditthe views so charged.Thereis nothing
absurdabout the view that some moraljudgmentsare exceptionless.Two
examples (neitherof which is empty) are "deliberatelycausing pointless
miseryis wrong"and "respectingotherculturesis primafacie right."These
judgmentsare exceptionless(or plausiblythoughtto be so) partlyowing to
the terms "deliberately,""pointless,"and "prima facie." For instance,
apparentexceptions to the firstjudgmentwill fall outside the extension of
"deliberatelycausing pointless misery"(or "deliberatelycausing pointless
misery")and thus fail to be genuine exceptions.
66. Nor does it refute most other versions of universalism,e.g., those proposed by
Nussbaum,supranote 3, at 212-46; POJMAN,supranote 4, ch. 3; STACE,supranote 4, ch.
7; HATCH,supranote 7, ch. 7; RESCHER,supranote 48, chs. 9-10; SINGER,supranote48, chs.
1-5.
I. The Failure of the Ethnocentrism Argument
The trouble with the ethnocentrismargument is quite simple: to grant

universalismis not to be ethnocentric.Infact, it'sconsistentwith universal-
ism to advance the following as universally valid: "Ethnocentrismis
immoral."So the ethnocentrismargumentfails. The same goes for argu-
mentsthat substitute"imperialistic," "authoritarian," for
or "antipluralistic"
"ethnocentric."For example, although universalism implies that some
moralrequirementsare the same for everyone, it does not implythatwe all
have a moral requirementto be the same, nor that we have any moral
requirementthatdiscouragesculturaldiversity.Most likely,one of our main
requirementsis to respect such diversity (and hence to respect cultural
Therefore,universalismis compatiblewith culturalpluralism.68
integrity).67
Relativistsare likely to revise the ethnocentrismargumentso that it
avoids our criticism.Accordingto the new argument,even if universalists
are not ethnocentricin the usual sense, any list of preceptsthey produce is
boundto be culturallybiased.This is ensuredby the well-establishedthesis
of culturaldeterminism,accordingto which all of our beliefs,concepts, and
perceptions are culturallyconditioned to such an extent that unbiased
thoughts,choices, and inferencesare impossible.69
The weakness of this argumentresides in the word "biased."The fact
that a thesis is culturallybiased discreditsthe thesis only if "biased"means
roughlythe same as "distorted"or "mistaken."70 But if it has that meaning,
two problems arise. First,cultural determinismis not confirmed by any
evidence marshaledfor it, because accordingto culturaldeterminism,that
evidence is not evidence at all, but a batch of mistakes or distortions.
Second,the relativist'snew argumentfailsto makerelativismmoreplausible
thanuniversalism.Itsmainpremise,culturaldeterminism,impliesthatevery
67. Whetherrespectingculturalintegrityinvolvescondoningall that is customarywithina

cultureis anotherquestion.And whetherdisapprovingof a custom requiresinterfering
with it is still anotherquestion.Discussionof these issues becomes muddledif they are
not distinguished,and even more muddledif we mistakenlythinkthatthe injunctionto
respectculturalintegrityrequiresculturalrelativismfor its support.Not only does the
injunctionto respectculturalintegritystandin no need of relativism,it findsrelativisma
troublesomebedfellow.Accordingto culturalrelativism,the judgment"showingrespect
for culturalintegrityis morallyright"is not valid for all cultures.
68. Formoreon how universalismmakesroomfor pluralism,see Nussbaum,supranote 3,
at 224-25; Perry,supranote4, at 471- 75; HATCH, supranote 7, ch. 7; WIREDU, supranote
50, chs. 3, 6.
69. SUMNER,supranote 7, ? 232; BENEDICT, supranote6, at 2-3; HERSKOVITS,supranote 6, at 15-
20, 56, 58, 84-85.
70. Suppose,forinstance,thata thesiscountsas biasedif questions,interests,or assumptions
sharedby only some of the world'sculturescontributedto its genesis.Thenno doubt is
cast on the thesis by showing it to be biased.The Pythagorean theoremis biasedin this
sense, but it's not implausibleon that account.
productof the human mind is culturallybiased. So every such productis

