G.R. No.

L-59825 September 11, 1982

ERNESTO MEDINA and JOSE G. ONG, petitioners,

vs.
HON. FLORELIANA CASTRO-BARTOLOME in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance
Cf Rizal, Branch XV, Makati, Metro Manila, COSME DE ABOITIZ and PEPSI-COLA BOTTLING COMPANY OF
THE PHILIPPINES, INC., respondents.

ABAD SANTOS, J.:

Civil Case No. 33150 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal Branch XV, was filed in May, 1979, by Ernesto Medina
and Jose G. Ong against Cosme de Aboitiz and Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. of the Philippines, Inc. Medina was the
former Plant General Manager and Ong was the former Plant Comptroller of the company. Among the averments in
the complaint are the following:

3. That on or about 1:00 o'clock in the afternoon of December 20, 1977, defendant Cosme de
Aboitiz, acting in his capacity as President and Chief Executive Officer of the defendant Pepsi-Cola
Bottling Company of the Philippines, Inc., went to the Pepsi-Cola Plant in Muntinlupa, Metro Manila,
and without any provocation, shouted and maliciously humiliated the plaintiffs with the use of the
following slanderous language and other words of similar import uttered in the presence of the
plaintiffs' subordinate employees, thus-

GOD DAMN IT. YOU FUCKED ME UP ... YOU SHUT UP! FUCK YOU! YOU ARE BOTH SHIT TO
ME! YOU ARE FIRED (referring to Ernesto Medina). YOU TOO ARE FIRED! '(referring to Jose Ong
)

4. That on January 9, 1978, the herein plaintiffs filed a joint criminal complaint for oral defamation
against the defendant Cosme de Aboitiz duly supported with respective affidavits and corroborated
by the affidavits of two (2) witnesses: Isagani Hernandez and Jose Ganseco II, but after conducting
a preliminary investigation, Hon. Jose B. Castillo, dismissed the complaint allegedly because the
expression "Fuck you and "You are both shit to me" were uttered not to slander but to express anger
and displeasure;

5. That on February 8, 1978, plaintiffs filed a Petition for Review with the office of the Secretary of
Justice (now Ministry of Justice) and on June 13, 1978, the Deputy Minister of Justice, Catalino
Macaraig, Jr., issued a resolution sustaining the plaintiff's complaint, reversing the resolution of the
Provincial Fiscal and directing him to file against defendant Cosme de Aboitiz an information for
Grave Slander. ... ;

6. That the employment records of plaintiffs show their track performance and impeccable
qualifications, not to mention their long years of service to the Company which undoubtedly caused
their promotion to the two highest positions in Muntinlupa Plant having about 700 employees under
them with Ernesto Medina as the Plant General Manager receiving a monthly salary of P6,600.00
excluding other perquisites accorded only to top executives and having under his direct supervision
other professionals like himself, including the plaintiff Jose G. Ong, who was the Plant Comptroller
with a basic monthly salary of P4,855.00;

7. That far from taking these matters into consideration, the defendant corporation, acting through its
President, Cosme de Aboitiz, dismissed and slandered the plaintiffs in the presence of their
subordinate employees although this could have been done in private;

8. That the defendants have evidently enjoyed the act of dismissing the plaintiffs and such dismissal
was planned to make it as humiliating as possible because instead of allowing a lesser official like
the Regional Vice President to take whatever action was necessary under the circumstances,
 Cosme de Aboitiz himself went to the Muntinlupa Plant in order to publicly upbraid and dismiss the
plaintiffs;

9. That the defendants dismissed the plaintiffs because of an alleged delay in the use of promotional
crowns when such delay was true with respect to the other Plants, which is therefore demonstrative
of the fact that Cosme de Aboitiz did not really have a strong reason for publicly humiliating the
plaintiffs by dismissing them on the spot;

10. That the defendants were moved by evil motives and an anti-social attitude in dismissing the
plaintiffs because the dismissal was effected on the very day that plaintiffs were awarded rings of
loyalty to the Company, five days before Christmas and on the day when the employees' Christmas
party was held in the Muntinlupa Plant, so that when plaintiffs went home that day and found their
wives and children already dressed up for the party, they didn't know what to do and so they cried
unashamedly;

xxx xxx xxx

20. That because of the anti-social manner by which the plaintiffs were dismissed from their
employment and the embarrassment and degradation they experience in the hands of the
defendants, the plaintiffs have suffered and will continue to suffer wounded feelings, sleepless
nights, mental torture, besmirched reputation and other similar injuries, for which the sum of
P150,000.00 for each plaintiff, or the total amount. of P300,000.00 should be awarded as moral
damages;

