Medina vs.

Castro-Bartolome
No. L-59825. September 11, 1982.*
ERNESTO MEDINA and JOSE G. ONG, petitioners, vs. HON. FLORELIANA
CASTRO-BARTOLOME in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the Court of
First Instance of Rizal, Branch XV, Makati, Metro Manila, COSME DE
ABOITIZ and PEPSI-COLA BOTTLING COMPANY OF THE PHILIPPINES,
INC. respondents.
Labor law, Jurisdiction; A complaint for damages filed by an employee
against an officer of their corporation based on slanderous language
allegedly made by the latter falls under the jurisdiction of the ordinary
courts.It is obvious from the complaint that the plaintiffs have not
alleged any unfair labor practice. Theirs is a simple action for damages
for tortious acts allegedly committed by the defendants. Such being
the case, the governing statute is the Civil Code and not the Labor
Code. It results that the orders under review are based on a wrong
premise. WHEREFORE, the petition is granted; the respondent judge is
hereby ordered to reinstate Civil Case No. 33150 and render a decision
on the merits. Costs against the private respondents.
Aquino, J., dissenting:
Labor Law; Jurisdiction; Actions; The dismissal for lack of jurisdiction of
the case at bar by the CFI is correct as damages claims arising from
employer-employee relations fall within the jurisdiction of the NLRC.
In my opinion the dismissal of the civil action for damages is correct
because the claims of Medina and Ong were within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC, as originally provided in
article 217 of the Labor Code and as reaffirmed in Presidential Decree
No. 1691. Medina and Ong could not split their cause of action against
Aboitiz and Pepsi-Cola. (See Aguda vs. Judge De Guzman, G. R. No.
58133, March 26, 1982; Evon vs. Judge De Guzman, G. R. No. 58265,
March 25, 1982; Cardinal Industries, Inc. vs. Vallejos, G. R. No. 57032,
June 19, 1982; Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. vs. Martinez, G. R. No. 58877,
March 15, 1982.
Same; Same; Same; Same.The decisions of the Regional Director and
Deputy Minister Inciong are res judicata as to the claims of Medina and
Ong.
________________
* SECOND DIVISION
598

598
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Medina vs. Castro-Bartolome
PETITION to review the decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal,
Br. XV. Castro-Bartolome, J.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
ABAD SANTOS, J.:
Civil Case No. 33150 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal Branch XV,
was filed in May, 1979, by Ernesto Medina and Jose G. Ong against
Cosme de Aboitiz and Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. of the Philippines, Inc.
Medina was the former Plant General Manager and Ong was the former
Plant Comptroller of the company. Among the averments in the
complaint are the following:
3. That on or about 1:00 oclock in the afternoon of December 20,
1977, defendant Cosme de Aboitiz, acting in his capacity as President
and Chief Executive Officer of the defendant Pepsi-Cola Bottling
Company of the Philippines, Inc., went to the Pepsi-Cola Plant in
Muntinlupa, Metro Manila, and without any provocation, shouted and
maliciously humiliated the plaintiffs with the use of the following
slanderous language and other words of similar import uttered in the
presence of the plaintiffs subordinate employees, thus
GOD DAMN IT YOU FUCKED ME UP X X X. YOU SHUT UP! FUCK YOU!
YOU ARE BOTH SHIT TO ME! YOU ARE FIRED (referring to Ernesto
Medina). YOU TOO ARE FIRED! (referring to Jose Ong).
4. That on January 9, 1978, the herein plaintiffs filed a joint criminal
complaint for oral defamation against the defendant Cosme de Aboitiz
duly supported with respective affidavits and corroborated by the
affidavits of two (2) witnesses: Isagani Hernandez and Jose Ganseco II,
but after conducting a preliminary investigation, Hon. Jose B. Castillo,
dismissed the complaint allegedly because the expression Fuck you
and You are both shit to me were uttered not to slander but to express
anger and displeasure;
5. That on February 8, 1978, plaintiffs filed a Petition for Review
with the office of the Secretary of Justice (now Ministry of Justice) and