discredited,includingculturalrelativismand culturaldeterminism.
Inshort,the relativisthas shot himselfin the foot. His argumentrestson
a premisewhich, if interpretedso that it can do the work assigned to it,
discreditsboth itselfand relativism.(Of course, if it discreditsitselfwe can
dismiss it as false, in which case it discreditsnothing.Such are the puzzles
spawned by self-discreditingpremises.)His problem is similarto one he
faced earlier,when he claimed that every truthis merely a local truth.His
presentargumentrestson a similarclaim, one thatthwartshis aims just as
surely as the earlierone did.
Perhapsthe relativistwill respondby revisingculturaldeterminismso
that it concerns only normativemoraltheories. He then can use it against
such theories without threateningeither relativismor cultural determin-
ism.71Thistactic fails. Forone thing, metaethicaltheoriesare no less biased
than normativeones, in any sense of "biased"that supportsthe view that
normativetheoriesare inescapablybiased. Ironically,this is especially true
of the metaethicalthesis of relativism,which owes much of its popularityto
historicallyspecific "biases,"amongthem the anti-Victorian attitudeof early
twentiethcenturyintellectuals.72
J. The Failureof the Naivete Argument

The naivete argumentis anotherfailure,for it confounds universalismwith
moralnaivet.73The belief that some moraljudgmentsare universallyvalid
is neither logically nor causally related to any view-naive, cynical, or
whatever-about human motivationor about the development of moral
beliefs. Frankly,it is surprisingthat people fall for the naivete argument,
given how weak it is. Forwhateverreason,some people associaterelativism
with the tough-minded,sophisticatedperson of the world and associate
universalismwith the naive, overly-optimisticboy next door. Bothassocia-
tions are groundless.
A possible reply is that if beliefs are influencedby enculturation,the
universalist'smetaethicalbeliefs are so influenced.To the extent that she
knows this, she will rejectthem. To continue holding them is to betraya
naivete about the effects of enculturation.
71. Rentelnseems to advocatethis strategy.See RENTELN,supranote 3, at 69, 71, 74-76.

72. On this topic, Elvin Hatch is illuminating.See HATCH,supra note 7, chs. 2-3. See
especiallyid. at 50. See also Bidney,supranote 21, ?? 5-6; CARL N. DEGLER,IN SEARCH
OF
HUMAN
NATURE
chs. 3, 8 (1991).
73. Foranotherangleon the confusionin the naivet6argument,see Beckwith,supranote 59,
at 587.
This reply differs little from the "culturaldeterminism"argumentand

fails for the same reasons. If the fact that human beliefs are influencedby
enculturationdiscreditsthose beliefs, the relativist'sbelief in relativismis
discredited.
Suppose the relativistprotestsby saying (correctly)that although his
knowledgeof the effects of enculturationjustifiesa close look at his beliefs
and a carefulscrutinyof the argumentson which they are based, it does not
necessarilydiscredithis beliefs. Then he must grantthe same point about
the universalist'sbeliefs, in which case he has no groundsfor saying that
insofaras the universalistknows of the effects of enculturation,she will
rejectuniversalism.
K. The Failureof the ToleranceArgument74
The tolerance argumenttrades on the ambiguityof the statement, "we

cannot imposeour moralityon othercultures."Letus considerthe argument
step by step:
(1) If relativism is true, we cannot impose our morality on other
cultures.
(2) So we must refrainfrom imposingour moralityon other cultures.
(3) To refrainfrom imposingour moralityon others is to be tolerantof
others.
(4) Therefore,relativismrequiresus to be tolerantof other cultures.
To makepremise(1) true,we mustreadthe second partof it to have the
firstof the three meaningsdiscussedearlier.Thatis, we must readthat part
to mean, "we cannot projectour moralityonto other cultures."As pointed
out in SectionVI, partM, relativismis specificallyaboutthe limitsof moral
validity;so althoughit rulesout projectingour moralityonto others,it does
not rule out morallycoercing or morallyvictimizingothers. So premise(1)
is false unless it concerns moral projectionratherthan moral coercion or
victimization.The same goes for (2), which is meant as a corollaryof (1).
When considering (3), however, we should note that tolerance has
nothingto do with failing or succeeding to state valid moraljudgments.It
involves refrainingfrom various actions-actions that interferewith the
lives of other people. Thus, even if we do not project our moralityonto
74. I discussthis argumentmorefully, along with some empiricalresearchthat may seem,

