RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS BETWEEN HUSBAND AND WIFE

A. Cohabitation, Mutual Love, and Respect

Narag vs Narag

FACTS:
Mrs. Julieta Narag filed several cases against his husband, Atty. Dominador Narag, for
his alleged affair with Gina Espita who happens to be a former student of the respondent
back when Ms. Espita was a first-year college student. Finally, in the most recent case filed
by Mrs. Narag, the complainant had her seven children sign the appeal for disbarment of
Atty. Narag. Mrs. Narag presented as evidence the pictures of the respondent and Ms. Espita
together, love letters, testimony of Mr. Charlie Espita, the brother of Ms. Espita and the
source of the
mentioned pictures and love letters, and the testimony of the children of Atty. And Mrs Nara
g. In the proceedings, Atty. Narag has been engaged in an affair with Ms.Espita, and being
live-in partners, have had two children with the latter. Atty. Narag denied the allegations by
presenting
Argumentum ad Misericordia.

ISSUE:
Should Atty. Narag be disbarred even if he denied the allegations against him?

RULING:
Atty. Narag was not able to invalidate the authenticity of the pieces of evidence presented
against him, but instead, presented an argument to pity. He is, by order of the honorable
court, being disbarred by virtue of The Code of Professional Responsibility which provides:
Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
CANON 7 A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession,
and support the activities of the Integrated Bar.
Rule 7.03 A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to
practice law, nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous
manner to the discredit of the legal profession.

Goita vs Campos Rueda

Facts:
The parties were legally and immediately thereafter established their residence at 115 Calle San Marcelino,
where they lived together for about a month, when the plaintiff returned to the home of her parents. The
defendant, one month after he had contracted marriage with the plaintiff, demanded of her that she
perform unchaste and lascivious acts on his genital organs; that the plaintiff spurned the obscene demands
of the defendant and refused to perform any act other than legal and valid cohabitation; that the defendant,
since that date had continually on other successive dates, made similar lewd and indecorous demands on
his wife, the plaintiff, who always spurned them, which just refusals of the plaintiff exasperated
the defendant and induce him to maltreat her by word and deed and inflict injuries upon her lips,
her face and different parts of her body; and that, as the plaintiff was unable by any means to induce the
defendant to desist from his repugnant desires and cease from maltreating her, she was obliged to leave the
conjugal abode and take refuge in the home of her parents. This is an action by the wife against her
husband for support outside of the conjugal domicile. It was urged in the first instance, and the court so held,
that the defendant cannot be compelled to support the plaintiff, except in his own house, unless it be by
virtue of a judicial decree granting her a divorce or separation from the defendant.
Issue:
Whether or not the husband be compelled to pay the pension outside of the conjugal domicile?
Held:
Marriage in this jurisdiction is a contract entered into in the manner and with the solemnities established by
General Orders No. 68, in so far as its civil effects are concerned requiring the consent of the parties. To this
extent a marriage partakes of the nature of an ordinary contract. But it is something more than a mere
contract. It is a new relation, the rights, duties, and obligations of which rest not upon the agreement of the
parties but upon the general law which defines and prescribes those rights, duties, and obligations. Marriage
is an institution, in the maintenance of which in its purity the public is deeply interested. It is a relation for life
and the parties cannot terminate it at any shorter period by virtue of any contract they may make .The
reciprocal rights arising from this relation, so long as it continues, are such as the law

determines from time to time, and none other. When the legal existence of the parties is merged into one by
marriage, the new relation is regulated and controlled by the state or government upon principles of public
policy for the benefit of society as well as the parties. And when the object of a marriage is defeated by
rendering its continuance intolerable to one of the parties and productive of no possible good to the
community, relief in some way should be obtainable.

Tenchavez vs Escano

B. Fixing the Family Domicile

Dadivas vs Villanueva

Plaintiff filed a case against the Defendant on May 27, 1927for the purpose of obtaining
separate maintenance and custody of two younger minor children. As well as a proper
allowance for professional
legal services rendered by the Plaintiffs attorney.
Upon hearing the cause the trial court absolved the defendant from the complaint and
abrogated a prior order of the court for maintenance pendent lite, with costs against the
plaintiff. From this judgment, the plaintiff appealed.

FACTS:
1. July 16, 1905- Plaintiff and Defendant were married.
2. Manila- place of marriage and residence of the couple.
3. Children: Antonio- 18 yrs. Guillermo- 10 yrs., minor Sergio- 9 yrs., minor
4. Infidelity and cruelty- grounds on which separate maintenance is sought
5. Proof of infidelity-ten years prior to the institution of the action, the defendant was guilty
of repeated acts of infidelity with four different women.
6. Incorrigible nature of the defendant in relations with other women and brutality towards
the plaintiff caused the plaintiff to establish a separate abode for herself and two minor
children.
7. April 20, 1927-occurrence of final separation of wife (plaintiff) and husband (defendant).-
the month before the plaintiff filed an appeal to obtain separate maintenance.
8. Proof to the charge of cruelty-does not establish a case for separate maintenance-
unproved and insufficient
9. Repeated acts of conjugal infidelity (by the husband/defendant)-proved-recurrent-gives
wife (plaintiff) an undeniable right to relief

ISSUE:
Whether the wife has an undeniable right to relief.