21. That the defendants have demonstrated their lack of concern for the rights and dignity of the
Filipino worker and their callous disregard of Philippine labor and social legislation, and to prevent
other persons from following the footsteps of defendants, the amount of P50,000.00 for each
plaintiff, or the total sum of P100,000.00, should be awarded as exemplary damages;

22. That plaintiffs likewise expect to spend no less than P5,000.00 as litigation expenses and were
constrained to secure the services of counsel for the protection and enforcement of their rights for
which they agreed to pay the sum of P10,000.00 and P200.00 per appearance as and for attorney's
fees.

The complaint contains the following:

PRAYER

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing. it is most respectfully that after proper notice and
hearing, judgment be rendered for the plaintiffs and against the defendants ordering them, jointly
and solidarily, to pay the plaintiffs the sums of:

1. Unrealized income in such sum as will be established during the trial;

2. P300,000.00 as moral damages;

3. P100,000.00 by way of exemplary damages:

4. P5,000.00 as litigation expenses;

5. P10,000.00 and P200.00 per appearance as and for attorney's fees; and

6. Costs of this suit.

Plaintiffs also pray for such further reliefs and remedies as may be in keeping with justice and equity.
 On June 4, 1979, a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction was filed by
the defendants. The trial court denied the motion on September 6, 1979, in an order which reads as
follows:

Up for resolution by the Court is the defendants' Motion to Dismiss dated June 4, 1979, which is
basically anchored on whether or not this Court has jurisdiction over the instant petition.

The complaint alleges that the plaintiffs' dismissal was without any provocation and that defendant
Aboitiz shouted and maliciously humiliated plaintiffs and used the words quoted in paragraph 3
thereof. The plaintiffs further allege that they were receiving salaries of P6,600.00 and P4,855.00 a
month. So the complaint for civil damages is clearly not based on an employer-employee
relationship but on the manner of plaintiffs' dismissal and the effects flowing therefrom. (Jovito N.
Quisaba vs, Sta. Ines-Melale Veneer & Plywood Co., Inc., et al., No. L-38088, Aug. 30,1974.)

This case was filed on May 10, 1979. The amendatory decree, P.D. 1367, which took effect on May
1, 1978 and which provides that Regional Directors shall not indorse and Labor Arbiters shall not
entertain claims for moral or other forms of damages, now expressly confers jurisdiction on the
courts in these cases, specifically under the plaintiff's causes of action.

Because of the letter dated January 4, 1978 and the statement of plaintiff Medina that his receipt of
the amount from defendant company was done "under strong protest," it cannot be said that the
demands set forth in the complaint have been paid, waived or other extinguished. In fact, in
defendants' Motion to Dismiss, it is stated that 'in the absence of a showing that there was fraud,
duress or violence attending said transactions, such Release and Quitclaim Deeds are valid and
binding contracts between them, which in effect admits that plaintiffs can prove fraud, violence,
duress or violence. Hence a cause of action for plaintiffs exist.

It is noticed that the defamatory remarks standing alone per se had been made the sole cause under
the first cause of action, but it is alleged in connection with the manner in which the plaintiffs had
been dismissed, and whether the statute of limitations would apply or not would be a matter of
evidence.

IT has been alreadly settled by jurisprudence that mere asking for reinstatement does not remove
from the CFI jurisdiction over the damages. The case must involve unfair labor practices to bring it
within the jurisdiction of the CIR (now NLRC).

WHEREFORE, the defendants' Motion to Dismiss dated June 4, 1979 is hereby denied.

The defendants are hereby directed to interpose their answer within ten (10) days from receipt
hereof.

While the trial was underway, the defendants filed a second motion to dismiss the complaint dated January 23,
1981, because of amendments to the Labor Code immediately prior thereto. Acting on the motion, the trial court
issued on May 23, 1981, the following order:

Up for resolution by the Court is the defendants' Motion to Dismiss dated January 23, 1981, on
grounds not existing when the first Motion to Dismiss dated June 4, 1979 was interposed. The
ground relied upon is the promulgation of P.D. No. 1691 amending Art. 217 of the Labor Code of the
Philippines and Batasan Pambansa Bldg. 70 which took effect on May 1, 1980, amending Art. 248 of
the Labor Code.