but in fact fails,to buttressit, in JohnJ. Tilley,MoralArgumentsfor CulturalRelativism,
17 NETH.Q. HUM.RTS.36 (1999).
others,we can easily be intolerantof othersby morallycoercingor morally

victimizing them. Therefore,to maintain, plausibly,that to refrainfrom
imposingour moralityon others is to be tolerantof others, we must use
"imposingour moralityon others"to mean "morallycoercing or morally
victimizingothers."
So the tolerance argument is plainly fallacious. If we interpretits
premisescharitably,the firsttwo have to do with projectingour morality
onto others, but the third has to do with morally coercing and morally
victimizingothers.The resultis an argumentthatdoes nothingto supportits
conclusion.
A predictablereply is that although relativismdoes not ensure toler-
ance, it remainspreferableto universalismbecause unlikethe latter,it does
not ensure intolerance.This reply is mistakenbecause universalismdoes
not rule out tolerance. In fact, most universalistssee the following as valid
for everyone: "A high degree of tolerance, including tolerance of other
cultures,is morallydesirable."
Some relativistswill be skepticalof this and will argueas follows:To be
a universalistis to thinkthat some moralstandardsare universal,meaning
that everyone is subject to them. Call the acts that conflict with those
standardsx, y, and z. Now, if we believe thatx, y, and z conflictwith moral
standardsto which everyoneis subject,we surelyare committedto the view
that we must interferewith any culturethat does x, y, and z. However,to
interferein this way is to be intolerant.Thus, if we accept universalism,we
are committed to being intolerantof other cultures, specifically those
culturesthat do x, y and z.
The argumentfails owing to its second premise,which is patentlyfalse.
The fact thatx conflictswith a universalmoralstandarddoes not entail that
we should interferewith x. Obviously,whetherwe should interferewith a
practicedependson manythingsotherthan its moralstatus.Forexample, it
depends on how harmfulthe practiceis and on how much harmwe might
produce by interferingwith it.
VIII. A REPLYFROM THE RELATIVIST
Relativistshave a final replyto our criticisms,a replythey considera trump

card. They maintainthat no one has decisively established intuitionism,
Kantianism,contractarianism, or any moraltheorythat presupposesuniver-
salism. Facedwith this, we have no choice but to embrace relativism.
Thisreplyis flawed in fourways. First,it restson the assumptionthatwe
must reject any thesis for which we have no decisive proof. No one has
decisively proven this assumption; so the assumption refutes itself.
Second, although relativists deny that (a) some moral judgments are
universallyvalid, most of them believe, tacitlyanyway,that (b) some moral