HELD:
The decision/judgment of the lower court was reversed in favor of the wife/plaintiff and
against the p. 2,000
for attorneys fees, Php. 720 for expenses husband/defendant. It was ordered that the
plaintiff have and recover of the defendant the sum of Ph of procuring transcript and Php.
500 per month, beginning April 1, 1928. The defendant was ordered to pay the plaintiff
byway of maintenance on or before the 10th day of each month, the sum of Php. 500.

RATIONALE:
In order to entitle a wife to maintain a separate home and to require separate maintenance
from her husband, it is not necessary that the husband should bring a concubine into the
marital domicile. Repeated illicit relations with women outside of the marital establishment
are enough. The law is not so unreasonable as to require a wife to live in marital relations
with a husband whose propensity towards other women makes common habitation with him
unbearable.

Garcia vs Santiago

FACTS:
1. April 8, 1910- alleged date of marriage between the plaintiff, Cipriana Garcia and the
defendant, Isabelo Santiago.
2. February 3, 1925- the date when the plaintiff was compelled to leave her conjugal
dwelling due to continued family dissensions.
3. Alejo Santiago (Defendant No. 2)
-Son of Isabelo Santiago (Defendant No. 1)
-allegedly seduced Prisca Aurelio
4. Prisca Aurelio
daughter of Cipriana Garcia (the Plaintiff)
- gave birth to a child that was allegedly Alejo Santiagos child
5. Isabelo Santiago
-failed to see the vindication of the honor of Prisca Aurelio, the plaintiffs daughter by
requiring his son to marry her.
- refused to get involved with the matter, thus seemingly countenancing the illicit relations
between his son and the plaintiffs daughter
-has allegedly conveyed/been conveying their conjugal properties to Alejo to foster latters
whims & caprices and thus, damaging & prejudicing her rights. Some of these properties
include lands acquired during the plaintiffs and the defendants marriage with money
belonging to the conjugal partnership.-publicly maintained illicit relationship with Geronima
Yap
6. February 3, 1925
-separation of the plaintiff and defendant.
-the separation was necessary to avoid personal violence
7. Isabelo Santiago
-continually refused to provide for the plaintiffs support
8. Cipriana Garcia (the plaintiff)
-could not live in their conjugal dwelling because of the illicit relationship between her
daughter, Prisca Aurelio and AlejoSantiago, countenanced by the other defendant, Isabelo
Santiago.
-demanded that she is entitled to P500.00 pendente lite monthly pension from
conjugal partnership
-claimed that her husband, Isabelo Santiago (Defendant No. 1)has shown himself unfit to
administer the property of conjugal partnership and the court should therefore order its
administration to be placed in her hands.

ISSUE/RATIONALE:
1. Whether their separation is unjustified
NO. They were having a stormy life prior to the separation due to the frequent fights.
Isabelo ordered her to leave the house &threatened to ill-treat her if she returned. Priscas
situation is embarrassing for her mother. Highly possible that Alejo causedPriscas
pregnancy. Compelling them to cohabit could lead to further quarrels.
2. Whether transfers of property from Isabelo to Alejo are illegal
NO. Failed to prove that property was community property. Documentary evidence even
show that it was acquired by Isabelo before their marriage.
3. Whether Cipriana is entitled to P500.00 monthly maintenance
NO. Thats too much. P50.00 would be enough.
4. Whether Isabelo is unfit to administer their conjugal property
NO. No sufficient reason found to deprive him of this right.
5. Whether Cipriana is entitled to an allowance of attorneys fees
NO.

HELD:
That the judgment appealed from is therefore modified. Separation is allowed. Isabelo is
ordered to provide
Cipriana with a P50.00monthly allowance to be paid within the first 10 days of the month.
No costs allowed.

Atilano vs Chua Ching Beng

PILAR ATILANO vs. CHUA CHING BENG Date: March 29, 1958
Nature: Appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga.

FACTS:
Pilar Atilano (plaintiff-appellee), 19 years old, married Chua Ching Beng (defendant-
appellant) on May, 1951. They lived in Manila with the parents of the defendant. In October
of that year, the couple went back to Zamboanga for a vacation. Plaintiff stayed behind,
telling the defendant that she would go back to him later. On September 1953, however,
plaintiff filed a complaint of support (P200 per month) against her husband, alleging
estrangement since October 1952, incessant bickering and the his inability to provide a
home for them without his parents. Defendant did not disclaim obligation to support;
however, he expressed his desire to fulfil his obligation if she returns to Manila and lives with
him in a domicile separate from his parents. As the husband, he claims the right to fix the
residence of the family. After plaintiff filed a petition for pendente lite with the CFI, CFI:
Plaintiff is granted a monthly allowance in the amount of 75 pesos. The defendant then filed
a petition that elected to fulfil his obligation as fixed by the trial court to receive and
maintain plaintiff at his residence in Pasay City. CFI: Denied petition.CA: Presented to SC for
Adjudication under Section 17-6 of RA 296.

ISSUE:
WON a wife is entitled to receive support from her husband where she refused to live with
him on account of some misunderstanding she had with the husbands immediate relatives.