The Court agrees with defendants that the complaint alleges unfair labor practices which under Art.
217 of the Labor Code, as amended by P.D. 1691, has vested original and exclusive jurisdiction to
Labor Arbiters, and Art. 248, thereof ... "which may include claims for damages and other affirmative
reliefs." Under the amendment, therefore, jurisdiction over employee-employer relations and claims
of workers have been removed from the Courts of First Instance. If it is argued that this case did not
arise from employer-employee relation, but it cannot be denied that this case would not have arisen
 if the plaintiffs had not been employees of defendant Pepsi-Cola. Even the alleged defamatory
remarks made by defendant Cosme de Aboitiz were said to plaintiffs in the course of their
employment, and the latter were dismissed from such employment. Hence, the case arose from
such employer-employee relationship which under the new Presidential Decree 1691 are under the
exclusive, original jurisdiction of the labor arbiters. The ruling of this Court with respect to the
defendants' first motion to dismiss, therefore, no longer holds as the positive law has been
subsequently issued and being a curative law, can be applied retroactively (Garcia v. Martinez, et
al., L-47629, May 28, 1979; 90 SCRA 331-333).

It will also logically follow that plaintiffs can reinterpose the same complaint with the Ministry of
Labor.

WHEREFORE, let this case be, as it is hereby ordered, dismissed, without pronouncement as to
costs.

A motion to reconsider the above order was filed on July 7, 1981, but it was only on February 8, 1982, or after a
lapse of around seven (7) months when the motion was denied.

Plaintiffs have filed the instant petition pursuant to R. A. No. 5440 alleging that the respondent court committed the
following errors:

IN DIVESTING ITSELF OF ITS JURISDICTION TO HEAR AND DECIDE CIVIL CASE NO. 33150
DESPITE THE FACT THAT JURISDICTION HAD ALREADY ATTACHED WHICH WAS NOT
OUSTED BY THE SUBSEQUENT ENACTMENT OF PRESIDENTIAL DECREE 1691;

IN HOLDING THAT PRESIDENTIAL DECREE 1691 SHOULD BE GIVEN A RETROSPECTIVE

EFFECT WHEN PRESIDENTIAL DECREE 1367 WHICH WAS IN FORCE WHEN CIVIL CASE NO.
33150 WAS FILED AND TRIAL THEREOF HAD COMMENCED, WAS NEVER EXPRESSLY
REPEALED BY PRESIDENTIAL DECREE 1691, AND IF EVER THERE WAS AN IMPLIED
REPEAL, THE SAME IS NOT FAVORED UNDER PREVAILED JURISPRUDENCE;

IN HOLDING THAT WITH THE REMOVAL BY PRESIDENTIAL DECREE 1691 OF THE PROVISO
INSERTED IN ARTICLE 217 OF THE LABOR CODE BY PRESIDENTIAL DECREE 1367, THE
LABOR ARBITERS HAVE ACQUIRED JURISDICTION OVER CLAIMS FOR DAMAGES ARISING
FROM EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE RELATIONS TO THE EXCLUSION OF THE REGULAR COURTS,
WHEN A READING OF ARTICLE 217 WITHOUT THE PROVISO IN QUESTION READILY
REVEALS THAT JURISDICTION OVER DAMAGE CLAIMS IS STILL VESTED WITH THE
REGULAR COURTS;

IN DISMISSING FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION CIVIL CASE NO. 33150 THEREBY VIOLATING
THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE PETITIONERS NOTABLY THEIR RIGHT TO DUE
PROCESS.

The pivotal question to Our mind is whether or not the Labor Code has any relevance to the reliefs sought by the
plaintiffs. For if the Labor Code has no relevance, any discussion concerning the statutes amending it and whether
or not they have retroactive effect is unnecessary.

It is obvious from the complaint that the plaintiffs have not alleged any unfair labor practice. Theirs is a simple action
for damages for tortious acts allegedly committed by the defendants. Such being the case, the governing statute is
the Civil Code and not the Labor Code. It results that the orders under review are based on a wrong premise.

WHEREFORE, the petition is granted; the respondent judge is hereby ordered to reinstate Civil Case No. 33150
and render a decision on the merits. Costs against the private respondents.

SO ORDERED.

[SEPARATE OPINIONS NOT INCLUDED]