statementsare universallyvalid, includingthese: "to behave accordingto
the traditionsof one's cultureis primafacie right;"and "eachcultureshould
be respectedby others, providedit reciprocatesin kind."75
Relativistssay thatwe should reject(a) unless we see a prooffor it. But
what goes for (a) surely goes for (b), and to the extent that (a) is without
proof, so is (b). Indeed, no plausible argumentexists for (a) that differs
notablyfrom those advanced for (b). Thus, unless relativistsare willing to
reject (b), they should thinktwice about theirobjectionto (a).
Third,the replytreatsrelativismas a defaultposition,a positionwe are
to adopt without proof, providedthe argumentsfor universalismfail. But
why should relativismhave this status?Ifwe rejectuniversalismbecause we
find the argumentsfor it wanting, why should we then adopt relativism?
Why not choose nihilism, the view that no moral judgment is valid for
anyone?
Evenif we limitour optionsto relativismand universalism,relativismis
not a default position. For it is no more obvious or commonsensicalthan
universalism.Any appearance to the contrarystems from confounding
relativismwith liberalism,situationism,or one of the otherdefensibleviews
discussed earlier.Nor are the argumentsfor relativismin any way obvious
or commonsensical;the only thing "common"aboutthem is thatthey stem
from common confusions. So relativismhas no privilegedstatus in moral
theory. It is simply one more theory, no less in need of supportthan any
other.And every attemptto supportit has failed.
Fourth,the relativistprovidesno evidence that no versionof universal-
ism has been proven.He providesno evidence because he thinkshis point
is obvious. He observes that no form of universalismis unanimously
accepted and takes this as proof that no form of universalismenjoys
adequatesupport.
His reasoning backfires. If a lack of consensus signaled a lack of
adequate support(it doesn't, of course), few theories would be as poorly
supportedas relativism.There is no consensus, either among scholars or
among people in general,that relativismis true. Nor is this consensus likely
to form, given the feebleness of the relativist'sarguments. Also, no
consensus exists among relativistsabout how best to defend their thesis
(some preferthe toleranceargument,othersthe researchargument,and so
on) or even about how to define it.
75. See, e.g., DOWNS, supra note 6; BENEDICT, supra note 6, at 37, 278; HERSKOVITS, supra note
6, at 15, 33, 93-94, 101; LEACH,supra note 7, ch. 4.
IX. CONCLUSION
The precedingsections show that the argumentsfor relativismfail and that

the relativist'srescue effortsare no better.Alternativeargumentscome to
mind, butthey are not so much argumentsas assumptionsstandingin need
of arguments.For example, some might claim that morality reduces to
mores,thatmoralpreceptsdifferlittlefrom legal ones, or thatwe need only
be reflectiveto see that every moral judgmenttacitly refersto a limited
group. Not one of these claims is plausible.The thirdone, for instance, is
palpablyfalse. When I considerwhat I mean by "causingneedless harmis
wrong,"I find that I mean just that-that causing needless harmis wrong. I
am makinga point about causing needless harm,without regardto who
causes it. I am not makinga point abouta limitedgroup.This is not to deny
that some moral judgmentsare about specific groups. When the nomads
described in Section V say that killingthe old and weak is right,no doubt
they mean the old and weak of their culture. But such examples fail to
rescue the claim we are examining. That claim refers to all moral
judgments, as indeed it must if is to have any chance of supporting
relativism.
The upshot is that those of us who favor universalismover relativism
can go on doing so, for there is nothing in the relativist'sargumentsto
incline us the otherway. Thisresultis important.Formostof us, to deny that
we accept universalism-tentativelyaccept it, anyway-would be grossly
insincere.76This is especially true when we consider the following. First,
relativismderives no supportfrom liberalism,situationism,or any of the
other things with which relativistsconfuse it. Second, universalismdiffers
sharplyfrom absolutism,ethnocentrism,and the other questionableviews
to which relativiststryto tie it. Third,the rejectionof universalismimplies
that not one of the following (under)statements is universallyvalid:
* Toleratingculturaldiversityis primafacie right.
* Ethniccleansing is not so good.
* Torturingchildrenfor the fun of hearingthem scream is wrong.
* Avoidingextremeracismand xenophobia is morallyOK.
76. Nor is this a matterof blind faith. Plausibleargumentsfor universalismare easier to

producethanrelativistssuppose.(Whatis notso easy to produceare plausiblearguments
for theoriesthat proposea simple, universalalgorithmfor moraldecisions. Relativists
often confusethe argumentsfor such algorithmswith argumentsfor universalism.)Fora
briefone, see WIREDU,supranote 50, at 29. Formoreelaborateones in the same spirit,
see WHITE, supranote 4, chs. 4-5; RESCHER,supranote 48, ch. 9; G.J.WARNOCK,
THEOBJECT
OF MORALITY(1971).
546 HUMANRIGHTS
QUARTERLY Vol.22
* Annihilatinga culturebecause its customs seem odd is not right.