RULE:
No. Defendant-appellant given the option to support wife at conjugal dwelling apart from his
parents home. Should plaintiff refuse, he is under no obligation to give any support. SC
Decision: giving the defendant husband Chua Ching Beng the option of supporting his wife
at their conjugal dwelling apart from the home of the parents of the husband. Should
plaintiff wife refuse to abide by the terms of this decision, then the defendant-appellant shall
be considered relieved from the obligation of giving any support to his wife.
RATIO:
The person obliged to give support may, at his option, fulfil his obligation either by paying
the allowance fixed, or by receiving and maintaining in his house the person who has a right
to receive support. The latter alternative cannot be availed of in case there is a moral or
legal obstacle thereto; Thus, husband is only obliged to pay for support if there is moral or
legal reason for him not to provide support in own home. In this case, the primary reason for
her leaving are the in-laws and even if this would be seen as legal basis, the fact that
husband promised that if she came home he would provide a separate home for them
negates this basis. Misunderstanding with in-laws does not constitute a moral or legal
obstacle that may prevent defendant from fulfilling the said provision. The law provides the
husband with the authority to fix the conjugal residence. The fact that he is willing to
establish a residence separate from his parents renders the plaintiffs objections to living
with her in-laws moot.

C. Mutual Help and Support

Pelayo vs Lauron

FACTS:
Petitioner Pelayo, a physician, rendered a medical assistance during the child
delivery of the daughter-in-law of the defendants. The just and equitable value of services
rendered by him was P500.00 which the defendants refused to pay without alleging any
good reason. With this, the plaintiff prayed that the judgment be entered in his favor as
against the defendants for the sum of P500.00 and costs.
The defendants denied all of the allegation of the plaintiff, contending that their
daughter-in-law had died in consequence of the child-birth, and that when she was alive, she
lived with her husband independently and in a separate house, that on the day she gave
birth she was in the house of the defendants and her stay there was accidental and due to
fortuitous circumstances.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the defendants are obliged to pay the petitioner for the medical
assistance rendered to their daughter-in-law.

HELD:
According to Article 1089 of the Old Civil Code (now 1157), obligations are created
by law, by contracts, by quasi-contracts, by illicit acts and omissions or by those which any
kind of fault or negligence occurs. Obligations arising from law are not presumed. Those
expressly determined in the Code or in special law, etc., are the only demandable ones.

The rendering of medical assistance in case of illness is comprised among the

mutual obligations to which the spouses are bound by way of mutual support as provided by
the law or the Code. Consequently, the obligation to pay the plaintiff for the medical
assistance rendered to the defendants daughter-in-law must be couched on the husband.

In the case at bar, the obligation of the husband to furnish his wife in the
indispensable services of a physician at such critical moments is especially established by
the law and the compliance therewith is unavoidable.

F. Use of Surname

Silva vs Peralta, 110 Phil 57

ELENITA LEDESMA SILVA - plaintiff-appellant
ESTHER PERALTA - defendant-appellee

Prayer:
(1) Appellant Elenita Silva should be awarded moral damages for Esther Peralta's
unauthorized use of the designation of "Mrs. Esther Silva";
(2) The award of pecuniary damages against appellant Saturnino Silva is unwarranted by the
facts and the law.

Issue:
WON damages awarded to appellee are a natural and direct consequence of Silva's deceitful
maneuvers in making love to appellee, and inducing her to yield to his advances and live
with him as his wife (when Silva knew all the time thathe could not marry Esther Peralta
because of his undissolved marriage to an Australian woman, a prior wedlock that he
concealed from appellee).

Facts:
Esther in good faith regarded herself as Saturnino's lawful wife. Saturnino made Esther
believe that they were really married.

Doctrine:
Art. 378 CC - The unauthorized or unlawful use of another person's surname gives a right of
action to the latter. Silva v Peralta unauthorized use of the designation as the wife of
another by use of surnames should be charged of damages.

Tolentino vs CA

FACTS:
Private respondent Consuelo David married Arturo Tolentino in 1931. The marriage was
dissolved and terminated in 1943 pursuant to the law during the Japanese occupation by a
decree of absolute divorce on the grounds of desertion and abandonment by the wife for at
least 3 continuous years.
Arturo Tolentino then married Pilar Adorable but she died soon after the marriage. After that,
Constancia married Arturo Tolentino on April 21, 1945 and they had 3 children. Constancia
Tolentino is the present legal wife of Arturo Tolentino. Consuelo David continued using the
surname Tolentino after the divorce and up to the time that the complaint was filed. Her
usage of the surname Tolentino was authorized by the family of Arturo Tolentino (brothers
and sisters). In RTC, Consuelo David should discontinue her usage of the surname of
Tolentino. The CA decision reversed that of the RTCs.

ISSUES:
1. WON the petitioners cause of action has already prescribed
2. WON the petitioner can exclude by injunction Consuelo David from using the surname of
her former husband from whom she was divorced.