on June 13, 1978, the Deputy Minister of Justice, Catalino Macaraig, Jr.,
issued a resolution sustaining the plaintiffs
599
VOL. 116, SEPTEMBER 11, 1982
599
Medina vs. Castro-Bartolome
complaint, reversing the resolution of the Provincial Fiscal and
directing him to file against defendant Cosme de Aboitiz an information
for Grave Slander, x x x;
6. That the employment records of plaintiffs show their track
performance and impeccable qualifications, not to mention their long
years of service to the Company which undoubtedly caused their
promotion to the two highest positions in Muntinlupa Plant having
about 700 employees under them with Ernesto Medina as the Plant
General Manager receiving a monthly salary of P6,600.00 excluding
other perquisites accorded only to top executives and having under his
direct supervision other professionals like himself, including the
plaintiff Jose G. Ong, who was the Plant Comptroller with a basic
monthly salary of P4,855.00;
7. That far from taking these matters into consideration, the
defendant corporation, acting through its President, Cosme de Aboitiz,
dismissed and slandered the plaintiffs in the presence of their
subordinate employees although this could have been done in private;
8. That the defendants have evidently enjoyed the act of dismissing
the plaintiffs and such dismissal was planned to make it as humiliating
as possible because instead of allowing a lesser official like the
Regional Vice President to take whatever action was necessary under
the circumstances, Cosme de Aboitiz himself went to the Muntinlupa
Plant in order to publicly upbraid and dismiss the plaintiffs;
9. That the defendants dismissed the plaintiffs because of an
alleged delay in the use of promotional crowns when such delay was
true with respect to the other Plants, which is therefore demonstrative
of the fact that Cosme de Aboitiz did not really have a strong reason
for publicly humiliating the plaintiffs by dismissing them on the spot;
10. That the defendants were moved by evil motives and an antisocial attitude in dismissing the plaintiffs because the dismissal was
effected on the very day that plaintiffs were awarded rings of loyalty to
the Company, five days before Christmas and on the day when the
employees Christmas party was held in the Muntinlupa Plant, so that
when plaintiffs went home that day and found their wives and children

already dressed up for the party, they didnt know what to do and so
they cried unashamedly;
xxx

xxx

xxx

600
600
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Medina vs. Castro-Bartolome
20. That because of the anti-social manner by which the plaintiffs
were dismissed from their employment and the embarrassment and
degradation they experience in the hands of the defendants, the
plaintiffs have suffered and will continue to suffer wounded feelings,
sleepless nights, mental torture, besmirched reputation and other
similar injuries, for which the sum of P150,000.00 for each plaintiff, or
the total amount of P300,000.00 should be awarded as moral
damages;
21. That the defendants have demonstrated their lack of concern
for the rights and dignity of the Filipino worker and their callous
disregard of Philippine labor and social legislation, and to prevent other
persons from following the footsteps of defendants, the amount of
P50,000.00 for each plaintiff, or the total sum of P100,000.00, should
be awarded as exemplary damages;
22. That plaintiffs likewise expect to spend no less than P5,000.00
as litigation expenses and were constrained to secure the services of
counsel for the protection and enforcement of their rights for which
they agreed to pay the sum of P10,000.00 and P200.00 per
appearance, as and for attorneys fees.
The complaint contains the following:
PRAYER
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, it is most respectfully prayed
that after proper notice and hearing, judgment be rendered for the
plaintiffs and against the defendants ordering them, jointly and
solidarity, to pay the plaintiffs the sums of:
1. Unrealized income in such sum as will be established during the
trial;
2. P300,000.00 as moral damages;