* Launchinga nuclear war over a minor tariff dispute is morally
uncalled-for.
* Imperialistdominationof other nations is ethically inappropriate.
* Walkingon one's feet (as opposed, say, to hand-walking)is prima
facie permissible.
* Deliberate,massive poisoning of riversand oceans is primafacie
wrong.
Few people can believe-sincerely believe-that not one of these
judgmentsis universallyvalid. Formostof us, then, universalismis the only
sincere option untilwe see a compellingcase againstit. Culturalrelativists
have made no such case; indeed, they have produced not one cogent
argument.We must conclude that for all their efforts, and for all the
popularityof their position,theirthesis remainsdestituteof support.
APPENDIX:ERRORSIN FORMULATINGCULTURALRELATIVISM
My aim in Section IIwas to formulaterelativismfairlyand to avoid seven

common errors:
Error1: Formulatingrelativismso that it is intolerablyunclear.This is
usually done by using termsthat cry out for definitionand then failing to
provide the definitions.An example: defining relativismas the view that
"thereare no transculturallyvalid moral standards,"and then failing to
clarify"valid"and "standards."
Error2: Formulatingrelativismso that the notion of relative truthis
essentialto it. Thisis an errorbecause some relativistslocate theirrelativism
in the content of moraljudgments,not in the notion of truth.They regard
moral judgmentsas true (or false) in a nonrelativeway, but they also see
every such judgmentas tacitly referringto a culture.
Error3: Formulatingrelativismso thatthe relativityof moraljudgments
is ensured by their content. This is the opposite of Error2. It is an error
because some relativistslocate their relativism,not in the content of moral
judgments,but in the notion of moraltruth.They contend that every moral
truth is true in a relative way. The claim that the relativityof moral
judgmentsis ensuredby theircontent should be seen, not as a component
of relativism,but as just one way of fleshingout thatthesis. The same goes
for the claim that moral judgments are true in only a relative way.
Error4: Formulating relativism so that the following claim is essential to
it: "Valid cross-cultural moral comparisons are impossible." This claim
shouldbe seen as an alleged consequenceof relativism,not as a component

of it. When relativistsmaketheirclaim aboutthe invalidityof cross-cultural
comparisons, they base it (whether correctly or not) on a distinctive
metaethicalview. It'sthis view thatformsthe core of theirtheory.
Error5: Formulatingrelativism as a view about moral judgments
simpliciterwithout restrictingthe meaningof "moraljudgment."This is an
error because few or no relativistsextend their thesis to the following
statements(amongothers),which surely are moraljudgmentsin the usual
sense: "Wrongacts are wrong"(a tautology,but a moral judgmentnone-
theless). "Polyandryis rightwhen practiced by the western Pahari.""It's
primafacie rightto behave accordingto the traditionsof one's culture."The
typical relativistsees none of these judgmentsas "relative"in any way. For
instance,he sees all three as just plain true-true for you, truefor me, true
for everyone. The second judgmentis indeed about a specific culture,but
this does not restrictits truthto that culture.
Error6: Formulatingrelativismso thatthe followingview would not be
a brandof it: "Somemoraljudgmentsare valid for all existingcultures,but
for every such judgment we can easily imagine cultures for which the
judgment would not be valid." This thesis implies that the pancultural
validityof any moraljudgmentM is somehow a functionof the norms,laws,
habits,customs, ideals, attitudes,opinions, or traditionsof the culturesnow
existing. (I am assuming that cultures are individuatedaccording to the
thingsjust listed.)Ifthe habits,customs, etc., of one of those cultureswere
to change significantly,resultingin a new culture resemblingone of the
imaginaryones spoken of in the above thesis, then M would cease to be
valid for that cultureand, hence, cease to be panculturallyvalid. A thesis
with this implicationshould be classifiedas a formof relativism.77
Error7: Formulatingrelativismso thatan injunctionto be tolerantis one
of its components. The injunctionto be tolerant should be seen as an
alleged implicationof relativism,not as somethingessential to it.78Surely
Benedict and Herskovitscould retracttheir calls for tolerance without
ceasing to be relativists.
77. Rentelntakescare to avoid the mistakediscussedhere. See RENTELN,supranote 3, ch. 3.