HELD:
1. Yes
In Art 1150 CC The time for prescription of all kinds of actions, when there in no special
provision which ordains otherwise, shall be counted from the day they may be brought.
Art 1149 CC Period of prescription is 5 years from the right of action accrues.
The action has long prescribed because she married Arturo Tolentino on April 21, 1945; Civil
Code took effect on August 30, 1950; She acquired knowledge that Consuelo David was still
using the surname Tolentino in 1951.
She should have filed the case after she obtained knowledge that Consuelo David was still
using the surname Tolentino. The case was filed on November 23, 1971 or 20 years after she
obtained knowledge.
2. No
Philippine law is silent whether or not a divorced woman may continue to use the surname
of her husband because there are no provisions for divorce under Philippine law.
On the Commentary of Tolentino as regards Art 370 of the CC. The wife cannot claim an
exclusive right to use the husbands surname. She cannot be prevented from using it, but
neither can she restrain others from using it.
Art 371 is not applicable because it contemplates annulment while the present case refers to
absolute divorce where there is severance of valid marriage ties. Effect of divorce was more
akin to death of the spouse where the deceased woman is continued to be referred to as
Mrs. of the husband even if he has remarried.
If the appeal would be granted the respondent would encounter problems because she was
able to prove that she entered into contracts with third persons, acquired properties and
entered into other legal relations using the surname Tolentino. Petitioner failed to show the
she would suffer any legal injury or deprivation of right.
There was no usurpation of the petitioners name and surname. Usurpation implies injury to
the interests of the owner of the name. It consists with the possibility of confusion of
identity. The elements of usurpation were 1. Actual use of anothers name, 2. Use is
unauthorized, 3. Use of anothers name is to designate personality or identity of a person.
None of these elements were present in the case because public knowledge referred to
Constancia as the legal wife of Arturo, and Consuelo did represent herself after the divorce
as Mrs. Arturo Tolentino.
Silva v Peralta was cited by the petitioner but the case is not applicable. In Silva, it was
not mere use of the surname that was enjoined but the defendants representation that she
was the wife of Saturnino Silva, there was usurpation of the status of the wife.

YASIN vs SHARIA COURT

FACTS:
On May 5, 1990, Hatima C. Yasin filed in the Shari'a District Court in Zamboanga City a
"Petition to resume the use of maiden name. The respondent court issued an order which
ordered amendments to the petition as it was not sufficient in form and substance in
accordance Rule 103, Rules of Court, regarding the residence of petitioner and the name
sought to be adopted is not properly indicated in the title thereof which should include all
the names by which the petitioner has been known. Hatima filed a motion for
reconsideration of the aforesaid order alleging that the petition filed is not covered by Rule
103 of the Rules of Court but is merely a petition to resume the use of her maiden name and
surname after the dissolution of her marriage by divorce under the Code of Muslim Personal
Laws of the Philippines, and after marriage of her former husband to another woman. The
respondent court denied the motion since compliance to rule 103 is necessary if the petition
is to be granted, as it would result in the resumption of the use of petitioners maiden name
and surname.

ISSUE:
whether or not in the case of annulment of marriage, or divorce under the Code of Muslim
Personal Laws of the Philippines, and the husband is married again to another woman and
the former desires to resume her maiden name or surname, is she required to file a petition
for change of name and comply with the formal requirements of Rule 103 of the Rules of
Court.
HELD:
NO. When a woman marries a man, she need not apply and/or seek judicial authority to use
her husband's name by prefixing the word "Mrs." before her husband's full name or by
adding her husband's surname to her maiden first name. The law grants her such right (Art.
370, Civil Code). Similarly, when the marriage ties or
Vinculum no longer exists as in the case of death of the husband or divorce as authorized by
the Muslim Code, the widow or divorcee need not seek judicial confirmation of the change in
her civil status in order to revert to her maiden name as the use of her former husband's
name is optional and not obligatory for her. When petitioner married her husband, she did
not change her name but only her civil status. Neither was she required to secure judicial
authority to use the surname of her husband after the marriage, as no law requires it. The
use of the husband's surname during the marriage, after annulment of the marriage and
after the death of the husband is permissive and not obligatory except in case of legal
separation. The court finds the petition to resume the use of maiden name filed by petitioner
before the respondent court a superfluity and unnecessary proceeding since the law requires
her to do so as her former husband is already married to another woman after obtaining a
decree of divorce from her in accordance with Muslim laws.

Remo vs Secretary of Foreign Affairs

FACTS:
-Petition is for Maria Virgina Remo Rallonza to use her maiden name Remo in her passport
renewal. Original passport is issued using married surname Rallonza.
-Petitioner is married to Francisco R. Rallonza. The husband is alive and the couple is neither
annulled nor divorced.
-DFA denied request. Office of the President denied appeal and subsequent motion for
reconsideration.
-CA denied petition and motion for reconsideration.

ISSUE:
WoN a married woman can use her maiden name in her passport renewal after using her
married surname in her prior passport

RULING:
Petition denied.

RATIO:
Article 370 of the NCC: A married woman may use:

(1) Her maiden first name and surname and add her husbands surname, or
(2)Her maiden first name and her husband's surname, or
(3)Her husbands full name, but prefixing a word indicating that she is his wife, such as
"Mrs."

Petitioner is neither divorced, widowed, nor annulled.

When a woman gets married, she does not change her name. Only her civil status.
A woman is not obliged to change her name upon marriage, she has the option not to.
She is not required to have judicial authority to do so.
In the present case, however, petitioner requested to resume her maiden name in the
replacement passport arguing that no law prohibits her from using her maiden name.
As per the rules of passport renewal, DFA allows women to use their maiden name in
passport even if they are married. They can also continuously use their maiden name
in renewals or use their married name thereafter.
 In the present case, however, the petitioner is already using her married name and
wants to revert back to her maiden name. Petitioner consciously chose to use her
husbands surname before, in her previous passport application, and now desires to
resume her maiden name. If we allow petitioners present request, definitely nothing
prevents her in the future from requesting to revert to the use of her husbands
surname. Such unjustified changes in one's name and identity in a passport, which is
considered superior to all other official documents, cannot be countenanced.
Otherwise, undue confusion and inconsistency in the records of passport holders will
arise. Thus, for passport issuance purposes, a married woman, such as petitioner,
whose marriage subsists, may not change her family name at will.
The issuance of passports is impressed with public interest. A passport is an official
document of identity and nationality issued to a person intending to travel or sojourn
in foreign countries. It is issued by the Philippine government to its citizens
requesting other governments to allow its holder to pass safely and freely, and in
case of need, to give him/her aid and protection.

