Airbus – A330 Boost Pump

Stuart Tucker
Product Support & Technical Service
Aerospace

© 2018 Eaton. All Rights Reserved..

Agenda
Airbus A330 fuel pump history

Alert Operators Transmission (AOT) instruction definition

Airworthiness Directive (AD)

AOT output

Investigation findings

Way forward

© 2018 Eaton. All Rights Reserved.. 3

Issue/application
• Platform:
• Airbus A330 / 340
• Aircraft problem/impact:
• Possible Safety concern
• Description of problem
• Cavitation erosion
• Identify assembly/part number:
• Fuel Boost Pump 568-1-28300-100 series
• Consequence(s)
• Maintenance burden

© 2018 Eaton. All Rights Reserved.. 4

History of issue
A 8810 Mk101 Fuel Pump (serial number A03945)
was removed from an A330 in August 2017 due to an
aircraft circuit breaker trip. When returned to the
Eaton facility for repair the pump was seen to be
exhibiting cavitation erosion around the inlet webs
such that erosion breakthrough into the electrical
connector conduit had occurred.

This condition, if not detected and corrected, could

result, in case the pump is running dry, in an ignition
source in the fuel tank, which may result in a fuel tank
explosion and consequent loss of the airplane.

© 2018 Eaton. All Rights Reserved.. 5

Alert Operators Transmission (AOT) instruction definition A28L006-17-02
Airworthiness Directive (AD) AD no. 2017-0224
To address this potential unsafe condition, Erosion – As defined Inspection interval - FH
Airbus issued Alert Operators Transmission (AOT) in the AOT
A28L006-17 to provide instructions to inspect some fuel Initial Inspection 10000
pumps when installed at specific positions No Erosion
5000
Due to design similarities, PN 568-1-28300-101, Case 1: Light Erosion
568-1-28300-103 and 568-1-28300-200 only are Case 2: Medium Erosion 800
considered affected.
Aft transfer pump
Standby
The aim of the AOT is to inform operators of the need CTR Tank
(600QL1,600QL2)
Rear CTR Tank
(608QL1,
pumps
(112QA1,
(712QN1,712QN2
&
608QL2) 711QN1,711QN2,
to perform inspections on fuel pumps that have 112QA2)
711QN3, 711QN4)
A330-200 X (except A330-200F) X
accumulated more than 10000FH. X (when equipped with
wet center tank MOD
A330-300 204025) X
An AD was as issued to instruct repetitive inspections A340-200
A340-300
X
X
of these fuel pumps and, depending on findings, A340-500
A340-600
X
X
X X
X
replacement of damaged fuel pumps with serviceable
parts. This AD also requires an update of the applicable
MMEL, and the reporting of inspection results to Airbus.

© 2018 Eaton. All Rights Reserved.. 6

A330/340 fuel pump inspection

Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 Step 4 Step 5

Carefully position Carefully lay the Rotate the pump so With the electrical It is only the right-hand
the pump down for pump down with the that the electrical connector facing side of the web/vane
inspection electrical connector connector is facing downwards this aligns that requires inspection
facing you downwards the web/vane for in accordance
inspection with the AOT

© 2018 Eaton. All Rights Reserved.. 7

Criteria as per A28L006-17 Rev 01 dated
16-NOV-2017
The three below criteria are to be compared with the
findings found on the pump to decide which action should
be applied to close the inspection:
Case 1: Light Erosion (blemishing):
• Surface blemishing with grey anodise treatment
removed from web
• Base material has begun to erode with light blemishing without
pitting or cavity
Case 2: Medium Erosion (pitting):
• An extensive surface blemishing with grey anodise treatment
removed from web
• Base material has eroded with pitting or single or multiple
shallow cavities
Case 3: Severe Erosion:
• Base material is heavily eroded with pitting and single, multiple
deep cavities or breakthrough

© 2018 Eaton. All Rights Reserved.. 8

AOT output
EASA AD 2017-0224 Initial Inspection Number of Pumps based on whole fleet
expired 16/12/2017 and 26/12/2017 Number of Pumps 1780
2282 Part Number not
(standby Pumps) Inspected
applicable as per AOT

Number of Pumps 1465

Not reached 10,000 hrs initial
FAA AD 2017-25-16 Initial Inspection Remaining
inspection requirement

expired 29/01/2017 and 29/01/2018

(standby Pumps) Findings Reported by Operators
(Initial Inspection)
Case 0 1035
Case 1 561
Case 2 133
Case 3 51

© 2018 Eaton. All Rights Reserved.. 9

Investigation findings / way forward
The conclusion of the investigation and using a problem analysis fault tree approach the testing has confirmed that a
8810 Mk103 pump generates significant levels of vapour when operating in a low flow system environment (Mk103
and Mk101 are geometrically identical). The pump impeller/inducer combination is designed to operate at a volumetric
flow of 6,500 igph [490 lpm] in order to provide sufficient performance when operating with one pump non-operational
in a collector cell (during climb, at altitude and with hot fuel). Consequently when the pump is operated at very low
flows there is a significant amount of recirculation within the pump inlet which agitates the fluid and releases vapour.
At very low flows the vapour centrifuges within the pump inlet, with a significant volume shed through the designed
vapour extraction system, however some rotating vapour will impinge against static surfaces within the inlet of
Mk101/Mk103.
Further the system analysis demonstrates the pump will be operated at this low flow condition for the majority of its
life. Cavitation is the formation of bubbles or cavities in liquid, developed in areas of relatively low pressure around an
impeller/inducer. The imploding or collapsing of these bubbles will trigger intense shockwaves inside the pump,
causing erosion to the pump housing.
It has also been demonstrated that the level of vapour created within the pump is highly sensitive to the pump
operation point within the aircraft system. Pump operation at very low flows is worst case, with the level of intensity
reducing as the flow is increased such that at flows beyond approximately 1,500 igph [150 lpm] the intensity would
reduce to a level that would create no significant material loss issue. This is supported by rig testing, CFD analysis,
a system sensitivity study and service returned units.

© 2018 Eaton. All Rights Reserved.. 10

Provision timeline/way forward
• Route Cause Analysis Report Rev C issued to Airbus 21 March 2018
• Conclusion within this report is to be agreed
• Primary solution hardware testing to end June 2018
• Prototype Hardware being sourced end July 2018
• Prototype Pump start endurance tests August 2018 for a period of
8 months

© 2018 Eaton. All Rights Reserved.. 11

Questions/Comments

© 2018 Eaton. All Rights Reserved.. 12

© 2018 Eaton. All Rights Reserved.. 13