78. This is emphasizedin RENTELN,supranote 3, at 73-74.

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HUMAN RIGHTSQUARTERLY

We often hearthat "moralityis relativeto culture"or that "rightand wrong

* John]. Tilleyis an AssociateProfessorof Philosophyat IndianaUniversity-Purdue University

HumanRightsQuarterly22 (2000) 501-547 @ 2000 by The JohnsHopkinsUniversityPress

the lastword in ethicaltheory.Inwhat follows I challengethis stateof affairs

My firstaim is to produce an adequateformulationof culturalrelativism.

Kiely, ThirdWorldistRelativism:A New Formof Imperialism,25 J. CONTEMP.ASIA159

which a judgmentmightbe relativeto a culture.First,itstruth(orfalsehood)

7. I have in mindBENEDICT,supranote6; RuthBenedict,Anthropologyand theAbnormal,10

Next, for simplicity,let us interpretculturalrelativismso that it pertains,

that fail to qualify. One reason for extending "cultures"to realisticallyimaginable

Although most of this article concerns culturalrelativism,some of it

The views to be discussed require eight further comments. First, my

14. SUMNER,supranote 7, supranote 6, at 101; Benedict,supra

Second, throughoutmost of this article I speak as if universalismwere

* MethodologicalContextualism:Everycustom,belief, or action must

mightput it, culturalrelativismis merelya schemafor normativetheoriesof

metaethical,I am deviatingfromthe views of Sumner,Benedict,and Herskovits,who

IV. AGENT RELATIVISM

This section addresses agent relativismand appraiserrelativism.25 These

by challenging practices that are deeply entrenched in his culture. But

contradiction.Thus,"morallyright"is not a stand-infor "inaccordwith the

Culturalrelativism("relativism"for short) is not as clearly flawed as the

A. The Triviality Argument

Accordingto the firstargument,universalismis temptingonly if we focus on

for everyone, nothing importantwould follow. When offeringexamples of

The next argumentbegins with facts aboutdifferentcultures.Some cultures

C. The Human Sacrifice Argument

The thirdargumentresemblesthe second, but concerns a more "appalling"

31. Othercustomscould have been chosen here, for example,the Dinka'sritualburialof

D. The Nomad Argument

The fourthargumentconcerns a homicidal custom that derives, not from

We now come to the most common argumentfor relativism.To state it

The next argumentfocuses not on the notion of truth, but on that of

H. The EmpiricalOutlook Argument

Accordingto the eighth argument,to rejectrelativismin favorof universal-

We can introducethe next argumentby asking,who's to judge?Universal-

J. The Naivete Argument

A further reason to accept relativism is that to accept its opposite,

K. The Tolerance Argument

A. Indefinite judgments versus Empty judgments

First, we must distinguish indefinite judgments, meaning those whose

kindness,the act is morallyright.(This is not to say that these questions

B. Morality versus Victorian Morality

We must also distinguish morality, meaning morality as it is usually

34. Evenwhen this requirementexists, it seldom createsgreatdifficulties.But I will let this

Third, we must distinguishrelativismfrom moral liberalism,a common

D. MoralJudgmentsversus Judgmentsof Blame

The fourthdistinctionis between moraljudgments,as earlierdefined, and

to avoid it. Ifrelativismsays nothingaboutthe moralityof rape,torture,and racism,if it

nor to come close to showing, that no moraljudgmentis universallyvalid.

Next, we must distinguish relativismfrom the commonplace view that

38. STOUT, supranote 4, at 86-87.

In sum, we must not confuse relativismwith situationism,41the view

F. Validity versus Acceptance

Next, we must distinguishvalid moral judgmentsfrom accepted ones. A

neithersaying nor denying that the preceptsare valid. On other occasions

The next distinctionis between truthand justification.43 SupposeJohngives

(5) If I grantthat my beliefs can be justifiedwithout being true, I must