G. Relief from Courts

Perez vs Perez

FACTS:
Antonio Perez, as guardian ad litem of his son, filed a civil case against defendant
Angela Tuason de Perez at the CFI Manila.
He wants to declare his wife as prodigal and place under guardianship based on the
following allegations:
she was squandering her estate on a young man named Jose Boloix
she was spending the conjugal partnership of gain
defendant has expressed her desire to marry and have children with Jose Boloix, if
only to embarrass her husband.
CFI dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction.

ISSUE:
WON the case falls under the jurisdiction of the CFI or the Juvenile Domestic Relations
Court.

HELD:
RTC has no jurisdiction. It is the Juvenile and Domestic Relation Court which has
jurisdiction. Material injury pertains to personal injury (personal relations between man and
wife) and not patrimonial or financial.

Arroyo vs Vazquez, 42 Phil 54

FACTS:
Plaintiff Mariano and defendant Dolores were married in 1910, and lived in Iloilo City. They
lived together with a few short intervals of separation. On July 4, 1920, defendant Dolores
went away from their common home and decided to live separately from plaintiff. She
claimed that she was compelled to leave on the basis of cruel treatment on the part of her
husband. She in turn prayed fora decree of separation, a liquidation of their conjugal
partnership, and an allowance for counsel fees and permanent separate maintenance.

CFI: Ruled in favor of the defendant-she was granted alimony amounting to P400, as well as
other fees.
In this case, a cross-complaint took place. Plaintiff then asked for a restitution of conjugal
rights, and a permanent mandatory injunction requiring the defendant to return to the
conjugal home and live with him as his wife.

ISSUE:
WON defendant had sufficient cause for leaving the conjugal home;
WON plaintiff may be granted the restitution of conjugal rights/absolute order/permanent
mandatory injunction. Plaintiff is granted a judicial declaration of defendants lack of
sufficient cause to leave the domicile.

RULE:
NO on both issues. Defendant is admonished to return to the conjugal home. The permanent
mandatory injunction may not be granted.

RATIO:
On sufficient cause for leaving the conjugal home. Cruelty done by plaintiff to defendant was
greatly exaggerated. The wife was inflicted with a disposition of jealousy towards her
husband in an aggravated degree. No sufficient cause was present. Courts should move with
caution in enforcing the duty to provide for the separate maintenance of the wife since this
recognizes the de facto separation of the two parties. Continued cohabitation of the pair
must be seen as impossible, and separation must be necessary, stemming from the fault of
the husband. She is under obligation to return to the domicile. When people understand
that they must live togetherthey learn to soften by mutual accommodation that yoke
which they know they cannot shake off; they become good husbands and wivesnecessity
is a powerful master in teaching the duties which it imposes (Evans v. Evans)On granting
the restitution of conjugal rights. It is not within the province of the courts to compel one of
the spouses to cohabit with, and render conjugal rights to, the other. In the case of property
rights, such an action may be maintained. Said order, at best, would have no other purpose
than to compel the spouses to live together. Other countries, such as England and Scotland
have done this with much criticism. Plaintiff is entitled to a judicial declaration that the
defendant absented herself without sufficient cause and it is her duty to return.

PROPERTY RELATIONS BETWEEN SPOUSES

A. General Provisions

Collector vs Fisher, 110 Phil 686

B. Donation propter nuptias

1. Requisites for Donation

Domalagan vs Bolifer, 33 Phil 471

Facts:

Domalagan and Bolifer entered into a contract to marry their son and daughter upon a
consideration that Domalagan will pay Bolifer P500. And So Domalagan paid P500 and P16
as token of future marriage. But, Bolifers daughter got married with another man.
Domalagan filed anaction for damages, and demanded the return of the money he has
given.

Issue: Whether or not damages may be recovered.

Held:

Damages may be recovered for the breach of promise to marry although the same is made
orally. The rules of court applicable at the time provides that, any agreement made upon
the consideration of marriage, other than mutual promise to marry should be in writing, or in
any notes or memorandum and subscribed by parties, otherwise it shall be unenforceable.

Serrano vs Solomon, 105 Phil 998

Solis vs Barroso, 53 Phil 912

Mateo vs Lagua, 29 SCRA 864

2. Void Donations

Matabuena vs Cervantes, 38 SCRA 284

FACTS:

In 1956, herein appellants brother Felix Matabuena donated a piece of lot to his common-
lawspouse, herein appellee Petronila Cervantes. Felix and Petronila got married only in 1962
or six years after the deed of donation was executed. Five months later, or September 13,
1962, Felix died. Thereafter, appellant Cornelia Matabuena, by reason of being the only
sister and nearest collateral relative of thedeceased, filed a claim over the property, by
virtue of a an affidavit of self-adjudication executed by her in1962, had the land declared in
her name and paid the estate and inheritance taxes thereon. The lower court of Sorsogon
declared that the donation was valid inasmuch as it was made at the time when Felix and
Petronila were not yet spouses, rendering Article 133 of the Civil Code inapplicable.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the ban on donation between spouses during a marriage applies to a
common-law relationship.