3. P100,000.00 by way of exemplary damages;

4. P5,000.00 as litigation expenses;
5. P10,000.00 and P200.00 per appearance as and for attorneys
fees; and
6. Costs of this suit.
Plaintiffs also pray for such further reliefs and remedies as may be in
keeping with justice and equity.
601
VOL. 116, SEPTEMBER 11, 1982
601
Medina vs. Castro-Bartolome
On June 4, 1979, a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground of
lack of jurisdiction was filed by the defendants. The trial court denied
the motion on September 6, 1979, in an order which reads as follows:
Up for resolution by the Court is the defendants Motion to Dismiss
dated June 4, 1979, which is basically anchored on whether or not this
Court has jurisdiction over the instant petition.
The complaint alleges that the plaintiffs dismissal was without any
provocation and that defendant Aboitiz shouted and maliciously
humiliated plaintiffs and used the words quoted in paragraph 3 thereof.
The plaintiffs further allege that they were receiving salaries of
P6,600.00 and P4,855.00 a month. So the complaint for civil damages
is clearly not based on an employer-employee relationship but on the
manner of plaintiffs dismissal and the effects flowing therefrom. (Jovito
N. Quisaba vs. Sta. Ines-Melale Veneer & Plywood Co., Inc., et al., No. L38088, Aug. 30, 1974.)
This case was filed on May 10, 1979. The amendatory decree, P.D.
1367. which took effect on May 1, 1978 and which provides that
Regional Directors shall not indorse and Labor Arbiters shall not
entertain claims for moral or other forms of damages, now expressly
confers jurisdiction on the courts in these cases, specifically under the
plaintiffs causes of action.
Because of the letter dated January 4, 1978 and the statement of
plaintiff Medina that his receipt of the amount from defendant
company was done under strong protest, it cannot be said that the

demands set forth in the complaint have been paid, waived or other
extinguished. In fact, in defendants Motion to Dismiss, it is stated that
in the absence of a showing that there was fraud, duress or violence
attending said transactions, such Release and Quitclaim Deeds are
valid and binding contracts between them, which in effect admits that
plaintiffs can prove fraud, violence, duress or violence. Hence a cause
of action for plaintiffs exist.
It is noticed that the defamatory remarks standing alone per se had
been made the sole cause under the first cause of action, but it is
alleged in connection with the manner in which the plaintiffs had been
dismissed, and whether the statute of limitations would apply or not
would be a matter of evidence.
It has been alreadly settled by jurisprudence that mere asking for
reinstatement does not remove from the CFI jurisdiction over the
damages. The case must involve unfair labor practices to bring it
within the jurisdiction of the CIR (now NLRC).
602
602
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Medina vs. Castro-Bartolome
WHEREFORE, the defendants Motion to Dismiss dated June 4, 1979 is
hereby denied.
The defendants are hereby directed to interpose their answer within
ten (10) days from receipt hereof.
While the trial was underway, the defendants filed a second motion to
dismiss the complaint dated January 23, 1981, because of
amendments to the Labor Code immediately prior thereto. Acting on
the motion, the trial court issued on May 23, 1981, the following order:
Up for resolution by the Court is the defendants Motion to Dismiss
dated January 23, 1981, on grounds not existing when the first Motion
to Dismiss dated June 4, 1979 was interposed. The ground relied upon
is the promulgation of P.D. No. 1691 amending Art. 217 of the Labor
Code of the Philippines and Batasan Pambansa Blg. 70 which took
effect on May 1, 1980, amending Art. 248 of the Labor Code.

The Court agrees with defendants that the complaint alleges unfair
labor practices which under Art. 217 of the Labor Code, as amended by
P.D. 1691, has vested original and exclusive jurisdiction to Labor
Arbiters, and Art. 248, thereof . . . which may include claims for
damages and other affirmative reliefs. Under the amendment,
therefore, jurisdiction over employee-employer relations and claims of
workers have been removed from the Courts of First Instance. If it is
argued that this case did not arise from employer-employee relation,
but it cannot be denied that this case would not have arisen if the
plaintiffs had not been employees of defendant Pepsi-Cola. Even the
alleged defamatory remarks made by defendant Cosme de Aboitiz
were said to plaintiffs in the course of their employment, and the latter
were dismissed from such employment. Hence, the case arose from
such employer-employee relationship which under the new Presidential
Decree 1691 are under the exclusive, original jurisdiction of the labor
arbiters. The ruling of this Court with respect to the defendants first
motion to dismiss, therefore, no longer holds as the positive law has
been subsequently issued and being a curative law, can be applied
retroactively (Garcia v. Martinez, et al., L-47629, May 28, 1979; 90
SCRA 331-333).
It will also logically follow that plaintiffs can reinterpose the same
complaint with the Ministry of Labor.
WHEREFORE, let this case be, as it is hereby ordered, dismissed,
without pronouncement as to costs.
603
VOL. 116, SEPTEMBER 11, 1982
603
Medina vs. Castro-Bartolome
A motion to reconsider the above order was filed on July 7, 1981, but it
was only on February 8, 1982, or after a lapse of around seven (7)
months when the motion was denied.
Plaintiffs have filed the instant petition pursuant to R. A. No. 5440
alleging that the respondent court committed the following errors:
IN DIVESTING ITSELF OF ITS JURISDICTION TO HEAR AND DECIDE CIVIL
CASE NO. 33150 DESPITE THE FACT THAT JURISDICTION HAD ALREADY

