Republic v. Purisima
Republic v. Purisima
Republic v. Purisima
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-36084 August 31, 1977
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE AMANTE P. PURISIMA, the Presiding Judge of the court of first
Instance of Manila (Branch VII), and YELLOW BALL FREIGHT LINES, INC.,
respondents.
Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, Assistant Solicitor General Santiago M. Kapunan,
Solicitor Oscar C. Fernandez and Special Attorney Renato P. Mabugat for petitioner.
Jose Q. Calingo for private respondent.
acting as part of the machinery of the national government unless consent be shown, had
been applied in 53 other decisions. 3 There is thus more than sufficient basis for an
allegation of jurisdiction infirmity against the order of respondent Judge denying the motion
to dismiss dated October 4, 1972. 4 What is more, the position of the Republic has been
fortified with the explicit affirmation found in this provision of the present Constitution: "The
State may not be sued without its consent."
The merit of the petition for certiorari and prohibition is thus obvious.
1. There is pertinence to this excerpt from Switzerland General Insurance Co., Ltd. v.
Republic of the Philippines: 6 "The doctrine of non-suability recognized in this jurisdiction
even prior to the effectivity of the [1935] Constitution is a logical corollary of the positivist
concept of law which, to para-phrase Holmes, negates the assertion of any legal right as
against the state, in itself the source of the law on which such a right may be predicated.
Nor is this all.lwphl@it Even if such a principle does give rise to problems, considering the
vastly expanded role of government enabling it to engage in business pursuits to promote
the general welfare, it is not obeisance to the analytical school of thought alone that calls
for its continued applicability. Why it must continue to be so, even if the matter be viewed
sociologically, was set forth in Providence Washington Insurance Co. v. Republic thus:
"Nonetheless, a continued adherence to the doctrine of non-suability is not to be deplored
for as against the inconvenience that may be caused private parties, the loss of
governmental efficiency and the obstacle to the performance of its multifarious functions
are far greater if such a fundamental principle were abandoned and the availability of
judicial remedy were not thus restricted. With the well-known propensity on the part of our
people to go the court, at the least provocation, the loss of time and energy required to
defend against law suits, in the absence of such a basic principle that constitutes such an
effective obstacle, could very well be imagined." 7 It only remains to be added that under
the present Constitution which, as noted, expressly reaffirmed such a doctrine, the
following decisions had been rendered: Del mar v. The Philippine veterans Administration; 8
Republic v. Villasor; 9 Sayson v. Singson; 10 and Director of the Bureau of Printing v.
Francisco. 11
2. Equally so, the next paragraph in the above opinion from the Switzerland General
Insurance Company decision is likewise relevant: "Nor is injustice thereby cause private
parties. They could still proceed to seek collection of their money claims by pursuing the
statutory remedy of having the Auditor General pass upon them subject to appeal to judicial
tribunals for final adjudication. We could thus correctly conclude as we did in the cited
Provindence Washington Insurance decision: "Thus the doctrine of non-suability of the
government without its consent, as it has operated in practice, hardly lends itself to the
charge that it could be the fruitful parent of injustice, considering the vast and everwidening scope of state activities at present being undertaken. Whatever difficulties for
private claimants may still exist, is, from an objective appraisal of all factors, minimal. In the
balancing of interests, so unavoidable in the determination of what principles must prevail if
government is to satisfy the public weal, the verdict must be, as it has been these so many
years, for its continuing recognition as a fundamental postulate of constitutional law."
12
3. Apparently respondent Judge was misled by the terms of the contract between the
private respondent, plaintiff in his sala, and defendant Rice and Corn Administration which,
according to him, anticipated the case of a breach of contract within the parties and the
suits that may thereafter arise. 13 The consent, to be effective though, must come from the
State acting through a duly enacted statute as pointed out by Justice Bengzon in Mobil.
Thus, whatever counsel for defendant Rice and Corn Administration agreed to had no
binding force on the government. That was clearly beyond the scope of his authority. At any
rate, Justice Sanchez, in Ramos v. Court of Industrial Relations, 14 was quite categorical as
to its "not [being] possessed of a separate and distinct corporate existence. On the
contrary, by the law of its creation, it is an office directly 'under the Office of the President of
the Philippines." 15
WHEREFORE, the petitioner for certiorari is granted and the resolution of October 4, 1972
denying the motion to dismiss filed by the Rice and Corn Administration nullified and set
aside and the petitioner for prohibition is likewise granted restraining respondent Judge
from acting on civil Case No. 79082 pending in his sala except for the purpose of ordering
its dismissal for lack of jurisdiction. The temporary restraining order issued on February 8,
1973 by this Court is made permanent terminating this case. Costs against Yellow Ball
Freight Lines, Inc.
Antonio, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr. and Santos, JJ., concur.
Barredo, J., took no part.
Footnotes
1 Petitioner, Annex H.
2 L-23139, December 17 1966, 18 SCRA 1120.
3 Insurance Company of North America v. Republic, L-24520, July 11, 1967,
20 SCRA 648, was the first case citing Mobil with approval. The last opinion
came from the pen of Chief Justice Concepcion deciding therein the appeals
in Union Insurance Society of Canton, Ltd. v. Republic, L-26409, 46 SCRA
120; Domestic Insurance Company of the Philippines v. Republic, L-26550,
46 SCRA 121; Insurance Company of North America v. Republic, L-26587, 46
SCRA 121; British Traders Insurance Co., Ltd. v. Barber Line, Macondray and
Co., Inc., L-31157, 46 SCRA 121, the decisions being promulgated on July
31, 1972.
4 Ibid, Annex J.
5 Article XV, Section 16.
6 L-27389, March 30, 1970, 32 SCRA 227.
8 L-27299, June 27, 1973, 51 SCRA 340.
9 L-30671, November 28, 1973, 54 SCRA 83.