HELD:

While Article 133 of the Civil Code considers as void a donation between the spouses during
marriage, policy consideration of the most exigent character as well as the dictates of
morality requires that the same prohibition should apply to a common-law relationship. As
stated in Buenaventura vs. Bautista (50 OG 3679, 1954), if the policy of the law is to prohibit
donations in favor of the other consort and his descendants because of fear of undue and
improper pressure and influence upon the donor, then there is every reason to apply the
same prohibitive policy to persons living together as husband and wife without the benefit of
nuptials. The lack of validity of the donation by the deceased to appellee does not
necessarily result in appellant having exclusive right to the disputed property. As a widow,
Cervantes is entitled to one-half of the inheritance, and the surviving sister to the other half.
Article 1001, Civil Code: Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the widow
or widower, the latter shall be entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the brothers and
sisters or their children to the other half.

Harding vs Commercial Union, 38 Phil 464

Henry Harding bought a car for 2T in 1915. He then gave the car to his wife Mrs.
Harding.
 While Mrs. Harding was having the car repaired at the Luneta Garage (Luneta was an
agent of Smith Bell and Co., which in turn is Commercial Unions agent), the latter
induced Mrs. Harding to insure the care with Commercial.
Mrs. Harding agreed, and Smith Bell sent an agent to Luneta Garage, who together
with the manager of LUneta, appraised the car and declared that its present value
was P3T. This amt was written in the proposal form which Mrs. Harding signed.
Subsequently, the car was damaged by fire. Commercial refused to pay because the
cars present value was only 2.8T and not 3T.

Issue:

Whether or not Commercial is liable.

Held:

Commercial is liable.

Where it appears that the proposal form, while signed by the insured was made out by the
person authorized to solicit the insurance (Luneta and Smith Bell) the facts stated in the
proposal, even if incorrect, will not be regarded as warranted by the insured, in the absence
of willful misstatement. Under such circumstances, the proposal is to be regarded as the act
of the insurer.

Sumbad vs CA 308 SCRA 575

C. System of Absolute Community of Property

Onas vs Javillo, 59 Phil 733

FACTS:

Crispulo Javillo married Ramona Levis and they had 5 children. After Ramonas death, he
married Rosario Onas and they had 4 children. - During his first marriage 11 parcels of land
were acquired; while in his 2nd marriage 20 parcels of land were acquired.

Partition was made on the claim that the properties of the 2nd marriage were products of
the first marriage. - Rosario Onas was opposing the partition that was made by the
administrator of the estate of her husband. She alleges the following errors:

All the properties acquired during the second marriage were acquired with the properties of
the first marriage.

TC erred in approving the partition dated September 9, 1931, notwithstanding that the same
did not include all properties of the deceased.

ISSUES and RULING:

1) WON the community partnership shall continue to exist between the surviving spouse and
the heirs of the deceased husband or wife.
NO - When the marriage is dissolved, the cause that brought about the community ceases,
for the principles of an ordinary partnership are not applicable to this community, which is
governed by special rules. - Provisions of law governing the subject should cease to have
any effect for community of property is admissible and proper in so far as it conforms to
unity of life, to the mutual affection between husband and wife, and serves as a recompense
for the care of preserving and increasing the property; all of which terminates by the death
of one of the partners. - Community terminates when the marriage is dissolved or annulled
or when during the marriage and agreement is entered into to divide the conjugal property.
The conjugal partnership exists as long as the spouses are united.

2) WON the properties of the second marriage can be claimed as products of the properties
of the first marriage - NO - Whatever is acquired by the surviving spouse on the dissolution
of the partnership by death or presumption of death whether the acquisition be made by his
or her lucrative title, it forms a part of his or her own capital, in which the other consort, or
his or her heirs, can claim no share.

3) WON the partition that was approved by the lower court is valid.

NO - Was based on the erroneous assumption that the properties of the second marriage
were produced by the properties of the first marriage. ** The property corresponding to the
first marriage consists of the 11 parcels of land. The remaining 20 parcels of land were
acquired during the second marriage.

Vda de Delizo vs Delizo, 69 SCRA 216

Facts:

Nicolas Delizo married Rosa Villasfer in 1981. She died in 1907.

He remarried. The second marriage with Dorotea de Ocampo lasted 46 years (1911-1957)
until Nicolas death.

The act of partition was filed by Nicolas two children from his first marriage, and theheirs of
his other deceased child (also from the first marriage).

Lower court divided the properties in the following way:

a. - 3 children of first marriage

b. - Dorotea
c. - children of both marriage (divided in 13 parts)

CA: Point of contention was Caanawan lands in Nueva Ecija. Other lands belong tosecond
marriage. No proof property owned by second marriage

-Testimony of Dorotea not persuasive

-Moises Patricio places acquisition sometime after the revolution: Rosa was stillalive at this
time

-LC: conjugal partnership of first marriage transformed into co-ownership by Nicolas and his
children, thus fruits belong to co-ownership.

CA disagrees with LC: HOWEVER, IT WAS DOROTEA AND NICOLAS WHOCULTIVATED THE
LAND, HENCE THE FRUITS OF THE LAND SHOULD GO TO THE SECOND MARRIAGE
Dorotea elevated case to SC. According to her, Canaawan properties were not part of first
marriages CPG as lands were homesteads. First marriage had possessory rights, but second
marriage had exclusive right over it as it was during the second marriagethat it was
registered pursuant to Act 926.