ATTACHED WHICH WAS NOT OUSTED BY THE SUBSEQUENT

ENACTMENT OF PRESIDENTIAL DECREE 1691;
IN HOLDING THAT PRESIDENTIAL DECREE 1691 SHOULD BE GIVEN A
RETROSPECTIVE EFFECT WHEN PRESIDENTIAL DECREE 1367 WHICH
WAS IN FORCE WHEN CIVIL CASE NO. 33150 WAS FILED AND TRIAL
THEREOF HAD COMMENCED, WAS NEVER EXPRESSLY REPEALED BY
PRESIDENTIAL DECREE 1691, AND IF EVER THERE WAS AN IMPLIED
REPEAL, THE SAME IS NOT FAVORED UNDER PREVAILED
JURISPRUDENCE;
IN HOLDING THAT WITH THE REMOVAL BY PRESIDENTIAL DECREE 1691
OF THE PROVISO INSERTED IN ARTICLE 217 OF THE LABOR CODE BY
PRESIDENTIAL DECREE 1367, THE LABOR ARBITERS HAVE ACQUIRED
JURISDICTION OVER CLAIMS FOR DAMAGES ARISING FROM EMPLOYEREMPLOYEE RELATIONS TO THE EXCLUSION OF THE REGULAR COURTS,
WHEN A READING OF ARTICLE 217 WITHOUT THE PROVISO IN
QUESTION READILY REVEALS THAT JURISDICTION OVER DAMAGE
CLAIMS IS STILL VESTED WITH THE REGULAR COURTS;
IN DISMISSING FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION CIVIL CASE NO. 33150
THEREBY VIOLATING THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE
PETITIONERS NOTABLY THEIR RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS.
The pivotal question to Our mind is whether or not the Labor Code has
any relevance to the reliefs sought by the plaintiffs. For if the Labor
Code has no relevance, any discussion concerning the statutes
amending it and whether or not they have retroactive effect is
unnecessary.
604
604
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Medina vs. Castro-Bartolome
It is obvious from the complaint that the plaintiffs have not alleged any
unfair labor practice. Theirs is a simple action for damages for tortious
acts allegedly committed by the defendants. Such being the case, the
governing statute is the Civil Code and not the Labor Code. It results
that the orders under review are based on a wrong premise.

WHEREFORE, the petition is granted; the respondent judge is hereby

ordered to reinstate Civil Case No. 33150 and render a decision on the
merits. Costs against the private respondents.
SO ORDERED.
Barredo, (Chairman), Concepcion, Jr. Guerrero, De Castro and
Escolin, JJ., concur.
AQUINO, J., dissenting:
I dissent with due deference to the opinion penned by Mr. Justice Abad
Santos.
This case is about the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance to
entertain an action for damages arising from the alleged disgraceful
termination of petitioners employment.
Ernesto Medina, the manager of the Muntinlupa plant of Pepsi-Cola
Bottling Company of the Philippines with a monthly salary of P6,600,
and Jose G. Ong, Pepsis controller in the same plant with a monthly
salary of P4,855, were summarily dismissed by Cosme de Aboitiz,
Pepsis president and chief executive officer, on December 20, 1977 for
having allegedly delayed the use of promotional crowns (pp. 29-31,
Rollo).
The two signed on January 5, 1978 letters of resignation and quitclaims
and were paid P93,063 and P84,386 as separation pay, respectively.
However, before receiving those amounts, Medina and Ong sent by
registered mail to Aboitiz letters wherein they indicated that they
objected to their illegal dismissal and that they would sign the
quitclaim and resignation papers under protest (pp. 32, 270-275,
Rollo).
605
VOL. 116, SEPTEMBER 11, 1982
605
Medina vs. Castro-Bartolome
More than a month after their dismissal, or on January 27, 1978,
Medina and Ong filed with the Ministry of Labor, a complaint for illegal
dismissal. They prayed for reinstatement with full backwages and, in