ISSUE:

To which CPG does the Caanawan lands belong to (1st or 2nd marriage)?

HELD:

Property belongs to the CPG of the 2nd marriage as land was only registered during second
marriage.

Act 926 (Homestead Act): Rights of homesteader to land does not become absolute until
the following requirements of law are fulfilled:

a. Person filing application backed by two credible witnesses has to prove he has resided and
cultivated the land for 5 years after filing application

b. Person filing has to make affidavit attesting that the land is not encumbered/alienated.

Lands were only distributed by cabecillas in 1905.

When Dacquel, Antolin, and Pascua conveyed the land to Nicolas, they could not have
fulfilled the requirements of Act 926 before conveyances to Delizo. Dacquel less than a year,
Antolin 2 years, Pascua 3 years

The 3 did not have legal rights to transfer to Delizo. What they transferred were inchoate
rights, not ownership rights.

PRINCIPLE: Deciding factor where homestead belongs to time of registration NOT when
homestead patent is issued as registration is the only time all requirements have been
fulfilled.

D. Conjugal Partnership of Gains

Rosete vs Provincial Sheriff, 95 Phil 560

People Bank and Trust Co. vs Register of Deeds

FACTS:

Appeal from CFI Manila judgment denying registration of instrument entitled Agreement
and Declaration of Trust in which Dominga Angeles, married to Manuel Sandoval living in
Palawan, conveyed in trust her paraphernal property, trustee was to redeem mortgage
constituted on such property with funds derived from the rents or sale thereof, grant a loan
of P10000 with which to redeem mortgage and collect the rents to be derived from said
property while remained unsold.

ISSUES:

1. WON the rents collected are fruits of the wifes property which therefore belongs to CPG,

2. WON management belongs to husband

3. WON contract is null and void since husband did not give consent

HELD:

Wife, as owner and administratrix of her paraphernal property, may appoint trustee to
collect the fruits of her property. The fruits are not yet conjugal property since they still have
to answer to expenses in the administration and preservation of the paraphernal property.
She may likewise do such without consent of the husband, subject to recourse by husband
or his heirs, thus rendering such contract merely voidable or void.

Castro vs Miat, 397 SCRA 271

Jocson vs CA

FACTS:

Emilio Jocon and Alejandra Jocson were husband and wife. The wife died first intestate then
the husband followed. Moises and Agustina are their children. Ernesto Vasquesz is the
husband of Agustina.

The present controversy concerns the validity of three (3) documents executed by Emilio
Jocson during his lifetime. These documents purportedly conveyed, by sale, to Agustina
Jocson-Vasquez what apparently covers almost all of his properties, including his one-third
(1/3) share in the estate of his wife. Petitioner Moises Jocson assails these documents and
prays that they be declared null and void and the properties subject matter therein be
partitioned between him and Agustina as the only heirs of their deceased parents.

Petitioner claimed that the properties mentioned in Exhibits 3 and 4 are the unliquidated
conjugal properties of Emilio Jocson and Alejandra Poblete which the former, therefore,
cannot validly sell. They say it is conjugal properties of Emilio Jocson and Alejandra Poblete,
because they were registered in the name of Emilio Jocson, married to Alejandra Poblete.

ISSUE:

WON the property registered under the name of Emilio Jocson, married to Alejandra
Poblete is conjugal property or exclusive property.

HELD:

Exclusive. Article 60 of the CC provides that All property of the marriage is presumed to
belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the
husband or to the wife. The party who invokes this presumption must first prove that the
property in controversy was acquired during the marriage. In other words, proof of
acquisition during the coverture is a condition sine qua non for the operation of the
presumption in favor of conjugal ownership.

It is thus clear that before Moises Jocson may validly invoke the presumption under Article
160 he must first present proof that the disputed properties were acquired during the
marriage of Emilio Jocson and Alejandra Poblete. The certificates of title, however, upon
which petitioner rests his claim is insufficient. The fact that the properties were registered in
the name of Emilio Jocson, married to Alejandra Poblete is no proof that the properties
were acquired during the spouses coverture. Acquisition of title and registration thereof are
two different acts. It is well settled that registration does not confer title but merely confirms
one already existing (See Torela vs. Torela, supra). It may be that the properties under
dispute were acquired by Emilio Jocson when he was still a bachelor but were registered only
after his marriage to Alejandra Poblete, which explains why he was described in the
certificates of title as married to the latter.

Contrary to petitioners position, the certificates of title show, on their face, that the
properties were exclusively Emilio Jocsons, the registered owner. This is so because the
words married to preceding Alejandra Poblete are merely descriptive of the civil status of
Emilio Jocson. In other words, the import from the certificates of title is that Emilio Jocson is
the owner of the properties, the same having been registered in his name alone, and that he
is married to Alejandra Poblete.

Francisco vs CA

FACTS:

Petitioner, the legal wife of private respondent Eusebio Francisco (Eusebio) by his second
marriage filed a suit for damages and for annulment of general power of attorney
authorizing Conchita Evangelista (Eusebios daughter in his first marriage) to administer the
house and lot together with the apartments allegedly acquired by petitioner and Eusebio
during their conjugal partnership. The trial court rendered judgment in favor of private
respondents dueto petitioners failure to establish proof that said properties were acquired
during the existence of the second conjugal partnership, or that they pertained exclusively
to the petitioner. As such, theCA ruled that those properties belong exclusively to Eusebio,
and that he has the capacity to administer them.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the appellate court committed reversible error in affirming the trial court's
ruling that the properties, subject matter of controversy, are not conjugal but the capital
properties of Eusebio exclusively.