the alternative, they prayed for additional separation pay of P72,904

for Medina and P35,927 for Ong (NLRC Case No. R4-STF-1-492-78, pp.
40, 288-299, Rollo).
The director of Region IV of the Ministry of Labor dismissed that
complaint because of their resignation and quitclaim. Medina and Ong
appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission. Deputy Minister
Amado C. Inciong affirmed the dismissal in his order of April 23, 1979
(p. 246, Rollo). He denied the motion for reconsideration of Medina and
Ong in his Order of October 25, 1979 (p. 327, Rollo).
Seventeen days after that order of dismissal, or on May 10, 1979,
Medina and Ong filed, in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Makati
Branch. XV an action for damages against Aboitiz and Pepsi-Cola by
reason of the humiliating manner in which they were dismissed. They
prayed for the payment of unrealized income and P415,000 as moral
and exemplary damages, attorneys fees and litigation expenses (pp.
34-5, 246, Rollo).
Aboitiz and Pepsi-Cola filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of lack
of jurisdiction, pendency of a labor case, lack of cause of action,
payment and prescription (p. 37, Rollo). Ong and Medina opposed the
motion.
Judge Floreliana Castro-Bartolome in her order of September 6, 1979
denied the motion to dismiss on the ground that under Presidential
Decree No. 1367, which took effect on May 1, 1979, the NLRC and
Labor Arbiters cannot entertain claims for moral or other damages,
thus implying that such claims should be ventilated in court (p. 247,
Rollo).
After Medina had commenced his testimony, Aboitiz and Pepsi-Cola
filed another motion to dismiss based on Presidential Decree No. 1691,
which took effect on May 1, 1980 and which repealed Presidential
Decree No. 1367 and restored to the NLRC and Labor Arbiters the
jurisdiction to adjudicate money claims of workers, including moral
damages, and other claims arising from employer-employee
relationship.
606
606
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Medina vs. Castro-Bartolome

Judge Bartolome in her order of May 23, 1981 dismissed the case for
lack of jurisdiction. That order of dismissal is assailed in this appeal by
Medina and Ong under Republic Act No. 5440.
In my opinion the dismissal of the civil action for damages is correct
because the claims of Medina and Ong were within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC, as originally provided in
article 217 of the Labor Code and as reaffirmed in Presidential Decree
No. 1691. Medina and Ong could not split their cause of action against
Aboitiz and Pepsi-Cola. (See Aguda vs. Judge Vallejos, G. R. No. 58133,
March 26, 1982; Ebon vs. Judge De Guzman, G. R. No. 58265, March
25, 1982; Cardinal Industries, Inc. vs. Vallejos, G. R. No. 57032, June
19, 1982; Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. vs. Martinez, G. R. No. 58877, March
15, 1982.
The decisions of the Regional Director and Deputy Minister Inciong are
res judicata as to the claims of Medina and Ong.
Petition granted.
Notes.Presidential Decree No. 1367 which took effect May 1, 1978
giving ordinary courts jurisdiction to award actual and moral damages
in case of illegal dismissal of employees gives retroactive effect to
cover a claim filed in court before said amendatory decree was passed.
(Garcia vs. Martinez, 90 SCRA 331.)
National Labor Relations Commission is without jurisdiction to hear
claims for moral damages under Presidential Decree No. 1367 which
amended Article 217 of the New Labor Code. (Bengson vs. Inciong, 91
SCRA 248.)
o0o [Medina vs. Castro-Bartolome, 116 SCRA 597(1982)]