RULING:

SC resolved the issue of the nature of the contested properties based on the provisions of
the New Civil Code. Indeed, Articles 158 and 160 of the New Civil Code have been repealed
by the Family Code of the Philippines. Nonetheless, SC cannot invoke the new law in this
case without impairing prior vested rights pursuant to Article 256 in relation to Article
105(second paragraph) of the Family Code. Accordingly, the repeal of Articles 158 and 160
of the New Civil Code does not operate to prejudice or otherwise affect rights which have
become vested or accrued while the said provisions were in force.

HELD:

Petition is denied. The Decision of the CA is affirmed.

Mendoza vs Reyes

FACTS: Ponciano and Julia were married in 1915. The properties in question consisting of Lots
5 and 6, were bought on installment basis. Thus, the spouses jointly obtained a loan to pay
their balance. The corresponding deed of absolute sale was executed where the vendee
named is 'Julia de Reyes'. Her signatures appear over the caption vendee and those of
Ponciano under the phrase: 'with my marital consent. As a result of these sales, TCTs were
issued in the name of "JULIA REYES married to PONCIANO REYES."

While Ponciano was absent attending his farm in Pampanga, Julia sold absolutely the lots in
question Efren V. Mendoza and Inocencia R. De Mendoza, as vendees, without the knowledge
and consent of Ponciano. At the same time the spouses were living separately and were not
in speaking terms.

Ponciano filed a complaint for the annulment of a deed of sale of two parcels of land
contending that said properties were conjugal properties of himself and his wife and that she
had sold them to petitioners "all by herself" and without his knowledge or consent.

Petitioner Mendozas alleged that the properties were paraphernal properties of Julia and that
they had purchased the same in good faith and for adequate consideration. Julia testified
that she bought the two parcels of land on installment basis and that the first payment came
from her personal funds. The CFI declared the properties exclusive and paraphernal
properties of Julia and ruled that she could validly dispose of the same without the consent
of her husband.

ISSUE:

WON the disputed properties are conjugal properties.

HELD:

Yes. The deed of sale is declared null and void with respect to one- half share of Ponciano.

Article 153 of the Civil Code provides:

ART. 153. The following are conjugal partnership property:

That which is acquired by onerous title during the marriage at the expense of the common
fund, whether the acquisition be for the partnership, or for only one of the spouses;

It is sufficient to prove that the property was acquired during the marriage in order that the
same may be deemed conjugal property. There is no question that the disputed property
was acquired by onerous title during the marriage.

Records show that the funds came from loans obtained by the spouses. Under Article 161 of
the Civil Code, all debts and obligations contracted by the husband and the wife for the
benefit of the conjugal partnership are liabilities of the partnership.

Julias claim of exclusive ownership is belied by the Income Tax Returns which she herself
prepared and filed in behalf of the conjugal partnership wherein she made the statement
that the rentals paid to her were income of the conjugal partnership, and she made to
appear the properties in question as capital assets of the conjugal partnership.

Property acquired during a marriage is presumed to be conjugal and the fact that the land is
later registered in the name of only one of the spouses does not destroy its conjugal nature.
If the fact that property acquired during marriage was registered in the name of the husband
alone does not affect its conjugal nature, neither does registration in the name of the wife.

Lorenzo vs Nicolas

Calimlim- Canullas vs Fortun 129 SCRA 675 (1984)

Concept:

Between Spouses (Family Code Sec. 87 & Civil Code Art. 133, 1490, 1492)Sale by husband of
conjugal land to his concubine is null and void for being contraryto morals and public policy
and subversive to the stability of the family, a basicsocial institution which public policy
cherishes and protects.Parties: Mercedes Calimlim-Canullas petitioner / Judge Fortun of
CFI Pangasinan &Corazon Daguines respondents.

Facts:

Dec 19, 1962 Fernando & Mercedes Calimlim-Canullas got married & had 5kids. They built
a conjugal home in fernandos inherited property.1978 Fernando abandoned his home &
lived with Corazon Daguines.April 15, 1980 - Fernando sold the house & lot to his concubine
for only P2000 statingthat house&lot were inherited by him. June 19, 1980 Daguines
claimed ownership but was unable so she filed case againstMercedes (kapal lang ng mukha
ng kabit!)Oct 27, 1981 Fernando & Daguines convicted of concubinageRTC of Pangasinan
ruled in favor of the concubine granting lot and half of house toher. Real wife Mercedes
appealed.

Issues:

WON conjugal house on exclusive property of husband is ipso facto givencharacter of

conjugal property2) WON sale of the house & lot to concubine was valid in this case.

Held & Ratio:

Yes! Lot where conjugal home was built w/ conjugal funds becomesconjugal property subject
to reimbursement from conjugal funds upon liquidation (which should happen in normal
cases upon death till death do us part, correct?)2) Sale to the concubine is NULL & VOID!
Art. 1409 & 1352 of the civil code says so!Unlawful cause. Also, constitution protects the
family

Ruling:

RTC decision set aside & sale of house & lot is declared null & void. No cost.